ML082381133
| ML082381133 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | North Anna  |
| Issue date: | 08/21/2008 |
| From: | NRC/RGN-II |
| To: | |
| References | |
| ER-08-301 | |
| Download: ML082381133 (216) | |
See also: IR 05000338/2008301
Text
Draft Submittal (Pink Paper)SIMULATOR SCENARIOS NORTH ANNA JUNE 2008 EXAM 05000338/2008301
&05000339/2008301
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: North Anna Scenario No.: 1 Op-Test No.: 1 Examiners:
Operators:
Initial Conditions:
Reactor is at 45%power MOL ready to start a second feed pump.Unit was returned to power yesterday following feed train work, and cleared chemistry hold 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> ago.Rods are in manual due to a problem with auto rod control.The letdown radiation monitor is OOS.1-FW-P-2 (terry turbine)was tagged out during the chemistry hold and was just returned to service.2-CC-P-1A is tagged out for seal work.Turnover: Start the"C" feed pump: the pump seals have already been vented in preparation
for the start.Continue to ramp unit to 1 00%using manual rods until instrument
shop is finished troubleshooting
the rod control problem.Event Malf.No.Event Event No.Type*Description
1 N (8)Start a second feed pump per OP 2 N (R)Ramp unit up using normal ramping OP R (8)(S)3 CN0201 C (8)(S)Condensate
pump trips with no auto-start
of standby pump 3a RD0121 TS (S)Several minutes later IRPI indication
for C8"A" rod K2 drops to 0 4 CH08 I (R)(S)Failure of 1-CH-FT-1122
high 5 MS1701 I (8)(S)Failure of"A" SG steam pressure channel III low (which also fails steam TS (S)flow)6 CH13 C (R)(S)Tube leak in non-regenerative
HX 7 MS1001 C (8)(S)"A" SG Steam leak outside containment
8 MS1001 M (ALL)"A" SG MSL8 outside containment
9 RD32 C (ALL)Reactor doesn't trip automatically
or manually (or with AMSAC)RD38 10 RD14 C (R)(S)Rods will not insert in auto 11 FW2601 I (8)(S)Motor-driven
AFW pumps don't auto-start
FW2602 Scenario may be ended when safety injection has been terminated
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
DOMINION NORTH ANNA POWER STATION INITIAL LICENSED OPERATOR EXAMINATION
SIMULATOR EXAMINATION
GUIDE SCENARIO NRC 1
EVENT 1.2.3.4.5.6.7.8.SIMULATOR EXAMINATION
GUIDE DESCRWTION
Start a second feed pump using OP Ramp unit up using normal ramping OP Trip of a running Condensate
pump with no auto-start
of standby pump w/IRPI for control bank"A" rod K-2 dropping to 0 Failure of l-CH-FT-1122
high Failure of steam pressure channel low Tube leak in non-regenerative
HX Steam leak outside containment
MSLB outside containment
Scenario Recapitulation:
Malfunctions
after EOP entry Total Malfunctions
Abnormal Events Major Transients
EOPs Entered EOP Contingencies
Critical Tasks 2 (Reactor will not trip automatically
or manually/rods
will not insert in auto, motor-driven
aux feed pumps do not auto-start)
9 (Running condensate
pump trips/standby
pump doesn'tstart, IRPI failure, l-CH-FT-1122
failure, SG steam pressure channel failure, tube leak in non-regen HX, steam leak outside containment, MSLB, reactor will not trip automatically
or manually/rods
will not insert in auto, motor-driven
aux feed pumps do not auto-start)
5 (Running condensate
pump trips/standby
pump doesn'tstart, l-CH-FT-1122
failure, SG steam pressure channel failure, tube leak in non-regen HX, steam leak outside containment)
1 (MSLB outside containment)
3 (FR-S.l, E-2, ES-l.l)1 (FR-S.l)3 SCENARIO DITRATION 130 Minutes SXGNRC 1 Page 2 Revision 0
SIMULATOR EXAMINATION
SCENARIO SUMMARY SCENARIO NRC 1 The scenario starts with the unit at 45%power ready for a second Main Feed Water pump to be started.The unitwasreturned
to power last shift following feed train work and cleared a 30%chemistry hold 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> ago.Rods are in manual due to a problem with auto rod control that I&C is currently investigating.
The letdown radiation monitor is OOS.The turbine-driven
auxiliary feedwater pump, I-FW-P-2, was tagged out during the chemistry hold and has just been returned to service, PMT was SAT.2-CC-P-IA is tagged out for seal work.First, the crew will start a second Main Feed Pump in accordance
with I-OP-2.I,"Unit Startup from Mode 2 to Mode 1," and I-OP-3I.I,"Main Feedwater System." Next, the crew will ramp the unit up in accordance
with I-OP-2.I,"Unit Startup from Mode 2 to Mode 1." Once the reactor power has increased approximately
5%, the first failure will occur.During the ramp, I-CN-P-IA will trip and I-CN-P-IB will not auto-start.
The crew will enter I-AP-3I,"Loss of Main Feedwater," and start the"B" Condensate
pump.Several minutes into the event, an IRPI for rod K-2 in control bank"A" will drop to zero.The US will review technical specification
3.1.7 and notify the instrument
shop.Once condensate
flow has beenestablished
and tech specs reviewed, the next event can occur.At this time, charging flow transmitter, I-CH-FT-1122, will fail high.The crew will respond in accordance
with the AR for C-C5 and take manual control of I-CH-FCV-II22.
Once charging flow has been restored to normal the next event can occur.Next, the Channel III steam pressure transmitter
for"A" SG (I-MS-PT-I475)
fails low.The crew should enter I-AP-3,"Loss of Vital Instrumentation," swap steam generator level control channels, and refer to technical specifications.
At this time the next event can occur.Due to the earlier oscillation
on the charging system, a tube leak will develop in theregenerative
heat exchanger.
The crew will respond in accordance
with I-AP-I6,"Increasing
Primary Plant Leakage." The crew will isolate letdown and make preparations
to place excess letdown in service.At this time the next event can occur.Asmall steam leak will develop in the main steam valve house on the"A" steam line between the main steam trip valve and the containment
wall.The crew will notice a decrease in megawatts and an increase in reactor power and enter I-AP-38,"Excessive
Load Increase," and begin to ramp the unit down.At this time the next event can occur.The"A" main steam line will rupture and the crew will be expected to enter I-E-O,"Reactor Trip and Safety Injection." The reactor will fail to trip, requiring the crew to transition
to FR-S.I,"Response to Nuclear Power GenerationJATWS." Rods will not be able to be inserted in auto.Once the reactor has tripped the crew will return to I-E-O and then transition
to I-E-2,"Faulted Steam Generator Isolation." The crew will then transition
to I-ES-I.I,"SI Termination." The scenario may be ended once SI has been terminated, or at the discretion
of the lead evaluator.
SXGNRC 1.Page 3 Revision 0
SCENARIO TJIRNOVER SHEET Read the following to the crew: Purpose: This examination
is intended to evaluate the crew's performance
of various tasks associated
with the Initial LicenseOperatorTraining
Program.All activities
should be completed in accordance
with approved operations
standards.
1.You are on a day shift during the week.2.When conditions
allow, utilize the computer log systems as you would in the plant.Unit Status: Unit 1 is at 45%power.RCS boron is 1202 ppm and core age is 9000 MWD/MTU.Aux steam is on unit 2.Unit 2 is at 100%power.Equipment Status: The unit was returned to powerlastshift following feed train work and cleared a 30%chemistry hold 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> ago.Control rods are in manual while the Instrument
Department
investigates
a problem with auto rod control.1-CH-RI-128
is out of service.The turbine-driven
auxiliary feedwater pump, 1-FW-P-2, was tagged out during the chemistry hold and was just returned to service, PMT was SAT.2-CC-P-1A is tagged out for seal work.Maintenance
rule window is green.Shift Orders: Start"C" main feedwater pump and then commence a ramp to 100%power.The 2 non-running
Main Feed Pumps have been vented per the OP.An operator is standing by at the feed pump.Control rods are to remain in Manual at this time due to the problem with auto rod control.SXGNRC 1 Page 4 Revision 0
SPD Verified: (Initials)
- I-FW-P-ICstarts
and runs normally BOP places"B" Condensate
pump in PTL.BOP places both control switches forFW-P-IC in PTL.BOP closes I-FW-MOV-I50C.
BOP verifies/places
switches for"B" MFP inPTL.BOP verifies/aligns
feed recircs.BOP starts each"C" MFP motor.BOP opens discharge MOV.BOP instructs field operator to monitor local lube oil tern erature.BOP places the"B" MFP in AUTO and verifies its dischar e MOV 0 ens.BOP places"B" Condensate
pump in AUTO.Crew directs initiation
of O-GOP-2.I8.
NOTE: The next event can occur once the crew has laced"C" MFP in service.SXGNRC 1 Page 5 Revision 0
SPD Verified: (Initials)
- Reactor power increases*Turbine power increases*Tavg/Tref increase*Generator megawatts increase NOTE: The crew may raise primary temperature
prior to ramping the turbine.BOP verifies/sets
desired ramp rate.BOP increases turbine setter to desired osition.BOP presses GO on turbine.BOP monitors turbine ramp.BOP adjusts limiter position, as required.RO starts a dilution when required.RO withdraws control rods to maintain rima tern erature.RO places AMSAC in"Normal" when rocedure criteria met.NOTE: The next event can occur once the crew has ramped approximately
5°;6 as determined
b the lead evaluator.
SXGNRC 1 Page 6 Revision 0
Main Condensate
pump has tripped w'cted to*respond in accordance
INSTRUCTOR
REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials)
- Annunciators
G-G6 and, later, G-F6 illuminate
- I-CN-P-IA has amber breaker disagreement
light lit*I-CN-P-IB does not auto-start
- Feed pump suction pressure decreases*After several mintues: annunciators
A-G2 and AFI will illuminate
- IRPI for rod K-2 in Control Bank A will drop to zero*Rod Bottom Light for K-2 will illuminate
BOP identifies
G-G6, CONDENSATE
PP IA-IB-IC AUTO TRIP illuminated.
