ML14339A615
| ML14339A615 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Kewaunee  |
| Issue date: | 11/24/2014 |
| From: | Dominion Energy Kewaunee |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML14339A626 | List: |
| References | |
| 14-572 | |
| Download: ML14339A615 (42) | |
Text
Revision 2511/26/14 KPS USAR 8-i 8.1 DESIGN BASIS..................................................
8.1-1 8.1.1 Principal Design Criteria....................................
8.1-1 8.1.1.1 Performance Standards.........................
8.1-1 8.1.1.2 Emergency Power.............................
8.1-1 8.1 References...................................................... 8.1-2 8.2 ELECTRICAL SYSTEM...........................................
8.2-1 8.2.1 Network Interconnections...................................
8.2-1 8.2.1.1 Substation DC System..........................
8.2-2 8.2.2 Plant Distribution System...................................
8.2-4 8.2.2.1 Single Line Diagrams........................... 8.2-4 8.2.2.2 Reserve Auxiliary and Tertiary Auxiliary Transformers 8.2-4 8.2.2.3 4160V System................................
8.2-5 8.2.2.4 480V System.................................
8.2-6 8.2.2.5 125V DC System..............................
8.2-6 8.2.2.6 Instrument Bus................................
8.2-7 8.2.2.7 Evaluation of Layout and Load Distribution.........
8.2-7 8.2.2.8 Deleted......................................
8.2-9 8.2.2.9 Relay Room..................................
8.2-9 8.2.2.10 Testing......................................
8.2-9 8.2.3 Emergency Power.........................................
8.2-10 8.2.3.1 Sources Description............................
8.2-10 8.2.3.2 Loading Description............................
8.2-12 8.2.3.3 Load Evaluation...............................
8.2-13 8.2.3.4 Batteries and Battery Chargers...................
8.2-14 8.2.3.5 Reliability Assurance...........................
8.2-16 8.2.3.6 Surveillance Requirements......................
8.2-18 8.2.4 Station Blackout..........................................
8.2-18 8.2.4.1 Introduction..................................
8.2-18 8.2.4.2 Deleted......................................
8.2-18 8.2.4.3 Alternate AC (AAC) Power Source................
8.2-18 8.2.4.4 Deleted......................................
8.2-19 8.2.4.5 Deleted......................................
8.2-19 8.2.4.6 Deleted......................................
8.2-19 8.2.4.7 Deleted......................................
8.2-19 Chapter 8: Electrical System Table of Contents Section Title Page
Chapter 8: Electrical System Table of Contents (continued)
Section Title Page Revision 2511/26/14 KPS USAR 8-ii 8.2.4.8 Deleted......................................
8.2-19 8.2.4.9 Deleted......................................
8.2-19 8.2.4.10 Deleted......................................
8.2-19 8.2.4.11 Deleted......................................
8.2-19 8.2.4.12 Deleted......................................
8.2-19 8.2.4.13 Deleted......................................
8.2-19 8.2.4.14 Deleted......................................
8.2-19 8.2.5 Deleted..................................................
8.2-19 8.2.5.1 Deleted......................................
8.2-19 8.2.5.2 Deleted......................................
8.2-19 8.2.5.3 Deleted......................................
8.2-19 8.2 References..................................................... 8.2-19
Revision 2511/26/14 KPS USAR 8-iii 8.2-1 Deleted....................................................
8.2-21 8.2-2 Deleted....................................................
8.2-22 8.2-3 Deleted....................................................
8.2-23 Chapter 8: Electrical System List of Tables Table Title Page
Revision 2511/26/14 KPS USAR 8-iv 8.2-1 System Interconnection.........................................
8.2-24 8.2-2 Offsite Power to KPS Substation..................................
8.2-25 8.2-3 Main 4160 and 480V Single-Line Diagram......................... 8.2-27 8.2-4 Tech Support Center Power Service Single Line.....................
8.2-28 8.2-5 DC Auxiliary and Emergency AC, Single Line Diagram............... 8.2-29 8.2-6 Circuit Diagram Non-Safeguards DC Auxiliary......................
8.2-30 8.2-7 Interlock Logic Diagram Bus 1-5 Source Breakers....................
8.2-31 8.2-8 Interlock Logic Diagram Bus 1-6 Source Breakers....................
8.2-32 8.2-9 Interlock Logic Diagram Diesel Generator Electric System.............
8.2-33 8.2-10 Deleted......................................................
8.2-35 Chapter 8: Electrical System List of Figures Figure Title Page
Revision 2511/26/14 KPS USAR 8.1-1 CHAPTER 8 ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS 8.1 DESIGN BASIS The function of the Auxiliary Electrical System is to provide reliable power to those auxiliaries required during any anticipated plant condition.
The design of the system is such that sufficient independence or isolation between the various sources of electrical power is provided in order to guard against an extended loss of all auxiliary power.
Provisions for standby or emergency power ensure the continuity of electrical power for critical loads.
8.1.1 Principal Design Criteria 8.1.1.1 Performance Standards All electrical systems and components vital to Spent Fuel Pool Emergency Makeup (i.e.,
Service Water), including the Diesel Generators (DGs) are designed to Class I* standards so that their integrity is not impaired by the Design Basis Earthquake. Similarly, they are designed so that their operation will not be impaired by tornado imposed loads.
8.1.1.2 Emergency Power Note: There no longer remain safety-related, engineered safety feature, or engineered safeguards electrical loads or buses. However, those buses providing electrical power to emergency fuel pool makeup or fire protection features may still be referred to as safety buses.
The emergency power systems as designed meet the intent of the 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 17, adopted February 20, 1971, as amended July 7, 1971.
The intent of GDC 17 is twofold:
- Avoid the risk associated with immediate controlled shutdown.
- Minimize the risk associated with this level of electrical degradation by limiting the operating time (in the applicable technical specification LCO modes) and by limiting activities that could cause an inadvertent plant shutdown (Reference 1).
Revision 2511/26/14 KPS USAR 8.1-2 Each element of the intent of the GDC addresses risks predicated upon OPERATION of the reactor. Therefore, the INTENT of the GDC was achieved when the station was permanently shut down and Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc. (DEK) lost the legal authority to place fuel within the reactor vessel (by virtue of having submitted the certification of permanent cessation of operation per the requirements of 10 CFR 50.82).
