Motor-Operated Valve Performance IssuesML031060093 |
Person / Time |
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Site: |
Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant ![Entergy icon.png](/w/images/7/79/Entergy_icon.png) |
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Issue date: |
08/21/1996 |
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From: |
Martin T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
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To: |
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References |
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IN-96-048, NUDOCS 9608150028 |
Download: ML031060093 (13) |
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Similar Documents at Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant |
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Mclaughlin on NRC, Regarding NRC Information Notice 2006-13: Groundwater Contamination 2020-09-03 The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Mcguire]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] </code>.
[Table view]The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Mcguire]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] </code>. |
l UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 August 21, 1996 NRC INFORMATION
NOTICE 96-48: MOTOR-OPERATED
VALVE PERFORMANCE
ISSUES
Addressees
All holders of operating
licenses or construction
permits for nuclear power reactors.
Purpose
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) is issuing this information
notice to alert addressees
to (1) lessons learned from the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Motor-Operated
Valve (MOV) Performance
Prediction
Program, (2) performance
problems with MOV key failures described
in a recent NRC Office for Analysis and Evaluation
of Operational
Data (AEOD) study, and (3) the potential
for torque output from MOV actuators
to be less than predicted
by Limitorque
Corporation.
It is expected that recipients
will review the information
for applicability
to their facilities
and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.
However, suggestions
contained
in this information
notice are not NRC requirements;
therefore, no specific action or written response is required.Background
In the 1980s. continuing
problems with the performance
of MOVs at nuclear power plants raised concerns regarding
MOV design, testing, and maintenance.
In response to these problems, both the nuclear industry and NRC initiated efforts to improve the performance
of MOVs at nuclear plants. In 1989, the NRC staff issued Generic Letter (GL) 89-10, "Safety-Related
Motor-Operated
Valve Testing and Surveillance," requesting
that nuclear power plant licensees and construction
permit holders verify the design-basis
capability
of their safety-related
MOVs. In response to GL 89-10, the nuclear industry has studied the performance
of MOVs through testing and analyses.
As a result of these activities, some weaknesses
in the design and manufacture
of MOVs were discovered
through evaluation
of the performance
history of MOVs. In this information
notice, the staff discusses
three issues involving
MOV performance
that have been identified.
Description
of Circumstances
1. Lessons Learned from EPRI MOV Performance
Prediction
Program As part of the industry effort regarding
the MOV issue. EPRI initiated
an MOV Performance
Prediction
Program to develop a methodology
to be used by licensees
in demonstrating
the design-basis
capability
of MOVs when valve-specific design-basis
test data are not available.
The program included 9608150028 I PX 4\\\s 1-Dv-11C/if
IN 96-48 August 21, 1996 development
of improved methods for prediction
or evaluation
of system flow parameters;
gate, globe, and butterfly
valve performance:
and motor actuator rate-of-loading
effects (load-sensitive
behavior).
Further, EPRI performed testing to provide information
for refining the gate valve model and rate-of-loading methods and conducted
numerous MOV tests to provide data for model and method development
and validation, including
flow loop testing, parametric
flow loop testing of butterfly
valve disk designs, and in situ MOV testing.In November 1994, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) submitted
the proprietary
EPRI Topical Report TR-103237, "EPRI MOV Performance
Prediction
Program -Topical Report," for review by the NRC staff. EPRI prepared 25 additional
reports to support the topical report. On March 15, 1996, the NRC staff issued a Safety Evaluation (SE) documenting
the staff review of the topical report. With the conditions
and limitations
described
in the SE, the staff stated that the EPRI program provides an acceptable
methodology
to predict the thrust or torque required to operate gate, globe, and butterfly
valves within the scope of the EPRI program and to bound the effects of load-sensitive
behavior on motor actuator thrust output.In a letter dated September
27, 1995, NEI forwarded
a summary of important contributions
and findings resulting
from the EPRI MOV Performance
Prediction
Program. As described
in an enclosure
to the NEI letter, important
findings (or confirmatory
information)
from the EPRI MOV program include the following:
a. The traditional
methods for predicting
gate valve performance
might be nonconservative
for many applications
because of incomplete
equations.
