05000361/FIN-2011010-04
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Evaluate the Effects of Fuse Resistance and High Energy Line Break Conditions on Control Circuit Voltage. |
| Description | The team identified a Green noncited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, which states in part: Measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. Specifically, as of July 22, 2011, the licensee failed to incorporate the fuse resistance, fuse clips resistance, and cable temperature and resistance effects (for Auxiliary Feedwater High Energy Line Breaks only), into Calculations E4C-084 and E4C-085, for degraded voltage conditions. This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Nuclear Notification NN-201546570 and NN-201550186. The team determined that the failure to fully evaluate the circuit load in determining design limits in electrical calculations for degraded voltage conditions was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the mitigating systems cornerstone attribute of design control, and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the team determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not represent a design issue resulting in the loss of function, did not represent an actual loss of a system safety function, did not result in exceeding a Technical Specification allowed outage time, and did not affect external event mitigation. Specifically, the licensee performed subsequent preliminary analyses which demonstrated that the control circuits, where marginal voltage was available, would function as required to mitigate an accident. This finding did not have a crosscutting aspect because the most significant contributor did not reflect current licensee performance. |
| Site: | San Onofre  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000361/2011010 Section 1R21 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2011 (2011Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.21 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Watkins R Kopriva S Pindale T Farnholtz W Sherbin S Kobylarz |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - San Onofre - IR 05000361/2011010 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (San Onofre) @ 2011Q3
Self-Identified List (San Onofre)
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