ML19325D100
ML19325D100 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Clinton ![]() |
Issue date: | 03/31/1989 |
From: | ILLINOIS POWER CO. |
To: | |
Shared Package | |
ML19325C384 | List: |
References | |
NUDOCS 8910190006 | |
Download: ML19325D100 (24) | |
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CLINTON POWER STATION 10CFR50.59 REPORT f FOR
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MODIFICATIONS
'FROM JANUARY THROUGH MARCH l 1989 I
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, PAGE" NO .' 1 MODIFICATIONS' 09/15/8L 10CFR50.59' REPORT FROM JANUARY.THROUGH MARCH 1989 LOG : DOCUMENT NUM8ER' EVALUATED flTLE 89 0076 rA Aro35 REVISE ENVIRONMENTAL 20NE BOUNDARIES This field alteration revises =the environmental zone boundaries of the 737', 778' and 781 elevations of the auxiliary, fuel and' containment buildings, and of~the 702' and 712' elevations of the control and diesel generator building. These revisions will' resolve discrepancies between the environmental zone boundaries and the current plant configuration. The plant components that'are affected- i by these changes have been reviewed and the necessary actions-taken to assure their proper ~ environmental j qualification. 7 AS- A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST.
89 co4P . FA CWFoo8 DEFEAT THE CONDENSER WATER BOX PRIMING SYSTEM i
This field alteration eliminates a circulating water (CW) cystem pump start interlock, adds blank flanges on condenser water box priming line valves 1CWO18 and 1CW019 and condenser inlet water box priming valves 1CWO1MC and 1CWO1MD, and removes the internals from condenser outlet water-box priming valves 1CWO1MA~and 1CWO1MB. The CW pump start' interlock prevents the starting of the CW pumps when the condenser water boxes are not full, and thus prevents i damage to the condenser from waterhammer. This. interlock is being bypassed to allow-the water boxes to be filled by the
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CW pumps instead of by thervacuum priming system. To 1 minimize the potential for waterhammer in the water boxes l while they are being filled by the CW pumps, the operational methodology of the CW: system will be revised such that the L
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inlet valves to the water boxes will be throttled during filling. The modifications to the condenser water box priming valves will prohibit the use of the vacuum priming system for filling the condenser water boxes and will prevent the leakage of raw lake water from the condenser L water boxes to the condenser vacuum system. l
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1 L~ AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTICN DID HOT EXIST.
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PAGE NO. 42 -MODIFICATIONS 09/15/89
-10CFR50.59 REPORT FROM JANUARY THROUGH MARCH 1989 LOG DMWE NT.
NUMPlR.- EVALUATED T11LE i
, (89-0028 FA Der 002 REPLACE CLASS 1E BATTERY CELLS The cells currently installed in the Class 1E batteries are no longer produced by the manufacturer. This field
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alteration replaces tnese cells with cells currently '
available from the manufacturer. The amp-hour rating of the new cells, although different from the original cells, meets ,
, , the original design requirements of the direct current power system._ The new cells are identical in size, weight and construction to the current cells and thus there.is no impact to their seismic qualification, environmental qualification, or flame retardant cap!bility.
AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN
,UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST.
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89 0054 'FA Hr005- CORRECT VL AND VC SYSTEM DOCUMENT DISCREPANCIES This iield alteration revises design drawings to show pressure switches and a pressure controller that are t
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installed in ~ the laboratory ventilation -(VL) system, and to show that valves OVC010A and OVC010B of the control room ventilation (VC) system and valves IVR002A and 1VR002B of the' containment building ventilation (VR) system are globe valves instead of gate valves. The pressure switches and the pressure' controller in the VL system provide
-overpressure protection for the VL system humidification boiler. The original startup testing of the VL system has shown that the present configuration of the-VL system, which includes the pressure switches and the pressure controller, functions as designed. Also, changing valves OVC010A, OVC010B, 1VR002A, and IVR002B from gate valves to globe t valves does not affect the design function, the performance, or the failure modes of the valves or of the VC and VR r systems.
AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST.