BOP identifies
that I-CN-P-IA has tripped and I-CN-P-IB has not auto-started.
NOTE: Crew may not stop the ramp until immediate actions of AP have been com leted.US directs crew to stop ramp and secure an on-oin dilution.US directs entry into AP-31.BOP checks power>70%.(NO)BOP verifies 2 main feed pump running.BOP checks MFW pump suction pressure>300 si.0 BOP starts"B" Condensate
pump.BOP checks any MFW pumps tripped.o Crew evaluates reducing power<55%.*BOP stabilizes
SG levels.*Crew verifies MFP performance:
- Suction pressure adequate*<550 amps on motors*Annunciator
F-B5 NOT lit.SXGNRC I Page 7 Revision 0
NOTE: Report from field will be that the"B" pump is running fine.Nothing to see locally on the" A" pump.If sent to breaker will report an overcurrent
dro.Crew maintains stable plant conditions.
NOTE: Several minutes after the Condensate
pump trip, IRPI K-2 will dro to zero.RO identifies
A-G2, RPI ROD BOT ROD DROP, and A-FI, CMPTR ALARM ROD DEV/SE.NOTE: If unsure of conditions, the crew may enter l-AP-l.2 for a dropped rod.Steps in this procedure were not included.ROidentifies
IRPI K-2 in control bank"A" is readin zero.RO checks for other indications
of a dro ed rod.RO identifies
that no rod has dropped, IRPI roblem.NOTE: If I&C is asked to investigate
the K-2 rod, they will report that it is an IRPI roblem.US refers to TS 3.1.7 A and determines
that a flux map must be done within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> (if current power is>50%)or power reduced to<50%.US makes notifications
on Condensate
pump trip/auto-start
failure, and IRPI indication.
NOTE: The next event may occur once the standby Condensate
pump has been started and tech specs have been reviewed.SXGNRC 1 Page 8 Revision 0
TIME EXPECTED*ACTION
INSTRUCTOR
REMARKS SPD Y erified: (Initials)
- Annunciator
C-C5 will illuminate
- 1-CH-FI-1122
will indicate full scale high*1-CH-FCY-1122
will indicate minimum demand*Later C-B3 may alarm if 1-CH-FCY-1122
not vet in manual and ooen.RO identifies
C-C5, CH PP TO REGEN HX HI-LO FLOW.RO identifies
charging flow indicates high on 1-CH-FI-1122.
RO identifies
actual charging flow indicates low.NOTE: RO will need to monitor pressurizer
andVCT levels, and/or letdown temperature, to adjust charging flow.RO takes manual control of1122 and restores charging flow to normal.Crew makes report of instrument
failure and requests assistance.
NOTE: The next event can occur once the crew has restored charging flow to normal.SXGNRC 1 Page 9 Revision 0
SPD Verified: (Initials)
- Annunciators
F-Hl and F-El illuminate
- Status lights N-C3 and N-D3 illuminate
- I-MS-PI-1475
fails low*1-MS-FI-1474
fails low*"A" MFRV ramps closed*"A" SG level decreases BOP identifies
F-Hl, HI STM LINE SG lA LO and F-El, STM GENIA FW>STM FLOW CH III-IV.BOP identifies
I-MS-PI-1475
and1474 failin low.US directs the crew to enter 1-AP-3.BOP verifies redundant channels normal.BOP takes manual control of the"A" Main Feed Re Valve to control SG level.Crew verifies first stage pressure indications
normal.Crew verifies systems affected by PRZR level channels normal:*RO verifies operable pressurizer
level channel selected*RO verifies letdown in service*Crew leaves l-CH-FCV-1122
in manual due to previous failure*RO verifies control group heaters are not tri ed.Crew verifies both first stage pressure channels normal.Crew verifies all SGWLC channels selected to an 0 erable channel.0 f a failed steam pressure transmitter"tal Instrumentation." INSTRUCTOR
REMARKS SXGNRC 1 Page 10 Revision 0
Crew swaps to operable SGWLC channels.*RO verifies control rods in manual*Crew places steam dumps in either OFF or steam pressure mode*BOP checks all bypass MRFVs in manual*BOP places all MFRVs in manual*Crew selects channel IV on SGWLCS*Crew verifies all SG level channels are operable*BOP verifies steam generator levels are on program*BOP places MFRVs in Auto*RO returns steam dumps to Tave mode*Crew leaves control rods in manual due to auto rod control roblem.Crew verifies operation of instruments
and enters applicable
MOPs (I-MOP-55.77
for steam flow and 55.79 for steam ressure.US refers to Technical Specification
3.3.1 (function 15-72 hours to place in trip), 3.3.2 (functions
Ie, If, 4d, 4e-72 hours to place.in trip), 3.3.3 (function 17-Info action), 3.3.4 (Table B 3.3.4-1, Instrument
3c-Info action.US reports failure and requests assistance, WR,andCR.NOTE: The next event can occur once TS have been reviewed, or as directed by the lead evaluator.
SXGNRC 1 Page 11 Revision 0
SPD Verified: '(Initials)
- Letdown flow decreases*VCT level slowly decreases*CC sur e tank level slowl increases RO identifies
a decrease in letdown flow and/or a decrease in VCT level.NOTE: Crew may also check Aux Building and Containment
sump levels at this time.US announces entry into AP-16.Crew verifies unit in modes 1,2, or 3.*RO verifies parameters
under his control:*PRZR level*RCS subcooling
- VCT level.RO checks 1-CH-LCV-1115A
not diverted.NOTE: Crew may also notice increase in CC sur e tank level at an time.Crew checks letdown parameters
normal for plant conditions:
- Letdown flow.0 RO isolates letdown:*Closes 1-CH-HCV-1200B
- Closes 1-CH-LCV-1460A
and 1460B.Crew checks excess letdown temperature
and ressure.Crew checks charging parameters
normal:*Pump discharge pressure*Flow*Regen HX outlet temperature
- Seal Injection flow*AB sum level.SXGNRC 1 Page 12 Revision 0
ry plantleakage
due to a tube leak iIi the non ons in accordance
with 1-AP-16'l"Increasing
EXPECTED ACTION Crew checks containment
parameters:
- Sump pumping rate*Temperature
- Pressure*Radiation*Dispatches
operator with AB attachment
as time ermits.Crew checks safeguards
parameters:
- Sump alarms*Radiation monitors*Temperatures
- Locall check for leaks as re uired.Crew verifies 1-CH-FCV-1122 in auto (and determines
that it is not desired to lace in AUTO due to revious failure.Crew checks sample system.Crew checks no CVCS manipulations
in ro ress.Crew makes preparations
to place excess letdown in service.NOTE: The next event can occur once letdown has been isolated and the crew is making preparations
to place excess letdown in service.SXGNRC 1 Page 13 Revision 0
SPD Verified: (Initials)
- Main steam pressure decreasing.
- Tave decreasing.
- Power increasing.
RO identifies
Tave decreasing
unex ectedl.Crew identifies
that power is increasing.
US directs crew to enter 1-AP-38.RO verifies all steam dumps closed.BOP verifies all SO PORVs closed.Crew verifies main turbine load normal and reactor ower100%and stable.NOTE: When operators have been dispatched, a call will be made stating that there is steam coming out the door of the Unit one main steam valve house.RO commences lowering Tave using borationlcontrol
rods.BOP commences lowering main turbine load.NOTE: Once the crew is informed of the steam issuing from the MSVH they may choose to trip the reactor due to safety concerns and because a power reduction will cause SG ressures to increase.Crew checks reactor power reduced to the ower level before the event started.NOTE: The next event will occur when ramp has been stopped, the unit has been tripped, or as directed by the lead evaluator.
SXONRC 1 Page 14 Revision 0
- Annunciators
F-Fl, F-F2, F-F3 illuminate
- "A" steam generator pressure decreases until generator is blown down*The reactor does not trip automatically
or manually*Control rods do not insert in auto*Neither motor-driven
AFW urn auto-starts
Crew identifies
a main steam line break has occurred.US directs crew to enter 1-E-O.RO/BOP attempt to trip the reactor.US directs the crew to transition
to FR-8.1.Crew identifies
reactor did not trip, transitions
to I-FR-S.l,"Response to Nuclear Power Generation/
ATWS,"*RO/BOP manually trips the reactor.(NO)*BOP tri s the turbine Critical Task*BOP checks all AFW pumps running, (NO)Crew identifies
reactor did not trip, transitions
to I-FR-S.l,"Response to Nuclear Power Generation/
ATWS,"*RO verifies at least one charging pump runnln.Critical Task CT Continued***Crew verifies adequate negative reactivi insertion or in*ects the BIT.SXGNRC 1 Page 15 Revision 0
EXPECTED ACTION NOTE: Once the steam leak is reported the crew ma close the MSTVs.NOTE: A safety injection will likely occur before the reactor is tripped.The crew will initiate attachment
for SI after the reactor has been shutdown.NOTE: Approximately
two minutes after operator is dispatched
the reactor will be locall tri ed.Crew dispatches
operator to locally trip reactor.NOTE: If reactor is sub critical the crew will transition
to E-O at this time, see below for ste s.Crew checks if reactor is subcritical.
NOTE: Crew may throttle auxiliary feed in this or subse uent ste s.BOP checks SG levels.Crew verifies all dilution paths isolated.Crew checks for reactivity
insertion from uncontrolled
cooldown.BOP closes the MSTVs and Bypass Valves.Cre_w checks for faulted SG.Crew checks CETCs less than 1200 o P.Crew verifies the reactor is subcritical.
