Semantic search

At 0344 hrs. EDT, the licensee declared an Alert under Emergency Action Level HA.1. The initiating event was a pegged high off gas ventilation effluent radiation monitor and inability to obtain a confirmatory sample within 15 minutes. Only the gaseous channel failed high. The particulate and iodine channels remained reading normally. When plant chemistry technicians were able to obtain samples (an initial and back-up), they were negative with no activity greater than background detected. The plant management and operations team is currently evaluating their exit strategy for the Alert. The plant remains stable at 100% power, operating at normal operating parameters. The NRC entered monitoring mode at 0438 hrs. in response to this event. Notified DOC (Outlaw), DOE (Wyatt), USDA (Brzostek), EPA(NRC) (Baumgartner), and HHS (Phillips). The NRC Resident Inspector was notified and is present in the control room.

• * * UPDATE FROM RALPH DAVIS TO JEFF ROTTON AT 0907 HRS ON 07/20/04 * * *

The licensee terminated the Alert at 0901 hrs. EDT. The basis for the termination was that samples taken at the site boundary were negative, samples taken locally at the skid indicated no activity, and the licensee determined that the radiation monitor equipment was faulted. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified by the licensee. The licensee notified the State of Ohio (Collins), Ashtabula County, OH, Geauga County, OH and Lake County, OH. The NRC exited monitoring mode at 0914 hrs. EDT. The NRC Operations Center notified DHS (Everett), FEMA (Biscoe), DOE (Smith), EPA(NRC) (Jones), USDA (Comeau), HHS (Molina), HQPAO (Brenner), DOC (Outlaw) and RIVDO (Farnholtz).

• * * RETRACTION FROM MEADE TO CROUCH AT 1637 EDT ON 9/10/04 * * *

The following retraction was received from the licensee via facsimile: Update to Emergency Plan Alert Event Notification 40882 Retraction This is a follow-up notification to inform the NRC that Perry Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP) is retracting an Alert Emergency Declaration reported on July 20, 2004. Emergency Action Level HA.1, 'Any unplanned release of gaseous radioactivity to the environment that exceeds 200 times the ODCM (Offsite Dose Calculation Manual) Control limit for 15 minutes or greater', was entered based on an invalid reading due to a failed instrument. The Offgas Vent Pipe Gaseous Radiation Monitor had pegged offscale high. The post-accident high range Offgas Vent Pipe Gaseous Radiation Monitor, which monitors the same process stream, had started in response to the offscale reading and was indicating low, which did not correspond to the offscale readings. The radiation monitors for Offgas pre-treatment and post treatment process streams were both reading normally for the plant conditions. Other plant and process radiation monitors, post accident high range monitors, and area radiation monitors did not indicate increased radiation levels to support the off-scale Offgas Vent Pipe Gaseous Radiation Monitor. Aside from the one offscale radiation monitor, there were no corresponding indications that there was a release in progress. The Shift Manager took actions based on the offscale reading. In addition to the radiation monitor reading, the entry criteria for the Emergency Action Level (EAL) required entry into an Alert, unless gaseous effluent levels were verified by chemistry sample analysis methods to be less than the ODCM limits within 15 minutes. These results were not provided within 15 minutes, therefore the Shift Manager declared the Alert. Troubleshooting confirmed that the Offgas Vent Pipe Gas instrument reading was invalid. The Emergency Plan directs classification of events based on valid indications. At no time was there any unplanned release that would have required taking any emergency plan actions. Therefore, the entry criteria in the EAL were not met and the Alert emergency classification is being retracted. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector of this retraction. Notified NRREO (Reis), R3DO (Hills) and IRD (Nieh).