The risk associated with an immediate controlled shutdown has been eliminated. The risk related to a level of electrical degradation that was minimized by limiting operating time has been eliminated when the unit was permanently shut down. The risk associated with an inadvertent plant shutdown was also eliminated because the reactor may no longer be operated.
This ensures that the intent of GDC-17 has been achieved by the station when the station achieved safe shutdown of the unit, transferred all fuel to the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP), and certified that the reactor was permanently defueled - and thereby became legally prohibited from placing fuel in the reactor, and thereby legally prohibited from operating the reactor.
Independent alternate power systems are provided with adequate capacity to supply Spent Fuel Pool emergency makeup, Spent Fuel Pool Cooling, Fire Protection, and building heating loads.
The plant is supplied with normal, standby and emergency power sources as follows:
- 1. The main source of auxiliary power is supplied from the American Transmission Companys 138 kV and 345 kV transmission systems. The reserve auxiliary and tertiary auxiliary transformers can both be powered from either transmission system through the interconnecting auto transformer.
- 2. Two diesel generators are connected to the safety buses to supply emergency power in the event of loss of all other ac auxiliary power.
- 3. Emergency power for instruments and for control is supplied from two 125V dc station batteries.
The diesel generators are located in the Class I section of the Administration Building and can be connected to separate 4160V auxiliary system buses.
8.1 References
- 1. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.93, Availability of Electric Power Sources.
Revision 2511/26/14 KPS USAR 8.2-1 8.2 ELECTRICAL SYSTEM 8.2.1 Network Interconnections The American Transmission Companys 345 kV and 138 kV transmission systems are interconnected at the plant site substation by two transformers: T10 rated at 300 MVA and T20 rated at 500 MVA. The 345 kV transmission system has interconnections with Northern States Power Company. Two 345 kV transmission lines are connected to the plant switching station and are on separate line structures in order to minimize the possibility of losing more than one circuit at a time. Two 138 kV lines are connected to the plant switching station from the 138 kV grid system.
An analysis of the integrated 345/138 kV power system has been made and shows that a fault on any one of the transmission lines or any bus section at the Kewaunee Substation will not cause a cascading failure on the transmission system, thereby insuring an off-site power supply to the plant for any of the aforementioned failures. (See Stability Study in Reference 6 and Reference 7).
The centerline of the two 138 kV lines is 265 feet south of the southern-most two 345 kV lines on a separate right-of-way as they leave the plant property. About one-half mile west of the substation the two 345 kV lines turn: one, line R-304, goes north and the other, line Q-303, turns south at a dead-end tower. Line Q-303 crosses over both 138 kV lines, one before the dead-end tower and one after (see Figure 8.2-2). Since dead-end tower failure is not considered a credible accident, failure of a 345 kV line structure at some point could only cause a failure of one 138 kV line. There is no area where a failure of a 138 kV line structure can cause a failure of either 345 kV line. Thus, there is no single failure that can disable more than two lines.
This results in three pairs of physically independent sources of offsite power (see NRC Safety Evaluation Report in Reference 1).
The 345 kV and 138 kV substation sections have each been configured to a double-breaker, double-bus orientation. This allows for improved switching capability, reliability, and maintainability (see Figure 8.2-1).
The reserve supply transformer is used to furnish power to the 20.0 kV reserve auxiliary transformer via a 20 kV overhead transmission line from the substation. The tertiary supply transformer is used to furnish power to the 13.2 kV tertiary auxiliary transformer via an underground insulated power cable. This cable becomes the second of the two physically independent circuits to provide off-site power to the on-site distribution systems.
The reserve supply transformer and the tertiary supply transformer are bifurcated at the substation to connect to either the east or west 138 kV buses. Each leg of the bifurcation is separated from the respective bus with a 138 kV circuit breaker. The controls for the 138 kV breakers are separated into two distinct 125V dc branch circuits; one serving the breaker closing
Revision 2511/26/14 KPS USAR 8.2-2 circuit and one of the two trip circuits with the primary relaying; the other serving the second trip coil and the backup relaying. These breakers are manually controlled from the plant Electrical Vertical Panel A.
A similar connection to the west 138 kV bus is made for the 345/138 kV T10 autotransformer through a breaker, which can be used to energize the T10 autotransformer if the need arises. This breaker is normally under system operating office supervisory control, but also has local controls in the substation north control house. Another connection to the east 138 kV bus, through the two circuit breakers used for isolation of the tertiary supply transformer, and through the east 138 kV bus extension breaker, is made for the 345/138 kV T10 autotransformer if the need arises. The two circuit breakers used for isolation of the Tertiary Supply Transformer are manually controlled from the Electrical Vertical Panel A, or locally controlled in the substation south control house. The east 138 kV bus extension breaker is normally under system operating office supervisory control, but also has local controls in the substation north control house.
A similar connection to the east 138 kV bus is made for the 345/138 kV T20 autotransformer through the east 138 kV bus extension breaker, which can be used to energize the T20 autotransformer if the need arises. Another connection to the west 138 kV bus, through an aforementioned breaker, and through the two circuit breakers used for isolation of the Tertiary Supply Transformer, is made for the 345/138 kV T20 autotransformer if the need arises.
The west 138 kV bus is connected to a capacitor bank with a 138 kV oil circuit breaker (see Figure 8.2-1). Each of the four-capacitor banks has a switching device. The controls for the breaker and switching devices for the capacitor banks are located on the Electrical Vertical Panel A. The breaker and capacitor bank switching devices can be controlled by Kewaunee from Electrical Vertical Panel A, when permission is granted by the ATC.
The 345 kV system is normally used to energize the 345/138 kV autotransformers. The 345 kV circuit breakers are under system operating office supervisory control, or locally controlled in the substation north control house.
Loss of either off site transmission circuit should not affect the other transmission circuit or the two standby power sources. Finally, loss of power sources should not affect the availability of the transmission sources.
8.2.1.1 Substation DC System The Substation DC System consists of two separate systems; the 48V dc distribution system furnishing power to the solid-state relay systems and the 125V dc distribution system furnishing control power and additional electro-mechanical and microprocessor based relay systems.
Revision 2511/26/14 KPS USAR 8.2-3 The DC battery systems in the substation are located in the north and south control houses.