US directs transition
to 1-E-O.RO verifies reactor tripped.BOP verifies turbine tripped.RO verifies AC emergency busses ener ized.E-O steps SXGNRC 1 Page 16 Revision 0
RO/BOP check if SI has actuated or is re uired.YES BOP verifies feedwater isolation:
- MFRV s closed*MFRBV s closed*Main feed MOV s closed*Standby MFP in PTL*Main feed pumps tripped*MFP discharge MOVS closed*SG BD TV s closed.Crew verifies phase A isolation:
- Manually initiates Phase A*Initiates Attachment
to veri isolation.
BOP verifies aux feed pumps running.RO verifies charging pumps running.BOP verifies low head pumps running.BOP verifies all SW pumps running.Crew checks if main steamlines
should be isolated.Crew verifies SI flow.BOP verifies aux feed flow.*RO checks Tave stable at or trending to desired temperature
and Aux Feed flow is ad*usted if re uired.RO checks pressurizer
PORVs and spray valves.RO checks RCP trip and charging pump recirc criteria.Crew checks SG not faulted.(NO)US directs transition
to 1-E-2.BOP closes the MSTVs and Bypass Valves.If not done in FR-S.1 or using a focused brief.SXGNRC 1 Page 17 Revision 0
BOP checks pressure in all SGs.Crew identifies"A" as faulted SG.NOTE: Crew may have already isolated feed flow to the faulted generator using a focused brief.ak has'occurred and the will be*expected to respond"Response to Nuclear an-ES-l.l.,"S1 Crew isolates the faulted SG.Critical Task*BOP verifies MFW isolated.**BOP verifies I-FW-MOV-I00A
andFW-HCV-I00A
closed.*BOP verifies"A" SG PORV closed.*BOP verifies all SG blowdown trip valves closed.*Crew dispatches
an operator to locally close I-MS-18.BOP checks ECST level.BOP verifies 1A established
to containment.
Crew checks secondary radiation.
- RO resets S1*RO resets phase A*RO resets AMSAC (if necessary)
- BOPchecks secondary radiation normal.Crew checks if S1 can be terminated.
YES US directs transition
to l-ES-l.l.RO stops all but one charging pump.RO checks RCS pressure.SXGNRC 1 Page'18 Revision 0
EVENT 8: Given that the unitis at power, and am**steallllin.e
break has occUll"edand
the reactor cannot be tripped either automatically
nor ually, the crew will be e ected to respond in ac danoe withl-E-:O," ct?r..r Safe tion," I-FR-S.l,"Resp se to Nuclear nerationJATWS
-2""Faulted'Stea
'enerator Isolation,," and 1-8-1.1""81'EXPECTED ACTION Crew terminates
SI:*BOP verifies LHSI suctions from sump closed*RO checks charging pump recirc flow path aligned*BOP closes BIT inlet valves1867 A and 1867B*BOP closes BIT outlet valvesMOV-1867C and 1867D*BOP verifies alternate SI valves closed.NOTE: The scenario may be terminated
after the crew terminates
SI, or as directed b the lead evaluator.
SXGNRC 1 Page 19 Revision 0
REFERENCES
Operating Procedure 1-0P-31.1," Main Feedwater System." Operating Procedure 1-0P-2.1,"Unit Startup from Mode 2 to Mode 1." Abnormal Procedure l-AP-3,"Loss.0fVital Instrumentation." Abnormal Procedure l-AP-16,"Increasing
Primary Plant Leakage." Abnormal Procedure l-AP-31,"Loss of Main Feedwater." Abnormal Procedure l-AP-38,"Excessive
Load Increase." Functional
Restoration
Procedure I-FR-S.l,"R.esponse
to Nuclear Power Generation!
A TWS." Emergency Procedure l-E-O,"Reactor Trip or Safety Injection." Emergency Procedure l-E-2,"Faulted Steam Generator Isolation." Emergency Procedure l-ES-l.l,"SI Termination." Station Annunciator
Response Procedures.
Guide and Reference Document PI-AA-5000,"Human Performance." INPO, Guideline for Teamwork and Diagnostic
Skill Development:
INPO 88-003, INPO, ACAD 07-002 Simulator Training Guidelines
42 86 22 24 4 14 14 36 11 18 N/A 1 Jan.1988 Jan.2007 SXGNRC 1 Page 20 Revision 0
ATTACHMENTS
ATTACHMENT1-SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S
COMPUTER PROGRAM ATTACHMENT2-SCENARIO PERFORMANCE
OBJECTIVES
ATTACHMENT3-SIMULATOR PERFORMANCE
DATASHEET (Last page of scenario)SXGNRC 1 Page 21 Revision 0
SXGNRC 1 ATTACHMENT
1 SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S
COMPUTER PROGRAM Page 22 Revision 0
SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S
COMPUTER PROGRAM NRCl Injtjalcondjtjons
1.RecallIC 161 2.Ensure Tave (555-565), Tref, PDTT level, and VCT level are selected on trend recorders.
3.Place a WRmagnet on l-CH-RI-128.
4.Set D bank to 155 steps in PCS.5.I-OP-2.I and I-OP-31.I filled out to appropriate
steps.6.Reactivity
plan available.
7.Rods in manual.8.Rackout 2-CC-P-IA and verify 2-CC-P-IB is running.Close U2_CC_ll, U2_CC_4.Letdown rad monitor failure Malfunction:
RM0207, Severity=-1 Auto-start
failure of l-CN-P-Switch override: IB CNPIB ASTOP=OFF Auto-start
failure of I-FW-P-Malfunctions:
3AJ3B FW260I FW2602 Failure of rods to move in auto Failure of Auto or Manual Reactor Trip SXGNRC 1 Malfunction:
RD14 Malfunctions:
RD32 RD38 Remote function: RP AMSAC DEFEAT=TRUE Page 23 Revision 0
1)Start a MFW pump 2)Unit ramp 3)Trip of"A" Condensate
pump/IRPI failure Give appropriate
cues as WCC and field operator.MFW pump suction flows are available on Extreme View.Give appropriate
cues as WCC and field operators.
Malfunctions:CN0201,Delay
time==5, Trigger==3 RDO 121, Delay time==185, Severity==-1, Trigger==3 NOTE: When sent to Condensate
pumps, report that"B" is running fine.Can see no nothing wrong with A" locally.If sent to Condensate
pump breaker, report that 15A4 has an overcurrent
drop on it.NOTE: If I&C technicians
are called about rod, can report back that it is an IRPI problem.As they would be standing by for IRPI adjustments
during the ramp, this communication
can be given in a timely manner.NOTE: The next event can occur once Condensate
flow has been re-established
and tech specs have been reviewed.4)Failure of 1-CH-FT-1122
Malfunction:
CH08, Delay time==5, Severity==1, Ramp==10, Trigger==4 NOTE: If dispatched
to look at valve, transmitter, etc, report that everything
looks normal.NOTE: The next event can occur once charging has been returned to normal, or as directed by the lead evaluator.
5)Failure of"A" SG CH.III steam pressure Malfunction:
MS 1701, Delay time==5, Ramp==5, Severity==-1, Trigger==5 NOTE: The next event can occur once Tech Specs have been reviewed.SXGNRC 1 Page 24 Revision 0
6)Tube leak in non-regen HX 7)Steam leak outside containment
8)MSLB with A TWS/Rods will not insert in auto Malfunction:
CH13, Delay time=5, Ramp=120, Severity=50, Trigger=6 NOTE: The next event can occur once letdown has been isolated and preparations
are being made to place excess letdown in service.Do not close breaker for excess letdown procedure until after next event initiated.
Malfunction:
MS1001, Delay time=5, Ramp=180, Severity=2.5, Trigger=7 NOTE: When operators have been dispatched, a call will be made stating that there is steam coming out the door of the Unit one main steam valve house.NOTE: The next event can occur once reactor power has been stabilized, or the unit has been tripped.Malfunctions:
Update MSI001 to a severity of 20 using trigger 8 On trigger screen set up trigger 8 as follows: IMP MS1001 (0 5)20 300 NOTE: Trigger 10 will open the RTBs TWO minutes after it is inserted.Remote functions:
SP_RTA_BKR=F, Delay time=120, Trigger=10 SP_RTB_BKR=F, Delay time=121, Trigger=10 NOTE: Check SG pressure and decide if you could safely enter MSVH at that time.NOTE: The scenario may be terminated
once the crew has terminated
safety injection, or at the direction of the lead evaluator.
SXGNRC 1 Page 25 Revision 0
SXGNRC 1 ATTACHMENT
2 SCENARIO PERFORMANCE
OBJECTIVES
Page 26 Revision 0
SIMULATOR REQUALIFICATION
EXAMINATION
TERMINAl, PERFORMANCE
OBJECTIVE Given equipment failures and operationalsituations,operate
the plant in aGcordance
with Technical Specifications
to bring the unit to a safe condition, using applicable
procedures, and applying effective teamwork, communication, and diagnostic
skills.GENERIC PERFORMANCE
OBIF,CTIVES
A.During shift operations
the shift manager will take a conservative
course of action, especially
when uncertain conditions
exist, when dealing with core cooling or heat sink availability, primary systemandcontainment
integrity, and reactivity
control associated
with plant evolutions.
B.During shift operations
the shift manager will provide overall crew guidance by prioritizing
and integrating
the actions of the shift crew in accordance
with administrative
procedures.
C.During shift operations
each crew member will participate
in a team effort that resolves conflicts, provides input into the team decision and communicates
all the necessary information
to enhance teamwork in accordance
with administrative
procedures.
