ML20078R902
| ML20078R902 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 11/09/1983 |
| From: | Ellis J Citizens Association for Sound Energy |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20078R907 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8311150341 | |
| Download: ML20078R902 (36) | |
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11/ M C UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ._ . ...
'83 NOV.14 All:28 BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD -
I CFFICE CF ECRUM In the Matter of CCCC.'M h SP/ -
I- cri m APPLICATION OF TEXAS UTILITIES I I' Docket Nos. 50-445 GENERATING COMPANY, ET AL. FOR and 50-446' "
AN OPERATING LICENSE FOR I COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC I STATION UNITS #1 AND #2 I.
(CPSES)
INDEX TO CASE'S (1) PARTIAL ANSWER TO BOARD'S 10/25/83 MEMORANDUM (PROCEDURE CONCERNING QUALITY ASSURANCE);
(2) MOTION FOR ADDITIONAL HEARINGS; AND (3) MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDERS Page Overview 1 NEW AND SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION 3 William Dunham's affidavit and request to testify 3 Effect of intimidation on quality of work at Comanche Peak 6 The Lipinsky memorandum 7 Implications of Lipinsky memorandum 9 Motion to call Mr. Lipinsky to testify, under protective order 9 Motion for protective orders for all QC Inspectors who were ever under the supervision of Harry Williams, and in particular all Protective Coatings QC personnel 11 Need to adopt procedure used in Catawba hearings 12 CASE has attempted previously to get the Board to consider problems of intimidation, firing QC inspectors and craftspeople who insist nonconforming items be reported, as well as the pattern of discouraging workers from doing the job right to begin with 13 8311150341 831109 DR ADOCK 050004]
$ 503
Index- Page 2 Page CASE does not believe it is necessary for the Board to 14 be forced into a rushed situation in the first place Overlapping of information herein with ongoing NRC OI investigation -- everyone knows what is going on but the Licensing Board 15 Questions which must be answered 17 DIFFICULTIES WITH THE PROCEDURES CHOSEN BY THE BOARD 18 "Show and tell" difficulties 18 NRC Staff walkdowns 23 Hearings requested on NRC investigation and inspection of Messerly-identified concerns 25 Cygna Report 25 General comments 27 CASE'S MOTIONS 30 Possible postponement of scheduled conference call 32 P
ATTACHMENTS Affidavit of William A. Dunham Attachments: Department of Labor letter, 10/18/83, confirming illegal termination of Mr. Dunham 8-page statement provided to the Department of Labor by Mr. Dunham after his firing Typed copy of Dunham 8-page statement Lipinsky memorandum, 8/8/83, re: Trip Report, visit to Comanche Peak i Inspection Report 83-07/83-04, re: investigation into allegations by QC Protective Coatings Inspectors i
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9 O UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of -
APPLICATION OF TEXAS UTILITIES I I
Docket Nos. 50-445 GENERATING COMPANY, ET AL. FOR and 50-446 AN OPERATING LICENSE FOR I COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC I STATION UNITS #1 AND #2 I (CPSES) I I
CASE'S (1) PARTIAL ANSWER TO BOARD'S 10/25/83 MEMORANDUM (PROCEDURE CONCERNING QUALITY ASSURANCE);
(2) MOTION FOR ADDITIONAL HEARINGS; AND (3) MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDERS CASE (Citizens Association for Sound Energy), Intervenor herein, hereby files this, its (1) Partial Answer to Board's 10/25/83 Memorandum (Procedure Concerning Quality Assurance); (2) Motion for Additional Hearings; and (3)
Motion for Protective Orders, pursuant to the Board's directives and 10 CFR 2.730 and 2.743(a).
Specifically, CASE moves that the Board order additional hearings on:
(1) Intimidation, harassment, and threatening of QC Inspectors and craftspeople; (2) Discouragement from doing the job right to begin with; (3) Concerns raised by CASE witnesses testifying regarding items (1) and (2) and the effect on the quality of work and the safety of the Comanche Peak plant; (4) Open items regarding the Walsh/Doyle Allegations; and (5) Assessment of Applicability of Board Notification 82-105A to Comanche Peak.
We also move that the Board grant a Protective Order for:
(1) J. J. Lipinsky, with 0. B. Cannon Company, ordering Applicants and NRC personnel (including their attorneys) not to contact, talk to, correspond with, or attempt to influence Mr. Lipinsky or anyone connected with him in any way. Should the Board choose to call
, Mr. Lipinsky as a Board witness, CASE should also be included in the provisions of the protective order just as Applicants and NRC personnel are. (See discussion on pages 7-11 herein, and Depart-mental Correspondence QAD-83-0096, dated August 8,1983, to R. B.
Roth from J. J. Lipinsky, attached.)
(2) All Quality Control (QC) Inspectors who were ever under the supervision of Harry Williams, and in particular all Protective Coatings QC personnel, ordering Applicants and NRC personnel (including their attorneys) not to contact, talk to, correspond with, or attempt
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to influence these individuals in any way. (See discussion on pages 11-12 herein, and Affidavit and Attachments thereto of William A. Dunham, attached.)
We also request that the Board make clear to the Applicants that these Protective Orders apply to Applicants and their attorneys in the broad sense ,
of the word, including all contractors, sub-contractors, etc. Further, we ask that the Board order (or, if it is beyond the Board's authority to so order, that it ask the highest level of the NRC's Office of Investigations to cooperate) that no NRC investigator is to contact any of the individuals referenced in (1) and (2) preceding until such time as the Board has had
an opportunity to evaluate the information contained herein and make its own detennination as to whether or not it, needs the testimony of any of those individuals in order to complete the record of these proceedings.
(We do not believe that this will interfere with the on-going investigation, since the investigators will in all likel;ihocd have completed their ais-cussions with those individuals by this time.) We believe this is necessary because of sworn testimony and affidavits in these proceedings that attempts have been made by NRC investigator (s) to deter individuals from testifying (see Testimony of Henry Stiner, Tr. 4249/1-4250/6, especially 4249/15-20; 1/9/83 Affidavit of Roy Combs, page 3, last paragraph, attached to CASE's 1/11/83 Written Argument on Issues, to the Appeal Board, CASE Attachment 5, page3). (It should be noted that CASE is not making any inferences at this point as to motivations on the part of NRC investigators in this regard.)
