ML17150A088

2017 Fermi Initial License Exam-Administered Written RO-SRO Exam

ML17150A088
Person / Time
Site:	Fermi
Issue date:	05/25/2017
From:	Bielby M E Operations Branch III
To:	NRC/RGN-III/DRS/OLB
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ML17061A756	List: ML17150A088 ML17150A090 ML17150A105 ML17213A257 ML17213A266 ML17213A272
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1Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:BANKThefollowingsequenceofeventsoccursintheplant:TimeEvent1000Thereactorisoperatingat100%power.RRMGASpeedis75%.RRMGBSpeedis75%.TotalCoreFlowis85%.1005RRMGAspeedis70%andunexpectedlyLOWERING.10103D108,RECIRCSYSAFLUIDDRIVELUBEOILPRESSLOW,alarms.1015Thereactorisoperatingat80%power.RRMGAspeedis35%.RRMGBspeedis75%.TotalCoreFlowis66%.10203D104,RECIRCPUMPAMGDRIVEMTRGRDFAULT/OVERCURRENT,alarms.Basedontheaboveconditions,3D112,RECIRCSYSAFLUIDDRIVESCOOPTUBELOCK,alarmedat(1).At1020,TotalCoreFlowINDICATION(2).A.(1)1005(2)INCREASEDduetolowerLoopAFlowResistanceB.(1)1005(2)DECREASEDduetosubtractionofLoopAFlowfromLoopBC.(1)1010(2)INCREASEDduetolowerLoopAFlowResistanceD.(1)1010(2)DECREASEDduetosubtractionofLoopAFlowfromLoopBAnswer: B2017ILOWrittenPage:1of207Question1 AnswerExplanation:B.CriteriaforAutomaticScoopTubeLockuponcontroldeviation(5%),andLoopFlowSubtractionoccurswhenRRPumpTrips.1010LowOilPressurewillstartRRMGEmergencyOilPumpC,andwouldcauseaScoopTubeLockbutithasalreadyoccurred.ReductionsinRecircflowresistancenormallyraisesactualcoreflowduringapowerreductionbyrods,theflowsubtractionnetworkcausesINDICATEDCoreFlowtoDECREASE.PlantProcedures03D112NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295001AK2.KnowledgeoftheinterrelationsbetweenPARTIALORCOMPLETELOSSOFFORCEDCOREFLOWCIRCULATIONandthefollowing:295001AK2.01Recirculationsystem10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamLOR2009ExamLOR2015ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:BankHighRO2017ILOWrittenPage:2of207Question1 2Points:1.00Difficulty:2.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:BANKTheplantisoperatingat90%powerwhenaneventoccursandthefollowingindicationsareseeninthecontrolroom:120kVBUS101POWERONlightOFF120kVBUS102POWERONlightOFFR14-R819,SSXfmr#64SecondaryVoltIndicator0(zero)volts345kVBUS301POWERONlightOFF345kVBUS302POWERONlightOFFR14-R833,SSXfmr#65SecondaryVoltIndicator0(zero)voltsR14-R835,SSXfmr#65SecondaryVoltIndicator0(zero)voltsGiventheseconditions,whichoneofthefollowingactionsisrequired,andwhy?A.PlacetheReactorModeSwitchinSHUTDOWNduetoaCOMPLETElossofOffsitePower.B.ManuallystartandloadALLEmergencyDieselGeneratorsduetolossofOffsitePowertoBOTHdivisionsofESFBuses.C.PlacetheReactorModeSwitchinSHUTDOWNduetolossofOffsitePowertoONLYONEdivisionofESFBusesANDhalfoftheBOPBuses.D.VerifyautomaticstartandloadingofEmergencyDieselGenerators11AND12duetolossofOffsitePowersourcetoONLYONEdivisionofESFBuses.Answer: A2017ILOWrittenPage:3of207Question2 AnswerExplanation:StemconditionsindicatecompleteLossofOffsitePower.20.300.OffsiteImmediateActionrequiresplacingReactorModeSwitchinSHUTDOWN.DistractorExplanation:B.Isplausibleandincorrect,EDGsshouldhaveautostartedanditisrequiredtoverifyautomaticEDGstarts.ItisnotappropriatetomanuallystartEDGs.C.Isplausibleandincorrect,ifpowerwaslosttoonlythe345kVsystem,ONEDivisionofESFBusesandHalfoftheBOPBuseswouldbelost.Modeswitchtoshutdownisrequired.D.Isplausibleandincorrect,ifpowerwerelosttoonlythe120kVsystem,ONEDivisionofESFBuseswouldbeaffected.ReferenceInformation:20.300.OffsiteIA(pg_3)PlantProcedures04D13220.300.OffsiteNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295003AK3.KnowledgeofthereasonsforthefollowingresponsesastheyapplytoPARTIALORCOMPLETELOSSOFA.C.POWER:295003AK3.053.7/3.7ReactorSCRAM10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(10)Administrative,normal,abnormal,andemergencyoperatingproceduresforthefacility.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamLOR2009ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:BankHighRO2017ILOWrittenPage:4of207Question2 3Points:1.00Difficulty:4.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:BANKTheplantisoperatingat100%powerwithRHRPump"A"operatinginTorusCooling.Atransientoccurs,resultinginthefollowingconditions:ControlRodsAllfullyinsertedMSIVsAllclosedRCICSysteminjectingat650gpm1D6,DIVICSSLOGICPOWERFAILUREAlarming1D8,RHRLOGICA125VDCBUSPOWERFAILUREAlarming9D17,DIVIESS130VBATTERYTROUBLEAlarmingALLDiv.1ECCSPumpsCMCindicationlost(nolights)Basedontheseconditions,RHRPump"A"is(1)and(2).A.(1)RUNNING(2)CANbeelectricallytrippedB.(1)RUNNING(2)CANNOTbeelectricallytrippedC.(1)TRIPPED(2)WILLautostartonreceiptofavalidsignalD.(1)TRIPPED(2)WILLNOTautostartonreceiptofavalidsignalAnswer: B2017ILOWrittenPage:5of207Question3 AnswerExplanation:B.RHRPump"A"haslostcontrolpower,indicatedbytheDCAnnunciators;thereforeRHRPump"A"willcontinuetorunandcannotbeelectricallytripped.ControlpowerisrequiredforbothCMCindicationandtripfunction.DistractorExplanation:A.Isplausibleandincorrect;RHRpumpwillremainrunning,butcannotbeelectricallytripped.C.Isplausibleandincorrect;RHRpumplosescontrolpower,whichisrequiredforBOTHtripandstartfunctions.D.Isplausibleandincorrect;RHRpumplosescontrolpower,whichisrequiredforBOTHtripandstartfunctions.ReferenceInformation:ARP1D8(pg1)PlantProcedures01D08NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295004AA1.Abilitytooperateand/ormonitorthefollowingastheyapplytoPARTIALORCOMPLETELOSSOFD.C.POWER:295004AA1.02Systemsnecessarytoassuresafeplantshutdown10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamLOR2009ExamLOR2015ExamI-DrawingsI-2201-01ILO2017NRCQuestionUse:BankHighRO2017ILOWrittenPage:6of207Question3 4Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:BANKTheplantisoperatingat90%power.24.110.05,RPS-TurbineControlandStopValveFunctionalTestisinprogress.OneportionofthetestdidnotresultinaHalfScramindicationwhenrequired.TheoperatoractionwhichresultsintheHIGHESTpowerconditionthatmeetsLCOrequirementsistolowerreactorpowerto(1)basedonaturbinetripviolatingthe(2)safetylimit.A.(1)26%(2)MinimumCriticalPowerRatioB.(1)29%(2)MinimumCriticalPowerRatioC.(1)26%(2)ReactorCoolantSystemPressureD.(1)29%(2)ReactorCoolantSystemPressureAnswer: B2017ILOWrittenPage:7of207Question4 AnswerExplanation:PertheDBD(C71-00)Anautomaticbypassshallbeprovidedforboththeturbinestopvalveclosureandturbinecontrolvalvefastclosuretripswhentheturbinefirststagepressureisequalto,orlessthanavaluethatisequivalentto30percentnuclearboilerratedpower.TheDBDfurtherstatesthattheRPSTripFunctionofTSVClosureisbasedonoperationalandsafetylimits(MCPR)FurtherexplanationcanbefoundinTS&TSBBelow29.5%,theRPSTripFunctionofTSVClosureisNotApplicable.ThisisarequiredACTIONofT.S.3.3.1D.1.E.TSVClosureTripisbasedonnotexceedingMinimumCriticalPowerRatioSafetyLimit.(TSB3.3.1)DistractorExplanation:ReactorCoolantSystemPressureSafetyLimitisconsideredplausiblesinceaTurbineTripwithoutBypassATWSmaycausearapidreductioninsteamflowaccompaniedbypowerrisefromvoidcollapse.ReferenceInformation:C71-00DBDREACTORPROTECTIONSYSTEMObjectiveLinkLP-OP-315-0129-C004.Statemajorprecautionsandlimitations,andmajorsafetyconsiderationsfortheTurbineSteamSystem,anddescribetheirbases.PlantProcedures20.109.01NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2241000K4.KnowledgeofREACTOR/TURBINEPRESSUREREGULATINGSYSTEMdesignfeature(s)and/orinterlockswhichprovideforthefollowing:241000K4.05Reactorscram295005AA2.Abilitytodetermineand/orinterpretthefollowingastheyapplytoMAINTURBINEGENERATORTRIP:295005AA2.05Reactorpower295005AK2.KnowledgeoftheinterrelationsbetweenMAINTURBINEGENERATORTRIPandthefollowing:295005AK2.01RPSTechnicalSpecifications3.3.1.1ReactorProtectionSystem(RPS)Instrumentation10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(2)Generaldesignfeaturesofthecore,includingcorestructure,fuelelements,controlrods,coreinstrumentation,andcoolantflow.10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamLOR2009ExamLOR2015ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:BankHighRO2017ILOWrittenPage:8of207Question4 5Points:1.00Difficulty:3.50LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEWTheplantwasoperatingat20%powerduringastartupwithMainTurbinewarmupinprogress.ApressureregulatorfailureHIGHoccursresultinginaReactorScram.NOoperatoractionshavebeentaken.Giventheaboveconditions,manualoperationof____couldremoveDecayHeat,withoutanyothersystemmanipulation.A.TurbineBypassValves.B.RCICforlevelcontrol.C.MainSteamLineDrainValves.D.MoistureSeparatorReheaterIsolationvalves.Answer: B2017ILOWrittenPage:9of207Question5 AnswerExplanation:Withpowerat20%,theModeSwitchisinRUN.PressureregulatorfailurehighcausestheMainTurbineBypassValvestofullyopen,loweringRPVPressure.Whenpressurereaches756psigwithModeSwitchinRUN,aGP1PCISisolationoccursandaScram.Decayheatfromtheseconditionswillnotresultinreactorpressurerisingto1093psigforLow-Low-Set.WithMSIVsclosed,onlyRWCUisimmediatelyavailabletoremovedecayheat.DistractorExplanation:A.andC.AreincorrectandplausiblesincetheTurbineBPVsandMSLDrainsarenotavailableduetotheGp1Isolation.D.IsincorrectplausiblebecauseoftheGp1isolationandopeningtheMSRvalvescouldcauseasuddenTurbinespeedincrease.ReferenceInformation:20.000.21Bases(generalinfoonscram)23.601LowpressureIsolations(pg9)23.601SCRAMcause(pg28)PlantProcedures20.000.2120.000.21BasesNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295006AK1.KnowledgeoftheoperationalimplicationsofthefollowingconceptsastheyapplytoSCRAM:295006AK1.01Decayheatgenerationandremoval10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:HighNewRO2017ILOWrittenPage:10of207Question5 6Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:BANKWhichoneofthefollowingcorrectlyidentifiestheRCICcontrolsorindicationsavailableBOTHintheMainControlRoomANDattheRemoteShutdownPanel?A.RCICPumpFlowindication.B.RCICPumpDischargePressureindication.C.E5150-F010,RCICPumpCSTSuctionIsolationValve,controlpushbuttons.D.RCICPumpFlowcontrollerwithManualandAutomaticSetpointAdjustments.Answer: A2017ILOWrittenPage:11of207Question6 AnswerExplanation:RCICFlowIndicationexistsatbothlocations.DistractorExplanation:B.IsincorrectandplausiblebecauseitexistsonlyintheMCR.C.IsincorrectandplausiblebecauseitexistsonlyintheMCR.D.IsincorrectandplausiblebecauseitexistsonlyintheMCR.ReferenceInformation:20.000.19,page6PlantProcedures20.000.19NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295016AK2.KnowledgeoftheinterrelationsbetweenCONTROLROOMABANDONMENTandthefollowing:295016AK2.01Remoteshutdownpanel:Plant-Specific10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(8)Components,capacity,andfunctionsofemergencysystems.NRCExamUsageILO2012ExamILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:BankLowROSelectedforEarlyReview(NRC)2017ILOWrittenPage:12of207Question6 7Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEWTheplantwasoperatingat65%whenaneventresultsinthefollowingconditions:NorthTBCCWpumpTrippedCenterTBCCWpumpTripped480VBus72NDeenergizedStatorWaterCoolingGeneratorInletTemperature(FieldReport)130°FrisingTBCCWHeadTankLevel(FieldReport)EmptyN&SRFP&RFPTTurbineBearingDrainTemperatures160to165°FrisingTheCRSdirectsplacingtheModeSwitchinShutdownandthetriptheMainTurbine.Whatisthebasisforthedirectedactions?A.TheonlybasisforthisactionistoplacethereactorinasafeconditionandpreventsdamagetoMainTurbineGeneratorequipment.B.TheonlybasisforthisactionistopreventingoverheatoftheReactorFeedPumpbearings.C.TheonlybasisforthisactionistopreventdamagetotheMainTurbineGenerator.D.Theonlybasisforthisactionistoplacethereactorinasafecondition.Answer: A2017ILOWrittenPage:13of207Question7 AnswerExplanation:Theaboveconditionsrequireentryinto20.128.01,LossofTurbineBuildingCoolingWater.SincetheN&CTBCCWpumpsaretrippedandtheSTBCCWpumpisdeenergized(lossof72N),atotallossofTBCCWhasoccurred.ThefirstAOPoverriderequiresplacingtheModeSwitchinS/DandtrippingtheMTG.TheseactionsinsertareactorscramtobypassMSIVisolationonlowpressure,andtriptheMTGtopreventexceedingdesigntemperatures,preventingequipmentdamage.DistractorExplanation:PreventingoverheatoftheReactorFeedPumpbearings,preventingdamagetotheMainTurbineGenerator,andplacingthereactorinasafeconditionareallitemsthattheoveridesaredesignedfor.TheCRS'suseoftheoveridesisforall,notjustone.ReferenceInformation:20.128.01BasesOVERRIDE(Pg2)20.128.01SYMPTOMS(Pg9)PlantProcedures20.128.0120.128.01BasesNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295018AK3.KnowledgeofthereasonsforthefollowingresponsesastheyapplytoPARTIALORCOMPLETELOSSOFCOMPONENTCOOLINGWATER:295018AK3.02Reactorpowerreduction10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(8)Components,capacity,andfunctionsofemergencysystems.10CFR55.41(b)(10)Administrative,normal,abnormal,andemergencyoperatingproceduresforthefacility.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:HighNewRO2017ILOWrittenPage:14of207Question7 8Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEWTheplantisoperatingnormallyat100%powerwhenasystemairruptureoccurs.IttakestheCRLNOseveralminutestogettotheP807panel.Nooperatoractionsassociatedwiththeairsystemshavebeenperformed.(ReviewHANDOUT:AirSystemMimicfromH11-P807)Basedononlytheseindications,whereisthelocationoftheairrupture?A.IASHeaderB.D1NIASHeaderC.D2NIASHeaderD.TurbineBldgHeaderAnswer: D2017ILOWrittenPage:15of207Question8 AnswerExplanation:TheairrupturelocationcanbeidentifiedusingairvalvepositionindicationontheP807panel.At100%power,theonlyvalvesclosedareP5000-F403,IAStoDiv2NIAS,andtheDWSASupplyisolationvalves,P5000-F603andF604.AruptureintheTurbineBldgairheaderwillresultinloweringStationAirHeaderpressure.At<95psig,thestandbyaircompressorwillauto-start,andat<85psigP5000-F401,StationAirtoTurbineBldgHeaderisolationvalve,willclosewhichisolatestheairleakallowingStationAirHeaderpressuretorecover.Allotheropenisolationvalvesremainopen.DistractorExplanation:A.IsplausibleiftheassumptionismadethatStationAirpressurecontinuestolowerto<75psigwhichwouldresultintheremainingisolationvalvestoclose.B.IsplausibleiftheassumptionismadethatP5000-F403,IAStoDiv2NIASisolationvalve,hasclosedduetoaleakinDiv2NIAS.C.IsplausibleiftheassumptionismadethatP5000-F401,StationAirtoTBHdrisolationvalve,willisolatealeakintheStationAirHeader.ReferencesInformation:I-2450-04,05PlantProcedures20.129.0123.129NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295019PartialorCompleteLossofInstrumentAirG2.1.7Abilitytoevaluateplantperformanceandmakeoperationaljudgmentsbasedonoperatingcharacteristics,reactorbehavior,andinstrumentinterpretation10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(5)Facilityoperatingcharacteristicsduringsteadystateandtransientconditions,includingcoolantchemistry,causesandeffectsoftemperature,pressureandreactivitychanges,effectsofloadchanges,andoperatinglimitationsandreasonsfortheseoperatingcharacteristics.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamI-DrawingsI-2450-04I-2450-05ILO2017NRCQuestionUse:HighNewRO2017ILOWrittenPage:16of207Question8 9Points:1.00Difficulty:4.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEWTheplantisinMODE5withfuelhandlingoperationsinprogressandDivision1RHRoperatinginShutdownCooling.TheoperatingRHRPumptripswhenanelectricalfaultcausestheclosureofE1150-F008,RHRSDCOtbdSuctionIsolValve.Thevalvecannotbereopenedelectricallyormanually.WhichONEofthefollowingactionsisrequiredundertheseconditions?A.PlaceDivision2RHRinShutdownCooling.B.StartONERHRPumpandopenSRVstodrainwatertotheTorus.C.ShiftFuelPoolCoolingandCleanupdischargetotheReactorWell.D.StartONECoreSprayPumpandopenSRVstodrainwatertotheTorus.Answer: C2017ILOWrittenPage:17of207Question9 AnswerExplanation:BOTHLoopsofRHRarerenderedunavailablebytheCOMMONsuctionlineisolation.WithNORHRavailableandtheReactorVesselHeadandFuelPoolGatesremoved,20.205.01,LossofShutdownCooling,directsshiftingFPCCUdischargetotheReactorWell,maximizingflowtotheReactorCavity.DistractorsExplanation:B&Dareplausibleandincorrect;IftheHeadandFuelPoolGateswereinplaceandMSlineplugsremovedthesewouldbecorrectactions.Aisplausibleandincorrect;SinceF008isontheCOMMONsuctionline,withnobypassvalve,withnobypassvalveDIV2RHRwillnotbeavailable.ReferenceInformation:20.205.01ConditionJ(pg9)PlantProcedures20.205.01NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295021AK2.KnowledgeoftheinterrelationsbetweenLOSSOFSHUTDOWNCOOLINGandthefollowing:295021AK2.05Fuelpoolcoolingandcleanupsystem10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:HighNewRO2017ILOWrittenPage:18of207Question9 10Points:1.00Difficulty:2.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:NEWAnirradiatedfuelbundleisbeingremovedfromthecore.Anadjacentbundlehasbeenliftedalongwiththeselectedbundle.Whennoticed,fuelmovementisstopped,andtheadjacentbundlefallsbackintothecore.Bubblescometothepoolsurface,andthelocalContinuousAirMonitor(CAM)alarms.Thefollowingindicationsareobserved:16D1,RBREFUELINGAREAFIFTHFLOORHIGHRADN,alarms.3D31,DivI/IIFPVENTEXHRADNMONITORUPSCALE,alarms.D21-R600RadiationMonitoringRecorder,Channel17indicates10mr/hr.D21-K717,RB5RefuelFloorLoRangeARMIndtripUnit(Ch.17),indicatestripped.Whichofthefollowingis(1)anautomaticaction(ifany)thatwilloccurasaresultofthiseventand(2)thereasonfortheaction?A.(1)RadiationalarmONLY(2)WarnspersonnelofpossiblehazardsandtoevacuateaffectedareaB.(1)ONEdivisionofRBHVACtrips,andONEdivisionofSGTSAutoStarts(2)EnsuresnegativepressuremaintainedinSecondaryContainment,andpreventsexceedingsystemdesignflowrateC.(1)BOTHdivisionsofRBHVACtrip,andBOTHdivisionsofSGTSAutoStart(2)Stopstheunfilteredreleaseofradioactiveparticlestotheenvironment,andmaintainsnegativepressureintheReactorBuildingD.(1)Group14-DrywellandSuppressionPoolVentilationSystem,andGroup16-NitrogenInertingSystemisolationsONLY(2)ClosesoffreleaseroutesforradioactivematerialsfromtheSecondaryContainmenttocontainandlimitthereleasetotheenvironmentAnswer: A2017ILOWrittenPage:19of207Question10 AnswerExplanation:Arearadiationmonitorsprovidealarmonly,andFPVentRadMonitorupscaleprovidesnoautomaticactions.16D1and3D31requireAOPentryandplantannouncementforpersonnelevacuation.Also,theindicationsprovidedDONOTshowhighleveltripsoftherequiredinstrumentation(3D35/3D36)forRBHVACtrip/SGTSactuation.DistractorExplanation:B.IsincorrectbutplausibleifthecandidateassumestheindicationsshowahighleveltripofonetripchanneloftheFuelPoolVentExhaustRadMonitor(onlyonedivisionactuated).C.IsincorrectbutplausibleifthecandidateassumestheindicationsshowahighleveltripofatleasttwotripchannelsoftheFuelPoolVentExhaustRadMonitor(bothdivisionsactuated).D.IsincorrectbutplausiblebecausetheseactionsareassociatedwithReactorBuildingVentExhaustRadMonitorUpscaleTriporFuelPoolVentExhaustRadMonitorUpscaleTrip,butarenottheonlyactionsforthetrip(ifactuated).ReferenceInformation:20.710.01(pg3)PlantProcedures20.710.0120.710.01BasesNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295023AK3.KnowledgeofthereasonsforthefollowingresponsesastheyapplytoREFUELINGACCIDENTS:295023AK3.03Ventilationisolation10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(11)Purposeandoperationofradiationmonitoringsystems,includingalarmsandsurveyequipment.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:LowNewRO2017ILOWrittenPage:20of207Question10 11Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:BANKTheplantisbeingstartedafterarefuelingoutage.Reactorpoweris9%whenasmallsteamleakdevelopsinthedrywell.ThePCRMSisinservicewithnoalarmsindicated.TheCRSenters29.100.01,Sheet2,PrimaryContainmentControl,basedonhighDrywelltemperatureof145°F.Drywellpressureis0.7psigandrising0.05psigevery15minutes.Basedontheseplantconditionswhataction(s)shouldbetaken?A.StartSGTS,andventtheTorus.B.PlaceRHRinTorusCoolingandTorusSpray.C.VerifyRBHVACisrunning,andventtheDrywell.D.Scramthereactorinanticipationofanautomaticscram.Answer: C2017ILOWrittenPage:21of207Question11 AnswerExplanation:TheEOPs,stepPCP-1,directventingthedrywelltokeepDWpressure<1.68psiginaccordancewith29.ESP.07,step1.0.ThecandidateshouldrecognizethatDWpressureishighbutnotrisingfast,soventingtheDWisappropriate.DistractorExplanation:A.Isplausibleandincorrectbecauseasteamleakwouldindicateparticulateintheair.ThecandidatecouldexpecttheventpathtobethroughSGTStoreduceradioactiverelease,however,therearenoalarmsonPCRMSwhichindicatesno(orlittle)radioactiveparticulatestoscrub.B.Isplausibleandincorrectbecausethereareelevatedcontainmentparameters.Thecandidatemaydeterminethatcontainmentcoolingforpressurereductionisnecessaryatthistime.D.IsplausibleandincorrectbecausetheEOPshavebeenentered.ThecandidatemaydeducethatascramonhighDWpressureisimminentandthatscrammingthereactorisaconservativeaction.Thisisnotthecorrectanswerbecauseventingthedrywellisdirectedandshouldallowtheoperatorstoperformacontrolledshutdownwithoutplacingtheplantthroughascramtransient.ReferenceInformation:29.ESP.07(pg3)PlantProcedures29.ESP.07NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295024EA1.Abilitytooperateand/ormonitorthefollowingastheyapplytoHIGHDRYWELLPRESSURE:295024EA1.14Drywellventilationsystem295024EA2.Abilitytodetermineand/orinterpretthefollowingastheyapplytoHIGHDRYWELLPRESSURE:295024EA2.01Drywellpressure.10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(10)Administrative,normal,abnormal,andemergencyoperatingproceduresforthefacility.NRCExamUsageILO2013ExamILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:BankHighRO2017ILOWrittenPage:22of207Question11 12Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEWTheplantisoperatingat80%powerwiththestandbyReactorPressureRegulatoroutofserviceforrepairs.Thein-serviceReactorPressureRegulatorthenmalfunctionswithitsoutputslowlylowering.Assumingnooperatorintervention,reactorpowerwill___________________________.A.loweruntiltheMSIVsisolateonlowsteampressure.B.remainconstantastheTurbineBypassValvesopentocontrolreactorpressure.C.rise,MWeoutputwilllower,andthereactorwillscramonhighpressureORhighpower.D.stabilizeatalowerlevelduetoaReactorRecirculationPumprunbackfromthelossofFWheating.Answer: C2017ILOWrittenPage:23of207Question12 AnswerExplanation:PressureRegulatorfailurewithloweringoutputresultsinreactorpressurerising.TurbineBypassValvesremainclosedandTurbineControlValvesclose,causingTurbineGeneratoroutput(MWe)tolower.Reactorpressurewillriseuntilthereactorscramsonhighreactorpressureorhighreactorpower.DistractorExplanation:A.Isplausibleifthecandidatethinksloweringpressureregulatoroutputresultsinloweringreactorpressure.Thisisincorrectsincethefailurecausesreactorpressuretorise.B.IsplausibleifthecandidatethinkstheTurbineBypassValveswilloperatetolowerreactorpressure.Thisisincorrectsincethefailedregulatorwillmaintainthebypassvalvesclosed.D.IsplausibleifthecandidatethinksthepressurechangewillresultinalossofFWheatingasaresultofthesensitivityoftheheaterdrainssystemandRecircRunback.Thisisincorrectbecausethereactorwillscramduetotherisingpressure.ReferenceInformation:20.109.02EnclosureA23.601(pg10&pg41)PlantProcedures20.109.0223.109NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2262002K1.Knowledgeofthephysicalconnectionsand/orcause-effectrelationshipsbetweenUNINTERRUPTABLEPOWERSUPPLY(A.C./D.C.)andthefollowing:262002K1.03Rodpositioninformation:Plant-Specific295025EK1.KnowledgeoftheoperationalimplicationsofthefollowingconceptsastheyapplytoHighReactorPressure:295025EK1.01Pressureeffectsonreactorpower10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(5)Facilityoperatingcharacteristicsduringsteadystateandtransientconditions,includingcoolantchemistry,causesandeffectsoftemperature,pressureandreactivitychanges,effectsofloadchanges,andoperatinglimitationsandreasonsfortheseoperatingcharacteristics.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:HighNewRO2017ILOWrittenPage:24of207Question12 13Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:MODIFIEDAfteraplanttransientandreactorscram,thefollowingconditionsexist:Div1RHRisbeingusedforTorusCooling/TorusSpraywithONEPumpat11,500gpm.Div1CoreSprayisinjectingwithTWOPumpsat7,750gpm.TorusPressureis5.0psig.TorusLevelis-70(minus70)inches.TorusTemperatureis190°F.TheNOintheReactorBuildingcallstoreporttheRHRandCoreSprayPumpsarerattling.Usingcurrentpumpconfiguration,whichofthefollowingisthehighestflowpermissible?A.CoreSprayFlow-5,500gpm;RHRFlow-8,000gpmB.CoreSprayFlow-6,500gpm;RHRFlow-10,000gpmC.CoreSprayFlow-6,500gpm;RHRFlow-8,000gpmD.CoreSprayFlow-5,500gpm;RHRFlow-10,000gpmAnswer: C2017ILOWrittenPage:25of207Question13 AnswerExplanation:CandidatemustapplyNPSHandVortexlimits.TorusOverpressurecalculatestobe(5+3.5+((-70)/30))=6.2psig.Thismeansthatthe5PSIGoverpressurecurveapplies.TheRHRvortexlimitfor-70"is<9,000gpm,whileNPSHis12,000gpm.TheCSvortexlimitfor-70"is<7,000gpm,whileNPSHis8150gpm(Max).TheCSflowislimitedbyVortexlimitcurve(<7000),andRHRflowislimitedbyVortexlimitcurve(<9000).DistractorExplanation:Alldistractorsareplausiblebecausetheycontainaviolationofoneorbothcurves.ReferenceInformation:29.100.01SH62017ILOWrittenPage:26of207Question13 PlantProcedures29.100.01SH6NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295026EK1.KnowledgeoftheoperationalimplicationsofthefollowingconceptsastheyapplytoSUPPRESSIONPOOLHIGHWATERTEMPERATURE:295026EK1.01PumpNPSH295026EK2.KnowledgeoftheinterrelationsbetweenSUPPRESSIONPOOLHIGHWATERTEMPERATUREandthefollowing:295026EK2.02Suppressionpoolspray:Plant-Specific10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(8)Components,capacity,andfunctionsofemergencysystems.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:HighModifiedRO2017ILOWrittenPage:27of207Question13 14Points:1.00Difficulty:2.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:MODIFIEDAtwhichofthefollowingDrywellTemperatureandRPVpressurecombinationsmayRPVWaterlevelindicationbecomeunreliableduetoboilingintheinstrumentrun?DrywellTemperatureRPVpressureA.250°F25PSIGB.300°F75PSIGC.350°F100PSIGD.375°F250PSIGAnswer: C2017ILOWrittenPage:28of207Question14 AnswerExplanation:Caution1of29.100.01,Sheet6,statesthatRPVlevelindicationsareaffectedbyinstrumentruntemperaturesandRPVpressure,andthattheinstrumentmaybecomeunreliableduetoboilingintherunifthetemperatureneartherunisabovetheRPVsaturationtemperature.ThecandidatemustusetheRPVSaturationTemperaturecurvetodeterminewhichofthegivensetsoftemperatures/pressuresputconditionsintheunreliablewaterlevelareaofthecurve.Accordingtothecurve,RPVlevelindicationmaybecomeunreliableifRPVpressureis100psigandDrywellTemperatureisgreaterthan~330°F.ThismakesdistracterCcorrectsincepressureis100psigandtemperatureis350°F.DistractorExplanation:TheotherdistractorsareincorrectbutplausiblebasedinplottingthedataintheRPVSaturationTemperaturecurve.ReferenceInformation:29.100.01SH6PlantProcedures29.100.01SH6NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295028EA2.Abilitytodetermineand/orinterpretthefollowingastheyapplytoHIGHDRYWELLTEMPERATURE:295028EA2.03Reactorwaterlevel10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(10)Administrative,normal,abnormal,andemergencyoperatingproceduresforthefacility.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:HighModifiedRO2017ILOWrittenPage:29of207Question14 15Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:BANKThefollowingplantconditionsexistafteraLOCAevent:TorusWaterTemperature180°F(stable)TorusWaterLevel-30inches(stable)TorusPressure0psig(stable)ReactorPressure70psig(stable)CSTLevel0.1feetWhichoneofthefollowingdescribesACCEPTABLEconditionsforthefollowingpumpsbeingusedforRPVLevelcontrol?A.RCICoperationat650gpm.B.HPCIoperationat4500gpm.C.SinglepumpLPCIFlowof12,500gpm.D.TotalCoreSprayLoopFlowof6800gpm.Answer: D2017ILOWrittenPage:30of207Question15 AnswerExplanation:ThemaximumCoreSprayflowbasedonTorustemperatureandpressureisfoundusingtheCoreSprayNPSHLimitcurve.At180°FTorusTemperatureand2.5psigToruspressure(torusoverpressure),loopflowislimitedto<7000gpm.DistractorExplanation:A.Isplausibleandincorrect,becauseRCICFlowLimitis<600gpmat180°FTorusTemperature.B.Isplausibleandincorrect,becausetheHPCITurbineisisolatedonLowSteamPress,andflowislimitedto<3500gpmat180°FTorusTemperature.C.Isplausibleandincorrect,becauseRHRLoopFlowof<10,000gpmistheNPSHLimitat180°FTorusTemperature.ReferenceInformation:29.100.01SH6ILOExamNote:DoubleJeopardywithR13discussion.ForthisquestionDistractors1&2(A&B)arenotonR13.ForDistractor3(C)andtheanswer,R13requiredcorrectlyreadingVortexLimit.ThisquestionrequirescorrectlyreadingNPSH.WhileNPSHisreviewedonR13,itisNOTthelimitingfactor.PlantProcedures29.100.01SH6NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295030LowSuppressionPoolWaterLevel295030EK1.KnowledgeoftheoperationalimplicationsofthefollowingconceptsastheyapplytoLOWSUPPRESSIONPOOLWATERLEVEL:295030EK1.02PumpNPSH10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(10)Administrative,normal,abnormal,andemergencyoperatingproceduresforthefacility.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:BankHighRO2017ILOWrittenPage:31of207Question15 16Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEWTheplantisoperatingat100%powerwithFeedwaterControlSysteminAuto(3element)whenRPVlevelfallsbelow173".Allactuationsoccurasexpected.WhatisthestatusoftheFeedWaterLevelControlSystem?A.C32-R618,MasterFeedwaterLevelController,setpointsetdownto150inchesandC32-R620,N21-F403StartupLCVControllerat197insingleelementcontrol.B.C32-R618,MasterFeedwaterLevelController,setpointsetdownto197inchesandC32-R620,N21-F403StartupLCVControllerat197inthreeelementcontrol.C.C32-K616A,NorthReactorFeedPumpController,andC32-K616B,SouthReactorFeedPumpController,inAUTOwithoutputscorrespondingtoapproximately3200rpm.D.C32-R618,MasterFeedwaterLevelController,setpointat197incheswithC32-K616A,NorthReactorFeedPumpController,andC32-K616B,SouthReactorFeedPumpControllerAUTO.Answer: A2017ILOWrittenPage:32of207Question16 AnswerExplanation:Post-ScramFeedwaterLogicinitiationfromaReactorScramcausedbylowRPVlevel.DistractorExplanation:B.Isincorrectandplausiblebecausesetpointsetdownis150inchesandstaysinthreeelementforaReactorScramcausedbylowreactorwaterlevel.C.IsincorrectandplausiblebecauseFeedpumpcontrollersarepulsedtomanualwithanoutputofapproximately2650.D.IsincorrectandplausiblebecauseNormalreactorwaterlevelcontrolindicationswithnoReactorScram.ReferenceInformation:ARP3D157(pg1)PlantProcedures03D157NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295031EK2.KnowledgeoftheinterrelationsbetweenREACTORLOWWATERLEVELandthefollowing:295031EK2.16Reactorwaterlevelcontrol10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:HighNewRO2017ILOWrittenPage:33of207Question16 17Points:1.00Difficulty:2.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:NEWAneventhasoccurredresultinginareactorscram.TheEOPshavebeenentered,andthefollowingconditionscurrentlyexist:Reactorpoweris15%andsteady.SRVsarebeingusedtomaintainreactorpressurebelow1093psig.SLCSystemisinjectingintotheRPV.RPVwaterlevelisbeingmaintained0-50inches.WhichONEofthefollowingconditionswillallowtheoperatingcrewtorestoreRPVleveltothenormalband?A.ReactorperiodisnegativeB.AllIRMsindicatedownscaleC.SLCTanklevelis<45inchesD.Tworodsatposition04,allremainingrodsat02Answer: C2017ILOWrittenPage:34of207Question17 AnswerExplanation:<45inchesintheSLCTankisthedefinitionofHotShutdownBoronWeight,andoverrideFSL-OR2allowsRPVleveltoberestoredtothenormalband.DistractorExplanation