D.During shift operations
the Shift Technical Advisor will independently
assess events and based on those assessments
make recommendations
to the crew regarding mitigation
strategy.SXGNRC 1 Page 27 Revision 0
EVENT 1 PERFORMANCE
OBJECTIVES
Given that the unit is at 45%power, the crew will start a second Main Feedwater in accordance
with 1-0P-31.1,"Main Feedwater System." NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS: R406 Start a standby main feedwater pump.CRITICAl, TASK: N/A SXGNRC 1 Page 28 Revision 0
EVENT GOAl,;EVENT 2 PERFORMANCE
OB,IECTlVES
Given that the unit is at 45%power and the crew has been instructed
to increase power, the crew will ramp the unit up in accordance
with2.1,"Unit Startup from Mode 2 to Mode 1." NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS;R705 Dilute the RCS using the blender.CRITICAl, TASK;N/A SXGNRC 1 Page 29 Revision 0
EVENT GOAl J: EVENT 3 PERFORMANCE
OBJECTIVES
Given that the unit is at power and a Main Condensate
pump has tripped with no auto-start
of the standby pump, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance
with l-AP-31,"Loss
of Main Feedwater." NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS: R781 Respond to a loss of main feedwater.
S70 Evaluate compliance
with technical specifications.
CRITICAl, TASK: N/A SXGNRC 1 Page 30 Revision 0
EVENT 4 PERFORMANCE
OBJECTIVES
Given that the charging flow transmitter
has failed high, the crew will respond in accordance
with AR for C-C5 annunciator
NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS: None CRITICAl, TASK: N/A SXGNRC 1 Page 31 Revision 0
EVENT GOAl,: EVENT 5 PERFORMANCE
OBJECTIVES
Given the plant is in mode one with indications
of a failed steam pressure transmitter, the crew will respond in accordance
with l-AP-3,"Loss of Vital Instrumentation.
" NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS: R626 Respond to a steam generator water level control channel failure.S70 Evaluate compliance
with technical specifications.
CRITICAl, TASK: N/A SXGNRC 1 Page 32 Revision 0
EVENT 6 PERFORMANCE
OBJECTIVES
Given that there are indications
of primary plant leakage due to a tube leak in the non-regenerative
heat exchanger, the crew will take actions in accordance
with l-AP-16,"Increasing
Primary Plant Leakage." NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS: R520 Respond to increasing
primary-plant
leakage.CRITICAIJ TASK: N/A SXGNRC 1 Page 33 Revision 0
EVENT GOAl,;EVENT 7 PERFORMANCE
OBJECTIVES
Given a steam leak between a MSTV and containment, the crew will respond in accordance
with l-AP-38,"Excessive
Load Increase." NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS;R539 Perform the immediate operator actions in response to an excessive load increase.CRITICAl, TASK;N/A SXGNRC 1 Page 34 Revision 0
EVENT GOAl,: EVENT 8 PERFORMANCE
OB,IECTIVES
Given that the unit is at power, and a main steam line break has occurred and the reactor cannot be tripped either automatically
nor manually, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance
with l-E-O,"Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," I-FR-S.l,"Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS," I-E-2,"Faulted Steam Generator Isolation," andES-I.I,"SI Termination." NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS: R224 Perform the immediate operator actions in response to a nuclear power generation/ATWS.
RI83 Identify and isolate a faulted steam generator.
RI89 Terminate safety injection.
CRITICAl, TASK: See Following Pages SXGNRC 1 Page 35 Revision 0
CT Statement*
Crew identifies
reactor did not trip, transition
to I-FR-S.l,"Response toNuclearPower
GenerationlATWS," and take actions to bring thereactorsubcritical.
Safety Significance*
Failure to insert negative reactivity
under the postulated
plant conditions
results in an unnecessary
situation in which the reactor remains critical.Failure to insert negative reactivity
constitutes"mis-operation
or incorrect crew performance
which leads to incorrect reactivity
control." Valid indication
of a required reactor trip by the presence of a first out annunciator, with a failure of the reactor to trip automatically
or manually from the control room.Performance
Indicator*
RO inserts control rods in manual RO places in-service
boric acid transfer pump in fast speed.RO opens emergency borate valve l-CH-MOV-1350-OR-Crew dispatches
operator to locally trip the reactor using attachment, Remote Reactor Trip.Feedback**Control rods moving in or fully inserted.*Emergency boration flow indicated.
- Neutron flux decreasing.
- Pressurizer
pressure less than 2335 psig.WOO Reference*
FR-S.l Background.
Conditions*
Prior to completion
of step requiring its performance.
SXGNRC 1 Page 36 Revision 0
CT Statement-
Crew starts all AFW pumps_Safety Significance-
Failure to start at least the minimum required number of AFW pumps under the postulated
plant conditions
can lead to violation of the RCS emergency stress limit.Validindication
of a required reactor trip by the presence of a first out annunciator, with a failure of the reactor to trip automatically
or manually from the control room.Perfonnance
Indicator-
BOP places motor driven AFW pumpcontrolswitches
to start Feedback-Minimum AFW flow indicated to SGs_WOO Reference-
FR-S.l Background
Conditions*
Before completing
step requiring its performance
SXGNRC 1 Page 37 Revision 0
CT Statement*
Crew isolates faulted Steam Generator.
Safety Significance*
Failure to isolate a faulted SG that can be isolated causes challenges
to the integrity CSF beyond those irreparably
introduced
by the postulated
conditions.
For the reference plant, neither of these transients (blowdown of a single SG with or without RCPs running)constitutes
an orange-path
challenge to the integrity CSF.However, if the faulted SG is not isolated, the cooldown transient for reactor vessel inlet temperature
could result in an orange-path
challenge to the integrity CSF, especially
if RCPs are not running.**"A" SG is depressurizing
in an uncontrolled
manner or is completely
depressurized
and Valve position and flow rate indication
that AFW continues to be delivered to the faulted SG Perfonnance
Indicator*
BOPclosesI-FW-MOV-IOOD
to secure AFW flow to"A" steam generator.
Feedback*AFW flow indication
to"A" steam generator decreases to zero.WOG Reference*
E-2 Background.
Conditions*
Prior to transitioning
out ofE-2.SXGNRC 1 Page 38 Revision 0
ATTACHMENT
3 SThJULATORPERFORMANCEDATASHEET
SPD Verified: (Initials)
- I-FW-P-IC starts and runs normally EV P Scenario Performance
Datasheet
, the crew will start a S'*cond Ma F eedwater System.f1 SPD Verified: (Initials)
- Reactor power increases*Turbine power increases*Tavg/Tref increase*Generator megawatts increase SPD Verified: (Initials)
- Annunciators
G-G6 and, later, G-F6 illuminate
- I-CN-P-IA has amber breaker disagreement
light lit*I-CN-P-IB does not auto-start
- Feed pump suction pressure decreases*After several mintues: annunciators
A-G2 and AFI will illuminate
- IRPI for rod K-2 in Control Bank A will drop to zero*Rod Bottom Light for K-2 will illuminate
EVENT 4: Giventhatthe
charging flow transmitter
has failed high 4l.the crew will respond in accordance
with ARfar C-C5 annunciator
SPD Verified: (Initials)
- Annunciator
C-C5 will illuminate
- I-CH-FI-II22
will indicate full scale high*I-CH-FCV-II22
will indicate minimum demand*Later, C-B3 may alarm if I-CH-FCV-II22
not yet in manual and open.SXGNRC 1 Date_Revision 0
SPD Verified: (Initials)
- Letdown flow decreases*VCT level slowly decreases*CC surge tank level slowly increases SPD Verified: (Initials)
- Main steam pressure decreasing.
- Tave decreasing.
- Power increasing.
SPD Verified: (Initials)
- Annunciators
F-Fl, F-F2, F-F3 illuminate
- "A" steam generator pressure decreases until generator is blown down*The reactor does not trip automatically
or manually*Control rods do not insert in auto*Neither motor-driven
AFW pump auto-starts
SXGNRC 1 Date----Revision 0
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: North Anna Scenario No.: 2 Op-Test No.: 1 Examiners:
Operators:
Initial Conditions:
Unit at 100%powerMOL.The letdown rad monitor is OOS and 1-FW-P-2 (terry turbine)was just returned to service last shift.2-CC-P-1A is tagged out for seal work.Turnover: Maintain 100%power and support maintenance
on 2-CC-P-1A.-.nt Malf.No.Event EventType*Description
1 SW0104 C (B)(S)SW pump trips TS (S)2 ROO?I (R)(S)Uncontrolled
inward rod motion 3 R (R)(S)Loss of condenser vacuum due to loss of air ejector loop seal.Will need to N (B)ramp unit back.3a FW0801 I (B)(S)During ramp will lose error signal to"A" MFRV 4 CH2201 C (R)(S)Running charging pump degrades, auto-start
defeated on standby pump, CH2101 TS (S)discharqe check valve will stick on deqraded pump 5 RC04 C (All)RCS leak TS (S)6 RC0101 M (All)SBLOCA?Sl08 I (All)Auto SI will not actuate if required 8 C(B)(S)BIT valves will not open automatically
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivitv, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent (M)aior
DOMINION NORTH ANNA POWER STATION INITIAL LICENSED OPERA TOR EXAMINATION
SIMULATOR EXAMINATION
GUIDE SCENARIO NRC 2
EVENT 1.2.3.4.5.6.SIMULATOR EXAMINATION
GUIDE DESCRIPTION
SW pump trips Uncontrolled
inward rod motion Loss of condenser vacuum.During ramp will lose level error signal to"A" MFRV Running charging pump degrades, auto-start
defeated on standby pump, discharge check valve will stick on degraded pump RCS leak SBLOCA Scenario Recapitulation:
Malfunctions
after EOP entry Total Malfunctions
Abnormal Events Major Transients
EOPs Entered EOP Contingencies
Critical Tasks 2 (Failure of auto SI, BIT inlets do not open)8 (SW pump trip, uncontrolled
rod motion, loss of condenser vacuum, loss oflevel error signal to MFRV, degradation
of running charging pump/stuck
open check valve, RCS leak, SBLOCA, failure of auto SI, BIT inlets do not open)5 (SW pump trip, uncontrolled
rod motion, loss of condenser vacuum, loss of level error signal to MFRV, degradation
of running charging pump/stuck
open check valve, RCS leak)1 (SBLOCA)1 (E-l)o 6 SCENARIO Dr IR ATION 90 Minutes SXGNRC2 Page 2 Revision 0
SIMULATOR EXAMINATION
SCENARIO SUMMARY SCENARIO NRC 2 The scenario begins with the unit at 100%power.The letdown radiation monitor is OOS and the terry turbine was returned to service last shift.2-CC-P-IA is tagged out for seal maintenance.
