ML14339A653
| ML14339A653 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Kewaunee  |
| Issue date: | 11/24/2014 |
| From: | Dominion Energy Kewaunee |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML14339A626 | List: |
| References | |
| 14-572 | |
| Download: ML14339A653 (68) | |
Text
Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-iAppendix BSpecial Design Procedures Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-ii Intentionally Blank Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-iiiB.1Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-1B.2Classification of Structures and Components. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-1B.2.1Definition of Nuclear Safety Design Classifications (NSDC) . . . . . . . . . . . . B-2B.3Design Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B
-10B.4Loads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-11B.4.1Environmental Loads. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-12B.4.2Tornado Loads. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-12B.4.3Live Loads. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-12 B.4.4Dead Loads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-12 B.4.5Seismic Loads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-13 B.4.6Design Basis Accident (DBA) Loads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-13B.4.7Other Loads. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-13 B.4.8Seismic Design and Verification of Modified, New and Replacement Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-13B.5Protection of Class I Items. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-14B.6Design Criteria for Structures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-15B.6.1Load Combinations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-15 B.6.2Stress Design Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-17B.6.3Structural Design Basis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-17B.7Design Criteria for Components. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-33B.7.1Load Combinations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-33 B.7.2Design Criteria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-34B.8Protection Against Crane Toppling and Control of Heavy Loads. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-50B.8.1Protection Against Crane Toppling. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-50B.8.2Control of Heavy Loads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-50B.8.3Design Criteria for Upgraded Auxiliary Building Crane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-51B.9Deleted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-53B.9.1Deleted. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-53 B.9.2Deleted. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-53 B.9.3Deleted. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-53 B.9.4Deleted. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-53Appendix B: Special Design ProcedureTable of ContentsSectionTitle Page Appendix B: Special Design ProcedureTable of Contents (continued)SectionTitle Page Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-ivB.10Deleted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-55B.10.1Deleted. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-55B.10.2Deleted. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-55 B.10.3Deleted. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-55 B.10.4Deleted. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-55B.11Internal Flooding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B
-55B.11.1Deleted. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-55 B.11.2Flooding Design Criteria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-55 B.11.3Deleted. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-55 B.11.4Deleted. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-55 B.11.5Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-55B.12Deleted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-59B.12.1Deleted. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-59 B.12.2Deleted. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-59 B.12.3Deleted. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-59References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-59 Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-vAppendix B: Special Design ProceduresList of TablesTableTitle PageB.2-1Classification of Structures, Systems and Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .B-4B.6-1Load Combinations for Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .B-25B.6-2Applicable Code Stresses Class I Structures:
Reinforced Concrete - Structural Steel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .B-27B.6-3Applicable Code Stresses: Class I Structures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .B-28B.6-4Allowable Stresses: Class I*, II, III*, III and IV Structures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .B-29B.6-5Damping Factors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .B-30B.6-6Tornado-Generated Missiles. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .B-31B.6-7Internally-Generated Missiles Inside Of Containment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .B-32B.7-1Load Combinations For Components Class Of Components. . . . . . . . . . . . . .B-41B.7-2Loading Conditions and Stress Limits: Pressure Vessels. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .B-42 B.7-3Loading Conditions and St ress Limits: Pressure Piping in Accordance with USAS B31.1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .B-43B.7-4Loading Conditions and Stress Limits: Equipment Supports. . . . . . . . . . . . . .B-45 B.7-5Load Combination and Stress Limits for Class I Components. . . . . . . . . . . . .B-45B.7-6Alternative Design Loading Combinations and Stress Limits:
Pressure Class 1, 2, and 3 Piping In Accordance With ASME Section III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .B-46B.9-1Deleted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .B-54 Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-viAppendix B: Special Design ProcedureList of Figures FigureTitle PageB.7-1Typical Stress Strain Curve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-47B.7-2Comparison Between Design and Co llapse Conditions Hoop Stress: 0.90 S y B-48B.7-3Comparison Between Design and Co llapse Conditions Hoop Stress: 0.00 S y B-49B.11-1Deleted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-57 B.11-2Deleted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-58 Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-1 Appendix BSpecial Design ProceduresB.1SCOPE The special design procedures contained in this appendix apply to all structures, systems (including instruments and c ontrols), and all components.B.2CLASSIFICATION OF STRUCTURES AND COMPONENTS All structures, systems (includi ng instruments and controls), an d components are classified as Class I, I*, II, III, III* or IV according to their function and im portance in relation to the safe decommissioning of the facility , with emphasis on the degree of in tegrity required to protect the public. These are listed in Table B.2-1.The Turbine Building, Administr ation Building, Auxiliary Bu ilding and Shield Building structures are constr ucted as a contiguous complex. In general, these structures are identified as either Class I or Class III by placing emphasis on the predominant use of the structure in its relation to the safe deco mmissioning of the station.
In some instances there may be more than one classification applicable within a building or structure. This situation is tr eated as a mixed classification.
Individual components or porti ons of a system may be dete rmined to have a different classification than the system as a whole. This determin ation would be accomplished by considering design and functionality requ irements of both the system and the components/sub-components, consistent with the 10 CFR 50, Appendix B program for the Kewaunee Power (KPS).
Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-2B.2.1 Definition of Nuclear Safety Design Classifications (NSDC)
The definition of the nuclear safe ty design classifications is gi ven in the following paragraphs 1:1.Class I Those structures and components including instruments and contro ls whose failure might cause or increase the severity of a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) or result in an uncontrolled release of substantial 2 amounts of radioactivity, and those structures and components vital to safe shutdown and isolation of the reactor. Some items in Table B.2-1 are designated as Class I* indi cating that these items have been designed to Class I Design Basis Earthquake (DBE) loading (dynamic) only, and that these items ar e treated as Class III items in all other respects.2.Class II Those structures and components whic h are important to reactor operation 3 but not essential to safe shutdown and isolation of the reactor and whose failure would not result in the release of substantial amounts of radioactivity.3.Class III Those structures and components which are not directly related to reactor operation or containment. Some items in Table B.2-1 are designated as Class III* indicating that the items are Class III by definition, however, these have been designed to Class II seismic loading.4.Mixed ClassificationThis classification includes structures that ar e combinations of various Class I, II or III structures. Mixed classifications apply only to structures an d not to any systems and/or components. The design criteria for mixed classification are detailed in Section B.6 of this Appendix.5.Class I - Part Class III The spent fuel pool is classified as a Class I structure. The Auxili ary Building structure above the spent fuel pool is cla ssified as a Class III* structure. The Te chnical Suppor t Center (TSC) basement (586 ft - 0 in) is classified as a Class I structure. The upper floors of the TSC (606 ft-0 in and 626 ft-0 in) are classified as Class III* structures.1.For clarity and continuity, the NSDC definitions have not been revised to reflect the permanent shutdown of the station.2.A substantial amount of radioactivity is defined as that amount of radioactive material, which would produce radiation levels at the site boundary in excess of 1.0 percent of 10 CFR 100 guidelines.3.Reactor operation is defined as the condition where the reactor is producing only that power required to maintain the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) at normal operating pressu re and temperature.
Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-36.Class III - Part Class IThe Turbine Building is classified as a Class III* structure. Those areas in the Turbine Building that are classified as Cl ass I house the following equipment:a.Basement Floor*Safety significant 480V Switchgear*Air Compressorsb.Mezzanine Floor*Batteries The Class I designation applies to the walls, floors, ceilings, structural support and foundations of structures that isolate, support, or are associated with the protection of Class I equipment.In response to Bulletin 80-11, which identified NRC concerns re garding the structur al integrity of safety-related masonry walls a detailed study was performed to provide a technical evaluation of the plant's masonry walls, that at the time were classified as safety-related. The basic documents for guidance in this review were the criteria developed by the Structural and Geo-Technical Engineering Branch of the NRC.
The review concluded that the sa fety-related masonry walls in the plant could withstand the loads and load combinations, as specified in the USAR, without exceeding allowable stress limits (see NRC Safety Evaluation Report in Reference 35).Door 142 and Door 143 were modified per DCR 3594 to allow venting of Room 302 and Corridor 304 in the Auxiliary Building to accommodate atmospheric pressu re changes due to a tornado. Room 302 and Corridor 304 are partially enclosed with Class I masonry block walls that are not designed to withstand differential pressure loads from a tornado. Venting of Room 302 and Corridor 304 will minimize the pressure loads on the af fected ma sonry block walls and help ensure the structural integrit y of the walls during a tornado.
Door 49 was modified with breakaway pins per DCR 3597 to provide rela y room block wall protection from Atmospheric Pre ssure Change (APC) which coul d result from design tornado loads as specified in USAR Appendix B , Section B.4.2 , Item 1.
Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-4Table B.2-1 CLASSIFICATION OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTSNote:This table documents system level and major subsystem design requirements. Systems may contain components or subsystems having a nuclear safety design classification different than the system/subsystem level classification cited within this table. Note:Some abandoned systems, st ructures, or components (SSC) wi ll continue to be listed in this table.
Item ClassClassification of Buildings and StructuresReactor containment vessel (including all penetrations, air locks, isolation valves, vacuum relief devices, and internal containment structur es performing Class I function)
I*Shield Building (including vent and all penetrations)I*Spent Fuel Pool Structure (including fuel transfer tubes and valves)IControl RoomIScreenhouse (including Access Tunnel and areas housing Service Water, Turbine Building Ventilation and Screenhouse Ventilation System Components)
I Concrete Encased Electrical (Class 1) Screenhouse Conduit Structure (598'0")ICirculating Water Intake and Discharge StructuresI Auxiliary Building (areas housing Auxiliary Building Special Ventilation System, radwaste storage, and Engi neered Safety Features)
I Auxiliary Building Support System for crane a I*Auxiliary Building (except Class I or I*)
b III*Turbine Building (areas housing safeguard batteries, safety significant 480V switchgear, air compressor)
ITurbine Building Support System for Turbine Building craneI*Turbine Building (Except Class I or I*)III*
Administrative Building baseme nt (586 feet 0 inch), includes diesel generator roomIEmergency Diesel Generation Room Air Inlet and Outlet Structures I Administrative Building (first and second floors, 606 feet 0 inch and 626 feet 0 inch)III TSC basement (586 feet 0 inch)
I TSC upper floors (606 feet 0 inch and 626 feet 0 inch)III*Miscellaneous structures III Security Building IIIOffice/Warehouse AnnexIVAdministration & Training FacilityIV HP Loading Dock IVAugmented Water System Building IV Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-5Table B.2-1 (continued)CLASSIFICATION OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTSNote:This table documents system level and major subsystem design requirements. Systems may contain components or subsystems having a nuclear safety design classification different than the system/subsystem level classification cited within this table. Note:Some abandoned SSCs will continue to be listed in this table.