design features, manufacturing
controls, and wide-ranging
friction coefficients.
b. The edge radii on disk seats and guide slots are critical to gate valve performance
and predictability.
c. Stellite friction coefficients
increase with differential-pressure
valve strokes in cold water to a plateau level, stabilize
quickly in hot water, and decrease as differential
pressure increases.
d. Gate valves with carbon steel guides and disk guide slots with tight clearances
might fail to close under blowdown conditions.
e. Many existing gate valve manufacturing
and design processes
and controls, and plant maintenance
practices, might contribute
to poor valve performance.
f. Traditional
methods for predicting
globe valve performance
for incompressible
flow conditions
are nonconservative
for globe valves in which differential
pressure acts across the plug guide.
' IN 96-48 August 21. 1996 g. Globe valve thrust requirements
for some designs can be excessive
under compressible
flow and blowdown conditions
because of the potential
for plug-side
loading.h. Rate-of-loading
effects (load-sensitive
behavior)
can reduce the static thrust output by up to 30 percent under dynamic conditions.
i. Hydrodynamic
torque coefficients
used by some butterfly
valve manufacturers
might be nonconservative
for certain applications, with valves located near piping elbows especially
vulnerable.
j. Butterfly
valve seats should be periodically
replaced to avoid hardening or degradation.
In addition to these reported important
findings, EPRI confirmed
that thrust requirements
to unwedge a gate valve can be higher under dynamic conditions
than under static conditions.
2. MOV Key Failures On March 29. 1996. AEOD issued report AEOD/E96-01.
entitled, "Engineering
Evaluation
-Motor-Operated
Valve Key Failures," on the continuing
occurrence
of problems with keys in MOVs at nuclear power plants. A significant
number of MOV key failures have been identified
that involved (a) anti-rotation
keys.(b) valve operator-to-valve
stem keys. and (c) motor pinion gear keys. A total of 73 reports were written involving
MOV key failures between January 1990 through September
1995. Many of these key failures were not detected during surveillance
tests but were detected on demand, during valve operations.
or during maintenance
activities
and had existed for some time before they were discovered.
A number of key failures were discovered
during maintenance
activities
even though the valves had been operated satisfactorily
and passed all previous surveillance
tests.3. Limitorque
Motor Actuator Performance
In 1977. Limitorque
Corporation
established
guidelines (referred
to as the SEL documents)
for sizing ac-powered
motor actuators
used in MOVs. Those guidelines
predicted
the motor actuator output torque as a product of the nominal motor-rated
start torque. pullout efficiency, application
factor (typically
0.9), overall actuator gear ratio, and a degraded voltage factor.Over the past few years, Limitorque
has accepted the use of run efficiency
for closing valves powered by ac-powered
motor actuators.
Limitorque
has also stated that licensees
may eliminate
the application
factor when voltage supplied to the motor is less than 90 percent of its rated voltage. (See Limitorque
Technical
Update 93-03 [Accession
9608120083].)
Recent industry
IN 96-48 August 21. 1996 and NRC-sponsored
test information
has raised questions
regarding
the accuracy of the Limitorque
assumptions
for actuator efficiency.
Discussion
1. Lessons Learned from the EPRI MOV Performance
Prediction
Program As discussed
in the staff SE on the EPRI topical report, the EPRI program provided important
information
on the design, testing. and maintenance
of MOVs in nuclear power plants. Some of the EPRI information
is applicable
to gate.globe, and butterfly
valves regardless
of the type of actuator operating
the valve. Examples of such information
are given below: Gate Valves Almost all flow testing by licensees
in response to GL 89-10 was conducted under pumped-flow
conditions.
Several gate valves tested by EPRI under blowdown conditions
demonstrated
unpredictable
performance
and internal damage. Extrapolation
of test data from pumped-flow
conditions
to blowdown conditions
may not be sufficient
to ensure that a gate valve can operate under its design-basis
conditions.
Valve aging conditions
can influence
gate valve performance.
The thrust requirements
to operate gate valves under normal flow conditions
can increase with time and valve stroking.Thrust requirements
to unwedge gate valves under dynamic conditions
may be greater than under static conditions.