After the crew assumes the watch, the unit 2"A" service water pump will trip resulting in a loss of service water to"B" header.The crew should respond in accordance
with I-AP-I2,"Loss of Service Water," and after checking system integrity, start the unit 1"B" SW pump.After the service water system has been verified stable, the next event will occur.The next event will be a failure of the automatic rod control system.Control rods will start inserting for no known reason.The crew will be expected to perform the immediate operator actions of AP-I.I,"Continuous
Uncontrolled
Rod Motion," and place rod control in manual.After the crew stabilizes
the unit and directs I&C department
to investigate, the next event will occur.The crew should identify an increase in Main Condenser pressure and enter I-AP-I4,"Low Condenser Vacuum," to respond to the event.As directed by I-AP-I4, the crew should reduce main turbine load until main condenser vacuum stabilizes.
During the ramp the"A" MFRV will lose its level error signal.Due to this failure the valve will not automatically
control level at program during transient conditions.
When sent to investigate
the vacuum loss, the turbine building operator will report that the"A" Air Ejector loop seal is hot to the touch.He will be directed to isolate the loop seal.Once this has been done, vacuum will start to improve and the crew will stop the ramp.When the unit is stable the next event can occur.Next, the running charging pump, I-CH-P-IA, will degrade.The crew will start another charging pump.When the crew secures the degraded pump its discharge check valve will stick open.The crew should enter I-AP-49,"Loss of Normal Charging." The crew will close the"A" charging pump discharge and restore charging to normal.The crew will then use AP-49 to reestablish
letdown and stabilize the plant.The Unit Supervisor
should refer to Technical Specifications
and declare the"A" charging pump inoperable.
Due to"C" pump having nostart capability,andthus only being operable when running, the crew will make preparations
to start this pump.At this point the next event will occur.The transient on the chargingsystemwill
cause an RCS leak to occur inside the containment.
The crew should respond in accordance
with I-AP-I6,"IncreasingPrimaryPlant
Leakage." The US should refer to Technical Specifications
and either direct the crew to commence a unit shutdown or make preparations
for a containment
entry due to excessive RCS leakage.Once the crew has commenced either a ramp or started preparations
for a containment
entry, the next event will occur.The RCS leak will worsen and the crew will trip the reactor and enter I-E-O,"Reactor Trip or Safety Injection." Safety injection will fail to actuate automatically, but can be manually initiated.
The BIT inlet valves will fail to open automatically
and will have tobemanually
opened.The crew will stop the RCPs and close the charging pump recirc valves.The crew will transition
to I-E-I,"Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant." Once the crew has performed some actions inE-I, the scenario can be terminated.
SXG NRC 2 Page 3 Revision 0
SCENARIO TURNOVER SHEET Read the following to the crew: Purpose: This examination
is intended to evaluate the crew's performance
of various tasks associated
with the Licensed Operator Training Program.All activities
should be completed in accordance
with approved operations
standards.
1.You are on a day shift during the week.2.When conditions
allow, utilize the computer log systems as you would in the plant.Unit Status: Unit 1 is at 100%power.RCS boron is 978 ppm and core age is 9000 MWD/MTU.Aux steam is on unit 1.Unit 2 is at 100%power.Equipment Status: 1-CH-RI-128, Letdown radiation monitor, is OOS.1-FW-P-2 was returned to service last shift, PMT was SAT.2-CC-P-1A is tagged out for seal maintenance.
Maintenance
rule window is green.Shift Orders: Maintain current plant conditions
and support maintenance
on 2-CC-P-1A.
SXGNRC2 Page 4 Revision 0
g\T:E:}J"Tl:Giventhe
plant in model and indications
of alossof one service water pump, the crew willresDond
in accordance
withO-AP-I2"LossofService
Water." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR
REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials)
- Annunciators
J-D3 and J-B3 illuminate
J-D3, SW PP I-PIA, 2-PIA AUTO TRIP, and J-B3, SERV WTR RETURN HDR LO FLOW.BOP identifies
low flow condition on"B" SW header.BOP identifies
unit-2"A" SWpump tripped.US directs entry into O-AP-I2.BOP checks SW reservoir level.Crew determines
no flooding is indicated.
Crew verifies SW headers are intact.BOP verifies at least one SW pump running on each header.(NO)BOP starts"B" SWpump.BOP verifies return header flow is indicated.
BOP verifies SW system stable.US makes notifications.
US refers to TS-3.7.8 and determines
that action"B" applies, which allows 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to verify SW throttled.
NOTE: The next event will occur after the US refers to technical specifications, or as directed bv the lead evaluator.
SXGNRC2 Page 5 Revision 0
EVENT 2: Given that the unit is operatingatpowerandcontrol
rods are inserting for no apparent reason, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance
with l-AP-l.l"Continuous
Uncontrolled
Rod Motion." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR
REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials)
- Rods step in at maximum speed RO identifies
control rods stepping in at maximum speed.RO/BOP identify no known cause of rod insertion.
US directs crew to enter AP-l.l.Crew takes action to stop rod motion and stabilize the unit.*
- RO verifies rod motion stoDDed.Crew verifies control rods above the 10-10 insertion limit.RO checks RCS Tave and adjusts as directed by the US.RO checks PRZR pressure.RO checks PRZR level.Crew checks controls rods above the 10 insertion limit.Crew maintains stable plant conditions.
US notifies I&C to investigate.
The US reports the failure to the Wark Control Center and requests that the reactivity
management
admin procedure be referenced, appropriate
notifications
made, and Work Request and Condition Report be initiated.
NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew has stabilized
the plant, or as directed bv the lead evaluator.
Critical Task SXGNRC2 Page 6 Revision 0
that the unit is at power andlossof condenser vacuum is occurring, the crew will resDond(in
accordance
withl..AP-14"Low Condenser Vacuum." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR
REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials)
- Condenser vacuum worsens*Annunciator
A-G 1 alarms if vacuum reaches setpoint*"A" MFRV will not control in auto Crew identifies
worsening condenser vacuum.US directs crew to enter l-AP-14.BOP removes turbine from valve position limiter, as required.BOP places turbine control in IMP-IN.BOP commences manual turbine load reduction.
US directs entry into either 1-0P-2.2 or 1-AP-2.2 while continuing
with l-AP-14.*Crew monitors condenser vacuum 3.5" or less.BOP verifies condenser vacuum breaker closed.BOP verifies all condenser waterboxes
in service.(YES)NOTE: During the ramp the BOP will identify the failure of the"A" MFRV to automatically
control SG level at program.This valve will need to be adiusted in manual durin!!the ramD.BOP verifies air ejector lineup.BOP verifies gland steam operation.
Crew dispatches
watchstander
to perform local actions.NOTE: When dispatched, the field operator will isolate the loop seal per the AP-14 attachment
and then inform the control room.At this time vacuum will beQ"in to imnrove.RO controls RCS temperature
with blender or control rods.SXGNRC2 Page 7 Revision 0
EVENT 3: Given thatthe unitisatpoWerand
loss of condenservacuum
is occurring, the crew will resDond in accordance
with l-AP-14"Low Condenser Vacuum." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR
REMARKS Crew checks vacuum stable or improving.
Crew checks condensate
and circ water systems.Crew verifies vacuum stable or improving.
Crew verifies main turbine on line Crew checks cause of vacuum loss identified
and repaired.US makes report to Wark Control Center and requests that WR, CR, and management
notifications
be made.NOTE: Once the crew has stabilized
the unit the next event can occur.SXGNRC2 Page 8 Revision 0
EVENT 4: Given that the unit is at power and there is a degradation
of the running charging pump and a failed open discharge check valve occurs when the pump is secured, the crew will res ond in accordance
with l-AP-49"Loss of Normal Char in." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR
REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials)
- Charging flow initially decreases*Charging pump discharge pressure decreases*Temperature
increases on I-SW-TI-I03A
- Annunciator
C-B6 illuminates
- AnnunciatorsC-B3,C-B5, and C-C5 illuminate
when"A" charging pump is stopped*Charging flow goes to zero when"A" charging pump is stopped RO identifies
degrading conditions
onCH-P-IA.RO identifies
C-B6,B-C LUBE OIL HI TEMP.NOTE: Report from the field will be that l-CH-P-IA is makin a lot of noise.US directs starting of l-CH-P-IB (C).US directs stopping of l-CH-P-IA.
Crew identifies
loss of charging flow.NOTE: The crew may isolate letdown based on AR instructions.
If so, step 6 will restore letdown.US directs crew to enter l-AP-49.Critical Task RO verifies charging conditions
returning to normal.US reviews TS 3.5.2 for having only one operable HHSI pump (if l-CH-P-IB was started.US reports failures and requests WR, CR, and mana ement notifications
be made.SXGNRC2 Page 9 Revision 0
there is a degradation
of the running charging PumP and a failed open discharge check valve occurs when the pump is secured, the crew will resnond in accordance
with l-AP-49"Loss of Normal Charging." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR
REMARKS NOTE: Crew may also discuss an entry into TS 3.0.3, which was applicable
until the"A" discharl!e
MOVs were closed.NOTE: Crew may discuss starting the"C" pump on the IH bus (if not initially started), NOTE: Once the US has referred to Tech Specs or as directed by the Lead Evaluator.
the next event will occur.SXGNRC2 Page 10 Revision 0
EVENT 5: Given that the unitisatpower
andanRCS leak has developed, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance
with l-AP-16,I'Primarv
Plant Leakage." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR
REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials)
- Pressurizer
level decreases (B-F8 alarms)*Containment
sump level increases*Charging flow increases*Radiation levels on l-RM-RMS-160
and l-RM-RMS-163
increase*AnnunciatorsK-D2, and later, K-D4 alarm NOTE: Any of the following indications
may be identified
first.RO identifies
charging flow increasing.
