ML18283B543

Emergency Core Cooling Systems, Low Pressure Coolant Injection Modifications for Performance Improvement

ML18283B543
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry
Issue date:	05/31/1977
From:	Tennessee Valley Authority
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
Download: ML18283B543 (71)

Text

BROGANS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS LOW PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION MODIFICATIONS FOR PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT Ms@1977 TABLE OF CONTENTS Pacae 1 0~INTRODUCTION

..~.....2 2'BACKGROUND

.-~~~~--3 3.4.2 3.4.3 3.4.4 3.4.5 3o 0 DISCUSSION o o o~a o o s~~o e o o 3.1 Accident Descri tion 3.2 Modification 3.2.1 Suction Line Break.3.2.2 Dischar e Line Break.3.3 Model A lication 3.4 Safet Anal sis 3.4.1 E ui ment Ca abilit to Perform as Anal zed ui ment Interfaces Functional Interface Satisfaction of A ro riate.Standards ualit Assurance and Control 4 5 5 8 9 10 10 14 17 18 18 4 0

SUMMARY

AND CONCLUSIONS

.19

5.0 REFERENCES

....~........20 LIST OF TABLES Table Title ECCS Pump Configuration Local Peak Cladding Temperatures and Reflood Times Following a LOCA and Horst Single Failure LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Ficiure System Normal Operation Title 10 12 13 System Mode of Operation During Unit 1 LOCA (Suction Line Break)-No Failures System Mode of Operation During Unit 1 LOCA (Suction Line Break)-LPCI Injection Valve Failure System Mode of Operation During Unit 1 LOCA (Suction Line Break)-Diesel Failure System Mode of Operation During Unit 1 LOCA (Suction Line Break)-Battery Failure System Mode of Operation During Unit 1 LOCA (Suction Line Break)-Opposite Unit Spurious Accident Signal System Mode of Operation During Unit, 1 LOCA (Discharge Line Break)-No Failure System Mode of Operation During Uni)1 LOCA (Discharge Line Break)-LPCI Injec)ion Valve Failure System Mode of Operation During Unit 1 LOCA (Discharge Line Break)-Diesel Failure System Mode of Operation During Unit 1 LOCA (Discharge Line Break)-Battery Failure Syst: em Mode of Operation During Unit 1 LOCA (Discharge Line Break)-Opposite Unit Spurious Accident Signal Existing System Valve Bus Arrangement Modified System Valve Bus Arrangement, 15 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 System Valve Control Power Arrangement System RHR Pump Divisional Priorities Modified Unit 1 Recirculation Discharge Valve Circuit with Hydraulic-Pneumatic Operator (Without Backup Control)Modified Unit 1 Recirculation Discharge Valve Circuit with Hydraulic-Pneumatic Operator (With Backup Control)Modified Unit 1 LPCI Injection Valve Circuit With Hydraulic-Pneumatic Operator (Without Backup Control)Modified Unit 1 LPCI Injection Valve Circuit With Hydraulic-Pneumatic Operator (With Backup Control)Modified Unit 1 LPCI Minimum Flow Valve Circuit With Hydraulic-Pneumatic Operator (Without Backup Control)Modified Unit 1 LPCI.Minimum Flow Valve Circuit With Hydraulic-Pneumatic Operator (With Backup Control)Modified Unit 2 Recirculation Discharge Valve Circuit With Hydraulic-Pneumatic Operator (Without Backup Control)Modified Unit 2 Recirculation Discharge Valve Circuit with Hydraulic-Pneumatic Operator (With Backup Control)Modified Unit 2 LPCI Injection Valve Circuit With Hydraulic-Pneumatic Operator (>without Backup Control)Modified Unit 2 LPCI Injection Valve Circuit With Hydraulic-Pneumatic Operator (With Backup Control)Modified Unit 2 LPCI Minimum Flow Valve Circuit With Hydraulic-Pneumatic Operator (Without Backup Control)Modified Unit 2 LPCI Minimum Flow Valve Circuit With Hydraulic-Pneumatic Operator (With Backup Control)Typical Schematic for Hydraulic-Pneumatic Operator 1 0 INTRODUCTION Browns Ferry Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)design and performance for Units 1 and 2 have been the subject of a recent review.This review led to a change in the system, which provided a significant reduction in the peak cladding temperature following a postulated recirculation line break.This reduction in peak cladding temperature has been accomplished by elimination of the Low Pressure Coolant In jection (LPCI)System recirculation loop selection and keeping the Residual Heat Removal (RHR)cross-tie valve closed.A report on this previous modification was submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in a letter from J.E.Gilleland to Benard C.Rusche dated Fabruary 12, 1976.Portions of that previous report are presented here to give a coherent description and safety analysis.The proposed additional modification changes the power supply to the recirculation pump discharge valves, LPCI injection valves, and LPCI minimum flow valves.The change adds sufficient independent power supplies to eliminate the peed for the existing swing-bus feature.Major areas of discussion in this report include the proposed independent power supplies and a detailed safety analysis of the modification.

2.0 BACKGROUND

With the advent'of the Interim Acceptance Criteria, it became advisable to consider the simultaneous occurrence of spraying and flooding to meet the stringent new temperature limit of 2300 F.The thermal-hydraulic models were refined to permit an accurate calculation of coolant remaining in the vessel following the blowdown, and of spray coolant reaching the lower plenum after the boiloff which takes place as it passes through the active fuel region.These refinements permitted an accurate calculation of the flooding rate due to spray operation, and even with the new requirement of an active component failure anywhere in the ECCS, no jet pump BWR failed to meet the Interim Acceptance Criteria.ECCS modifications which might have been suggested by the new evaluation models were therefore unnecessary.

The final ECCS acceptance criteria adopted by the AEC are more conservative than the interim acceptance criteria.These new criteria reduce operating flexibility and could result in power level restrictions.

To offset the effect of the new criteria, a modification has been added to Units 1 and 2 which takes advantage of the credit given for the flooding effect achieved through the availability of additional LPCI pumps under certain single-failure conditions.

TVA commited to modify the power supply to the recirculation pump discharge valves, LPCI injection valves, and LPCI minimum flow valves to eliminate the need for the existing swing-bus feature before return to power operation following the second refueling outage of the respective units.

3-'DISCUSSION, 3.1 Accident Descri tion The Design Basis Accident (DBA), Loss-of-Coolant Accident (LOCA), is one of several hypothesized events used to evaluate the ability of the plant to operate without undue hazard'to the health and safety of the public.The overall initial assumptions remain as described in Section 14.6.3.1 of the FSAR: The reactor is operating at the most severe condition at the time of the LOCA, which maximizes the parameter of interest: primary containment response, fission product release, or core standby cooling system requirements.

A complete loss of normal AC power occurs simultaneously with the LOCA.This additional condition results in the longest delay time for the core standby cooling systems to become operational.

The LOCA assumes that a recirculation loop pipeline is instantly severed.This results in the most rapid coolant loss and depressurization with coolant discharged from both ends of the break.

Ig

.3.2 Modification Modification of the system requires the following hardware and wiring changes on Units 1 and 2: The auto-transfer feature of valve motive power is eliminated on RHR injection, recirculation pump discharge, and RHR pump minimum flow bypass valves.Motive power to these selected valves is provided by hydraulic-pneumatic operators.

Redundant power supplies to these actuators are provided for positioning the valves to the required LOCA configuration; 3.2.1 Suction Line Break Figure 2 illustrates operation of the modified system for a break in the recirculation pump suction line.The break location producing the highest peak cladding temperature is, as before, at the nozzle on the pressure vessel.The other side of the postulated

<<double-ended<<

break is fed through the recirculation loop by the jet pump nozzles, whose small area limits flow to a low value and makes frictional losses negligible in the calculation.