NEW AND SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION Imediately following the October 21, 1983, teie' phone conference call i
in which Mr. Reynolds reported to the Board and parties that another QC i
Inspector had been found by the Department of Labor to have been illegally fired (Tr. 9078/25-9079/16), CASE attempted to contact William Dunham. We have now done so and he is eager to get the information and knowledge which he has into the hands of the Licensing Board; he has agreed to testify as a CASE witness should the Board grant CASE's motion for additional hearings.
His Affidavit is attached hereto, along with four documents to which l
he refers in his Affidavit. Mr. Dunham's Affidavit and its attachments document l
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harassment, intimidation, and threatening of him and his subordinate QC Inspectors by management (including both Brown & Root and TUGC0 top management) at Comanche Peak. He discusses the signing by his supervisor, Harry Williams, of a state-ment to the NRC that he had indeed been harassing, intimidating, and threatening QC Inspectors, and the Applicants' response to that admission; he states in his Statement to the Department of Labor: .
"As a result of this statement, Mr. Williams was demoted from Civil Q.C. Supervisor over many departments to Supervisor of our group alone.
This erved two purposes for Q.C. Mgmt. The first purpose was to punish the Q.C. Coatings Department for complaining to the N.R.C. The second purpose was to punish Mr. Williams for getting caught."
Mr. Dunham discusses the continuation of the harassment, intimidation, and threats (after about a two-week lull) by Harry Williams.
(At this point, .'t is important to note that the practices of Harry Williams in this regard have been far-reaching. Mr. Dunham notes that Harry Williams was over about 30 QC inspectors at one time. One of those QC Inspectors was-Darlene Stiner; see testimony of Darlene Stiner, Tr. 4130/20-4131/10, 4137/4-14, 4138/4-4140/22, 4142/10-21, 4149/2-4151/15, 4157/1-9, 4158/19-4160/8, and especially 4140/9-22, 4150/13-4151/9, 4157/4-9, 4158/19-22.
There is no reason to believe that Harry Williams did not harass, intimidate, and threaten all of the 30 QC Inspectors who were under him and force them to accept unsatisfactory work, to sign documents for inspections made by other inspectors, etc.)
It is also important to note that Applicants' witnesses Brandt, Tolson, and Purdy were all directly involved in Mr. Dunham's interrogation following his going to Mr. Purdy regarding the actions of Harry Williams, and that
a Mr. Purdy did the actual firing of Mr. Dunham. The similarities between Mr. Dunham's firing and the illegal firing of Charles Atchison am striking and obvious. As pointed out by Mr. Dunham in his statement to the Department of Labor, "this is not an solated incident but a continuing management ;
policy."
As indicated in Mr. Dunham's Affidavit and in the October 18, 1983, letter to Bmwn & Root by the Department of Labor, the Department of Labor (DOL) found that Mr. Dunham had been illegally terminated, and that this detemination was made following a DOL investigation into Mr. Dunham's alle-gations. DOL stated:
" Facts gathered during the investigation show that Mr. Dunham was scheduled for termination before his final counseling session with Mr. Purdy. He was terminated because he was vocal in his opposition to intimidation, harassment and threats made by management to the QC inspectors. "
Another important statement in my Dunham's Affidavit (page 6) is that it is his understanding that "the QC vault in regards to protective coatings has been put on hold by the NRC an'd that massive falsification of documenta-tion in protective coatings has been discovered." (Here again, this is obviously infomation which the Applicants and the NRC inspectcrs at Comanche Peak would be aware of; CASE just became awam of it fmm Mr. Dunham, and we believe it is fitting that the Licensing Board should not be the only onas in the hearings not to know what's going on.)
Mr. Dunham also states that it is his understanding that Harry Williams "was teminated shortly after my firing; but' that-I've heard that he's still with Gibbs &- Hill, out in San Diego, I believe. it was." (Emphasis added.) ,
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Another important piece of infonnation contained in Mr. Dunham's Affidavit is confinnation that he believes that "he.(Robert Hamilton) was fired because he was a tough inspector and refused to bend the rules." (Affidavitatpage 7.)
CASE is very troubled by the Bosrd's apparent intention of relying in large part on hearings concerning the acceptability of the finished construction at Comanche Peak in making its decision as to whether or not to grant an operating license for Comanche Peak. In the telephone conference call on 10/21/83, Judge Bloch confinned NRC Staff counsel Scinto's understanding of the Board's position: "
. . . that is that basically if we can obviate the delay in coming to a conclusion on the issue of intimidation, and that is the procedure to look and to find a way in which we can get evidence of the status of the adequacy of the plant." (Tr. 9112/22-9113/2.)
The reason for CASE's concern is that we do not believe that the Board can obtain an accurate picture from such hearings as to the quality of work at Comanche Peak. One reason is that you can't always tell by looking whether something's been done correctly or not. When you have a situation where QC Inspectors and craftspeople have been intimidated, harassed, and threatened i
into performing and accepting defective work or work which has not been adequately checked, the quality of the work is in reality indeterminate at best and inferior at worst. Mr. Dunham summed up the situation better than CASE ever could have when he stated (Affidavit, page 7):
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. . . when you have QC inspectors intimidated and harassed and threatened, l
what you have in effect is a plant that's been built without inspection.
If inspections are compromised, you have no quality control at all."
(Emphases added.)
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CASE believes that what Mr. Dunham is referring to is precisely what we have at Comanche Peak, and we are prepared to bring forward additional witnesses to support our belief -- witnesses who have supplied, in large part, the bases for our belief.
Perhaps one of the most important portions of Mr. Dunham's Affidavit has to do with the Lipinsky memorandum, copy of which is attached to Mr.
Dunham's Affidavit. As discussed in his Affidavit, this is (page 3 of-Affidavit):
. . . an inter-office Department Correspondence dated August 8,1983, from J. J. Lipinsky 'with 0. B. Cannon Company to (I assume) his boss, R. B. Roth, under Subject of: Trip Report OBC Job No. H8301 (Comanche Peak Unit 1-Glen Rose, TX). I gave a copy of this inter-office memo to an NRC investigator (I believe'it was Don Driskill). . .
. . . O. B. Cannon Company is one of the few companies in the country with expertise in protective coatings for nuclear power plants. Brown
& Root or the utility hired the company to come to Comanche Peak to evaluate the protective coatings. The inter-office memo by Mr. J. J.
Lipinsky, Quality Assurance Director of 0. B. Cannon, speaks for itself.
I don't have a copy of any other report he might have filed with Brown
& Root or the utility."