IfthereactorisshutdownunderALLconditions,Sheet1canbeenteredwhichrestoresRPVleveltothenormalband.Alldistractersareplausiblebecausetheycouldbeusedtodecidethereactorisshutdown.However,noneoftheindicationsarevaliddeterminationsthatthereactorisshutdownunderallconditions.A.Negativereactorperiodisnotindicativethatthereactorisshutdownunderallconditions,onlythatpowerlevelislowering.B.IRMindicationisnotavalidmeanstodeterminethereactorisshutdownunderallconditions.D.Allrods<02,allcontrolrodsexceptone<02,ORColdShutdownBoronWeightinjected,arerequiredtoexittheATWSsideandrestoreRPVlevel.Twocontrolrods>02donotmeetthedefinition.ReferenceInformation:EPG(B-14-43to45)29.100.01SH1A(FLS-OR2)PlantProcedures29.100.01SH1ABWROGEPGAppBNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295037EK3.KnowledgeofthereasonsforthefollowingresponsesastheyapplytoSCRAMCONDITIONPRESENTANDREACTORPOWERABOVEAPRMDOWNSCALEORUNKNOWN:295037EK3.04Hotshutdownboronweight:Plant-Specific10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(5)Facilityoperatingcharacteristicsduringsteadystateandtransientconditions,includingcoolantchemistry,causesandeffectsoftemperature,pressureandreactivitychanges,effectsofloadchanges,andoperatinglimitationsandreasonsfortheseoperatingcharacteristics.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:LowNewRO2017ILOWrittenPage:35of207Question17 18Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:NEWAnoffsitereleaseisinprogresswithCCHVACrunninginRecircualtionmode.IfboththeNorthandSouth EmergencyMakeupintakesrecieveaHi-Hiradiationsignalwhiletheintakeselectorswitchisin AUTO,how willEmergencyMakeuplogicrespond?A.Bothinletswillremainopen.B.Bothinletswillcloseforafiveminutesamplingperiod.

C.Bothinletswillcloseandremainclosed.

D.Bothinletswillopenfora5minutesamplingperiod.Answer: A2017ILOWrittenPage:36of207Question18 AnswerExplanation:IfbothoftheradiationmonitorsarebothaboveorbelowtheHi-Hisetpointthelogicwillnotselecteitherintakeandboththeintakeswillremainopen.TheoperatormustselecttheEmergencyintaketoopenusingradiationlevelindicationintheRelayRoom.ThiswilloccurWiththe3positionswitchforEmergencyairintakeselectedtoAUTO.DistractorExplanation:DistractorareplausibleandincorrectbecausetheAirintakestakea5minutesamplebutbothintakesremainopenduringthesampling.ReferenceInformation:ST-OP-315-0073(pg20)-TrainingmaterialI-2611-51(T41M72)relaythatforcesbothopen-TechnicalReferenceNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295038EA1.Abilitytooperateand/ormonitorthefollowingastheyapplytoHIGHOFF-SITERELEASERATE:295038EA1.07Controlroomventilation:Plant-SpecificNRCExamUsageILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:LowNewRO2017ILOWrittenPage:37of207Question18 19Points:1.00Difficulty:2.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:BANKTheplantwasoperatingat100%powerwhenthefollowingalarmswerereceived:16D27,FIREALARM7D10,ELECTRICFIREPUMPAUTOSTARTInadditiontosoundingtheFireAlarmandannouncingtheevent,whichONEofthefollowinglistsoperatoractionsthatareIMMEDIATELYrequired?A.NotifyFireBrigadeLeaderandactivateFireBrigade.B.DispatchanoperatortoinvestigateandinformSecurity.C.NotifyFireBrigadeLeaderandinformSecurityofmagnitude,location,andtypeoffire.D.ActivateFireBrigade,establishcommunicationbetweenControlRoomandFireBrigade,andcallFrenchtownFireDept.Answer: A2017ILOWrittenPage:38of207Question19 AnswerExplanation:Immediateoperatoractionsforaconfirmedfireper20.000.22are:SoundFireAlarm,AnnounceeventoverHi-Com,NotifyFireBrigadeLeader,andActivateFireBrigade.Receiptof7D10isasecondaryindicationofaconfirmedfire.DistractorExplanation:B.Isplausibleandincorrectbecausedispatchinganoperatortoinvestigateisasubsequentactionforafirealarmreceivedwithnoconfirmation.C.IsplausibleandincorrectbecauseinformingSecurityofmagnitude,locationandtypeoffireisasubsequentaction.D.IsplausibleandincorrectbecauseestablishingcommunicationbetweenControlRoomandFireBrigadeisasubsequentaction.ReferenceInformation:20.000.22(pg3)PlantProcedures07D1016D2720.000.22NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2600000PlantFireOnSiteG2.1.20Abilitytointerpretandexecuteproceduresteps10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(10)Administrative,normal,abnormal,andemergencyoperatingproceduresforthefacility.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:BankHighRO2017ILOWrittenPage:39of207Question19 20Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEWTheplantisoperatingat80%powerduringarodpatternadjustment.TheSystemsOperationsCenternotifiesthemaincontrolroomthatthereispotentialfordegradedgridconditionsduetoerraticreactiveloadinginMonroeCounty.4D132,GeneratorFrequencyHigh/Low,alarms,andtheCRLNOreportsthatfrequencyiscurrentlyindicating58Hz.Whichofthefollowingoperatoractionsisrequired,andwhy?A.Reducegeneratorloadtoraisefrequencytostabilizethegrid.B.StartCTG11-1tominimizetheimpactofapotentiallossofthe120KvMat.C.ScramthereactortoprotecttheplantfromconditionsthatmightdamagetheMainGenerator.D.StartEDG11andEDG12toprotectsafetyrelatedequipmentfrompossiblelowvoltagehighcurrentconditions.Answer: C2017ILOWrittenPage:40of207Question20 AnswerExplanation:Withgeneratorfrequencylessthan58.2%andpowergreaterthan30%(conditionswhichcoulddamagethegenerator),20.300.GRID,Override1,directsplacingthemodeswitchinShutdowntoprotecttheplant.DistractorExplanation:A.IsplausibleandincorrectbecauseFermioperationsmaynottakeindependentactiontostabilizethegrid.SOC/ITCmustcoordinatethoseactions.B.Isplausibleandincorrectbecauseisnotdirectedbythe20.300.GRID.D.IsplausibleandincorrectbecausethisisdirectedonlyifSST64Busalarmsonlowvoltage.ReferenceInformation:20.300.GRID,page2PlantProcedures20.300.GRID20.300.GRIDBASESNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2700000AK3.KnowledgeofthereasonsforthefollowingresponsesastheyapplytoGENERATORVOLTAGEANDELECTRICGRIDDISTURBANCES:700000AK3.01Reactorandturbinetripcriteria10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(10)Administrative,normal,abnormal,andemergencyoperatingproceduresforthefacility.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:HighNewRO2017ILOWrittenPage:41of207Question20 21Points:1.00Difficulty:2.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:MODIFIEDTheplantisoperatingat100%power,steadystate,whenCondenserCirculatingWaterSystemmalfunctionscausecondenservacuumtocommencedegrading.Thecrewenters20.125.01LossOfCondenserVacuumandstartsperformingactionstomitigatetheevent.Thefollowingconditionsexistcurrently:SJAEallinserviceCondenserVacuum1.45psia(degrading)ReactorPower90%andlowering.Ascondenservacuumcontinuestodegradefromtheseconditions,whichofthefollowingcondenserpressurechangeswouldresultinamainturbineautomatictripwiththeMainTurbineBypassValvesNOTtripped?A.B.C.D.Answer: C2017ILOWrittenPage:42of207Question21 AnswerExplanation:Turbinetripsetpoint(3.68psia)minuscurrentcondition(1.45psia)=2.23psi.(6.8psia)MainTurbineBypassValveClosureminuscurrentcondition(1.45psia)=5.35psi.Anincreaseof4psiwouldcauseaturbinetripandNOTtriptheMainTurbineBypassValvesDistractorExplanation:AnswersareplausibleandincorrectbasedonsetpointsandcalculationsprovidedintheAnswerExplanation.ReferenceInformation:20.125.01NOTE1pg2PlantProcedures04D10820.125.01NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295002AK2.KnowledgeoftheinterrelationsbetweenLOSSOFMAINCONDENSERVACUUMandthefollowing:295002AK2.02Mainturbine10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:LowModifiedRO2017ILOWrittenPage:43of207Question21 22Points:1.00Difficulty:2.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:BANKAseismiceventhasoccurredduringaplantstartup.AGroupIIsolationoccurredwhileat8%power.RPShasinitiatedascramonMSIVclosure.NootherautomaticRPStripshaveactuatedandnooperatoractionshavebeentaken.AtwhatpressurewillthefirstSRVopen?A.1017psigB.1135psigC.1047psigD.1093psigAnswer: B2017ILOWrittenPage:44of207Question22 AnswerExplanation:Per23.201:LowLowSetlogicisactivated,whenbothsignalshavesealedin;anySRVopenandReactorpressuregreaterthanhighReactorVesselSteamDomePressureScramsetpointof1093psig.ThelogicopensandclosesB2104-F013A,Div1MSLineDSRV,andB2104-F013G,Div2MSLineBSRV,soReactorpressureiscontrolledautomatically.SRVAcontrolsReactorpressurebetween905and1017psig,andSRVGcontrolsReactorpressurebetween935and1047psig.SincethefirstSRVopensat1135psig(perenclosureA,23.201),NoSRVwillopenuntilthen.Afterthat,LLSwillbearmedandcycletocontrolpressure.DistractorExplanation:ThedistractorsareplausiblebecausetheyarepressuresthatrelatetoSRVoperations.(LLSandHiPressure)ReferenceInformation:23.201EnclAPlantProcedures23.201NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295025EK3.KnowledgeofthereasonsforthefollowingresponsesastheyapplytoHIGHREACTORPRESSURE:295025EK3.01Safety/reliefvalveopening\10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(3)Mechanicalcomponentsanddesignfeaturesofreactorprimarysystem.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamLOR2013ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:BankLowRO2017ILOWrittenPage:45of207Question22 23Points:1.00Difficulty:2.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:NEWTheplantisat100%whenRWLincreasestotheL8Tripsetpoint.WhichONEofthefollowingdescribestheplantresponseandthereasonfortheresponse.TheL8instrumentsdirectlycause__(1)__andthiswill__(2)__A.(1)ReactorScram(2)mitigatethereductioninMCPRcausedbytheL8.B.(1)ReactorScram(2)preventtheerosionoftheMainTurbineBlades.C.(1)TurbineTrip.(2)mitigatethereductioninMCPRcausedbytheL8.D.(1)TurbineTrip.(2)preventtheerosionoftheMainTurbineBlades.Answer: D2017ILOWrittenPage:46of207Question23 AnswerExplanation:Per23.601ReactorVesselHighWaterLevel-Level8,(AorB)and(CorD)=MainTurbine/NandSFWTurbineTrip.PerTSB3.3.2.2Atripofthemainturbineandclosureofthestopvalvesprotectstheturbinefromdamageduetowaterenteringtheturbine.InthiscasetheTSBarethereferencedocumentfortheinformationprovidedinstudenttextandtrainingmaterialforreasonfortheLevel8MainTurbineTrip.DistractorExplanation:PerTSB3.3.2.2TheLevel8tripindirectlyinitiatesareactorscram(above30%RTP)fromthemainturbinetripandtripsthefeedwaterpumps,therebyterminatingtheevent.ThereactorscrammitigatesthereductioninMCPR(causedbytheTurbineTripvstheL8).Basedonthestemofthequestionthisisincorrectinthecontextofthequestion.ReferenceInformation:23.601Pg22TSB3.3.2.2(Background&SafetyAnalysis)ILO2017ExamNote:ValidationdataSRO80%passValidationdataRO70%passLODof2discussion.PertheDBDforRPStheindirecttripthatcomesfromthelimitswitchesandsolenoidontheturbinevalvesdoesbenefitthemargintoMCPR,howeverthisisnotthereasonforthetrip.ThetripisfortheTurbineandissenttotheTurbinevalves.TheresultingSCAMisachainedeventthathappensbecauseofwhattheturbinevalvesdo.ThisisaTripandbasesquestion,howeverthereisacomplexitytothisquestionbecauseoftherelationshipwithRPS.ValidationdataandthiscomplexitymakesthisaLOD2questionPlantProcedures23.601NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295008AK1.KnowledgeoftheoperationalimplicationsofthefollowingconceptsastheyapplytoHIGHREACTORWATERLEVEL:295008AK1.01MoisturecarryoverTechnicalSpecifications3.3.2.2FeedwaterandMainTurbineHighWaterLevelTripInstrumentation10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(8)Components,capacity,andfunctionsofemergencysystems.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:LowNewRO2017ILOWrittenPage:47of207Question23 24Points:1.00Difficulty:2.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:BANKTheplantisoperatingat70%powerwhenmultiplealarmsarereceived,andthefollowingconditionsarenoted:RPVlevel192inches(decreasing)NRFPTspeedincreasingSRFPTspeeddecreasingSteamFlow/FeedFlowRecordersteamflow>feedflowBothSBFWpumpsarestartedandinjectingatratedflow.RPVlevelisnow178inchesandcontinuestodecrease.Giventheseconditions,whichofthefollowingactionswillbetakeninaccordancewithplantprocedures?A.PlaceModeSwitchinShutdown.B.ManuallyinitiateandinjectwithHPCI.C.ManuallyinitiateandinjectwithRCIC.D.PlacetheRecirculationSystemA&BFlowLimiter2/3DefeatSwitchinDEFEAT.Answer: A2017ILOWrittenPage:48of207Question24 AnswerExplanation:ThiscombinationofRFPsandSBFWpumpsisnotrecoveringlevel.Perimmediateactions20.107.01A1,PlacemodeswitchinSHUTDOWN.DistractorExplanation:B.IsincorrectplausiblebecauseHPCIisnotwithintheboundsoftheanalysisforincreasedsubcooling.Itisnottheapprovedmethodofwateradditionforthesituationgiven.C.IsincorrectplausiblebecausethereisinsufficienttimetoturnthetransientbeforeaL3SCRAM.IttakesthesameamountoftimetostartandinjectwithRCICasitdoeswithSBFW.Lossof14"isanindicatorthatL3wouldoccurbeforeRCICcouldbeplacedinserviceandturnlevel.D.Isincorrectandplausiblebecausethe2/3defeatshouldbeplacedinNORMALper20.107.01ReferenceInformation:20.107.01Immediateactions.PlantProcedures20.107.01NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295009AA1.Abilitytooperateand/ormonitorthefollowingastheyapplytoLOWREACTORWATERLEVEL:295009AA1.01Reactorfeedwater295009AA2.Abilitytodetermineand/orinterpretthefollowingastheyapplytoLOWREACTORWATERLEVEL:295009AA2.01Reactorwaterlevel295009AA2.02Steamflow/feedflowmismatch10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(10)Administrative,normal,abnormal,andemergencyoperatingproceduresforthefacility.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamLOR2011ExamLOR2013ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:BankHighROSelectedforEarlyReview(NRC)2017ILOWrittenPage:49of207Question24 25Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:BANKTheplantisoperatingatfullpowerandthefollowingconditionsexist:*14DWCoolingFansareoperating.*T47-R803A,DrywellCoolingSystemAreaTemperaturesDiv1,point16indicates>175°F(alarmsetpointis155°F).*P42-K803,RBCCWTCVP42-F400CTRLR,valvepositionindicates100%.*LakeTemperatureis71°F.TheAVERAGEDrywellTemperaturehasrisenfrom132°Fto136°Fduringthelast8hoursandthePrimaryContainmentPressureRecorderindicatesDrywellPressurehasrisenfrom14.4inWCto16.6inWC.WhichONEofthefollowingactionsisappropriate?A.OperateALLavailableDrywellCoolingper29.100.01.B.PlaceRBCCWSCSinserviceinaccordancewith23.127.01.C.ManuallyINITIATEEECWandEESWSystemsper20.127.01.D.IncreasecoolingwaterflowusingP42-F400,RBCCWTempControlVlv,inAUTOorMANUAL.Answer: B2017ILOWrittenPage:50of207Question25 AnswerExplanation:WithHighDWtemperatureandRBCCWTCVfullyopen,itisrequiredtoplaceRBCCWSupplementalCoolingintoservice.DistractorExplanation:A.TheEOPentrycondition(145F)hasnotbeenexceededC.IsappropriateifthereisalossofRBCCW.D.TheRBCCWtemperaturecontrolvalve(TCV)isinlineandalreadyat100%.HoweveriftheexamineeincorrectlyassumestheTCVisabypassvalvetheywouldbelievethatclosingtheTCVwouldincreasecoolingflow.ReferenceInformation:ARP8D41(pg1)PlantProcedures08D4123.127.01NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295012AK1.KnowledgeoftheoperationalimplicationsofthefollowingconceptsastheyapplytoHIGHDRYWELLTEMPERATURE:295012AK1.01Pressure/temperaturerelationship295012AK3.KnowledgeofthereasonsforthefollowingresponsesastheyapplytoHIGHDRYWELLTEMPERATURE:295012AK3.01Increaseddrywellcooling10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(5)Facilityoperatingcharacteristicsduringsteadystateandtransientconditions,includingcoolantchemistry,causesandeffectsoftemperature,pressureandreactivitychanges,effectsofloadchanges,andoperatinglimitationsandreasonsfortheseoperatingcharacteristics.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamLOR2011ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:BankHighRO2017ILOWrittenPage:51of207Question25 26Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:BANKReactorpressureis800psigduringareactorstartup.FollowingaCRDPumptrip,the3D10CRDACCUMULATORTROUBLEalarmisreceivedonawithdrawncontrolrod.Whatactionisrequired,andisthereasonforthisaction?A.PlaceModeSwitchinShutdownIMMEDIATELY.Thisisaconservativemeasure;becausebydesign,controlrodscramcanonlybeaccomplishedwithouttheaccumulatorpressurewhenthereactorvesselpressureisatorabove600psig.B.PlaceModeSwitchinShutdownIMMEDIATELY.Thisisaconservativemeasure;becausebydesign,controlrodscramcanNOTbeaccomplishedwithouttheaccumulatorpressurewhenthereactorvesselpressureisatorabove600psigC.PlaceModeSwitchinShutdownin20Minutes.Theallowedcompletiontimeof20minutesisreasonable;toplaceaCRDpumpintoservicetorestorethechargingheaderpressure.D.PlaceModeSwitchinShutdownin20Minutes.Alloftheaccumulatorswouldnothavesufficientpressure,resultinginapotentiallyseveredegradationofthescramperformance.Answer: A2017ILOWrittenPage:52of207Question26 AnswerExplanation:PerAOPandBASES,anytimebelow900psigaCRDAccumulatortroublelightisonforawithdrawnrod,themodeswitchisplacedinshutdown.Thisisaconservativemeasurebecausebydesign,controlrodscramcanbeaccomplishedwithouttheaccumulatorpressurewhenthereactorvesselpressureisatorabove600psigDistractorsExplanation:B.isincorrectandplausiblebecauseofthebasis.C.isincorrectandplausiblebecausebutwouldbetrueifpressurewasgreaterthan900psig.D.isincorrectandplausiblebecausebutwouldbetrueifpressurewasgreaterthan900psig.ReferenceInformation:20.106.01BasisOverride1(pg2)PlantProcedures20.106.01NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295022AK2.KnowledgeoftheinterrelationsbetweenLOSSOFCRDPUMPSandthefollowing:295022AK2.03Accumulatorpressures295022AK3.KnowledgeofthereasonsforthefollowingresponsesastheyapplytoLOSSOFCRDPUMPS:295022AK3.01ReactorSCRAM10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(5)Facilityoperatingcharacteristicsduringsteadystateandtransientconditions,includingcoolantchemistry,causesandeffectsoftemperature,pressureandreactivitychanges,effectsofloadchanges,andoperatinglimitationsandreasonsfortheseoperatingcharacteristics.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:BankHighRO2017ILOWrittenPage:53of207Question26 27Points:1.00Difficulty:2.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:BANKThefollowingactionsautomaticallyoccurredastheresultofHighRadiation:*ReactorBuildingHVACtripped.*SGTSstarted.*ControlCenterHVACalignedtorecirculationmode.Basedontheinformationprovidedabove,whichONEofthefollowingradiationmonitorindicationsistheLOWESTvaluethatcancausetheseautomaticactions?A.FuelPoolVentExhaustindicating7.3mRem/hr.B.ReactorBuildingVentExhaustindicating14,500cpm.C.FuelPoolVentExhaustindicating2.3mRem/hr.D.ReactorBuildingVentExhaustindicating11,500cpm.Answer: A2017ILOWrittenPage:54of207Question27 AnswerExplanation:PerARP3D35FuelPoolVentExhaustabove3mr/hrwillcausetheseautomaticisolationsandactuations.DistractorExplanation:ReactorBuildingVentExhaustisincorrectandplausiblebecausethetripsetpointis16,000cpmFuelPoolVentExhaustindicating2.3isincorrectandplausiblebecauseAnswerExplanation.ReferenceInformation:ARP3D35(pg2)PlantProcedures03D035NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295034EK2.KnowledgeoftheinterrelationsbetweenSECONDARYCONTAINMENTVENTILATIONHIGHRADIATIONandthefollowing:295034EK2.04SecondarycontainmentventilationG2.1.27Knowledgeofsystempurposeandorfunction