Globe Valves Limited testing by EPRI of globe valves under blowdown or high-temperature
flow conditions
suggested
that higher thrust than typically
predicted
may be required to operate these valves.Thrust requirements
for globe valves are influenced
by the area of the valve seat or guide. depending
on the valve design.The EPRI test database is not sufficient
to justify modifying
the Limitorque
guidelines
for sizing and setting globe valves to lower the typical valve factor of 1.1 as-umed in the guidelines.
k\ -#IN 96-48 August 21, 1996 Butterfly
Valves Several areas of the EPRI Butterfly
Valve Application
Guide need improvement
or correction.
EPRI is currently
revising the application
guide and plans to include new information
on flow and torque coefficients;
system analysis techniques;
treatment
of bearing, packing, and hub-seal torque: upstream elbow modeling:
and rated and survivable
torque calculations.
2. MOV Key Failures The MOV key failures may involve a common-cause
failure that could render redundant
trains of certain safety-related
systems inoperable
if they had remained undetected.
The MOV key failures can be attributed
to (a) instal-lation and design deficiencies
for anti-rotation
keys, (b) loosening
or slipping, wear or normal aging, excessive
force or overtorque, and discre-pancies in material or size for valve operator-to-valve
stem keys, and (c)high-impact
loads, improper materials, installation
deficiency, wear or normal aging, and vibration
for motor pinion gear keys.The anti-rotation
key failures involving
installation
deficiencies
were generally
associated
with inadequate
staking and securing of setscrews
during installation
of the keys. It appeared that the installation
instructions
provided by the vendors were not always included in licensee maintenance
procedures.
Many motor pinion gear key failures involving
an installation
deficiency
were due to failure to stake the keys following
replacement
of the motors or the pinion gears. Although licensees
revised their MOV maintenance
procedures
to include restaking
the pinion key or motor shaft as recommended
by Limitorque
Maintenance
Update 89-1 (Accession
9608120068), many licensees
did not investigate
the potential
problems of maintenance
activities
that were conducted
before their procedure
changes.The motor pinion gear key failures attributable
to high-impact
loads or improper material appear to involve AISI (American
Iron and Steel Institute)
type 1018 keys in high-speed
and high-inertia
configurations.
The replacement
of 1018 keys with harder 4140 keys in some cases may lead to keyway deforma-tion or damage, depending
on impact loads and the shaft material.
The situa-tion may present a complex stress problem that is not completely
considered
in design and could produce a severe and complex stress concentration
on the key, as well as the keyway. This situation
could lead to cracking and failure of the shaft.The potential
for these key problems to render safety systems inoperable
empa-sizes (a) the importance
of plant maintenance
programs in assuring that MOV keys are staked and secured as required, (b) the importance
of plant MOV surveillance
and maintenance
activities
in the early detection
of key
IN 96-48 August 21, 1996 degradation, and (c) the possibility
of shaft cracking as a result of replacement
of 1018 keys with harder material when the replacement
will involve a relatively
soft shaft and high impact loads.3. Limitorque
Motor Actuator Performance
The NRC staff conducted
an inspection
at Limitorque
in May 1993 and reviewed the basis for its motor actuator sizing guidelines.
As discussed
in NRC Inspection
Report 99900100/93-01.
the staff found that the values for individual
parameters
assumed in the Limitorque
sizing equation were not determined
by testing but were founded primarily
on engineering
judgment.
The lack of significant
failure history of motor actuators
when using the Limitorque
sizing equation has been the primary basis for confidence
in the equation.
Licensee modifications
of the parameters
in the Limitorque
sizing guidelines
has the potential
to influence
performance.
Tests of MOVs under differential
pressure and flow conditions
performed
by licensees
in response to GL 89-10 have revealed that significantly
more torque and thrust are required to open and close many gate valves than predicted
by the valve vendors. This need for more torque than originally
believed has led licensees
to evaluate the Limitorque
motor actuator sizing guidelines
to determine
whether more torque output is available
from the motor actuators than was predicted
by the guidelines.