The discharge valves of the recirculation loops will begin closing upon receipt of a permissive signal.The valves are capable of closing against a differential pressure of 200 psid.To assure the recirculation system discharge valve is not required to close with a differential pressure greater than 200 psid, valve closures are delayed until reactor vessel pressure 4 has decreased to less than 225 psig.By the time the recirculation discharge valve has stroked sufficiently that it could present a flow-limiting restriction, the vessel pressure will have decayed below 200 psig.Valve closure is therefore effected in about 62 seconds, of which 29 seconds represents the reactor vessel.pressure permissive and 33 seconds the maximum valve closure time.The effect is isolation of the break from the LPCI system injection point.Approximately 46 seconds a f ter the br eak, the LPCI startup sequence is complete and flow commences in both loops.Flow into P the broken loop will not reach its expected value for an additional 16 seconds, when the recirculation discharge valve has fully closed.The LPCI pumps go nearly to full runout flow, as limited by the additional resistance in the pump discharge line, , because each pair of pumps is delivering flow to its own bank of jet pump nozzles rather than to one bank as would be the case of loop selection logic.Additional resistance has been added to the LPCI pump discharge lines.This replaces the resistance lost when only one or two pumps are discharging into a system designed.for three pump flow.The added resistance prevents insufficient Net Positive Suction Head (NPSH)in these modes of operation.

In analyzing the single failures for a suction line break, both AC and DC power failures are considered (see Figures 4 and 5).For AC power considerations the most significant single failure for the modified system is a Diesel Generator failure.This failure results in two LPCI pumps operating in one loop, one LPCI pump operating in the alternate loop, and two CS pumps operating in one CS system.The most significant DC power single failure would be loss of a battery.For a suction line break this failure results in two LPCI pumps operating in one loop, one LPCI pump operating in the alternate loop, and two CS pumps operating in one CS system.Table 1 shows the various pump combinations for postulated single f ailures.The unique power arrangement at Browns Ferry Units 1 and 2 requires examination of an opposite unit spurious accident signal.For this event one RHR pump in each loop of each reactor and one core spray system (two pumps)plus all required valves are available.(Figure 6)The limiting single failure is that failure which results in the longest reflood time and consequently the highest peak cladding temperature (PCT).Sensitivity studies have been performed which demonstrate that a typical limiting failure in the modified system is the failure of the LPCI injection yalve in the unbroken loop.,This failure results in four core spray pumps, two in each CS loop, and two LPCI pumps in one loop providi'ng ECCS flow to A the core.This combination gives a longer ref looding time than one core spray system (two pumps)and one LPCI pump in each loop which is available following an opposite unit spurious accident signal.This is due in part to the effects of counter current flow limiting (CCFL)on the amount of the core spray flow available for ref looding.The assumed occurrence of CCFL results in there being, only a slight improvement with four CS pumps when compared to two CS pumps.Additionally, the two LPCI pumps feeding into one loop deliver significantly less than twice the flow delivered by a single pump feeding each loop due to the system orificing effects.Thus.the availability of one LPCI pump in each loop for the alternate unit spurious accident signal provides better reflood characteristics than two LPCI pumps into one loop even when supplemented by two additional CS pumps.3.2.2 Di'schar e Line Break Figure 7 illustrates the operation of the modified system with a break in the recirculation pump discharge line.When the LPCI startup sequence is complete, the LPCI flow in the broken loop is lost through the break.With the modification, the worst-case single failures are failure during opening of the LPCI injection valve opposite the break and failure during opening of the LPCI minimum flow bypass valve serving the RHR pumps intended for injection i'nto the unbroken loop.Table 1 and Figures 8-11 show the pump combination which results from the postulated single failures.The suction line break remains the design basis accident for the modified system, but with a lower calculated peak cladding temperature.

A typical limiting single failure for the discharge line break is the LPCI injection valve failure.This failure results in four core spray pumps available for core reflooding.

This condition results in a longer reflood time than the opposite unit spurious accident signal in which two core spray and one LPCI pumps are available for reflooding.

As previously discussed one LPCI pump provides faster reflooding and, consequently lower PCT than two additional CS pumps.Representative relative peak cladding temperature for the two events described above is shown in Table 2.The present Browns Ferry Units 1 and 2 system utilizes two power supplies for the electrical distribution system providing power to the LPCI valves.Figure 12 shows the arrangement of the buses and the valves fed from these buses.Figure 13 shows the modified system which eliminates the auto-transfer feature for the electrical distribution system.Electrical interlocks will be maintained to prevent manual paralleling of the two AC sources.The AC power only supplies power for the non-essential hydraulic pumps on the valve operators.

Figures 16 through 27 show the valve operator redundant DC power supplies to provide the motive power to produce the stored pneumatic energy.3.3 Model A lication The core heatup calculations are performed using the approved Appendix K emergency core cooling evaluation models.

3.4 Safet Anal sis The proposed modification has been analyzed and evaluated to assure the changes do not introduce adverse effects to the overall plant.The areas evaluated are discussed in the balance of this section.3.4.1 E ui ment Ca abilit to Perform as Anal zed The major components of the proposed modification are unchanged, except for the valve operators and the power supplies for selected valves.Each major element is considere'd below: 3.4.1.1 Emer enc Diesel-Generators The proposed modification does not change any of the operating requirements of the diesel generators.

The operating modes of the LPCI pumps were changed by the previous modification such that two'umps discharge to each injection header thereby changing the discharge flow characteristics from that previously established.

Prior to reactor startup after the previous modification, flow tests were conducted to establish the pump discharge path characteristics from which pump flow curves were developed.

This information was used to determine the additional resistance to be added on the discharge side of each pump to ensure satisfaction of pump Net Positive Suction Head (NPSH)requirements.

3.4.1.3 Control Circuitr All standards for engineered safeguards control equipment are maintained.

Additional relays and wiring have been added to assure single-failure capability.

3.4.1.4 Recirculation Loo E ualizer Valve and LPCI S stem Cross-Tie.

Valve Inadvertent opening of these valves could negate the LPCI system injection when needed, therefore one equalizer valve and the cross-tie valve were closed and motive power removed by the previous modification.

An annunciator was added to indicate the LPCI cross-tie valve and/or equalizer valve are not fully closed.3.4.1.5 Recirculation Pum Dischai e Valves Closure of the recirculation pump discharge valves is of importance to the proper application of the proposed modification.

Hydraulic-pneumatic operators will be added to these valves.Four aspects of valve compatibility have been investigated:

3.4.1.5.1 Environment As reported in Section 5.2 of the Browns Ferry FSAR, the recirculation system valves are designed to operate under the environmental conditions associated with the DBA-LOCA.The added hydraulic-pneumatic operators are designed to operate under the same conditions.

3.4.1.5.2 Break Effects A study of the drywell geometry was performed prior to the previous modification to determine the effects of jet impingement resulting from a postulated recirculation line break.For the suction line break, re-routing of cable has been provided, to prevent discharge valve operator malfunction.

Valve closure at the time of a discharge line break is not considered in the ECCS analysis.Also, closure of the discharge valve does not change the LPCI system input capability during a discharge line break (See Figure 7).For the break effects study, breaks were assumed at all terminals, branch lines, and at other locations based upon stress.Breaks were assumed at all locations where pressure plus dead load plus thermal plus earthquake stresses exceed 0.8(1.2S>+S~)

.Additionally, in piping runs where no stresses occur in excess of 0.8(1.2S>+S>), a minimum of two intermediate breaks were postulated based upon the highest total stresses combined as above.

3.4.1.5.3 Valve Dif ferential Pressure Recirculation valve closure requires both a LOCA initiation signal and a decrease in reactor pressure to the permissive setting.With valve closure initiation delayed until reactor pressure has decayed to less than 225 psig (approximately 29 seconds)the differential pressure across the closed valve will always be less than the maximum 200 psid.The sensor and permissive circuitry are designed to satisfy all requirements for engineered safeguards control systems.3.4.1.6 Minimum Flow B ass Valve Minimum flow bypass valves will be provided with hydraulic-pneumatic operators with redundant DC power supplies and flow switches to assure maximum pump protection under postulated accident conditions.