The Lipinsky memorandum is vitally important. For example, he states l
in his Trip Report:
- "R. Tolson (TUGCO) asked for examples of specific problem areas or items.
"JJL (J. J. Lipinsky) replied that specifics cannot be given without a I thorough review / audit. However, described problems with material storage, l painter qualification / indoctrination, possible documentation deficiencies, l and mora le problems." (Memorandum, page 2, item B; emphasis added.)
" Essentially Brown & Root is happy with the level of enforcement / inspection currently in force for the specification / procedure requirements." (Memorandum, l page 3, item D.)
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" Meeting with J. Church (TUGC0-VP) J. Merritt (TUGCO) JJN, JJL
. . . B) J. Merritt (TUGCO) directed JJN/0BC (J. J. Norris/0. B. Cannon) to do no more (other than recommend alternative air supply) until notified by TUGCO." (Memorandun, page 3, item F.)
"The following are the writers observations / opinions as a result of this site visit:
"A) To some extent a parallel can be drawn with Comanche Peak and Zimmer.
Comanche Peak is doing inspections to the degree that they (Comanche Peak) are comfortable with or will tolerate. However in the real t world there are requirements that have to be satisfied, and in at least the areas of material storage, painter qualification /indoctri-nation, documentation and traceability indications are that Comanche
- Peak falls short in adequately satisfying these requirements. The writer's opinion is that management at Comanche Peak has deluded itself into thinking everything is alright or it will all come out i in the wash. The fact that management attempts to squash any efforts to point out quality problems (No NCR;s, QC reporting to production, etc.) to some extent confirms the above, and has led to a morale problem with the inspection staff.
"B) Almost'everyone in the inspection staff is looking to get out of Comanche Peak. The inspection staff works 60-70 hours. a week.
You can't work people on an extended basis even with high salaries (apparently only a few stay a whole year). In addition to the long hours the inspectors contacted by the writer (other disciplines included) all have a low opinion of the quality of tne work put in place, andTii effect are keeping quiet until they can find another job.
"D) . . . The writer cannot recommend an audit at this time because B&R is hostile to the idea and no action would be taken by B&R l on problems / concerns detected during the audit. . . .
1 "SUl91ARY:
l "1) This trip was not as productive as the writer had hoped. Often the writer felt that B&R wanted to buy the 'right' answer. This I is substantiated to some extent by the fact that they did not try to utilize the expertise and/or experience of the writer with regard to Quality. Assurance / Quality Control, and. the attitude of the B&R management (especially Quality Assurance).
"2) If OBC (O. B. Cannon) tries to obtain a contract on this site, the writer would suggest that it be a rework contract because it will ,
be impossible (by all indications) to salvage what work is currently in place." (Memorandum, pages 3 and 4; emphases added.)
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The fact that Mr. Lipinsky was able to make these deteminations and fom these opinions in just the three short days that Applicants allowed him onsite clearly indicates that the problems discussed briefly by him in
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his Trip Report are so unmistakable, so pervasive, and so blatant that one l
1 would have to be blind in both eyes not to be able to see them. Certainly the NRC< personnel inspecting the plant (and especially the NRC Resident Inspectors of Construction and of Operations) must have been aware that such L problems existed and still exist at Comanche Peak. It is inconceivable to believe otherwise.
The implications-of this' must be dealt with by the Licensing Board --
l and quickly -- to restore any semblance of confidence in the integrity of i the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
CASE moves that the Board call Mr. Lipinsky to testify in hearings regard-i ing: intimidation, harassment, and threatening of QC Inspectors and crafts-people; discouragement from doing the job right to begin with; and concerns j
raised by CASE witnesses testifying regarding the preceding two items and the
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l effect on the quality of work and the safety of the Comanche Peak plant.
It appears to CASE that the most logical way to accomplish this wuld be for the Board to call Mr. Lipinsky as a Board witness, rather than as l
a CASE witness or a witness for Applicants. We further move that the Board
- call Mr._ Lipinsky_ under a protective order. The purpose for this is two-fold
(1) to assure that the Board hears his testimony without interference from anyone;' and (2) to avoid any possibility that Mr. Lipinsky or his company l
might be pressured or blackballed because of his candor and courage. We ask that the Board order Applicants, the NRC Staff, and even CASE and their attorneys not to contact, talk to, correspond with, or attempt to influence Mr. Lipinsky or anyone connected with him in any wayI . We ask that the Board do this imediately, pending the Board's determination of how it wishes to proceed.
CASE realizes that this is a somewhat unusual procedure. However, it is also unusual (at least to be so well documented) for a record of intimida-tion, harassment, and threatening of QC Inspectors to come to light during operating license hearings such as these, and for an independent, outside consultant to have such important infomation regarding such practices.
CASE believes that the information should be presented to the Board directly from Mr. Lipinsky, without CASE, the NRC Staff, or the Applicants sponsoring him as a witness. The procedure recommended by CASE would allow this to occur, while at the same time preventing anyone from unduely influencing or harassing him.
CASE has always believed that this is exactly what happened to Mr.
Lobbin. Although Judges Bloch and Jordan were noi, present during his cross-examination, we are sure that Dr. McCollom will recall Mr. Lobbin's severely agitated state during his testimony in the hearings, stuttering and stammering, obviously under extreme pressure. CASE simply could not bring itself to attempt to tear his story apar t (fearing that to do so would have totally 1
CASE has deliberately not contacted Mr. Lipinsky yet in this matter, until the Board considers CASE's motion and decides how it wishes to proceed.
However, in fairness to Mr. Lipinsky, we are sending a copy of this pleading to him so that he will be aware of what is going on.
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l destroyed the man as well in the process), but chose rather to depeno' on the truth's coming out through other less. debilitating means. '
In the alternative, CASE asks that the Board grant CASE a protective order for Mr. Lipinsky so that neither the Applicants nor the NRC Staff and their attorneys will be allowed to contact, talk to, correspond with, or attempt to influence Mr. Lipinsky or anyone connected with him in any way2 . CASE will then contact Mr. Lipinsky to ascertain whether or not he would be willing to voluntarily testify as a CASE witness. If not, we will then ask the Board for a subpoena for him to testify.
CASE also moves that the Board grant CASE a protective order for all QC Inspectors who were ever under the supervision of Harry Williams, and in particular all Protective Coatings QC personnel, ordering Applicants and NRC personnel (including their attorneys) not to contact, talk to, correspond with, or attempt to influence these individuals in any way. We ask that the Board put this protective order in-effect immediately, pending a detenni-nation by the Board as to how it wishes to proceed.