The north control house consists of a 125V dc distribution system. The 125V dc distribution system consists of redundant battery chargers, two batteries, and six distribution cabinets. The north control house batteries feed ATC substation breaker controls and differential relays, and plant indications for ATC substation breaker / switching devices associated with the capacitor banks The south control house consists of a 125V dc distribution system. The 125V dc distribution system consists of redundant battery chargers, two batteries and two distribution cabinets. The south control house batteries feed the new Dominion substation differential relays, substation and plant breaker controls, substation and plant indications, and fourteen ATC breaker indications in the plant.
The battery chargers are furnished with ac and dc (output) failure relays and redundant ac sources. High and low voltage alarms are provided for the dc circuit.
The 125V dc distribution system is arranged so that the two circuits used to control each high-voltage circuit breaker emanate from different distribution cabinets. Each branch circuit in the three breaker distribution cabinets is individually monitored and alarmed on loss of dc voltage. These alarms are displayed in the substation control house and are transmitted to the plant control room annunciator as a substation alarm. The branch circuits in the fuse distribution cabinet are not individually monitored and alarmed on loss of dc voltage. A loss of power to any of the microprocessor based relays fed from the fuse cabinet would be indicated locally on the relay and transmit an alarm to the transmission system operator. The overall effect is that of a dual supply to the high-voltage breaker control trip elements with alarm should any portion of the supply system become abnormal.
The circuit breakers can close on 90V dc and trip on 70V dc. Each battery charger is equipped with a low voltage alarm set at 122V dc. The battery is considered to be fully discharged when the voltage reaches 105V dc. The actual closing energy of an SF6 breaker is from the spring mechanism (138 kV) and pneumatic mechanism (345 kV). The actual closing energy of an oil circuit breaker is supplied from air compressors integral with each circuit breaker. The air compressors are ac powered. The storage cylinders have sufficient capacity when fully charged for five operations if ac were lost. These breakers can be manually tripped at the breaker.
Loss of the substation battery and a concurrent fault on one of the transmission lines wherein the plant would continue to supply power to the fault is a set of postulated conditions, which would lead to an undetected failure. Under these postulated conditions, the fault would clear when the transmission-line remote terminal breakers opened. The Kewaunee breakers can be manually tripped and, thus, isolate the fault, thereby restoring off-site power to the plant via the remaining transmission lines.
Revision 2511/26/14 KPS USAR 8.2-4 Thus, given an undetected failure, the capability to clear and restore off-site power to the Kewaunee plant will not be lost, and the restoration of off-site power (assuming the grid is available) will be made within the time period (seven days) in which the plant can be maintained in a safe condition without off-site ac power. Assessments have shown that in excess of 15 days is available to establish SFP makeup capability before evaporation will lower SFP inventory to 3 feet above the stored fuel (Reference 17).
8.2.2 Plant Distribution System The Auxiliary Electrical System is designed to provide a simple arrangement of buses requiring the minimum of switching to restore power to a bus in the event that the normal supply to that bus is lost.
8.2.2.1 Single Line Diagrams The basic components of the plant electrical system are shown on the Single Line or Circuit Diagrams, Figure 8.2-3 and Figure 8.2-5. These figures show the 20 kV, 4160V, 480V and instrument bus ac systems and the 125V dc systems. In addition, Figure 8.2-1, Figure 8.2-3 and Figure 8.2-5 show the basic elements of the 13.8 kV, 21.0 kV, 138 kV and 345 kV substation systems.
8.2.2.2 Reserve Auxiliary and Tertiary Auxiliary Transformers The primary sources of electrical power are the Reserve Auxiliary Transformer (RAT) and the Tertiary Auxiliary Transformer (TAT). Power is routinely supplied to two buses (Buses 1-5 and 1-6) through the 13.2-4.16 kV, two-winding Tertiary Auxiliary Transformer, which is connected by an underground line, to the 138/13.8 kV Tertiary Supply Transformer (TST) in the substation, and ultimately to a 138 kV portion of the substation. Alternatively, power may be supplied to the two buses (Buses 1-5 and 1-6) through the 20-4.16 kV, three-winding Reserve Auxiliary Transformer, which is connected by an overhead line, to the 138/21 kV Reserve Supply Transformer (RST) in the substation, and ultimately to a 138 kV portion of the substation.
Additionally, the system has the flexibility to provide power to either safety bus via the RAT while powering the other safety bus from the TAT. A Load Tap Changer (LTC) is used on both the RST and TST to adjust the voltage to the RAT and TAT as necessary. The maximum and minimum range of each LTC is +/-10% of the nominal secondary voltage of the RST and TST and includes 33 taps (nominal, 16 taps each to lower and raise voltage) to adjust the voltage. The LTCs can be adjusted manually at the respective RST and TST local motor drive panel and from the control room Electrical Vertical Panel A.
The LTCs may also be operated in automatic mode. In automatic mode, each LTC relies on both a primary and supervisory microcontroller. The supervisory microcontroller prevents the
Revision 2511/26/14 KPS USAR 8.2-5 primary microcontroller from adjusting secondary side voltage outside established upper and lower limits in the event of a primary microcontroller failure.
Automatic operation of the LTCs, including their potential failure modes, has been evaluated. This evaluation determined that the simultaneous failure of both microcontrollers on one LTC is unlikely. Simultaneous failure of both the RST and TST microcontrollers, resulting in loss of both power supplies at the same time, is even more unlikely. Microcontroller maintenance and testing activities provide reasonable assurance that failure rates remain low. A failure in which the LTC rapidly increases or decreases transformer output voltage is unlikely since both the primary and supervisory microcontrollers would have to fail. A failure of the LTC to respond to changing transmission system voltage generally occurs slowly and can be mitigated by operator action. A failure of the voltage sensor results in the affected LTC ceasing to operate in automatic mode and could result in the tap changer failing to change the tap setting when required, i.e., the tap setting remains as is. Failure of the tap changer to change settings when demanded, i.e.,
passive failure, is less severe than active failures of the LTC. This is because the overvoltage or undervoltage condition would typically evolve relatively slowly and the magnitude of the resultant change in voltage would be limited to the effect of the change in grid voltage. Alarms alert the operator to high/low voltage conditions on the 4.16 kV and 480 V safety buses.
Control power for the plant auxiliary breakers is supplied by the plant batteries. The high-side (substation) breakers use the substation batteries for control power.
8.2.2.3 4160V System The 4160V system is routinely divided into three buses, as shown in Figure 8.2-3. Three of the buses are routinely used to power the station.