Item Class Classification of Systems and Components Reactor Plant Equipment Reactor-Reactor pressure vessel and its supportsI*-Vessel internalsI*-Fuel assembliesI*
-Rod Cluster Control Assemblies (RCCAs) and drive mechanisms I*-In-core instrumentation structures I*Reactor Coolant System-Piping and valves containing full system pressure (including safety and relief valves)I*-Steam generators I*-Pressurizer (excluding pressurizer relief tank, piping downstream of pressurizer relief and safety valves)
I*-Reactor coolant pumps I*-Supporting and positioning membersI*-Primary Sampling System (up to second isolation valve)
I*-Pressurizer relief tank and piping (downstream of pressurizer relief valves)IIEmergency Core Cooling System-Safety Injection System (including Accumulator Tanks, Safety Injection Pumps, Residual Heat Removal Pumps (RHR), Refueling Water Storage Tank, RHR Heat Exchangers (RHR), and Primary Connecting Piping and Valving)
I*Residual Heat Removal System I*Internal Containment Spray System (includi ng spray pumps, spray ring headers, and primary connecting piping and valving)
I*Primary Sampling System (beyond second isolation valve)
III Component Cooling System I*Reactor Control and Protection System I*Radiation Monitoring System (t o the extent that it must function in support of Class I equipment)
I*
Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-6Emergency Power Supply System-Diesel GeneratorsI*-Fuel Oil Storage Tank I*-Diesel Generator Cooling System I*-Safety features busesI*-Emergency Load Distribution System I*-DC power supply, batteries, cableI*-Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Vent LinesI*-Fuel Oil Supply Lines to Day Tanks I*Instrumentation-Instrumentation and Control (on all Class I systems)
I*-Plant Process Computer System (PPCS)
III-Turbine Plant System Instrumentation (except portions of Reactor Control and Protection System, which is Class I)
IIINuclear Fuel Handling and Storage-New Fuel Storage RacksI*-Spent Fuel Storage I-Spent Fuel Pool LinerI*-Fuel Transfer System (Including Fuel Transfer Carriage, Containment Upender and Auxiliary Building Upender)
III-Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System (Piping and valving whose failu re could result in significant releas e of pool water)
I*-Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Syst em (portions not Class I)
IIIVentilation SystemsShield Building Ventilation System I*Auxiliary Building Special Ve ntilation System (includes Zone SV isolation dampers and boundary ductwork)
I*Auxiliary Building Air Conditioning System IIIAuxiliary Building Ve ntilation System IIITable B.2-1 (continued)CLASSIFICATION OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTSNote:This table documents system level and major subsystem design requirements. Systems may contain components or subsystems having a nuclear safety design classification different than the system/subsystem level classification cited within this table. Note:Some abandoned SSCs will continue to be listed in this table.
Item ClassClassification of Systems and Components (continued)
Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-7-Safeguards Fan Coil Units I*Reactor Building Ventilation System-Containment Purge and Vent System (Containment Isolation Valves are Class I)III-Containment Dome Fans I*-Post-LOCA Hydrogen Control System (Containment Isolation Valves are Class I)III-Containment Vacuum Relief System I*-Containment Fan Coil Units (incl udes fans, coils, and housings)
I*-CRDM Shroud Cooling System II-Reactor Gap and Neutron Detector Cool ing System (excluding Class I piping segment in the reactor cavity)
II-Reactor Support Cooling System II Control Room Air Conditioning System with Service Water System cooling water supply. (Includes Relay Room a nd Mechanical Equipment Room)
I*-Control Room Chillers for normal operation IIITurbine Building Ventilation System (General Area)III-Class 1E Battery Rooms Ventilation System I*-Screenhouse Ventilation System I*-Emergency Diesel Generator Rooms Ventilation System I*-Class I Aisle Safeguards Fan Coil Units I*Technical Support Center Ventilation System IIChemical and Volume Control System-All items except those listed below.I*-Boric acid transfer pumps II-Boric acid filterII-Boric acid heat tracing II-Batch tank III*-Evaporator condensate demineralizersIII*-Condensate filter III*-Monitor tanks III*Table B.2-1 (continued)CLASSIFICATION OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTSNote:This table documents system level and major subsystem design requirements. Systems may contain components or subsystems having a nuclear safety design classification different than the system/subsystem level classification cited within this table. Note:Some abandoned SSCs will continue to be listed in this table.
Item ClassClassification of Systems and Components (continued)
Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-8-Monitor tank pumpsIII*-Deborating demineralizersIII*-Concentrates holding tank III*-Concentrates holding tank transfer pumps III-Chemical mixing tank III-Resin fill tank IIIWaste Disposal System-Waste Hold-Up Tank III*-Sump Tank III*-Gas Decay Tanks I*-Reactor Coolant Drain Tank and PumpsII-Waste Gas Compressor PackageI*-Waste Evaporator Feed Pump III*-Sump Tank PumpsIII*-Interconnecting Piping and Valves Between Class I EquipmentI*-Waste Evaporator c III*-Waste Evaporator Condensate TanksIII*-Laundry and Hot Shower TanksIII Automatic Gas Analyzer H 2 and O 2 III*Nitrogen Supply ManifoldIIIHydrogen Supply ManifoldIII
Miscellaneous Reactor Plant Equipment-Steam Generator Blowdown System upstream of Isolation Valves BT3A and BT3B outside of containment I*-Steam Generator Blowdown System downstream of Isolation Valves BT3A and BT3B III-Polar CraneI*-Manipulator CraneIII-Fuel Pool Bridge CraneI*
-Auxiliary Building CraneI*Table B.2-1 (continued)CLASSIFICATION OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTSNote:This table documents system level and major subsystem design requirements. Systems may contain components or subsystems having a nuclear safety design classification different than the system/subsystem level classification cited within this table. Note:Some abandoned SSCs will continue to be listed in this table.
Item ClassClassification of Systems and Components (continued)
Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-9-Turbine Building CraneI*-All Other Cranes III-Conventional Equipment, Tanks, Piping (other than Class I and II)IIITurbine Plant-Turbine, Generator, Foundations, Exciter, Oil Purification, Turbine Gland Seal System, Reheaters and Moisture Separators, Hydrogen and CO 2 Systems IIIService Water System-Serving Class I equipmentI*-All that is not Class IIIIMake-Up Water SystemsIII-Reactor Make-Up Water Storage TankIIICirculating Water System-Circulating water pumpsIII
-Intake piping to ScreenhouseI*
-Circulating water pump discharge pipingIII-Condenser discharge pipingIII Condensate and Feedwater Systems-Main CondenserIII
-Condensate SystemIII-Main Feedwater System (excluding Class I piping and isolation valves)IIIAir Removal SystemIIIAuxiliary Feedwater SystemI*Main Steam System-Main Steam System (portions not Class I)III*-Main steam, safety, relief, and isolation valvesI*-Main steam up to isolation valves including steam piping to Turbine Driven AFW Pump I*Steam Dump SystemIII*Table B.2-1 (continued)CLASSIFICATION OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTSNote:This table documents system level and major subsystem design requirements. Systems may contain components or subsystems having a nuclear safety design classification different than the system/subsystem level classification cited within this table. Note:Some abandoned SSCs will continue to be listed in this table.
Item ClassClassification of Systems and Components (continued)
Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-10B.3DESIGN CODESThe design and construction of this plant has be en in accor dance with the following codes, as applicable:Heating Steam System (those portions in di esel generator rooms, battery rooms, screenhouse, and auxiliary bui lding steam exclusion zones)
I*Heater and Moisture Separator Drain SystemIIIBleed Steam SystemIIISecondary Sample SystemIII
Miscellaneous Power Systems and Plant Equipment-Station and Instrument Air SystemIII
-Instrument Air System - Portions required for safe shutdownI*-Instrument Air System (except portions required for safe shutdown) II-Fire Protection (serving Class I equipment)I*-Fire Protection System in cluding detection and alarm (other than Class I)
III-Potable Water System IIITransformers-Main Auxiliary TransformerII-Reserve Auxiliary TransformerII-Tertiary Auxiliary TransformerII-4.16-0.480 kV safety features transformers I*-4.16-0.480 kV auxiliary transforme r (other than Class I)
III-Transformer serving pressurizer he aters from safety features bus IIa.For definition of Class I
- , refer to Section B.2.1.b.For definition of Class III
- , refer to Section B.2.1 .c.No longer in service.Table B.2-1 (continued)CLASSIFICATION OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTSNote:This table documents system level and major subsystem design requirements. Systems may contain components or subsystems having a nuclear safety design classification different than the system/subsystem level classification cited within this table. Note:Some abandoned SSCs will continue to be listed in this table.
Item ClassClassification of Systems and Components (continued)
Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-111.American Concrete Institute Code ACI 318-632.American Institute of Steel Construction "Speci fication for the Design, Fabrication and Erection of Structural St eel Buildings," 1963 Edition 13.American Welding Society Code D 1.0 "Sta ndards for Arc and Gas Welding in Building Construction"4.International Conference of Building Offi cials "Uniform Building Code," 1967 Edition5.Atomic Energy Commission publication TID 7024 "Nuclear Reactors and Earthquakes"6.American Society of Mechanical Engineers "Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code" 7.Piping Code, USAS B31.1.0-1967 with appl icable N-code cases to ASA B31.1-1955 2, 38.Welding Research Council Bulletin No. 107, 1965 Edition 9.Wisconsin Administrative Code: "Rules of Department of Industry, Labor & Human Relations"10.Crane Manufacturers Association of America Specification 70, "Specifications for Top Running Bridge and Gantry Type Multiple Gi rder Electric Overhead Traveling Cranes,"
2004 Edition.11.ASME NOG-1, "Rules for C onstruction of Overhead and Gantry Cranes (Top Running Bridge, Multiple Girder)," 2004 Edition.12.Electrical Overhead Crane Institute (EOCI) Standard 61.
13.NUREG-0612, "Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants," dated July 1980.14.NUREG-0554, "Single Failure Proof Cranes for Nuclear Power Plants," dated May 1979.B.4LOADSAll Structures and Comp onents in this plant ar e designed to withst and various kinds and combinations of loads.The different kinds of loads treated in the desi gn are described in the subsequent paragraphs.1.A later edition may be used for plant physical changes provided appropriate reconciliation is documented. 2.An alternative Design Code to USAS B31.1 is ASME Section III (Post 1980 Editions Approved by NRC, reference Table B.7-6). 3.During RFO 28 tubing for penetrations 1, 3, 21, 27E, 27EN, 27N, 27NE, and 36, located between containment and the shield building, was analyzed to ASME Section III, reference Table B.7-6. Analyses were performed to reconcile thermal stresses that may occur during sampling and differences in displacement of the containment and shield buildings due to annual temperature variations and periodic ILRT testing.
Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-12The load combinations are given in Section B.6 for Structures and in Section B.7 for Components.B.4.1 Environmental Loads These consist of wind and snow loads.*Snow Load A snow load of 40 lb per sq. ft of horizontal projected area is us ed in the design of Structures and Components exposed to snow.*Wind LoadThe design wind speed is 100 mph. Wind pressure, shape factors, gust fa ctors, and variation of winds with height have all been determined in accordance with the procedures given in the American Society of Civil Engineers' paper ASCE 3269 "Wind Forces on Structures."B.4.2 Tornado Loads Tornado loadings used in design consist of the following:1.A differential pressure equal to 3 psi. This pressure is assumed to build up from normal atmospheric pressure in 3 seconds.2.A lateral force caused by a funnel of wind having a peripheral tangential velocity of 300 mph and a forward progression of 60 mph.3.The design tornado-driven missile was assumed equivalent to an airborne 4 in x 12 in x 12 ft -0 in plank travelling end-on at 300 mph, or a 4000 lb. automobile flying through the air at 50 mph and at not more than 25 feet above ground level.The plant site was examined for possible so urces of other missiles including building and equipment parts which were evaluated to determine the potentially most damaging missile. The result of this study is reported in Section B.6.3 of this appendix. The conclusion of this study is that no other missiles are as damaging as the design missiles given above.B.4.3 Live Loads Equipment loads are specified from manufacturer
's drawings and floor loads are based upon the intended use of the floor.B.4.4 Dead Loads Dead loads consist of the weight of structural steel, concrete, dead weight of the component, etc., as computed for each case.
Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-13B.4.5 Seismic LoadsSeveral different seismic loads were used in the design of this plant.1.Operational Basis Earthquake (OBE)
The OBE was based upon a maximum vertical ground acceleration of 0.04g, a maximum horizontal ground acceleration of 0.06g and the response spectra are given on Plate 8 in Appendix A.2.Design Basis Earthquake (DBE)
The DBE was based upon a maximum horizont al ground acceleration of 0.12g and the response spectra are given on Plate 9 in Appendix A.3.Uniform Building Code Earthquake LoadsThe seismic loads for this category are in ac cordance with the require ments of the Uniform Building Code. This code specifies the location of the plant site to be in a "Zero" earthquake area. However, for conservatism, earthquake loads applicable to Zone 1 areas were used in the design under this category.B.4.6 Design Basis Accident (DBA) Loads The DBA for this plant was the instantaneous double-ended rupture of the cold leg of the RCS.
This accident transmits loads to structures and equipment, which were designated as DBA loads.
In the permanently shutdown and defueled condi tion, DBA loads, as defined above, are reduced to zero.B.4.7 Other Loads In addition to all the above loads listed, other loads were used in the design wherever applicable.
Among these were ice loads, jet forc es, other pipe rupture loads, etc.B.4.8 Seismic Design and Verifi cation of Modified, New and Replacement Equipment On February 19, 1987 the NRC issued Generic Letter (GL) 87-02, "Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical and Electrical Equipmen t in Operating Reactors, Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46."
The Seismic Qualificat ion Utility Group (SQUG) developed Generic Implemen tation Procedure (GIP) For Seismic Evaluation of Nuclear Plant Equipment (Reference 19 and Reference 25), as modified and supplemented by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm ission Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report Nos. 2 and 3 (Reference 14 and Reference 26), which may be used as an alternative to existing methodologi es for the seismic design and verification of m odified, new or Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-14 replacement equipment cla ssified as Seismic Class I. Subsequent revisions to the GIP may be used provided they have receiv ed USNRC review and approval.
The SQUG methodology may only be applied to certain classes of active mechanical and electrical equipment as specified in the SQUG GIP (Reference 19 and Reference 25), electrical relays, new and replacement cabl e and conduit raceway systems, ta nks and heat exchangers. The GIP criteria and procedures may be applied to modification or repair of existing anchorage (anchor bolts or welds) including one-for-one component replacements and new anchorage designs. However, for new installa tions and new anchorage designs, th e factor of safety currently recommended for new nuclear power plants shall be met when determining allowable anchorage loads.As specified in the GIP, and accepted by the NRC in Reference 14 and Reference 26 , the use of 5 percent damped response spectra may be used when performing seismic evaluations in accordance with the GIP. However, as stated in Reference 18 , if it is determined that the equipment natural frequency is within +/-
25 percent of the frequency a ssociated with the peak acceleration, the peak acc eleration will be used as the input motion for that piece of equipment.Subsequently, in 1998 the NRC accepted Kewaunee' s USI A-46 program implementation as described in the NRC Safety Evaluation Report in Reference 24.B.5PROTECTION OF CLASS I ITEMS The Class I items are protected against damage from:a.Rupture of a pipe or tank resulting in serious flooding to the extent that the Class I function is impaired.b.Deletedc.Earthquake, by having the abilit y to sustain seismic accelerat ions adopted for purposes of plant design without loss of function. Prot ection from interaction with the surrounding buildings is accomplished by providing a separating joint of sufficient size for earthquake displacements. Unless the building is designed to Class I seismic design, an analysis is made to demonstrate that it will not collapse; otherwise, the systems are protected locally.d.Tornado wind loads.e.Other natural hazards. Examples of these hazards are seiche and ice.f.Fire, in such a way that fire and operation of fire-fi ghting equipment does not cause damage to redundant parts of the system.g.Missiles from different sources. These sources comprise:(i.)Tornado created missiles.
Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-15(ii.)Missiles from component s containing moving parts, which could be subjected to overspeed. (Potential sources for such missiles are diesel engines and gas turbines.)(iii.)DeletedNo protection is required if th e factors described under item a (non-HELB), item f, and item g cannot affect any Class I systems, or if redundant syst ems are provided and the physical separation of these systems is sufficient to prev ent these factors from damaging both systems.
Under item c and item d, redundancy and physical separation may decrease the requirements for protection. If redundancy and physi cal separation are not used, a nd if the surroundi ng building is not designed as a missile barrier, missile protection by shielding is necessary, either by shielding the source itself or by shielding the system.B.6DESIGN CRITERIA FOR STRUCTURES
This section describes the general Design Criteria for Structures used in the plant design. Special situations like protecti on against crane toppling, et c., are given towards the end of this appendix in separate paragraphs.B.6.1 Load CombinationsThe load combinations applicable to Class I, Class I*, Class II, Class III*, Class III, and Class IV Structures are given in detail in subsequent paragraphs and are also listed in Table B.6-1.Class I Structures Class I Structures are analyzed for each of the following conditions of loading:1.Normal Operating ConditionsThe load combinations consist of Dead and Live loads together with the environmental loads (wind and snow) as specified in Section B.4.1.2.Operational Basis Earthquake Conditions The combination consists of Dead, Live, DBA, and snow loads together with the greater of the OBE or Wind loads.3.Design Basis Earthquake ConditionsThe load combination consists of Dead, Live, Snow, and DBA loads together with the DBE loads.4.Tornado Condition Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-16 The load combination consists of Dead and applicable Live loads together with the 300-mph design tornado and tornado missile loads, if any. These loads are assumed non-coincident with DBA or Seismic loads.
In addition to the above four c onditions, windrowed ice loading wa s considered for the following Class I structures:1.The screenhouse water intake structure is located inland from the shore of the Lake Michigan and is not therefore subjected to ice loading.
2.The circulating water intake stru cture is designed for ice loading.Class I* StructuresThose structures de signated as Class I* were analyzed for each of the following conditions of loading:1.Normal Operating Conditions The load combination co nsists of Dead and Live loads to gether with environmental loads (wind and snow).2.Design Basis Earthquake Conditions The load combination consists of Dead, Live, Snow and the DBE loads.Class II Structures Class II Structures were designed for the greater of the following two combinations of loads:1.Dead, Live, and Environmental loads (wind and snow), or 2.Dead, Live, and Uniform Building Code earthqua ke loads specified in Section B.4.5 of this Appendix.Class III* Structures
Class III* Structures were designed for the greater of the two comb inations of loads given above for Class II Structures.Class III Structures Class III Structures were designed for Dead and Live loads togeth er wi th environmental loads (wind and snow).As a minimum, Class III Structures were designed in accord ance with the applicable codes as listed in Section B.3. In accordance with th e Wisconsin Public Service Corporation's normal policy for the design of steam-electric generating stations, certain items of power plant structures in the Class III category were designed according to th e requirements of a higher classification.
Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-17Class IV Structures Class IV structures were designed for Dead and Live loads together with environmental loads (wind and snow) in accordance with the State of Wisconsin Administrative Code.B.6.2 Stress Design Criteria Normal OperationThe allowable stress design criteria that were ap plied for normal operati ng conditions were in accordance with the applicable code(s) listed in Section B.3. These code allowa ble stresses are summarized in Table B.6-2 , Table B.6-3 , and Table B.6-4.Design Basis Accident and Operational Basis Earthquake
The allowable stress design criteria applied for the DBA condition in combination with the OBE were that stresses remain within the allowable limits specified by the applicable code(s) listed herein, except that allowable st resses were not increased for th e earthquake condition as is permitted by some codes. These code allowable stresses are summarized in Table B.6-2 , Table B.6-3 , and Table B.6-4.Safe Shutdown The design criteria for tornado missiles, the 300-mph design tornado conditi on, and also for the DBA in combination with the DBE we re that the reactor can be safely shut down and that there be no uncontrolled release of radioactivity.To meet these criteria, structur es or components were examined for their function in the total system to assure a safe and orderly shut down.
These criteria, as applied to tornado winds, and to the DBA c ondition in combin ation with DBE loads, will permit some permanen t deformation but will not permit loss of structural function. In this sense, structural function is defined to mean that structures wi ll remain intact and continue to support their normal operating loads after an earthquake and/or DBA, but may require repair or replacement for future continued use.
Tornado missiles may result in large local deformati ons, but the criteria will not permit the missile to breach the barrier so th at essential safety features functions are jeopardized.B.6.3 Structural Design Basis Class I Structures The designs of Class I structures for seismic, tornado winds , tornado missiles, etc., are given in subsequent paragraphs.
Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-18 Seismic Design For dynamic analysis, an equivalent mu lti-mass mathematical mo del was constructed to approximate the structural system. The ef fect of the foundation soils was included in the model by means of equivalent springs. The spectral met hod was then used to determine the maximum response of each mass po int for each node, usi ng as input the OBE (Plate 8 in Appendix A) and the damping factors given in Table B.6-5. The total response for each point was determined by the root-mean-square metho
- d. From this, a set of curves was developed which s how the variation with height of the maximum tr anslational accelerati ons, displacements , shears and moments in the structure. All of the above work was performed by John A.
Blume and Associates and is reported in detail in a separately submitted Topical Report JAB-PS-01(s) (hereinafter referred to as "The Blume Report"). Vertical acceleration equal to two-thirds the horizontal ground acceleration was applied to the structure.
Operational Basis Earthquake Using the data presented in the Blume Report, stre sses were computed for th e various parts of the plant structures. The stresses resulting from bot h horizontal and vertic al acceleration were combined to obtain the total eart hquake stresses. Earthquake stresse s were then added linearly and directly to stresses caused by DBA, snow, dead loads, and the approp riate operating loads to obtain the total stresses. The total stresses were reviewed to ensure that they were within the maximum stress limits as established in Table B.6-2 and Table B.6-3. Direct superposition of stresses has been used for all loads except miss ile impact and contact points of pipe rupture restraints. For these loads the material is stre ssed beyond the elastic range. Design procedures for missile impacts are given in the section entitled Tornado Missiles of this appendix.