We believe that the Board should also call as Board witnesses all QC inspectors who were at any time under the supervision of Harry Williams (those who still work at the plant, and any who can be located who formerly worked at the plant). This is one way in whicn the Board can satisfy itself as to the issue of intimidation, etc., and its effect on the quality of the 2 See also last paiagraph on page.2 (continued on page 3) of this pleading.
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work at the plant. In .this regard, CASE urges that the Board avail itself of the procedure adopted in the Catawba hearings in October 1983, whereby the Licensing Board allowed workers and former workers to come directly to the Board for in camera interviews under the QA contention under a protective order, without the Applicants or parties present. This would allow the Board to determine from discussions with interested QC Inspectors whether or not they believe it is necessary for the Board to hold the hearings with them in camera or not. If the QC Inspectors believe that they are more likely .
to be fired or otherwise terminated (voluntarily or involuntarily), we reluctantly (because it goes against our basic belief in the public's right to know) move that the Board' hold such hearings with those witnesses in camera, with only the lead attorney or representative of each party present or informed of what is said, and the records sealed. Although CASE believes that the public has (the public) a right to know what is going on at Comanche Peak so that itAcan be assured the public's rights are protected, we will not voluntarily be a party to jeopardizing any QC Inspector's livelihood and future against his/her will.
It is CASE's opinion that too many QC Inspectors and craftspeople have already been sacrificed in their attempts to make sure that Comanche Peak will be a l ' safe plant. The NRC should have put a stop to it long ago.
Surely the Licensing Board can arrive at a solution which will enable it to ascertain the truth without further such sacrifices. CASE is doing its' best.to assist in the Board's efforts, as outlined herein.
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It should be pointed out at this time that CASE has attempted previously to get the Board to consider the problems not only of intimidation, but also of firing QC inspectors and craftspeople who refuse .to wear blinders and insist that nonconforming items be reported, as well as the pattern of dis-couraging workers from doing the job right to begin with (which CASE is con-Vinced also exists at Comanche Peak) Months ago CASE contacted the Board Chairman (and he passed the info, nation along to the other parties3 ) regarding an ongoing investigation by the NRC Office of Investigations into concerns raised by Robert Messerly. CASE advised the Board Chairman that we had a potential witness who had information which we thought should be litigated in these proceedings, but that the Office of Investigations had regt.ested that CASE not bring the information forward until they had completed their investigation into his concerns. Judge Bloch advised that he believed that the investigation by 01 was the best way to handle it at that time, and we therefore abided by the wishes of 01 in that regard -- but always with the clear understanding that at some point in time we did want to bring the matters before the Licensing Board.
We again attempted to bring forward the concerns of Mr. Messerly and
! other CASE potential witnesses with our August 3,1983, pleading under subject i
i of Record Regarding Discouragement from Reporting Nonconformin'g Conditions at Comanche Peak Nuclear Plant. The Board treated this CASE pleading as 3
j See discussion during 10/21/83 telephone conference call; tr. 9120/22-9122/5.
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a motion to supplement the record, and as such, it was denied by the Board in its 8/15/83 Memorandum and Order (Motion to Supplement and Correct Record)
"for lack of ripeness." In that Memorandum and Order, the Board stated, in part:
. . . with (one) exception,'we do not consider it appropriate for a party to ' supplement' the record with respect to issues that may still be heard in this case. By awaiting a possible hearing, which might occur either with respect to our recently issued Proposed Initial Decision or with respect to the ongoing investigations being conducted by the Office of Investigation, CASE will be able to assist the Board
- by presenting its evidence in a controlled, organized fashion."
(First and second emphases added; third emphasis in the original.)
Now that the Board is attempting to find means other than by awaiting the report by OI by wnich they can determine whether or not the. plant has been built so that it can operate safely, CASE submits that the time has come to hear CASE's witnesses, especially in light of the new and significant information contained herein. (It should be noted that CASE does not believe it is necessary for the Board to be forced into a rushed situation in the first place. We fully expect that the NRC's Caseload Forecast Panel is by now aware of most if not all of the information contained herein and that that is the reason the Board has not yet received the Panel's report about when. they believe fuel loading can be achieved. It might also be appropriate and worthwhile for the Board to call as witnesses all the members of the Caseload Forecast Panel and attempt to ascertain what specific problems at the plant they are aware of. Obviously, the most orderly way to proceed would be to await the investigation report of.the NRC 01, then have hearings-on that report, including rebuttal testimony from CASE's witnesses. But because of the pressure by. Applicants and NRC Staff to get the hearings over b
and done with, and because of the Board's desire to find some other means by which it can satisfy itself that Comanche Peak has been built correctly, CASE submits that having hearings with CASE's witnesses being allowed to testify, as well as hearings at the same time on the investigation report of Bob Messerly's ailegations, is preferable to what the Board is presently proposing; at a minimum, CASE's witnesses should be allowed to testify in addition to the methods the Board is proposing.)
1 CASE realizes that the information contained herein in some ways overlaps with the ongoing NRC Office of Investigations (01) investigation currently under way. We note the Board's concern (page 2 of Board's 10/25/83 Memorandum (Procedure.Concerning Quality Assurance), top of page) regarding "the need for 0I to conduct its investigation without undue interference from us."
Although CASE shares the Board's concerns in this regard to a certain extent, we believe that in this instance what is actually taking place is more like 0I's investigation is unduly interfering with the mandated responsibility of the Licensing Board to make its decision on whether or not to grant an operating license for this nuclear power plant based on complete and adequate infonnation necessary for it to make an informed decision.
We say this because it appears that one of two things has happened:
(1). the NRC Office of Investigations (01) began its investigation into the intimidation, harassment, and threatening of QC Protective Coatings Inspectors in January 1983, and 'it is continuing now and it is claimed that it will be another five months before the investigation is finished, for a total of
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14 months of investigating! Surely 0I must have some information regarding
- this issue which it can give to the Board to assist it at this time. Surely by this time 01 has talked to a sufficient number of just the individuals
- CASE told them about (about 18 or so individuals) -- who did not want or ask ,
for confidentiality'-- to be able to provide the Board with helpful informa-tion at this time. (2) If the NRC' investigation has not been continuing since January 1983 'lin which case it could be assumed that the January in-vestigation was completed),wA didn't the NRC 01 bring fonvard to the Licensing Board the infomation that Harry Williams had signed a statement that he had been intimidating, harassing, and threatening QC Inspectors back around March, 1983? ,
The information which we are presenting at this time will not, we believe, interfere with the OI investigation nor will it alert anyone to it who is
- not already aware of wha.t's going on. In short, it appears to CASE that at I
this point, everyone knows what is going on but the Licensing Board. CASE' is' sending this information to the Board as quickly as we can organize it.