Bus 1-4 is routinely connected via bus main breakers to the Tertiary Auxiliary Transformer via Bus 1-5. Station electrical loads may be similarly provided by the reserve auxiliary transformer. This bus supplies power to balance-of-plant auxiliaries, and supplies power to two 4160-480V station service transformers. A third transformer connected to Bus 1-4 supplies power to the Technical Support Center.
Buses 1-5 and 1-6 are connected via bus main breakers to the reserve auxiliary and tertiary auxiliary transformers. In addition, each bus is directly fed via a main breaker by a diesel generator. Each bus can directly supply two 4160/480V station service transformers. Ordinarily, three station service transformers are powered from Bus 1-5. In addition, the service water pumps are directly connected to Buses 1-5 and 1-6.
Revision 2511/26/14 KPS USAR 8.2-6 8.2.2.4 480V System The 480V system is divided into 8 load center or switchgear buses, as shown in Figure 8.2-3 and Figure 8.2-4.
Transformer 1-42 is routinely connected to 4160V Bus 1-4. Transformer 1-42 feeds 480V Buses 1-32 and 1-42. In a similar manner, 480V Buses 1-35 and 1-45 are routinely connected to 4160V Bus 1-4. Bus 1-46, supplying the Technical Support Center (TSC), is connected to 4160V Bus 1-4.
The various motor control centers throughout the plant are then connected to these switchgear buses.
The power required for the 480V vital plant loads is routinely supplied from three 480V buses routinely fed from 4160V Bus 1-5. Transformer 1-51 is fed from 4160V Bus 1-5 through Breaker 1-505 and supplies Bus 1-51. This transformer, bus and breakers, including one bus tie, are assembled as a switchgear unit. In a similar manner, Bus 1-52 is also connected via breaker 1-505 to 4160V Bus 1-5. Bus 1-62 is routinely powered from Bus 1-52 via cross tie breakers. Bus 1-52 can also be powered from 4160V Bus 1-6 via breaker 1-607 and Transformer 1-62.
The large 480V motors are connected to Bus 1-51. Motor control centers supplying the smaller loads are fed from Buses 1-52 and 1-62.
Transformer BRA-106 is utilized to transform 480V to 120V for use on the vital 120 VAC system supplied by downstream panel BRA-105. This transformer regulates output voltage at a preset value to ensure adequate voltage is available to the downstream components. Likewise, transformer BRB-106 performs the same function for downstream panel BRB-105 and its downstream components.
8.2.2.5 125V DC System The 125V DC System is grouped into two subsystems (see Figure 8.2-5 and Figure 8.2-6) each subsystem equipped with one battery and a normally operating battery charger, distribution panels and inverters. Components prefixed with BRA and BRC make up one dc subsystem and those prefixed with BRB and BRD make up the other subsystem.
The dc power requirements of all DC plant loads are supplied by the batteries BRA-101 and BRB-101. Each battery consists of 59 cells, each of which are the lead calcium type. The batteries are rated 125V dc, 1770 ampere-hours at the eight-hour rate without discharging below 1.78V (average) per cell. Two main dc distribution panels (BRA-102 and BRB-102) are fed from these batteries via main fuses. The main distribution panels connect the battery to the battery charger, to
Revision 2511/26/14 KPS USAR 8.2-7 the sub-distribution panels, and allow for the interconnection of the two buses through the bus tiebreakers.
BRA-102 supplies Sub-Distribution Panel BRA-104. BRA-104 in turn supplies the control and excitation power for Diesel Generator 1A, the control power for Buses 1-5, 1-51, and 1-52, control and power to one-half of the plant equipment required in the event of loss of ac power and provides a standby power source for Inverters BRA-111 and BRA-112.
BRB-102 supplies Sub-Distribution Panel BRB-104. BRB-104, in turn, supplies the control and excitation power for Diesel Generator 1B, the control power for Buses 1-6, 1-61, and 1-62, control and power to one-half of the plant equipment required in the event of loss of ac power and provides a standby power source for Inverters BRB-111 and BRB-112.
Distribution Panels BRA-104 and BRB-104 supply Sub-Distribution Panels BRC-103 and BRD-103, respectively. Panel BRC-102 is a standby source for inverter BRC-109. The BRC and D-103 panels supply Technical Support Center diesel generator control and excitation power, control power for Buses 1-4, 1-32, 1-35, 1-42, 1-45, and 1-46, other equipment sensitive to a loss of ac power and are a standby source for Inverter BRD-109 and a proprietary inverter.
Each subset comprised of two battery buses is served by one operating battery charger. Each battery also has a spare battery charger connected but not operating.
The two bus tie breakers between 125V dc Distribution Cabinet BRA-102 and 125V dc Distribution Cabinet BRB-102, are manually operated.
8.2.2.6 Instrument Bus The 120V ac instrument supply is split into several buses as shown on the one line diagram Figure 8.2-5. There are four instrument buses, each fed by an inverter which, in turn, is fed from a dc bus. Additional buses, each fed by an inverter, supply the Plant Process Computer System (PPCS) and Cabinet BRD-115, respectively. There are two additional buses; each fed from an MCC through a transformer.
8.2.2.7 Evaluation of Layout and Load Distribution The reserve auxiliary and tertiary auxiliary transformers are located outdoors and are physically separated from one another by firewalls. Each transformer cell, formed by the firewalls, has an automatic water spray system to extinguish and prevent the spread of fires.
Revision 2511/26/14 KPS USAR 8.2-8 The 4160V switchgear and 480V load centers are located in areas which minimize their exposure to mechanical, fire and water damage. This equipment is coordinated electrically to permit safe operation of the equipment under normal and short-circuit conditions.
The 480V MCCs are located in the areas of electrical load concentration. Those originally associated with the turbine-generator auxiliary system in general are located in the Turbine Building. Those originally associated with the nuclear steam supply system are located in the Auxiliary Building.
The application and routing of control, instrumentation and power cables are such as to minimize their vulnerability to damage from any source. The construction design drawings had second level review in accordance with the Kewaunee Construction Quality Assurance Program.
All cables are specified using conservative margins with respect to their current-carrying capacities, insulation properties and mechanical construction. The power conductors are three conductor, galvanized armored and installed in a single layer in ladder type cable trays, and clamped to insure that ample ventilation spacing is maintained throughout the run.
Bulk control power supply cables are treated as noted in the previous paragraph.