BOP identifies
containment
sump level increasing.
Crew identifies
containment
radiation levels are increasing.
US directs entry into l-AP-16 and l-AP-5.Crew verifies unit in mode 1.AP-16 RO verifies primary parameters
under operator control.NOTE: Crew may isolate letdown at this time.RO checks LCV-1115A not diverted.RO verifies letdown in service with normal indications.
RO checks excess letdown parameters.
RO checks charging system parameters
normal.BOP checks Auxiliary Building sump level normal.Crew checks containment
conditions.
Crew identifies
increasing
containment
radiation and sump pumping rate.US/STA refers to Tech.Spec.3.4.13.SXGNRC2 Page 11 Revision 0
EVENT 5: Given that the unit is at power and an RCS leak has developed, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance
with l-AP-16,"Primary Plant Leakage." TIME EXPECTED ACTION US directs crew to either commence a unit shutdown or make preparations
for a containment
entIy.US makes report to Work Control Center and requests CR and management
notifications.
Health Physics department
is informed of the high reading on l-RM-RMS-160
and asked to take containment
gaseous and oarticulate
samoles if required.A primary leak rate calculation
is initiated.
HP is requested to take containment
sump samples.NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew either makes preparations
to ramp, makes preparations
for a containment
entry, or as directed by the lead evaluator.
INSTRUCTOR
REMARKS AP-5 steps for l-RM-RMS-160
alarm SXGNRC2 Page 12 Revision 0
EVENT 6: Given that the unit is at power and a LOCAhas occurred, the crew will respond in accordance
with 1-E-O,"Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and 1-E-1,"Loss of Reactor or SecondarY Coolant." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR
REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials)
- Pressurizer
level and pressure rapidly decrease*Containment
pressure slowly increases*SI does not automatically
actuate, if required*BIT inlet valves do not open automatically
RO identifies
PRZR pressure and level rapidly decreasing.
US directs crew to enter 1-E-O.Crew manually trips the reactor.BOP verifies turbine trip.RO verifies AC emergency busses energized.
Crew checks if safety injection has actuated, or should have actuated.;r Critical Task SI will notautomaticallYactuate.
BOP verifies feedwater isolation:
- MFRV s closed*MFRBV s closed*Main feed MOVs closed*Standby MFP in PTL*Main feed pumps tripped*MFP discharge MOVS closed*SG BD TV s closed.ROIBOP manually initiate phase A isolation.
BOP verifies AFW pumps running.NOTE: Crew may have previously
held a focused briefed and started t-CH-P-tC.Crew verifies SI pumps running.(NO)Crew starts 1-CH-P-1C.
BOP verifies SW pumps running.SXGNRC2 Page 13 Revision°
EVENT 6: Given that the unit is at power and a LOCA has occurred, the crew will respond in accordance
with l-E-O,"Reactor Trip or Safety Iniection," and l-E-l,"Loss of Reactor or Secondm: v Coolant." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR
REMARKS Crew checks if MS should be isolated.(YES)Crew verifies/closes
MSTVs.*Crew checks if CDA required.(NO)NOTE: The following is a continuous
action step and actions will be performed when containment
pressure has exceeded 20 Dsia.*Crew checks if QS is required.Crew manually starts QS:*QS discharge valves are opened*QS pumps are started*CAT outlet valves are ouened NOTE: Crew may have aligned BIT usine CAP.Crew verifies SI flow.(NO)US directs initiation
of attachment
6.Crew manually aligns the BIT:*RO verifies charging pump line-up*BOP verifies BIT reCITe valves closed.*BOP verifies BIT outlet valves open.*BOP verifies AFW flow.*RO checks RCS Tave stable at or trending to required temperature.
BOP adjusts AFW flow, if required.RO checks PRZR PORVs and spray valves.RO checks RCS subcooling.
NOTE: The RCPs may have already been stopped usine the CAP.Crew checks at least one charging pump running and flowing to the RCS.SXG NRC 2 Page 14 Critical Task Attachment
6 steps Revision°
EVENT 6: Given that the unit is at power and a LOCA has occurred, the crew will respond in accordance
with l-E-O,"Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and l-E-l,"Loss of Reactor or Second Coolant." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR
REMARKS Critical Task Critical Task BOP checks SGs not faulted.(YES)BOP checks SGs not ruptured.(YES)Crew checks ifRCS is intact inside containment.
0 US directs crew to transition
to l-E-l.RO checks RCP trip and charging pump recirc criteria.BOP checks SGs not faulted.(YES)BOP checks intact SG levels.Crew checks secondary radiation:
- RO resets SI, Phase A*Crew verifies IA trip valves open*RO resets AMSAC*Crew checks SG Blowdown, AE, Main steamline, and terry turbine exhaust radiation monitors normal*BOP checks SG levels*Crew initiates attachment
to place BD rad monitors in service*BOP opens SG surface sample trip valves and informs chemist.NOTE: The scenario may be terminated
after the crew checks secondary radiation, or as directed by the lead evaluator.
SXGNRC2 Page 15 Revision°
REFERENCES
PROCEDURE REV.Abnonnal Procedure 0-AP-12,"Loss of Service Water." 31 Abnonnal Procedure 1-AP-1.1,"Continuous
Uncontrolled
Rod Motion." 8 Abnonnal Procedure 1-AP-13,"Loss of One or More Circulating
Water Pumps." 13 Abnonnal Procedure 1-AP-14,"Low Condenser Vacuum." 20 Abnonnal Procedure 1-AP-49,"Loss ofNonnal Charging." 14 Abnonnal Procedure 1-AP-16,"Increasing
Primary Plant Leakage." 24 Abnonnal Procedure 1-AP-5,"Unit 1 Radiation Monitoring
System." 26 Emergency Procedure 1-E-0,"Reactor Trip or Safety Injection." 36 Emergency Procedure 1-E-1,"Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant." 22 Station Annunciator
Response Procedures.
N/A Guide and Reference Document PI-AA-5000,"Human Perfonnance." 1 INPO, Guideline for Teamwork and Diagnostic
Skill Development:
INPO 88-003, Jan.1988 INPO, ACAD 07-002 Simulator Training Guidelines
Jan.2007 SXGNRC2 Page 16 Revision 0
ATTACHMENTS
A IT ACHMENT1-SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S
COMPUTER PROGRAM A IT ACHMENT2-SCENARIO PERFORMANCE
OBJECTIVES
A IT ACHMENT 3-SIMULATOR PERFORMANCE
DATASHEET (Last page of scenario)SXGNRC2 Page 17 Revision 0
SXGNRC2 ATTACHMENT
1 SIMULATOR OPERA TOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM Page 18 Revision 0
SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S
COMPUTER PROGRAM SXGNRC2 Initial conditions
1.Recall IC 162 2.Ensure Tave, Tref, PDTT level, and VCT level are selected on trend recorders.
3.Place WRmagnet on l-CH-RI-128.
4.Rackout 2-CC-P-IA and verify 2-CC-P-IB is running.Close U2_CC_4, U2-CC_11.PRELOADS PRIOR TO SCENARIO START CONDITION MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDEIETC.
Letdown RM failure Malfunction:
RM0207, Severity=-1 Failure of BIT inlets to open Switch Override (SI): (Keeps valves from opening on SI)onSI MOV867 A CLOSE=ON MOV867B CLOSE=ON Setup so that valves will open when OPEN burton pressed: Set up trigger 10 as follows MOV867A_OPEN(1)=1 (you need the (1)for this valve only)DOR MOV867 A CLOSE Set up trigger 11 as follows MOV867B OPEN=1 DOR MOV867B CLOSE Failure of auto SI Malfunction:
S108 l-CH-P-IB will not auto-Switch Override: start CHPIB ASTP=OFF SXGNRC2 Page 19 Revision 0
SCENARIO EVENTS EVENT MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/COMMUNICATIONS
1)Loss of service water Malfunction:
SWOI04, Trigger=1 NOTE: When sent to pump can report that 2-SW-P-IA looks normal and I-SW-P-IB is running normally.NOTE: When sent to breaker for 2-SW-P-IA (25H5)can report an overcurrent
trip.NOTE: The next event will occur after the US refers to technical specifications, or as directed by the lead evaluator.
2)Rod Insertion.
Malfunction:
RD07, Delay time=5, Trigger=2 NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew has stabilized
the plant, or as directed by the lead evaluator.
3)Loss of Condenser Malfunction:
Vacuum CN0901, Delay time=5, Ramp=120, Severity=100, Trigger=Failure oflevel signal to"A" 3 MFRV NOTE: When sent to perform attachment, verify that enough of a ramp has occurred, then close I-VP-21 either on Extreme View or a monitor screen.(If no one dispatched
with attachment
in hand, than initially report the loop seal is hot and get direction to isolate.)Malfunction:
FW080 1, Delay time=5, Trigger=3 NOTE: Allow the crew to stabilize the unit before proceeding
with next event, or as directed by the Lead Evaluator.
SXGNRC2 Page 20 Revision 0
EVENT MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/COMMUNICATIONS
4)Degradation
of 1-CH-P-Malfunctions:
1A with check valve failure CH2201, Delay time=5, Ramp=120, Severity=50, Trigger=4 CH2101, Delay time=5, Trigger=4 NOTE: If operator sent to l-CH-P-IA, can report that it is making a lot of noise.If asked, can also report that I-SW-TCV-I02A is full open.NOTE: If asked to check on l-CH-P-IB (C), can report that the pump appears to running satisfactorily, with no seal leakage.NOTE: Once the US has referred to Tech Specs or as directed by the Lead Evaluator, the next event will occur.5)RCS leak Malfunction:
RC04, Delay time=5, Ramp=300, Severity=10, Trigger=5 (Thwbrtot
NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew either makes preparations
to ramp, makes preparations
for a containment
entry, or as directed by the lead evaluator.