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10CFR50.59 REPORT FROM JANUARY THROUGH MARCH 1989
- LOG' ' DOCUMENT 4 NtMBEit JEVALUATED . TITLE 89 0045 FA HYF004 REVISE SETPOINT OF HY SYSTEM EXCESS FLOW' CHECK VALVE
-This-field alteration revises design documents to reflect the actual setpoint of hydrogen (HY) system excess-flow check valve 1HY687 as 5776-standard cubic fect per hour
, (scfh):instead of 1447 scfh.. The higher setpoint has a negligible impact on~the fire loading of the-turbine building and still ensures that the check valve will isolate
.the'HY: system piping in the event of.a pipe break. Also, a hydrogen leak not large enough to cause the check valve to close is unlikely because'all of the unsupervised HY system
piping in the turbine building is at low pressure and is of L
welded construction.
AS A RESULT.0F THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN l
UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST.
88 0192 Pta 00 07 REPLACE 33 VALVES IN'THE OFF-GAS 5x8 TEM.
This plant-modification replaces 33 off-gas.(OG) system valves that have standard packing-with valves that have bellow seals. Valves with bellow seals are being installed to meet the original design criteria of the OG system, anu ,
thus. provide greater pressure boundary integrity. This q
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. modification also replaces 10 quick disconnect fittings with pipe caps. As with the new valves, the pipe caps.will provide the OG' system with greater pressure boundary i integrity. The new valver and pipe caps meet the applicable piping design criteria and will not affect the operation or performance of the OG system.
-AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN i UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST.
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110CFR50.59. REPORT FROM JANUARY THROUGH MARCH 1989 .
LM - D K WENT.
, NUMBER- ' EVALUATED TITLE 88-0375 'FA RHF008 DISABLE VALVE-TEST PERMISSIVE 8 AND ANNUNCIATORS
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This. field alteration disables the-test permissives-and the l control room test permissive annunciators for the residual j heat removal system low pressure coolant injection valves' :
1E12-F042A, 1E12-F042B, and 1E12-F042C and the low pressure !
core-spray injection valve 1E21-P005. These test.
permissives and test permissive annunciators would have 'l allowedLthe injection valves to be tested during power
- ' operation. However, since the testing requirements for J these valves are such that their testing can be accomplished a while the plant is shut-down,-the valves are not tested-during power operation... Thus, the test permissives are not
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-required and the test permissive annunciators do not provide a meaningful annunciation. This modification will have no
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impact on-che safety functions of these injection valves. ,
AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN l UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST.
' 89 00W FA SXF007 REPLACE SPRING IN SX' SYSTEM RELIEF VALVE ISX169C This field alteration replaces a spring in shutdown service-k water (SX) system relief valve 1SX169C to change its set
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pressure from 370 psig to 150 psig. This relief valve provides overpreusure protection for the tube side of diesel generator. heat exchanger 1DG13A which has a design prescure of 150 psig. Therefore, this-modification will ensure that
-the SX system piping meets the design requirements'of the ASME Code,Section III, Claen 3.
. AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATIO" 'T WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFET ESTION DID NOT EXIST.
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NUMBER-' EVAL JATED . TITLE.
89 0022 TA WF003 - REVISE VW SYSTEM DAMPER LOCATIONS +
This.' field alteration revises: design drLwings to show-the as-built ccnfiguration of three backdraft/ balancing damper q combinations in the radwaste building ventilation- (VW) system. The backdraft/ balancing damper combinations were '
. installed with their locations reversed. -However, the functions and performance of the dampers and the VW system' .
are not affected. 1 AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN: )
UNREVIEWED SAFETY'OUESTION DID NOT EXIST. I
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88 0303~ FA WMr015 REVISE WM SYSTEM VALVE SYMBOLS JThis field alteration revises the piping and instrumentation diagran for-the makeup water domineralizer (WM) system to '
show-that the-lime shutoff' valves to the lime softeners are .
ball valves instead of a globe valve and a gate valve. This field-alteration also assigns equipment identification n' ambers to these valves. The operation of the WM system is not affected by-this. change as the lime shutoff valves do not have a flow control function.
AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN >
UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST.