Control cables normally employ minimum size of #12 AWG when run in multi conductor cables in control trays. As there are few continuous loads on these circuits no attempt was made at derating. Continuously loaded circuits (current transformer secondaries) are sized by burden requirements of the circuit. In special cases #14 AWG multi-conductor control cable was allowed in cable trays. In these identified cases, a safety evaluation has been performed. Special cases may continue to allow #14 AWG multi-conductor cable to be used. These will require a safety evaluation and approval by the responsible engineer.
Cables that are run in trays have fire resistant jackets. Appropriate instrumentation cables are shielded as required to minimize induced-voltage interference.
Supports and cable trays for safety feature power cable systems are designed for 100 percent loading plus the forces generated by a seismic disturbance. Other cable systems are designed for 100 percent loading. The ladder fill is restricted to one layer, clamped in place to maintain 1/2 to 1-1/2 inch spacing between cables.
Cable trays are seismically designed for maximum fill. The tray fill is restricted to 60 percent of the trays cross sectional area.
Revision 2511/26/14 KPS USAR 8.2-9 8.2.2.8 Deleted 8.2.2.9 Relay Room The main (original) relay room is arranged in two groups of four rows of cabinets. The cabinets contain abandoned Reactor Protection System and Engineered Safeguard circuits and miscellaneous relay and metering circuits.
A relay room expansion to the south has two rows of cabinets with provision for a third.
The cabinets contain PPCS input/output and miscellaneous monitoring equipment.
The upper levels of the relay room are used for cable routing, as there is no separate room labeled cable routing room.
Horizontal fire barriers are provided between the Control Room and the relay room at the control consoles and panels.
8.2.2.10 Testing Testing of the operator-activated Class I* circuitry that initiates and controls the connection of the buses to the power sources for the ac emergency power system; the tertiary auxiliary transformer, the reserve auxiliary transformer, and the diesel generators; can be done by transferring the buses, one at a time, from one source to another with controls available to the operator in the Control Room. Manual switching of these source breakers occurs during periodic breaker maintenance, bus maintenance and diesel generator testing.
A sequential events recorder prints out the operation of each relay in the scheme providing printed proof of the circuitrys proper response. Upon successful completion of this test a green light glows to the left of the test switch.
A switch is provided for each bus or transformer lockout, which isolates its output contacts allowing the lockout to operate without actually tripping any breakers. The continuity of transformer lockout relays is continually monitored by indicating lamps located in the Control Room.
The power sources for the dc emergency power system associated with the Train A load group are Station Battery 1A and 480V MCC 1-52C (via Battery Charger 1A). The power sources for the dc emergency power system associated with the Train B load group are Station Battery 1B and 480V MCC 1-62C (via Battery Charger 1B). Both MCC 1-62C and MCC 1-52C are often powered from safety Bus 1-5 via Bus 1-62 and/or Bus 1-52, as applicable. The transfer of a dc bus between its respective battery and battery charger can be tested by opening the 480V breaker supplying power to the charger, thus simulating a loss of power to the 480V bus. The dc system
Revision 2511/26/14 KPS USAR 8.2-10 should transfer to the battery as its source of power. If, after opening the 480V breaker to the charger the dc bus retains its voltage, the transfer was successful.
8.2.3 Emergency Power 8.2.3.1 Sources Description The normal source of power to Bus 1-5 and Bus 1-6 is the tertiary auxiliary transformer.
The reserve auxiliary transformer provides a backup source.
If all other power sources should fail, two diesel generators are provided, one with the ability to be connected to 4160V Bus 1-5 and one with the ability to be connected to 4160V Bus 1-6. Each of these is a General Motors Corporation, Electro-Motive Division, Model A-20-C1, diesel engine-generator unit rated at 2600 kW, (2860 kW, 110 percent overload, two thousand hours per year) 0.8 pf, 900 rpm, 4160V, 3-phase, 60 Hz. The generator has emergency ratings of 2950 kW for seven days continuous and 3050 kW for thirty minutes per year.
Each diesel generator, as a backup to the normal and backup ac power supplies, is capable of supplying its rated load. The electrical emergency power system logic diagrams are shown in Figure 8.2-7, Figure 8.2-8, and Figure 8.2-9. The units are located in separate rooms in Class I portion of the Administration Building. Each diesel generator is equipped with a jacket water and lube oil keep warm system, which provides warm lube oil to selected engine components. The keep warm system reduces wear of engine parts during starting and, in conjunction with heated diesel generator rooms, eliminates cold starts and maintains the diesel generators in a warm ready to start condition, thereby providing for more reliable diesel generator starts.
Service water for the diesel engine cooling water heat exchanger is supplied from separate service water headers for DGs 1A and 1B. The cooling water heat exchanger is an engine-mounted, water-to-water heat exchanger providing cooling for the engine jacket water and for the engine oil heat exchanger. Vent Supply Fans located in each Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Room provide both combustion air for the diesel engine and sufficient cooling air to maintain the design basis room temperature of 120-degrees F as formerly specified in the Environmental Qualification Plan. The EDG Ventilation System is described in Section 9.6.7.
Separate trains of startup air compressors and receivers are located outside each EDG room.
Primary and reserve air receivers are provided to supply compressed air to the associated EDG Air Start System, and the EDG cooling water isolation valve actuators. The EDG Ventilation intake, recirculation, and exhaust damper actuators air supply is from instrument air with a compressed air bottle back-up.
Each diesel generator can be started by either one of two pairs of air motors mounted on each side of the diesel (four air motors per engine). Each unit has its own independent starting system including two banks of two air receivers, two primary and two reserve, and one
Revision 2511/26/14 KPS USAR 8.2-11 compressor powered from the 480V emergency bus. An air cooler/dryer is installed on the discharge of each air start system compressor. The dry air improves the starting performance of the diesel engine. The primary or reserve receivers have sufficient storage to crank the diesel engine for twenty seconds.
Starting air is admitted from the air start receivers to the starting system through a pressure-reducing valve to supply air to the air start motors.
The following describes a typical diesel engine start sequence. The sequence stated assumes the air start motor priority selector switch is in the #1 position. The air start motor priority selector switch is typically rotated from set #1 to set #2 on a monthly basis. This ensures even run time on the air start motors.