Obviously, the Applicants know the details contained herein and have copies of all the documents attached (with the possible exception of the actual statement Mr. Dunham gave to the Department of Labor). They had to have been aware that the Department of Labor was making.an investigation onsite. And obviously they were fully aware of the part their own employees played in this investigation (including the signing around March 1983 of the statement by Harry Williams and his subsequent demotion to being in charge only of the very QC Inspections who had ccmplained to the NRC about his 3a This' appears to be the understanding of the NRC Staff attorneys; see Tr.
. 9108/21-25,10/21/83 telephone conference call.
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harassment, intimidation and threats). Why didn't the Applicants inform the Licensing Board of these important developments which are directly related to an ongoing Board concern?
Equally obviously, the NRC Region IV personnel must have known most (and pr'obably all) 6f those same details. Inspection Report 50-445/83-07, 50-446/83-04 (copy attached) indicates that some NRC personnel who have testi-fied in these proceedings apparently were aware of such details, since they were either directly involved in the inspections regarding the Inspectors' allegations or were informed about the scope and findings of the inspection (C. E. Johnson and.T. F. Westerman, see Appendix B, page 1, of Report; and R. G. Taylor, the NRC Senior Resident Inspector - Construction, see Appendix B, page 9, ite:3 7, respectively) . Why didn't the NRC Inspectors (especially those who have testified in these proceedings since March 1983) inform the Licensing Board of these important developments which are directly related to an ongoing Board concern?
The fact that Applicants responded as they did to Harry Williams admission to the NRC speaks for itself, and we will n'ot dwell on it here.
But there is another very disturbing aspect of this matter which CASE believes must be addressed if the Board is ever to know the truth about how Comanche Peak has been built: For example: Why did the NRC personnel who were aware of Harry Williams' statement to the NRC go alcng with Applicants' allowing Harry Williams to even remain onsite? Why did those NRC personnel go along with Applicants' placing Harry Williams in charge of the very QC Inspectors who had complained about him to the NRC? How is it possible that l
NRC Region IV allowed this to happen and to continue until Harry Williams was terminated shortly after the illegal firing of Mr. Dunham?
These and other related questions should be included in hearings on intimidation, harassment, and threatening of QC Inspectors and craftspeople; discouragement from doing the job right to begin with; and concerns raised
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by' CASE witnesses testifying regarding the preceding two items and the effect on.the quality of work and the safety of the Comanche Peak plant.
DIFFICULTIES WITH THE PROCEDURES CHOSEN BY THE BOARD In its October 25, 1983 Memorandum (Procedure Concerning Quality Assurance),
the Board outlined certain procedures that "may provide it with a way of deter-mining the safety of Comanche Peak without awaiting the conclusion of pending investigations concerning quality assurance matters."
CASE has discussed some of these matters in the preceeding (see especially pages 6-15). In addition, the following should be pointed out.
The task which the Board has delegated to CASE is an extraordinary one --
far beyond what is usually required of an Intervenar. By the wording of its order in this regard (page 3 of Board's 10/25/83 Memorandum), in effect the Board is asking the Intervenor to provide the Board with additional information which neither the Applicants nor the NRC is apparently aware of -- information about problems which currently exist at the plant, detailing a particular loca-tion and a particular type of hardware deficiencyi.
4 See Tr. 9125/9-9128/14,10/21/83 telephone conference call.
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To accomodate the Board's request, as it is phrased, would require in order to be able to say with certainty that problems are still there and exactly where they are, the bringing forward of individuals who are still employed at the plant.
Everyone who w6rks at the plant is well aware that -to come forward would mean not only his/her current job at Comanche Peak, but in all likelihood the loss of any possibility-of ever working in the nuclear industry (with its extremely high wages) again. They know that if you want to keep your job and keep working, you don't make waves at Comanche Peak.
The employees-at Comanche Peak have good reason to think this. They've seen good employees run off (by: being harassed, being given distasteful jobs to do, being made to feel unwelcome or pressured, their concerns being ignored,
' their being convinced that they would be in the next layoff, their getting tirdd of the attitude of management abodt quality, until it just wasn't worth it anymore and they quit -- this is constructive discharge -- Bob Bronson, Dennis Culton, Jack Doyle, Cordella Hamilton, Darlene Stiner, and Mark Walsh,
-to name a few).
And they've .seen what happens when you complain to the NRC: Your concerns
-are downplayed and made to seem totally without merit or totally unimportant; you have the superviso'r you complained about put over just your group to continue to harass, intimidate,- and threaten you; the items you point out specifically that have problems are taken down, covered up', or corrected before the NRC
- comes out to check out what you've told them; the NRC is unable to either '
confirm or refute whether or not a QC Inspector was wrongfully fired, even
tbough the Department of Labor investigator had access to the same information and had no trouble at all in making a determination of wrongful discharge; and even when there is a clear-cut case of wrongful discharge of a QC Inspector for refusing to wear blinders and trying to do a good job and see that a nuclear power plant is built correctly, and the NRC has proposed a $40,000 fine against the utility, the NRC then decides to wait (perhaps for years) until the Court decides the case, even though the Department of Labor (from the initial investi-gator clear through the U. S. Secretary of Labor) has thoroughly investigated, held hearings, and determined that the QC Inspector was indeed wrongfully fired!
This is CASE's view of what's going on at Comanche Peak -- based not just on what we know from the hearings, but on what we have been told by the.
individuals to whom it has happened. We believe that it's time the Licensing Board heard for themselves what thesa individuals have to say -- not just on the issue of intimidation, but what such intimidation and their concerns mean to the safety of Comanche Peak.
It is important to note that the Licensing Board in these proceedings has accepted as binding on them the Department of Labor decision under collateral estoppel, and CASE is convinced that the Licensing Board really wants to find out the truth. We believe that it is imperative that the Board hear CASE's witnesses before making its decision on whether or not to grant an operating license for Comanche Peak.