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- m 10CFR50.59 REPORT
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LOG- -DOCUMENT
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' 88 0390 :itMa M00 88 093 BLOCK OPEN VX SYSTEM DAMPERS AND FIRE DOORS g LThis temporary modification blocks open suitchgear heat- f removal -(VX) system damper IVXO4YA and installs portable :
fans in the doorways of the division 1 inverter and battery
. rooms. This will allow the VX system to maintain :
ventilation in the division 1 switchgear, inverter and battery rooms during the first refueling outage while the 1A1 bus is out of service. The-normal safety function of damper IVXO4YA is to isolate the non-safety related VX supply fan from the VX system when the safety related VX.
supply;fantis running. Since the safety related VX supply fan.and damper IVXO4YA>will be. inoperable while the 1A1 bus ,
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L- is outsof service, damper IVXO4YA must be blocked open to allowithe non-safety related VX supply. fan to. provide VX ;
system' flow. Also, since the doors of the division 1
-inverter and battery rooms are fire doors, a fire watch will be posted at the' doors.
" AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST.
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89 0012 ' TEMP MOD 88 098 BYPASS SAMPLE COOLERS IN SAMPLE PANEL OPL33JC This temporary modification bypasses two sample coolers in radwaste. building process sample panel OPL33JC so'that samples can be obtained from concentrated waste tank sample points OR11A and ORllB. The samples normally pass through ,
the coolers. However, the inlet and outlet lines to the t.
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coolers are 1/4".in diameter and therefore, the lines are susceptible to clogging. Since the temperature of the l : samples is only'120 degrees Fahrenheit prior to passing 1 through the coolers, it.is not essential that the samples be y cooled. ;
AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN
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UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST.
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, ' 10CFR50.59 REPORT FROM JANUARY THROUGH MARCH 1989 )
' L W. DCCMENT
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NUMBER- . EVALUATED- TITLE i
< , ~ 89 0006 TEMP MOD 89 001 -INSTALL GAGGING DEVICE ON RELIEF VALVES This temporary modification installs a gagging device on '
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p 'rolief-valves 1B21-F408 and 1G33-F036 to prevoc.t the valves-from lifting and creating a hazard to personnel working in
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, the main condenser during the first' refueling; outage. Valve 1B21-F408 is installed on piping which provides steam from ,
the main. steam (MS) system to the. auxiliary steam (AS) l system. Gagging. valve 1B21-F408 shut will not result in the i overpressurization of.the,MS system or the AS. system piping as other relief valves in the AS system will actuate prior 3
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to. piping design pressures being exceeded. Valve 1G33-F036 is installed on a reactor water cleanup (RT) system blowdown line to waste surge tanks in the equipment drain (WE)
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system. To prevent overpressurization of the RT system piping which may occur while valve 1G33-F036 is gagged shut, '
caution tags will'be placed on the RT system blowdown valves .
to require the verification of an open flow path to the WE
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system waste' surge tanks prior to beginning a blowdown.
AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN 4
UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST.
b f 89 0004 TEMP Moo 89 002 INSTALL BLOCKING DEVICE ON OG SYSTEM DISCHARGE VALVE This temporary modification. installs a mechanical bloci.ing
' device on the off-gas (OG) system discharge valve to.the station ventilation stack. This blocking device is.
necessary.to maintain the valve in a closed position for pressure testing and maintenance >of the OG system during the ,
first refueling outage because the valve-fails open if the electrical signal or the instrument air to the valve is '
' lost. The OG system will be declared inoperable while the blocking device is installed.
AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST.
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- 89 0002 TEMP MOD 89 003- PROVIDE WATER FOR CONDENSER TUBE CLEANING c r
This temporary modification attaches temporary hoses to
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plant service water (WS): system. drain valves 1WS050A/B, 1WS056A/S, 1WS102, 1WS147 and_1WS199 to supply water to the equipment that will be used to clean main condenser tubes during,the first refueling outage. The performance of:the ,
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.WS system will not be affected by this modification.
AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID-NOT EXIST.