Design Basis Earthquake The forces for the DBE were take n to be two times the forces as determined by the spectral analyses for the OBE. S tresses were combined as before and it was established that they were within limits as indicated in Table B.6-2 and Table B.6-3.Tornado Winds Structures were analyzed for stresses due to to rnado and missile loads. Stresses due to tornado loading were combined with stresses due to dead loads and the appropriate operating loads to obtain a total stress. Maximum stresses were limited to those specified in Table B.6-2.Tornado Missiles
Spectrum of Missiles Considered Many missiles were considered , but only the most damaging mi ssiles were used for design.
Missiles were assumed to be generated by explos ive inje ction due to pressure differential, by building component failure, a nd by aerodynamic lifting, each resu lting in an airborne or Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-19 free-falling missile.
Only objects with lar ge su rface-to-weight ratios woul d remain airborne long enough to attain high ho rizontal velocities. Table B.6-6 lists the missiles considered and the maximum velocities that w ould be attained by each.
Design for Missiles The design basis missile protection criteria (Reference 36) states "systems required to shut the plant down and to keep the plant in a safe shutdown condition shall not be prevented from performing their function by external missiles." It also states: "pro tection of the equipment relied upon to provide reasonable assurance of safe plant operation ca n be achieved by either housing or making them part of redundant sy stems with such physical separation that sufficient back-up is provided to assure no loss-of-function of them."
Systems, structures, an d components (SSC) were designed to meet the design basis missile protection criteria, consideri ng the spectrum of design basi s missiles and the limiting, most damaging design basis missile for that specific SSC. Systems re lied upon for safe shutdown and safe plant operation in a tornado event were eith er placed (housed) in a class 1 structure for protection or designed as a redundant system with sufficient physical separation to ensure that the single limiting, most damaging DB missile would not cause a loss of function of that system.
Systems with peripheral, unprot ected SSC were evaluated for to rnado effects to address the potential vulnerabilities in these systems (References 37 , 38 , 39). Based on these evaluations it was concluded that: 1) the system design is in compliance with the original design basis tornado missile protection criteria
- 2) there is adequate physical sepa ration and redundancy in the design to ensure that the system is capabl e of performing its desi gn function required in a tornado event for safe shutdown 3) the plant will be able to withstand the consequen ces of the tornado, will retain the capability to achieve and maintain the reactor in a safe shutdown condition, and there will be no uncontrolled release of radioactivity as a resu lt of the tornado even t 4) the unprotected peripheral SSC in these system s can reasonably be exempt from the requirement for specific missile barriers without jeopardizing the health and safety of the public.
The concept in analysis and design considered impact to be a plastic collis i on between the missile and the structure.
Tornado missiles generall y are of an intermediate energy level. Their total kinetic energy is dissipated by energy absorption of the affected struct ure as a whole. This results from the elastic and plastic response of the structure to the impact force, energy absorptio n by the missile itself due to plastic deformation of the missile, and by the building structure missile barrier member due to local plastic deformation.
A missile barrier of reinforced concrete will react to missile impact as a combination of non-ductile concrete and ductile reinforc ing steel. The mode of conc rete failure w ill be brittle fracture such as might result from punching shear. Shear cracks will occur at the impact area Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-20 perimeter and progress outward as concentric perimetric rings of fracture. A reinforced concrete member will respond elas tically and plastically as a moment-resisting reinforced concrete element up to the point of brittle fracture of the concrete, and then the reinforcement will respond as tensile strands in membrane actions, elongating plastically to absorb the kinetic energy.The problem of establishing a missile barrier can be subdivided according to the behavioral response of the characteristic structural el ement, i.e., slab, wall, beam, and column.
Slab and walls can respond by perfo rating or shear failure, plasti c bending, and finally forming a tensile membrane as described above.
A comparison was made of various penetration formulas such as the Army Corps of Engineers, Ballistic Research Laboratory, a nd Modified Petry before selection of the Mo dified Petry formula as the most commonly used and be st fit to the controlling cond itions. None of the available formulas developed from empirical ballistic information were particularly suited to tornado missile problem solutions.
In using the Petry formula, the usua l rule is to make a slab or wall of a thickness at least twice the penetration determined by the se cond Modified Petry formula for concrete of fi nite thickness. This was done assuming all deformation to occu r in the concrete (ind estructible missile). A correction factor was applied to st eel missiles of non-circ ular or open cross-section, such as steel girts and steel pipe, so that th e area used in the Petry formul a to determine the theoretical penetration of an indestru ctible missile was three times the net cross-sect ional area of the steel.
Assumption of an indestructible missile leads to very high peak loads and shear stresses when making an analysis for impulse loading, therefor e, experiments of limited scope were performed which verified that almo st all of the local plastic deformat ion would occur in the wood (for a wood missile) impacting on concrete, a nd that st eel missiles would enter a plastic range while penetrating concrete.To provide a workable solution for applying the Petry formula to a wood missile, a "K" value predicted on plastic deformation (or destruction) of the wood was used to determine the "penetration" or deceleration path, and from this a peak load was obtained. In the case of the steel missile, the peak load is limited by the short-duration yield strength of the steel.Table B.6-6 is a tabulation of tornado-generated mi ssiles, which shows th e weight to cross sectional area ratio and gives the impact velocity of the worst case for these missiles. All tornado-generated missiles were assumed to impact end on at 90 degrees to the surface being impacted, and all areas of Class I structures exposed to either falling or horizontally flying torn ado missiles are investigated. The tornado missiles were as sumed to come from stored material, destruction of lower class structures, off-site cons truction, etc. The peak loads associated with the various missiles are as follows:
Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-21*Horizontal flying wood plank400 kips*Vertical falling wood plank288 kips
- Steel girts 197 and 257 kips*Steel pipe 180 kips*Automobile 182 kips Using the peak load, slabs and walls were analyzed for their response to shear (approximately at the ultimate strength of the concrete, in shear) a nd ability to develop plas tic hinges and a tensile membrane of reinforcing steel. After the shear fail ure of the slab or wall, the plastic deformation of the longitudinal reinforcing is calculated not to exceed a strain of 5 percent.Reinforced concrete beams in a horizontal plane were analyzed for impulse loading. A rectangular force-time curve was assumed so that the methods contained in Reference 1 could be used. The dynamic system was established, includi ng boundary conditions, size of member , member characteristics, reinforc ing, loading, span, etc., to dete rmine the natural frequency and plastic strength of the member. Fr om the peak load previously found and the plastic resistance, the ductility factor was determined and this was conservatively limited to 6. If this is exceeded, the beam is redesigned to limit the duc tility factor to 6. Th e dynamic reactions were calculated for the elastic or plastic strain range, as required, and combined with other loads (Dead loads, etc.). A minimum value of missile impact reaction of 300 kips was used in order to provide a minimum shear strength capability for mi ssiles impacting near a support.The allowable shear stresses used were: 4 f 'c d for reinforced beam webs, 6 f 'c d for d/2 stirrup spacing, 10 f 'c d for d/4 stirrup spacing where: = 0.85, and d = 1.25, f 'c = ultimate compressive strength of concrete, and using a minimum we b reinforcement of 0.15 percent bs (beam width, b x bar spacing, s).
Stirrup stress wa s limited to 0.85 times 1.25 f y (yield strength of reinfo rcing bars) and bond stress was limited to 0.15f
'c with 0.85 of the summation of the perimeter of bars.
Beams designed by this pr ocedure will have very minimal plastic deflect ion under tornado missile impact. Beams, which were too small to comply with the above requirements were investigated for the capability to hang from adjacent sl abs as a thickened portion of the slab.
Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-22 Columns were designed for a 300-kip missile imp act load, centered on top, combined with all other applicable loading. The 300-kip load was chosen to es tablish a minimum strength in columns subject to missile impact and exceeds the dyna mic reaction fro m the beams.The stress level in columns under the above loading was limited to 1.5 times the ACI code allowable stress to provide a higher factor of safety in the column s than that used in beam and slab design.The listed procedures were conser vative and provide for missile barr iers that can absorb sufficient missile energy to reduce the missile velocity to zero without physical breach of the barrier, and keep cracking and plastic deform ation within acceptable levels.Class I* Structures The design of Class I* Structures is similar to the design of Class I Structures for seismic loads only , as detailed previ ously in this section.
In all other respects the de sign requirements of Class I* Structures are identical to the design requirements of Class III Structures, as detailed below.Class II StructuresStructures in this class we re designed for the conditions of loading specified in Section B.6.1 and Table B.6-1 and in accordance with the design methods and allowable stresses specified in the codes listed in Section B.3. Stresses were combined as before and reviewed to assure that they were within the limits set forth in Table B.6-4.Class III* Structures The design of Class III* Structures is simila r to the design of Class II Structures for the condition of loading specified in Section B.6.1 and Table B.6-1.In all other respects the de sign of Class III* Structures is identical to the design of Class III Structures as detailed below.Class III StructuresStructures in this class we re designed for the conditions of loading specified in Section B.6.1 and Table B.6-1 , and in accordance with the design method s and allowable stresses specified in the codes listed in Section B.3. Stresses were combined as before and reviewed to assure that they were within the limits set forth in Table B.6-4.
Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-23Class IV StructuresStructures in this class we re designed for the conditions of loading specified in Section B.6.1 and Table B.6-1 and comply with the requirements of the State of Wisconsin Administrative Code. These facilities provide staff wo rking space, employee f acilities, and material and record storage space. These structures are designe d to be independent of other pl ant structures except for minor loads imposed at the interconnection to existing facilities. These struct ures connect to Class III or Class III* structures only.Mixed Classification Structures A Class I area located in a lower class structure was treated as a Class I structural system within the lower class structure.
Components of the Class I structural system which were requi red to meet the total structural function of this system may extend into the lowe r class area and were analyzed for their Class I function. These components include related foundations, s upporting structures and overhead structures.
The design provisions made where a structure of a lower seismic design classification is adjacent to a structure of a higher classi fication to prevent damage to th e higher classification structure under conditions associated with design basis seismic or tornado events were as follows:*The mathematical model of the Reactor, Auxi liary and Turbine Buildings including the steel framed structures were all considered as one interconnected st ructure for the dynamic earthquake analysis. The resultant acceleration displacements, shears and torques have all been included in the design of the interconn ected Class II struct ures, thus making the structural elements higher classi fication. At joints where seismi c separations between adjacent structures were required a gap equal to twice the sum of their respective displacements was provided.*Smaller lower class structures appending the ma in structures were an alyzed under Class II seismic requirements in accordance with this appendix. These structures were reviewed to assure that the effects of a DB E would not damage the higher-grade structures sufficiently to affect the safe and orderly shutdown of the reactor.The Class I concrete structures were analyzed and de signed to withstand the effects of a tornado in accordance with the parameters as established in this appendix.Steel-framed structures are enclosed with meta l siding and roof decking.