.10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:BankLowRO2017ILOWrittenPage:55of207Question27 28Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEWTheplantisoperatingat100%powerAllRPVwaterlevelindicationislost.Thecrewhasentered29.100.01SH3ARPVflooding-ATWS5SRVsareopenRHRistheonlysystemavailableforinjection.WhichoneofthefollowingisthehighestpressurewhentheCRSwouldorderstartingaRHRpumptoprovideadequatecorecooling(ACC)andwhy?A.310psigbecausedthisisthehighestdischargepressuretheLPCIpumpcandevelop.B.285psigbecausedthisisthehighestdischargepressuretheLPCIpumpcandevelop.C.225psigbecausebelowthispressureLPCIinjectionisrequired.D.100psigbecausebelowthispressureSRVswillbeclosed.Answer: C2017ILOWrittenPage:56of207Question28 AnswerExplanation:PerMSCPwith5SRVopenpressuremustbelessthan230.EOPStepFSRF-4DistractorExplanation:A.IsincorrectandplausiblebecausethisisthehightdischargepressuretheLPCIpumpcandevelop(29.ESP.01)howeverperanswerexplainationthispressureistoohigh.B.IsincorrectandplausiblebecausethisisthehightdischargepressuretheCSpumpcandevelop(29.ESP.01)howeverperanswerexplainationthispressureistoohigh.D.IsincorrectandplausiblebecauseitisnottheHIGHESTpressurewhereinjectionispermissablepertheEOPsReferenceInformation:EOP29.100.01SH3APlantProcedures29.100.01SH3ANUREG1123KACatalogRev.2203000K3.KnowledgeoftheeffectthatalossormalfunctionoftheRHR/LPCI:INJECTIONMODE(PLANTSPECIFIC)willhaveonfollowing:203000K3.04Adequatecorecooling10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:HighNewRO2017ILOWrittenPage:57of207Question28 29Points:1.00Difficulty:4.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:MODIFIEDRHRLoopBisinShutdownCooling,andRPVWaterlevelis194inchesandlowering.Amaintenancemishaphascausedalinetobesheared.Thelineisthereferencelineforthe followinginstruments:B21-N080CDIV1REACTORLEVELNARROWRANGETRANSMITTER.B21-N080DDIV1REACTORLEVELNARROWRANGETRANSMITTER.ShortlyafterthisincidentACTUALRPVlevelbeginsloweringat2inchesaminute.

Assumingnooperatoractionwhatisthepositionofthefollowingvalves15minutesafterACTUALRPVlevelstartedtolower?E1150-F008 RHRSDCOTBD SUCTIONISOVLVE1150-F009 RHRSDCINBD SUCTIONISOVLVA.B.

C.

D.Answer:2017ILOWrittenPage:58of207Question29OPENCLOSECLOSEOPENOPENOPENCLOSECLOSE AnswerExplanation:PerM-2090B21-N080C/Daresuppliedfromasingletap.FailuretothereferencelegwillmakealevelinstrumentfailHIGH.ThismeansthatforNSSSS(C&D)logicwillneverbemet.23.601TripsheetshowsthatA&Cwillbemetatbelow173.4inches.2inchesperminfor15minutesis30inches.194-30=164withislessthan173.4.A&CNSSSSclosestheE1150-F009DistractorExplanationDistractorareincorrectandplausiblebasedonAnswerExplanation.ReferenceInformation:M-209023.601(pg11)PlantProcedures23.601MaintenancePlantDrawingsM-2090NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2205000A1.Abilitytopredictand/ormonitorchangesinparametersassociatedwithoperatingtheSHUTDOWNCOOLINGSYSTEM(RHRSHUTDOWNCOOLINGMODE)controlsincluding:205000A1.05Reactorwaterlevel205000K4.KnowledgeofSHUTDOWNCOOLINGSYSTEM(RHRSHUTDOWNCOOLINGMODE)designfeature(s)and/orinterlockswhichprovideforthefollowing:205000K4.03Lowreactorwaterlevel:Plant-Specific205000K6.KnowledgeoftheeffectthatalossormalfunctionofthefollowingwillhaveontheSHUTDOWNCOOLINGSYSTEM(RHRSHUTDOWNCOOLINGMODE):205000K6.04Reactorwaterlevel10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:HighModifiedRO2017ILOWrittenPage:59of207Question29 30Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:MODIFIEDTheplanthasbeenshutdownfor24hoursfollowing300daysofpoweroperationwiththefollowingconditions:RHRPumpBisoperatinginShutdownCoolingMode.RHRSWPumpsBANDDaresupplyingtheDiv2RHRHeatExchanger.RPVLevelis230inches.Whichofthefollowingactionsshouldbetakenforanover-currenttripofRHRSWPumpB?A.ThrottleclosedE1150-F068B,Div2RHRHXServWTROutletFCV,toestablishproperRHRSWflowANDmonitorandrecordRPVtemperatureandpressureIAW22.000.05,"Pressure/TemperatureMonitoringDuringHeatupAndCooldown"B.ThrottleopenE1150-F068B,Div2RHRHXServWTROutletFCV,tomaximizeservicewaterflowANDmonitorandestablishdecayheatremovalper23.800.05,AlternateRemoteCoolantCirculationandDecayHeatRemoval.C.FullycloseE1150-F048B,RHRHeatExchangerBypassValve,toincreaseheatexchangerloadANDmonitorandestablishdecayheatremovalper23.800.05,AlternateRemoteCoolantCirculationandDecayHeatRemoval.D.FullyopenE1150-F048B,RHRHeatExchangerBypassValve,toreduceheatexchangerloadANDmonitorandrecordRPVtemperatureandpressureIAW22.000.05,"Pressure/TemperatureMonitoringDuringHeatupAndCooldown"Answer: A2017ILOWrittenPage:60of207Question30 AnswerExplanation:RHRSWvalveisthrottledclosedtomeetpumpDPrequirements.MonitorandrecordRPVtemperatureandpressureIAW22.000.05,"Pressure/TemperatureMonitoringDuringHeatupAndCooldown"isrequiredbySOPforSDCDistractorExplanation:B.IsincorrectandplausiblebecauseThrottleopenE1150-F068Bwillincreaseflowandcoolinglostbypumptrip,howeveritisNOTallowedbyprocedurebecauseflowmustbeREDUCEDperNOTEinSOPtoarangeof5400gpmto6300gpmtopreventexcessivevibrationofE1150-F068B,Div1RHRHxServWtrOutletFCV.23.800.05,AlternateRemoteCoolantCirculationandDecayHeatRemovalCOULDbeusedandisdirectedfromthelossofSDCAOP.C.IsincorrectandplausiblebecauseFULLYclosingE1150-F048BwouldgreatlyincreasecoolingtothefuelandcoolinghasbeenalreadyreducedwiththelossoftheRHRSWpump,forthiseventitwouldbegoodtothrottledinthecloseddirectiontomaintaincooldownorthethecurrentpressure/temperaturebandHOWEVERtheSOPspecificallyprecludesFULLYclosingtheE1150-F048BwhenONLYONERHRpumpisrunningintheloop.MonitorandrecordRPVtemperatureandpressureIAW22.000.05,"Pressure/TemperatureMonitoringDuringHeatupAndCooldown"isrequiredbySOPforSDCD.IsincorrectandplausiblebecauseFULLYopeningE1150-F048Bwouldgreatlyreducecoolingwhencoolinghasareadybeenreduced.23.800.05,AlternateRemoteCoolantCirculationandDecayHeatRemovalCOULDbeusedandisdirectedfromthelossofSDCAOP.ReferenceInformation:23.205Section6.2(SDCDiv2RHR)23.208Section5.4(RHRSWoperation)PlantProcedures23.20523.208NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2205000A4.Abilitytomanuallyoperateand/ormonitorinthecontrolroom:205000A4.04Heatexchangercoolingwatervalves10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(10)Administrative,normal,abnormal,andemergencyoperatingproceduresforthefacility.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:HighModifiedROSelectedforEarlyReview(NRC)2017ILOWrittenPage:61of207Question30 31Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:BANKWhichofthefollowingresponsesbestcompletesthestatementbelowregardingalimitationassociatedwiththeoperationoftheHPCIsystem?WhentheHPCIturbineisrunning,itsspeedmustbemaintainedabove__(1)__rpmtoensure__(2)__.A.(1)2000(2)adequatedischargepressuretoallowinjectionintotheRPVB.(1)2000(2)stabilityofoperationC.(1)4000(2)stabilityofoperationD.(1)4000(2)adequatedischargepressuretoallowinjectionintotheRPVAnswer: B2017ILOWrittenPage:62of207Question31 AnswerExplanation:Asstatedintheprecautionsandlimitationsin23.202.DistractorsExplanation:A.IsincorrectandplausiblebecauseHPCIcouldbeatlowerRPMdependingonwhatRPVpressureisandfortesting.C.Isincorrectandplausiblerpmiswrong.D.IsincorrectandplausiblebecauserpmiswrongwithincorrectlimitationReferenceInformation:23.202P&L3.3PlantProcedures23.202NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2206000K5.KnowledgeoftheoperationalimplicationsofthefollowingconceptsastheyapplytoHIGHPRESSURECOOLANTINJECTIONSYSTEM:206000K5.01Turbineoperation:BWR-2,3,4206000K5.05Turbinespeedcontrol:BWR-2,3,410CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(5)Facilityoperatingcharacteristicsduringsteadystateandtransientconditions,includingcoolantchemistry,causesandeffectsoftemperature,pressureandreactivitychanges,effectsofloadchanges,andoperatinglimitationsandreasonsfortheseoperatingcharacteristics.NRCExamUsageILO2010ExamILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:BankLowRO2017ILOWrittenPage:63of207Question31 32Points:1.00Difficulty:2.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:NEWWiththeplantoperatingat100%power,whichofthefollowingsetsofconditionsrequiresimmediateentryintoLCO3.0.3?A.HPCISysteminoperable.B.TwoormoreADSvalvesinoperable.C.HPCIandoneormoreADSvalvesinoperable.D.OneLPCIpumpinbothLPCIsubsystemsinoperable.Answer: C2017ILOWrittenPage:64of207Question32 AnswerExplanation:Per3.5.1ConditionK,HPCIandoneormoreADSvalvesinoperableenterLCO3.0.3immediately.DistractorExplanation:A.IsincorrectandplausiblebecauseitisConditionE,anddoesnotrequiredLCO3.0.3B.IsincorrectandplausiblebecauseitisConditionJ,anddoesnotrequiredLCO3.0.3D.IsincorrectandplausiblebecauseitisConditionB,anddoesnotrequiredLCO3.0.3ReferenceInformation:T.S.3.5.1NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2206000HPCISystem

.G2.2.39Knowledgeoflessthanonehourtechnicalspecificationactionstatementsforsystems.TechnicalSpecifications3.5.1ECCSOperating10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(10)Administrative,normal,abnormal,andemergencyoperatingproceduresforthefacility.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:LowNewRO2017ILOWrittenPage:65of207Question32 33Points:1.00Difficulty:2.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:MODIFIEDWhileoperatingat100%power,aseismiceventcausesalossofalloffsitepowerANDarecirculationlooprupture.IfEDG#11failstostart,whatwouldbetheimpactofthiselectricallossonlowpressureinjection?A.CoreSprayPumpAisde-energized.B.CoreSprayPumpBisde-energized.C.CoreSprayPumpCisde-energized.D.CoreSprayPumpDisde-energized.Answer: A2017ILOWrittenPage:66of207Question33 AnswerExplanation:OnlyCoreSprayPumpAispoweredfrom4160vBus64B.DistractorExplanation:B.Isplausibleandincorrect,CSpumpBispoweredfrom4160vBus65EC.Isplausibleandincorrect,RHRpumpCispoweredfrom4160vBus64CD.Isplausibleandincorrect,RHRpumpDispowerfrom4160vBus65FReferenceInformation:I-2215-02(G-7)PowerMonitorforPumpAPlantProcedures23.203NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2209001K2.Knowledgeofelectricalpowersuppliestothefollowing:209001K2.01Pumppower209001K6.KnowledgeoftheeffectthatalossormalfunctionofthefollowingwillhaveontheLOWPRESSURECORESPRAYSYSTEM:209001K6.02Emergencygenerators10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:LowModifiedRO2017ILOWrittenPage:67of207Question33 34Points:1.00Difficulty:2.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:NEWTheplantisshutdowninMODE4andDIV1CoreSprayisinoperationforsurveillancetesting.RHRPumpBisinserviceforshutdowncooling.FlowthroughDIV1CoreSprayisbeingcontrolledbyE2150-F015A,Div1CSTestLineIsoValveat3500gpm.Reactorwaterlevelsuddenlylowers.IfReactorwaterlevelcontinuestolowerto__(1)__inchesthenon-runningcorespraypumpswillstartandtheE2150-F015A,Div1CSTestLineIsoValvewill__(2)__.A.(1)31.8(2)remainOPEN.B.(1)31.8(2)CLOSEC.(1)110.8(2)remainOPEN.D.(1)110.8(2)CLOSEAnswer: B2017ILOWrittenPage:68of207Question34 AnswerExplanation:Per23.203,Section5.5,AutoInitiationDiv1,"IfDiv1CoreSprayisintheTestModewhenanautomaticinitiationsignalisreceived,E2150-F015A,Div1CSTestLineIsoVlv,willcloseasthesystemalignsforinjectiontotheReactorVessel."AlsoshownonI-2210-01thatL1orHighDrywellwillstartCoreSprayPumpsandclosetheE2150-F015A.DistracterExplanation:110.8inchesisplausibleandincorrectbecauseitistheL2setpoint,andtheE2150-F015AisplausibleandincorrectiftheexamineedoesnotunderstandthesetpointsassociatedwithactuationsandisolationsCSlogic.ReferenceInformation:I-2210-01LogiceDiagramCoreSpray23.203Section5.5(pg22)NOTEI-2215-02CoreSprayLogic23.601Pg16ReactorVesselLowWaterLevel-Level1PlantProcedures23.203NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2209001A1.Abilitytopredictand/ormonitorchangesinparametersassociatedwithoperatingtheLOWPRESSURECORESPRAYSYSTEMcontrolsincluding:209001A1.03Reactorwaterlevel209001A1.08Systemlineup10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(5)Facilityoperatingcharacteristicsduringsteadystateandtransientconditions,includingcoolantchemistry,causesandeffectsoftemperature,pressureandreactivitychanges,effectsofloadchanges,andoperatinglimitationsandreasonsfortheseoperatingcharacteristics.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:LowNewRO2017ILOWrittenPage:69of207Question34 35Points:1.00Difficulty:2.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:BANKDuringanATWS,SLCPumpBhasbeenstarted.Thefollowingindicationsareobserved:RPVPressureis1015psig.SLCTankLevelis72inchesdecreasing.SLCPumpDischargePressureis1050psig.3D11,SLCIGNITIONCONTINUITYLOSS,isactivated.BOTHH11-P603ContinuityCircuitindicatinglightsareOFF.G3352-F004,RWCUSupplyOtbdIsoVlv,andF220,RWCUToFwOtbdCntmIsoVlv,areCLOSED.G3352-F001,RWCUSupplyInbdIsoVlv,remainsOPEN.Theaboveconditionsindicatewhichofthefollowing?A.Normaloperation.B.SLCExplosiveValvesfailedtofire.C.RWCUfailedtoisolateonSLCinjection.D.SLCPumpBDischargeReliefValvefailedopen.Answer: A2017ILOWrittenPage:70of207Question35 AnswerExplanation:ProperindicationofSLCinjectionincludeRWCUisolation(G3352-F004andF220only),SLCtankleveldecreasing,3D11activated,ContinuityCircuitindicatinglightsoff,andpressureslightlyhigherthanRPVpressure.DistractorExplanation:B.Isincorrectandplausiblebecauseiftheyfailedtofire,3D11wouldnotalarm,ContinuityCircuitindicatinglightswouldbeon,andpressurewouldbehigher.C.IsincorrectandplausiblebecauseRWCUdidisolateproperly,butthereisacommonmisconceptionG3352-F001shutsonSLCinjection.D.Isincorrectandplausiblebecauseeventhoughpressureishigher,itisnotfluctuatingasindicationofreliefvalvestuckopen.ReferenceInformation:23.139,page11PlantProcedures23.139NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2211000A1.Abilitytopredictand/ormonitorchangesinparametersassociatedwithoperatingtheSTANDBYLIQUIDCONTROLSYSTEMcontrolsincluding:211000A1.10Lightsandalarms211000A4.Abilitytomanuallyoperateand/ormonitorinthecontrolroom:211000A4.07LightsandalarmsG2.1.31Abilitytolocatecontrolroomswitches,controlsandindicationsandtodeterminethattheyarecorrectlyreflectingthedesiredplantlineup10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(5)Facilityoperatingcharacteristicsduringsteadystateandtransientconditions,includingcoolantchemistry,causesandeffectsoftemperature,pressureandreactivitychanges,effectsofloadchanges,andoperatinglimitationsandreasonsfortheseoperatingcharacteristics.NRCExamUsageILO2012ExamILO2017ExamLOR2011ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:BankLowRO2017ILOWrittenPage:71of207Question35 36Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:BANKAnoperatorstandingbyaHydraulicControlUnit(HCU)bankhearsaclickofmultiplesolenoidvalveschangingposition,andnosoundofairdischarging.ThisisfollowedbyanannouncementfromtheControlRoomofthereceiptofa1/2scram.WhichONEofthefollowingistheinitiatingeventwhichleadstothiscondition?A.A1/2scramofRPSChannelA.B.A1/2scramofRPSChannelB.C.A1/2scramcausedonehalfoftheBack-UpScramValvestoenergize.D.A1/2scramcausedonehalfoftheBack-UpScramValvestode-energize.Answer: A2017ILOWrittenPage:72of207Question36 AnswerExplanation:WhenRPSAcauseahalfscram,solenoidswillreposition,noairwouldvent.DistractorExplanation:B.isincorrectforifRPSBinitiatedthehalfscam,airwouldbevented.C/D.isincorrectbecausebackupscamvalvesenergizewhenfullscramsignalispresent.ReferenceInformation:M-5703-1MaintenancePlantDrawingsm-5703-1NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2212000K1.Knowledgeofthephysicalconnectionsand/orcause-effectrelationshipsbetweenREACTORPROTECTIONSYSTEMandthefollowing:212000K1.06Controlroddrivehydraulicsystem10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(6)Design,components,andfunctionofreactivitycontrolmechanismsandinstrumentation.NRCExamUsageILO2012ExamILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:BankLowRO2017ILOWrittenPage:73of207Question36 37Points:1.00Difficulty:2.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:BANKThereactormodeswitchisinREFUELandtheshortinglinksareinstalled.IRMGHiHiUpscaletripisobserved.WhatistheresponseoftheRPSandReactorManualControlSystems?A.HALFScram:NoRodBlock.B.FULLScram:NoRodBlock.C.HALFScram:RodBlock.D.FULLScram:RodBlock.Answer: C2017ILOWrittenPage:74of207Question37 AnswerExplanation:WithshortinglinksinstalledIRMA/E/C/GHighflux(120on125scale)causesA1/A2ofRPStotrip,causinghalfscram.AdditionallywiththemodeswitchinrefuelIRMupscalecausesaRodblock.DistracterInformation:HalfScramandNoRodblockareincorrectandplausiblebasedonreferencedprintsReferenceInformation:I-2115-6ShowshowmodeswitcheffectsrodblocksfromSRM/IRMARP3D73(pg2)REACTORSCRAM