The Limitorque
sizing guidelines
have typically
been assumed to underestimate
the output torque capability
of motor actuators.
Therefore, some licensees
eliminate
the application
factor from the output torque equation and use run efficiency
for ac-powered
MOVs in the closing direction.
Further, some licensees
have asserted that motor torque greater than the nominal start rating may be assumed in the sizing guidelines
because motors typically
deliver more torque than their rating before they stall.In response to the questions
surrounding
the Limitorque
sizing equation, the NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory
Research evaluated
the performance
of Limitorque
motor actuators
through testing at the Idaho ational Engineering
Laboratory (INEL). Preliminary
results of the INEL tests suggest that (1)motor output is greater than the nominal rating for many motors. (2) the actual output efficiency
may not reach "run" efficiency
for some Limitorque
actuators
and may drop below "pullout" efficiency
under high loads, (3) the torque loss under degraded voltage conditions
can be more severe for some ac motors than the typically
assumed square of the ratio of actual voltage to rated voltage, and (4) the torque loss under degraded voltage conditions
can be more severe for some dc motors than the typically
assumed linear ratio.Preliminary
results of this testing are documented
in NUREG/CR-6100. "Gate Valve and Motor-Operator
Research Findings" (September
1995). INEL is preparing
a report. NUREG/CR-6478, to document its recent findings in this area. This report is scheduled
to be issued by the end of 1996.
IN 96-48 August 21, 1996 At meetings of the Motor-Operated
Valve Users' Group of nuclear power plant licensees
in February and July 1995, Commonwealth
Edison (ComEd) presented
the results of its motor and actuator output testing program. The testing conducted
by ComEd was more extensive
than the NRC-sponsored
testing and revealed similar results. Previously, in NUREG/CP-0137, "Proceedings
of the Third NRC/ASME Symposium
on Valve and Pump Testing" (July 1994), motor actuator testing by Texas Utilities
raised questions
regarding
Limitorque
motor actuator output. Texas Utilities
also found lower output during in situ motor actuator testing compared to torque stand testing.This information
raises concerns regarding
the basis for Limitorque
acceptance
of licensee assumptions
that the torque output of its actuators
is greater than predicted
by the original Limitorque
SEL guidelines.
The NRC staff has been discussing
with Limitorque
the discrepancy
between guidance relaxing the original motor actuator sizing criteria and the recent motor actuator test results. The manufacturer
has stated that updated information
for the industry on the sizing of its motor actuators
is being developed.
Related Generic Communications
Failures of Limitorque
Operator SMB-4 Motor-to-Shaft
Key," March 20, 1981 (Accession
8011040272).
Motor Shaft Keys in Limitorque
Motor Actuators." October 20, 1988 (Accession
8810140018).
Motor-Operated
Valve Testing and Surveillance," June 28, 1989 (Accession
8906290082).
- NRC IN 90-37. "Sheared Pinion Gear-to-Shaft
Keys in Limitorque
Motor Actuators," May 24, 1990 (Accession
9005180095).
Testing of Motor-Operated
Valves," June 5, 1990 (Accession
9005290270).
Keys in Motor-Operated
Valves Manufactured
by Velan," June 9. 1993 (Accession
9306030147).
Valve Performance
Prediction
Program by the Electric Power Research Institute," November 30, 1993 (Accession
93111904527!.
of Motor-Operated
Valve Electric Power Train Due to Sheared or Dislodged
Motor Pinion Gear Key," February 4. 1994 (Accession
9402010052).
IN 96-48 August 21, 1996
Inadequacies
in the Prediction
of Torque Requirements
for and Torque Output of Motor-Operated
Butterfly
Valves," September
28. 1994 (Accession
9409210211).
This information
notice requires no specific action or written response.
If you have any questions
about the information
in this notice, please contact one of the technical
contacts listed below or the appropriate
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.'. Thomas T. Martin, Director Division of Reactor Program Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical
contacts: Thomas G. Scarbrough.