There is no way CASE can guarantee that problems identified by former workers will still exist, especially if we are forced to reveal in advance
to anyone the specific problems and their specific locations. Our witnesses and potential witnesses are thoroughly convinced that to do so would assure that the problems will have been corrected or removed by the time the Board actually :nakes its site visit. (According to unrefuted sworn testimony in these proceedings", this has already happened in some instances. CASE witness Darlene Stiner testified that when NRC investigators checked to see if she and her husband were correct that weld rod cans were being left unplugged, the investigators found that the rod cans were plugged in, even though a couple of weeks following that, Darlene Stiner wrote an NCR for the same problem; see Tr. 4162/21-4164/15. Henry Stiner confirmed this in his testimony; see Tr. 4230/3-25. He also testified that, regarding " counterfeit hangers," the, NRC investigators told him that all the hangers whose numbers had been given to them had been taken down; see Tr. 4246/5-13. It is important to note that the infonnation which the Stiners supplied to the investigators was supposedly known only to NRC personnel at the time.)
Another important aspect which wa do not believe the Board has considered is that one of the reasons Robert Messerly and others have asked that they be allowed to show NRC investigators specific problems is that they do not have the infonnation to be able to tell the investigators the exact hanger number and location, etc. Craft personnel normally would not have papenvork such as QC Inspectors or supervisory personnel might have; it is not the craft's job to document locations to begin with and retain the papenvork. But such indi-viduals may be able to take an investigator to a particular hanger, for example, and point out a specific problem.
Some individuals with whom we have talked simply do not believe that the Applicants will not find out about specific items and try to correct them before the Board's site visit. These individuals do not make any difference in their minds between the Applicants and the Applicants' attorneys. In
' reviewing the transcript of the 10/21/83 conference call, CASE too is troubled by Tr. 9126/6-15. It is not clear to CASE that Mr. Reynolds actually ever committed to refrain from telling his clients what the specific problems and locations were. Further, CASE (lacking attorneying expertise and training) is unable to answer the questions which has been asked by some individuals:
i What authority does the Board have and what would it be able to do (and what would it do) should Applicants' attorney. disregard the Board's order and tell his clients about the specific problems and locations?
Some of the individuals contacted have indicated that they have already been to the NRC and have (to put it mildly in some. cases) been dissatisfied with the NRC's response. To them, the NRC is the NPC, and they make no difference in their minds between the NRC Region IV inspectors, 01 investi-gators, or the Licensing Board. Some of them have no desire to have any
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further dealings with the NRC in any capacity.
L Having said all this, CASE believes that some of our potential witnesses may still be willing to go to the site and attempt to show the Board specific problems in construction and/or design. However, without exception, these individuals are not willing to identify the specific items and locations to anyone (incit. ding attorneys) connected with the NRC Staff or the Applicants.
They think it would be a waste. of everyone's time and effort and that the l
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Applicants would find out the details and make sure that the problems were corrected prior to the Board's visit. It should be noted that those were not the conditions under which they originally offered to take the NRC investiga' tors and show them problems.
CASE believes that the Board's idea may still be a productive one;
- however, it does not appear that it is workable under the specific. conditions which have been outlined by the Board at this time. We believe it would be helpful. for us to continue to try to find some mutual ground which would be acceptable to our witnesses so that.they could be assured that they would not be compromised and afford the Applicants an opportunity to turn what could be a good idea to their own advantage. Clarification by the Board of the questions on page 22 (end of paragraph one) might also be helpful.
We still have not been able to contact some individuals and will attempt to do so. We still have not heard'from the individual who is on the road
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who has to call us. We will keep the Board informed of our progress, and expect to know pretty well what we can and cannot do by the time we have to file our review of the record on intimidation on November 21.
In 'its 10/25/83 Memorandwn (Procedure Concerning Quality Assurance), the Board states that "we will conduct hearings concerning the acceptability of the finished construction at Comanche Peak. . . concerning: the first two I
staff walkdowns of finished safety systems (in addition to the fuel building),
the Cygna report, and Ap~plicant's follow-up inspection of protective coatings ."
5 This will be addressed by Mr. Dunham in more detail in his testimony in hear-ings (should the Board allow); it should be noted that he is listed in In-spection Report 83-07/83-04 (attached) as " Lead QC, Backfit Program, B&R" for Protective Coatings (page 3, Appendix 8, of Report).
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The Board, in asking the NRC Region IV witnesses to testify about the staff walkdowns of finished safety systems, is in effect asking them to
' testify-.about their own work. If there are major problems discovered at this point, after years and years of inspections by Region IV personnel, it, is obviously a very adverse reflection upon not only the Applicants, but upon NRC Region IV personnel as well. Does the Board realistically expect that such personnel would deliberately now give themselves failing grades, even .if they were warranted? NRC Region IV personnel who have been involved in past inspections have an obvious vested interest in the outcome of such inspections.
Region IV has been able to operate as an autonimous entity, without being routinely monitored by anyone or any branch of the NRC _(including, as CASE understands it, the national NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement). Even when the new and supposedly improved Office of Investigations undertook its recent investigation, the investigators handled only " people" matters (such as intimidation, harassment, and threatening of QC inspectors), but they l-turned the investigation of the technical aspects over to the NRC Region IV
,7 inspectors. Based on past such follow-up inspections, there is reasonable assurance that the reports regarding such matters will indicate: (a) the l}
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!; NRC 'can neither confirm nor refute the allegation; (b) the allegation was not substantiated; (c) the allegation was substantiated but it really doesn't make any difference anyway b'ecause it's so completely unimportant; (d) the I NRC didn't investigate because the allegation lacked specificity.6 6 See Inspection Reports 79-09, Staff Exhibit 63; 79-15, Staff Exhibit ~120;
'79-22/79-21, Staff Exhibit 121; 79-26/79-25, CASE Exhibit 253; 80-02, l Staff Exhibit 122. -
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CASE urges that the Board include,as part of the hearings CASE is request-
.ing, hearings on Inspection Report 50-445/83-27 regarding the NRC investiga-tion and inspection of concerns brought forward by Robert L. Messerly.7 -
This will give the Board an opportunity to hear first-hand what Mr. Messerly ,
has to say as well as what the NRC inspectors and investigators have to say
. regarding the issues he has raised. And, for the first time, the Board will have the opportunity to make its own determination (since Mr. Messerly chose not to remain confidential) regarding the credibility and thoroughness of this and similar NRC investigations / inspections.O As pointed out by the Board Chairman in the 10/21/83 telephone conference call (Tr. 9116/3-16), regarding the Cygna Report:
. . . there is a problem in the Cygna report that there is a lot of care spent on finding out that positive findings are reliable, that is you review them with them and go over them to make sure that the positive finding is reliable. But if I read it correctly, there is no inter-inspector reliability. There is no going over of areas where there is a negative finding."