SUMMARY

ARP3D11(pg2)RODBLOCK

SUMMARY

PlantProcedures03D01103D073NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2215003K1.Knowledgeofthephysicalconnectionsand/orcauseeffectrelationshipsbetweenINTERMEDIATERANGEMONITOR(IRM)SYSTEMandthefollowing:215003K1.01RPS215003K1.02Reactormanualcontrol215003K4.KnowledgeofINTERMEDIATERANGEMONITOR(IRM)SYSTEMdesignfeature(s)and/orinterlockswhichprovideforthefollowing:215003K4.01Rodwithdrawalblocks215003K4.02ReactorSCRAMsignals10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(6)Design,components,andfunctionofreactivitycontrolmechanismsandinstrumentation.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:BankLowRO2017ILOWrittenPage:75of207Question37 38Points:1.00Difficulty:2.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:MODIFIEDDuringareactorstartup,reactorpowerisonRange3oftheIntermediateRangeMonitors,andSourceRangeMonitor(SRM)detectorsarebeingwithdrawnfromthecore.DIV148/24VDCDistributionlosespower.Assumingnooperatoractionistaken,aControlRodBlockiscausedbypowerlossto_____.A.SRMAandSRMDONLY.B.SRMBandSRMCONLY.C.SRMA,CandIRMsA,C,E,G.D.SRMsB,DandIRMsB,D,F,H.Answer: C2017ILOWrittenPage:76of207Question38 AnswerExplanation:PowertoIRMChannelsA,C,E,GandSRMChannelsAandCisfrom48/24VDCDistributionCabinet2IA1-3DistracterExplanation:DistractersareplausibleasSRMdrivesarepoweredfrom120/208VDistributionCabinet72E-2B-1vice48/24VandknowingtheRODBLOCKsetpoint.ReferencesInformation:ARP3D113,RODBLOCK300VDCdecreasing(pg.2),SOP23.602,ENERGIZINGSRM(Pg9).PlantProcedures03D11323.602NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2215004K2.Knowledgeofelectricalpowersuppliestothefollowing:215004K2.01SRMchannels/detectors10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:LowModifiedRO2017ILOWrittenPage:77of207Question38 39Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:MODIFIEDAplantstartupisinprogress.Reactorpoweris30%andbeingincreasedbycontrolrodwithdrawal.APRM1malfunctionsandisindicating0%power.WhichoneofthefollowingdescribestheeffectonRodBlockMonitorsasaresultoftheAPRMfailure?A.RBMAandBarefunctional.OutwardControlrodmotioncancontinue.B.RBMAandBareNOTfunctional.OutwardControlrodmotionisblocked.C.RBMAisNOTfunctional.BypassingAPRM1willallowoutwardcontrolrodmotion.D.RBMBisNOTfunctional.BypassingAPRM1willallowoutwardcontrolrodmotion.Answer: C2017ILOWrittenPage:78of207Question39 AnswerExplanation:TheexamineeshouldcorrectlyrecognizethatAPRM#1istheprimaryAPRMforRBMAanddeterminethat,underthecurrentconditionof30%power,theRBMisbypassedduetoAPRM2powerinputof0%.TheRBMisbypasseduntilpowerexceedsthesetpointof27%powerfromtheprimaryAPRM.ThesecondaryAPRM(APRM4inthiscase)willbeautomaticallyselectedaftertheAPRM2bypassjoystickisoperated.DistracterExplanation:A.IsincorrectandplausiblebecausetheexamineemayincorrectlyrecallthattechnicalspecificationAdditionallyRBMAisassociatedwithAPRMs#1and3,andsinceitismayseemmorelogicaltoassociateAPRMs1&2withRBMA,ratherthanAPRMs2&4beingassociatedwithRBMB.AlsowiththeAPRMdownscalewiththemodeswitchinrun,outwardrodmotioncouldnotoccurduetoaAPRMdownscalecontrolrodwithdrawlblock.B.IsincorrectbutplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldincorrectlydeterminethattheAPRMdownscaleeffectsbothRBMs.(RecircflowtransmitterfailurescouldaffectbothRBMsflowcomparator).OutwardcontrolrodmotionisblockedbytheAPRMdownscalefailure.D.IsincorrectbutplausiblebecausetheexamineemayincorrectlyrecallthatRBMBisassociatedwithAPRM#1.ReferenceInformation:23.607(pg3)1.1SystemDescriptionPlantProcedures03D09903D10323.60523.607NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2215005K3.KnowledgeoftheeffectthatalossormalfunctionoftheAVERAGEPOWERRANGEMONITOR/LOCALPOWERRANGEMONITORSYSTEMwillhaveonfollowing:215005K3.07Rodblockmonitor:Plant-SpecificTechnicalSpecifications3.3.2.1ControlRodBlockInstrumentation10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:HighModifiedRO2017ILOWrittenPage:79of207Question39 40Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:BANKFollowingareactorscramandMSIVisolation,RPVwaterleveldroppedto103inches,thenroseto215inches.CurrentRPVlevelis182inches(slowlylowering).Giventheseconditions,whichofthefollowingactionsarerequiredtomanuallystartRCIC?A.DepresstheLevel8resetbutton,wait15seconds,andthenopenE5100-F095,RCICStmInletBypassValve.B.DepresstheLogicAandBIsolationresetbutton,andopenE5100-F059,RCICTurbineInletTripThrottleValve.C.OpenE5100-F095,RCICStmInletBypassValve,wait15seconds,andopenE5100-F045,RCICSteamInletValve.D.Closeandre-openE5100-F059,RCICTurbineInletTripThrottleValve,thenopenE5100-F045,RCICSteamInletValve.Answer: C2017ILOWrittenPage:80of207Question40 AnswerExplanation:Per23.206,ifRCICisneeded,thetripwasduetoL8andRPVlevelis>L2,RCICistobestartedmanuallyinaccordancewithsection5.4"ManualInitition"Theonlyactionsthatshouldberequired(thatmatchthisquestion)istoOpenE5100-F095,wait15secondsandthenOpenE5100-F045.Thedistractorsareplausibleanddependontheexamineesunderstandingofsystemoperationsandplantconditions.PlantProcedures23.206NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2217000K4.KnowledgeofREACTORCOREISOLATIONCOOLINGSYSTEM(RCIC)designfeature(s)and/orinterlockswhichprovideforthefollowing:217000K4.06Manualinitiation10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(10)Administrative,normal,abnormal,andemergencyoperatingproceduresforthefacility.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamLOR2013ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:BankHighRO2017ILOWrittenPage:81of207Question40 41Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:MODIFIEDPlantisat100%Powerwithannunciator1D57,ADS/SRV/EECWTCVPOWERSUPPLYFAILUREinalarm.Fieldinvestigationof1D57showthat2PA2-6Circuit1istripped.AtransientoccursresultinginconditionsrequiringtheADSsystemtofunction.HowwillADSrespond?A.TheADStimerwillstartandallADSvalveswillOPENasdesigned.B.TheADStimerwillNOTstartandtheADSvalveswillNOTopen.C.TheADStimerwillstartandallADSvalveswillNOTopen.D.TheADStimerwillNOTstart,ADSvalveswillopenatL1.Answer: A2017ILOWrittenPage:82of207Question41 AnswerExplanation:TheexamineeshouldalsodeterminethatADSLogicStringAhaspower;however,ADSLogicStringBwillhavelostpowerfromanalternatesource(2PA2-6,Circuit1).DistracterExplanation:Distractorsareincorrectandplausiblebasedonanswerexpainations.ReferenceInformation:ARP1D57validatesthatsomeADScomponentsarede-energizeddueto2PA2-6Ckt1offasindicatedinthestemThelogicprintsforADSpowersupplies(I-2095-01)andBADSlogicpower(I-2095-07)indicatehowthelogicremainsautomaticallypoweredonalossofthepowerfrom2PA2-6Ckt1.ThelogicprintsforADSvalvesP,J,R(I-2095-02)indicatehowthevalvesremainsautomaticallypoweredonalossofthepowerfrom2PA2-6Ckt1.ValvesHandEarethesame.PlantProcedures01D3101D3601D4401D57BWROGEPGAppBNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2218000K5.KnowledgeoftheoperationalimplicationsofthefollowingconceptsastheyapplytoAUTOMATICDEPRESSURIZATIONSYSTEM:218000K5.01ADSlogicoperation10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(5)Facilityoperatingcharacteristicsduringsteadystateandtransientconditions,includingcoolantchemistry,causesandeffectsoftemperature,pressureandreactivitychanges,effectsofloadchanges,andoperatinglimitationsandreasonsfortheseoperatingcharacteristics.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:HighModifiedRO2017ILOWrittenPage:83of207Question41 42Points:1.00Difficulty:4.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:NEWTheplantisoperatingatpowerwhenitisdiscoveredthatanMTEinstrumentwhichfailedpost-usecalibrationwasusedtosetallL1instrumentationsetpoints.WhichofthefollowingincludesONLYGroupisolationsthatwouldbeimpactedbythiserror?Group1-MSIV&DrainsGroup2-RxSampleGroup3-RHRGroup4-SDC/HDSprayGroup5-CSSGroup6-HPCIA.Groups1,3,5B.Groups1,2,4C.Groups2,3,6D.Groups4,5,6Answer: A2017ILOWrittenPage:84of207Question42 AnswerExplanation:TheautomaticclosureofvariousClassBvalvespreventsthereleaseofsignificantradioactivematerialfromthePrimaryContainment.Thesevalvesarenotneededforasafeshutdownoftheplant.DistractorExplanation:B.isincorrectandplausible;(2)RxSample+(4)SDC/HDSpray.C.isincorrectandplausible;(6)HPCID.isincorrectandplausible;(4)SDC/HDSpray+(6)HPCIReferenceInformation:29.ESP.01Pg4(underL1)PlantProcedures23.42729.ESP.01NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2223002K6.KnowledgeoftheeffectthatalossormalfunctionofthefollowingwillhaveonthePRIMARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONSYSTEM/NUCLEARSTEAMSUPPLYSHUT-OFF:223002K6.04Nuclearboilerinstrumentation10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:LowNewRO2017ILOWrittenPage:85of207Question42 43Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEWWhichofthefollowingrepresenttheresponseofReactorPowerandMainTurbineGeneratorOutput,foraSRVopeningforafewsecondsandthenclosing?A.#1&#3B.#1&#4C.#2&#3D.#2&#4Answer: B2017ILOWrittenPage:86of207Question43 AnswerExplanation:Graphsshowplantresponse.BothReactorPowerPowerandGeneratorOutputdropwhenaSRVisopenedat100%power.WhentheSRVcloses,theyreturntonormal.DistractorExplanation:DistactorsareincorrectandplausiblebasedonunderstandingtheeffectofSRVopeningandclosingduringpoweroperations.ReferenceInformation:BWRFundamentalsNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2239002A1.Abilitytopredictand/ormonitorchangesinparametersassociatedwithoperatingtheRELIEF/SAFETYVALVEScontrolsincluding:239002A1.07Turbineload10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(5)Facilityoperatingcharacteristicsduringsteadystateandtransientconditions,includingcoolantchemistry,causesandeffectsoftemperature,pressureandreactivitychanges,effectsofloadchanges,andoperatinglimitationsandreasonsfortheseoperatingcharacteristics.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:HighNewRO2017ILOWrittenPage:87of207Question43 44Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:BANKWithreactorpowerat100%,RFPpumpspeedsbegintooscillate.TheCRLNOreviewstheindicationsandwiththeagreementoftheCRStakestheRFPBcontrollertoEMERGENCYBYPASSmode.RFPBimmediatelystabilizesatitscurrentvalueandARFPspeedreturnstonormalwithnooscillations.HowwillRPVlevelnowrespondandwhatactionsareneededtorestorelevelcontrol?A.Levellowers.ImmediatelylowerrecircflowandinsertCRAMarraytoallowcapacityoffeedwatertoturnlevel.B.Levellowers.TakemanualcontrolofRFPAandRFPBtoraiseFeedFlowandrestorelevel.C.Levelwillnotchange.ImmediatelylowerrecircflowandinsertCRAMarraytolowerfeeddemandtowithinthecapacityofoneRFP.D.Levelwillnotchange.ContinuouslymonitorforchangesinRPVleveluntilcontrollerisrepaired,controlspeedofRFPBifnecessaryinmanual.Answer: D2017ILOWrittenPage:88of207Question44 AnswerExplanation:Leveldoesnotchange.AOP20.107.01directsplacingtheaffectedRFP(B)tomanual,andcontrollingspeedasnecessarytoallowunaffectedRFP(A)tocontrollevel.DistractorExplanation:A.IncorrectandplausiblebecauseRFPAwillnotlosesignalsolevelwillnotlower.B.IncorrectandplausiblebecauseRFPAwillnotlosesignalsolevelwillnotlower.C.Incorrectandplausiblebecauseincorrectaction,currentconfigurationisacceptablewithoperatormonitoringlevelandcontrollingRFPBinmanualwiththecontrollerinEMERGENCYBYPASSmode.ReferenceInformation:20.107.01&BasisPlantProcedures20.107.0123.107NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2259002A2.Abilityto(a)predicttheimpactsofthefollowingontheREACTORWATERLEVELCONTROLSYSTEM;and(b)basedonthosepredictions,useprocedurestocorrect,control,ormitigatetheconsequencesofthoseabnormalconditionsoroperations:259002A2.06Lossofcontrollersignaloutput10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(10)Administrative,normal,abnormal,andemergencyoperatingproceduresforthefacility.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:BankLowRO2017ILOWrittenPage:89of207Question44 45Points:1.00Difficulty:2.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:MODIFIEDSurveillanceisbeingperformedonDiv1SGTS.TheEastandWesttrainsofRBHVACareinservice.WhichofthefollowingeventswouldcauseDivision1SGTSflowasindicatedbyT46-R800A,Div1SGTSExhGasFlowRecordertofallbelow2000scfm?A.Div1SGTS24kWHeatertripped.B.SGTSPre-Filterdifferentialpressureis1.3"watergauge.C.BreakerforT4100-C004RBEastExhaustFanhastripped.D.T46-F003A,Div1SGTSExhaustFanInletVortexDamper,malfunctioning.Answer: D2017ILOWrittenPage:90of207Question45 AnswerExplanation:SGTSExhaustFanInletVortexDampermodulatesonstarttomaintainnormalflowband.Amalfunctioncouldcauseittomaintainalowerthannormalflow.DistractorsExplanation:A.Isincorrectandplausiblebecausetheheaterwilltriponalarm.Ifwatercollectsinthecharcoalitcouldrestrictflow.B.Isincorrectandplausiblebecauseitcouldlowerflow,butvortexdamperwouldmaintainflow.C.IsincorrectandplausiblebecauseRBHVAChasoperatingrelationshipwithSGTS,howeveronetraintrippingwillnotcauseflowtolowerinrunningdivisionofSGTS.ReferenceInformation:8D35PlantProcedures08D3523.404NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2261000A3.AbilitytomonitorautomaticoperationsoftheSTANDBYGASTREATMENTSYSTEMincluding:261000A3.03Valveoperation10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:LowModifiedRO2017ILOWrittenPage:91of207Question45 46Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:MODIFIEDTheplantisoperatingat100%reactorpowerwithEDG13currentlysynchronizedtotheGRIDandbeingcontrolledfromtheMainControlRoom.Alossofthe120Kvmatoccurs.Basedontheseconditions,whichofthefollowingstatementscorrectlydescribesEDGoperationandparameterresponsewhencontrolledfromtheMainControlRoom?A.WhenEDG12GovernorControlswitchistakentoraise,EDG12Generatorfrequencywillincrease.B.WhenEDG12EDGVoltageControlswitchistakentoraise,EDG12GeneratorKVARSwillincrease.C.WhenEDG13GovernorControlswitchistakentoraise,EDG13Generatorfrequencywillincrease.D.WhenEDG13EDGVoltageControlswitchistakentoraise,EDG13GeneratorVoltagewillincrease.Answer: A2017ILOWrittenPage:92of207Question46 AnswerExplanation:ToanswerthisquestiontheexamineemustdeterminethatEDG13wouldbeinDroopmodeandEDG12wouldbeinisochronous.UnderstandingthisiscriticalincontrollingtheEDGandbeingabletokeepit'sparameterinbandasanoperator.BasedonthistheGovernorcontrolswitchandtheVoltagecontrolswitcheffecttheEDGdifferently.ForDROOP,GovernorControlcontrolsLOADinKWandVoltageControlcontrolsreactiveloadinVARS.ForISOCHRONOUSGovernorControlcontrolsfrequencyinHzandVoltageControlcontrolsoutputvoltage.DistracterExplanation:B.isplausibleandincorrectbecauseitwouldbetrueifEDG12wasinisochronous.C.isplausibleandincorrectbecauseitwouldbetrueifEDG13wasindroop.D.isplausibleandincorrectbecauseitwouldbetrueifEDG13wasindroop.ReferenceInformation:ST-OP-315-0065-001(pg26)PlantProcedures23.307NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2262001A4.Abilitytomanuallyoperateand/ormonitorinthecontrolroom:262001A4.05Voltage,current,power,andfrequencyonA.C.buses10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:HighModifiedRO2017ILOWrittenPage:93of207Question46 47Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:NEWAfirehasdamagedUPSAandbecauseofthefireallloadsforUPSAaredenergized.UPSBcontinuestofunctionnormally.Whichofthefollowingcontrolroomindicationsareimpacted?A.RodWorthMinimizer(C11-J601)B.FeedwaterLineBFlow(C32-R604B)C.ReactorPressureRecorder(C32-R609)D.RPISindicationsontheFullCoreDisplay(C1109-Y001)Answer: D2017ILOWrittenPage:94of207Question47 AnswerExplanation:PerARP3D22,RPISindicationsontheFullCoreDisplayarelostwithUPSA.DistractorExplanation:ListeddistractorsareplausibleandincorrectbecausetheyarepowerfromUPSB.ReferenceInformation:ARP3D22(pg.1)PlantProcedures3D22NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2262002K1.Knowledgeofthephysicalconnectionsand/orcause-effectrelationshipsbetweenUNINTERRUPTABLEPOWERSUPPLY(A.C./D.C.)andthefollowing:262002K1.03Rodpositioninformation:Plant-Specific10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:LowNewRO2017ILOWrittenPage:95of207Question47 48Points:1.00Difficulty:2.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:BANKTheplantisoperatingat100%powerwhenthefollowingalarmsarereceived:10D68,DivIIESS130VBattery2PBTrouble2D24,DivIICSLogicPowerFailure2D30,RHRLogicB125VDCBusPowerFailure2D50HPCILogicBusPowerFailureUndertheseconditions,controlpowerforSafetyReliefValves(1)islost.SafetyReliefValve(2)remainspoweredfromaredundantDCpowersource.A.(1)A,E,H,J,P,andR(2)BB.(1)A,B,H,J,P,andR(2)EC.(1)D,F,G,K,L,M,andN(2)CD.(1)C,D,F,K,L,M,andN(2)GAnswer: D2017ILOWrittenPage:96of207Question48 AnswerExplanation:SRVsC,D,F,K,L,M,andNreceivecontrolpowerfromDivIIDCpower.(I-2095-01)SRVGhasaredundantcontrolpowerfeature125VDCfromDedicatedShutdownPNLH21P623(BOP)(I-2095-04),.DistractorExplanation:A&Bareincorrectandplausible;SRVsA,B,E,H,J,P,andRareunaffectedbyaDivIIDCpowerloss;theyreceiveDivIDCcontrolpower.Cisincorrectandplausible;SRVChasnoredundantDCpowersource,andisLOSTbyaDivIIDCpowerloss.ReferenceInformation:I-2095-01&I-2095-04PlantProcedures20.300.260VESF23.201NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2263000K2.Knowledgeofelectricalpowersuppliestothefollowing:263000K2.01MajorD.C.loads295004AK1.KnowledgeoftheoperationalimplicationsofthefollowingconceptsastheyapplytoPARTIALORCOMPLETELOSSOFD.C.POWER:295004AK1.02RedundantD.C.powersupplies:Plant-Specific10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamLOR2009ExamLOR2015ExamI-DrawingsI02095-475ILO2017NRCQuestionUse:BankLowRO2017ILOWrittenPage:97of207Question48 49Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:MODIFIEDTheplantisoperatingat100%power.EDG11isrunningparalleledtoBus64Bforasurveillancerun.Thefollowingeventsthenoccur:9D23,D14160VESSBus64BBreakerTripped,alarms.64B-Pos.B6tripsopen.64B-Pos.B8tripsopen.Bus64BpowerONlightgoesOFF.Basedontheseindicationswhichofthefollowingistrue?A.WestCRDPumpwilltripifrunning.B.NorthRRMGSetscooptubepositionerislocked.C.AhalfscramisreceivedonDivision1ifRPSAisonnormalsupply.D.CRSshouldenter20.307.01,EmergencyDieselGeneratorFailureONLY.Answer: C2017ILOWrittenPage:98of207Question49 AnswerExplanation:Per20.300.64B,CondtionDaddresstheRPSlossifRPSAisonnormal.DistractorExplanation:A.IsincorrectandplausiblebecauseWestCRDispoweredfromDiv2.B.IsincorrectandplausiblebecauseoccursfromaLossof64C.(20.300.64CNote8)D.Isincorrectandplausiblebecausenotappropriateasbushastripped;notanEDGissue,64CAOPwilldirectlyentryinto20.307.01ReferenceInformation:20.300.64BConditionDPlantProcedures20.300.64BNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2264000K3.KnowledgeoftheeffectthatalossormalfunctionoftheEMERGENCYGENERATORS(DIESEL/JET)willhaveonfollowing:264000K3.03Majorloadspoweredfromelectricalbusesfedbytheemergencygenerator(s)10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:HighModifiedRO2017ILOWrittenPage:99of207Question49 50Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:BANKFollowingaLossofCoolantAccidentwithanelectricalplantmalfunction,plantconditionsareasfollows:345kVMatPowerIndicatingLightsareOFF.EDG13isLOADEDcarryingBus65E.Bus65FandBus14EDPowerIndicatingLightsareOFF.Bus72FandBus72EDPowerIndicatingLightsareOFF.65F-F6BreakerisTRIPPED.65F-F8BreakerisCLOSED.WhichoneofthefollowingliststheelectricalprocedurewhichshouldbeexecutedtoprovideMAXIMUMLowPressureECCSInjectiontosupport29.100.01,Sheet1,RPVControlactions?A.20.300.65F,LossofBus65F,duetoBus65FbeingLOCKEDOUT.B.20.300.72F,LossofBus72F,duetoBus72FbeingLOCKEDOUT.C.20.307.01,EmergencyDieselGeneratorFailure,duetoEDG14failingtostart.D.20.300.SBO,LossofOffsiteandOnsitePower,duetoacombinationofelectricalmalfunctions.Answer: C2017ILOWrittenPage:100of207Question50 AnswerExplanation:Alossof345kvpowerindicatedinlossofESFDiv2ACPower.AnEDG14STARTFAILUREhasresultedinBUS65FbeingdeenergizedJustification:A.isincorrectbecausea65FLOCKOUTconditionisexcludedby65F-F8breakerbeingCLOSED.B.isincorrectbecausea72FLOCKOUTconditionisexcludedby65F-F6breakerbeingtripped.D.isincorrectbecauseaStationBlackoutisexcludedbyDIV1ESFBusesenergizedandEDG13LOADED.

Reference:

20.307.01,stepH1PlantProcedures20.307.01-EDGFailureNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2262001K1.Knowledgeofthephysicalconnectionsand/orcauseeffectrelationshipsbetweenA.C.ELECTRICALDISTRIBUTIONandthefollowing:262001K1.01Emergencygenerators(diesel/jet)264000EmergencyGenerators(Diesel/Jet)G2.4.11Knowledgeofabnormalconditionprocedures

.G2.4.8KnowledgeofhowabnormaloperatingproceduresareusedwithEOPs10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(10)Administrative,normal,abnormal,andemergencyoperatingproceduresforthefacility.NRCExamUsageILO2012ExamILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:BankHighRO2017ILOWrittenPage:101of207Question50 51Points:1.00Difficulty:2.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:BANKTheplantisexperiencingalossofairevent.Stationairheaderis73psigwithallStationAirCompressorsrunning.Atthistime,airsupplytoPCMSisolationvalvesis____________________________________.A.providedbyStationAirB.providedbyInstrumentAirC.providedbyNon-InterruptibleAirD.isolatedduetolowInterruptibleAirSystempressureAnswer: C2017ILOWrittenPage:102of207Question51 AnswerExplanation:Enclosuresin20.129.01showPCMSisanNIASload.Atthisairpressure,allairsuppliesareisolatedexceptNIAS.DistractorExplanation:A.Isplausibleandincorrectbecausestationairisanairsystemthatisnotasourcewiththegivencondition.B.IsplausibleandincorrectbecauseInstrumentAirisanairsystemthatisnotasourcewiththegivencondition.D.IsplausibleandincorrectbecauseNon-InterruptibleAirsupplies,howevernotwiththegivencondition.ReferenceInformation:20.129.01(ConditionA-Cforwhathappens)M-2015(FOS)PlantProcedures20.129.0123.129NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2300000K4.Knowledgeof(INSTRUMENTAIRSYSTEM)designfeature(s)andorinterlockswhichprovideforthefollowing:300000K4.02Cross-overtootherairsystems10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2013ExamILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:BankLowRO2017ILOWrittenPage:103of207Question51 52Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:NEWTheplantisoperatingat100%powerwiththefollowingStationAirCompressorlineup:EastStationAirCompressorDangerTaggedOut(Unavailable)CenterStationAirCompressorRunningWestStationAirCompressorAutoFollowingaseismicevent:Bus72Rhasbeende-energizedTheWestStationAirCompressorisdamagedandwillnotoperate.Basedonthis,whichofthefollowingindicateshowtheCompressedAirSystemresponds?P50-R802P5002-D001STATIONAIRPRESSUREDIV1CONTROLAIRCOMPRESSORA.B.C.D.Answer: B2017ILOWrittenPage:104of207Question52STOPPED95psiandsteadyRUNNING84psiandloweringSTOPPED84psiandloweringRUNNING95psiandsteady AnswerExplanation:Basedonlogicprintslisted&AOP20.129.01,ControlAirCompressorsstartat85psithereforesystempresshastogotobelow85psiandthen,perthequestionsstempressurerecovers.Basedonthisthe401willgetaclosedsignal,andthe402and440willnotgetclosesignals.DistracterExplanation:Distracterareplausiblebasedonnotunderstandingsetpointsorpowersupplies/auto-startsofcompressorsA.Isincorrectbecause401willgetclosesignalat85#.Thisanswerisplausibleiftheexamineeincorrectlyassumesthesystempressuredidnotgolowenoughtocauseisolations.C.Isincorrectbecause402willnotgetclosesignaluntil75#andairheaderonlywentto83#.Thisanswerisplausibleiftheexamineeincorrectlyassumesthesystempressuredidgolowenoughtocauseisolations.D.Isincorrectbecause402&440willnotgetclosesignaluntil75#andairheaderonlywentto83#.Thisanswerisplausibleiftheexamineeincorrectlyassumesthesystempressuredidgolowenoughtocauseisolations.ReferenceInformation:I-2450-02,04,05arenotshownhere,howevertheyareincludedindevelopmentfolder,theAOPactionsmatchtheactuations.20.129.01(pg3)Systemactuationbasedonpressureperactionstatement.PlantProcedures20.129.0120.300.72ANUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295019AA1.Abilitytooperateand/ormonitorthefollowingastheyapplytoPARTIALORCOMPLETELOSSOFINSTRUMENTAIR:295019AA1.03Instrumentaircompressorpowersupplies300000K5.KnowledgeoftheoperationalimplicationsofthefollowingconceptsastheyapplytotheINSTRUMENTAIRSYSTEM:300000K5.01Aircompressors10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:LowNewRO2017ILOWrittenPage:105of207Question52 53Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:BANKWiththeplantoperatingat100%powerandtwoTBCCWPumpsinservice,thefollowingoccurs:480VACBus72Nisde-energized.5D5,TBCCWPUMPSDIFFERENTIALPRESSUREHIGH/LOW,alarms.TBCCWHeadersPressureIndicatoronP43-R805indicates17psid.TBCCWPumpSuctionPressureis14psig.Asaresultofthistransient,whichofthefollowingdescribesthestatusoftheTBCCWsystem?A.OneTBCCWpumpisinservice;P43-F405,TBCCWDPControlValve,isSHUT.B.OneTBCCWpumpisinservice;P43-F405,TBCCWDPControlValve,isOPEN.C.TheremainingTBCCWpumptrippedonLowSuctionPressure;P43-F405,TBCCWDPControlValve,isSHUT.D.ThestandbyTBCCWpumpcanbestarted;P43-F405,TBCCWDPControlValve,iscontrollingpressureinthenormalband.Answer: A2017ILOWrittenPage:106of207Question53 AnswerExplanation:WithpowerlosstoBus72N,twoofthreeTBCCWPumpsaredeenergized.DistractorExplanation:B.IsplausibleandincorrectbecauseitwouldbetrueifPressurewere>30psid.C.IsplausibleandincorrectbecauseitwouldbetrueifSuctionPressurewere<7psig.D.IsplausibleandincorrectbecauseitwouldbetrueifBus72Mwasdeenergizedand72NwereenergizedReferenceInformation:20.300.72NAttachment1,Page1of1(TBCCWPUMPLOADINFO)ARP5D5(Systemresponse)PlantProcedures04D005NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2400000K6.KnowledgeoftheeffectthatalossormalfunctionofthefollowingwillhaveontheCCWS:400000K6.04Pumps10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamLOR2011ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:BankHighRO2017ILOWrittenPage:107of207Question53 54Points:1.00Difficulty:2.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:BANKTheshiftoperatingcrewisperforming24.106.01,OperableControlRodCheck.TheP603operatorstopsexercisingcontrolrodsandreportsthefollowing:Coolingwaterflowischangingwheneveracontrolrodismoved.Drivewaterflowis2gpmduringwithdrawmovement.Drivewaterflowis4gpmduringinsertmovement.CRDsystemflowisindicating63gpmandoscillatingwhenthecontrolrodismoving.WhichONEofthefollowingconditionswouldcausethecoolingwaterflowoscillations?A.Pressureequalizingvalvefailure.B.Stabilizingvalvesfailuretocycle.C.FluctuatingairsupplypressuretotheCRDFlowControlValve.D.C11-F127(ScramOutletValve)valveleakingcausingincreasedcoolingwaterflow.Answer: B2017ILOWrittenPage:108of207Question54 AnswerExplanation:Theflowindicationsshowthestabilizingvalvesarenotoperating.DistractorExplanation:Theexamineemustunderstandsystemflowpathsandwhatthenormalvaluesareandhowthesystemoperatestoanswercorrectly.Thedistractorsareplausiblebecausetheyarethingsthatcanbewrongwiththesystem.ReferenceInformation:C11-00DBDforCONTROLRODDRIVEHYDRAULICSSYSTEM(pg103ofpdforPage4-77ofdocument)detailstheCOMPONENTDESIGNBASISDATAforSolenoidValve:ControlRodDriveHydraulicStabilizingValve.MaintenancePlantDrawings6M721-5703-1-CONTROLRODDRIVESYSTEMFUNCTIONALOPERATINGSKETCHM-2081-ControlrodDriveHydraulicSystemReactorBuildingPart1of2NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2201001A3.AbilitytomonitorautomaticoperationsoftheCONTROLRODDRIVEHYDRAULICSYSTEMincluding:201001A3.01Valveoperation201001K4.KnowledgeofCONTROLRODDRIVEHYDRAULICSYSTEMdesignfeature(s)and/orinterlockswhichprovideforthefollowing:VOLTAGEANDELECTRICGRIDDISTURBANCES:201001K4.02Stablesystemflowwhenmovingcontrolrods(stabilizingvalves).10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(6)Design,components,andfunctionofreactivitycontrolmechanismsandinstrumentation.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamLOR2013ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:BankLowRO2017ILOWrittenPage:109of207Question54 55Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:MODIFIEDTheoperatingcrewiscurrentlyperformingaRodPatternAdjustmentfromGroup10toGroup9ControlRods.WhilewithdrawingaControlRod,3D80ControlRodDriftAlarms.Onthefullcoredisplayanon-selectedrodindicatesControlRodDrift.Whenthedriftingrodisselected,RPISshowtherodismovingINTOthecore.WhatimpactdoesthishaveontheReactorManualControlSystem,andwhatactionsshallbetaken?A.Arodblockisenforced.DisarmtheControlRodatitscurrentposition.B.Theabilitytomovecontrolrodsremainsfunctional.FullyinserttheControlRodusingRONORSwitchinEMERRODIN.C.OnlytheRONORswitchcanbeusedtomovecontrolrods.IndividuallyscramtheControlRod.D.Onlythe"EmergencyIn"positionoftheRONORswitchisfunctional.PlacetheReactorModeswitchinSHUTDOWN.Answer: B2017ILOWrittenPage:110of207Question55 AnswerExplanation:OnlyaControlRodDriftoccurred.TheRMCSremainsfunctional,andtheControlRodisrequiredtobefullyinsertedperIMMEDIATEACTIONSof20.106.07.DistracterExplanation:A.isincorrectbecauseaRodBlockalarmisnotreceived.C.isincorrectbecausealthoughtheRONORswitchisfunctionaltheRMCSisalsofunctional,therodisnotscrammedunlessitdriftsafterithasbeendisarmed.D.isincorrectbecausetheRMCSisfunctionalandthemodeswitchisonlyplacedinSHUTDOWNif2ormorerodsaredrifting.ReferenceInformation:20.106.07IA.PlantProcedures20.106.07NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2201002A2.Abilityto(a)predicttheimpactsofthefollowingontheREACTORMANUALCONTROLSYSTEM;and(b)basedonthosepredictions,useprocedurestocorrect,control,ormitigatetheconsequencesofthoseabnormalconditionsoroperations:201002A2.02Roddriftalarm10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(5)Facilityoperatingcharacteristicsduringsteadystateandtransientconditions,includingcoolantchemistry,causesandeffectsoftemperature,pressureandreactivitychanges,effectsofloadchanges,andoperatinglimitationsandreasonsfortheseoperatingcharacteristics.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:HighModifiedRO2017ILOWrittenPage:111of207Question55 56Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:MODIFIEDDuringaplantevent,bothdivisionsofEECWinitiate:DuetomalfunctionP4400-F606A,EECWDIV1DWSPLYOUTBOARDISOMOVcloses.Whichofthefollowingdescribestheimpactofthisfaultandanyrequiredoperatoractions?A.RRMGSetbearingdamagecouldoccur.TripRRPumpA.B.RRPumpmotordamagecouldoccur.Ifflowcannotberestoredwithin2minutestripRRPumpA.C.RRPumpsealdamagecouldoccur.Ifsealcavitytemperatureexceeds180°F,RecircPumpAmustbetrippedandisolated.D.RRMGSetNorthCoolingFanairtemperaturescouldincrease.IfMGsetairtemperatureexceeds260°F,tripRRPumpA.Answer: B2017ILOWrittenPage:112of207Question56 AnswerExplanation:Withoutcooling,RRMGsetshouldbetrippedwithin2minutes.Motordamagemayoccur.EECWloadwhenEECWinservice.DistractorExplanation:A.Isplausible,butcoolingwouldstillbeavailabletoMGsetbearingsRBCCWloadwhenEECWinservice.C.Isplausible,SealTemperaturealarmsat160°Fandpumpshouldbetrippedandisolatedat>200°F.D.Isplausible,butcoolingwouldstillbeavailabletoMGsetcoolingunitRBCCWloadwhenEECWinservice.ReferenceInformation