A surveillance test was being performed on the Emergency Recirc vent System and all six dampers on both trains failed to stroke in the required Tech. Spec. times. Therefore, both trains of the Emergency Recirc Vent System were declared inoperable and the plant entered T.S. 3.0.3. The LCO action statement requires the plant to be in mode 2 in 7 hours and mode 3 in the following six hours and mode 4 in the following 24 hours. They are currently troubleshooting the problem. The NRC resident Inspector was notified HOO Note: see event 41085

• * * UPDATE ON 10/02/04 AT 1940 EDT FROM FREDERICK SMITH TO GERRY WAIG * * *

Update to (Event) Notifications 41084 and 41085: At 1840 (EDT) on 10/02/04 it was determined that the apparent slow response times of the Control Room Emergency Recirculation (CRER) dampers was due to a malfunctioning relay in the initiation circuit, not due to failure of the dampers. The LCO actions associated with the CRER system were exited and the actions associated with the initiation instrument were entered. Therefore the plant is no longer required to shutdown per T.S. 3.0.3. The plant shutdown has been terminated. Plant power will be returned to 100%. The licensee has notified the NRC resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Thomas Kozak).

• * * RETRACTION FROM KEN MEADE TO BILL HUFFMAN ON 10/25/04 AT 1433 EDT * * *

At 1300 on 10/02/04, results of a surveillance indicated that dampers in both trains of the Control Room Emergency Recirculation System (CRERS) were slower than allowed by Technical Specifications (TS) requiring both trains of the CRERS to be declared inoperable. With both trains inoperable, Technical Specification 3.0.3 was entered which required a plant shutdown. The shutdown was commenced at 1500. This condition was reported as required in Event Notification 41085. Additionally, with both CRERS trains inoperable, this condition was determined to be reportable as a loss of safety function (accident mitigation) and was reported as required in Event Notification 41084. Subsequently, it was determined that the failure was the result of a defective time delay relay in the radiation monitor initiation circuit. Other inputs that would have caused the dampers to reposition in an accident were not impacted. The appropriate TS (3.3.7.1), for the radiation monitor, was entered and TS 3.0.3 was exited. The significant actions required by this TS were to restore the function within 7 days or place the system in emergency recirculation. It did not require entry into an action to shutdown. When this condition was identified, TS 3.0.3 was exited, the shutdown was terminated, and the plant was restored to full power. Since a TS required shutdown was not required, Event Notification 41085 is being retracted. The condition was also reported as a loss of safety function for the accident mitigation function of CRERS. The CRERS is automatically activated by a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) signal or a Control Room Ventilation (CRV) high radiation signal. The LOCA instrumentation circuitry was not affected by the defective time delay relay and thus the damper stroke times were not impacted. The CRV airborne radiation monitor signal is considered a "diverse" signal to the LOCA signal. Since the LOCA signal would have properly initiated the CRERS and the CRV high radiation signal is redundant, there was no loss of safety function. Since there was no loss of safety function, Event Notification 41084 is being retracted. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. NRC R3DO(Gardner) has been notified.

At 1054 EST on 11/04/04, the licensee declared an Unusual Event due to an acidic water spray in the Water Treatment Building affecting normal access. Licensee entered EAL MU-1, Toxic Gas detected within the Protected Area that impacts normal operations. There were two personnel in the building at the time of the leak, one Non-licensed operator and his supervisor. The Non-licensed operator was overcome by fumes and became nauseous and was taken to the onsite dispensary. The non-licensed operator was treated and taken to the local hospital. The supervisor did not seem to be affected, but he has been taken to the onsite dispensary for any necessary treatment. No unplanned release has occurred and no protective action recommendations are applicable at this time. The acidic water spray made contact with a 480 Vac panel in the building and has caused an electrical ground. Equipment in the building that may potentially affect plant operation if damaged are the clearwell pumps. The clearwell pumps supply seal water for the Main Circulating water pumps, and the non vital service water pumps. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and made all state and local government emergency management notifications.

• * * Update on 11/04/04 at 1338 EST by Rick Wiles taken by MacKinnon * * *

Atmospheric conditions in the area have been confirmed to be normal. Slippery conditions and acid hazard still exist on the floor. Licensee is still in an Unusual Event. NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this update. R3DO (S. Burgess) notified.

• * * Update on 11/04/04 at 1512 EST by Rick Wiles taken by MacKinnon * * *

Unusual Event terminated at 1502 EST. Surrounding Counties and the State of Ohio were notified by the licensee that the Unusual Event was terminated. NRC Resident Inspector notified of the termination of the Unusual Event. R3DO (Sonia Burgess), NRR EO (Terry Reis), IRD (Dick Wessman), FEMA (Austin) and DHS (Lee) notified.