This modification eliminates the need for the auto-transfer of power to these valves.AC power will only supply the nonessential hydraulic pump to the operators of these valves.3.4.1.7 Batteries DC power from qualified station batteries will be the primary and redundant power sources to the hydraulic-pneumatic operator.Each source is selected such that no single battery failure inhibits redundant power sources or results in a configuration of ECCS pump availability that is less than adequate for core cooling.

3.4.1.8 H draulic 0 erators See Figure 28.Alarms will be provided in the main control room for non-standard accumulator parameters.

Accumulator pressure indication will also be provided for operator verification and interpretation.

3.4.1.8.1 Seismic uglification The operability of the hydraulic-pneumatic valve operators and all the appurtenances vital to their operation during and after a SSE is verified in accordance with IEEE 382 and 384 as applicable to the plant.If the installation of the hydraulic-pneumatic valve operators produce increased loading condition, the LPCI system and recirculation water system shall be requalified to the standards and codes which were applied to the original unmodified system.3.4.2 ui ment Interfaces The effects'of the proposed change on the various operating modes of the equipment have been'evaluated and found to be acceptable, as described below: 3.4.2.1 Emer enc Diesel-Generators The proposed modification introduces no new or different interfaces for this equipment.

3.4.2.2 Motor Control Centers and Control Panels l I Motor control centers will be modified on those valves necessary for automatic operation for LPCI injection (LPCI injection, recirculation pump discharge, and RHR pump minimum flow bypass valves)in order to accomodate the addition of hydraulic-pneumatic operators.

A control panel will be added for backup control to the hydraulic-pneumatic operators.

All standards for engineering safeguards control will be maintained.

3.4.2.2.1 Valve Power Existing Limitorque valve operators will be replaced by hydraulic-pneumatic operators on valves necessary for automatic operation for LPCI injection.

This modification allows elimination of the valve motive power auto-transfer feature for redundant power supplies.Physically and electrically separate, redundant DC power supplies are provided to the new operator to assure proper valve movement to the required position during a LOCA.Valve motion times are maintained in order for previous analyses to remain applicable.

3.4.2.2.2 Valve Motor Control To ensure that a malfunction in the individual valve controller does not couple back to the other valve control circuits, the redundant A and B circuits were provided separate relays and contacts in the logic panels on a previous modification.

This separated, redundant arrangement has been applied to the LPCI and 4 recirculation system valves needed for operation as described.

System interfacing and protection as related to the valve motor control centers are unchanged except as noted in 3.4.2.2.3.4.2.2.3 DC Control Power As shown in Figure 14 and Browns Ferry FSAR Figure 8.6-3, 250 VDC from the station batteries provides control power to LPCI logic panels.After the proposed modification the same equipment receives power from this source as in the original design.These station batteries are also the power source for hydraulic-pneumatic operators.

Failure of any one station battery does not cause interactions that exceed the limiting case-for core cooling capabilities.

See also 3.4.1.7.3.4.2.3 LPCI Lo ic Panels To provide the necessary redundancy required on the previous modification, changes were made to the LPCI logic panels.To preclude valve-to-valve interface, redundant and separate relays and contacts were provided for each LPCI and recirculation system.Each of the added redundant relays was provided full separation from all others by enclosure in a metal box.The wiring from redundant contacts between the two logic panels was provided separation by enclosure in flex conduit and termination'n metal junction boxes.This logic scheme will be maintained in the new modification.

The only changes to be made to the LPCI logic panels on this modification will be to add redundant flow information to the minimum flow bypass valves.Since redundant flow switches will be added to each LPCI system, and each circuit can be kept separate to the new operators, no new interfacing will be necessary in the logic panels.3.4.2.4 H draulic/Pneumatic 0 erators Physical and electrical separations are maintained on the operators to assure redundant features.3.4.3 Functional Interface The RHR system, as discussed in this report, performs as a short-term post-LOCA core cooling function.The system also provides a long-term containment cooling function which is described in Sections 4.8.6.2 and 14.6.3.3.2 of the FSAR.The effects of the proposed change to the core cooling function on the containment cooling function were evaluated and found to be acceptable after modification as described below.In analyzing single failures which might influence long-term suppression pool cooling, both AC and DC control and emergency power failures as well as component failures in the RHR and RHRSW I (cooling water)systems were considered.

The worst case single failure (Reactor MOV Board loss)with the modified system still leaves two RHR heat exchangers, two RHR pumps, and two RHR Service Water pumps and associated valving available for suppression pool cooling.The suppression pool temperature versus time response for this combination of equipment is shown by curve C in FSAR Figure 14.6-12.

i 3.4.4 Satis faction of A ro riate Standards The proposed modification directly affects as.Engineered Safeguards System and has been designed to Class I system standards.

The standards and guides which were applicable to the original design have been reviewed to assure the modified system design, equipment, and installation meet or exceed the qualifications of the unmodified system.3.4.5 ualit Assurance and Control Quality assurance and control will be applied to this modification as detailed in Appendix D of the Browns Ferry FSAR.A'ppendix D incorporates the requirement of 10CFR50, Appendix B.

4 0

SUMMARY

AND CONCLUSXONS The proposed modification involves some physical'changes to the plant to permit elimination of the swing-bus concept and adoption of the total system availability of the new design.The analytical methods used reflect the most recent , determinations of NRC staff and reactor suppliers for modeling the performance of Emergency Core Cooling Systems.The application of the proposed modification adds to the overall capability of the plant to continue operation in a manner that ensures the health and safety of the public while providing ben'efit in the production of electrical energy.>>18-5 0 REFERENCES

.1.Interim Policy Statement, USAEC, dated June 19, 1971;

Subject:

AEC Adopted Interim Acceptance Criteria for Performance, of ECCS for'Light-Water Power Reactors.2.NEDE-20973, Supplement 1.3.Letter from J.E-Gilleland (TVA)to Benard C.Rusche (NRC)dated February=12, 1976.

TABLE 1 ECC S PUMP CONFIGURATION Suction Side Break Pum s Available++

No Failures Opposite Unit Spurious Accident Signal LPCI Injection Valve Failure+LPCI Minimum Valve Failure+Recirculation Discharge Valve Failure-Break Side~Diesel Failure Battery.Failure~4 Core Spray, 2 LPCI in one Loop 4 Core Spray, 2 4 Core Spray, 2 LPCI in one Loop LPCI in one Loop 2 Core Spray, 2 LPCI in one Loop, 1 LPCI in other Loop 2 Core Spray, 2 LPCI in one Loop, 1 LPCI in other.Loop 4 Core Spray, 2 LPCI in each Loop 2 Core Spray, 1 LPCI in each Loop Dischar e Side Break No Failures LPCI Injection Valve Failure+Pum s Available~*