NRR (301) 415-2794 Email: tgs@nrc.gov
Chuck Hsu. AEOD (301) 415-6356 Email: cchl@nrc.gov
Michael T. Bugg, RIII (630) 829-9500 Email: mtb@nrc.gov
Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information
Notices A/; >'/c>
K>,0 Attachment
IN 96-48 August 21. 1996 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION
NOTICES Information
Date of Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to 96-47 96-46 96-45 96-44 96-43 Recordkeeping, Decommis-sioning Notifications
for Disposals
of Radioactive
Waste by Land Burial Authorized
Under Former 10 CFR 20.304. 20.302.and Current 20.2002 Zinc Plating of Hardened Metal Parts and Removal of Protective
Coatings in Refurbished
Circuit Breakers Potential
Common-Mode
Post-Accident
Failure of Containment
Coolers Failure of Reactor Trip Breaker from Cracking of Phenolic Material in secondary
contact assembly Failures of General Electric Magne-Blast
Circuit Breakers Unexpected
Opening of Multiple Safety Relief Valves Effects of a Decrease in Feedwater
Temperature
on Nuclear Instrumentation
Deficiencies
in Material Dedication
and Procurement
Practices
and in Audits of Vendors 08/19/96 08/12/96 8/12/96 8/05/96 08/02/96 08/05/96 07/26/96 07/25/96 All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
licensees All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors All holders of OLs or CPs for pressurized
water reactors All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors 96-42 96-41 96-40 OL = Operating
License CP = Construction
Permit
IN 96-48 August 21, 1996
Inadequacies
in the Prediction
of Torque Requirements
for and Torque Output of Motor-Operated
Butterfly
Valves," September
28, 1994 (Accession
9409210211).
This information
notice requires no specific action or written response.
If you have any questions
about the information
in this notice, please contact one of the technical
contacts listed below or the appropriate
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.'I tiinal signed by Brian K Gimes 41116A-Thomas
T. Martin. Director I Division of Reactor Program Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical
contacts: Thomas G. Scarbrough.
NRR (301) 415-2794 Email: tgs@nrc.gov
Chuck Hsu, AEOD (301) 415-6356 Email: cchl@nrc.gov
Michael T. Bugg. RIII (630) 829-9500 Email: mtb@nrc.gov
Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information
Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
"" W Copy Ores =N"- No copy DOCUMENT NAME: 96-48.IN To rpecefe a rrw of this document.
Indicate In the box: "C" = Copy without enclosures
OFFICE PUB:ADM I D/DE I C/PECB:DRPM
I ID INAME BCalure* BSheron* AChaffee*
J11M0rtin DATE 06/21/96 07/16/96 08/13/96 1 08//5n6 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
IN 96-XX August XX. 1996 This information
notice requires no specific action or written response.
If you have any questions
about the information
in this notice, please contact one of the technical
contacts listed below or the appropriate
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes. Acting Director Division of Reactor Program Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical
contacts: Thomas G. Scarbrough.
NRR (301) 415-2794 Internet:tgs@nrc.gov
Chuck Hsu, AEOD (301) 415-6356 Internet:cchl@nrc.gov
Michael T. Bugg. NRR (630) 829-9500 Internet:mtb@nrc.gov
Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information
Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information
Notices DOCUMENT NAME: G:\TAG\MOV96.IN5 Ta rgeAve a coov of this document.
Indicate In the box: "C" a Copy without enclosures
r -Copy with enclosures "N" z No copy OFFICE PUB:ADM -I D/DE I IC/PECB:DRPM;
l D/DRPM NAME BCalure* BSheronI ACha ffee VI BGrimes DATE 06/21/96 08/ /96 08/1';/96
-08/ /96 OFFICIAL PA f)v r -,r ' '.-
IN 96-XX July XX, 1996
Inadequacies
in the Prediction
of Torque Requirements
for and Torque Output of Motor-Operated
Butterfly
Valves,w September
28, 1994.This information
notice requires no specific action or written response.