The siding and a portion of the roof decking have been attached with pr essure relief fasteners to vent the building from tornado pressures and forces. This will prevent the stresses in the main structural frames from exceeding the allowable li mits established in this appendix, a nd thus prevent their collapse onto Class I structures.
Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-24 The design assures that a failure of adjacent lower class structur es due to earthquake, tornado winds or missiles will not cause a loss of function to the Class I structure by direct or indirect failure of structural components.
Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-25Table B.6-1 LOAD COMBINATIONS FOR STRUCTURESClass of Structures Conditions of LoadingClass IClass I*Class IIClass III*Class IIIClass IVNormal OperatingDead + Live + Wind + Snow Dead + Live + Wind + Snow Dead + Live + Wind + Snow Dead + Live + Wind + Snow Dead + Live + Wind + Snow Dead + Live + Wind + SnowOperational Basis Earthquake (OBE)
Dead + Live +
DBA + Snow +
Greater of the OBE or WindNANANANANA Design Basis
Dead + Live +
Snow + DBA + DBE Dead + Live +
Snow + DBENANANANATornadoDead + Live +
300 mph Design Tornado + Tornado Missile, if anyNANANANANA Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-26 OtherIn addition to above, jet forces ice loads, pipe rupture loads, etc., whichever is applicableNADead + Live +
Uniform Building Code Zone 1 earthquake loads (see Section B.4.5)
Dead + Live + Uniform Building Code Zone 1 earthquake loads (see Section B.4.5)NAWind + Snow Loads are specified in the State of Wisconsin
Administrative Code as 80 mph and 30 lb/ft 2 Note: N/A = Not ApplicableTable B.6-1 (continued)LOAD COMBINATIONS FOR STRUCTURESClass of Structures Conditions of LoadingClass IClass I*Class IIClass III*Class IIIClass IV Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-27Table B.6-2APPLICABLE CODE STRESSES CLASS I STRUCTURES: REINFORCED CONCRETE - STRUCTURAL STEELLoading ConditionReinforced ConcreteStructural Steel1.Normal Operating Condition:
Dead and Live Loads + Environmental Loads (Wind + Snow)
ACI 318-63 allowable valuesAISC allowable values2.Operational Basis Earthquake Condition:
Dead + Live + DBA + Snow + Greater of the OBE OR Wind ACI 318-63 allowable valuesAISC allowable values3.Design Basis Earthquake Condition:
Dead Loads + Live + Snow Loads + DBA +
DBE Load 1 1/2 times ACI 318-63 allowable values 1 1/2 times AISC allowable values4.Tornado Condition:
Dead Loads + Live Loads + 300 mph Design Tornado (Does not include Tornado Missile)f c = 0.75 f '
c f s = 0.90 Y.S.
f s = 0.90 Y.S.Where: f '
c= Minimum 28-day compressive strength of concrete f c = Compressive stress in concrete f s = Tensile Stress in steel Y.S.=Specified minimum yield strength or yield point of steel Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-28Table B.6-3APPLICABLE CODE STRESSES: CLASS I STRUCTURESLoading ConditionCriteria Concrete Stresses f cReinforced Steel Stresses615 Grade 40A 615 Grade 60 Allowable Working Stress psi Percent of Min. Spec. Yield 1 Allowable Working Stress psi Percent of Min. Spec. Yield 1 Normal Operating Condition ACI 318-63
Allowable values0.45 f 'c 20,000 50 24,000 40Operational Basis
Earthquake ACI 318-63 Allowable Values0.45 f 'c 20,000 50 24,000 40 Design Basis
Earthquake 11/2 times ACI 318-63 allowable values0.675 f 'c 30,000 75 36,000 601.Minimum specified yield points of steel reinforcements are as follows:
A615 Grade 4040,000 psi A615 Grade 6060,000 psi Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-29Table B.6-4ALLOWABLE STRESSES: CLASS I*, II, III*, III AND IV STRUCTURESClassLoading Condition CriteriaI*Item (3), Table B.6-2 and Table B.6-3Item (3), Table B.6-2 and Table B.6-3IIDead load plus live loads, plus greater of wind plus snow or Zone I earthquake ACI 318-63 and AISC allowable
stresses with no increase in
stresses for earthquake conditionIII*Same as for Class II above ACI 318-63 and AISC allowable stresses with no increase in stresses for earthquake conditionIIIItem (1), Table B.6-2ACI 318-63 and AISC allowable stressesIVItem (1), Table B.6-2State of Wisconsin Administrative Code Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-30Table B.6-5DAMPING FACTORSItem Percent ofCritical Damping*Reactor Containment vessel 1.0 Shield Building 2.0 Reactor containment vessel internal concrete 5.0Steel frame structures 2.0 Reinforced concrete construction 2.0 Piping systems 0.5 Electrical and mechanical equipment evaluated in accordance with the Blume Report (Reference 9) 1.0 Foundation soils 5.0Electrical and mechanical equipment evaluated in accordance with the SQUG GIP**5.0*The maximum percent of critical damping factors given is applied to both the OBE and the DBE.** See Section B.4.8.Note: At and below the mezzanine floor level, the Shield Building, Auxiliary Building, and Containment System are interconnected so as to comprise a monolithic structure. The many shear walls below this level in the Auxiliary Building, the grout under the Reactor Containment Vessel, and the shear walls in the Containment System all combine to form a very stiff connection between the Basement level and the Mezzanine level. For this reason, the mathematical model used for the dynamic analysis of these buildings considers that they are rigid between these two levels. Above mezzanine floor level these concrete buildings are not interconnected and the individual damping values are used (i.e., 5 percent for Auxiliary Building, 2 percent for Shield Building, and 5 percent for Reactor Containment Vessel internal concrete construction).
Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-31Table B.6-6TORNADO-GENERATED MISSILES MissileWeight (lb)Weight to Cross Sectional Area Ratio (lb/sq in.)
Explosive Injection Height (ft)Elevation of Origin AboveTarget (ft)Total Height of Drop (ft)VerticalVelocity (ft/sec)VerticalEnergy (ft-lb)HorizontalVelocity (ft/sec)HorizontalEnergy(ft-lb)Wood Plank 4 in x 12 in x 12 ft - 0 in Rough Douglas Fir 150 150 3.1 3.1112 NA 67 NA 179 NA 108 NA 27,168 NA NA 440 NA 450,930Steel Girt W 10 in x 11.5 in x 20 ft - 0 in A36 Steel 230 230 6.8 6.8 92 NA 67 NA 159 NA 102 NA 37,157 NA NA 35 NA 4375Steel Girt W 8 in x 15 in x 20 ft- 0 in A36 Steel 300 300 6.8 6.8 35 NA 67 NA 102 NA 81 NA 30,564 NA NA 35 NA 5707 Steel Pipe 4 in STD. 10.79 lb/ft 4.5 in O.D. x 20 ft - 0 in 216 216 6.8 6.8 10 NA 67 NA 77 NA 70 NA 16,435 NA NA 66 NA 14,610 Automobile40000.525NANANANA73330,990Notes:All tornado missiles are assumed to impact end-on, at 90 degrees to surface being impacted.
NA = Not Applicable Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-32Table B.6-7 INTERNALLY-GENERATED MISSILES INSIDE OF CONTAINMENT MissileWeight to Cross Sectional Area Ratio (lb/sq. in.)Velocity(ft/sec)Impact Point 3 in Motor Operator Isolation Valve 14.1100Missile Shield Slab6 in x 6 in Valve (Safety Relief Valve) 9.375Missile Shield Slab 3 in Air operator Relief Valve 2.450Missile Shield Slab Housing Plug 1.8240Reactor Vessel Missile Shield Drive Shaft 49.5151Reactor Vessel Missile Shield Drive Shaft and
Drive Mech.
13514.3Reactor Vessel Missile ShieldNote: All internally generated missiles are assumed to impact at 90 degrees.
Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-33B.7DESIGN CRITERIA FOR COMPONENTS This section describes the genera l design criteria for all mechanic al, electrical, instrument, and control components used in the plant design.B.7.1 Load Combinations The load combinations applicable to Class I, Class I*, Class II, Class III*, and Class III Components are given in detail in subsequent paragraphs and are also listed in Table B.7-1. The term Live loads when used on components consists of thermal and pressure loads.
Class I Components Class I Components were analyzed for each of the followi ng conditions of loading:
1*Normal Operating Condition The load combination consists of Dead and Li ve loads, together with Environmental loads (wind or snow), wherever applicable.*Normal and OBE Condition The load combination consists of Dead and Live loads, together with the greater of the OBE or Wind loads.*Normal and DBE ConditionThe load combination consists of Dead and Live, together with DBE, loads.*Normal and Pipe Rupture The load combinations consists of Dead, Live , and pipe rupture loads, excluding loads from pipe rupture in the reactor coolant loop.*Normal and DBE and Pipe RuptureThe load combination consists of Dead, Live, DBE loads, and pipe rupture loads, excluding loads from pipe rupture in the reactor coolant loop.1.Replacement steam generator lower units are designed and analyzed to loading combinations defined in Design Specifications 414A03, consistent with ASME Code,Section III, Division 1, Subsection NB, Class 1, 1986 Edition through 1987 Addenda. The original steam domes are analyzed in the same manner as the replacement lower units.
Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-34 Class I* Components Those components designated as Class I* were analyzed for each of the followi ng conditions of loading:*Normal Operating ConditionThe load combination consists of Dead and Live loads, together with Environmental loads, if applicable.*Normal and DBE Condition The load combination consists of Dead, Live and DBE loads.
Class II Components
Class II Components were designed for the greater of the following two combination of loads:*Dead, Live and Environmental loads, if applicable, or
,*Dead, Live, and Uniform Building Code (UBC) loads specified in Section B.4.5 of this Appendix.Class III* Components
Class III* Components were designated for the greater of the two co mbinations of loads given abo ve for Class II components.
Class III Components Class III components were designed for Dead and Live loads, together with Environmental loads, if applicable.As a minimum, Class III components were designe d in accordance with the applicable codes as listed in Section B.3. In addition, in accordance with the Wi sconsin Public Serv ice Corporation' s normal policy for the design of steam-electric generating stati ons, certain components of the power plant in the Class III category were designed according to the requ irements of a higher classification.