3D122RECIRCPUMPASEALCLGH2OFLOWLOW(INITIALRESPONSE)PlantProcedures03D12220.127.0123.138.01NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2202001K5.KnowledgeoftheoperationalimplicationsofthefollowingconceptsastheyapplytoRECIRCULATIONSYSTEM:202001K5.03Pump/motorcooling:Plant-Specific10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(4)Secondarycoolantandauxiliarysystemsthataffectthefacility.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:HighModifiedRO2017ILOWrittenPage:113of207Question56 57Points:1.00Difficulty:2.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:MODIFIEDTheplantisoperatingat100%powerwhenthefollowingalarmsarereceived:3D156,REACTORWATERLEVELLOW3D127,RECIRCSYSLOOPBONLYOPERATINGWhatistheexpectedresponsefromtheReactorRecirculationsystemandthebasisforthatresponse?A.BothRRpumpstriptopreventinadvertentpoweroscillations.B.RRPumpsrunbacktoLimiter1topreventinsufficientsubcooling/NPSHloss.C.RRPumpsrunbacktoLimiter2toreducesteamflowandwaterlossfromthevessel.D.RRPumprunbacktoLimiter4topreventvibrationsinthereactorvesselinternals.Answer: D2017ILOWrittenPage:114of207Question57 AnswerExplanation:RRLimiter4isactuatedbytheNorth(South)RRMGSetdrivemotororMGSetfieldbreakersopening.Annunciator3D127indicatestheNorthRRpumphastripped.ThebasisforLimiter4istopreventexcessivevibrationsonthevesselinternals.DistractorExplanation:AIsplausible,AlternateRodInsertion(ARI)tripsbothRRMGsetsforRPVLevel2.BIsplausible,RRLimiter1isactuatedforfeedflowlessthan20%orRecirculationpumpdischargevalvenotfullopen.CIsplausible,RRLimiter2isactuatedwhenRPVLevel4(192.7)alarmsandaRFPistrippedorhaslowsuctionflow.ArunbackofRecirculationPumpspeedreducessteamflowthuswaterlossfromthevessel.ReferenceInformation:23.138.01Pg4-9PlantProcedures20.107.0120.138.0123.138.01NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295009AK2.KnowledgeoftheinterrelationsbetweenLOWREACTORWATERLEVELandthefollowing:295009AK2.03RecirculationsystemNRCExamUsageILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:HighModifiedRO2017ILOWrittenPage:115of207Question57 58Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:BANKTheplantisoperatingat97%power.RWCUisoperatingnormallywithG3352-F044,RWCUF/DSysBypassValveopentosupportremovingFilterDeminsfromservice.TheRBCCWSystemisthenlost.WhichofthefollowingstatementsdescribestheexpectedfinalconditionoftheRWCUSystem,assumingNOoperatoractionsaretaken?A.G3352-F119,RWCUSupplySuctIsoValveclosed.RWCUPumpstripped.B.RWCUPumpstripped.Novalveclosuresoccur.C.RWCUPumpsinoperation.RWCUFilterDeminsinHOLD.D.G3352-F001,RWCUSupplyInbdIsoValve,G3352-F004,RWCUSupplyOtbdIsoValve,andG3352-F220,RWCUToFWOtbdCntmIsoValveclosed.RWCUPumpstripped.Answer: A2017ILOWrittenPage:116of207Question58 AnswerExplanation:LossofRBCCWcoolingtoNRHXRcausesahightemperaturewhichleadstothiseffect.WhenRWCUNRHXOutletTempreaches140°F,G3352-F119closes,RWCUPumpstrip,andRWCUDeminsshiftintoHold.DistractorExplanation:Alldistractorsareplausibleandarebasedontheexaminee'sabilitytoproperlyinterpretindicationsandunderstandsystemoperations.DistractorRWCUcomponestlistedallhaveautotripsorevents.ReferenceInformation:2D110RWCUNONREGENHXOUTLETTEMPHIGH(AutoActions)PlantProcedures02D11020.127.01NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2204000K6.KnowledgeoftheeffectthatalossormalfunctionofthefollowingwillhaveontheREACTORWATERCLEANUPSYSTEM:204000K6.01Componentcoolingwatersystems10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:BankHighRO2017ILOWrittenPage:117of207Question58 59Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:BANKTheplantisoperatinginMode3withDivision1RHRinShutdownCoolingmodewhenRPVlevelbeginsloweringduetounknownreasons.Thefollowingindicationsareobserved:NarrowrangeRPVlevelshowa6"differencebetweeninstruments1.Widerangeshowsa20"differencebetweenindicators2.Occasionalnotchingisoccurringonallinstruments3.Whichofthefollowingoperatoractionsshallbetakenatthistime?A.Insertallcontrolrodsnotfullyinserted.B.VerifyMainTurbineBypassValvesareclosed.C.VerifyReferenceLegBackfillisinservicewithproperflowrate.D.IsolateSDCbyclosingShutdownCoolingSuctionIsolationValvesE1150-F008andE1150-F009.Answer: D2017ILOWrittenPage:118of207Question59 AnswerExplanation:22.000.02P&L3.4.1states"Iflevelanomalies(levelindicationdeviatesmorethan5"onnarrowrangeindication,22"onwiderangeindicationornotchingoccurs)andanunexplainedlossofRPVleveloccurs,takeimmediateactiontoisolateSDCbyclosingE1150-F008,RHRSDCOtbdSuctionIsoVlv,andE1150-F009,RHRSDCInbdSuctionIsoVlv,andreferto20.205.01,"LossofShutdownCooling."DistractorExplanation:A.plausibleifthoughtistoensurereactorisfullyshutdown.B.plausibleifthoughtisthatfailedopenTBVsarecausingRPVlevelloss.C.plausibleduetomalfunctionofbackfillcausinglossoflevelindications.ReferenceInformation:22.000.02P&L3.4.1PlantProcedures22.000.02NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2216000A4.Abilitytomanuallyoperateand/ormonitorinthecontrolroom:216000A4.01Recorders10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(10)Administrative,normal,abnormal,andemergencyoperatingproceduresforthefacility.NRCExamUsageILO2013ExamILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:BankLowROSelectedforEarlyReview(NRC)2017ILOWrittenPage:119of207Question59 60Points:1.00Difficulty:2.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:NEWInadditiontoprovidingapositivemargintothenegativedesignpressureoftheprimarycontainment,whyisTorusSpraysterminatedpriorto0PSIG?A.Topreventbypassingthesuppressionpoolviathevacuumreliefsystemintheeventofasteamblowdownfromthedrywell.B.TomaintainapositivesuppressionchambertoprecludedamageorfailureofSRVsfrom"waterslugs"whenSRVsareopenedtoEMERGENCYDEPRESSURIZE.C.Topreventbypassingthesuppressionpoolviathevacuumreliefsystemshoulditbecomenecessarytoventthedrywellsothatsomefilteringoffissionproductsoccurs.D.Tomaintainapositivesuppressionchamberanddrywellpressuretoprecludeairfrombeingdrawninthroughthevacuumreliefsystemde-inertingtheprimarycontainment.Answer: D2017ILOWrittenPage:120of207Question60 AnswerExplanation:PertheEPGsthepurposeoftheoverrideistomaintainingapositivesuppressionchamberanddrywellpressuretoprecludesairfrombeingdrawninthroughthevacuumreliefsystemtode-inerttheprimarycontainmentandtomaintainpositivemargintothenegativedesignpressureoftheprimarycontainment.DistractorExplanation:A.Isincorrectandplausiblebecausevacuumreliefsystemdoesprovideaflowpath,howeverthisflowpathisclosedorwouldcloseinthelistedconditions.B.Isincorrectandplausiblebecausewaterslugsarecommonreasonsforvacuumbreakers,howeverthisisnotthepurposeofthesevacuumbreakersC.Isincorrectandplausiblebecausevacuumreliefsystemdoesprovideaflowpath,howeverthisflowpathisclosedorwouldcloseinthelistedconditions.ReferenceInformation:EPGB-7-5PlantProceduresBWROGEPGAppBNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2223001K5.KnowledgeoftheoperationalimplicationsofthefollowingconceptsastheyapplytoPRIMARYCONTAINMENTSYSTEMANDAUXILIARIES:223001K5.01Vacuumbreaker/reliefoperation10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(5)Facilityoperatingcharacteristicsduringsteadystateandtransientconditions,includingcoolantchemistry,causesandeffectsoftemperature,pressureandreactivitychanges,effectsofloadchanges,andoperatinglimitationsandreasonsfortheseoperatingcharacteristics.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:LowNewRO2017ILOWrittenPage:121of207Question60 61Points:1.00Difficulty:2.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:NEWTheplantisinMODE5withthegatesinstalledbetweentheReactorCavityandtheSpentFuelPool.RHRBpumpisinserviceforShutdowncooling.AnobjectisbeingremovedfromtheSpentFuelPool.(1)Whichofthefollowingcouldcausefuelstoragepoolwaterleveltolowerand(2)Whatisthebasisformaintainingfuelstoragepoolwaterlevel>22ftoverthetopofirradiatedfuelassembliesseatedinthespentfuelstoragepoolracks?A.(1)TripoftheFuelPoolingCoolingandCleanupsystem.(2)Shieldinggammathatisproducedfromdecayinanirradiatedfuelassembly,whiletheassemblyisbeingmoved.B.(1)TripoftheFuelPoolingCoolingandCleanupsystem.(2)Absorbingiodinegasesbeforetheyarereleasedtothesecondarycontainmentduetoafuelhandlingaccident.C.(1)TripofRHRBpump.(2)Shieldinggammathatisproducedfromdecayinanirradiatedfuelassembly,whiletheassemblyisbeingmoved.D.(1)TripofRHRBpump.(2)Absorbingiodinegasesbeforetheyarereleasedtothesecondarycontainmentduetoafuelhandlingaccident.Answer: B2017ILOWrittenPage:122of207Question61 AnswerExplanation:MOP13givesguidanceonthistypeofevolution.AnythingthatcouldchangeSpentFuelPoollevelorRWLhastobereportedtotheShiftManagerbeforetheevolution.Operationsassignsamonitorfromtheoperationsdepartment,normallyaNLO.Thebasesstatethatthisisbasedonabsorbingiodinegasesbeforetheyarereleasedtothesecondarycontainmentduetoafuelhandlingaccident.DistracterExplanation:(1)TripofRHRBpump,isplausibleandincorrectbecauseitisinservice,howeverwiththegatesinstalledshutdowncoolingwillnoteffectSFPlevel(2)Shieldinggammathatisproducedfromdecayinanirradiatedfuelassembly,whiletheassemblyisbeingmoved,isplausibleandincorrectbecausegammaispresent,howeverthisisnottheconcernaddressedinthebasis.ReferenceInformation:ForthisquestiontheT.S.B.isusedasareferenceforsysteminformationthatistaughtinthesystemscourseunderlessonplanLP-315-0115pertrainingobjectiveC013:C013.DescribetheFuelPoolCoolingandCleanupsystemtechnicalspecificationlimitingconditionsforoperation,theirbases,theassociatedsurveillancerequirement(s),andtheirrelationshiptooperability.T.S.3.7.7andBASESMOP13NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2233000FuelPoolCoolingandCleanupG2.1.27Knowledgeofsystempurposeandorfunction

.TechnicalSpecifications3.7.7SpentFuelStoragePoolWaterLevel10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:LowNewRO2017ILOWrittenPage:123of207Question61 62Points:1.00Difficulty:2.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:BANKTheplantisstartingupafterarefuelingoutage.TheCRLNOispreparingforMainTurbinerunupwiththefollowingplantconditions:ModeSwitchinRUNReactorPower~10%BypassValves>25%openIFtheCRLNOplacesthegovernorinterlockswitchinEXERCISEPERMITatthistime,whichofthefollowingresultsistobeexpected?A.TheVALVEOPENLIMITINCONTROLandWRSGINCONTROLbacklightswillilluminate.B.N3000-F412,HoodSpraySecControlVlv,willopen,and4D31,LPHOODSPRAYSON,willalarm.C.Thein-servicepressureregulators'setpointwillberaised,causingtheBypassValvestoopen.D.Thein-servicepressureregulators'setpointwillbelowered,causingtheBypassValvestoopen.Answer: D2017ILOWrittenPage:124of207Question62 AnswerExplanation:Per23.109DONOTplacetheGovernorInterlockswitchinEXERCISEPERMITwithanypressureinthe52"Manifold.Thiswillcausetheregulators'setpointtobeloweredapproximately30psigandtheBypassValvetofullyopen.AnRPVwaterlevelandpressuretransientwillresult.QuestionisbasedonOPEXfromRF12DistractorExplanation:A.IsplausibleandincorrectbecauseVALVEOPENLIMITINCONTROLandWRSGINCONTROLbacklightsarerelatedtotheturbineandarenotrelatedtoexercisepermit.B.IsplausibleandincorrectbecausehoodsspayisrelatedtotheturbineandthelistedalarmisvalidfortheN3000-F412,howevertheN3000-F412isnoteffectedbyexercisepermit.C.IsplausibleandincorrectbecausethesetpointISeffected,howeverthisdistractorhasitgoingthewrongway.ReferenceInformation:23.109P&L3.21PlantProcedures23.109NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2241000A1.Abilitytopredictand/ormonitorchangesinparametersassociatedwithoperatingtheREACTOR/TURBINEPRESSUREREGULATINGSYSTEMcontrolsincluding:241000A1.07Bypassvalveposition241000A4.Abilitytomanuallyoperateand/ormonitorinthecontrolroom:241000A4.06Bypassvalves(operation)241000K1.Knowledgeofthephysicalconnectionsand/orcauseeffectrelationshipsbetweenREACTOR/TURBINEPRESSUREREGULATINGSYSTEMandthefollowing:241000K1.06Bypassvalves10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(10)Administrative,normal,abnormal,andemergencyoperatingproceduresforthefacility.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:BankLowRO2017ILOWrittenPage:125of207Question62 63Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:BANKTheplantisoperatingat100%powerwhenanelectricalfaulttripstheNORMALfeedto65D.WhatistheshorttermimpactontheCondensate/Feedwaterdeliverysystem?A.LossofcoolingtotheReactorFeedwaterpumpbearings.B.TripofHeaterFeedPumpsandReactorFeedwaterPumps.C.TripofHeaterDrainsPumpsandReactorRecircrunbacktoLimiter1.D.ReductioninFeedwatertemperatureandsubsequentReactorpowerspike.Answer: B2017ILOWrittenPage:126of207Question63 AnswerExplanation:Thelossof65DwillcauseatripoftheNorthandSouthCondenserpumpsandlossoffeedwatertothevessel.Thiswillrequireentryinto20.107.01LossofFeedwaterorFeedwaterControl,andtheimmediateactionofplacingthemodeswitchinshutdown.DistractorExplanation:A/C/DareincorrectbecausealossofcondensatewillresultinaRFPtripandSCRAMcondition.ReferenceInformation:20.300.65DAttachment1PlantProcedures20.107.0120.300.65DNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2256000K2.Knowledgeofelectricalpowersuppliestothefollowing:256000K2.01Systempumps10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2012ExamILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:BankLowRO2017ILOWrittenPage:127of207Question63 64Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:BANKAreactorstartupisinprogressandRPVpressureis200psig.Thefollowingalarmsactuateindicatingfueldamageandradiationrelease:3D83,MNSTMLINECHA/B/C/DRADNMONITORUPSCALE3D20,2MINUTEHOLDUPPIPERADNMONITORUPSCALE3D24,2MINUTEHOLDUPPIPERADNMONITORUPSCALETRIPTheCRSannouncesentryintotheSecondaryContainmentControl/RadioactiveReleaseEOP.CondenservacuumthenbeginstoDECREASE.Whatisthecauseofthedegradingvacuum?A.SteamJetAirEjectorsisolated.B.OffgasRingWaterPumpstripped.C.MechanicalVacuumPumpstripped.D.MainSteamIsolationValvesclosed.Answer: C2017ILOWrittenPage:128of207Question64 AnswerExplanation:MVPtripisindicatedby3D24,2MINUTEHOLDUPPIPERADNMONITORUPSCALETRIP,alarms.MSradmonitorshavenetyettripped.DistractorExplaination:A.IsincorrectandplausiblebecauseSJAEarenotinserviceuntil300psig.B.Isincorrectandplausiblecaneffectvacuum,howeverthiswillnotcauseAlarm3D24D.Isincorrectandplausiblecaneffectvacuum,howeverthiswillnotcauseAlarm3D24ReferenceInformation:3D24PlantProcedures20.000.07NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2271000A1.Abilitytopredictand/ormonitorchangesinparametersassociatedwithoperatingtheOFFGASSYSTEMcontrolsincluding:271000A1.12Processradiationmonitoringindications271000K1.02Processradiationmonitoringsystem272000A3.AbilitytomonitorautomaticoperationsoftheRADIATIONMONITORINGSYSTEMincluding:272000A3.02Offgassystemisolationindications272000K1.Knowledgeofthephysicalconnectionsand/orcauseeffectrelationshipsbetweenRADIATIONMONITORINGSYSTEMandthefollowing:10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(5)Facilityoperatingcharacteristicsduringsteadystateandtransientconditions,includingcoolantchemistry,causesandeffectsoftemperature,pressureandreactivitychanges,effectsofloadchanges,andoperatinglimitationsandreasonsfortheseoperatingcharacteristics.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamLOR2015ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:BankHighRO2017ILOWrittenPage:129of207Question64 65Points:1.00Difficulty:2.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:MODIFIEDDivisionICCHVACisoperatinginPurgemodeduetoafireintheRelayRoomwhentheMainControlRoomreceivesthefollowingalarm:3D36DIVI/IIRBVENTEXHRADNMONITORUPSCALETRIPWhatwillhappentotheCCHVACconfiguration?A.DivICCHVACwilltripandwillhavetobemanuallystartedintheRecirculationmode.B.DivICCHVACwilltransferfromPurgemodetoRecirculationmode.C.DivICCHVACwilltripandDivIICCHVACwillautomaticallystartintheRecirculationmode.D.DivICCHVACwillcontinuetooperateinPurgemode.LogicmustberesettoallowshifttoRecirculationmode.Answer: B2017ILOWrittenPage:130of207Question65 AnswerExplanation:PerDesignBaseDocument,HierarchyofModes,AutomaticRecircmodewillinitiatefromanyothermode.T-41-02Section2.2.4.3RecirculationModestatesrecircmodewillinitiateduetoReactorbuildingventilationexhaustradiationhigh.DistracterExplanation:DistractersareincorrectandplausiblebasedonalldistracterlistactualmodesofCCHVACanddescribeevents/modesforCCHVAC,theHierarchyofModesdirectsthatanautomaticshifttorecircwilloccur.ReferenceInformationT-41-02pg.4-5,20PlantProcedures23.413T41-02CONTROLCENTERHEATING,VENTILATING,ANDAIR-CONDITIONING(CCHVAC)SYSTEMNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2290003K4.KnowledgeofCONTROLROOMHVACdesignfeature(s)and/orinterlockswhichprovideforthefollowing:290003K4.01Systeminitiations/reconfiguration:Plant-Specific10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:HighModifiedRO2017ILOWrittenPage:131of207Question65 66Points:1.00Difficulty:2.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:BANKInaccordancewithMOP09,"LockedValve",a____________________padlockshouldbeusedonalocked"throttled"positionvalve.A.redB.blackC.redwithblackdotD.yellowwithblackdotAnswer: C2017ILOWrittenPage:132of207Question66 AnswerExplanation:PerMOP09Section3.8.3Redwithblackdot-THROTTLEDDistractorExplanation:Distractorcolorsareincorrectandusedforotherconfigurationcontrols.ReferenceInformation:MOP09(pg4)PlantProceduresMOP09-LockedValveGuidelinesNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.1.1KnowledgeofconductofoperationsrequirementsNRCExamUsageILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:BankLowRO2017ILOWrittenPage:133of207Question66 67Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:BANKThereisasmallleakintheSteamTunnel.Usingacamera,anisolationvalvehasbeenidentified.Duringthepre-jobbrief,thisactivityisidentifiedasMODERATE.RPhasdeterminedthatplasticPCsarerequiredforentry.DryBulbtemperatureis104°F,andnootherheatstresspreventionequipmentwillbeused.Afterisolatingtheleak,theNuclearOperatorreportsthejobtook10minutes.TheEARLIESTthisNuclearOperatorcanbesentbacktonormaldutiesisafter_____minutesofresttime.A.10B.20C.30D.60Answer: C2017ILOWrittenPage:134of207Question67 AnswerExplanation:UsingTABLE21-3,staytimeis20minutesforplasticPCsforatemperatureof104°F.Usingtheresttimecalculationonpage21.5,resttimeisactualtime/timelimit(10/20)times60minutes,or30minutes.DistractorExplanation:A.isincorrect,butcouldbecorrectifchartreadwrongorcalculationnotproperlyutilized.B.isincorrectbecausethisistheactualstaytimeallowed.D.isincorrectbecauseifthisdoesnottaketheratiooftimeworkedvsstaytimeintothecalculation.ReferenceInformation:SafetyHandbook,Section21,Table21-3BPlantProceduresSafetyHandbook,Section21,HotandColdEnvironments/TemperatureExtremesNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.1.26Knowledgeofindustrialsafetyprocedures(suchasrotatingequipment,electrical,hightemperature,highpressure,caustic,chlorine,oxygenandhydrogen).10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(5)Facilityoperatingcharacteristicsduringsteadystateandtransientconditions,includingcoolantchemistry,causesandeffectsoftemperature,pressureandreactivitychanges,effectsofloadchanges,andoperatinglimitationsandreasonsfortheseoperatingcharacteristics.NRCExamUsageILO2012ExamILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:BankLowRO2017ILOWrittenPage:135of207Question67 68Points:1.00Difficulty:2.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:BANKI&Ctechniciansarepreparingtoperformasurveillanceprocedureonaninstrument.Theyobservethataprerequisitetotheprocedurecannotbemetunderpresentplantconditions.Omittingtheprerequisitewillnotaffecttheperformanceoftheprocedure,andthesurveillancewillbepastitscriticaldatethenextday.WhichONEofthefollowingselectionsindicates(1)whocanwaivetheprerequisiteand(2)howthiswaivermustbedocumentedaftertheprerequisiteismarkedasN/Ainordertocontinuewiththesurveillance?A.(1)ControlRoomSupervisor(2)MakeanentryintheUnitLogB.(1)FieldSupportSupervisor(2)MakeanentryinthecontrollingsurveillancedocumentC.(1)I&CSupervisor(2)WriteaCARDtodocumentandinvestigatethewaiverD.(1)ShiftTechnicalAdvisor(2)DocumentthewaiverontheSurveillancePerformanceForm(SPF)Answer: A2017ILOWrittenPage:136of207Question68 AnswerExplanation:MGA03,step5.1.7,statestheShiftManager/ControlRoomSupervisorcanwaivetheprerequisiteifwarranted.ThereasonforwaivingtheprerequisiteshallbejustifiedanddocumentedeitherinthecontrollingdocumentorUnitLog.DistractorExplanation:B.IsincorrectbecausetheFSScannotwaiveraprereq,butisplausiblebecausethewaivercanbedocumentedonthecontrollingdocument.C.IsincorrectbecauseaCARDisnotusedtodocumentthewaiverperMGA03,butisplausiblebecausetheI&CSupervisoristhetechnician'ssupervisor.D.IsincorrectbecausethewaivercannotbedocumentedontheSPFperMGA03,butisplausiblebecausetheShiftManagercanwaiveaprerequisite.ReferenceInformation:MAG03(5.1.7)PlantProceduresMGA03-ProcedureUseandAdherenceNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.2.12Knowledgeofsurveillanceprocedures10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(10)Administrative,normal,abnormal,andemergencyoperatingproceduresforthefacility.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamLOR2011ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:BankLowRO2017ILOWrittenPage:137of207Question68 69Points:1.00Difficulty:2.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:BANKTheplanthasbeenshutdownforanextendedoutage.Priortoworkbeingreleased,whichofthefollowingsystemsmustbeverifiedfreeofhydrogenusingagassampler?A.TBCCWB.MainTurbineC.HeaterDrainsD.MainSteamLinesAnswer: C2017ILOWrittenPage:138of207Question69 AnswerExplanation:PerMOP12,thefollowingsystemshaveapotentialforthepresenceofhydrogeninthepipingandcomponents:OffGas,FeedWater,CondensatedownstreamoftheCFDs,HeaterDrains,H2SealOil,StatorWindingCooling,HydrogenWaterChemistryandGeneratorGassystems.Thesesystemsmustbeverifiedfreeofhydrogenusingagassamplerpriortoworkbeingreleasedonthesystem.DistractorExplanation:A.IsplausiblebecauseTBCCWcoolsthestatorwindingcoolingwhichisanothersystemthatmustbefreeofHydrogen,howeveritisincorrectB.IsplausiblebecauseMainTurbinehasaninterfacewithhydrogenrelatedsystems,howeverisnotsystemrequiredtobechecked.D.IsplausibleMainsteamisthesourceofHydrogenintotheoffgassystem,howeveritisnotrequiredtobechecked.RefereesInformation:MOP123.2.12(pg9)PlantProceduresMOP12-TaggingandProtectiveBarrierSystemNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.2.13Knowledgeoftaggingandclearanceprocedures.10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(10)Administrative,normal,abnormal,andemergencyoperatingproceduresforthefacility.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:BankLowRO2017ILOWrittenPage:139of207Question69 70Points:1.00Difficulty:2.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:NEWPerMOP05,ControlofEquipment,whileperforminglineups,componentslocatedinalockedhighradiationareaarenotrequiredtobeverifiedincorrectpositionif:A.Lineupisforanon-safetyrelatedsystem.B.Indicationisvisiblefromthemaincontrolroom.C.Thelineupisbeingperformedonanoperatingsystem.D.Documentationisavailableshowingnopersonnelentriescouldaffectcomponentpositioning.Answer: D2017ILOWrittenPage:140of207Question70 AnswerExplanation:OperationsConductManualMOP05,ControlofEquipment,section3.2forperforminglineupsstatesthatcomponentslocatedinahighradiationarea,entryisnotrequiredifdocumentationisavailableshowingnopersonnelentriesthatcouldaffectcomponentpositioningorapreviouslineupexistsdocumentingcorrectposition.DistractorExplanation:IfanInitialLicensedcandidateorLicensedOperatordoesnotfullyunderstandtherequirementsforperforminglineupsinalockedhighradiationarea(LHRA),thedistractorscouldbeconsideredplausible.A.Non-SafetyrelatedequipmentdoesnotexemptanoperatorfromperformingacorrectlineupinLHRAB.ComponentindicationfromthecontrolroompanelisnotavalidmethodofperformingalineupsIAWMOP05.C.AnoperatingcomponentinaLHRAisnotexemptfromalineupverification.ReferenceInformation:MOP05Sedition3.2(pg18)PlantProceduresMOP05-ControlOfEquipmentNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.2.14Knowledgeoftheprocessforcontrollingequipmentconfigurationorstatus.10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(10)Administrative,normal,abnormal,andemergencyoperatingproceduresforthefacility.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:LowNewRO2017ILOWrittenPage:141of207Question70 71Points:1.00Difficulty:2.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:MODIFIEDAnaccidenthasoccurredwhichrequireslifesavingmeasures.Radiationlevelsintheareaoftheinjuredpersonare15,000mrem/hr.EmergencyexposureTEDE(WholeBody)limitforlifesavingoperationshasbeenauthorized.TheMAXIMUMstaytimeforarescuerunderthesecircumstancesis_____________.A.20minutesB.40minutesC.60minutesD.100minutesAnswer: D2017ILOWrittenPage:142of207Question71 AnswerExplanation:PerEP-201-03Table3,thedoselimittosavelivesis25REMTEDEWholeBody.25000/15000=1.66(60mins)=100minsDistractorExplanation:A.5000/15000(60mins)=20minsB.10000/15000(60mins)=40minsC.15000/15000(60mins)=60minsReferenceInformation:PerEP-201-03Table3(pg6)PlantProceduresEP-201-03NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.3.13Knowledgeofradiologicalsafetyprocedurespertainingtolicensedoperatorduties,suchasresponsetoradiationmonitoralarms,containmententryrequirements,fuelhandlingresponsibilities,accesstolockedhigh-radiationareas,aligningfilters,etc.G2.3.4Knowledgeofradiationexposurelimitsundernormalandemergencyconditions10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(10)Administrative,normal,abnormal,andemergencyoperatingproceduresforthefacility.NRCExamUsageILO2006ExamILO2017ExamLOR2013ExamLOR2015ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:HighModifiedRO2017ILOWrittenPage:143of207Question71 72Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:BANKAlicensedoperatorisconductingaNormalDaytoDay(greentripticket)inspectionofequipmentwhichislocatedinahighradiationarea.Inaccordancewithplantadministrativeprocedures,theoperatormustperformtheinspectionbywhichofthefollowingmethods?A.TheevolutionshouldbepreplannedandthereceiveddoseshouldbemaintainedALARA.B.Theoperatorshouldentertheareawithahandheldmonitoringdevice.C.ObtainRadiationProtectionverbalapprovalpriortotheinspectionD.Conductedbyavisualinspectionatthebarriertothearea.Answer: D2017ILOWrittenPage:144of207Question72 AnswerExplanation:IAWMOP01,Normal,daytodayinspectionofhighradiationareasshouldbemadebyvisualinspectionatthedoorforabnormalconditionssuchassteam,leaks,hightemperature,orunusualnoises.DistractorExplanation:A.Isincorrectandplausiblebecausethisnecessaryifitisrequiredtoentertheinspectionarea.B.Isincorrectandplausiblebecauseentryisnotallowedfordaytodayinspections.C.IsincorrectandplausiblebecausethisactionwouldberequiredperMRP06ifentrywasneeded.ReferenceInformation:MOP01Section3.30NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.3.12Knowledgeofradiologicalsafetyprinciplespertainingtolicensedoperatorduties,suchascontainmententryrequirements,fuelhandlingresponsibilities,accesstolockedhigh-radiationareas,aligningfilters,etc.10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(10)Administrative,normal,abnormal,andemergencyoperatingproceduresforthefacility.NRCExamUsageILO2012ExamILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:BankLowRO2017ILOWrittenPage:145of207Question72 73Points:1.00Difficulty:4.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEWTheplantisoperatingat100%powerwhentheKeylockModeSelectorSwitchisrotatedoutofOPERATEforthefollowingMainSteamLineRadiationMonitors:D11-K603AMAINSTEAMLINEARADIATIONMONITORD11-K603BMAINSTEAMLINEBRADIATIONMONITORWhatistheStatusof(1)RPSand(2)NSSS?A.(1)Scram(2)Group1:B2103-F016MSLINEINBDDRAINISOVALVEClosedGroup2:B3100-F019RRSAMPLELINEINBDISOVLVClosedB.(1)HalfScram(2)Group1:B2103-F016MSLINEINBDDRAINISOVALVEClosedGroup2:B3100-F019RRSAMPLELINEINBDISOVLVClosedC.(1)Scram(2)Group1:B2103-F019RRSAMPLELINEINBDISOVLVClosedGroup2:B3100-F020RRSAMPLELINEOTBDISOVLVClosedD.(1)HalfScram(2)Group1:B2103-F019RRSAMPLELINEINBDISOVLVClosedGroup2:B3100-F020RRSAMPLELINEOTBDISOVLVClosedAnswer: A2017ILOWrittenPage:146of207Question73 AnswerExplanation:AfullSCRAMBasedonlogic(A1orA2)and(B1orB2)wouldresultwithisolationsAandB=Group1:B2103-F016&Group2:B3100-F019.Andper23.625section3.2PlacingtheModeSelectorswitchfortheMainSteamLineRadiationmonitorsinanypositionotherthanOPERATEwillactuateRPSandNSSStriplogic.DistractorExplanation:Distractorsareplausibleandincorrectbasedontripsheetfrom23.601.TripsisolationsareforothercombinationsofMSLRM.ReferenceInformation:23.601(Pg46)23.625(Pg15)P&LSection3.2PlantProcedures23.60123.625NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.3.15Knowledgeofradiationmonitoringsystems,suchasfixedradiationmonitorsandalarms,portablesurveyinstruments,personnelmonitoringequipment,etc.10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:HighNewRO2017ILOWrittenPage:147of207Question73 74Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEWTheplantisoperatingat10%power.Atransientoccurswhichcausesareactorscram.WhichoneofthefollowingindicationswouldalwaysindicateanEmergencyOperatingProcedure(EOP)entrycondition?A.3D168REACTORPRESSUREHIGHB.1D42REACVESSEL/PRESSRECORDERHISPDMODEC.Division1andDivision2EECWWhiteEmergencyModelightsOND.3D73TRIPACTUATORSA1/A2TRIPPEDAND3D74TRIPACUATORSB1/B2TRIPPEDAnswer: B2017ILOWrittenPage:148of207Question74 AnswerExplanation:BothsetpointsforthisAlarmareEOPentryconditions.173.4"and1093#DistractorExplanations:A.IsincorrectandplausiblebecausereactorpressurehighisEOP,howeverthisalarmis1045#(1093#istheEOP).C.IsincorrectandplausiblebecauseEECWdoesactivateonhighdrywellpressureanEOPentry,howeveritalsoactivatesonlowRBCCWpressure.D.Isincorrectandplausiblebecauseat100%thiswouldcauseanEOPentryconditiononL3.Howeveritdoesnotat10%power.ReferenceInformation:ARP1D42setpointsPlantProcedures01D42NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.4.2Knowledgeofsystemsetpoints,interlocksandautomaticactionsassociatedwithEOPentryconditions10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:HighNewRO2017ILOWrittenPage:149of207Question74 75Points:1.00Difficulty:2.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:NEWWhichoneofthefollowingidentifiestheMINIMUMrequiredqualificationsforperson(s)responsiblefortheCommandFunctioninthecontrolroomduring(1)NORMALand(2)