4 Core Spray, 2 LPCI in one Loop 4 Core Spray~LPCI Minimum Flow Valve Failure+4 Core Spray Diesel Failure Battery Failure ,Opposite Unit Spurious Accident Signal 2 Core Spray, 1 LPCI 2 Core Spray, 1 LPCI 2 Core Spray, 1 LPCI+Limiting Sing3.e Failure~>In Unbroken Loop TABLE 2 LOCAL PEAK CLADDING TEMPERATURES AND REFLOOD TIMES FOLLOWING A LOCA AND WORST SINGLE FAILURESuction Line Break Discharge Line Break Peak Cladding Tem erature~F 2200 2022 Flooding Time seconds 108 126 DIG A 0 IV I 0/G 8 0/G C DIV II 1A 1A 2A 2A f+~%1 1C 1C 2C 2C 18 18 28 28 ID 1D 2D 20 CROSSTIE CROSSTIE LPCI A LPCI 8 LPCI A LPCI 8 DISCH SUCTION 0ISCH RECIRC 8 RECIRC A NOT RUNNING RECIRC 8 RECIRC A Figure 1 System Normal Operation 0/G A 0 IV I D/G 8 D/G C 0 IV II D/G 0 I~-0-4-0--q 1A IAi 2Ai 2A I L C 1C 1CI 2CI 2C L C~-e-4-e--1B~1B 2B 2B~L C C.';.!,::L~.: I 10 10 20 2D'C.C$'ROSSTIE CROSSTIE LPCI A LPCI B LPCI A LPCI B BREAK DISCH SUCTION DISCH DISABLED OR NOT RUNNING RECIRC 8 RECIRC 4 RECIRC B RECIRC A Figure System Mode of Operation During Unit 1 LOCA (Suction Line Break),-No Failures 0/G A DIV I D/G 8 D/G C.0 IV II 0/G D IA IA 2A 2A 1C IC 2C 2C L C':"',:C~g;:2g

"~: L C::bg:;"::,'.,L$

18 18 28 28 I 10 1D 20 2D C

.C,;: CROSSTIE CRDSSTIE LPCI A LPCI 8 LPCI'A LPCI 8 BREAK OISCH SUCTION OISCH RECIRC 8 RECIRC A DISABLED OR NDT RUNNING RECIRC 8 RECIRC A Figure 3 System Mode of Operation During Unit 1 LOCA (Suction Line Break j-LPCI Injection Va/ve Failure 0/G A DIV I 0/G 8 D/G C OIV II D/G D 1A IA 2A 2A.sr.'::::,,"4';.-:.:::.

I~~%1 1C 1C 2C 2C.I" 18 18 28 28 C,,:Ci.:.:

10 1D 2D 20 L C"CP.4'.1-~g"5::j': CROSSTIE CROSSTIE LPCI A LPCI 8 LPCI A LPCI 8 BREAK OISCH SUCTION OISCH RECIRC 8 RECIRC A DISABLED OR NOT RUNNING RECIRC 8 RECIRC A Figure 4 System Mode of Operation During Uni t 7 LOCA (Suction Line Break/-Diesel Failure DIG A 0 IV I DIG 8 0/G C DIV II DIG 0 1A 1A 2A"2A 1C IC 2C 2C 18 18 28 28 I~I 10.10 2D 20 L C+'Cn:.4K%CROSSTIE CROSSTIE LPCI A LPCI 8 LPCI A LPCI 8 BREAK DISCH SUCTION DISCH RECIRC 8 RECIRC A 0 ISAB LED 0 R NOT RUNNING RECIRC 8 RECIRC A Figure 5 System Mode of Operarion During Unit 1 LOCA (Suction Line Break/-Battery Faiiure D/G A OIV I 0/G B OIG C OIV II D/G D I 0--q IA IAi 2Ai 2A I s p'y.c (c:.:-::::>I.',;.

f~+1 1C IC I 2C I 2C'.",L','1 C';.C,~L.I~-e~-o--IB~18~2BI 2B~:.-;:C:1 C I l I 1D ID 2O 2O:.'"C" C L CROSSTIE CROSSTIE LPCI A LPCI B LPCI A LPCI B BREAK 0 ISCH SUCTION DISCH RECIRC 8 RECIRC A DISABLED OR NOT RUNNING RECIRC B RECIRC A Figure 6 system Mode of Operation During Unit 1 LOCA (Suction Line Breaki-Opposite Unit Spurious Accident Signal 0/G A.DIV I D/G 8 D/G C DIV I I D/G 0 1A 1A 2A 2A 1C 1C 2C 2C C g5g A'g rr 18 18 28 28 I C 1D ID 2D 2D L C CROSSTIE CROSSTIE LPCI A LPCI 8 LPCI A LPCI 8 DISCH SUCTION DISCH RECIRC 8 RECIRC A;.ge..:;.DISABLED, NOT RUNNING'Sj+c,'R NOT CONSIDERED IN ANALYSIS zjz~p;: RECIRC 8 RECIRC A Figure System Mode of Operation During Unit 1 LOCA (Discharge Line BreakJ.-No Faf/urea D/G A DIV I 0/G 8 0/G C DIV II 0/G 0 1A 1A 2A 2A 1C 1C 2C 2C..."5;: C i~Q@3;4':~g'8 18 28, 28 c r'cj:..-:::'i;'".

1D 10 20 20.=-I.'=.C CROSSTIE CROSSTIE LPCI A 4c LPCI 8 LPCI A LPCI 8 DISCH SUCTION DISCH RECIRC 8 RECIRC A DISABLED, NOT RUNNING OR NOT CONSIDERED IN ANALYSIS RECIRC 8 RECIRC A Figure 8 stem Mode of Operation During Unit 1 LOCA (Discharge Line Breakj-LPCI Injection Valve Failure 0/G A'IVI 0/G 8 0/G C DIV II D/G D I~~I I~~~1 1A IA-2A 2A 1C 1C 2C 2C 18 18 28 28 1 1D 10 2D 2D CROSSTIE CROSSTIE LPCI A LPCI 8 LPCI A LPCI 8 0 ISCH SUCTION DISCH RECIRC 8 RECIRC A DISABLED, NOT RUNNING;~~,::P'.

OR NOT CONSIDERED IN ANALYSIS RECIRC 8 RECIRC A Figure 9 System Mode of Operation During Unit 1 LOCA fDischarge Line Breaki-Diesel Failure

0/G A DIY I 0/G B 0/G C DIV II 0/G 0.:,L','--:-.C.'jC~IC'IC 2C 2C:~t.";: C'jg~'";<<4>>'B 1B 2B 2B I W l 10 1D 20 2D CROSSTIE CROSSTIE LPCI A LPCI 8 LPCI A LPCI B DISCH SUCTION DISCH RECIRC B RECIRC A DISABLED,NOT RUNNING~$';~)OR NOT CONSIDERED IN ANALYSIS RECIRC B RECIRC A Figure QQ System Mode of Operation During Unit 1 LOCA (Disc/Iarge Line Break/-Battery Failure 0/G A DIV I 0/G B D/G C DIV II D/G 0 1A 1A 2A 2A 1C 1C 2C 2C I C+v 18 18 2B 2B I 10 1D 2D 2D x%w?CROSSTIE CROSSTIE LPCI A IL LPCI B LPCI A LPCI 8 DISCH SUCTION DISCH RECIRC B RECIRC A DISABLE, NOT RUNNING',A,;;OR NOT CONSIDERED IN ANALYSIS RECIRC B RECIRC A Figure System Mode of Operation During Unit 1 LOCA (Discharge Line Breakl-Opposite Unit Spurious Accident Signal D/G A DIV I D/G C DIV II-D/G 8 OIV I O/G O D IV II k kV SBTDN BD A 4 kV SHTDN BD C)NO 4 kV SHTDN.BDB)NO 4 kV SPAN BDD.0)NC 1A I A.2A 2A 18 28 28 C C L 1C 1C 2C 2C L C C L 10 1D 2D 2D L C C L): 480V SHTON BO IA)NC UNIT 1)NC 480V SHTDN BO 18)Nc)'Nc)Nc)NC 480V SHTDN BO 2A)Nc UNIT 2)NC 480V SHTOiY, BD 28)"'C)NC)N 4SOV RX MOV BD 10)NO 5 480VRX MOVBD tC)Nc'O)NC 480V RX MOY BD 2D)NO 3 480V RX~MOVBD2C)iiic NO)Nc)Nc)NC)Nc)NC)1C NC NC NC bC NC~IC iC NC)Nc)Nc 2458 2.538 gp td N 0'K~a o" UD Ir.0 10.25 A z 0 I-0 o~hz'l0.1GA 263A 245A 0 z 10-258 10.168 2458 2-538------ELECTRICAL lNTERLOCK 10-25 A 10 16A 243A 245A 0-258 10 168 Figure 3;2 Existing System Valve Bus Arrangement 1.Valve closed and motive power removed.