B.7.2 Design Criteria1.Deleted 2.Deleted Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-351.Deleted2.Deleted3.Deleted4.Deleted5.Deleted 6.Deleted1.Deleted 2.Deleted3.Deleted 4.Deleted Design Criteria for Class I* Components
- 1.Deleted 2.Deleted3.Deleted Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-36 Mechanical and Electrical EquipmentThe following information is HISTORICAL and is not intended or expected to be updated.Westinghouse-Furnished EquipmentThe Standard Westinghouse 2-loop analysis used an envelope of response acceleration spectra which was more conservative than those presented in the Blume Report (Reference 9).The Seismic criteria for Westinghouse fu rnished equipment were as follows:1.Equipment specifications to vendors required that Westinghouse-supplied Seismic Class I Auxiliary Pumps be designed by the vendor to operate during horizontal and vertical acceleration of 1.0g and 0.67g, respectively and simultaneously. The sum of the primary stresses shall not exceed Section III of the ASME Code fo r pressure-containing members and other critical components.2.Seismic Class I tanks were designed by West inghouse PWR to withstand the simultaneous horizontal and vertical forces resulting from the amplifie d ground accelera tion response spectrum curves for the DBE.3.Seismic Class I valves were designed by the vendor to withstand seismic loadings equivalent to 3.0g in the horizontal direction and 2.0g in the vertical direction.To assure that Westinghouse-supplied NSSS Class I mechanical components met the above seismic design criteria, the foll owing procedure was implemented:1.The acceleration factor was included in the Equipment Specification and the vendor had to certify the adequacy of the component to meet this seismic requirement.2.The vendor's drawings and calculations we re reviewed by the cognizant engineer responsible for the particular component to determine whether the component met all specification requirements3.Based on engineering judgment and detailed analyses on similar equipment, the cognizant engineer eithera.Accepted the component, orb.Rejected the component as inadequa te, or recommende d modifications, orc.Requested that the engineeri ng analysis section review th e drawing details and perform a detailed analysis, if deemed necessary, using one of th e methods described in the following paragraph.To conform to the above, seismic analysis of selected NSSS Seismic Class I components including heat exchangers, pumps , tanks and valves was performed by Westinghouse using one of three methods depending on the relative ri gidity of the equipment being analyzed:
Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-37 Balance of Plant Equipment The seismic design criteria for balance of plant Class I (seismic) mechanical components and electrical equipment are described as follows:1.For the OBE, the mechanical components and electrical equipm ent shall be designed to be capable of continued safe oper ation within normal design limits when subjected to the combination of normal loads and OBE loads.2.For the DBE, the mechanical components and electrical equipment are designed so that the deflections or distortions resulting from the combination of normal loads and twice the OBE loads shall not prevent their pr oper functioning, shall not endanger adjacent or attached equipment, and shall not cause the equipment to operate in an uncontrolled manner.In order to meet these seismic design criteria the following measures were taken for seismic design and restraint:1.Equipment which is rigid and rigidly attached to the supporting struct ure is analyzed for loading equal to the acceleration of the supporting structure at the appropriate elevation; 2.Equipment which is not rigi d, and therefore a potential fo r response to the support motion exists, is analyzed for the pe ak of the floor response cu rve with appropriate damping values;3.In some instances, non-rigid equipment is analyzed using a mu lti-degree-of-freedom modal analysis including the effect of modal participation factors and mode shapes together with the spectral moti ons of the floor response spect rum defined at the support of the equipment.The inertial forces, moments, and stresses are determined for each mode. They are then summed using the square-root sum-of-the-squares method. A suff icient number of masses are included in the mathematical mo dels to insure that coupling effects of members within the component are properly considered. The results of these analyses indicate that the models contain more masses than necessary. The met hod of dynamic analysis uses a proprietary computer code called WESTDYN. This code uses as input, inertia values, member sectional properties, elastic charac teristics, support restraint data ch aracteristics, and the appropriate seismic response spectrum. Both horizontal and vertical components of the seismic response spectrum are applied simultaneously. The modal participation factors are combined with the mode shapes and the envelope seismic response sp ectra to give the structural response for each mode. The inertial forces, moments, and stress es are computed for each mode, from which the modal stresses are determined. The stresses are then summed using the square-root sum-of-the-squares method.In general, no additional restraints beyond those normally provided are required to assure seismic adequacy.The following information is HISTORICAL and is not intended or expected to be updated.
Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-381.The mechanical component or electrical equipmen t and its supports were designed to be sufficiently rigid so that its natural frequency or frequencies will be out of the range of resonance with the building st ructure where it is located, ba sed on the response acceleration spectrum curves established in the earthquake analysis prepared by Jo hn A. Blume and Associates.2.The maximum stresses induced from the comb ination of normal loads plus OBE loads were maintained below the allowable stress limit of the material as given in the applicable codes.3.The maximum stresses induced from the combination of norma l loads plus twice the OBE loads were limited to less than 90 percent of the yield strength of the material under consideration, and the deflections or distortions were so limited that they will not affect proper functioning of the equipment.
The analytical or testing methods utilized to verify the adequacy of the above are described as follows:1.Analytical Methods a.Where practical the natural frequency or frequencies of the component or equipment under consideration were de termined by the use of a proper mathematical model.b.For a single-degree-of-freedom model, the natural period was used to determine the horizontal and vertical response accelerations from the structural floor response acceleration spectra. These accelerations we re applied at the mass center of the component simultaneously and the system was analyzed statically.c.For a multiple-degree-of-f reedom model, where practic al, the modal superposition method was used to determine th e response of the dynamic system.d.For those components for which the natural fr equency could not be determined, the peak value of the structur al floor response accelerations for the a ppropriate mass point multiplied by the maximum tors ional acceleration factor at the mass center of the component were applied and the se ismic forces were determined.e.For the DBE, the response acceleration va lues are twice those used for the OBE.2.Testing Methods: (one of the following)a.Continuous TestThe test was executed at frequencies incr emented within the range of significant structural response of the appli cable structural response spectr
- a. The test consisted of the application of a continuous sinusoidal motion co rresponding to the ma ximum structural acceleration for which th e equipment was to be qualified and for an appropriate length of time. The equipment was properly mounted during testing so as to reflect the field-installed condition.
Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-39b.Sine Beat Test Natural or resonant fr equencies were detected by scanning from the lo west practical frequency to 25 Hz. The test at resonant frequencies consisted of the application of sine beats of peak acceleration values correspondi ng to that for which the equipment was to be qualified. The duration of the beat for each particular test frequency was chosen to most nearly produce a magnitude of equipmen t response equivalent to that produced by the particular floor accelera tion with proper damp ing ratio. The equi pment was properly mounted during testing so as to re flect the field-installed condition.
Seismic input values used for analysis or tes ting purposes to verify the adequacy of Class I (seismic) components were obtained from T opical Report JAB-PS-03 prepared by John A. Blume and Associates, Engineers (Reference 9).Instrumentation and Control Systems The design bases for protection-grade equipment (Class I) with respect to earthquakes were that for an OBE or DBE, the equipmen t was designed to ensure that it did not lose its capability to perform its function; i.e., shut the plant down and/or maintain the unit in a safe shutdown condition. For the DBE, the capability of the protection equipment to perform its function was maintained.
If a seismic disturbance occurs subsequent to an accident, the instrumentation and electrical equipment associated with emergenc y core cooling will not be inte rrupted during this disturbance.
Initial evaluation of Protection System equipment for its ability to withsta nd the seismic condition was typically done by actual vi bration-type testing of typical protection-grade equipment.
Mathematical models derived fr om empirical tests were not nor mally used for seismic design evaluation of instrumentation. However , in the abse nce of empirical test da ta, such as may be the case for very large equipment (for example, control room pane ls), evaluation may have been supported by mathematical analysis or some combination of mathematical analyses and prototype testing. (See Reference 4 for discussion and documentation of some test program results).Design Criteria for Class II and Class III* Components Components in this class are designed for the conditions of loading specified in Table B.7-1 and in accordance with the design methods and allowable stresses sp ecified in the codes listed in Section B.3. Stresses are combined as for Class I above and reviewed to assure that they are within the limits set forth in the applicable codes.
Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-40 Design Criteria for Class III Components Components in this class are designed for the conditions of loading specified in Table B.7-1 and in accordance with the design methods and allowable stresses sp ecified in the codes listed in Section B.3.
Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-41Table B.7-1LOAD COMBINATIONS FOR COMPONENTS CLASS OF COMPONENTSCondition of LoadingClass I 1, 2Class I* 3Classes II and III*Class III1.NormalDead + Live +
Environmental Loads (Snow or Wind) If
ApplicableDead + Live +
Environmental Loads (Snow or Wind) If Applicable Dead + Live +
Environmental Loads (Snow or Wind) If
Applicable Dead + Live +
Environmental Loads (Snow or Wind) If
Applicable2.Normal and Operational Basis Earthquake (OBE)Dead + Live + Greater of the OBE or Wind
LoadsNADead + Live + UBC Loads NA3.Normal and Design Basis Earthquake (DBE)
Dead + Live +
DBE Loads Dead + Live +
DBE LoadsNANA4.Normal and Pipe RuptureDead + Live + Pipe Rupture Loads Except
RCL Pipe Breaks NA NA NA5.Normal Design Basis Earthquake and Pipe Rupture Dead + Live + DBE +
Pipe Rupture Loads
Except RCL Pipe Breaks NA NA NANote: NA = Not Applicable1.The replacement steam generator lower units were designed and analyzed to loading combinations defined in Design Specification 414A03, consistent with ASME Code,Section III, Division 1, Subsection NB, Class 1, 1986 Edition through 1987 Addenda. The original steam domes were analyzed in the same manner as the replacement lower units.2.The replacement reactor vessel head was designed and analyzed to loading combinations defined in WCAP-16237-P, Rev 1, Addendum 2, consistent with ASME Code,Section III, Division 1, Subsection N.3, Class 1, 1998 Edition through 2000 Addenda. This methodology was approved by NRC for application to KPS under Letter No. K-04-035, License Amendment 172, dated February 27, 2004.3.The upgraded Auxiliary Building crane is also designed to withstand two-blocking, load hang-up, and broken wire rope without an uncontrolled lowering of the load, in accordance with NUREG-0554.
Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-42Table B.7-2LOADING CONDITIONS AND STRESS LIMITS: PRESSURE VESSELSLoading ConditionsStress Intensity LimitsNote*1.Normal Condition(a) P m < S m (b) P m (or P L) + P B < 1.5 S m (c) P m (or P L) + P B + Q < 3.0 S m 1 22.Upset Condition(a) P m < S m (b) P m (or P L) + P B < 1.5 S m (c) P m (or P L) + P B + Q < 3.0 S m 1 23.Emergency Condition(a) P <
1.2 S m or S y, whichever is larger (b) P m (or P L) + P B < 1.8 S m , or 1.5 S y, whichever is larger 34.Faulted Condition(a) Stainless Steel Design Limit Curves as given in Figure B.7-2 and Figure B.7-3 (b) Carbon Steel(i) P m = 1.5 S m or 1.2 S y, whichever is larger (ii) P m (or P L) + P B < 2.25 S m or 1.875 S y, whichever is larger 4 P m = primary general memb rane stress intensity P L = primary local membrane stress intensity P B = primary bending stress intensity Q = secondary stress intensity S m = stress intensity value from ASME B&PV Code,Section III, Nuclear Vessels S y = minimum specified material yiel d strength (ASME B&PV Code,Section III, Table N-424 or equivalent)
- For description of notes, see Notes For Tables B.7-2, B.7-3, And B.7-6.
Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-43Table B.7-3LOADING CONDITIONS AND STRESS LIMITS: PRESSURE PIPING IN ACCORDANCE WITH USAS B31.1 Loading ConditionsStress Limits1.Normal Condition P < S2.Upset ConditionP <
1.2S3.Emergency ConditionP <
1.5 (1.2S)4.Faulted Condition For stainless steel Design Limit Curves as defined in Figure B.7-3, See Note 4 a For carbon steel P < S y or 1.8S, whichever is higher bWhere:P = Stress S = Allowable stress from USAS B31.1, Code for Power Piping, 1967 S y = Minimum specified yield strength (ASME B&PV Code,Section III, Table N-424 or equivalent)a.For description of Note 4, see Notes For Tables B.7-2, B.7-3, And B.7-6.b.At some points of high local stress, intensification P may exceed this limit. For such points, local piping deflection will be limited to twice the calculated OBE deflection to ensure no loss of function in the "Faulted Condition."
Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-44Notes For Tables B.7-2, B.7-3, And B.7-6Note 1The limits on local me mbrane stress intensity (P L < 1.5S m) and primary membrane plus primary bending stress intensity [P M (or P L) + P B < 1.5S M] need not be satisfied at a specific location if it can be shown by means of limit analysis, or by tests, that the specified loadings do not exceed two-thirds of the lower bound collapse load as per paragraph N-417.6 (b) of the ASME B&PV Code,Section III, Nuclear Vessels.Note 2In lieu of satisfying the specific requirements for the lo cal membrane stress intensity (P L < 1.5S m), or the primary plus secondary stress intensity (P L + P B + Q < 3S M) at the specific location, the structural acti on may be calculated on a plastic basis and the design will be considered to be acceptable if shakedown occurs, as opposed to continuing deformation, and if the deformations which occur prior to shakedown do not exceed specified limits, as per pa ragraph N-417.6 (a) (2) of the ASME B&PV Code,Section III, Nuclear Vessels.Note 3The limits on local me mbrane stress intensity (P L < 1.5S m) and primary membrane plus primary bending intensity [P m (or P L) + P B < 1.5S M] need not be satisfied at a specific location if it can be shown by means of limit analysis, or by test, that the specified loadings do not exceed 120 percent of two thirds of the lower-bound
collapse load as per paragraph N417.10 (c) of the ASME B&PV Code,Section III, Nuclear Vessels.
Note 4 aAs an alternate to the design limit curves which represent a pseudoplastic instability analysis, a plastic instability analysis ma y be performed in some specific cases considering the actual strain-h ardening characteristic of th e material, but with yield strength adjusted to correspond to the tabulat ed value at the appropriate temperature in Table N-424 or N-425, as per paragraph N-417.11 (c) of the ASME B&PV Code,Section III, Nuclear Vessels. These specific cases will be just ified on an individual basis.a.This alternate design procedure was not utilized on this application.
Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-45Table B.7-4 LOADING CONDITIONS AND STRESS LIMITS: EQUIPMENT SUPPORTSLoading ConditionsStress Limits1.Normal ConditionWorking stresses or a pplicable factored load design values2.Upset ConditionWorking stresses or a pplicable factored load design values 3.Emergency ConditionWithin yield after lo ad redistribution to maintain supported equipment within emergency condition stress limits4.Faulted ConditionPermanent deflection of supports limited to maintain supported equipment within faulted condition stress limitsTable B.7-5LOAD COMBINATION AND STRESS LIMITS FOR CLASS I COMPONENTS Load CombinationStress Limit 1.Normal** (deadweight, thermal and pressure)Normal Condition2.Normal and Operational Basis EarthquakeUpset Condition3.Normal and Design Basis EarthquakeFaulted Condition
- 4.Normal and Pipe RuptureFaulted Condition5.Normal and Design Basis Earthquake and Pipe RuptureFaulted Condition*This load combination may be evaluated by the emergency condition stress limit.**For Class I piping, stresses due to restrained thermal expansion are treated in accordance with USAS B31.1.0-1967, Power Piping.
Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-46Table B.7-6 ALTERNATIVE DESIGN LOADING COMBINATIONS AND STRESS LIMITS:
PRESSURE CLASS 1, 2, AND 3 PIPING IN ACCORDANCE WITH ASME SECTION IIICondition ASME Section III Code ClassDesign Loading CombinationsPrimary Stress P m (P 1) + P b Equation 9Primary + Secondary Stress P m (P 1) + P b + Q Equation 10Peak Stress P m (P 1) + P b + Q + F Equation 14Normal and Upset1 (NB-3600)Design pressure, weight, OBE, and other mechanical loads (Equation 9) Pressure, Thermal Expansion and Thermal Gradients (steady-state and transient) (Equation 10, 14) 1.8S m but not greater than 1.5S y (See Notes 1 & 2) 3S m (See Notes 1 & 2)Salt = KS p/2 Cumulative usage factor less than 1Emergency1 (NB-3600) Design pressure, weight, DBE, and other mechanical loads (Equation 9) 2.25 S m but not greater than 1.8S y (See Notes 3 & 4) N/AN/AFaulted1 (NB-3600)Design pressure, weight, DBE, and other mechanical loads (Equation 9) 3S m but not greater than 2.0
S y (See Notes 3
& 4)N/AN/ADesign Loading CombinationsNormal and upset2 (NC-3600) and 3 (ND-3600)Design pressure, weight and other sustained loadsDesign pressure, sustained loads, OBE and other occasional mechanical loadsThermal expansionAllowable 1.5 S h 1.8 S h but not greater than 1.5S y (1.25S c + 0.25S h)f + S h - (S lp + S dl)Emergency/
Faulted2 (NC-3600) and 3 (ND-3600)N/AOperating pressure, sustained loads, DBE and other occasional mechanical loads N/AAllowable 2.25 S h but not greater than 1.8 S y (Level C) 3S h but not greater than 2S y (Level D)
Note:The nomenclature, conditions, and applications of the above limits are in accordance (with post-1980 editions approved by NRC) ASME,Section III, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Sub articles NB-3000, NC-3000 and ND-3000. For description of Notes 1, 2, 3, and 4 see Notes for Table B.7-2, Table B.7-3, and Table B.7-4. If the Class 1 NB-3600 allowables are not met the component may be qualified by NB-3200. Plastic Analysis may be performed per ASME NB-3200. Operability when exceeding these requirements may be based on Section III Appendix F criteria.
Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-47 Figure B.7-1TYPICAL STRESS STRAIN CURVE Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-48 Figure B.7-2COMPARISON BETWEEN DESIGN AND COLLAPSE CONDITIONS HOOP STRESS: 0.90 S y
Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-49 Figure B.7-3COMPARISON BETWEEN DESIGN AND COLLAPSE CONDITIONS HOOP STRESS: 0.00 S y
Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-50B.8PROTECTION AGAINST CRANE TOPPLING AND CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADSB.8.1 Protection Against Crane Toppling The Auxiliary Building crane and the T urbine Building crane are located in areas where they are subject to possible damage from tornado and earthquake. These crane bridges and trolleys are protected against tipping, derailment, and unco ntrolled movements that could possibly create damage.To assure stability of the Turbine Building cran e, the bridge and trolle y are equipped with fixed, fitted rail yokes that allow free rolling movement but prevent th e wheels from being lifted or derailed. The Auxiliary Building crane trolley is prevented from dera iling by restraints that trap it between the bridge girders. The bridge and trolley wheels are equi pped with electrically activated, spring set brakes. Upon loss of power or when th e crane or trolley are not under operator control, the springs activate the brakes, locking the wheels firmly in place to prevent rolling out of position. The positive wh eel stops and bumpers provided to prevent over-travel of the trolley and bridge will prevent the trolley and bridge from leaving th e rails, even in the unlikely event of brake failure.B.8.2 Control of Heavy LoadsAs a result of Generic Task A-36, "Control of Heavy Loads Near Spent Fuel," the NRC issued NUREG-0612, "Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants." NUREG-0612 was to be implemented in two phases. Phase I addressed Section 5.1 of NUREG-0612 and established seven basic guidelines for all nucl ear power plants, which detailed provisions for the handling of heavy loads in the area of the reactor ves sel ne ar stored spent fuel, in other areas where an accidental load drop could damage equipment required for safe s hutdown or decay heat removal.
The following cranes are subjected to the seven guidelines of NUREG-0612 Phase I:1.Turbine Building Crane 2.Auxiliary Building Fuel Handling Crane3.Deleted The seven basic guidelines of NUREG-0612, Phase I listed below are sa tisfied for the above listed cranes
.1.Safe Load Paths 2.Load Handling Procedures3.Crane Operator Training 4.Special Lifting Devices Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-515.Lifting Devices (Not Specially Designed) 6.Cranes (Inspection, Te sting, and Maintenance)7.Crane DesignThe spent fuel pool bridge and hoist crane has the capability of carrying loads which could, if dropped, fall into the spent fuel pool. However, based on the use of these cranes, they have been excluded from further re view against NUREG-0612.
The NRC has determined that Kewaunee has adequately addressed NUREG
-0612 and has significantly reduced the probability of a he avy load handling accident to an acceptably small value (see NRC Safety Evaluation Report in Reference 16).B.8.3 Design Criteria for Upgrad ed Auxiliary Building CraneThe Auxiliary Building (AB) crane was upgraded in support of dry spent fuel storage cask loading operations. This upgrade involved the replacement of the original trolley with a single-failure-proof desig n, replacement of the trolley controls , and an upgrade to the existing AB crane bridge. The upgrade of the AB crane meets the guidance in Section 5.1.6 of NUREG-0612, "Control of Heavy Loads at Nu clear Power Plants,"
and NUREG-0554, "Sin gle Failure Proof Cranes for Nuclear Power Plants," as applicable.The AB crane is designated as Class I* per Table B.2-1 and therefore is desi gned to meet Class I seismic standards. The crane is designed to st ay on its rails and not allow an uncontrolled lowering of the load as a result of a seismic event. It is not re quired to be operational during or after a seismic event. The AB cr ane is also designed to withsta nd the crane design basis accident events described in NUREG-0554: two-blocki ng, load hang-up, and wire rope failure.
Because the replacement AB crane trolley is a new component and th e crane bridge is an existing component, the construction codes applicable to the two are not identical. The construction codes for the trolley and bridge are as follows:AB Crane Trolley Codes and Standards Construction is in acc ordance with NUREG-0554 and, where NUREG-0554 does not offer specific guidance (e.g., normal condition load combinations an d stress acceptance criteria), construction is in accordance with Crane Manufacturers Association of America Specification 70 (CMAA-70), 2004 Edition. Seismic lo ad combinations and stress anal ysis acceptance criteria, as well as guidance used to address two-blocking, load hang-up, and wire rope failure are taken from ASME NOG-1-2004.AB Crane Bridge Codes and Standards Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-52 Construction is in accordance with NU REG-0554 and Electric al Overhead Crane Institute Standard 61 (EOCI-61), CMAA-70 (200 4), and ASME NOG-1-2004 in that hierarchy, where NUREG-0554, and EOCI-61 do not offer specific construction guidance.