EMERGENCYconditions?A.(1)CRS (2)CRSB.(1)CRS (2)SM C.(1)SM (2)CRS D.(1)SM (2)SMAnswer:2017ILOWrittenPage:150of207Question75 AnswerExplanation:PerMOP01ThereshallbeoneindividualwithanactiveSeniorReactorOperator(SRO)licenseforFermi2assignedtheCommandFunctionforandlocatedintheControlRoomatalltimeswhentheplantisinOperationalCondition1,2,or3.DuringemergencyconditionsthisshallbetheSM.DuringroutineoperationsitshallbetheCRSexceptforshortperiodsofrelief,duringwhichtheSMshouldbeintheControlRoom,butanotherindividualpossessinganactiveSROlicenseforFermi2mayproviderelief.DistractorExplanation:Distractorsareplausibleandincorrectbasedonanswer.ReferenceInformation:MOP01Pg20(Section3.7.4)ILO2017ExamNotesTASKID02SFGA004OBJECTIVEID45397CoveredonAdminatrativeQualificationCard(QP0013)PlantProceduresMOP01ConductofOperationsNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.4.12Knowledgeofgeneraloperatingcrewresponsibilitiesduringemergencyoperations10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(10)Administrative,normal,abnormal,andemergencyoperatingproceduresforthefacility.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:LowNewRO2017ILOWrittenPage:151of207Question75 76Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEWTheplantwasoperatingat100%powerwhenatransientisobserved.Theplanthasstabilizedwiththefollowingindications:*GeneratorMegawattOutputis1047Mwe.*ReactorPoweris91%.*RPVLevelis197inches.*ReactorPressureis1017psig.*Totalcoreflow84Mlbm/hrBasedontheseconditions,(1)Whathasoccurredand(2)whichofthefollowingactionmusttheCRSDirect?A.(1)JetPumpFailure(2)AdjustRRMGsetspeedstomatchloopjetpumpflowsandstayoutsidetheSCRAMandExitRegions.B.(1)JetPumpFailure(2)Monitorcoreforthermal-hydraulicinstabilityusing24.000.01Att.34BC.(1)UncontrolledRecircFlowChange.(2)AdjustRRMGsetspeedstomatchloopjetpumpflowsandstayoutsidetheSCRAMandExitRegions.D.(1)UncontrolledRecircFlowChange.(2)Monitorcoreforthermal-hydraulicinstabilityusing24.000.01Att.34B2017ILOWrittenPage:152of207Question76 Answer: B2017ILOWrittenPage:153of207Question76 AnswerExplanation:Theincreasedrecircflowanddecreasedjetpumpflowareconsistentwithajetpumpfailure.20.138.02requires24.000.01Att.34BbeperformedtoMonitorcoreforthermal-hydraulicinstability(A.2)10CFR55.43(b)(5)SROJustification:ThisquestionmeetsES-401Attachment2requirementstobeSRO-OnlybecauseansweringthisquestionrequiresspecificknowledgeofAOP20.138.02,itisnotrelatedtoimmediateactionsandtheentryconditionsarenotrelevantorleadingtotheanswer.Theanswertothisquestionsisbasedonassessingplantconditions(jetpumpfailure)andthenthecorrectmitigatingactiontotake.DistracterExplanation:"UncontrolledRecircFlowChange"isincorrectandplausible,becauseloopflowindicationdidchange.ThefactthatBloopwhenupandjetupwentdownindicatesajetpumpfailureandnotaUncontrolledRecircFlowChange."AdjustRRMGsetspeedstomatchloopjetpumpflowsandstayoutsidetheSCRAMandExitRegions"isincorrectandplausible,becauseitistheanactionrequiredforUncontrolledRecircFlowChangeandNOTanactionforJetPumpFailure.ReferenceInformation:20.138.02SymptomsandA.1toA.7PlantProcedures20.138.02NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295001AA2.Abilitytodetermineand/orinterpretthefollowingastheyapplytoPARTIALORCOMPLETELOSSOFFORCEDCOREFLOWCIRCULATION:295001AA2.04Individualjetpumpflows:Not-BWR-1&210CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.43(b)(5)Assessmentoffacilityconditionsandselectionofappropriateproceduresduringnormal,abnormal,andemergencysituations.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:HighNewSRO2017ILOWrittenPage:154of207Question76 77Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:BANKAt0800onMarch23rd,whileoperatinginMode1,aDivision2batterychargerwasdamaged.OnehourlateritwasreportedthattheDivision2batteryterminalvoltageis124volts.Basedontheseconditions,whenistheplantrequiredtobeinMode3?A.March23rdat2000B.March23rdat2100C.March23rdat2200D.March23rdat2300Answer: D2017ILOWrittenPage:155of207Question77 AnswerExplanation:InMode1,oneinoperablebatterychargermustberestoredin4hours(TS3.8.4ConditionA).Oneinopbatterychargerandbatterymustberestoredin2hours(ConditionB).Thisoverridestheinitialrequiredaction.Ifbothcannotberestoredin2hours,wemustbeinMode3in12hours.1hr+2hr+12hr=15hr.15hoursfrominitialfailure(0800)is2300.10CFR55.43(b)(2)SROJustification:ThisquestionmeetsES-401Attachment2requirementstobeSRO-OnlybecauseansweringthisquestionrequiresspecificknowledgeofT.SandhowtoapplyTS,itisnotrelatedtoimmediateactionsorTSSafetyLimitsandtheentryconditionsarenotrelevantorleadingtotheanswer.Whileinformationfoundabovethedoublelineisneeded,correctunderstandingofrulesSection1andSection3isneeded.Theanswertothisquestionsisbasedonassessingplantconditions(LossofDC)andapplyingrequirementsofTS.A.Isincorrectandplausiblebecauseitcouldbeselectedifthe12hoursiscalculatedfrom0800.B.Isincorrectandplausiblebecauseitcouldbeselectedifthe12hoursiscalculatedfromthelowvoltagereport.C.Isincorrectandplausiblebecauseitcouldbeselectedifthe2hoursiscalculatedfrom0800,thenthe12hoursadded.ReferenceInfomation:TS3.8.4,ConditionCNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295004PartialorCompleteLossofD.C.PowerG2.2.40AbilitytoapplytechnicalspecificationsforasystemTechnicalSpecifications3.8.4DCSourcesOperating10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.43(b)(2)Facilityoperatinglimitationsinthetechnicalspecificationsandtheirbases.NRCExamUsageILO2012ExamILO2017ExamLOR2013ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:BankHighSRO2017ILOWrittenPage:156of207Question77 78Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:BANKTheplantisoperatingat85%power.At1355,aseismiceventoccurs.At1400,1D66SteamLeakDetectionAmbientTempHighalarms.Steamtunneltemperatureis170°Fandrising5°F/Min.RWCUindicatesisolated.RWCUHxroomtemperatureis175°Fandincreasing2°F/min.AsCRS,whatactionshallyoudirectFIRST,andreasonforthisaction?A.Afterabrief,placetheReactorModeswitchinSHUTDOWN.ThiswillreducetheenergybeingdischargedintosecondarycontainmentandpreventautomaticscramonMSIVclosure.B.ImmediatelyshutMSIVs.Thiswillpreventaprimarysystemfromdischargingintosecondarycontainment.C.At1408,placetheReactorModeSwitchinSHUTDOWN.Requiredactionduetoexceedingmaxsafetemperature,protectingplantequipment.D.At1420,open5SRVs(ADSpreferred).Thiswillreducetheenergybeingdischargedintosecondarycontainment(twoareatemperaturesgreaterthanmaxsafe).Answer: A2017ILOWrittenPage:157of207Question78 AnswerExplanation:Indicationsgivetwoareatemperaturesgreaterthenmaxnormal,whichrequiresisolationofanyprimarysystemdischargingintosecondary.MSIVsshuttingautomaticallyscramthereactor.ThemodeswitchistakentoshutdownpriortoshuttingtheMSIVs.B.isplausible;thisisavalidaction,butwouldcauseanautomaticscram,sothemodeswitchistakentoshutdownpriortothisaction.C.isplausible;basedontheleakrate,steamtunneltempwouldbe210°F.Thisisthemaxsafetemperature.EOPsdirectyoutoplacemodeswitchinshutdownpriortoreachingthistemperature.YouwouldalsogetaMSIVisolationatthistime.D.isplausible;at1408,thereactorwouldscramonMSIVclosure.At1420,youwouldgetyoursecondareatemperature>maxsafe,requiringanED.

Reference:

29.100.01SH5,SC-3PlantProcedures29.100.01SH5NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295006SCRAM295032EK3.KnowledgeofthereasonsforthefollowingresponsesastheyapplytoHIGHSECONDARYCONTAINMENTAREATEMPERATURE:295032EK3.02ReactorSCRAMG2.4.21Knowledgeoftheparametersandlogicusedtoassessthestatusofsafetyfunctionssuchasreactivitycontrol,corecoolingandheatremoval,reactorcoolantsystemintegrity,containmentconditions,radioactivityreleasecontrol,etc.10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.43(b)(5)Assessmentoffacilityconditionsandselectionofappropriateproceduresduringnormal,abnormal,andemergencysituations.NRCExamUsageILO2012ExamILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:BankHighSRO2017ILOWrittenPage:158of207Question78 79Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:MODIFIEDAfireisinprogress.TurbineBuildingAreaTemperaturehasexceeded200°FandanautomaticReactorScramhasoccurred.AllcontrolrodsarefullyinsertedandtheReactorModeSwitchisinSHUTDOWN.ConditionsexistthatrequiretheevacuationoftheMainControlRoomtotheRemoteShutdownPanel.TheRelayroomremainsaccessible.AttheRemoteShutdownPanel,thefollowingconditionsarenoted:*RPVPressureis900psig.*RPVWaterLevelis175inches.AssumingthatCOLDShutdownisdesired,whichoneofthefollowingis(1)theproceduraldirectedmethodforconductingacooldown,and(2)WhatistheLOWESTRPVPressureallowablewithinONEhour?A.(1)LOWERthepressuresettingonpressurecontrollersinTurbineControlRelayPanel.(2)400psig.B.(1)LOWERthepressuresettingonpressurecontrollersinTurbineControlRelayPanel.(2)350psig.C.(1)OPENSafetyReliefValvesAorBattheRemoteShutdownPanel.(2)400psig.D.(1)OPENSafetyReliefValvesAorBattheRemoteShutdownPanel.(2)350psig.Answer: C2017ILOWrittenPage:159of207Question79 AnswerExplanation:RISINGTurbineBuildingAreaTemperaturescausingaReactorScramindicateMSIVsareCLOSED.SRVswillbeoperated.20.000.19limitscooldownto90°F/hr.TheLOWESTRPVPressureallowablewithinONEhouris450psig.10CFR55.43(b)(5)SROJustification:ThisquestionmeetsES-401Attachment2requirementstobeSRO-OnlybecauseansweringthisquestionrequiresspecificknowledgeofAOP20.000.19,itisnotrelatedtoimmediateactionsandtheentryconditionsarenotrelevantorleadingtotheanswer.Theanswertothisquestionsisbasedonassessingplantconditions(Cooldownduringcontrolroomabandonment)andthentakingactionbasedontherequirementsofAOP20.000.19DistracterExplanation:(1)LOWERthepressuresettingonpressurecontrollersinTurbineControlRelayPanelisplausibleandincorrectiftheexamineethoughtthecauseofthescramwasnotclosedMSIVsandthoughttheywereOPEN.(2)350°Fisplausibleandincorrectiftheexamineethoughtthecooldownlimitis100°F/hr.ReferenceInformation:AOP20.000.19CondKpg13andAttachment1,pg1PlantProcedures20.000.19NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295016AA2.Abilitytodetermineand/orinterpretthefollowingastheyapplytoCONTROLROOMABANDONMENT:295016AA2.06Cooldownrate10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.43(b)(5)Assessmentoffacilityconditionsandselectionofappropriateproceduresduringnormal,abnormal,andemergencysituations.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:LowModifiedSRO2017ILOWrittenPage:160of207Question79 80Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:BANKTheplantisoperatingat100%power.P50-R802,StationAirHeaderPressureis90psig(lowering).WhichONEofthefollowingisrequiredper20.129.01,"LossofStationand/orControlAir"andthereasonforthataction?Itisrequiredto:A.StartanyavailableStationAirCompressorstopreventtheINBOARDMainSteamIsolationValvesfromdriftingshut.B.StartanyavailableStationAirCompressorstopreventtheOUTBOARDMainSteamIsolationValvesfromdriftingshut.C.CloseP5000-F401,StationAirtoTBHdrIsoVLVtopreventtheINBOARDMainSteamIsolationValvesfromdriftingshut.D.CloseP5000-F401,StationAirtoTBHdrIsoVLVtopreventtheOUTBOARDMainSteamIsolationValvesfromdriftingshut.Answer: B2017ILOWrittenPage:161of207Question80 AnswerExplanation:WithStationAirLowPressure,20.129.01requiresstartingANYStationAirCompressor.ThisactionpreventsOUTBOARDMSIVsfromdriftingshut.10CFR55.43(b)(5)SROJustification:ThisquestionmeetsES-401Attachment2requirementstobeSRO-OnlybecauseansweringthisquestionrequiresspecificknowledgeofAOP20.129.01,itisnotrelatedtoimmediateactionsandtheentryconditionsarenotrelevantorleadingtotheanswer.Theanswertothisquestionsisbasedonassessingplantconditions(Airloss)andthentakingactionbasedontherequirementsofAOP20.129.01andknowthereasonsDistractorExplanation:A.isplausible;INBOARDMSIVsareprovidedbyDIV1DrywellPneumatics.whichissupportedbyDIV1NIAS.C.isplausible.Withtheseconditions,itisFIRSTrequiredtostartANYStationAirCompressor.OUTBOARDMSIVsaretheconcern.D.isplausible.Withtheseconditions,itisFIRSTrequiredtostartANYStationAirCompressor.ReferenceInformation:20.129.01CondA&Caution120.129.01BASISCondA&Caution1ILO2017ExamNote:TheK/AisIAS.QuestionappearedtobeonStationAirtooutsidereview.QuestionisIAS,therearenotIASaircompressors.IASissuppliedfromStationAir.AnswersanddistractorsareallIASrelated.PlantProcedures20.129.01NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295019AA2.Abilitytodetermineand/orinterpretthefollowingastheyapplytoPARTIALORCOMPLETELOSSOFINSTRUMENTAIR:295019AA2.01Instrumentairsystempressure10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.43(b)(5)Assessmentoffacilityconditionsandselectionofappropriateproceduresduringnormal,abnormal,andemergencysituations.NRCExamUsageILO2012AuditILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:BankHighSRO2017ILOWrittenPage:162of207Question80 81Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:MODIFIEDTheplantwasshutdownduetoaleakinthedrywell.Thefollowingconditionsexist:Allrodsinserted.RPVlevel150inchesandrecoveringwithHPCI,andStandbyFeedwaterinjecting.BothReactorFeedPumpsaretripped,HeaterFeedPumpsareavailable.RPVPressureis890psigandslowlylowering.DrywellPressureis9psigandrising.DrywellTemperatureis170°Fandrising.TorusPressureis7.5psigandrising.AsCRS,youshalldirectwhichofthefollowing?A.InitiateDrywellSprays.B.InitiateTorusCoolingandTorusSprays.C.IsolateEECWtoandfromtheDrywell.D.LowerRPVpressuretoallowHeaterFeedPumpstorecoverlevel.Answer: B2017ILOWrittenPage:163of207Question81 AnswerExplanation:Per29.100.01SH2,stepPCP-4,youmustspraythetoruspriortotoruspressurereaching9psig.Thestandardorderisplaceintoruscooling/torusspray.10CFR55.43(b)(5)SROJustification:ThisquestionmeetsES-401Attachment2requirementstobeSRO-OnlybecauseansweringthisquestionrequiresspecificknowledgeofactionsrequiredbytheEOPs,itisnotrelatedtoimmediateactionsandtheentryconditionsarenotrelevantorleadingtoanswer.TheSROmustassesstheplantconditions(toruspressure)andthenselectingthestepoftheEOPtomitigate/recover.DistractorExplanation:A.Isincorrectandplausiblebecauseyouhavenotexceededthe9psigintheTorus.C.Isincorrectandplausiblebecauseyouhavenotexceeded242°Fdrywelltemperature.YouwillhoweverisolateEECWtothedrywellinstepPCP-3.D.Isincorrectandplausiblebecausewithlevelrecovering,yourprioritywouldbeaddressingcontainment.Thiswouldbeastrategyiflevelwasnotrecovering.ReferenceInformation:29.100.01SH2,PCP-4PlantProcedures29.100.01SH2NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295024EA2.Abilitytodetermineand/orinterpretthefollowingastheyapplytoHIGHDRYWELLPRESSURE:295024EA2.04Suppressionchamberpressure:Plant-Specific10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.43(b)(5)Assessmentoffacilityconditionsandselectionofappropriateproceduresduringnormal,abnormal,andemergencysituations.NRCExamUsageILO2012ExamILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:HighModifiedSRO2017ILOWrittenPage:164of207Question81 82Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:BANKTheplantwasoperatingnormallywithRCICisolatedforscheduledmaintenancewhenaStationBlackoutoccurred.HPCIhasfailedtoinjectduetoelectricalproblemswiththeinjectionvalve.Attime12:00,thefollowingconditionsexist:Reactorpressure950psig(slowlyrisingduetodecayheat)Reactorwaterlevel-32"(slowlyloweringat0.2"/minute)Toruswatertemperature120°FDrywelltemperature160°FDrywellpressure2.1psigAt12:10,temporarynitrogensupplyisconnectedtotheSRVs.At12:20,theHPCIinjectionvalveisopened,andwaterlevelbeginsRISING.WhichofthefollowingactionsisthecrewdirectedtoperformNEXT?A.EntertheSAGs.B.Emergencydepressurizethereactor.C.Stabilizepressurelessthanhighpressurescramsetpoint.D.DepressurizetheRPVbyfullyopeningMnTurbB/Pvalves,ignoringcooldownrate.Answer: C2017ILOWrittenPage:165of207Question82 AnswerExplanation:Basedonconditionsabove,therequirementsforSTEAMCOOLINGhavebeenmet(RPVlevel<0andnoinjectionfromtable1,2,or3)WheninjectionstartsandlevelstartstorisetheCRSwilltaketheSTC-OR1,whichdirectsP-3onsheet1-stabilizepressurelessthanhighpressurescramsetpoint(1093#).10CFR55.43(b)(5)SROJustification:ThisquestionmeetsES-401Attachment2requirementstobeSRO-OnlybecauseansweringthisquestionrequiresspecificknowledgeofactionsrequiredbytheEOPs,itisnotrelatedtoimmediateactionsandtheentryconditionsarenotrelevantorleadingtoanswer.TheSROmustassesstheplantconditions(RPVLevelandInjectiontotheRPV)andthenselectingthestepoftheEOPtomitigate/recover.DistractorExplanation:A.IsincorrectandplausiblebecauseaSAGentrywouldberequiredifyoucouldnotrecoverlevelgreaterthan-25inches.Thestemstatelevelisrising.B.Isincorrectandplausible.Thisactionwouldberequiredifleveldroppedto-40incheswithnoinjection.D.Isincorrectandplausible.DonotmeettheconditiontoexecuteP-OR1-2,itishoweveravalidoverrideforthesectionoftheEOPthatisbeingused.ReferenceInformation:29.100.01SH129.100.01SH3APlantProcedures29.100.01SH129.100.01SH3NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295031EA2.Abilitytodetermineand/orinterpretthefollowingastheyapplytoREACTORLOWWATERLEVEL:295031EA2.04Adequatecorecooling10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.43(b)(5)Assessmentoffacilityconditionsandselectionofappropriateproceduresduringnormal,abnormal,andemergencysituations.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamLOR2015ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:BankHighSRO2017ILOWrittenPage:166of207Question82 83Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:BANKTheplantisoperatingat60%power.DigitalFeedwaterLevelControlisin3-ElementcontrolwiththeReactorLevelSelectSwitchinA.3D164,FEEDWATERCONTROLDCSTROUBLEhasalarmed,andbothReactorFeedwaterPumpControllershaveswitchedtoEmergencyBypass.RPVLevelis196inchesandslowlylowering.TheCRSwilldirectwhichofthefollowingproceduralactions?A.PerformSOP23.107.PLACEtheLevelControlModeSwitchin1ELEM,andcontinuepoweroperationinSingleElementControl.B.PerformSOP23.107.PLACEbothEmergencyBypassswitchesinposition"M",manuallyadjustReactorFeedwaterPumpControllerstomatchFeedPumpspeeds,andcontinuepoweroperationin3ElementControl.C.EnterAOP20.107.01.PlacetheReactorModeSwitchinShutdown.AllowPostScramFeedwaterLogictorecoverlevel.D.EnterAOP20.107.01.PLACEbothEmergencyBypassswitchesinposition"M",manuallyadjustReactorFeedwaterPumpControllerstomatchFeedFlowwithSteamFlow,andcontinuepoweroperationwithmanualfeedpumpspeedcontrol.Answer: D2017ILOWrittenPage:167of207Question83 AnswerExplanation:WithbothReactorFeedPumpControllersinEMERGENCYBYPASS,manualfeedwatercontrolisrequiredbytheAOPtomaintainlevel.10CFR55.43(b)(5)SROJustification:ThisquestionmeetsES-401Attachment2requirementstobeSRO-OnlybecauseansweringthisquestionrequiresspecificknowledgeofAOP(20.107.01),itisnotrelatedtoimmediateactionsandtheentryconditionsarenotrelevantorleadingtotheanswer.Theanswertothisquestionsisbasedonassessingplantconditions(DCSTROUBLEandFEEDPUMPCONTROLERS)andthenselectingthecorrectsectionofAOP..DistracterExplanation:A.Isplausibleandincorrect;wouldbetrueforalossofonefeedflowortwosteamflowinputs,ifNOTinEmergencyBypass.B.IsaplausibleandincorrectmisconceptioninthatmatchingRFPspeedswouldbeeffectivevicematchingsteamflowandfeedflow.C.Isplausibleandincorrectmisconception;testingknowledgeofpumpingcapacitywithcontrollersinEmergencyBypass.ReferencesInformation:20.107.01,page9;23.107,page8PlantProcedures20.107.0123.107NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295009AA2.Abilitytodetermineand/orinterpretthefollowingastheyapplytoLOWREACTORWATERLEVEL:295009AA2.02Steamflow/feedflowmismatch10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.43(b)(5)Assessmentoffacilityconditionsandselectionofappropriateproceduresduringnormal,abnormal,andemergencysituations.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamLOR2011ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:BankHighSRO2017ILOWrittenPage:168of207Question83 84Points:1.00Difficulty:4.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEWTheplantisoperatingat50%reactorpower.HPCIisinservicefortesting.ReviewattachedcopyofTR3.3.6.4andTS3.6.2.1.TRSR3.3.6.4.1,SR3.6.2.1.1wereperformedearlierinshift,beforetheHPCItesting.Point4[D]onT23-R800(T23N004)faileditsCHANNELCHECKperTRSR3.3.6.4.1.BasedonthesesurveillancesandaboveindicationofTorustemperatures,whichofthefollowingmeetaCONDITIONthathasaREQUIREDACTION?A.ONLYTS3.6.2.1B.ONLYTR3.3.6.4C.BOTHTR3.3.6.4ANDTS3.6.2.1D.NEITHERTR3.3.6.4NORTS3.6.2.1Answer: C2017ILOWrittenPage:169of207Question84 AnswerExplanation:BasedonrequirementsofTR3.3.6.4Point4isINOP.andPoint4mustbesubstitutedforwithPOINT5.Calculation:IndicatedCorrectedPoint1106.8106.8Point2103.6103.6Point3103.6103.6Point498.2108.2Point5108.2108.2Point6102.9102.9Point7103.8103.8Point8105.6105.6Highest108.2108.2Lowest98.2102.9Difference105.3Average104.1105.3BasedonthisneitherTR3.3.6.4norTS3.6.2.1aremet.ThereforeanACTIONstatmentmustbeenteredforBOTH.10CFR55.43(b)(2)SROJustification:ThisquestionmeetsES-401Attachment2requirementstobeSRO-OnlybecauseansweringthisquestionrequiresspecificknowledgeofT.SandTRMandhowtoapplyactionsrequiredbyasurveillance,itisnotrelatedtoimmediateactionsorTSSafetyLimitsandtheentryconditionsarenotrelevantorleadingtotheanswer.Whileinformationfoundabovethedoublelineisneeded,correctunderstandingofanSRisrequiredtoassessLCO3.6.2.Theanswertothisquestionsisbasedonassessingplantconditions(Failedinstrument,elevatedtorustemperaturesandHPCIrunning)andevaluatingsurveillanceresultsandthenapplyingrequirementsofasurveillancefromtheTRM.DistracterExplanation:DistractersareplausibleandincorrectbasedonapplyingT.SandTRMReferenceInformation:TR3.3.6.4,TS3.6.2,TRSR3.3.6.4.1,SR3.6.2.1.12017ILOWrittenPage:170of207Question84 NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295013HighSuppressionPoolWaterTemperatureG2.2.37Abilitytodetermineoperabilityand/oravailabilityofsafetyrelatedequipmentTechnicalSpecifications3.6.2.1SuppressionPoolAverageTemperatureTechnicalRequirementsManual3.3.6.4SuppressionPoolWaterTemperatureInstrumentation10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.43(b)(2)Facilityoperatinglimitationsinthetechnicalspecificationsandtheirbases.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:HighNewSRO2017ILOWrittenPage:171of207Question84 85Points:1.00Difficulty:2.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:BANKAscramconditionexists,RPSdidnotactuateandattemptstomanuallyscramhavefailed.ThecrewenterstheEOPsonfailuretoscram.TheCRSdirectstheP603operatortoperformFSQ1-8.WhileperformingFSQ1-8controlrodsinsertandthefollowingconditionsexist:APRMsarereadingdownscale.TheIRMshavebeeninsertedandarereadingbetweenRange4and5andlowering.RPVPressureis950psigandbeingmaintainedbyMainTurbineBypassValves.SLChasnotbeeninjected.7ControlRodsareFULLOUT,allothersarefullyinserted.(1)Isthereactorshutdownunderallconditions,and(2)whatproceduralactionswilltheCRSdirect?A.(1)NO(2)InjectSLCandinsertcontrolrodsIAW29.ESP.03.B.(1)NO(2)ExitRxPowerlegof29.100.01A,RPVCONTROL-ATWS,andperform20.000.21,REACTORSCRAM.C.(1)YES(2)ExitALLlegsof29.100.01A,RPVCONTROL-ATWS,andperform29.100.01Sheet1,RPVCONTROLD.(1)YES(2)ExitRxPowerlegof29.100.01A,RPVCONTROL-ATWS,andperform20.000.21,REACTORSCRAM.Answer: B2017ILOWrittenPage:172of207Question85 AnswerExplanation:PerEPGs,positiveconfirmationthatthereactorwillremainshutdownunderallconditionswithoutboronisbestobtainedbydeterminingthatnocontrolrodiswithdrawnbeyondtheMaximumSubcriticalBankedWithdrawalPosition.7RODSareoutthereforethisisnotpossible.ThereactorisbelowRange7ontheIRMsandtrendingdownindicatingthereactorisshutdown.FSQoverrideone(1)statesthatifthereactorisshutdown,exittotheSCRAMAOP.10CFR55.43(b)(5)SROJustification:ThisquestionmeetsES-401Attachment2requirementstobeSRO-OnlybecauseansweringthisquestionrequiresspecificknowledgeofEPGdefinationof"remainshutdownunderallconditions",itisnotrelatedtoimmediateactionsandtheentryconditionsarenotrelevantorleadingtotheanswer.Theanswertothisquestionsisbasedonassessingplantconditions(RPISFailure)andthenselectingthecorrectsectionofEOPtouse.DistracterExplanation:A.isincorrectbecausetheCRSshouldexittheATWSEOP.ThisanswerisplausiblebecausetheexamineemaydeterminethecorrectactionistocontinueonandinjectBoronbecausethereactorwillnotremainshutdownunderallconditionsC.isincorrectbecausePerEPGs,positiveconfirmationthatthereactorwillremainshutdownunderallconditionswithoutboronisbestobtainedbydeterminingthatnocontrolrodiswithdrawnbeyondtheMaximumSubcriticalBankedWithdrawalPosition.7rodsarefulloutthereforethisisnotpossible.Theexamineemaydeterminethepowerindicationsmeanthereactorwillremainshutdownunderallconditions.D.isincorrectbecauseisincorrectbecausePerEPGs,positiveconfirmationthatthereactorwillremainshutdownunderallconditionswithoutboronisbestobtainedbydeterminingthatnocontrolrodiswithdrawnbeyondtheMaximumSubcriticalBankedWithdrawalPosition.7rodsarefulloutthereforethisisnotpossible.Theexamineemaydeterminethepowerindicationsmeanthereactorwillremainshutdownunderallconditions.TheanswerisplausiblebecausetheexamineemaydeterminethatexitingtheATWSEOPandenteringthenormalRPVControlEOPisthecorrectcourseofaction.PlantProcedures29.100.01SH1A29.100.01SH6BWROGEPGAppBNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295015AA2.Abilitytodetermineand/orinterpretthefollowingastheyapplytoINCOMPLETESCRAM:295015AA2.01Reactorpower10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.43(b)(5)Assessmentoffacilityconditionsandselectionofappropriateproceduresduringnormal,abnormal,andemergencysituations.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:BankHighSRO2017ILOWrittenPage:173of207Question85 86Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:BANKEarlierinshiftthefollowinginstrumentsfailedhigh:B21-N090CDIV1CS/RHRPERMISSIVEMAINSTMPRESSUREXMTRB21-N090DDIV2CS/RHRPERMISSIVEMAINSTMPRESSUREXMTRShortlyafteridentifyingtheinstrumentfailure,anearthquakeoccurs.BothRecircPumpstrip,andDrywellpressurerisescausingareactorscram.Postreactorscramplantconditionsareasfollows:RPVLevelis164inchesandlowering.RPVpressureis350psigandloweringrapidly.Drywellpressureis18.3psigandrising.E1150-F017A&B,LPCILoopOutboardInjectionIsoValvesareopenWhichofthefollowingidentifiesboth(1)thecurrentRHRSystemvalvelineupand(2)theCRSdirectiontotheCRLNOconcerningRHRSystemoperation?A.(1)E1150-F015A&B,LPCILoopInboardIsolationValves,areclosed.(2)ManuallyopenE1150-F015ontheloopdesiredforinjectionper23.205,RHRSystem.B.(1)E1150-F015A&B,LPCILoopInboardIsolationValves,areopen.(2)MaintainRPVWaterLevel173to214inchesusingLPCIperEOP29.100.01,Sheet1.C.(1)E1150-F015A&B,LPCILoopInboardIsolationValves,areclosed.(2)PerformForcedLPCILoopSelectLogicOperationonthedesiredloopper23.205,RHRSystem.D.(1)E1150-F015A&B,LPCILoopInboardIsolationValves,areopen.(2)ManuallycloseE1150-F015ontheloopdesiredforContainmentCoolingper23.205,RHRSystem.Answer: A2017ILOWrittenPage:174of207Question86 AnswerExplanation:ReactorSteamDomePressure-LowisaninputintotheLPCILoopSelectLogic.Ifpressureis<906psig,LPCIwillalignforinjection.E1150-F015A/BgetsanopensignalfromLPCILoopSelect,butwillnotopenuntilreactorpressureis<461psig(permissive).Inthiscase,thelogicwillnever"see"reactorpressure<906psig,sothelogicwillnotinitiate.SinceE1150-F015A/Bwillnotgetanopensignalfromthelogic,itremainsclosedafterthe461psigpermissiveismetandmustbereopenedper23.205.10CFR55.43(b)(5)SROJustification:ThisquestionmeetsES-401Attachment2requirementstobeSRO-Onlybecauseansweringthisquestionrequiresspecificknowledgeof(NeedforinjectionperEOPSheet1),itisnotrelatedtoimmediateactionsandtheentryconditionsarenotrelevantorleadingtotheanswer.Theanswertothisquestionsisbasedonassessingplantconditions(Nuclearboilerinstrumentfailures)andthentakingactionbasedanSOPtomeetthenneedsoftheEOPtomitigatetheevent.DistracterExplanation:B.isincorrectbecauseE1150-F015A&Bareclosed.Iftheexamineeassumesthisisthecorrectlineup,actionsfromtheEOParelogical.C.isincorrectbecauseforcedLPCIloopselectisnotrequired.Bothloopsareoperable,andE1150-F015canbemanuallyopened.IfexamineeassumesE1150-F015A&Bcannotbeopened,forcedlogicoperationwouldbelogical.D.isincorrectbecauseE1150-F015A&Bareclosed.Iftheexamineeassumesthisisthecorrectlineup,actionspreventinjectionfromtheoppositeloopandsetupfortoruscoolingarelogical.ReferenceInformation:23.601pg24-ReactorSteamDomePressure-LowisaninputintotheLPCILoopSelectLogic.Itinitiatesifreactorpressureis<906psigandoneorbothRRPumpsarenotrunning.ST-OP-315-0041-001(Fig18)showstheLPCILoopSelectionLogic-if<2RRPumpsarenotrunning,andrxpressureis>906psig,theselectionlogicwillnotactuate.23.205-listssectionsforManualLPCIInitiation(whichrequiresopeningE1150-F015A/B)andForcedLPCIloopSelectionLogicoperation(plantconditionsdonotmeetrequiredprerequisites).PlantProcedures23.205NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2203000A2.Abilityto(a)predicttheimpactsofthefollowingontheRHR/LPCI:INJECTIONMODE(PLANTSPECIFIC);and(b)basedonthosepredictions,useprocedurestocorrect,control,ormitigatetheconsequencesofthoseabnormalconditionsoroperations:203000A2.10NuclearboilerinstrumentfailuresG2.4.21Knowledgeoftheparametersandlogicusedtoassessthestatusofsafetyfunctionssuchasreactivitycontrol,corecoolingandheatremoval,reactorcoolantsystemintegrity,containmentconditions,radioactivityreleasecontrol,etc.10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.43(b)(5)Assessmentoffacilityconditionsandselectionofappropriateproceduresduringnormal,abnormal,andemergencysituations.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:BankHighSRO2017ILOWrittenPage:175of207Question86 87Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:BANKTheplantisoperatinginMODE4whenthefollowingalarmsoccur:1D6,DIV1CSSLOGICPOWERFAILURE1D13,TESTABILITYDIV1ECCSLOGIC/POWERFAILUREWhichoneofthefollowingdescribestheimpactofthisindicationontheCoreSpraySystemONLY,andwhatactionisrequired?A.AutomaticoperationofDiv1CSSwillbeinhibitedbutmanualinjectionremainsfunctional.CoreSprayisrequiredtobeOPERABLEinthepresentMODE.Div1CSSmustberestoredwithin4hours.B.AutomaticandmanualoperationofDiv1CSSwillbeinhibited.OnlyonedivisionofCoreSprayisrequiredtobeOPERABLEinthepresentMODE.TechnicalSpecificationLCO3.5.2issatisfiedindefinitely.C.AutomaticandmanualoperationofDiv1CSSremainfunctional.CoreSprayLoopAisassuredtoproducetherequiredflowandsatisfiestheTechnicalSpecificationLCO3.5.2indefinitely.D.AutomaticandmanualoperationofDiv1CSSremainfunctionalbutE2150-F031A,DIV1CSPumpsMinFlowValve,Autocloses.CoreSprayLoopAisNOTassuredtoproducetherequiredflow.Div1CSSmustberestoredin4hours.Answer: B2017ILOWrittenPage:176of207Question87 AnswerExplanation:ThealarmsindicatethattheDCpowertoCSSLogicAhashadafailure.ThiswillpreventAutomaticandManualinjectionofDiv1CSS.Thepumpscanbemanuallystartedbuttheinjectionvalvesareincapableofopening.OnedivisionofCSSisrequiredtobeoperableinMode4(assumingaLPCIsubsystemisoperable).TechSpec3.5.2issatisfied.10CFR55.43(b)(2)SROJUSTIFICATIONThisquestionmeetsES-401Attachment2requirementstobeSRO-OnlybecauseansweringthisquestionrequiresspecificknowledgeofapplyingT.S.3.5.2,itisnotrelatedto<1hourTS/TRMAction,cannotbeansweredLCO/TRMinformationlisted"above-the-line",andcannotbeansweredbysolelybyknowingtheTSSafetyLimits.TheSROmustassessingplantconditionsandthenapplyRequiredActionsofT.S.andusetherequirementsofConditionsDistractorExplanation:A.isincorrectbecausetheinjectionvalvesF004AandF005AareinterlockedclosedandrequireasignalfromCSSLogicAtoopen.C.isincorrectbecauseDCLogicpowerhasbeenlostandbothAutoandManualinjectionwillbeinhibited.D.isincorrectbecauseDCLogicpowerhasbeenlostandbothAutoandManualinjectionwillbeinhibited.ReferenceInfromation:ARP1D6TechSpec3.5.2PlantProcedures01D06NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2209001A2.Abilityto(a)predicttheimpactsofthefollowingontheLOWPRESSURECORESPRAYSYSTEM;and(b)basedonthosepredictions,useprocedurestocorrect,control,ormitigatetheconsequencesofthoseabnormalconditionsoroperations:209001A2.04D.C.failuresTechnicalSpecifications3.5.2ECCSShutdown10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.43(b)(2)Facilityoperatinglimitationsinthetechnicalspecificationsandtheirbases.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:BankHighSelectedforEarlyReview(NRC)SRO2017ILOWrittenPage:177of207Question87 88Points:1.00Difficulty:2.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEWDuetoanerrorinthecalibrationprocedurefortheRPSReactorVesselSteamDomePressure-Highinstruments,thehighpressuretripsetpointforallfourchannelswereadjustedsuchthatthechannelswouldnottripuntilReactorVesselSteamDomePressureis1300psig.(1)GiventhelistedconditionswillRPStrippriortoreachingtheReactorCoolantSystemPressureSafetyLimit?(2)WhichofthefollowingwillsatisfytherequirementsofT.S.3.3.1.1ReactorProtectionSystem(RPS)InstrumentationRequiredActionC.1ONLY?A.(1)Yes(2)B21-N078AandB21-N078CSettotripat1100psigB.(1)Yes(2)B21-N078AandB21-N078DSettotripat1100psigC.(1)No(2)B21-N078AandB21-N078CSettotripat1100psigD.(1)No(2)B21-N078AandB21-N078DSettotripat1100psigAnswer: B2017ILOWrittenPage:178of207Question88 AnswerExplanation:TorestoretripcapabilityforReactorVesselSteamDomePressure-High,atleastoneofthetripsystemsmustberestored(tripsetpointlessthan1113psigpsig).Torestoreatripsystemthetwochannelsforthattripsystem[(AorC)and(BorD)]mustberestored.10CFR55.43(b)(2)SROJUSTIFICATIONThisquestionmeetsES-401Attachment2requirementstobeSRO-OnlybecauseansweringthisquestionrequiresspecificknowledgeofapplyingT.S.3.3.1.1C.1Basis.Theanswerisrelatedto<1hourTS/TRMActionhoweverthisknowledegealonecannotanswerthequestion,cannotbeansweredLCO/TRMinformationlisted"above-the-line",andcannotbeansweredbysolelybyknowingtheTSSafetyLimits(ROhalfrequiredbytheK/A).TheSROmustassessingplantconditionsandthenapplyRequiredActionsofT.S.andusetherequirementsofConditionstodeterminethecorrectalignmentofRPSchannelstomeettheintentofT.S.3.3.1.1C.1DistracterExplanation:DistractersareplausibleandincorrectbasedonlogiclistedaboveandhowtheT.S.BasisforRPSdefinesatripsystemforRPSrequiredbyT.S.3.3.1.1C.1ReferenceInformation:23.601Pg10(ReactorVesselSteamDomePressure-High)T.S.3.3.1.1CONDC(requirement)+BASIS(T.S.B3.3.1.1)S.L2.1.2NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2212000RPSG2.2.22KnowledgeoflimitingconditionsforoperationsandsafetylimitsTechnicalSpecifications3.3.1.1ReactorProtectionSystem(RPS)Instrumentation10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.43(b)(2)Facilityoperatinglimitationsinthetechnicalspecificationsandtheirbases.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:HighNewSelectedforEarlyReview(NRC)SRO2017ILOWrittenPage:179of207Question88 89Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEWThereactorhasscrammedduetoacoolantleakandacompletelossoftheReactorFeedSystem.ThecrewhascompletedtheSCRAMreportsandenteredtheEOPs.AllCoreSprayPumpsarerunningAllRHRpumpsarerunning.HPCIisinjecting.RCICisinjecting.Drywellpressureis2.2psiandincreasingat0.1psi/minute.RPVlevelis25inchesandisincreasingat5.0inches/minute.ADStimersaretimingdownandindicate93seconds.(1)AssumingNOoperatoractionandalltrendscontinueatcurrentrates,whatisthestatusoftheADSSRVsin2minutes?AND(2)WhichofthefollowingEOPstepsmusttheCRSdirectnow?A.(1)Open(2)InhibitADSB.(1)Closed(2)InhibitADSC.(1)Open(2)L/U,startpumps,andmaximizeinjflowwithsourcesfromTables1and3.D.(1)Closed(2)L/U,startpumps,andmaximizeinjflowwithsourcesfromTables1and3.Answer: B2017ILOWrittenPage:180of207Question89 AnswerExplanation:In93secondsADSwillNOTopenthe5ADSSRVbecauseRPVlevelwillbe(25inches+(93secX(1min/60sec)X5inches/min)=32.75inches,becauseLevel1is31.8inchesthelevel1permissivedropsoutandtheADStimersreset.SeeI-2095-06forDIV1explanation,DIV2explanationisthesame.BasedonconditionsEOPSheet1(L-5)ismetsoADSmustbeinhibited.10CFR55.43(b)(5)SROJustification:ThisquestionmeetsES-401Attachment2requirementstobeSRO-OnlybecauseansweringthisquestionrequiresspecificknowledgeofEOPSheet1,itisnotrelatedtoimmediateactionsandtheentryconditionsarenotrelevantorleadingtotheanswer.Theanswertothisquestionsisbasedonassessingplantconditions(ADSinitiationsignalspresent)andthentakingactionbasedontherequirementsofEOPSheet1.DistracterExplanation:DistractersareincorrectandplausiblebasedonanswerexplanationofADSValvesbeingopen,andtheactionistheEOPstepforrecoveringfromanEmergencyDepressurization(StepL-19sheet1).TheuseofTable3makesitincorrect.ReferenceInformation:I-2095-06andB21-04(logic)and29.100.01SH1StepL-1toL-6.PlantProcedures29.100.01SH1B21-04AUTOMATICDEPRESSURIZATIONSYSTEMDESIGNBASISDOCNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2218000A2.Abilityto(a)predicttheimpactsofthefollowingontheAUTOMATICDEPRESSURIZATIONSYSTEM;and(b)basedonthosepredictions,useprocedurestocorrect,control,ormitigatetheconsequencesofthoseabnormalconditionsoroperations:218000A2.06ADSinitiationsignalspresent10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.43(b)(5)Assessmentoffacilityconditionsandselectionofappropriateproceduresduringnormal,abnormal,andemergencysituations.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:HighNewSRO2017ILOWrittenPage:181of207Question89 90Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:BANKDuringastartup,theNorthRFPTisoperating.Thefollowingconditionsexist:ReactorPower1%CTPReactorpressure750psigSULCV40%openSULCVM/AStationAUTONorthFeedwaterFlowControlM/AStationMANUALTheInterruptibleAirSupplytotheSULCVisnowLOST.(1)HowwillthisfailureFIRSTaffectRPVWaterLevel,and(2)whichONEofthefollowingactionswillCRSdirecttomitigatethisfailure?A.(1)RPVWaterLevelwillRISE.(2)PLACEtheC32-R620,N21-F403RPVStartupLevelControllerSULCVM/AStationinMANUAL,andlowertheOUTPUTsignaltoCLOSEtheSULCV.B.(1)RPVWaterLevelwillRISE.(2)TRIPtheNorthRFPT,STARTtheWestStandbyFeedwaterPump,andcontrolRPVWaterLevelusingN2103-F003,SBFW4"DischFlowCtrlVlv.C.(1)RPVWaterLevelwillLOWER.(2)STARTtheWestStandbyFeedwaterPump,andcontrolRPVWaterLevelusingN2103-F003,SBFW4"DischFlowCtrlVlv.D.(1)RPVWaterLevelwillLOWER.(2)PLACEtheFeedwaterFlowControlM/AStationinAUTO,andOPENN2100-F607,NRFPDischLineIsoValve.Answer: B2017ILOWrittenPage:182of207Question90 AnswerExplanation:TheSULCVfailsOPENonLossofAir.WithaReactorFeedwaterPumpTurbineoperatingatafixedspeed(MANUAL)-RPVWaterLevelwillRISE.TRIPPINGtheRFPTwillstopflowthroughtheSULCVandSBFWcanbeoperatedtocontrolRPVWaterLevel.10CFR55.43(b)(5)SROJustification:ThisquestionmeetsES-401Attachment2requirementstobeSRO-OnlybecauseansweringthisquestionrequiresspecificknowledgeofAOP20.129.01andSOP23.107,itisnotrelatedtoimmediateactionsandtheentryconditionsarenotrelevantorleadingtotheanswer.Theanswertothisquestionsisbasedonassessingplantconditions(AirlosstoSULCV)andthentakingactionbasedontherequirementsofAOP20.129.01andSOP23.107.DistractorExplanation:A.Isplausibleandincorrect;wouldbetrueforautocontrolsignalfailuretoSULCV.Irrespectiveofcontrolleroutput,withLossofAir,theSULCVwillcontinuetoOPENandRPVWaterLevelwillRISE.ThiswillNOTmitigatethefailure.CIsplausibleandincorrect;butRPVWaterLevelwillRISE.D.Isplausibleandincorrect;butRPVWaterLevelwillRISE.ReferenceInformation:AOP20.129.01Airlossimpact(Enclosures)PlantProcedures20.107.0120.129.0123.107NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2259002A2.Abilityto(a)predicttheimpactsofthefollowingontheREACTORWATERLEVELCONTROLSYSTEM;and(b)basedonthosepredictions,useprocedurestocorrect,control,ormitigatetheconsequencesofthoseabnormalconditionsoroperations:259002A2.05Lossofapplicableplantairsystems10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.43(b)(5)Assessmentoffacilityconditionsandselectionofappropriateproceduresduringnormal,abnormal,andemergencysituations.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamLOR2011ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:BankHighSRO2017ILOWrittenPage:183of207Question90 91Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:BANKAfterareactorscramfromaturbinetrip,thefollowingconditionsexist:ReactorPoweris3%.TorusTemperatureis140°Fandrising.DrywellPressureis1.4psigandsteady.SLCisinjecting.Division2RHRisinTorusCoolingandTorusSpray.RPVwaterleveliscurrently63incheswithadirectedlevelbandof50to100inches.29.ESP.11hasbeendirected,butisNOTcomplete.TheCRLNOsubsequentlyreportsheisoutofhiswaterlevelbandLOW.RPVlevelcurrentlyindicates30inches.(1)WhatisthespecificeffectoftheseconditionsonDIV2RHR,and(2)whatactionsshalltheCRSdirecttotheCRLNO?A.(1)E1150-F027B,Div2RHRTorusSprayIso,E1150-F028B,Div2RHRTorusIsoVlv.andE1150-F024B,Div2RHRTorusClgIso,close.(2)TerminateandPreventinjectionduetoexceedingtheBIIT.B.(1)OnlyE1150-F028B,Div2RHRTorusIsoVlv.closes.(2)TerminateandPreventinjectionduetoexceedingtheBIIT.ThenplaceDIV1RHRinTorusCoolingandTorusSpray.C.(1)E1150-F027B,Div2RHRTorusSprayIso,E1150-F028B,Div2RHRTorusIsoVlv.andE1150-F024B,Div2RHRTorusClgIso,close.(2)Changewaterlevelbandto0-50inches.ThenplaceContainmentSprayModeSelectSwitchinMANUAL,andre-openF027B,F028B,andF024B.D.(1)OnlyE1150-F027B,Div2RHRTorusSprayIso,andE1150-F024B,Div2RHRTorusClgIso,close.(2)Changewaterlevelbandto0-50inches.ThenplaceContainmentSpray2/3CoreHeightOverrideSwitchinMANUALOVERRIDE,andre-openF027BandF024B.Answer: C2017ILOWrittenPage:184of207Question91 AnswerExplanation:DuetolevelfallingbelowLevel1,E1150-F027B,Div2RHRTorusSprayIso,E1150-F028B,Div2RHRTorusIsoVlv,andE1150-F024B,Div2RHRTorusClgIso,close.Torestore,thesevalvesmustbere-openedafterContainmentSprayModeSelectSwitchisplacedinMANUAL.Dueto29.ESP.11notbeingcompleted,MSIVswillgoclosed.ODE-10statesexpectedlevelbandforthisconditionis0-50inches(ReactorPower>3%&heatdischargingtoTorus:0-50inches).10CFR55.43(b)(5)SROJustification:ThisquestionmeetsES-401Attachment2requirementstobeSRO-OnlybecauseansweringthisquestionrequiresspecificknowledgeofEOPSH1&SH2,itisnotrelatedtoimmediateactionsandtheentryconditionsarenotrelevantorleadingtotheanswer.Theanswertothisquestionsisbasedonassessingplantconditions(RHR/LPCI:TORUS/SUPPRESSIONPOOLSPRAYMODE)andthentakingactionbasedontherequirementsofEOPSH1&SH2and23.205.DistractorExplanation:A.RHRisolationvalveswillclosebecauseofL1butTorusTemperatureisnotgreaterthantheBIIT.BAllRHRisolationvalveswillclose.TorustempisbelowtheBIIT.D.ContainmentSpray2/3CoreHeightOverrideSwitchisnotplacedinMANUALOVERRIDEuntilRPVlevelisbelowLevel0.ReferenceInformation:23.205,EnclosureA,29.100.01SH1APlantProcedures23.20529.100.01SH1ANUREG1123KACatalogRev.2203000A2.Abilityto(a)predicttheimpactsofthefollowingontheRHR/LPCI:INJECTIONMODE(PLANTSPECIFIC);and(b)basedonthosepredictions,useprocedurestocorrect,control,ormitigatetheconsequencesofthoseabnormalconditionsoroperations:203000A2.03Valveclosures230000A2.Abilityto(a)predicttheimpactsofthefollowingontheRHR/LPCI:TORUS/SUPPRESSIONPOOLSPRAYMODE;and(b)basedonthosepredictions,useprocedurestocorrect,control,ormitigatetheconsequencesofthoseabnormalconditionsoroperations:230000A2.03Valveclosures295037EK2.KnowledgeoftheinterrelationsbetweenSCRAMCONDITIONPRESENTANDREACTORPOWERABOVEAPRMDOWNSCALEORUNKNOWNandthefollowing:295037EK2.09Reactorwaterlevel10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.43(b)(5)Assessmentoffacilityconditionsandselectionofappropriateproceduresduringnormal,abnormal,andemergencysituations.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamLOR2015ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:BankHighSRO2017ILOWrittenPage:185of207Question91 92Points:1.00Difficulty:2.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:BANKWhichoneofthefollowingcompletesthestatementwhichdescribesthebasesoftheLimitingConditionforOperationwhichrequirestheMainTurbineBypassvalvesandtheMoistureSeparatorReheatertobeoperableabove25%power?AnoperableMainTurbineBypasssystemandtheMoistureSeparatorReheaterwillensure___________________.A.theplantcooldownlimitsarenotexceededduringallturbinetripevents.B.RPVpressurescramsetpointsarenotexceededduringallturbinetripevents.C.theMCPRsafetylimitisnotexceededduringrapidoverpressurizationtransients.D.theAPLHGRsafetylimitisnotexceededduringrapidoverpressurizationtransients.Answer: C2017ILOWrittenPage:186of207Question92 AnswerExplanation:ThetechspecbasesdescribesthesystemsasbeingrequiredtomaintainMCPRwithinthesafetylimitforoverpressurizationtransients.ClosedReference10CFR55.43(b)(2)SROJUSTIFICATIONThisquestionmeetsES-401Attachment2requirementstobeSRO-OnlybecauseansweringthisquestionrequiresspecificknowledgeofT.S.B,itisnotrelatedto<1hourTS/TRMAction,cannotbeansweredLCO/TRMinformationlisted"above-the-line",andcannotbeansweredbysolelybyknowingtheTSSafetyLimits.TheSROmusthaveknowledgeoftheBasisforT.S.3.7.6.DistracterExplanation:Aisplausible,thebypassvalvesareusedtocooldowntheplantafterascrambutthesystemisnotdesignedtopreventexceedingcooldownlimits.Bisplausible;ThebypassandMSRsystemwilllimitpeakreactorpressureduringturbinetripeventsbutwillnotpreventreactorpressurefromrisingabovethescramsetpointforALLturbinetripevents.Displausible;APLHGRisathermallimit,butnotasafetylimit.Itisrequiredtobemaintainedabove25%powerbutnotforoverpressuretransients.ReferenceInformation:T.S.B3.7.6NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2245000MainTurbineGeneratorandAuxiliarySystemG2.2.25KnowledgeofbasesinTechnicalSpecificationsforlimitingconditionsforoperationsandsafetylimits.TechnicalSpecifications3.7.6TheMainTurbineBypassSystemandMoistureSeparatorReheater(Basis)10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(3)Mechanicalcomponentsanddesignfeaturesofreactorprimarysystem.10CFR55.43(b)(2)Facilityoperatinglimitationsinthetechnicalspecificationsandtheirbases.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamLOR2011ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:BankHighSRO2017ILOWrittenPage:187of207Question92 93Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEWTheplantisoperatingat85%power.At1020aseismiceventoccurs.At1030IPCSARMdisplayindicates:2017ILOWrittenPage:188of207Question93 At1040IPCSARMdisplayindicates:2017ILOWrittenPage:189of207Question93 Basedonthegivenindicationsandassumingalltrendscontinuewithnooperatoraction:Attime1050(1)whatistheimpactonSecondaryContainmentand(2)whichofthefollowinglistsALLREQUIREDEOPactionsforSecondaryContainmentControltobedirectedbytheCRS?A.(1)2areaswillexceededMAXNORM.(2)IsolateALLsystemsdischargingintothisareaexceptsystemsrequiredbyEOPsordamagecontrolONLY.B.(1)1areawillexceededMAXSAFE.(2)IsolateALLsystemsdischargingintothisareaexceptsystemsrequiredbyEOPsordamagecontrolONLY.C.(1)2areaswillexceededMAXNORM.(2)IsolateALLsystemsdischargingintothisareaexceptsystemsrequiredbyEOPsordamagecontrol.ANDPERFORM29.100.01SH1enteringatstepRC-1.D.(1)1areawillexceededMAXSAFE.(2)IsolateALLsystemsdischargingintothisareaexceptsystemsrequiredbyEOPsordamagecontrol.ANDPERFORM29.100.01SH1enteringatstepRC-1.Answer: D2017ILOWrittenPage:190of207Question93 AnswerExplanation:Basedontrends:CSSDiv2isincreased19.9°Fsotemperaturewillbe145.9°Fwhichisbelowmaxnorm(148°F)HPCIPMPisincreasedby24.8°Fsotemperaturewillbe212°Fwhichisabovemaxsafe(210°F)SteamTunnelisincreased5.0°Fsotemperaturewillbe142.5°Fwhichisbelowmaxnorm(160°F)BasedonthisONEareaisaboveMAXSAFEandwithincreaseinHPCIRoomradto65.65(indicationofprimarysystemdischargingtosecondarycontainment)EOPflowchartrequirestepsSCT-1throughSC-6.10CFR55.43(b)(5)SROJustification:ThisquestionmeetsES-401Attachment2requirementstobeSRO-OnlybecauseansweringthisquestionrequiresspecificknowledgeofEOPSecondaryContainmentControl,itisnotrelatedtoimmediateactionsandtheentryconditionsarenotrelevantorleadingtotheanswer.Theanswertothisquestionsisbasedonassessingplantconditions(MaxSafeorMaxNorm)andthentakingactionbasedontherequirementsofEOPSecondaryContainmentControl.DistactorExplanation:Distractorareincorrectandplausablebasedonknowingvaluesformaxsafe/normandrequiredactionsofEOP.ReferenceInformation:29.100.01SH5PlantProcedures29.100.01SH5NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2290001A2.Abilityto(a)predicttheimpactsofthefollowingontheSECONDARYCONTAINMENT;and(b)basedonthosepredictions,useprocedurestocorrect,control,ormitigatetheconsequencesofthoseabnormalconditionsoroperations:290001A2.05Highareatemperature.10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.43(b)(5)Assessmentoffacilityconditionsandselectionofappropriateproceduresduringnormal,abnormal,andemergencysituations.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:HighNewSelectedforEarlyReview(NRC)SRO2017ILOWrittenPage:191of207Question93 94Points:1.00Difficulty:2.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:BANKWhichofthefollowingjobfunctionsistheresponsibilityoftheRefuelFloorSupervisorduringarefuelingoutage?A.MaintaincontrolofpersonnelenteringtheRefuelFloor.B.Providetheleadresponsibilityforallfuelmovementinstructionsandplans.C.DetermineifanevacuationisneccessarywheneveraCAMorARMalarms.D.ActasReactivityManagementSROduringControlRodtestinginacellthatcontainsfuel.Answer: D2017ILOWrittenPage:192of207Question94 AnswerExplanation:RefuelFloorSupervisorisanSROresponsibility.MOP13statesthat,duringarefuelingoutage,theRefuelFloorSupervisorshallbeontheRefuelFloorduringfuelmovements,andintheControlRoom(asReactivityManagementSRO)duringcontrolrodtestinginacellthatcontainsfuel