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' 89 0008 TEMP MOD 89 006. BLOCK OPEN CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM DAMPER This temporary modification blocks open the containment
' building ventilation (VR) system outside air damper to permit 1the VR system to supply makeup air to the containment building while.the damper operator is inoperable. The capability-of the VR system to provide containment isolation is.not affected as the outside air damper does not have a E containment isolation function. This modification =will not affect any other components or functions of the VR system.
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" AS A RESULT-OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST.
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PAGE NO. 4 TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS 09/15/89
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89-0018 TEMP MOD 89 008 ATTACH' PLEXIGLASS TO REFUELING AND FUEL HANDLING MASTS h This temporary modification installs plexiglass on the -5 refueling platform mast and the fuel handling platform mast to act as-a splash guard and beta shield for their.
-respective operator stations. The plexiglass will be tied
in. place ~and the~ installation will not restrict the movement '
or operation of thC masts. The seismic qualification of the
. masts and the platforms will not be affected by the minimal
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weigat of the plexiglass. . The plexiglass will be colored to facilitate its retrieval should it break free and fall into
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the rtactor vessel or onto the stored fuel. Also, broken plexiglass in the fuel pools will not impair the fuel pool
-coolir.g system'as suction is taken from the top of the '
poolc AS A R3SULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN -!
UNREVIEWED. SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST.
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'89 0023: TEMP MOD 89 011 CONNECT SRM CHANNEL "D" DETECTOR TO CHANNEL "A" CIRCUITRY
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To eliminate intermittent noise problems in source range monitor (SRM) channel "D" and to allow refueling operations
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to continue in compliance with Technical Specification 3.9.2, this temporary modification connects the SRM channel .
"D" detector'to the SRM channel "A" circuitry. Divisional separation between the SRM channels will-be maintained by routing the temporary cable through flexible conduit. This temporary modification will not impact the ability of the SRMs to provide signals to the-main control room or to the rod control and information system.
=AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST.
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1- 1 PAGE NO. 15. TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS 09/15/89 i
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LMUMBER' CVALUATLD- TITLE
- 89 0026, TEMP MOD 39 013 PROVIDE ALTERNATE FLOW PATH FOR MAIN GENERATOR PURGING I- This temporary modification installs a hose from. hydrogen-(HY) system carbon-dioxide supply isolation valve 1HY615 to a test connection at valve 1HY604. This-hoseLvill provide
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an alternate flow path for purging the main generator with i carbon dioxide.. The normal flow path cannot-be used because of a hydrogen. leak past-3 way valve 1HY601.. The design
- pressure of the temporary hose and the alternate flow path is adequate for the carbon dioxide flow.
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AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION,-IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST.
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'89 0032 TEMP MOD 89-017 INSTALL BUTTON AND SWITCH COVERS This' temporary modification installs plastic covers over the buttons and-switches on the refueling and the fuel handling platforms. These covers will prevent accidental operation of the buttons and switches, and will be painted or coated to permit easy' identification if they should fall into a pool. Also, the~ top of the cover for the grapple switch will be clear-to permit the verification of grapple position. The plastic covers will not impact the operation :
of the refueling and fuel handling platforms..
AS,A RESULT.OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN i UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID.NOT EXIST.
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' IIAGE NO.- 6 -. TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS 09/15/89 L ,
-10CFR50i59 REPORT FROM JANUARY THROUGH MARCH 1989
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NUMBER EVALUAliD; TITLC
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. 89 0039 ~ TEMP MOD 89 021- DEFLAT SX' SYSTEM-VALVE AUTO CLOSE INTERLOCK
-This temporary modification' defeats the interlock which closes the. shutdown service water (SX) system valve ISX014A !
when the division I SX system pump starts.. This interlock ensures that the non-safety related plant service water.(WS) system piping.and heat loads are isolated from the safety related SX_ system piping and heat-loads while the SX system pump is running. ' Defeating the interlock will allow valve 1SX014A to be opened while_the SX system pump is running..
Then, with both the SX and WS system pumps running simultaneouslyrand with a minimum pressure differential !
across valve 1SX014A,' stroke testing of the valve will'be I performed. . While this interlock is defeated, the divison I SX systemcwill be declared out of service.
AS A RESULT OF.THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. .