Further, despite Applicants' efforts to pass the Cygna Report off as a routine thing that the NRC requires of applicants all the time, the Cygna Report came about because of the NRC's (at the national level) loss of con-
- fidence that Comanche Peak is indeed a safe plant. As pointed out by Mr.
Treby (Tr. 9116) "this is a report that is used by the Commission's Office of NRR (Nuclear Reactor Regulation) to give them some level of confidence as to the completion of the plant."
7 A copy of Mr. Messerly's deposition taken by NRC investigators was forwarded to the Board and parties with CASE's 8/3/83 pleading on Record Regarding Discouragement from Reporting Nonconfonning Conditions at Comanche Peak Nuclear Plant.
8 See also Tr. 9098/17-9099/10, regarding " lack of specificity."
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CASE would like to go on record with a prediction at this . time: The reports from the Applicants and the NRC Staff witnesses regarding the first two staff walkdowns of finished safety systems will identify (at most) a few " minor" problems regarding which the Applicants have: (a) changed their procedures again; (b) instructed their craft and QC people in the right way to do things, thus assuring that U1e prob'lems won't occur again in the future (without' correcting similar problems which have occurred in the past); (c) written off the problems by " engineering judgement" as being insignificant; (d) decided to "use as is" based on " engineering judgement" (without support-
.ing documentation, tests, or analyses); (e) declared it to be a "non-problem" on the grounds that the NRC inspectors didn't really understand the procedur.es or the situation to begin with; or (f) a coabin'ation of the preceding.
We do not have to have hearings to discover the above. It is a given, based on the past testimony of Applicants' and NRC Region IV witnesses in' these proceedings.
CASE apologizes sincerely to the Board if the preceding appears to be disrespectful in any way; we certainly do not intend it as such. CASE is fully aware and appreciative of the extremely difficult position in which the Board finds itself, and we realize that the Board is attempting by the methods it sees available to it at this time to discover the truth about l
whether or not Comanche Peak is a safely built plant which the Board can confidently license.
l-However, CASE has been patiently awaiting the Board's approval of hear-ings regarding the concerns raised by CASE's witnesses and potential witnesses l
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-- concerns which relate not only to an issue with which the Board is ve,ry much concerned (intimidation), but in the effects of such intimidation, etc.,
on the quality of the work at the plant. We believe tie most logical way to proceed would be to await the investigation report by.01, then hold hear ,
ings on it. However, if the Board is not going to await that report, CASE submits that the time to hear CASE's witnesses is now.
In addition to the preceding, there are a fed general comments which CASE would .like to make at this time regarding certain portions of the 10/21/83 telephone conference call:
1
- l- Tr. 9080/5-14: CASE is concerned regarding the Board's analysis that ,
delaying licensing would penalize the Applicants. It appears to CASE that the question which must be considered is whether legitimate doubts have been raised about the effectiveness of the quality assurance program to date.
If there are any such doubts, the public health and safety clearly outweighs any cost to the Applicants of assuring that the public is protected. Since specific acts of the Applicants have raised such doubts, Applicants are hardly in a position to argue that such doubts do not exist.
Tr. 9080/16-17: The Board assumes no serious involvement of the top levels of management. Clearly this is not the case, as is emphasized by the new information contained herein. This new information confirms and su'pports the findings of the Secretary of Labor and the Administrative Law Judge that top QA/QC officials of the Applicants have been violating NRC 1
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regulations, federal law, and the supposed policies of the company for some tiime. Yet there is no indication that any of them have been disciplined in any way for their actions. This i, an obvious indication that they have been acting as they thought the top management wanted them to act; there is ,
- a. clear message from top management that such actions are acceptable to the Applican ts. This calls into serious question the fitness of management to
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construct and operate a nuclear power plant.
Tr. 9080/20-22: In addition, the allegations which have been made (and confirmed by the Department of Labor in two. instances that we know of) call into serious question the entire quality assurance program at Comanche Peak.
This is vitally important, since the quality assurance program is the only -
program to document and verify that work has been done properly. Given the size of the job, the complexity of the work done to date, and the inability of any inspector to go back to many areas .now inaccessible, a substantial doubt about the effectiveness of the quality assurance program (which now exists) would create sufficient doubt to deny the license in that there would not be the assurance of safety that the Board should be able to have. If the problem is intimidation (as is the case), rather than incompetence (which has been admitted insofar as some engineers), the doubt is even harder to remove. What documentacion is there which records everything as fine when in fact there were serious deficiencies the QC inspector was afraid to report?
With' no clue from the documentation and with the inspector probably now long gone, how would anyone know to go back and look at that area again? .There
,3 _ . . _
, 29 ..
is also the problem that later inspection cannot detect flaws which might not surface for years.
4 Tr. 9086/9-13 and 9090/23-25: Applicants say that they have provided a responsive action program. Was there never any previous guidance issued at the site to assure that the management at the site fully understands the requirements of both the Atomic Energy Act and the Energy Reorganization Act with regard .to protective activities? If any prior guidance was issued, it was cbviously ineffective; or they never issued any guidance about firing people for engaging in protected activities; or they deliberately violated such guidance.
It appears that Applicants only provided such guidance to their managers after a civil penalty had been pr'oposed by the NRC. This means that they ignored ,
the first level D0L finding, the ALJ's finding, and the Secretary of Labor's finding. How many times did it have to be raised as a possible problem before the Applicants issued such guidance? Was it before or after Bill Dunham was fired?
The new and significant infonnation contained herein proves, in CASE's view, that the Applicants believe that they can do whatever they want to and get away with it. CASE urges that the Board remove this (hopefully) mistaken idea from Applicants' mind.
With regard to the dependence on the NRC walk-downs at the plant, if such walk-downs can be depended upon by an applicant when the project is l
-completed as: proof of quality, the the Quality A'surance s Program is an unneces-sary exercise. Obviously 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, was not written as an
l exercise.- CASE certainly did not look upon its accepted Contention 5 and the hearings- relating to it as merely an exercise, and we hope the Board did not. The NRC regulations clearly consider it essential that work be
-examined at the time it is performed by an independent inspection process. ,
This clearly has not occurred at Comanche Peak. Further, nowhere in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, is there an absolution clause providing that if a con-struction permit holder fails to adequately conduct a Quality Assurance Program, the Applicants can rely on an NRC walk-down to prove the quality of the plant after the fact.