When the diesel start signal is initiated, a start attempt is made through air start motor set #1. If the air start motor set #1 fails to engage within 2 seconds, a second start attempt is made with the same set of motors. If the air start motors still do not engage, and then after 5 seconds a third start attempt is made, this time using the second pair of air start motors (set #2). Air start motors set #2 will continue to attempt to start the diesel generator on a two second cycle, until the engine starts or 15 seconds after the start signal, whichever occurs first. The start signal also initiates starting of the fuel priming pump and the governor booster pump. If, after fifteen seconds, the diesel has not reached 200 rpm, a start failure signal opens the fault relay. Starting air is cut off, the fuel priming and governor booster pump are stopped. Operator action is then required for further start attempts. The fault relay in the diesel generator room must be reset and any faults causing the fault lockout must be corrected before the start signal will be effective again.
The start failure relay serves to indicate an abnormally long period of engine cranking without an engine start (fifteen seconds) and to prevent subsequent engine starting attempts until the cause of the engine start failure has been determined by operating personnel. The total air capacity available to crank the engine is twenty seconds per air starter-tank combination.
The motor-driven compressor associated with each diesel is fed from the emergency bus supplied from the same diesel. The control voltage for each diesel starting system is from its associated 125V dc station battery.
An audible and visual alarm system is located in the control room and will alarm off-normal conditions of jacket water temperature, lube oil temperature, fuel oil level, starting air pressure and Diesel Generator Stator Hi Temperature (1 of 12 inputs feeding the 4160 Volt Stator Temperature Hot annunciator). An alarm in the control room also alerts the operator to other various off-normal conditions including jacket water expansion tank level and pressure, engine
Revision 2511/26/14 KPS USAR 8.2-12 crankcase pressure, and fuel oil pressure. Local audio and visual alarms are also provided at each diesel generator.
Reference 2 is a safety evaluation in which the NRC has concluded that, based on the review of submitted information and on-site inspections, the status annunciators for the diesel generators are acceptable. The review was specifically intended to ensure that any deliberately induced condition which may disable the diesel generators, and which is expected to occur more frequently than once per year, is automatically annunciated in the Control Room with devices worded to alert the operator of their abnormal status.
Two 850-gallon day tanks are located in enclosures within each diesel generator room.
The two tanks provide capacity for approximately four hours operation for one diesel generator at full load. Two separate 35,000-gallon underground storage tanks supply fuel oil through dedicated immersion pumps to each pair of day tanks. The usable amount of fuel oil, available for each diesel generator, contained in the associated diesel generator underground storage tanks and one set of day tanks would provide a minimum of 7 days fuel supply for operation of the associated diesel generator at 100% of the continuous rated power, thus assuring adequate time to restore off-site power or to replenish fuel. Minimum calculated usable volume was determined to be 32,858 gallons, which provides for a 7-day fuel supply plus margin on the respective diesel generator. An additional 30 gallons of usable volume is required to account for thermal expansion in the day tanks due to the temperature difference from the underground fuel oil storage tank to the day tanks. Thus the total usable volume required to be maintained in each underground storage tank and the associated day tanks must be at least 32,888 gallons. The diesel fuel oil storage capacity requirements are consistent with those specified in ANSI N195-1976/ANS-59.51, Section 5.2, 5.4, and 6.1. See Reference 13 and Technical Specifications for fuel oil storage requirements.
8.2.3.2 Loading Description Breakers 15211 and 16211 are bus tie breakers.
Both breakers can be closed only by operator action. The operator can close BKR 15211 or BKR 16211 only if:
- No fault has occurred on either Bus 1-52 or Bus 1-62, and
- No fault has occurred on the section of cable between 15211 and 16211, and
- Breaker 15201 and/or 16201 is open.
Revision 2511/26/14 KPS USAR 8.2-13 Breakers 15111 and 16111 can be closed by operator action only. The operator can close BKR 15111 or BKR 16111 only if:
- No fault has occurred on either Bus 1-51 or 1-61, and
- No fault has occurred on the section of cable between 15111 and 16111, and
- Breaker 15101 and/or 16101 is open.
If a diesel generator is overloaded, an alarm is annunciated in the control room. The diesel generator is not protected by overload devices.
8.2.3.3 Load Evaluation 8.2.3.3.1 Diesel Generators Each diesel generator was originally sized to start and carry the engineered safety features required for a post-blowdown containment pressure transient.
Selected generator nameplate data is as follows:
- Electro-Motive Division of General Motors Corporation
- Model A-20-C1, Serial Nos. 70-J1-1029 and 1039
- 2400/4160V, 60 Hz, Amps 782/452, 3 phase
- 3250-kVA, Temperature rise 85°C Stator-Thermometer
- Temperature rise 60°C, Rotor-Resistance
- 900 RPM, Power Factor 0.8
- 3575-kVA Peak, 2000 hours0.0231 days <br />0.556 hours <br />0.00331 weeks <br />7.61e-4 months <br /> per year
- Temperature rise 105°C, Stator-Thermometer
- Temperature rise 70°C, Rotor-Resistance.
- Insulation Class, H-Stator and F-Rotor Additional operating characteristics of the generator follow:
Capable of operating continuously at rated kVA output at any power factor between rated lagging and unity, at any voltage within +/- 5 percent of rated voltage.
Revision 2511/26/14 KPS USAR 8.2-14 Capable of tolerating for thirty seconds without injury a three-phase short circuit at its terminals when operating at rated kVA and power factor, 5 percent overvoltage and fixed excitation.
- 1. Sizing of generator power requirements.
Motors - All motors are the standard rating above the normal load. The service factor is added to the motor to cover fan and pump run-out or system conditions where applicable.
Checks have been made to assure that any required operating conditions are within the service factor.
Motor power requirements were calculated using best available information as detailed in Reference 11 (manufacturers certified test data being the best)
Brake hp was used for motors where certified test data or approved calculation was available.
KVA - Lumped loads for transformers, etc., were calculated at 80 percent motor loading factor.
Heater - Loads were taken at rated kW.
- 2. Generating load ratings:
- 3. Deleted
- 4. Deleted 8.2.3.4 Batteries and Battery Chargers The Station Electrical Distribution System contains two 125V station batteries. Each 125V station battery has a rating capability originally sized to carry the expected shutdown loads following a plant trip and a loss of all ac power for a period of eight hours without the battery Continuous 3250 kVA 100.0%
Continuous
- 2600 kW at 0.8 P.F.
100.0%
Overload, 2000 hours0.0231 days <br />0.556 hours <br />0.00331 weeks <br />7.61e-4 months <br /> per year 2860 kW at 0.8 P.F.