0/G A DIY I 0/G C DIV II 0/G 8 OIV 1 D/G 0 0 IV II k kV SBKDK BD A 4 kV SHTDN BOO NO 4 kV SHTDN BD B KO 4 av SHTDN BD D KO lA I A.2A)HC 2A 18 18 28 28)KC L 1C 1C 2C 2C NC 1D 1D 2D 20)KC L c c T.)N IJNIT1)NC 480V SHTDN 480V SHTON BO IA 80 18)NC)KC)NC)KC UNIT 2~)KC 480V SHTDN BD 2A)NC.)KC 480V SHTON BD 28)KC)KC)HC 48QV RX MOV BD 1D)KO)NC NO 480V RX MOV BD'IC 480Y RX MOV 80 20)HO~NC J PBQV RX MOV BD 2C)NC)HC NC NC'C XC NC NC)NC)KC)KC)VC PC)NC)KC)HC 2458 2.538 gg KJ N C-o~a o~tt:a 1 2 10 25A z 0 o Ill 10.16A 0 z 243A 245A 10 258 IQ 168 2458 2438 10-25 A 10.16A 2.65A 243A 0.258 10 168 Figure 13 h/odified System Vabe Bvs Arrengemene 1.Valve closed.and motive power removed.2.Power for hydraulic pump-not required for valve closure.Power for hydraulic~mp-not required for valve opening.Power for hydraulic pump-not required for one cycle of valve operation.

LOGIC 8 250 YDC LOCA LOGIC 8 LOFTI FLDhf DiV I L06IC A LOW FLOQ DIV T LOGIC B RX PRESS C II50 PRIG OPE N AflNIFLOW BYPASS YLY IO-IbA OPEM LPC I VALVE.IO-258 LOGIC 8 RX PREM C 2.25 PRIG CLOSE DECI PHP.D/SCAPI.YALUE 2-$3 LOGIC B LOQ FLOW DIV ZZ LOGIC A LOhf Flo Dll/2I LOGIC A RX PRESS K ISOPDIG OPEN MINI FLO4/BYPASS VLV.IO-Ih 8 L06'I C 4 RX PRES~.-<aP.SPSIS OPIUM LPC I VALVE IO-25 A LOSE DECI PHP.Orich'.VLY.2-53B LOGIC A LocA 2SOVS C RPuec IA 8QT..VALVE COMTZOL POlKE'CZAMGEHEAf T

C 4 UNIT 1 ACCIDENT INITIATING CIRCUITS UNIT 2 ACCIDENT INITIATING CIRCUITS BLOCKS UNIT'I RHR PUMP 1C'LOCKS UNIT 1 RHR PUMP 1Doo BLOCKS UNIT 2 RHR PUMP 2800 BLOCKS UNIT 2 RHR PUMP 2A" RHR PUMPS 1A AND 1C RHR PUMPS 18 AND 10 RHR PUMPS 2A AND 2C RHR PUMPS 28 AND 20'OR CORE SPRAY PUMP PRIORITIES.

SEE BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT FSAR, FIGURE BRAC~~STOPS IF RUNNING Figure gg MO~ajSystem RHR Pump Divisional Priorities

'

I Aecv Ac RHov BOID UNIT 1 RECIRCULATION R/NP DISCHAR6E VALVE I WETHOUT eACK-UP CONTROL)FCV 68-T9 (24SB)2$0Y DC AHOY 80 Id 2SOY OC RHOV 80/A SYHBOLSI LOCAIEO LOCAL PAHfL C LOCATED HATH CONTROL ROCXI PANEL LOCAIEO 9.32 PANEL jt LOCATED 9-33 P/HEL N LOCATXO 9-2I PAHfL p LOCATED HYU OP 8/CKUP OUHTCOC PANEL HUIES.I.2A.K6l, K63, K6A, KTI, Kro.Ket JOOOTHO CIRCUET e.IOA.A34 COCA b CX PÃXAA PERPIAMIVC 3.RELAY ENCASED TN STEfL BOX FLEX CONDUIT PRON CONTACTS To EHCLOSEO JUNCTION BOX.CAelf RUII IN FLEX COHOUET BETWEEN PANELS 9-32 8 9-33.I I L lh TRAIH A CLOSE dOCEHOlo Va TRAIN 8 CLUE dOCEHOID VX TRNIJ b OPEH dOL EHgID A TRARI b OPEN dOLENOO j/Af re~7FHI Aeo/If 0 Nl 2A Nl 2A-Nl 2A 2 XC98<<Igb gr/8 Tl'll TI 2I H368.Ir I Hsgb-I OA.RBBA IXA TTA 1, IDA-)gers j,-CX Ar 3~H36e TAA IOA-II38A I 0 IOA KSbd I I~J H368 TRA I FULLY OPE>>L i CloSED wHEH~I OPENS UPON PISTON I CDHTAcr L~J/LSI+CLOSED WHEN I v~lvf Hor I FULLr OPEN I J CLOSED WHEN)VALVE NOT FULLY CLOSED FCV 68-33 IT C I VALVE FULLY OPEN I I J I OPENS FHEN 1 I)pro I I CLOSES XHEN,)I PRESSURE I c reo I L IXIALTFrf0 ANN THSTRUHEHT BUS SUPPLY (Teo)I pfsroH CDHT ACTI I I I ANN BUS YR prl l$3 HYDRAULIC~OP f RATDR 8 R 0 2A 2A-KBAS Kelb P~fA-KBTD ACCUXULATOR PRf$$URf LOW P Scr il.<AccgvULATOR ACCUHULATOR HYDRAULICS HOT HYDRAULICS HOT FULLY CHARCED FULLY CHAROEO rgr 4p-rt Far Al/Y VALVE SHONV OPEN C FIG./4I)ACCUHULATOR PRESSURE LOW rate'AV Tt RECIRCULATION PUMP DISCHARGE VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT WITH HYDRAULIC OPERATOR 8ROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2

480V AC RHOV BOK I CB I L 480/l20 UNI71 RECIRCULATION POIMP DISCHARGE VALVE (tITH BACK UP CONTROL)rCIF f e.a (e-r~O 2$0V DC RNOV 80 lh b xsde-3 xsde-3 b XSde-3 250 VDC RTOV BD lb SVHBOLS f LOCATEO LOCAL PANEL LOCATfb HAIN CONTROL IXX'ANEL l.OCATED 9-32 PANEL LOCATEO 9-33 PANfL 0 LOCATfD 9-tl PANEL 9 LOCATED NCC 8 LOCATED HTD OP BACNVP CONTROL PANEL HOTES: I.2A.XGI.X63.X6A.Xrl.XTO.X69-JOGGING CIRCUIT.t.X$6d--BACX-VP CONTROL TRANSFER.3.lDA.X39.LOCA

&RX PRfss PERNISSIVE.