CASE'S MOTIONS For the reasons _ stated herein, CASE hereby moves that the Board order additional hearings on:
(1) Intimidation, harassment, and threatening of QC Inspectors and
, craftspeople; (2) . Discouragement from doing the job right to begin with; and (3) Concerns raises by CASE witnesses testifying regarding items (1) and (2) preceding and the effect on the quality of work and the safety of the Comanche Peak plant.9 We further move that the' Board grant Protective Orders for:
f (1) J. J. Lipinsky, with 0. B. Cannon Company, under the conditions outlined on page 2 of this pleading.; and (2) All Quality Control (QC) Inspectors who were ever under the super-vision of Harry Williams, and in particular all Protective Coatings QC personnel, under the conditions outlined on page 2 of this pleading.
9 Including hearings regarding NRC Inspection Report 50-445/83-27; see page 25 of this pleading.
In addition, CASE moves that the Board have hearings on:
-(l) Open items regarding the Walsh/Doyle Allegations; and (2) . Assessment of Applicability of Board Notification 82-105A to Comanche Peak.
The reasons for such hearings are detailed in CASE's 11/4/83 Assessment of Applicability of Board Notification 82-105A to Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, since it appears that the position of the Applicants and the NRC Staff, and CASE are still not resolved. We believe that it is especially important that such hearings be held, due to the fact that there is no indication that the author of the Stiff Clamp Report was ever made aware of the actual problems with cinched-up U-bolts at Comanche Peak as set forth in CASE's 11/4/83 Assessment or its Proposed Findings (Walsh/Doyle Allegations).
(See Affidavit of' David Terao on Stiff Pipe Clamps, attached to NRC Staff's 11/4/83 Brief on Board Notification 82-105A.) Obviously his testimony is needed.
Reasons for hearings on the Open Items regarding Walsh/Doyle allegations are' contained in the Affidavits of Mark Walsh (page 6, lines 3-20) and Jack Doyle (see especially page 29, lines 15-20), attar.hed to CASE's 11/4/83 Response to NRC Staff's Af'fidavits on Open Items Relating to Walsh/Doyle Allegations.
As discussed by Mr. Doyle (page 29), the matters in controversy have not been resolved and cannot be adequately dealt with and explained properly to the Board through affidavits. It could be better demonstrated with models than with words and drawings, as Mr. Doyle did in the September 1982 hearings.
He has indicated that he could and would provide such models. CASE believes
-such a demonstration would be very helpful to the Board in understanding the matters in controversy and in arriving at.its decision.
, w - -- e y-
In discussions with the NRC Staff attorneys, CASE was advised that
.we should receive their answer to our Motion for a New Contention by Thursday,
- November 10. If we receive their_ answer by that time, we have no objection to the Board's going forward with the Special Prshearing Conference Call regarding whether oi not to admit CASE's contention; this conference call is presently scheduled for November 16. (Our only concern to begin with was .that, with a holiday coming up Friday, we might be cut short on time necessary to properly review the Staff's pleading.) If we do not receive the Staff's pleading Thursday, we will advise the Board and ask that the telephone conference be postponed until Friday, November 18 (assuming that we do receive their pleading on Saturday, November 12).
However, the Board might want to consider postponing that conference call in order to include a discussion of the matters set forth in CASE's instant pleading. This would seem to CASE to be a logical move which would afford some economy of time and effort on the part of the Board and all parties.
Respectfully submitted, w .Q2 ugh [ML N ..
JMrs.) .Juapita EllisTPr,esident '_
CASE (Citizens Assocntion ^"
for Sound Energy)
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UNITED STATES OF~ AMERICA NUCLEAR' REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter:of l i
- APPLICATION OF TEXAS UTILITIES i
- GENERATING COMPANY, ET' AL. FOR Q Docket Nos. 50-445 AN OPERATING LICENSE FOR. i '
and 50-446
, COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC '
{
STATION UNITS #1 AND #2 (CPSES) l
' CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE By my, signature below, I hereby certify that true and correct copies of CASE's (1) Partial knswer to Board's 10/25/83 Memorandum (Procedure Concerning Quality Assurance); (2) Motion for Additional Hearings; ana Q) action for Protective Orders ~
have been sent to the names listed below this 9th day of November , 198 3 ,
by: Express Mail where indicated by
- and First Class' Mail elsewhere.
I
- Administrative Judge Peter B. Bloch - Alan S. Rosenthal , Esq. , Chairman .
- U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board 4350 East / West Highway, 4th Floor U. Si Nuclear Regulatory Commission
.Bethesda, Maryland 20014 Washington, D. C. 20555
- Dr. Kenneth A. McCollom, Dean Dr. W. Reed Johnson, Member #
Division of Engineering, Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Architecture and . Technology U. S. Nuclear. Regulatory Comatission Oklahoma State University Washington, D. C. 20555 Stillwater, Oklahoma 74074 Thomas S. Moore, Esq., Member
- Dr. Walter H. Jordan Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board 881 W. Outer Drive U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 Washington, D. C. 20555 .
-
- Nicholas S. Reynolds , ~Esq. Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Panel l Debevoise & Liberman U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l
1200 - 17th St. , N. W. Washington, D. C. 20555
- Washington, D. C. 20036
. Docketing and Service Section (3 copies)
I
- Marjorie Ulman Rothschild, Esq. Office of the ' Secretary Office of Executive Legal Director, USNRC U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Conmission~
Maryland National B'ank Building Washington, D. C. 20555 .
7735 Old Georgetown Road - Room 10105 Bethesda ,~ Maryland 20814 Atomic Safety. and Licensing Board Panel U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555
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....-o Certificate of S:rvice Page 2 d
- David J. Preister, Esq..
Assistant Attorriey General Environmental Protection Division ~
Supreme Court Building. '
Austin, Texas 78711 John Collins
. Regional Administrator, Region IV U. . S. Nuclear' Regulatory Conmission .
611 Ryan Plaza Or., Suite 1000 '
Arlington, Texas .76011 Dr. David H. Boltz 2012 S. Polk Dallas, Texas 75224 Lanny A.'Sinkin 114 W. 7th,' Suite 220 Austin, Texas - 78701 j
a>-,5 hdas f(Mrs.) Juanita Ellis, President FCASE (Citizens Association for Sound Energy) 1426 S. Polk Dallas, Texas 75224 214/946-9446 G
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