If you have any questions
about the information
in this notice, please contact one of the technical
contacts listed below or the appropriate
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Acting Director Division of Reactor Program Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical
contacts: Thomas G. Scarbrough, NRR (301) 415-2794 Internet:tgs~nrc.gov
Michael T. Bugg, NRR (301) 415-3303 Internet:mxbSnrc.gov
Chuck Hsu, AEOD (301) 415-6356 Internet:cchl@nrc.gov
Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information
Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
Afttthmontn
lit nf Pargnt1v TtvIs d NRC Informatinn
Notices OFFICE PUB:ADM D/ I 1&( \ C/PECB:DRPM
D/DRPM NAME BCalure* BS AChaffee BGrimes DATE 06/21/96 j /&/96 / /96 [ / /96 (OFFICIAL
RECORD COPY] $1 DOCUMENT NAME: G:\TAG\MOV96.INt
Chuck Hsu, AEOD (301) 415-6356 Internet:cchlnrc.gov
Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information
Notices OFFICE PUB:ADM C/E14EB:DE
C/PECB:DRPM
D/DRPM NAME Tech RWessman AChaffee BGrimes DATE C /LV//96 no /96 / /96 1 /96[OFFICIAL
RECORD COPY]DOCUMENT NAME: G:\TAG\MOV96.IN
I 9/
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list | - Information Notice 1996-01, Potential For High Post-Accident Closed-Cycle Cooling Water Temperatures to Disable Equipment Important to Safety (3 January 1996)
- Information Notice 1996-01, Potential for High Post-Accident Closed-Cycle Cooling Water Temperatures to Disable Equipment Important to Safety (3 January 1996)
- Information Notice 1996-02, Inoperability of Power-Operated Relief Valves Masked by Downstream Indications During Testing (5 January 1996, Topic: Stroke time)
- Information Notice 1996-03, Main Steam Safety Valve Setpoint Variation as a Result of Thermal Effects (5 January 1996)
- Information Notice 1996-03, Main Steam Safety Valve Setpoint Variation As a Result of Thermal Effects (5 January 1996)
- Information Notice 1996-04, Incident Reporting Requirements for Radiography Licensees (10 January 1996, Topic: Brachytherapy, Overexposure, Depleted uranium)
- Information Notice 1996-05, Partial Bypass of Shutdown Cooling Flow from Reactor Vessel (18 January 1996, Topic: Reactor Vessel Water Level)
- Information Notice 1996-06, Design & Testing Deficiencies of Tornado Dampers at Nuclear Power Plants (25 January 1996)
- Information Notice 1996-07, Slow Five Percent Scram Insertion Times Caused by Viton Diaphragms in Scram Solenoid Pilot Valves (26 January 1996)
- Information Notice 1996-08, Thermally Induced Pressure Locking of a High Pressure Coolant Injection Gate Valve (5 February 1996, Topic: Anchor Darling, Cold shutdown justification)
- Information Notice 1996-09, Damage in Foreign Steam Generator Internals (12 February 1996, Topic: Earthquake)
- Information Notice 1996-10, Potential Blockage by Debris of Safety System Piping Which Is Not Used During Normal Operation or Tested During Surveillances (13 February 1996)
- Information Notice 1996-10, Potential Blockage by Debris of Safety System Piping Which is Not Used During Normal Operation or Tested During Surveillances (13 February 1996)
- Information Notice 1996-11, Ingress of Demineralizer Resins Increases Potential For Stress Corrosion Cracking of Control Rod Drive Mechanism Penetrations (14 February 1996)
- Information Notice 1996-11, Ingress of Demineralizer Resins Increases Potential for Stress Corrosion Cracking of Control Rod Drive Mechanism Penetrations (14 February 1996)
- Information Notice 1996-12, Control Rod Insertion Problems (15 February 1996)
- Information Notice 1996-13, Potential Containment Leak Paths Through Hydrogen Analysis (26 February 1996, Topic: Stress corrosion cracking, Integrated leak rate test)
- Information Notice 1996-14, Degradation of Radwaste Facility Equipment at Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 (1 March 1996)
- Information Notice 1996-15, Unexpected Plant Performance During Performance of New Surveillance (8 March 1996)
- Information Notice 1996-16, BWR Operation with Indicated Flow Less than Natural Circulation (14 March 1996, Topic: Stress corrosion cracking)
- Information Notice 1996-17, Reactor Operation Inconsistent with the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (18 March 1996)
