Information Notice 1996-71, Licensee Response to Indications of Tampering, Vandalism, or Malicious Mischief

Licensee Response to Indications of Tampering, Vandalism, or Malicious Mischief

ML031050461
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant
Issue date:	12/27/1996
Revision:	0
From:	Martin T T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-96-071, NUDOCS 9612300051
Download: ML031050461 (8)

December 27, 1996

NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 96-71: LICENSEE RESPONSE TO INDICATIONS OFTAMPERING, VANDALISM, OR MALICIOUSMISCHIEF

Addressees

All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power reactors.

Purpose

This information notice is being issued to alert licensees to the benefits of planning aresponse to indications of tampering, vandalism, or malicious mischief. It is expected thatrecipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions,as appropriate. However, suggestions contained in this information notice are not NRCrequirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.

Description of Circumstances

Recent events at operating reactors indicate that some licensee personnel may notrecognize the potential significance of early indications of potential tampering, vandalism,or malicious mischief. As a result, licensee response may be untimely and of limited scopeand depth. Failure to promptly question, resolve the significance and implement anappropriate strategy to mitigate the consequence of a potential tampering, vandalism, ormalicious mischief situation, could leave the plant in a vulnerable state for a significantperiod of time. Lack of detailed planning, procedures, and training frequently plays a rolein the quality of response to these events. Brief accounts of two events illustrate theissue:Improperly Positioned Valve at Beaver ValleyDuring the conduct of a quarterly surveillance on Friday, July 14, 1995, to verify theposition of certain safety-related locked valves; the licensee determined that the servicewater cross-connect valve at the discharge of the recirculation spray heat exchanger wasin the incorrect position (shut in lieu of open), that the chain used to secure the valve inthe proper position had been cut, and that the lock appeared to have been placed back onthe chain in a manner that made it difficult to detect the condition. The licensee's staffinitially assumed the valve had been inadvertently mispositioned during earlier operationalevolutions, but subsequent interviews and analysis were unable to confirm thisassumption. 2I1.1 r?Pfs ITE 0i-1tttt S%-071Z 9017-21 ai41 -A,- _ -[,A_ ,a 0 SQAI 912flfA1--v----60do 'I 11 IT2D4t ICG IN 96-71December 27, 1996 Licensee management first learned of the event on Tuesday, July 18, 1995. Consequ-ently, licensee management was not able to oversee the licensee evaluation of the eventuntil considerable time had elapsed. The licensee's determination that potential tamperingcould not be ruled out was not made until six days after the incorrect valve positionwas identified. Thorough valve lineup checks and locked valve surveillances were notcompleted for both Beaver Valley units until after the plant staff made an emergencynotification system (ENS) call on Thursday evening, July 20, 1995. The similarity of thisevent to an event in the early 1 980s heightened the concern of both licensee and NRCpersonnel who knew of the previous events.Misadjusted Valves and Disabled Locks at St. LucieIn May 1996, St. Lucie personnel identified two pressure-relief valves which, when tested,were found to have pressure setpoints 55 percent and 9 percent above their design values.These valves also had broken wire seals. The root cause could not be determined.Although tampering could not be ruled out, it was concluded that the more likely cause forthe misadjusted valves was poor maintenance. Licensee management decided to alert theSecurity force; however, site Security was not notified. The failure to follow through onalerting site Security precluded coordinated actions of Operations and Security staffs toenhance awareness to other possible tampering events.On July 26, 1996, St. Lucie staff identified nine padlocks and two door locks in vital areasthat were intentionally damaged to inhibit opening the locks. These locks controlledpersonnel access to various pieces of plant equipment. The licensee did not identifykeylock switches as needing to be checked; consequently, these switches were notchecked until August 1996. Although the tampering of components within a vital areaindicated the need to be alert to additional tampering, other than alerting Security, thelicensee failed to consider additional measures to detect tampering. On August 14, 1996,St. Lucie staff identified three additional examples of tampering in vital areas that inhibitedthe opening of locks associated with safety-related equipment.DiscussionThe following factors may have contributed to these events:(1) The licensees' contingency plans required by 10 CFR 73.55(h)(1) and theimplementing procedures required by Appendix C to Part 73 did not adequatelyaddress tampering, vandalism, and malicious mischief. Other licensee procedurestouched some aspects of these situations; however, no plan or process was used toevaluate the potential malevolent event and determine its importance. Factors suchas safety significance, overtness, intent, sophistication of method, and the historyof similar incidents were not considered. Information Notice 83-27, "OperationalResponse to Events Concerning Deliberate Acts Directed Against Plant Equipment,"described events in which licensees were not prepared to assess the situation andtake necessary steps to ensure the operability of systems important to safety ormake decisions concerning continued operation. The information notice indicatedthat guidelines or procedures prepared by the licensee outlining a process of iIN 96-71December 27, 1996 following up on both deliberate and inadvertent acts with respect to plant operationshould be available.(2) The licensees' actions were limited in scope and depth, at least initially, in pursuingthe events.(3) The licensees' Operations staff were not sensitive to abnormalities identified earlierand apparently assumed no malice. Since the Operations staff may be the first toencounter signs of tampering, vandalism, or malicious mischief during its tours andsurveillance activities, sensitivity to precursors plays a key role in timely response toevents of this nature. Therefore, licensees may wish to periodically refresh theirOperations staff's sensitivity to and awareness of the evaluation process to ensureeffective response to these acts.(4) The licensee's Security staff was not told about these problems until well into thesequence of events at St. Lucie. Security's ability to identify the perpetrators andinstitute other protective measures diminishes severely as time elapses.Events of this nature are required by Appendix G to Part 73 of 10 CFR to be reported tothe NRC Operations Center within one hour of discovery.This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have anyquestions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contactslisted below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation project manager.Thomas T. Martin, DirectorDivision of Reactor Program ManagementOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contacts: Loren Bush, NRR(301) 415-2944E-mail: llb(nrc.govDavid Skeen, NRR(301) 415-1174E-mail: dls@nrc.gov

Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information NoticesAM -chrobL~A 4?f-r S W-AttachmentIN 96-71December 27, 1996 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUEDNRC INFORMATION NOTICESInformation Date ofNotice No. Subject Issuance Issued to96-7096-6996-6896-67Year 2000 Effect on ComputerSystem SoftwareOperator Actions AffectingReactivityIncorrect Effective DiaphragmArea Values in Vendor ManualResult in Potential Failureof Pneumatic DiaphragmActuatorsVulnerability of EmergencyDiesel Generators to FuelOil/Lubricating Oil Incom-patibilityRecent MisadministrationsCaused by Incorrect Cali-brations of Strontium-90Eye ApplicatorsUndetected Accumulationof Gas in Reactor CoolantSystem and InaccurateReactor Water LevelIndication During Shutdown12/24/9612/20/9612/19/9612/19/9612/13/9612/11/96All U.S. NuclearRegulatory Commissionlicensees, certificateholders, and registrantsAll holders of OLsor CPs for nuclearpower reactorsAll holders of OLsor CPs for nuclearpower reactorsAll holders of OLsor CPs for nuclearpower reactorsAll U.S. NuclearRegulatory CommissionMedical Use Licenseesauthorized to usestrontium-90 (Sr-90)eye applicatorsAll holders of OLsor CPs for nuclearpower reactors96-6696-65OL = Operating LicenseCP = Construction Permit IN 96-71December 27, 1996 following up on both deliberate and inadvertent acts with respect to plant operationshould be available. t(2) The licensees' actions were limited in scope and depth, at least initially, in pursuingthe events.(3) The licensees' Operations staff were not sensitive to abnormalities identified earlierand apparently assumed no malice. Since the Operations staff may be the first toencounter signs of tampering, vandalism, or malicious mischief during its tours andsurveillance activities, sensitivity to precursors plays a key role in timely response toevents of this nature. Therefore, licensees may wish to periodically refresh theirOperations staff's sensitivity to and awareness of the evaluation process to ensureeffective response to these acts.(4) The licensee's Security staff was not told about these problems until well into thesequence of events at St. Lucie. Security's ability to identify the perpetrator(s) andinstitute other protective measures diminishes severely as time elapses.Events of this nature are required by Appendix G to Part 73 of 10 CFR to be reported tothe NRC Operations Center within one hour of discovery.This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have anyquestions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contactslisted below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation project manager.original signed by D.B. MatthewsThomas T. Martin, DirectorDivision of Reactor Program ManagementOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contacts: Loren Bush, NRR David Skeen, NRR(301) 415-2944 (301) 415-1174E-mail: llb@nrc.gov E-mail: dls@nrc.govTech Editor has reviewed and concurred on 9/27/96

Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information NoticesDOCUMENT NAME: 96-71.INTo receive a copy of this document. hIdlcate I the box: 'C' -Copy w/oattachmentlenclosure 'E' -Copy wfattachmentlenclosure 'N' -No copyOFFICE TECH CONTS I C/PECB:DRPM I D/DRP I INAME LBush* AChaffee* TMartDSkeen* L ' IDATE 10/31/96 11/01/96 12OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

• IN 96-December , 1996 following up on both deliberate and inadvertent acts with respect to plant operationshould be available.(2) The licensees' actions were limited in scope and depth, at least initially, in pursuingthe events.(3) The licensees' Operations staff were not sensitive to abnormalities identified earlierand apparently assumed no malice. Since the Operations staff may be the first toencounter signs of tampering, vandalism, or malicious mischief during its tours andsurveillance activities, sensitivity to precursors plays a key role in timely response toevents of this nature. Therefore, licensees may wish to periodically refresh theirOperations staff's sensitivity to and awareness of the evaluation process to ensureeffective response to these acts.(4) The licensee's Security staff was not told about these problems until well into thesequence of events at St. Lucie. Security's ability to identify the perpetrators andinstitute other protective measures diminishes severely as time elapses.Events of this nature are required by Appendix G to Part 73 of 10 CFR to be reported tothe NRC Operations Center within one hour of discovery.This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have anyquestions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contactslisted below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation project manager.Thomas T. Martin, DirectorDivision of Reactor Program ManagementOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contacts: Loren Bush, NRR David Skeen, NRR(301) 415-2944 (301) 415-1174E-mail: llb@nrc.gov E-mail: dls@nrc.govTech Editor has reviewed and concurred on 9/27/96

Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information NoticesDOCUMENT NAME: G:\DLS\96-XXXTo receive a copy of this document. indicate In the box: 'C -Copy w/oattachment/enclosure WE -Copy wlettachmenlenClosure N -No copyOFFICE TECH CONTS C/PECB:DRPM l D/DRPJ- INAME LBush* AChaffee* Toard nDSkeen1 A a e haWDATE 10/31/96 11/01/96 12/zo /96Al. -r ... -.A In-n n/IU11l.IWAL KLLUKU HUrY 4 t

• IN 96-XXNovember xx, 1996 available. Furthermore, the licensee contingency plans requiredby 10 CFR73.55(h)(1) and the implementing procedures required by Appendix C to Part 73 didnot adequately address tampering, vandalism, and malicious mischief.(2) The licensee actions were limited in scope and depth, at least initially, in pursuing theevents.(3) The Operations staff was not sensitive to abnormalities identified earlier andapparently assumed no malice. Since the Operations staff may be the first toencounter signs of tampering, vandalism, or malicious mischief during its tours andsurveillance activities, sensitivity to precursors plays a key role in timely response toevents of this nature. Therefore, licensees may wish to periodically refresh theirOperations staffs sensitivity to and awareness of the evaluation process to ensureeffective response to these acts.(4) The licensee's Security staff was not told about these problems until well into thesequence of events. Security's ability to identify the perpetrator(s) and institute otherprotective measures diminishes severely as time elapses.Events of this nature are required by Appendix G to Part 73 of 10 CFR to be reported to theNRC Operations Center within one hour of discovery.This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have anyquestions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contactslisted below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Thomas T. Martin, DirectorDivision of Reactor Program ManagementOffice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contact:

Loren Bush, NRR(301) 415-2944E-mail: llb@nrc.govDavid Skeen, NRR(301) 415-1174E-mail: dls@nrc.gov

Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information NoticesDOCUMENT NAME: G:MDLS\IN96-XX.TPRTo receive a copy of this document. hIdicate hI the box: 'C' -Copy w/oattachmenVenclosure 'E' -Copy wlattachmentlenclosure 'N' -No copyOFFICE PECB:DRPM IC PSGB:DRPM C/PSGB:DRPM C/PECB:DRPM , D/DRPMNAME DSkeenZot-C LBush* LCunninghamnM AChaffeeCifv-' TMartinDATE 10/3//96 10/xv/96 10/ /96 1l// /96 3y9 10/ /96-i OFFICIAL RECORD COPY*- pervias 44 1i I K.IN 96-XXOctober xx, 1996 available. Furthermore, the licensee contingency plans requiredby 10 CFR73.55(h)(1) and the implementing procedures required by Appendix C to Part 73 didnot adequately address tampering, vandalism, and malicious mischief.(2) The licensee actions were limited in scope and depth, at least initially, in pursuing theevents.(3) The Operations staff was not sensitive to abnormalities identified earlier andapparently assumed no malice. Since the Operations staff may be the first toencounter signs of tampering, vandalism, or malicious mischief during its tours andsurveillance activities, sensitivity to precursors plays a key role in timely response toevents of this nature. Therefore, licensees may wish to periodically refresh theirOperations staffs sensitivity to and awareness of the evaluation process to ensureeffective response to these acts.(4) The licensee's Security staff was not told about these problems until well into thesequence of events. Security's ability to identify the perpetrator(s) and institute otherprotective measures diminishes severely as time elapses.Events of this nature are required by Appendix G to Part 73 of 10 CFR to be reported to theNRC Operations Center within one hour of discovery.This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have anyquestions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contactslisted below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Thomas T. Martin, DirectorDivision of Reactor Program ManagementOffice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contact:

Loren Bush, NRR(301) 415-2944E-mail: llbenrc.govDavid Skeen, NRR(301) 415-1174E-mail: dIs@nrc.gov

Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information NoticesDOCUMENT NAME: G:IDLSIN96-XX.TPRTo receive a copy of this document,. Indicate i the box: 'C' -Copy w/oattachment/enclosure 'E' -Copy w/attachmenVenclosure 'N' -No copyOFFICE PECB:DRPM -I PSGB:DRPM C/PSWJ RM/ )C/PECB:DRPM I D/DRPMINAME US-keen A50L- ILBush Xx:i' ILCurh&FaIIt V AChaffee TMartinDATE 10/6/4/96 10t796 10 9E -910/ /96 10/ /96OFFICIAL RECORD COPY