6)SBLOCA Malfunction:
RC0101, Delay time=5, Ramp=30, Severity=0.3, Trigger=6 NOTE: The scenario may be terminated
after the crew checks SI termination
criteria or as directed bv the lead evaluator.
SXGNRC2 Page 21 Revision°
SXGNRC2 ATTACHMENT
2 SCENARIO PERFORMANCE
OBJECTIVES
Page 22 Revision 0
SIMULATOR REQUALIFICATION
EXAMINATION
TERMINAL PERFORMANCE
OBJECTIVE Given equipment failures and operational
situations, operate the plant in accordance
with Technical Specifications
to bring the unit to a safe condition, using applicable
procedures, and applying effective teamwork, communication, and diagnostic
skills.GENERIC PERFORMANCE
OB JECTIVES A.During shift operations
the shift manager will take a conservative
course of action, especially
when uncertain conditions
exist, when dealing with core cooling or heat sink availability, primary system and containment
integrity, and reactivity
control associated
with plant evolutions.
B.During shift operations
the shift manager will provide overall crew guidance by prioritizing
and integrating
the actions of the shift crew in accordance
with administrative
procedures.
C.During shift operations
each crew member will participate
in a team effort that resolves conflicts, provides input into the team decision and communicates
all the necessary information
to enhance teamwork in accordance
with administrative
procedures.
D.During shift operations
the Shift Technical Advisor will independently
assess events and based on those assessments
make recommendations
to the crew regarding mitigation
strategy.SXGNRC2 Page 23 Revision 0
EVENT GOAL: EVENT 1 PERFORMANCE
OBJECTIVES
Given the plant in mode 1 and indications
of a loss of one service water pump, the crew will respond in accordance
with 0-AP-12,"Loss of Service Water." NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS: R653 Respond to a loss of a service water pump.S70 Evaluate compliance
with technical specifications.
CRITICAl, TASK: N/A SXGNRC2 Page 24 Revision 0
EVENT 2 PERFORMANCE
OBJECTIVES
Given that the unit is operating at power and control rods are inserting for no apparent reason, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance
withAP-l.l,"Continuous
Uncontrolled
Rod Motion." NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS: R474 Restore stable plant conditions
following continuous
uncontrolled
rod motion.S70 Evaluate compliance
with technical specifications.
CRITICAL TASK: See next page SXGNRC2 Page 25 Revision 0
CT Statement*
Crew takes action in accordance
with AP-I.I, to stop rod motion and stabilize the unit.Safety Significance'
Core reactivity
is not under control of the operator due to the failed control channel."It is expected that the operator will attempt to take manual actions to correct for anomalous conditions
during power operation." Continuous
inward control rod motion with T AVE and T REF matched.Perfonnance
Indicator RO places rod control to manual.Feedback Rod motion stops WOG Reference'
E-O Background
Document Conditions'
Prior to receiving an automatic reactor trip on low pressure.SXGNRC2 Page 26 Revision 0
EVENT 3 PERFORMANCE
OBJECTIVES
Given that the unit is at power and loss of condenser vacuum is occurring, the crew will respond in accordance
with l-AP-14,"Low Condenser Vacuum." NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS: R517 Perform the immediate operator actions in response to a loss of one or more circulating
water pumps.R518 Respond to a partial loss of condenser vacuum.CRITICAl!TASK: N/A SXGNRC2 Page 27 Revision a
EVENT GOAl,: EVENT 4 PERFORMANCE
OBJECTIVES
Given that the unit is at power and there is a degradation
of the running charging pump and a failed open discharge check valve occurs when the pump is secured, the crew will respond in accordance
with l-AP-49,"Loss of Normal Charging." NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS: R 704 Respond to a loss of normal charging.S70 Evaluate compliance
with technical specifications.
CRITICAL TASK: See next page SXGNRC2 Page 28 Revision 0
CT Statement*
Crew takes action to prevent charging pump run-out due to a stuck open discharge check valve on a non-running
charging pump.Safety Significance*
Failure to prevent charging pump run-out constitutes
a"mis-operation
or incorrect crew performance
which leads to degraded ECCS capacity."*Indication/annunciation
that one charging pump has tripped or been shutdown with a stuck open discharge check valve.*High amps on the running charging pump.*Low/no charging flow or seal injection indicated.
Perfonnance
Indicator Crew closes charging pump discharge MOV s on the previously
running charging pump.Feedback Discharge MOVs for the previously
running pump indicate closed and charging and seal injection flow returns to normal.WOG Reference*
None.Conditions*
Prior to Safety Injection being required by degraded plant conditions.
SXGNRC2 Page 29 Revision 0
EVENT 5 PERFORMANCE
OBJECTIVES
Given that the unit is at power and an RCS leak has developed, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance
with l-AP-16,"Primary Plant Leakage." NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS: R520 Respond to increasing
primary-plant
leakage.S70 Evaluate compliance
with technical specifications.
CRITICAL TASK;N/A SXGNRC2 Page 30 Revision 0
EVENT GOAl,;EVENT 6 PERFORMANCE
OBJECTIVES
Given that the unit is at power and a LOCA has occurred, the crew will respond in accordance
with l-E-O,"Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and l-E-l,"Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant." NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS;Rl85 Perfonn the immediate operator actions in response to a reactor trip or safety injection.
Rl84 Restore the Blowdown radiation monitors.R730 Verify safety injection flow.CRITICAl, TASK;See Following Pages SXGNRC2 Page 31 Revision°
CT Statement*
Crew manually initiates safety injection.
Safety Significance'
Failure to manually actuate SI under the postulated
conditions
constitutes"mis-operation
or incorrect crew performance
that leads to degraded ECCS capacity." Indication/annunciation
that SI is required, with NO indication
that SI has actuated.Perfonnance
Indicator RO/BOP manually actuates safety injection.
Feedback Indication/annunciation
that SI has actuated.WOG Reference'
E-O Background.
Conditions'
Prior to transitioning
out ofE-O.SXGNRC2 Page 32 Revision 0
CT Statement-
Crew aligns Charging pumps.Safety Significance'
Failure to manually establish flow from at least one HHSI pump constitutes"mis-operation
or incorrect crew performance
which leads to degraded ECCS...capacity." Indication/annunciation
that SI is in progress with no HHSI flow indicated.
Perfonnance
Indicator RO manually opens MOVSI 1836.Feedback HHSI flow to the cold legs is indicated.
WOG Reference'
E-O Background.
Conditions'
Prior to completion
of step requiring its performance.
SXGNRC2 Page 33 Revision 0
CT Statement*
Crew stops Reactor Coolant Pumps.Safety Significance*
Tripping RCPS at this time"prevents excessive depletion ofRCS water inventory through a small break in the RCS which might lead to severe core uncovery if the RCPs were tripped for some reason later in the accident." The RCPs should be tripped"before RCS inventory is depleted to the point where tripping the pumps would cause the break to immediately
uncover." Indication
of:*Subcooling
less than 25°P[85°P].*At least one charging pump running and flowing to the RCS.Performance
Indicator RO/BOP places control switch(es)
for all running RCPs in STOP.Feedback Indication/annunciation
of no RCPs running.WOG Reference*
RCP Trip/Restart
Background
Document.Conditions*
Prior to completing
the step directing its performance.
SXGNRC2 Page 34 Revision 0
CT Statement*
Crew takes action to prevent HHSI pump runout.Safety Significance'
Failure to prevent HHSI pump runout constitutes
a"mis-operation
or incorrect crew performance
which leads to degraded ECCS capacity."*Indication/annunciation
that SI is actuated and is required and*Indication
ofRCS pressure less than 1275 psig[1475 psig]and*RCPstripped
Perfonnance
Indicator RO closes charging pump recirc valves:*1-CH-MOV-1275A
- l-CH-MOV-1275B
- 1-CH-MOV-1275C.
Feedback Charging pump recirc valves indicate closed.WOG Reference'
None.Conditions'
Prior to RCS pressure reaching 1000 psig OR completion
of transfer to recirculation
mode, whichever comes fust.SXGNRC2 Page 35 Revision a
ATTACHMENT
3 SnJULATORPERFORMANCEDATASHEET
Scenario Performance
Datasheet EVENT.1: Given the plant in mode lalld indications
ofa lossof one service water pump, the crew will respond in accordance
withO-AP-12,"Loss of Service Water." SPD Verified: (Initials)
- Annunciators
J-D3 and J-B3 illuminate
- "B"SW header pressure and flow decrease EVENT 2: Given that the unit is operating atpower and control rodsare inserting for no apparent reason, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance
with 1-AP-1.1,"Continuous
Uncontrolled
Rod Motion." SPD Verified: (Initials)
- Rods step in at maximum speed EVB:NT3:Given
thatthe unit is at power and loss of condenser vacuum is occurring, the crew will respond in accordance
withl-AP-14,"Low Condenser Vacuum." SPD Verified: (Initials)
- Condenser vacuum worsens*Annunciator
A-G 1 alarms ifvacuum reaches setpoint*"A" MFRV will not control in auto EVENT 4: Given.that the*unitis
at.power and there is.adegradation
of the running charging pU lll P(li1dafailed
open dischargecheckvalveoccurswhenthe
pump is secured, the crew will resDondin accordance
with l-AP-49"Loss of Normal CharQinQ." SPD Verified: (Initials)
- Charging flow initially decreases*Charging pump discharge pressure decreases*Temperature
increases on I-SW-TI-I03A
- Annunciator
C-B6 illuminates
- AnnunciatorsC-B3,C-B5, and C-C5 illuminate
when"A" charging pump is stopped*Charging flow goes to zero when"A" charging pump is stopped EVENT 5: Giventhat the unit is at power and an RCS leak has developed, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance
with1-AP-16,"Primary Plant Leakage." SPD Verified: (Initials)
- Pressurizer
level decreases (B-F8 alarms)*Containment
sump level increases*Charging flow increases*Radiation levels on l-RM-RMS-160
and l-RM-RMS-163
increase*Annunciators
K-D2, and later, K-D4 alarm SXGNRC2 Date----Revision 0
Scenario Performance
Datasheet EVENT 6: Given that the unit is at power and a LOCA has occurred, the crew will respond in accordance
withl-E-O,"Reactor Trip or Safety Injection,"and
l-E-l,"Loss of Reactor or SecondarY Coolant." SPD Verified: (Initials)
- Pressurizer
level and pressure rapidly decrease*Containment
pressure slowly increases*SI does not automatically
actuate, if required*BIT inlet valves do not open automatically
SXGNRC2 Date----Revision 0
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: North Anna Scenario No.: 3 Op-Test No.: 1 Examiners:
Operators:
Initial Conditions:
Unit at 100%power MOL.The letdown rad monitor OOS and1-FW-P-2 (terry turbine)was just returned to service last shift.2-CC-P-1A is tagged for seal maintenance.