110.0%
Overload, 7 days per year 2950 kW at 0.8 P.F.
113.5%
Overload, 30 minutes per year 3050 kW at 0.8 P.F.
117.3%
- Capable of a 10% overload for a period of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> out of any 24-hour period to Diesel Engine Manufacturers Association (DEMA) standards.
Revision 2511/26/14 KPS USAR 8.2-15 terminal voltage falling below 105V. This design was based on initial battery duty cycle calculation, a design margin of 1.1, an expected aging factor of 1.25, and operation at a nominal temperature of 77°F, as calculated by the IEEE 485-1983 method. The qualified life of the 125V LCR-25 batteries is 20 years, provided they are operated at an average annual temperature of 77 degrees Fahrenheit or less and maintained in accordance with manufacturers recommendations.
The batteries were originally sized for an eight hour period. The sizing for the station batteries reflects that the battery room temperature can be below the 77°F used in previous battery sizing. Additionally, the sizing for the station batteries reflects that the battery room temperature can be as low as 60°F.
The station batteries (BRA101 and BRB101) are C & D Technologies, Inc. Type LCR-25 with 1770 AH capacity (8-hour), and nominal discharge rates of 464A (3-hour), 862A (1-hour),
and 1557A (1-min.).
Each of the two station battery chargers has been sized to recharge either of the above partially discharged station batteries within twenty-four hours, while carrying its normal load.
Partially discharged is defined as any condition between the battery charge condition after 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> of discharge (not less than 105V) and nominal (125V). Normal voltage when on charger is 129 to 135V (2.19 to 2.29V per cell).
The battery chargers are each supplied with a dc ammeter to continuously indicate the chargers current output. Each battery charger is also supplied with a dc voltmeter on the line side of the charger output circuit breaker. This voltmeter will indicate the charger or battery voltage whichever is higher. A dc ammeter on each of the main load side buses of the batteries continually indicate the total load current on each battery train. On a periodic basis the specific gravities of the pilot cells are checked.
The actual charge stored in the batteries can be related to the monitored parameters in the following ways:
- 1. The batteries are of the lead calcium type and are floated at 132V dc. As long as the specific gravities of the cells are at least 1.200 and the dc voltmeter reads 132V then the battery is considered fully charged.
Revision 2511/26/14 KPS USAR 8.2-16
- 2. The battery chargers are each rated at 150-ampere dc output and will supply the plant load under normal conditions. The current-limiting feature on these chargers is set at approximately 172.5 amperes. In a situation when the ammeter on the battery main bus reads above 0.0 amperes then the battery would be discharging as indicated on the main bus ammeter.
Since the battery and charger share the loads on the bus under the normal condition, the battery must have sufficient ampere-hour capacity to carry the total loads consisting of two classes as follows:
- 1. The momentary load, such as closing and tripping of switchgear, involves the one-minute rating of a battery, though the time duration of the operation is but a few cycles.
- 2. The continuous load usually involves the batterys three to eight-hour rating, although longer time periods are sometimes used. The load consists of indicating lamps, holding coils for relays and any other equipment continuously drawing current from the control bus.
8.2.3.5 Reliability Assurance All originally installed Class IE electrical equipment complied with IEEE Standard 344-1971, Trial Use Guide for Seismic Qualification of Class I Electrical Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations.
Two separate off-site power sources serve the 4160V buses supplying power to the safety equipment. Both sources are supplied from the 138 kV portion of the substation connected in separate breaker bays. One is from the 138/21 kV Reserve Supply Transformer via an overhead 20 kV circuit to the plant though the 20.0/4.16 kV Reserve Auxiliary Transformer, and the second is from the 138/13.8 kV Tertiary Supply Transformer via an underground 13.8 kV circuit to the plant through the 13.2/4.16 kV Tertiary Auxiliary Transformer.
One off-site source of power can supply sufficient power to run normal operating equipment. Any one of the four transmission lines can supply all the plant auxiliary power. A low-voltage station auxiliary transformer can supply all the auxiliary loads for the plant.
One battery charger is in service on each battery so that the batteries are always at full charge in anticipation of loss of ac power. This insures that adequate dc power is available for starting the diesel generators and for other emergency uses.
Revision 2511/26/14 KPS USAR 8.2-17 The physical barrier provided between the emergency diesel engine generator sets consists in part of a Class I reinforced concrete wall 18 inches thick and the remainder a reinforced concrete block wall 12 inches thick. The doors are all Underwriters Laboratories construction.
The EDG 1A room ventilation exhausts to the screenhouse tunnel and has a 1.5 hour5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> rated fire damper. The EDG 1B room ventilation exhausts directly to the outdoors. All other openings in the barrier are sealed with fire retardant materials to maintain fire separation of the two diesel generator units.
The only potential for an explosion in the diesel generator rooms exists within a diesel engine crankcase. The rooms have sufficient volume and are vented to preclude a pressure rise that would endanger the integrity of the room walls.
A rupture of the Class I* service water piping in or near the EDG rooms is not considered sufficiently credible to include as a design-basis event (Reference 10). However, a hypothetical rupture of the service water system piping was addressed as discussed below.
In the event of a service water line break in the area between diesel generator rooms some water leakage would occur into the diesel generator rooms. Leakage through the door into DG Room 1B would flow to the floor drain. Leakage through the door and through the trench into DG Room 1A would flow to the trench drain. All other openings into the diesel generator rooms from the tunnel are at higher elevations.
Both diesel generator rooms have double doors appropriately strengthened to prevent possible flooding. The trench into DG Room 1A was plugged to restrict leakage into the room, with the exception of a drain opening in the bottom of the trench barrier between the DG 1A room and the screenhouse tunnel.
Water flowing from the hypothetical service water line break would return to the screenhouse along the floor of the tunnel. Water entering the screenhouse would drain to the circulating water pump elevation where approximately 382,000 gallons are required to flood to the 586-foot elevation. Maximum possible service water pump run-out for two pumps would be less than 20,000 gpm total. The operator has over 19 minutes to respond to the low service water pressure alarm on one header, isolate that header from the Auxiliary Building and then trip the pumps.
The rupture of a service water line in an emergency diesel generator room could result in the loss of the generator and/or the safety bus in that room. Administrative operation from the Control Room of Class I* service water valving would isolate the break and if required, realign the service water supplies through the intact piping from the operating service water pumps.