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CLINTON POWER STATION ;
10CFR50.59 REPORT FOR- ,
PROCEDURES, TESTS.AND ,
AND'. EXPERIMENTS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS
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FROM JANUARY THROUGH' MARCH-
. 1989 b
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, IPAGE NO. E1 . PROCEDURES AND DOCUMENTS 09/15/89- ,
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10CFR50.59-REPORT FROM JANUARY-THROUGH' MARCH 1989'
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9 tM- D K WENT i NUMBER' EVALUATED TITLE
-89 0033 42800.26 R0 DROPPED NEUTRON SOURCE RECOVERY This plant: procedure will be used for the recovery of a dropped-neutron source from the core. Air operated pliers j
will be'used to' upright the dropped source so that the source can be picked up by the-instrument handling tool.
This? procedure-also. tests the performance of the air pliers- '
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on-a " mock up" neutrol. source in the fuel building to ensure that the-pliers are capable of manipulating the actual source. Failure of the, air-pliers.while manipulating the
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dropped neutron source will.not' increase the consequences of. ,
an accident as-lifting accidents over the core are based on a dropped fuellbundle which is heavier than a neutron source.- Also, failure of the air pliers while manipulating
'the-" mock up"-neutron source will not damage any components in the fuel building.
AS A RESULT'OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST.
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'89 0060 CR 1 88 09 091 REVISE' DRAWINGS TO SHOW CONFIGURATION OF PIPE LINE 1RE68A ;
_This-condition report revises a piping and instrumentation y . diagram and'a piping installation drawing to show a union,
.instead of a pipezflange-on pipe line'1RE6El of the
-containment building equipment drain (RE) system. This line routesivalve stem leakage-from the final injection valve of
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- the reactor core isolation cooling system to the equipment drains and is classified-as non-safety related. This change L'
will reflect'the actual field configuration of-the pipe line. The installed union meets the applicable design requirements. ;
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.AS A RESULT OF THE. EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. j j
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- 4 "PAGE NO. :2 PROCEDURES,AND DOCUMENTS 09/15/89' ')
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. NUMBER EVALUATED TITLE 89-0074 - ca 1 88-10-103 ' REVISE ESF' SYSTEM DESIGNATIONS 3 Thisl condition-report revises Chapters 6, 7 and 9 of the
-USAR to change the designations of various systems from engineered safety feature (ESP) systems to essential auxiliary. support (EAS) systems. .These changes provide 2
consistency between-the ESF designations in the USAR and the
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ESF designations in NUREG-0800, and do not alter the-design-W or functional requirements'of any plant systems or <
components. .The reliabili.ty of the systems that are being changed from ESFfsystems to EAS systems will not.be affected as there:will'be no change to maintenance or surveillance '
activities / requirements as a-result of this reclassification. ,
AS A~ RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST.
l 882 0348 : cR 188-11029 INOPERABLE TORQUE SWITCH ON SC SYSTEM' VALVE ,
A 10'CFR Part 21 notification issued by Limitorque Corporation identified:the potential failure of torque- .'
,; switches in.Limitorque valve actuators. All valves at Clinton Power' Station which contain this torque switch will be. verified-operable via testing with the exception of standby' liquid control (SC) system pump 1B suction isolation valve 1C41-F001B. The safety function of valve 1C41-F001B isxto open. An inoperable torque switch in this valve will
-not-affect its-ability to open and-therefore, will~have no affect on the valve's ability to perform its safety function.
AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST.
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-P GE NO.- 3= . PROCEDURES-AND DOCUMENTS 09/15/89
[10CFR50.59 REPORT FROM' JANUARY.THROUGHiMARCH 1989 LOG' IDOLUMENT
- NUMBER EVALUATED TITLE' .
r9-0059' cR 1 89 01*187- ADD' SEAL WELD TO THREADED CONNECTIONS-IN THE OG SYSTEM This condition report adds a seal _ weld to the 1" threaded outlet ' connections of offgas (OG) system relief valves 1N66-F040AL and 1N66-F040B. The-seal weld will. prevent
- leakage from the system through the existing threaded
- connections. Also,'the seal welding of 1". threaded
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connections in the OG system meets the-requirenents of Regulatory-Guide 1.143. ;
AS'A' RESULT OF THE' EVALUATION,.IT'WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST.
