05000361/FIN-2011004-01
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Finding | |
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Title | Failure to Maintain Emergency Core Cooling System Valves in Required Positions |
Description | The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.5.1.1.a for the failure of operations personnel to maintain valves in positions required by procedures. The inspectors observed a drain valve, required to be closed by procedure, to be less than fully closed during a partial walk down of the Unit 2 high pressure safety injection system. Specifically, prior to August 17, 2011, operations personnel failed to implement instructions for filling, venting, draining, startup, shutdown, and changing modes of operation for emergency core cooling systems as written to ensure that high pressure safety injection system suction line drain valve 1204MR096 was in the required position. A plant equipment operator verified that the valve was returned to the required position and promptly informed the control room of the out-of-position valve. This issue was entered into the licenseei12s corrective action program as Nuclear Notification NN 201608017. The performance deficiency is more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern and is therefore a finding. Specifically, if seismic class I valves continue to be mispositioned, safety-related plant systems may be unable to accomplish their safety functions after an accident. This finding is associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 i12 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the inspectors determined this finding to be of very low safety significance because it did not result in the loss of a system safety function, did not represent the loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its allowed outage time, did not result in the loss of safety function of any non-technical specification equipment, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating events. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the resources component because the licensee failed to ensure procedures for operation of Keratest valves were adequate |
Site: | San Onofre |
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Report | IR 05000361/2011004 Section 1R04 |
Date counted | Sep 30, 2011 (2011Q3) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.04 |
Inspectors (proximate) | R Lantz J Reynoso G Warnick E Ruesch S Achen |
CCA | H.7, Documentation |
INPO aspect | WP.3 |
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Finding - San Onofre - IR 05000361/2011004 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (San Onofre) @ 2011Q3
Self-Identified List (San Onofre)
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