A.RfLAV ENCASED I>>STEEL BOX.FLEX CONDUIT PRON CONTACTS TO fNCLOSED JUNCTION BOX.CABLE RVN IN FLEX CONDUIT BETVEEN PANELS 9-32 8 9-33.5.DPEC4rlOHAL IHJTRUCTlONJ ALL IHCTATX'TCJE FIAJBJ 86 RSHN10 WHEN OPE thllHB tl BACÃTAP CONTCOL PNME'.8 Vg TBA/M h CLCVC JOLCllbrD Vt TERAI b CLOJE JOLflAHD Vl Tthdr A OPEN JOc,Ewer 8 TCAtll 0 OPKN JOLfmlb xl II-Nl tg-PI eh-rl rl'l xddher~g C HJ68 31's H$68-t'IOA.K39A X$68-'A~HJ 68.JA H$68 JA---CH VALVEoNorŽ I FULLV OPE>>I L~I CLOSED tHEN VALVE HOT I FULLV CLCSED/OPENS UPON I PIKE I coxrmr L~J~CLOSED NHEN vhuf Hor Ar J I I A L Jr IOA.KJJB l OA-XJJAI I HOTf A b X$68 9 H 6 FCV68 33 I VALVE FULlV I OPEN I I J 8 Xsdd-3 N I Pwz spa 4A')rro I L Hsdd-JC r.'9th CLOSES tHEN I PRESSURE<lxlALIFIEO INSTRUHENT SOURCf TBD I coxrhcr I I ANN BVS V2 Lst LSJ lbORAVLIC<</OPERATOR a 6 24~2A-X6HA XQA~~Ct BC3A G R R e X$68 3 R R a 8 X$68-3 8 II C R R 3568 9 lV B X$68 3 RfTVRH~K\r, rat 9 ACCUHULA TON PRESSURE LOV I rrrst.A ACCUHUl.A TOR PRESSVRf LOVT r rrhl.j ACCUHULATOR HYDRAULICS NOT FULLV CHARGED rrrst P ACCUHUL A TON HYDRAULICS NOT FUl.l.r CHARGE 0 RECIRCULATION PUMP DISCHARGE VALVE VALVE SHOSN OPEN (Fm.IV)RETURN CONTROL CIRCUIT WITH HYDRAULIC OPERATOR BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT l.

I 44O VAC RAIOV ADIT Cd csv re Arcldv dd Id UNIT'RHR INI30ARD INJECTION VALVE (WITHOVT dACIIVP CONTIIOL)FCV rV-SS IO-ZSA I HS/I Ig SSd STOP HSrs-SSA HS/4~SSA ESO V DC RIAIIV dO~/A~/Ol T ROTd SYNIdOLS E COCATED LOCAL PANEL NEAR VACVE LOCATED AIAIN CONTROL ROOAI PANfL LOCATED t SE PANEL If CO4 TED S-SS PANEL CO4TED 4/dO 5WITCHOEAR LOCATED AICC d LOCA TED HYO OP dACIIVP CONTIIOL r%NEL NOTES I.RLl-N4T~COCA i Rr FIIESS PEIIIIIISSIVE'.

IOA-RSS-PCIS~g COW PRESS 5.V, TRAIN A CLOSE Vj TRAIN d CCDSE Vj TRAIN A OPfN YIIAIII d OPEN pc~aAP rAt~/IED E g ccc E I/ISII-I ssd C CLOSE IOA I(ISA II/OA Efrsd N Rd TA 0 HSTd SSA HSTd SSA--Cg ICP-HATA T S TOTE/OA IfSSA IOA IfbTA AAdd R I/OA.XLTa I Opf j/J v/jCW I PIS/fjj/I I Ccj j/rAC 7 I L I CCOSED WHEN i I VAlVE NUIT l I'VCCY OFcN L CCOSED I/HEN I VAC,VE NOT FVCLY CLOSED C I OPENS W//EN I VALVE FVCCY l~N I j r;-.;--.~

PrIESMC'l)rdO I A/IN dVS r I I CCOsfS w/IENI IPRESsvRE<A/VII dVS OVALIF/fD INS TRVLIEN T SVPPLY (TSD)I I I CcosES Cw I f 1 PIS TO/I CO/V TACT ANN dVS I AID TOR I jcro//ABULIC I<~oPcruroe L E LSI Vj Vg C5E R 0 P er/+-5$'I ACCVAIVC A Gjlt P/f4 S5VcVE FCV TN-55 ACCVMVCA/f/R jrrMPvc Icg rVCI/FVCC r C/Il R4 EO FCV TII 59 ACCV jrIVCATfjR jcro jc4uc/cs%01 FVLLY CIIAR4CO VALVE SHONN CLOSED (,FI6.IB)Aft VII FCV 14 SS ACCVRVLAYOII Pcf ESS VRC COccc RHR INBOARD INJECTION VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT WITH HYDRAULIC OPERATOR BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 I't vaoYAc ehIov 8o lc.LINIT'6/8 IMIMAE'D IMTECTIOQ VALVE cvlTN BncK.Up coNreoa)FCV 7 I-67 (10-858)15OVDC RIRW BDIA~srplooL 3: C LOCATED LOCAL PANEL NEAZ vALVE LOCATED PAIN CONTROL ROON PAIVEL LOCATEO 9-32 PANEL LOCATED 9 SS PANEI.Locnreo%leo sNITcA'GEAR

+LOCATED HCC g LocATED HYD Dp 8ncKUP courzol pANEL I CD I L EI K$7 I-CT 8 XSTH Cr IS re.ar N e Hs ru-crA 2T CTS usrH-STOP HSTg CT 250 VOC RHOV DDI8 8 XPP-IVOTE 5'OA-KCGA NOTES I.XSTN-dr BACA'UP COAflZOL TRAIVS FEZ ALARNS IH CONTROL ZOOM IN EMERGENCY POSITION.e.Ion-Hcc-Locn ex peessueE pERHlsslvE.

3.Ion~Kcs-pt/s+ex Low pzess q.....Vl-TRAIN A CLOSE YZ.TRAIN 8 CLOSE YS-TEAVT A OPEN VLI TRAIN 6 OPEN 5.OPEZAIING INSTRVCTIONS WILL RQlUIZE REPIOYAL OF rHESE FUSES<eI DUZIHB OPEZATION CN 8ACIIUP CONTROL PIOOE.id'-p g r/'IOOI I20 E'uSTv-CTB OPEN o E 4 rniV C LOSE IOA-KCSD IOA KQSA--CI OL+cpENs upou I,ISTONCo,v rnC r/+CLOSED WHEHI I VALVE Hor'FVLLr OPEN'.j~CLOSEN IIHEN I VALVE HOT II ULLY'LOSED~

l T II5 TII-CTC 7 5 Tu.co 5 IIS TH-C7A 5T d IN KS58 S ISTIC-BT IOPENS VHEu1 I vALVE.FULLVI I OPEN I J HS TN.C7A eh KCC'8 EI ID'-Cr N I opENs NIzu~I pM$5~'prao I HSTII CTC 8 IOA-KCCA ANII BUaS CLOSES 0I7 I PRESSURE I I C TDD L J aUALIFIED INSTRVHEKT SUPPLr C IlIDI I CLOSES ON I I PISTO~f I coNTAcr ANN BVS OV5 LSI VII V5 VI~se q Lse LSS IIroenvLIc

~<OPLRAroe CX OL 8 G G l5 lf cr l)T1 9 CI EN C R II EST'I.CT N z e<oB I5ru-cr c e Ill B CT C XSI5 cr N Fcv pf Gr ACCUHULATOZ peE55URE LOW I FRv pl.cr lCQlNVI AT Hroc4ULes NOT FULLr CHARGE,D FCV TN-Cr ACCUHULATOR'ITDRAULIC J IIOT FULLV CHARE ED IDrvcr L5TH Br N E, RETURN NLVE QIIOWN CLOSED (FIG.19)RETUeu szv ru-cr ACCUHVLATOZ peEssURE LOLV I RHR INBOARD INJECTION VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT WITH HYDRAULIC OPERATOR BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 J