During the performance of the High Pressure Core Spray system (HPCS) quarterly pump and valve operability test, the waterleg pump discharge low pressure alarm was unable to be cleared. It was determined that the waterleg pump discharge check valve had failed to open to provide keepfill flow. The HPCS system had been declared (inoperable at 0818 for a planned surveillance activity. At 1109, the low pressure alarm came in as expected, but was not able to be cleared. Subsequent mechanical agitation of the waterleg pump discharge check valve caused the valve to open and the low pressure condition to clear. Tech Spec 3.5.1 is applicable. Entry time 0818 on 12/17/04. Action is to restore HPCS to Operable within 14 days. NRC Resident Inspector was notified.

• * * UPDATE ON 01/05/05 @1211 BY KEN MEADE TO CHAUNCEY GOULD * * * RETRACTION

An 8 hour notification was made on December 17, 2004, in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The report was made due to a potential loss of the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) system safety function as a result of the loss of keep-fill pressure. The water-leg pump discharge check valve was determined to be the most likely cause of the loss of keep-fill pressure and was replaced. A preliminary investigation has determined that the water-leg pump discharge check valve had sufficient corrosion products (on the rising stem) to cause the valve disk to stick. With the check valve not able to fully open, the system low pressure alarm was activated. The lowest system pressure, about 24 psig, was determined to be just below the alarm setpoint of 27 psig. The alarm setpoint includes a 10 psig margin between receipt of the alarm and the pressure at which the piping would start to void. The pressure, 24 psig, was equivalent to the static head provided by the Condensate Storage Tank (CST) to the HPCS system. This alignment is the method used to maintain the system filled when the water-leg pump is unavailable. The 24 psig system pressure was adequate to maintain the system full. Since the system pressure was adequate and the HPCS system was maintained full, the safety function of the system was not adversely affected. Since the safety function was not affected, there is no reportable condition and Event Notification 41269 is retracted. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.

On 5/1/05 at 19:16, the plant entered MODE 2 and began a reactor startup. After withdrawing control rods, but prior to criticality, perturbations were noticed on reactor vessel level indications and control rod withdrawal was halted. At 22:32 control rods were inserted in reverse order to maintain the reactor subcritical. At that time, level instrumentation associated with the 'A' level reference leg was declared inoperable. All control rods were inserted at 23:02 in Mode 2. At 23:32 on 5/1/05 a 12 hour shutdown statement was entered due to the inoperable level instrumentation. Efforts were underway to troubleshoot and restore the level Instrumentation. On 5/2/05 at 06:11 the reactor mode switch was placed in shutdown - level instrumentation will not be restored within the time allowed by Technical Specifications. Instrument fill and vent procedures are being implemented at this time. The plant expects to enter Mode 2 later today. Technical specification 3.3.6.1 requires restoration within one hour, shutdown within 12 hours. This reference leg level affects both the wide and narrow range level instruments and feed into the Reactor Protective System, Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation, and Isolation Instrumentation systems. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

• * * RETRACTION ON 6/3/05 AT 12:02 FROM PERRY'S COMPLIANCE SUPERVISOR (KEN MEADE) TO ABRAMOVITZ * * *

Update to Event Notification (EN 41657) Retraction: A 4-hour notification was made on May 2, 2005, in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i), for a shutdown required by Technical Specifications. The report was made due to inserting all withdrawn control rods during a startup, prior to criticality, for Technical Specification 3.3.6.1 required actions. Technical Specification 3.3.6.1 was entered as a result of level perturbations determined to have been caused by reference leg keep-fill system operation when the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) was under vacuum conditions with minor component compression fitting leaks. Actions were taken to fix the minor leaks in the reference leg keep-fill panel. Additionally, the reference leg keep-fill system was removed from service until the RPV was pressurized. It was subsequently determined that since the reactor had not yet been taken critical, the reactor was in a shutdown condition. Per NUREG-1022, rev 2, section 3.2.1 'Plant Shutdown Required by Technical Specifications,' the 'initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown' does not include mode changes required by TS if initiated after the plant is already in a shutdown condition. Since the plant remained in a shutdown condition, this issue is not reportable. Since the condition is not reportable. EN 41657 is retracted. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R3DO (Burgess) has been notified.