Revision 2511/26/14 KPS USAR 8.2-18 8.2.3.6 Surveillance Requirements The periodic tests specified for the diesel generators will demonstrate their continued capability to start and carry rated load. The fuel supplies and starting circuits and controls are periodically monitored, and abnormal conditions in these systems would be indicated by an alarm without need for test startup (Reference 2).
The specified test frequencies provide reasonable assurance that any mechanical or electrical deficiency is detected and corrected before it can result in failure of one emergency power supply to respond when called upon to function.
Station batteries will deteriorate with time, but precipitous failure is extremely unlikely. The surveillance performed on the batteries will demonstrate battery degradation long before a cell becomes unserviceable or fails.
If a battery cell has deteriorated, or if a connection is loose, the voltage under load will drop excessively, indicating need for replacement or maintenance.
8.2.4 Station Blackout 8.2.4.1 Introduction With the station permanently shutdown, The station blackout (SBO) rule no longer requires that KPS have the ability to cope with an extended loss of both offsite and onsite AC power sources.
8.2.4.2 Deleted 8.2.4.3 Alternate AC (AAC) Power Source The TSC diesel generator was formerly used as an AAC source necessary to meet the SBO Rule. The TSC diesel generator remains an independent, non-class 1E, 600 kW (1000 hr/year standby rating) diesel generator that provides emergency power to 480V Bus 1-46 for TSC equipment. A connection can be made between this bus and the 480V Safety Bus 1-52. Isolation between the two buses is available with a breaker at Bus 1-52 and a breaker at Bus 1-46.
Revision 2511/26/14 KPS USAR 8.2-19 8.2.4.4 Deleted 8.2.4.5 Deleted 8.2.4.6 Deleted 8.2.4.7 Deleted 8.2.4.8 Deleted 8.2.4.9 Deleted 8.2.4.10 Deleted 8.2.4.11 Deleted 8.2.4.12 Deleted 8.2.4.13 Deleted 8.2.4.14 Deleted 8.2.5 Deleted 8.2.5.1 Deleted 8.2.5.2 Deleted 8.2.5.3 Deleted 8.2 References
- 1. NRC Safety Evaluation Report, M. B. Fairtile (NRC) to D. C. Hintz (WPS), Letter No. K-86-136, July 3, 1986.
- 2. NRC Safety Evaluation Report, S. A. Varga (NRC) to E. R. Mathews (WPS), Letter No. K-81-189, November 12, 1981.
- 3. NRC Safety Evaluation Report, A. T. Gody, Jr. (NRC) to K. H. Evers (WPS), Letter No. K-89-212, October 25, 1989.
- 4. Deleted
- 5. NRC Safety Evaluation Reports:
a.
Schwencer, A. (NRC) to E. W. James (WPS), Letter June 3, 1977.
b.
Licciardo, R. B. (NRC) to E. R. Matthews (WPS), Letter No. K-82-074, April 30, 1982.
c.
Neighbors, J. D. (NRC) to C. W. Giesler (WPS), Letter No. K-84-091, April 30, 1984.
d.
Laufer, R. J. (NRC) to C. A. Schrock (WPS), Letter No. K-93-203, September 30, 1993.
e.
Laufer, R. J. (NRC) to M. L. Marchi (WPS), Letter No. K-96-098, June 12, 1996.
Revision 2511/26/14 KPS USAR 8.2-20
- 6. Stability Studies Associated With Nuclear Power Plants In Wisconsin, E. R. Mathews, Wisconsin Public Service Corporation, October 11, 1968.
- 7. American Transmission Company Final Stability Study Report, 43 MW Generation Increase in Kewaunee County, Wisconsin MISO #G165 (#37239-01) and MISO #G383 (#37956),
prepared for the Midwest ISO, March 18, 2004.
- 8. Deleted
- 9. Deleted
- 10. NRC Safety Evaluation for Amendment 197, Licensing Basis Design Criteria Associated With Internal Flooding (TAC NO. MD0511), dated March 28, 2008.
- 11. Calculation C11450, Auxiliary Power System Modeling and Analysis.
- 12. Deleted
- 13. NRC Safety Evaluation Report, Peter S. Tam (NRC) to David A. Christian (DEK),
February 6, 2009.
- 14. Deleted
- 15. Deleted
- 16. Deleted
- 17. Letter from A. J. Jordan (DEK KPS) to Document Control Desk (NRC), Request for Exemptions from Portions of 10 CFR 50.47 and 10 CFR 50, Appendix E.
Revision 2511/26/14 KPS USAR 8.2-21 Table 8.2-1 DELETED
Revision 2511/26/14 KPS USAR 8.2-22 Table 8.2-2 DELETED
Revision 2511/26/14 KPS USAR 8.2-23 Table 8.2-3 DELETED
Revision 2511/26/14 KPS USAR 8.2-24 Figure 8.2-1 SYSTEM INTERCONNECTION
Revision 2511/26/14 KPS USAR 8.2-25 Figure 8.2-2 OFFSITE POWER TO KPS SUBSTATION
Revision 2511/26/14 KPS USAR 8.2-26 Intentionally Blank
Revision 2511/26/14 KPS USAR 8.2-27 Figure 8.2-3 MAIN 4160 AND 480V SINGLE-LINE DIAGRAM
Revision 2511/26/14 KPS USAR 8.2-28 Figure 8.2-4 TECH SUPPORT CENTER POWER SERVICE SINGLE LINE
Revision 2511/26/14 KPS USAR 8.2-29 Figure 8.2-5 DC AUXILIARY AND EMERGENCY AC, SINGLE LINE DIAGRAM
Revision 2511/26/14 KPS USAR 8.2-30 Figure 8.2-6 CIRCUIT DIAGRAM NON-SAFEGUARDS DC AUXILIARY
Revision 2511/26/14 KPS USAR 8.2-31 Figure 8.2-7 INTERLOCK LOGIC DIAGRAM BUS 1-5 SOURCE BREAKERS
Revision 2511/26/14 KPS USAR 8.2-32 Figure 8.2-8 INTERLOCK LOGIC DIAGRAM BUS 1-6 SOURCE BREAKERS
Revision 2511/26/14 KPS USAR 8.2-33 Figure 8.2-9 INTERLOCK LOGIC DIAGRAM DIESEL GENERATOR ELECTRIC SYSTEM
Revision 2511/26/14 KPS USAR 8.2-34 Intentionally Blank