.10CFR55.43(b)(7)SROJustification:ThisquestionmeetsES-401Attachment2requirementstobeSRO-OnlybecausethisquestionisaboutarefuelfloorSROresponsiblitythatisNOTashareresponsibiltywithanRO.DistracterExplanation:Alldistractorsareplausiblebecausetheyareallfunctions/responsibilitiesperformedduringrefuelingoutages.AistheresponsibilityoftheRefuelFloorCoordinator.B.isafunctionoftheSupervisor,ReactorEngineering.C.istheresponsibilityofRadiationProtectionReferenceInformation:MOP13Section3.2.1QuestionCognitiveLevelKnowledgePlantProceduresMOP13QuestionUseILONUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.1.35Knowledgeofthefuel-handlingresponsibilitiesofSROs10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.43(b)(7)Fuelhandlingfacilitiesandprocedures.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:BankLowSRO2017ILOWrittenPage:193of207Question94 95Points:1.00Difficulty:2.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:BANKNightOrdersareissuedbythe__(1)__/delegateforaspecifiedtimewhichwillnotnormallyexceed__(2)__.A.(1)ShiftManager(2)96hoursB.(1)Manager-NuclearOperations(2)48hoursC.(1)ShiftManager(2)48hoursD.(1)Manager-NuclearOperations(2)96hoursAnswer: D2017ILOWrittenPage:194of207Question95 AnswerExplanation:PerMOP013.20.1TheManagerNuclearOperations/delegateshallissueNightOrderstobeineffectfortheperiodoftimespecifiedinthedocument.Thistimemaybeupto,butshouldnotnormallyexceed,96hours.10CFR55.43(b)(5)SROJustification:ThisquestionmeetsES-401Attachment2requirementstobeSRO-OnlybecauseansweringthisquestionrequiresspecificknowledgeofMOP01itisnotrelatedtoimmediateactionsandtheentryconditionsarenotrelevantorleadingtotheanswer.Theanswertothisquestionsisbasedonknowledgeofadministrativeproceduresthatspecifynormalprocedures.DistracterExplanation:ShiftManagerisaplausibledistractor,andatimelimitof48hoursisreasonable.ReferenceInformation:MOP01,section3.20.1PlantProceduresMOP03-ConductOfOperationsNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.1.15Knowledgeofadministrativerequirementsfortemporarymanagementdirectives,suchasstandingorders,nightorders,operationsmemos,etc.10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.43(b)(5)Assessmentoffacilityconditionsandselectionofappropriateproceduresduringnormal,abnormal,andemergencysituations.NRCExamUsageILO2012ExamILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:BankLowSRO2017ILOWrittenPage:195of207Question95 96Points:1.00Difficulty:2.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:BANKItisMarch,andtheplantisoperatingat100%power.TheCSScallstoreportweatherconditionswillresultinsustainedwindsof43-48mphandgusts>60mph.InaccordancewithPSAandMaintenanceRuleOn-LineRiskManagementGuidelines,thePSAModelEventshouldbemanuallyadjustedtoaccountforthechangingsystemconditions.Theappropriateconditionis___(1)___,andtheEOOSAdjustmentFactorshouldbeincreasedto___(2)___.A.(1)HighWindAdvisory(2)ElevatedB.(1)HighWindAdvisory(2)HighC.(1)HighWindWatch/Warning(2)ElevatedD.(1)HighWindWatch/Warning(2)HighAnswer: D2017ILOWrittenPage:196of207Question96 AnswerExplanation:PerMMRAPPHSectionCIntheeventthatconditionsarisethathaveormayhaveanadverseimpactonaninitiatingevent,itisprudenttomanipulatethePSAmodeltoaccountfortheseconditions.ThisrequiresmanualadjustmentofthefrequencyofoneormoreoftheinitiatingeventsassumedtooccurinthePSAmodel.BasedonthistheSROwouldneedtoevaluatewindconditionsinthetablelistedinSectionCandfindthefollowingresults:ForCondition:HighWindWatch/Warning(sustainedwinds>40mph,windgusts>58mph).InitiatingEventImpacted:LossofOffsitePowerEOOSFrequencyAdjustmentIncreasetoHigh10CFR55.43(b)(5)SROJustification:ThisquestionmeetsES-401Attachment2requirementstobeSRO-Onlybecauseansweringthisquestionrequiresspecificknowledgeofactionsrequiredbyaconductmanual,itisnotrelatedtoimmediateactionsandtheentryconditionsarenotrelevantorleadingtoanswer.Theanswertothisquestionsisbasedonassessingplantconditions(windspeed)andthenselectingaproceduresectiontowithwhichtoproceed.DistractorExplanation:DistractercombinationsareincorrectandplausiblebasedoninterpretationthetableinMMRAPPHSectionC.ReferenceInformation:MMRAPPHSectionCPlantProceduresMMRAppendixHOnlineCoreDamageRiskManagementGuidelinesNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.2.17Knowledgeoftheprocessformanagingmaintenanceactivitiesduringpoweroperations,suchasriskassessments,workprioritization,andcoordinationwiththetransmissionsystemoperator10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.43(b)(5)Assessmentoffacilityconditionsandselectionofappropriateproceduresduringnormal,abnormal,andemergencysituations.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamLOR2009ExamLOR2015ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:BankHighSRO2017ILOWrittenPage:197of207Question96 97Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:BANKTheplantisrunningatratedpowerwiththeHPCIsysteminoperable.Whileperforming24.137.01,OPERABILITYOF480VSWINGBUS72CFAUTOMATICTHROWOVERSCHEME,thethrowoverfailedtooccurwhentheAutoThrowoverPermissiveTestswitchatBus72C,Position1AwastakentoCLOSE.TheSROhasenteredTechSpec3.0.3.MaintenancepersonnelhavesubmittedFormMMA26001,TROUBLESHOOTINGDATASHEET,forapprovalwiththefollowinginformation:ThetroubleshootingboundaryisBus72C,Position1AcubicleplaneAflashlightmustbreakthecubicleplanetoperformanadequatevisualinspectionbasedonorientationBasedontheinformationgiven,whatistheLOWESTlevelofapprovalrequired?A.ControlRoomNSOB.ControlRoomSupervisorC.ShiftManagerD.MaintenanceManagerAnswer: B2017ILOWrittenPage:198of207Question97 AnswerExplanation:MMA26EnclosureCdesignatesthisactivitytobe'CategoryC'basedonitbeing'HighRisk'andtheRigorMatrix.TheRigorMatrixallowsCategoryCbasedonVisualInspectionwithbarrierintrusion.CategoryCcanbeapprovedbyanSRO.DistractorExplanation:A.TheControlRoomLNOCANNOTapprovetheTroubleshootingdatasheet.TheyareonlyrequiredtobeROlicensed.C/D.TheMaintenanceManagerandSMCANapprovetheTroubleshootingdatasheet,buttheyarenottheLOWESTlevel.MMapprovalisrequiredforCategoriesA/B.ReferenceInformation:MMA26EnclCPlantProceduresMMA26-TroubleshootingTECHSPECSNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.2.20Knowledgeoftheprocessformanagingtroubleshootingactivities.10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.43(b)(5)Assessmentoffacilityconditionsandselectionofappropriateproceduresduringnormal,abnormal,andemergencysituations.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:BankHighSRO2017ILOWrittenPage:199of207Question97 98Points:1.00Difficulty:2.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:NEWTheEmergencyDirectorwillmakeaProtectiveActionRecommendation(PAR)decisionbasedonanestimateofradiationexposureof__(1)__or__(2)__thatanindividualmemberofthePUBLICmightreceive.A.(1)TEDE1rem(2)AdultThyroid5remB.(1)TEDE1rem(2)AdultThyroid10remC.(1)TEDE5rem(2)AdultThyroid5remD.(1)TEDE5rem(2)AdultThyroid10remAnswer: A2017ILOWrittenPage:200of207Question98 AnswerExplanation:PerEP-545:PARdecisionisbasedonanestimateofradiationexposureanindividualmightreceiveoveraprojectedperiodincomparisontoaProtectiveActionGuideline(PAG).PAGvaluesareasfollows:TEDE1remAdultThyroid5rem10CFR55.43(b)(4)SROJustification:ThisquestionmeetsES-401Attachment2requirementstobeSRO-OnlybecausethisquestionisaboutradiationvaluesusedforaSROresponsibilitytodetermineaPARthatisNOTashareresponsibilitywithanROorarevaluesthatarerequiredtobeknownbytheROforradiologicalsafetystaytimes.DistracterExplanation:DistracterareincorrectandplausiblebecausevaluesarefromotherradiologicallimitsReferenceInformation:EP-545Section4.3.2ILO2017ExamNotes:Questionisaboutlimitsinrelationtoanemergencyandpublicdose.WhileNGETknowlegdeofdoselimitsareknowntoradworkers,radworkersdonotknowPARsandhowdoseisrelatedtoPARs.Dosenumbersfordistractorsarecommonnumbersusedinrelationtodoselimits,tomakethemplausible.PlantProceduresEP-545NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.3.4Knowledgeofradiationexposurelimitsundernormalandemergencyconditions10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.43(b)(4)Radiationhazardsthatmayariseduringnormalandabnormalsituations,includingmaintenanceactivitiesandvariouscontaminationconditions.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:LowNewSRO2017ILOWrittenPage:201of207Question98 99Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:BANKAfirehasstartedintheH11-P603panelinthecontrolroom.Thefirecouldnotbeextinguishedbycontrolroompersonnel,andpersonnelevacuationhasbeendirected.Themanualscrampushbuttonshavebeendepressed;however,theswitchesmalfunctioned,andthereactordidnotscram.WhichoneofthefollowingdescribesthealternateactionswhichshallbedirectedbytheCRStoshutdownthereactorforthegivenconditionsduringthefire?A.PlacetheModeSwitchinShutdown.B.TurnOffcircuits5&6fromDistCab2PA-2and2PB-2C.De-energizebothPowerRangeNeutronMonitoringsystemsfromtheRPSpowerpanelintheDCMCCarea.D.Fullyde-energizeallRPSsystemloadsfromtheRPSpowerpanelintheDCMCCarea.Answer: C2017ILOWrittenPage:202of207Question99 AnswerExplanation:Afireinthecontrolroom(Zone12)wouldrequireentryintoprocedure20.000.18,CONTROLOFTHEPLANTFROMTHEDEDICATEDSHUTDOWNPANELasdirectedfromprocedure20.000.22,PLANTFIRES.Thefirstactiontoscramthereactorusingthemanualscrampushbuttonsisthepreferredmethodinaccordancewith20.000.18.De-energizingbothpowerrangeneutronmonitoringsystemsfromtheRPSpowerpanelintheDCMCCareaisthealternatemethoddirected.10CFR55.43(b)(5)SROJustification:ThisquestionmeetsES-401Attachment2requirementstobeSRO-OnlybecauseansweringthisquestionrequiresspecificknowledgeofAOP20.000.18,itisnotrelatedtoimmediateactionsandtheentryconditionsarenotrelevantorleadingtotheanswer.Theanswertothisquestionsisbasedonassessingplantconditions(plantdamage)andthenthecorrectmitigatingactiontotake.DistractorExplanation:A.isincorrectbutplausiblebecauseplacingthemodeswitchinshutdownwouldbeareasonablealternatemethodwhichwouldscramthereactor.Fortheconditionsgiveninthestem,thisactionwouldnotbeappropriateandnotdirectedbythecontrollingprocedure20.000.18.B.isincorrectbutplausiblebecausethisactionisdirectedtoremovepowertotheSRVstoprecludeanuncontrolledRPVblowdownduetospuriousactuationofSRVs(PromptOpertorAction).D.isincorrectbutplausiblebecausethisactionisdirectedasanotheralternatemethodofreactorshutdownforcontrolroomevacuation,butnotasaresultofafire.Thisactionisdirectedby20.000.19,CONTROLOFTHEPLANTFROMTHEREMOTESHUTDOWNPANEL.Thisactionwouldalsocausecontainmentisolation,complicatingtheactionsrequiredby20.000.18.ReferenceInformation:20.000.18ConditionB.1PlantProcedures20.000.1820.000.1920.000.22NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.4.25Knowledgeoffireprotectionprocedures.10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(10)Administrative,normal,abnormal,andemergencyoperatingproceduresforthefacility.10CFR55.43(b)(5)Assessmentoffacilityconditionsandselectionofappropriateproceduresduringnormal,abnormal,andemergencysituations.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:BankHighSRO2017ILOWrittenPage:203of207Question99 100Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEWFollowingatransientinwhichRPVleveldroppedbelowthetopofactivefuel(TAF),plantconditionsareasfollows:RPVlevelisbeingcontrolledat197inches.ALLControlRodsareinserted.ContainmentVentingisbeingperformedtomaintainTorusPressurebelowthePrimaryContainmentPressureLimit.ContainmentHighRangeRadiationMonitorsindicate2000R/hr,20minutesafterthescram.InaccordancewithEP-101,whichONEofthefollowingEmergencyActionLevelsisappropriatebasedsolelyonFissionProductBarrierDegradation?A.None.B.AlertFA1.1-AnyLossORAnyPotentialLossofEITHERFuelCladORReactorCoolantSystem.C.SiteAreaEmergencyFS1.1-LossORPotentialLossofAnyTwoBarriers.D.GeneralEmergencyFG1.1-LossofAnyTwoBarriersANDPotentialLossofThirdBarrierAnswer: C2017ILOWrittenPage:204of207Question100 AnswerExplanation:PerEP-101,EnclB2017ILOWrittenPage:205of207Question100 10CFR55.43(b)(5)SROJustification:ThisquestionmeetsES-401Attachment2requirementstobeSRO-OnlybecauseansweringthisquestionrequiresspecificknowledgeofEmergencyClassifactionfromEP-101,itisnotrelatedtoimmediateactionsandtheentryconditionsarenotrelevantorleadingtotheanswer.Theanswertothisquestionsisbasedonassessingplantconditions(plantdamage)andthenselectingthecorrectsectionofEP-101touse.DistractorExplanation:DistractorsareincorrectandplausiblebasedonapplyingEP-101,EnclBReferenceInformation:EP-101,EnclBPlantProceduresEP-101NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.4.41Knowledgeoftheemergencyactionlevelthresholdsandclassifications10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.43(b)(5)Assessmentoffacilityconditionsandselectionofappropriateproceduresduringnormal,abnormal,andemergencysituations.NRCExamUsageILO2017ExamILO2017NRCQuestionUse:HighNewSRO2017ILOWrittenPage:206of207Question100 2017ILOWrittenPage:207of207Question100