8'9 0050 CR 1 89 02 106 METAL DEBRIS ON THE JET PUMP SUPPORT PLATE.
This'conditionireport evaluates the impact of leaving metal debris lon' the jet pump - support' plate inside the reactor
- vessel. During the first refueling outage, an inspection of
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-the jet pumps revealed the debris, which consisted of small
, metal chips,1a piece of welding rod,-and_some pieces of light gauge wire'._ Because the debris has remained on the.
jet pump support plate (located outside of the core shroud) s for the entire first fuel cycle and the maximum flow rates prcduced by_the reactor recirculation system will remain the sane,' the debris will continue to remain on the jet pump support plate.
AS A RESULT OF_THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST.
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PAGE'NO. '4' ' PROCEDURES AND-DOCUMENTS 09/15/89-10CFR50'.59' REPORT FROM JANUARY.THROUGH MARCH 1989 LOC ' ' DOG MENT.
NUMBER' . EVALUATED . TifLF -
89 0046 EPIP AP 05 R3 A EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS TRAINING PROGRAM This Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure describos the e ~
methods-for conducting emergency preparedness' training.
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This revision specifies that-training on self contained breathing apparatus shall be: offered only to offsite fire departments on an annual basis instead of'to all offsite personnel who could potentially respond to an onsite emergency,,and clarifies'the. responsibilities-for the
. conduct,of.offsite training and the maintenance of training .;
[ records by the Emergency Planning Department. The self '
11 contained breathing. apparatus training change requires a !
I T* - revision:to-the Emergency Plan,'which is part of the USAR.
The rest of the changes are consistent with the Emergency Plan.
AS A RESULT OF;THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN-UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID.NOT EXIST. i
- 880397IIPQAMR19' REVISION OF THE IP NUCLEAR PROGRAM QA MANUAL j p The Illinois Power (IP)LNuclear Program Quality Assurance F (QA). Manual describes the quality program requirements and l the associated responsibilities of the nuclear program j
. departments. The manual is being revised to reflect the ,
current nuclear ptogram organizational structure and !
responsibilities, and to incorporate internal comments and -i
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comments'from the NRC.- These changes ~have been evaluated in accordance~with 10CFR50.54(a) and do not reduce.any previous commitments made to the NRC.
AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN ;
UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. i
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PAGE NO. 5 PROCEDURES'AND' DOCUMENTS 09/15/89
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10CFR50.59 REPORT FROM JANUARY THROUGH MARCH'1989
, LM DEWENT .
1 NUMBER EVALUATED TITLE
, 89 0043. MWR 003690 DEFEAT SX SYSTEM VALVE AUTO-CLOSE INTERLOCK i
This maintenance work request (MWR)1was issued to repair the ,
torque switch in shutdown service water (SX) system valve ISX014B. . To facilitate post maintenance, testing of-the valve, this MWR will lift leads and install jumpers to defeat an interlock which closes the valve when the division II SX system pump starts. This interlock ensures that the non-safety related plant service water (WS) system piping
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and heat loads are isolated from the safety related SX' ;
system and heat loads while the SX system pump is running.
Defeating the interlock will allow valve 1SX014B to be opened while the SX system pump is running. Then, with both the.SX and WS system pumps running simultaneously and with a minimum pressure ~diffarential across valve 1SX014B, stroke testing of the valve will be performed. While-this interlock is defeated, the division II SX system will be declared.out of service. ;
AS-A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST.
89 0013 PDR 89 0045 9337.81 FIRE DETECTOR CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL This procedure deviation for revision to the fire detector.
' channel functional-procedure will allow the use of a modified display annunciator module (DAX-1) card in fire protection panel 1H13-P841 during fire protection equipment surveillance testing. The modified =DAX-1 card will have its audible alarm feature bypassed with a switch to eliminate the nuisance alarms which will be received during i surveillance testing. While the audible alarm is bypassed,
. panal 1H13-P841 will be continuously monitored to ensure that. valid alarms receive the appropriate response. The modified DAX-1 card will not degrade the-performance or the L Underwriter's Laboratory rating of panel 1H13-P841.