A-B Crane Seismic Response Spec tra, Damping and AccelerationsThe seismic analysis of the AB crane considers trolley and bridge drive wheel rolling when the seismic forces exceed the drive wheel brake resisting force. This nonl inear boundary condition required seismic time history inputs to be developed consistent with Standard Review Plan (SRP), NUREG-0800, Section 3.7.1, Revision 3, Option II. With the exception of the nonlinear boundary condition at the trolley and bridge drive wheels, th e seismic analysis of th e upgraded AB crane is consistent with ASME NOG-1-2004.
The Blume Report, which forms the basis for se ismic analyses at the Kewaunee Power Station, does not include horizontal response spectra data for a mass point at the lo cation of the AB crane rail appropriate for use in anal yzing the upgraded crane. Therefor e, a lumped-mass stick model of the AB steel structure was used to generate additional horizontal response spectra applicable for use at the AB crane rail. Two percent damping for the Safe Shutdown Earthquake condition was applied to both the vertical and horizont al spectra at the crane rail elevation.Five sets of seismic acceleration time histories were then deve loped representing the response of the AB crane at the base of the crane bridge rails (Reference 44). Each set of time histories contains two horizontal and one vert ical time history , for a total of fifteen time histories. The time histories were used in conjunction with a 3-D mode l of the crane to perf orm the nonlinear seismic analysis. The methodology for anal yzing the response of the cr ane during a seismic event was based on the application of the commercially available finite element analysis computer program.
SAP 2000, Version
- 11. The use of SAP 2000 was reviewed purs uant to SRP Section 3.9.1, "Special Topics for Mechanical Components," which provides app licable criteria for evaluating computer programs for mechanical a nd structural design and analysis.
The NRC approval of the seismic methodology for the AB crane (Reference 45) is subject to the following limitations:1.The analyses are based on the seismic acceleration time histories reported in the license amendment request su bmittal dated July 7, 2008 (Reference 44).2.The calculated critical wheel tractions should be increased by 25 percent for the crane drive wheels and 100 percent for the trolley wheels.3.The seismic methodology use is limited to the AB crane.
Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-53B.9DELETED B.9.1 Deleted B.9.2 Deleted
B.9.3 Deleted B.9.4 Deleted Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-54Table B.9-1 DELETED Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-55B.10DELETED B.10.1 Deleted B.10.2 Deleted
B.10.3 Deleted B.10.4 DeletedB.11INTERNAL FLOODING B.11.1 DeletedB.11.2 Flooding Design Criteria The plant must withstand the consequences of an internal flooding event in such a manner that it retains the capability to achieve and maintain the reactor in a sa fe shutdown condition and to limit the consequences of a design basis accident.a.Deletedb.Deletedc.Deletedd.Deletede.Deletedf.DeletedB.11.3 Deleted B.1 1.4 DeletedB.11.5 ConclusionOn May 7, 2013, Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc. (DEK) submitted the second of two letters required, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.82(a)
(1)(i) and 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i i), to certify that it has permanently ceased power operation of KPS, and that the reac tor was permanently defueled. Therefore, as specified in 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2), the 10 CFR Part 50 license for Kewaunee Power Station no longer authorizes operat ion of the reactor or emplacement or retention of fuel into the reactor vessel.
Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-56Additionally, the current design ba sis of the station includes no SSCs that are credited with functions necessary to mitigate a design basis accident and are vulnerable to damage from the rupture of a tank or pipe.As stated previously, the design criteria establis hed for appropriately addr essing the consequences of internal flooding (i.e., the ef fects of the ruptur e of a tank or pipe) are limited to ensuring that the station design retain the capability to:*Achieve and maintain the reactor in a safe shutdown condition and
- Limit the consequences of a design basis accidentWith the permanent cessation of plant operation, and the prohibi tion of emplacement of fuel within th e reactor vessel, the capability to "achi eve and maintain the reac tor in a safe shutdown condition has been permanently achieved.Similarly, with no SSCs that are credited with de sign basis accident mitigati on being v ulnerable to damage from internal flooding, that design criterion is also permanently met.
Therefore, no design features of the station need be retained ba sed solely upon their contribution to meeting the internal flood mitigation de sign criteria.
Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-57 Figure B.11-1 DELETED Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-58 Figure B.11-2 DELETED Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-59B.12DELETED B.12.1 Deleted B.12.2 Deleted
B.12.3 DeletedREFERENCES1.Morris, Hansen, Holley, Biggs, Namyet, and Minami, Structural Design for Dynamic Loads , McGraw-Hill Co., Inc., New York, 1959.2.Deleted3.Housner, George W., Vibration of Structures Induced by Seismic Waves, Shock and Vibration Handbook, Volume III, McGraw-Hill, Inc., New York, 1961.4.Vogeding, E. L., Topical Report, Seismic Testing of Electrical and Control Equipment , WCAP 7817, December 1971.5.Deleted 6.Deleted7.Deleted8.John A. Blume & As sociates, Engineers, Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant-Earthquake Analysis of the Reactor-Auxiliary-Turbin e Building, JAB-PS-01, February 16, 1971 , (submitted as part of Amendment N
- o. 9 to this license application).9.John A. Blume & As sociates, Engineers, Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant-Earthquake Analysis: Reactor-Auxiliary-Turbine Building Response Acceleration Spectra , JAB-PS-03, February 16, 1971 (submitted as Amendment No. 9 to this licen se application).10.Deleted11.Deleted12.Deleted 13.Deleted14.Supplement No. 1 to Generic Letter (GL) 87-02 which transmits Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report No. 2 (SSER No. 2) on SQUG Generic Implementation Procedure , Revision 2 as corrected on February 14, 1992 (GIP-2), May 22, 1992.15.Deleted Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-60 16.NRC Safety Evaluation Report, S. A. Varga (NRC) to C.W. Giesler (WPS), Letter No. K-84-61, March 16, 1984.17.Letter from C. R. Steinhardt (WPSC) to the NRC Document Control Desk, September 17, 1992.18.Letter from C.R. Steinhardt (WPSC) to the NRC Document Control Desk, February 18, 1993.19.Seismic Qualificati on Utility Group (SQUG), Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP) for Seismic Verification of Nucl ear Power Plant Equipment, Revision 2 as corrected February 14, 1992.20.Deleted21.Deleted22.Deleted23.Deleted 24.Letter from W. O. Long (NRC) to M. L. Marchi (WPSC), Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant-Safety Evaluation Report for USI A-46 Program Implementation, Letter No. K-98-47, April 14, 1998.25.Seismic Qualificati on Utility Group (SQUG), Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP) for Seismic Verification of Nucl ear Power Plant Equipment , Revision 3, May 16, 1997.
26.Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report No. 3 (SSER No. 3) on the Review of Revision 3 to the Generic Implementation Procedure for Seismic Verifica tion of Nuclear Power Plant Equipment updated May 16, 1977, (GIP-3), (TAC No. M93624).
27.License Application Amendment 17 dated May 12, 1972 from E. W. James (WPS) to P.A. Morris (AEC).
28.License Application Amendment 24 dated January 24, 1973 from E. W. James (WPS) to J. F.
O'Leary (AEC).
29.License Application Amendment 27 dated March 16, 1973 from E. W. James (WPS) to J. F.
O'Leary (AEC).
30.License Application Amendment 28 dated April 13, 1973 from E. W. James (WPS) to J. F.
O'Leary (AEC).
31.Safety Evaluation of Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant, Supplement 2 dated July 24, 1972.32.NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Reactors (LWR Edition) dated July 1981.33.Letter October 31, 1972 to R. C. DeYoung (NRC) from E. W. James (WPS).
Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-6134.Deleted 35.NRC Safety Evaluation Report, S.A. Varga (NRC) to C.W. Giesler (WPSC), Letter No. K-84-204, September 21, 1984.
36.Missile Protection Criteria Prairie Island Nuclear Genera ting Plant and Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant Westinghouse Letter PIW-P-16, KW-P-20 dated July 31, 1967.
37.Operability Determination Closure Request for OBD 135-EDG Exhaust Ducts dated April 27, 2008.38.MEMO FPE 2007-0100 Evaluation of KPS Main Steam Safety Valves and Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves in a Design Basis Tornado Event dated January 9 2008.39.McDonald - Mehta Engineers Letter Report, Tornado Effects on Turbine Building and Diesel Generator Exhaust Lines dated April 28, 2005.40.Letter from Steven A. Varga (NRC) to CW Giesler (WPSC) Subject Control of Heavy Loads
-NUREG-0612-Phase II dated June 13, 1984.41.Deleted 42.Deleted 43.Deleted44.License Amendment Request 239, Request for Review and Approv al of Seismic Analysis Methodology for Auxiliary Building Crane, July 7, 2008 (includes seismic time histories).
45.NRC Safety Evaluation Report, P.S. Tam (NRC) to D.A. Ch ristian (Dominion), Kewaunee Power Station, Issuance of Amendment Re
- Seismic Analysis Methodology for the Auxiliary Building Crane , April 30, 2009.
46.License Application Amendment 32 dated August 31, 1973, from E.W. James (WPS) to J.F O'Leary (AEC).47.NRC Generic Letter 89-10: Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance , dated June 28, 1989, including Supplements 1 through 7.48.NRC letter to WPSC:
Close-Out of Generic Letter (GL) 89-10, Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance , dated January 4, 1996.49.Letter from Thomas T. Martin (NRC) to All Holders of Operating Licenses, NRC Generic Letter 96-05: Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capa bility of Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valves , September 18, 1996.
50.Joint BWR, Westinghouse and Combustion Engineering Owners' Group Program on Motor-Operated Valve Periodic Verification , MPR-1807, Revision 2, July 1997.
Revision 25-11/26/14 KPS USAR B-62 51.Safety Evaluation on Joint Owners' Group Program on Periodic Verification of Motor-Operated Valves Described in Topical Report NEDC-32719, Revision 2 (MPR-1807, Revision 2), October 30, 1997.52.Tae Kim (NRC) to Mark L. Marchi (WPSC), Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant - Closure of Generic Letter 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety Related Motor-Operated Valves and Safety Evaluation by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Relating to Response to Generic Letter 96-05, Periodic Ve rification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety Related Motor-Operated Valves , December 16, 1999.
53.Joint Owners' Group (JOG) Motor-Operated Valve Periodic Verification Program Summary , MPR-2524-A, Revision 1, September 2010.
54.Final Safety Evaluation on Joint Owners' Group Program on Motor-Operated Valve Periodic Verification , September 25, 2006.55.Deleted56.Deleted