dbO VAC llAC7V CID lb Cb VN/7 I HHR PVACP MINIMVAI FLOW BYPASS VALVE C v/I TNour/slee" ur courmu.)FCV 74-7/0-ISA IDA KIOWA HS rf 2r rsvp r~z~rv do rd sr+pep IA PllP IC sr/elf.E IIS/f/r rA 5 S/r 250 VDC Rheo/8D~IA'~e AIA.EN'YhlbOLS E LOCATED LOClL PlHEL HEAR VALVE I.OCATED MAIN CONTROL ROOM PANE/.0 LOCATED 9 52 PANEL LOCATED 9~SS PANEL LOCATED lido SIIITCIIOEAR LOCATED l/CC d lOCATED HYD Or.'ACKVP CONTROL/rAHEL NOTES:/IOA A'/OS LOW FLOH/Ol.K/09 LOW FACY S.Vj TRAIN A CLOSE V2 TRAIII 0 CLOSE VS TRAIN A OPEN Vg TRAIN 0 OPEN 9/rDrt-ebs r.eCR f~l2O g fax IVEN 0 E g ass.C CIOSE/OA KA&b dr+dT Is/P/A IC d 14.2 8 TD 9.b 5EC 5 HSI(rA HSTI rl IS d TD PIJ QUALIFIED IN5TRVMENT SUPPLY CrbD)b~I ANN bIIS A IVN b Lls OPENS UPON I ('lsroH c L~I CLOSED WmP., IVlLVE NDT IFVLLY OPEI/CLOSED VIREN I VlLVE NDT LLV CLOSE6 J loPEHS wu7N I IVALVE FIILLY I lard J IOPENS WV7u~Ir asm'1--P raD I ICLOSE5 WRY'PAI.SSURE I<Tbo ICLOSES OV" I IP/5/ISN IcoNTAcr L AloTOR Ls/VV Vk P52 L52 LSS HTDRAIILA OPEJIA TO/I+I f 9 C g O R R pcv rf r ACCllAIIILATDR PFESs VA'E Lolv Fcv rf-(Fcv ri-r ACCUNIKATOR ACCI/lrvl l IOR HYDRAULIC5 NDT HYD/IAULICS NOT FULLY CIIARGED FIILLY CHARGED VALVE SHONN CVEN (FIS.ED)PCI vRAr RE TVIIII'cv ri.r ACCUMULATOR PRE 5 SUIIE COPY RHR PUMP MINIMUM F OW BYPASS VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT WITH HYDRAULIC OPERATOR BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT I I

rso vlc RAIOY an e)CB I ssrr Asri-50 A'/OA Kloda 0 II5Pf Jdl 8 Isrr-Jo/I C Hsrr-5oLb STOP UNIT I RHR PVkP NININUM FLOW'YPASS VALVE fWITH BACK UP CONTROL J FCY 74-90/0-/88 dso vnc Rhlov BD/w'Nsrc-PAIP/D PAIPlP IOAIodb IOA-dSO VDC RAIOY BD~IB~Norrs 8 STAIBOLS: C LOCATED LOCAL PAKEL FEAR VlLYE~LOClrED MAIN CONTROL R¹(PANEL LOCl TED!-St PANEL LOCATED t-tt PlNEL LOCA TED rl60 SIVITCHGEAR LOCl TED AICC 8 LOClrED HI'D OR BlCKVP CIJNTROL PAh'EL IVOTES: L A$68-90-BACKVP CON'TR'OL TRAIVSFE'R lLARAIS IN CONTROL Rooll IN EAIERCENCT POSITION/OA-K/08-LOW FLOW IOA-Riot-LOW FLOW i LOCA VI TRAIN A CLOSE VZ TRA/h'CLOSE VS TRl/N l OPEh'r TRAIN 8 OPEIV C OPERlTlh'G I/'STRVCTIoh'S

/YILL REOVIRE REMOVAL OF rHESE ruSES fZJ DVRINC OPERATION/V BACIIVP CON'TROL hIODE.rd&'/20 C OPEN C Q Nsrr.Sbb'LOSE/OA-K/0th PAIP/B h Nsrr sop ST 0 Hsll-I 30A Tr.ds--Cg TD M SEC 8'srr.so 8 Agrr es0 Is rrQL OPEIIS V/OT I i PISTON I CONTlCT~CLOSED IVI/EN (1 i YlLYE NOT FLLLT OPEN~]lr CL OSED IVNEh'ALVE h'OT FVLLr CLOSED>TDPV~OPENS VI/EN'~i VALVE FVLLr'OPEN J COPENS WHEN I Pgc'Ssu&I 7 F4FD PS 5 ANN BVS OVAL IF/ED INsrRv/rEKT l/IN SVPPL lfTBDJ BIIS l CLOSES 0/V I I 0 ANN BVS h/OTOR LSI PSI Lsd LSS~TDRAVLIC'

/L oPERlroR ysrl.so N 8 8 8 C~i C 8 G C C R R R slrr sb N ESTC-8y N Asrr~N RETVRN VALVE SHONN OPEN (Flax/)stir.s0 IV v Iv NOTE S RETVRN Fcv r4~so ACC VAIVI.A TON PRESS//RE FL'v rr-so ACCVAIVL l TOR PRESS VRE LOW FCY rr-So ACCIIRVL A/OR HYDRA VLICS hTT FVLLT CHARGED NIDRAVLICS NOT I'VLLI'NARC D RHR PUMP MINIMUM FLOW BYPASS VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT WITH HYDRAULIC OPERATOR BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT I i I ARDY AC RNOY 80 2C UNIT 2 RECIRCULA7XN PUMP DISCHARGE VALVE IrfrHour eAGK-up ccHTROL)FCV 68-8 (2-Qa)tsoV DC RHOV 8024 STÃ80LS l C IDCATEO LIK:AL PNIEL LCCATED NAIN CIJITROL RNRI PNffL LOCArf0 9-32 PANEL LOCATfD 9-3J PNIEL~LIX'ATKO 9-tl PANEI.g LOCATE 0 Hflk OP M'%UP IRHTTNOL pANRL.MTESl I.tA.KSI, Kds, KSA, Krt,<<10.K69-JDGDIK CIMlfr.t.loA R39 LOCA.b RA tNKAS PEClfaLSIVC J.RELAT ENCASED IN STfEL 40K FLEK CO+III FROI CONTACTS TO fRcLDJED JUNGTIol 80K.cARLE RUN IN FLEK coNDUIT efrrffN PANELS 9.3t 8 9-JJ I L Ce I TRAIN A CLOJC DOLE IIOlo TRAIN 8 CUE JOL f llolo VJ rfle)i OPEN.DOLE hfUO*TtARI~AKN JOCCAOO g Adorlto Nl A Nl tA Nl tA-2 H368 rr K49A KTOA A'TIA AI C TI K Tl I 2 I HJItb I IOA K394 I~A)A 39A A)A.A'39A CK Ar 3 A Hsdd JT IOA-R398 R Hsdd JA/Pit Kdfe I 3 I I A I IOA..NJIJA I I IKITZ 4 FCY 68-33 0 C OIALIF!Eo INSIRUN&r S SLPPLT I f80)ARN 8VS ANN~eus HTCRAUI.IC OPERATOR L I VALVE Nor I FVLLT OPfN I L~I CLOSED lHEH I YALYE Hor I FULLY CLOSED/I OPENS VPOf PISTON I coNrmr L~J/LSI+CLOSED KHEN I VALVE Hor I FULLT OPE>>J CLOSED tHEN)VALVE Nor FULLY CLOSED~OPENS r&~N I VAI.VE FULLY I~I OPEN I J I rwzssL I I ptdo I L J V2 I CLosfs rHEN)I PRESSURf I c reo I L rsvp 1 Yl PSt I pfsroa coNTAGII I I gn I 2A 2A KSAA KSIA R~+'CJA a R AccuglLATDR PRESSURE LOT t 4/.7 ACC(PlULAIOR HYDRAULICS Nor FULLl'HARGED st S ACCUwVLATOR Hl'DRAULICS Ror FULLT CHARGED VALVE SHONV OPEN (Flo.ee)RETURN/C tt 9 ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE Lor RECIRCULATION PUMP DISCHARGE VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT WITH HYDRAULIC OPERATOR BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2