This event is being reported as 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. A postulated fire water system line break did not take into consideration the movement of a fire door boundary. Consequently, the break may affect safe shutdown of the plant. The door boundary was moved in May 1999. While assessing a calculation to update fire pump curves (CR 04-00422-04) it was found that the calculation does not appear to have been updated for the tornado depressurization event modifications (DCP 99-05014). Specifically, door DG-112 was moved to the control complex wall from the diesel generator wall. This door movement isolates the rattle space that was previously credited as a relief path for this internal flood. A full break is postulated for this line as the result of a safe shutdown earthquake. As the result of the postulated pipe break, both fire protection pumps are expected to auto start resulting in a break flow rate into the hallway of approximately 6,000 gpm. Standard Perry design practice is to assume a 30 minute duration for the pipe break flow isolation unless justified otherwise. The line in question was isolated at 2027 on 10/21/05. The valves are being maintained closed under administrative controls. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

• • • • RETRACTION ON 10/28/05 AT 1748 EDT FROM H. KELLY TO P. SNYDER ****

An 8-hour notification was made on October 24, 2005 under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. The report was made due to a postulated break for a non-safety non-seismic fire water pipe that could possibly affect safe shutdown of the plant. An evaluation was completed on October 28, 2005. This evaluation confirmed that the current plant configuration is consistent with the design basis. The evaluation used for the original event notification assumed a full break of the involved piping. Perry design basis for this moderate energy system is a leakage crack. The postulated leakage from the crack in the piping remains within design basis and does not significantly degrade plant safety. Since Perry remains in compliance with design basis and there is no unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety, there is no reportable condition. Therefore, ENF 42072 is retracted. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Lipa).

At 1506 EST, Operators heard a loud noise and discovered that a bearing in the Motor Control Switchgear in the Miscellaneous Equipment Area Return Fan "B" had failed. The Plant Fire Brigade responded and extinguished the fire. Offsite assistance was requested and did respond. No injuries were reported and all personnel have been accounted for. A reflash watch has been posted. The licensee will remain in the Alert awaiting completion of the ventilation transfer to the "A" train. The licensee notified state/local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector.

• * * UPDATE AT 1740 EST FROM KEN MEADE TO S. SANDIN * * *

At 1740 EST, the licensee terminated the Alert based on the fire being out and the plant stable. The licensee plans to issue a press release. Notified R3DO(Lanksbury), EO(Wermiel), IRD(Leach) and NRR ET(Dyer). Notified DHS SWO(Marianne), FEMA(Barden), DOE(DaSilva), HHS(Lt. Kleiman), USDA(Jimenez) and NRC-EPA(Crews).

A loss of instrument air caused a transient in feed system causing a lowering Hot Surge Tank Level. The Reactor was manually scrammed when Reactor Feed Booster Pumps were cavitating. Control Rod 42-55 did not insert on the initial scram. Control Rod 42-55 did insert when ARI was manually initiated. The loss of instrument air was the result of an air line rupture, and the licensee is steaming to the condenser while maintaining vessel level with feedwater. There was no ECCS injection, and the licensee is investigating the cause of the line rupture. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

• * * UPDATE AT 0814 ON 12/13/2006 FROM MICHAEL BROGAN TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

This update is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(c)(2) to immediately report the results of ensuing evaluations or assessments of plant conditions, the effectiveness of response or protective measures taken, and information related to plant behavior that is not understood. On December 13, 2006, at 0549 hours, the Perry Nuclear Power Plant notified the NRC Operations Center (Event Number 43049) of a manual Reactor Protection System actuation associated with a loss of instrument air. In the initial report, it was stated that control rod 42-55 did not insert on the initial scram, but did insert when Alternate Rod Insertion was manually initiated. Subsequently, reactor engineering review of control rod performance during the event determined that the control rod scram time for control rod 4255 was satisfactory and that the problem was with the control rod indication. The plant remains stable at this time. Control rod indication has two channels. Control rod 42-55 displayed one fully inserted indication and one blinking green indication (i.e. not fully inserted). When the system was reset, all rods indicated fully inserted with a "00" position indication. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R3DO (Lara).