- Information Notice 1996-18, Compliance with 10 CFR Part 20 for Airborne Thorium (25 March 1996, Topic: Stress corrosion cracking, Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1996-19, Failure of Tone Alert Radios to Activate When Receiving a Shortened Activation Signal (2 April 1996, Topic: Tone Alert Radio, Siren)
- Information Notice 1996-20, Demonstration of Associated Equipment Compliance with 10 CFR 34.20 (4 April 1996, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1996-21, Safety Concerns Related to the Design of the Door Interlock Circuit on Nucletron High-Dose Rate and Pulsed Dose Rate Remote Afterloading Brachytherapy Devices (10 April 1996, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1996-22, Improper Equipment Settings Due to Use of Nontemperature-Compensated Test Equipment (11 April 1996, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1996-23, Fires in Emergency Diesel Generator Exciters During Operation Following Undetected Fuse Blowing (22 April 1996, Topic: Brachytherapy, Overspeed trip)
- Information Notice 1996-24, Preconditioning of Molded-Case Circuit Breakers Before Surveillance Testing (25 April 1996, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1996-25, Traversing In-Core Probe Overwithdrawn at Lasalle County Station, Unit 1 (30 April 1996, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1996-26, Recent Problems with Overhead Cranes (30 April 1996, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1996-26, Recent Problems With Overhead Cranes (30 April 1996)
- Information Notice 1996-27, Potential Clogging of High Pressure Safety Injection Throttle Valves During Recirculation (1 May 1996, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1996-28, Suggested Guidance Relating to Development and Implementation of Corrective Action (1 May 1996, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1996-29, Requirements in 10 CFR Part 21 for Reporting and Evaluating Software Errors (20 May 1996, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1996-30, Inaccuracy of Diagnostic Equipment for Motor-Operated Butterfly Valves (21 May 1996)
- Information Notice 1996-31, Cross-Tied Safety Injection Accumulators (22 May 1996)
- Information Notice 1996-32, Implementation of 10 CFR 50.55a(g) (6) (II) (A), Augmented Examination of Reactor Vessel (5 June 1996, Topic: Non-Destructive Examination)
- Information Notice 1996-32, Implementation of 10 CFR 50.55a(g) (6) (ii) (A), Augmented Examination of Reactor Vessel (5 June 1996, Topic: Non-Destructive Examination)
- Information Notice 1996-33, Erroneous Data From Defective Thermocouple Results in a Fire (24 May 1996, Topic: Reverse polarity)
- Information Notice 1996-33, Erroneous Data from Defective Thermocouple Results in a Fire (24 May 1996, Topic: Reverse polarity)
- Information Notice 1996-34, Hydrogen Gas Ignition During Closure Welding of a VSC-24 Multi-Assembly Sealed Basket (31 May 1996)
- Information Notice 1996-35, Failure of Safety Systems on Self-Shielded Irradiators Because of Inadequate Maintenance and Training (11 June 1996)
- Information Notice 1996-36, Degradation of Cooling Water Systems Due to Icing (12 June 1996, Topic: High winds, Ultimate heat sink, Frazil ice)
- Information Notice 1996-37, Inaccurate Reactor Water Level Indication and Inadvertent Draindown During Shutdown (18 June 1996, Topic: Reactor Vessel Water Level)
- Information Notice 1996-38, Results of Steam Generator Tube Examinations (21 June 1996, Topic: Stress corrosion cracking)
- Information Notice 1996-39, Estimates of Decay Heat Using ANS 5.1 Decay Heat Standard May Vary Significantly (5 July 1996)
- Information Notice 1996-40, Defciencies in Material Dedication and Procurement Practices and in Audits of Vendors (7 October 1996, Topic: Coatings, Troxler Moisture Density Gauge)
- Information Notice 1996-41, Effects of a Decrease in Feedwater Temperature on Nuclear Instrumentation (26 July 1996, Topic: Feedwater Heater)
- Information Notice 1996-42, Unexpected Opening of Multiple Safety Relief Valves (5 August 1996, Topic: Reactor Vessel Water Level)
- Information Notice 1996-43, Failures of General Electric Magne-Blast Circuit Breakers (2 August 1996)
... further results |
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