ML13308A774

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2013 DAEC Initial License Examination Modifications Since 75-Day Submittal
ML13308A774
Person / Time
Site: Duane Arnold NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 04/08/2013
From:
NRC/RGN-III
To:
Duane Arnold
Randal Baker
Shared Package
ML13151A419 List:
References
50-331/13-301
Download: ML13308A774 (3)


Text

Modifications Since 75 Day Submittal Operating Exam (Outlines updated to reflect changes):

1. Scenario 1
a. Remove RO from Event 6
b. Do not credit BOP for instrument failure Event 3
c. Revised event descriptions and changed malfunction/remote/override descriptions as appropriate based upon current simulator modeling and development.
2. Scenario 2
a. Split up event 5 into 5a. and 5b. (Loss of Recirc, Loss of Bus)
b. Only credit RO with event 6.
c. Revised event descriptions and changed malfunction/remote/override descriptions as appropriate based upon current simulator modeling and development.
3. Scenario 3
a. Do not credit BOP for Event 2
b. Break up event 5 into 5a. and 5b. (One for RO actions, the other for BOP)
c. Revised event descriptions and changed malfunction/remote/override descriptions as appropriate based upon current simulator modeling and development.
4. SRO Admin JPM RC01 Changed the number of operator dose reviews from 5 to 3 due to time required to implement the JPM and redundancy of the task. All aspects of the task are still evaluated.
5. Simulator JPM S-3
a. Changed the procedure to be utilized from the system Operating Instruction to the Quick Response Checklist (QRC). The QRC is more appropriate given the initial conditions. All aspects of the task remain the same.
6. In-Plant JPM P-2
a. Changed the initial conditions slightly so that the procedure to be utilized is the system Operating Instruction vice the control room Alarm Response Procedure (ARP). Utilizing the ARP would require the evaluator to role play as a control room operator and direct the in-plant operator step by step as would be expected during control room ARP execution.

The task essentially remains the same. Utilizing the Operating Procedure provides a better evaluation since the candidate is now required to interpret the procedure.

Written Exam (Outlines updated to reflect changes):

1. Question 81, 295018 Partial or Total Loss of CCW / 8, 2.1.32 - Conduct of Operations: Ability to explain and apply system limits and precautions. Could NOT write a valid SRO level question on this K/A. Randomly replaced with 295003, Partial or Complete Loss of AC / 6, 2.4.4, Emergency Procedures / Plan: Ability to recognize abnormal indications for system operating parameters that are entry-level conditions for emergency and abnormal operating procedures.
2. Question 88, 239002 Safety relief Valves / 2.40 -Emergency Procedures / Plan: Knowledge of operational implications of EOP warnings, cautions, and notes.

There is only one Note or Caution in the EOPs associated with the SRVs. That Note addresses SRV operation with a low Torus Water Level. That knowledge is RO level knowledge. Could NOT write a valid SRO level question using this K/A. Randomly selected K/A 2.4.18 Knowledge of the specific bases for EOPs.

3. Question 28, 272000 Radiation Monitoring / K2.01 - Knowledge of electrical power supplies to the following: Main steamline radiation monitors.

There is an oversampling issue on radiation monitoring questions. Questions 56, 63, 70 and 81 all have K/As associated with off-site release. There may be more, if all the questions covering radiation monitoring are included; 28, 53, 56, 64, 70, 74, 87, 97, and 100. Randomly selected 202001 / K2.03, Knowledge of electrical power supplies to the following: Recirculation system valves

4. Question 79, 295031 Reactor Low Water Level / 2.2.39 - Equipment Control: Knowledge of less than or equal to one hour technical specification action statements for systems.

Could not write a discriminating SRO level question for this K/A given that one hour Tech Specs are generally considered RO level knowledge. Randomly selected generic K/A, 2.2.12, Knowledge of surveillance procedures,

5. Question 87, 223002, A2.04 - Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM/NUCLEAR STEAM SUPPLY SHUT-OFF; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations: Process radiation monitoring system failures.

This question presented a double jeopardy situation for the SRO when compared to question number 64. Both questions involved impacts of process radiation monitoring instrumentation on the PCIS. Randomly selected K/A 223002, A2.03, Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM/NUCLEAR STEAM SUPPLY SHUT-OFF; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations: System Logic Failures

6. Question 32, 216000, K6.02 - Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the NUCLEAR BOILER INSTRUMENTATION: D.C. electrical distribution.

This K/A resulted in an over sampling of topics regarding DC or loss of DC (see questions 4, 11, 12, 44). Randomly selected K/A 216000, K6.03, Knowledge of the effect that a loss or

malfunction of the following will have on the NUCLEAR BOILER INSTRUMENTATION:

Temperature Compensation

7. Question 86, 215005, A2.10 - Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the AVERAGE POWER RANGE MONITOR/LOCAL POWER RANGE MONITOR SYSTEM; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions Changes in void concentration Could not develop an operationally valid SRO question for this K/A. The only operationally valid question associated with changes in void concentration that affect the APRMs and also require a procedure response would be based on a thermal hydraulic instability event. The response to such an event is RO level knowledge in that the response is an immediate action of the DAEC abnormal procedures. Randomly selected K/A 215005, A2.08, Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the AVERAGE POWER RANGE MONITOR/LOCAL POWER RANGE MONITOR SYSTEM; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions: Faulty or erratic operation of detectors/systems