An automatic reactor scram occurred due to lowering reactor water level. Digital feedwater tuning activities were in progress at the time of the scram. All systems functioned as designed. The reactor water level has been restored to normal level band. The plant is stable in Hot Shutdown. There were no ECCS injections. At the time of the scram, the feedwater pump was in manual control for feedwater tuning. When water level started going down quickly, the operator was not able to restore sufficient feedwater flow before the level 3 (water level low) actuation. All control rods fully inserted on the scram. No valves repositioned and no safety or relief valves lifted after the scram. Reactor water level is being maintained with the motor feed pump and decay heat is being removed to the main condenser. The plant is in the normal shutdown electrical lineup. Reactor pressure is 509 psi and stable. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

• * * UPDATE FROM FREDERICK SMITH TO FANGIE JONES ON 05/17/07 AT 1301 * * *

This call is to clarify information provided in notification Event Number 43363 made by the Perry Nuclear Power Plant on May 15, 2007. The second paragraph, fourth sentence of the notification states: 'No valves repositioned and no safety or relief valves lifted after the scram.' The intent of the portion of the sentence 'No valves repositioned' was supposed to be in reference to the reporting requirement in 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv) to report any event or condition that results in valid actuation of general containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system or multiple main steam isolation valves (MSIVs).

The event on May 15, 2007, did not meet the 'containment isolation valves in more than one system / MSIVs criterion', however, subsequent review of the event identified that Residual Heat Removal 'B' Heat Exchanger Second Vent to Suppression Pool Containment Isolation Valve 1E12-F073B, closed, as designed, in response to the reactor coolant level 3 (water level low) condition that was present during the event. No additional reporting criteria have been identified and this update has been provided to clarify the earlier statement. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." Notified R3 RDO, (Ring), and NRR EO, (Ross Lee).

At 1550 hours, a self identification call was made to the State of Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), offices in Columbus, Ohio to inform them of the recent discovery of non-compliance issues relating to the accumulation, storage, and shipment (i.e., 90 days to ship) of hazardous waste (reference 40 CFR 261, 'Identification and Listing of Hazardous Waste'). Guidance was requested from the state EPA for remediation and reporting of the condition. The Perry Nuclear Power Plant personnel were advised by the Ohio EPA to properly identify, package and ship the waste as soon as possible. The waste consists of three drums of floor grinding waste generated during the resurfacing of the Auxiliary Building floor in 2005, and approximately 100 bags of miscellaneous trash generated during disassembly of plant equipment in 2007. This issue was discovered during activities to prepare the waste for shipment off site. The waste will be shipped per the direction of the Ohio EPA and an out-of-cycle hazardous waste annual report will be made to the Ohio EPA. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) as an event or situation related to the protection of the environment for which a notification to another government agency has been made. The resident inspector has been notified. The hazardous material contains low level rad waste.

• * * UPDATE FROM RICHARD O'CONNOR TO HOWIE CROUCH @ 1334 HRS EDT ON 6/03/08 * * *

On March 31, 2008, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), notification was made for an event or situation related to the protection of the environment for which a notification to another government agency was made. This report was made when a self-identification call was made to the State of Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) offices in Columbus, Ohio, for the discovery of potential non-compliance issues with 40 CFR 261 requirements for the accumulation, storage, and shipment of hazardous waste. Based on further investigation using a Toxicity Characterization Leachate Procedure analysis of the waste, it was determined that the waste was, in fact, non-hazardous and could be shipped for off-site disposal. The requirements of 40 CFR 261 had been and continue to be met. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State of Ohio. Notified R3DO ( Pelke).