>>BOY AC PKCY BD 2D I L.Aeo/l20 UNIT 2 RECIRCULATION PUMP DISCHARG'E VALVE filrH BACK-UP CONTROL)FCV 6S-T9 (8-55@7SOV DC RKOV BD 28 e XS68-T9 xs6e-r9 II X$6d Tb 850 VOC RHOY BD 81 SYKBOLS E LOCATEO lOCAL PANEL LOCA(ED HAIN CONTROL R(QK PAKfL LOCAIED 9.37 PANEL (I LocarEO 9.S3 PANEL o Locarfo 9.2I pAKEL LOCArfo KCC g Loclrfo HTD OP 4/CHVP CONneoL PANEL HOTES: I, 2A.<<6l.<<63.<<6i.Krl.<<lb.<<69.AMINO CIRCUIT.2.<<$68:t.BACK.UP CONTROL TRANSFfR 3.IOA KSB LOCA 8 RX PRESS PERKISSfVE A.RELAY ENCASfo IN Srffl.BOX FLEX CONDUIT FROK CONTACTS TO ENCLOSED JVHCTTDK BCX CAB(f RUK IH FLEX CONDUIT Bfrl'EEN PAKfLS 9 32 8 9.33.Orc<<AT(DNAL IHsrevc Do+9 ALL frcTATE rrcsE F(L363 BE cft(DYED WHEN OPECATINt>>(N BACKUP CONi COL t90OC.8 Vg TCAlN A CLOSC SOLCN(KP Yl TCAAI 0 CLOSE SOLEtCK4 Vt TEA/N 1 Orf tr SOLENC>>4 rcllu b opcN 30(Em'rm-a~n gt'--C>>Nl 2A NI 21-Nl 21-2 (Id IO4~94 Tl Tl TI 2T Al 3 I 3 I I A L>>8 C N$68.791 usrb T91 e ST IOA-rab1~I IOA XSQ H$68 2 TSIA R H$68-T9A fl Ir Iy xsee-'le e E e H$$8 IOA-NSbb KOTOR IFVLLLY OPEN I L~CLOSED KPEH I VALVE Hor FULLT CLOSED l I OPEIIS UPON I plsroH cowrAcr L~J LSI+CLOSED YHEN VAI.VE HOT FULLT OPEN J CLOSED tHEN I VALVE HOT NOTE 6 fr xsde-79 H 6 FCV68-33 I VALVE FULLY I I OPEN I J 8 xsee-H 8 0 OPENS YHEH 1 I/~ass~I)re I L J P$3 Vl KN US'A 8 1 CLOSES YHEH PRESSURf<TBD L/>>S9/I P$2 OUALIFIEO INSMVKENI SOURCE TBD I I CONTAcr Lse L$3 HVi.P>>VLIC p orf<<AICYI a LS6rf T9 t((S(T'I e 19 R R ff 7A~7A<<6HO<<Qb~>>~~C>>Il630 8>>>>0 R R e X$6d-XST 8-TS N R R X568-.re>>/~AccvKULATDR PRESSURE L(HY I/., a/tr ACCUKVLAICR HYDRAULICS Nor FULLY CHARCEO/;~>>/rr ACAIKVLAIOII Ht DR AV(I C$NOI FULLY CKARCE 0 8 xs68-79 VALVE SHOSN OPEN (I:IC.a9)<<$68 T9 E RETURN RETURN/.,+/.~t RECIRCULATION PUMP DISCHARGE VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT WITH HYDRAULIC OPERATOR BROWNS FERRY NU(;LEAR PLANT UNIT'2

leo vlc RMov do ec N roc a+Pe CrO Z>UNI7 2 RHR INBOARO INJECTION VALVE (YIITHOUT BACKUP COHTROQ FCV 8-GT/0-0'8 PSO V DC RMOV dogb SYMBOLS E LOCATED LOCAL PAIIEL HEAP VALVE e Loclrfo MAIR coHTRBL RODE PAHEL LOCATED F St PAHEL LOCATED 7 Ss PlirEL LOCATED l'ISO SVRTCIIOEAR LOCATED AtCC d LOCAtED HYO OP BACh'CA+CORTROL PAIIEL Cd I Ado IPD IISIW-GTA C'I g Nfl'PER E HSTE IT G7d STOP HSTS CTA iN ReSS T Rebl IOA X'4SA AC71Ã5 I.AQ KSb LOCA r Fp PRfSS PERAIISSIVE t.IDA-Res-Pcis~g Low PRESS S V TRAII A CLOSE V, TRAiH a CLOSE V)TRAIH A OPfif Vy 7PAIH g S'.nv-A:tt/dP Icdv TAP I KESB HSTS CITA S e HSTS-4TA--Cg 1 S TS-4d 4 KSSB ASA~KS CsA BUS I IRS TRUMEH 1'US SUPPLY f TBD)lHH OUA L Il'IED AHR AHH BUS Copcus upou I I pisryu I I Courlcr I L~J~C OSED fH I VALTE HOT I IULLY OPfir I~J CLOsfD WHEN~VALVE HOT I POLLY CLOSED C OPEHS WHEE I VALVE FVLLY'pfir J l.P~SSaeCE)re I r--a'CLOSES WafirI IPRESSURfUL/cs uroaAULIcs IVVI FULL r uol FULLY cul Rsco CA'ARCS VAC VZ SHONN CLOSED (nd.eu)AFrvau PCV TS GT ACCUMULATOR PRESS uRC LEW RHR INBOARD INJECTION VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT WITH HYDRAULIC OPERATOR BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 I (\

~(soxAC CAArY BO 20 UNIT 2 EVE INMAED IMTECTIOM VALVE<N(ru blca-UP CavreoL)FC V Tu-59 (IO-85'A)I eddvdc eteeeddee esvs(ool es" E LOCATE D LOCAl PANEL/eEAC VALVE.LOCATED/IA(u CONTROL PUON PANEL LOCArKO 9-se Pll/EL LOCATF.O 9.JS PANE'L LOCArEo u(co OM(rcu6EAe LCCATEO/ICC g LOCATED HVD DP bACKUP COMTROL P>I/EL I Cb e/00//20 KSTN-SS (F HSTN-5SA zr g e\ee OPE o-8 XS Tel.bs XJ Jre/.JJ N i(sr'I.5sb II'rop g Idle C OSE KISI-KCSA 250 voc CHOV bD eh 8 XSTN-NOTE 5'S C IOA-Kcrb (Oh K6sb 0 NOTES lsd.5S BACKUP COMIROL TCAHJFER ALAC/FJ w courzoL Rood w E~ERCENCY pos/T(oM.e.(Oa-((c-LOCA cx peEssueE FEe/rlsJNE.

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COO VAC RAIOV 8D gD I ce I daV<ZO Ui/IT Z RHR PUNP MINIMUM FLOVV BYPASS VALVE fWITH 8ACA'-UP CDN'TROLI FCV F4-7/0-/81 ZSO YDC RMOV 8D Z8 8 JSTASTA 7/H 7/F S/OA-R/OJA L'PEN 8 A$7d 7/H C Hsrd-78 STOP PAIP$ZA PAIPZC h5rd.Te'LOSE'Hsrc-Sr TA S NOTES 8 IP IOA-/LIDHA/OA.rote/OA-NIOJ8 Zso YDC RAIOV 8D~ZA~SI'AIBOLS:

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Pressure Transmi tte r (PS-l)PT Check~'alve Pneuma tic Accumulator Pressure Switch (PS-2)Electric Motor External Gas Supply (6000 psi)Level Switch (LS-l)Level Swi tch (LS-2 h 3)r I L Pressure Regulator Hyd raulic., c curn ula to Check Valve Hyd raulic Pump Relief Valve Res ervoi r V l V Solenoid Valve (4 Plcs)low~R gulator V 1 Shuttle Valve (2 Plcs)4 Way, 3 Pos ition Valve Hyd raulic Cylinder S Open Clos e Figure 28 Typical Schematic For lfydraulic

-Pneumatic Operator