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AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST.
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10CFR50.59 REPORT FROM JANUARY THROUGH MARCH 1989 LOG : PNENT i-~ ' NUMBER: .EVnLUATED- TITLE 89-0034 PDR 89-0140,141 - 3301.01 E1,V1 RT SYSTEM ELECTRICAL AND VALVE LINEUP As_part of the hydrogen water chemistry mini-test,
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electrochemical corrosion potential and constant extension rate. tensile measurements will-be conducted with reactor coolant obtained from'a reactor water cleanup (RT) system
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pump. . Due1to increased impurities at the reactor bottom
, head, these tests would be inconclusive if the-samples ,
- included reactor coolant taken from the bottom head drain. '
-This. procedure deviation.for revision to the RT system
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operating; procedure changes the electrical lineup (E1)_and '
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valve-lineup: (V1) such that the manually operated _ bottom head drain _ valve 1G33-F103 will be closed. RT system flow from the reactor bottom head will then be established by opening motor. operated bottom' head drain valve 1G33-F101.
< Use of valve 1G33-F101 to obtain flow from the reactor
~ bottom head-instead of valve 1G33-F103 will allow-the flow L from the reactor: bottom head to be isolated during the
' hydrogen water chemistry. mini-test. Operating the RT system
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without flow from the reactor' bottom head will not decrease-the effectiveness of the RT system or its. ability to prevent l thermal stratification in the: reactor bottom head because
-the flow will only be isolated during power operation while
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Lsufficient mixing is provided by the reactor recirculation '
2 system pumps. Finally, the additional isolations-of the bottom head drain piping will not significantly affect the drain piping's thermal fatigue analysis.
AS A-RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN-UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST.
L 89 0067 POR 89 0312 3506.01 DIESEL GENERATOR AND SUPPORT SYSTEMS ,
!
This plant operating procedure provides instructions for the safe operation of the diesel generator (DG) system and its associated support systems.. This procedure deviation for revision adds a procedure section that allows the installation of a jumper which bypasses the fuel' oil day tank high level cutout switch during additions of biocide to the diesel generator fuel oil system. Bypassing the cutout switch will allow the continuous running of the fuel oil transfer pump to evenly distribute the added biocide. The DG system will remain operable while the jumper is installed as none of its starting or operating characteristics are affected.
AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST.
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PAGE!NOh 7 PROCEDURES AND DOCUMENTS 09/15/89-
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d o^ 10CFR50.59~ REPORT FROM JANUARY THROUGH-MARCH 1989 1
- Loc' " DOCUMENT-NUMBER. EVALUATED - TITLE ,
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'i89-0003 STD PCP*03 003
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WESTINGHOUSE-HITTMAN MDSS PROCESS CONTROL'PRodRAM I 1
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The Westinghouse-Hittman' Mobile Incontainer Dewatering and l Solidification System (MDSS) . Process Control' Program' (PCP) 1 i' 'is being-implemented at Clinton Power Station. .The- 1 Westinghouse-Hittman MDSS is self contained and ties into ;
the solid radwaste processing (WX)' system at an existing J interface. point. The applicable ~ accident scenarios have '
been evaluated and were found to be acceptable. . Also, the 3 u
' system meets the design requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.143.-
'AS~A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN i UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT-EXIST. t
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89 0061: us a 1.e- COMPLIANCE TO REGULATORY GUIDE 1.21, REVISION 1 USAR Section 1.8 provides the licensee position on compliance to regulatory guides which are applicable to Clinton Power' Station (CPS). Regulatory Guide 1.21,
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Revision.1, provides guidance for measuring, evaluating, and
-reporting--radioactivity in solid wastes'and in releases of !
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radioactive materials in liquid and gaseous effluents from ;
nuclear power plants. This USAR change identifies various
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exceptions that are being taken to the' guidance. The !
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exceptions, however, still meet the measuring, evaluating,
- and reporting requirements of the Plant Technical Specifications.
AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN l
UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST.