The Perry Nuclear Power Plant will be taking the ERDS out of service for scheduled maintenance. From approximately 0200 hours EDT, on June 10, 2008, until 2000 hours EDT, on June 10, 2008, personnel will be performing cleaning and inspection activities on the 120 VAC Emergency Response Information System (ERIS) Computer Power Center. During this planned preventive maintenance, the Integrated Computer System, the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS), and the automatic mode calculation of the Computer Aided Dose assessment program (CADAP) will incur approximately two periods of unavailability of approximately two hours each. The unavailability periods are necessary to align a temporary power supply and reconnect the 120 VAC ERIS Computer Power Center upon completion of the activities. The dose assessment function will be maintained during the brief out of service time periods by manual input of data into CADAP and, if required, by manual calculation. In the event of an emergency, plant parameter data will be orally transmitted to the facilities through the Status Board Ring Down circuit with back-up by the Plant Branch Exchange, the Off Premise Exchange, and various redundant intra-facility circuits throughout the emergency facilities. The ability to open and maintain on 'open line' using the Emergency Notification System will not be affected and will be the primary means of transferring plant data to the NRC as a contingency until the ERDS can be returned to service during the two periods of unavailability. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), as a condition that results in a major loss of offsite communications capability. A follow-up notification will be made when the activities are completed and the equipment is restored. The Resident Inspector has been notified.

• * * UPDATE FROM DAVE O'DONNELL TO JOE O'HARA AT 1514 ON 6/10/08 * * *

ERDS is still in service and will not be restored to normal until tomorrow 6/11/08. The scheduled maintenance on the normal power supply today was delayed. Notified R3DO(Lipa)

• * * UPDATE FROM DAVE O'DONNELL TO KARL DIEDERICH AT 1710 ON 6/11/08 * * *

ERDS was on a temporary power supply. ERDS restored to normal power supply at 1650. Notified R3DO (Louden).

This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as a condition that results in a major loss of emergency offsite communications capability. On October 30, 2008, at approximately 0020 hours EDT, 120 VAC non-essential electrical power was lost to the plant computer due to high temperature in the computer room (approximately 80 degrees F). This resulted in the Integrated Computer System (ICS), the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS), and the automatic mode calculation of the Computer Aided Dose Assessment Program (CADAP) being out of service. At 0028 hours, back-up computer room ventilation equipment was placed in service, and at 0040 hours, the electrical system high temperature shutdown was reset with the computer room temperature at 77 degrees F. At 0217 hours, the computer room high temperature alarm was reset with the room at 72 degrees F. The 120 VAC electrical power was restored to the plant computer room at approximately 0245 hours. The ICS, SPDS, and CADAP equipment functions are in process of restoration. Restoration is expected during dayshift hrs. on 10/30/08. A follow up to this notification will be made when ERDS is restored. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

• * * UPDATE FROM DAVE O'DONNELL TO JOE O'HARA AT 1406 EDT ON 10/30/08 * * *

The ERDS system has been tested and restored to service. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R3DO(Kozak).

The Perry Nuclear Power Plant took the Plant Computer out of service for scheduled maintenance which took ERDS out of service. From 0810 hours EST on February 10, 2009 for approximately 6 hours, personnel will be performing maintenance activities on the Plant Computer. During this planned maintenance, the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and the automatic mode calculation of the Computer Aided Dose Assessment Program (CADAP) will be unavailable. In the event of an emergency, plant parameter data will be orally transmitted to the facilities through the Status Board Ring Down circuit with back-up by the Private Branch Exchange, Off Premise Exchange, and various redundant intra-facility circuits throughout the emergency facilities. The dose assessment function will be maintained during the out of service time period by manual input of data into CADAP and, if required, by manual calculation. The ability to open and maintain an 'open line' using the Emergency Notification System will not be affected and will be the primary means of transferring plant data to the NRC as a contingency until the ERDS can be returned to service during the period of unavailability. This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii), as a condition that results in a major loss of offsite communication capability. A follow-up notification will be made when the maintenance activities are completed and the equipment is restored. The (NRC) Resident Inspector has been notified.

• * * UPDATE AT 1250 EST ON 2/10/09 FROM STANLEY TO HUFFMAN * * *

At 1240 EST the licensee returned the plant computer to service. ERDS, CADAP, and SPDS have been restored to operable status. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R3DO (Burgess) has been informed.