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' PAGE,NO. 8 PROCEDURES AND DOCUMENTS 09/15/89 l
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10CFR$0.59 REPORT'FROM JANUARY THROUGH MARCH 1989 l l
b ton . ' oxumwi j uumsta tvAtuAtto Titu 89-0106 usAR 9.2 8
9.4 DESCRIPTION
S OF PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE ,
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This-USAR changa revises the description of maintenance in l varicus sections of Chapter 9 to state that maintenance is performed based on manufacturer's recommendations, plant' !
operating experience, and good engineering practice instead
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of being based solely on manufacturer's recommendations or !
requirements. Augmanting manufacturer's recommendations with
[. plant operating experience and engineering judgement -l
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provides a more effective methoa for specifying equipment L maintenance. This method is common in the industry and is i l
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acknowledged in the NRC draft Regulatory Guide DG ' 1, l Maintenance Programs for Nuclear Power Plants.
AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT war DETERMINED THAT AN t UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTIO!! DID NOT EXIST. ,
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89 oon usan TAs 3.9 5 BALANCE OF PLANT ACTIVE VALVES AND PUMPS
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' USAR Table 3.9-5 lists the balance of plant valves and pumps that are classified as active-safety related. The table is being rev3 sed to correct typographical errors, and to tid
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and delete various valves. The valves being added to the list ure seismically and environmentally qualified
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to f per;rr* their active-safety functions. The valves being deleted from the list have been evaluated to ensure that their active failure would not impact the safety function of l
their respective systems.
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AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINE 0 THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. ,
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i PAGE NO. 9 PROCEDURES AND DOCUMENTS 09/15/89
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210CFR50.59 REPORT FROM JANUARY THROUGH MARCH 1989 too Docustwt mretR tvAtuAtto flitt .
I C>0334 usAR TAB 3.9 5, RECLASSIFY INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM VALVES i This USAR change adds check valve 11A175 and relief valvec
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lIA128A and IIA 128B to the list of active balance of plant >
pumps and valves. Check valve lIA175 functions as a containment isolation valve and relief valves lIA120A and ;
IIA 128B provide overpressure protection for the automatic ,
depressurization system air supply bottle farms. The above ,
valves have been seismically and environmentally qualified to perform their active sa.fety functions. r AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED. SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST.
a? 0057 USAR TAB 6.2 47 ADD VALVE 8 TO THE CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE LIST
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This USAR change adds and deletes valves from the list of l containment isolation valves because of the re-classification of the low pressure core spray system, the residual heat removal system low pressure =oolant injection mode, the reactor core isolation cooling system, and the high pressure coro spray system, from closed loop outside containment (CLOC) systems to non-CLOC systems. The valves being added to the list meet the applicable requirements for
- containment isolation valves. The valves being deleted from the list no longer function as containment isolation valves ,
because they are the third containment boundary.
AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN I
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UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST.
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'PAGE NO. 10 PROCEDURES AND DOCUMENTS 09/15/89 10CFR50.59 REPORT FROM J ANUARY THROUGH KARCH 1989
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Loc oxwnf -
NUMBER EVALUAftD TITLE i
89 0072 USAR TAs 6.2 47 REVISE CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE CLOSURE TIMES ]
This USAR change revises the closure times for various
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contdinnent isolation valves listed in USAR' Table.6.2-47 to !
make the closure times consistent with those specified in Technical Specification Table 3.6.4-1. The closure times i for 88 valves are being reduced and thus, are more !'
conservative. -Three valves, however, are having their closure times increased. This increase is acceptable ,
because the original closure time was specified to
- demonstrate valve operability, not to limit a release from -
the containment. The increased closure times are still !
adequate to demonstrate operability of the valves.
AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST.
89 0088 USAR TAB 9.5 5 REVISE DIVISION I AND II DIE 8EL ENGINE OIL CAPACITY .
This USAR change revises the lube oil capacity of the !
division I and II 12 cylinder diesel engines and lists the lube oil capacity of the division I and II 16 cylinder diesel engines. These lube oil capacities were provided by the manufacturer of the diesel engines and have been verified by actual measurement. The revised oil capacities will not impact the previously assumed fire loading of the divison I and II diesel generator bays. [
AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST.
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