Turnover: Maintain current plant conditions
and support maintenance
on 2-CC-P-1A.
nt Malf.No.Event Event Type*Description
1 C(B)(S)BC pump trips and standby pump does not auto-start
2 RC1501 I (R)(S)Tavg unit fails high causing rods to step in 3 C (B)(S)Running IA compressor
trips with no auto-start
of standby compressor
4 RC0803 I (R)(S)Selected pressurizer
level channel fails low, letdown isolates TS (8)4a N (R)(S)Return letdown to service 5 R (R)(S)N (B)SG PORV fails partially open, unit is ramped back TS (S)6 FW2201 C (All)Running feed pump trips with no auto-start
of standby pump, unit must be tripped FW2101 7 FW2102 M (All)Main feed line suctions all break FW2103 8 RD32 I (All)No auto reactor trip will occur if required 9 Terry turbine will trip on overspeed and can't immediately
be reset, FW1102 C (All)discharge line break on one MDAFW pump and the other MDAFW pump FW1402 will deqrade-FR-H.1 Terminate scenario when feed flow has been restored from Terry Turbine*(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument (C)omponent (M)ajor
DOMINION NORTH ANNA POWER STATION INITIAL LICENSED OPERA TOR EXAMINATION
SIMULATOR EXAMINATION
GUIDE SCENARIO NRC 3
EVENT 1.2.3.4/4a.5.6.7.8.SIMULATOR EXAMINATION
GUIDE DESCRIPTION
BC pump trips and standby pump does not auto-start
Tavg unit fails high causing rods to step in Running IA compressor
trips with no auto-start
of standby compressor
Selected pressurizer
level channel fails low/restore
letdown SG PORV fails partially open, unit is ramped back Running feed pump trips with no auto-start
of standby pump, unit must be tripped Main feed line suctions will break Terry turbine will trip on overspeed, discharge line break on one MDAFW pump and the other will degrade, ending in an H.l scenario Scenario Recapitulation:
Malfunctions
after EOP entry Total Malfunctions
Abnormal Events Major Transients
EOPs Entered EOP Contingencies
Critical Tasks 2 (Main feed line break, AFW pumps not available)
8 (BC pump trips/standby
pump does not auto-start, Tavg unit fails high, running IA compressor
trips/standby
compressor
does not auto-start, pressurizer
level channel fails low, SG PORV fails open, main feed pump trips/standby
pump does not auto-start, main feed line break, AFW pumps not available)
6 (BC pump trips/standby
pump does not auto-start, Tavg unit fails high, running IA compressor
trips/standby
compressor
does not auto-start, pressurizer
level channel fails low, SG PORV fails open, main feed pump trips/standby
pump does not auto-start)
1 (Main feed line suction break)2 (ES-O.!, FR-H.l)1 (FR-H.l)6 SCENARIO Dr IR ATION 100 Minutes SXGNRC3 Page 2 Revision a
SIMULATOR EXAMINATION
SCENARIO SUMMARY SCENARIO NRC 2 The scenario begins with the unit at 100%power.The letdown radiation monitor is OOS and the terry turbine was returned to service last shift.2-CC-P-IA is tagged out for seal maintenance.
The"A" bearing cooling pump, I-BC-P-IA, will trip.The crew should identifYtheloss of bearing cooling and respond in accordance
with l-AP-19,"Loss of Bearing Cooling Water." The crew should determine that the"B" bearing cooling pump did not automatically
start, and per the RNO start I-BC-P-IB.
Once the crew has verified that the BC System has been restored, or as directed by the Lead Evaluator, the next event will occur.The next event will be the failure of the median/select
Tave unit.The crew will be expected to respond lAW l-AP-l.l,"Continuous
Uncontrolled
Rod Motion," and place rod control in MANUAL.Crew should address annunciator
response for B-A7, MEDIANIHI TAVG<>TREF DEVIATION, and take manual control of charging flow, and place steam dumps in steam pressure mode.After these actions have been completed and plant conditions
are stable, or as directed by the lead evaluator, the next event will occur.A loss of instrument
air will occur when 2-IA-C-l trips.The crew will enter l-AP-28,"Loss of Instrument
Air," and start all available air compressors.(l-IA-C-l will not start automatically, but will start in HAND).Once instrument
air pressure is returned to normal, the next event will occur.Next, PRZR level transmitter, l-RC-LT-1461, will fail low.The crew will respond to the failed channel IA W l-AP-3,"Loss
of Vital Instrumentation." The crew will swap to an operable level channel, restore letdown (Normal event), and review Tech Specs.The next failure to occur will be the"B" SG PORV failing open due to the failure of the E/P.The crew will reduce power per l-AP-38,"Excessive
Load Increase." They will restore reactor power to less than 100%and dispatch an operator to fmd the cause of the power increase,closethe valve locally, and stabilize the unit.The next event will occur after the crew has stabilized
the unit, or at the direction of the lead evaluator.
Shortly after the unit is stablized, I-FW-P-IA will trip due to low oil pressure.The BOP must identifY the pump trip, recognize that"B" MFP did not automatically
start and take actions IA W l-AP-31,"Loss of Main Feedwater." The crew will trip the reactor in accordance
with the immediate actions of l-AP-31 and enter l-E-O,"Reactor Trip or Safety Injection." The next event will take place on the reactor trip.The reactor will not automatically
trip, if required, and as a result of the transient placed on the main feedwater system, a feed line break will occur on the main feed pump suction line resulting in a loss of all main feed pumps.Several minutes after the reactor is tripped, I-FW-P-2 will trip on overspeed and will not be able to be immediately
reset.Since a safety injection will not be required at this time, the crew will transition
to l-ES-O.l,"Reactor Trip Response." Once SXG NRC 3 Page 3 Revision 0
the crew transitions
to 1-ES-0.1,"Reactor Trip Response," the last event will occur."A" MDAFW pump discharge line will break in the MSVH and no flow will reach the SG.The"B" MDAFW pump will degrade due to impeller damage.The crew should identify the loss of all feedwater and transition
to 1-FR-H.1,"Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink." On their first pass through 1-FR-H.1, the crew will not be able to restore main feed, auxiliary feed, or condensate
flow to the steam generators.
At this point, 1-FW-P-2 will be reset and the crew should establish adequate auxiliary feedwater flow to the SGs, allowing them to transition
out of 1-FR-H.1.The scenario may be terminated
after transition, or at the direction of the lead evaluator.
SXGNRC3 Page 4 Revision 0
SCENARIO TURNOVER SHEET Read the following to the crew: Purpose: This examination
is intended to evaluate the crew's perfonnance
of various tasks associated
with the LicensedOperatorTraining
Program.All activities
should be completed in accordance
with approved operations
standards.
1.You are on a day shift during the week.2.When conditions
allow, utilize the computer log systems as you would in the plant.Unit Status: Unit 1 is at 100%power.RCS boron is 978 ppm and core age is 9000 MWD/MTU.Aux steam is on unit 1.Unit 2 is at 100%power.Equipment Status: Letdown radiation monitor, 1-CH-RI-128, is OOS.1-FW-P-2, terry turbine, was returned to service last shift, PMT was SAT.2-CC-P-1A is tagged out.Maintenance
rule window is green.Shift Orders: Maintain current plant conditions
and support maintenance
on 2-CC-P-1A.
SXGNRC3 PageS Revision 0
EVENTl:Giventheplant
is.in Mode 1 andthe."A"ibearingcooling
water pump has tripped the crewwillresDondin
accordance
with l-AP-19."Loss
of Bearing Cooling Water." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR
REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials)
- Annunciators
F-F4, F-E4, F-R8 illuminate
- I-BC-P-IA has a breaker misalignment (amber and green lights lit)*I-BC-P-IB does not auto-start
BOP identifies
F-F4, BC WTR PP lA-IB AUTO TRIP SYS MISALIGNED.
BOP identifies
I-BC-P-IA has tripped.BOP identifies
that I-BC-P-IB did not automatically
start.US directs crew to enter l-AP-19.BOP checks status ofBC pumps.BOP starts I-BC-P-IB.
BOP verifies at least one BC pump running normally.Crew verifies that BC system is operating tower-to-tower.
Crew verifies that BC system is operating normally.Crew monitors main generator temperatures.
Crew dispatches
operator to check equipment supplied by BC: MFP Cond DumDS ERC HPs.LPs.US reports loss ofBC pump and failure of standby pump to auto-start
and requests assistance, Work Request, and Condition ReDort.NOTE: When sent to investigate, the operator will report that there is an overcurrent
trip on the breaker for I-BC-P-IA.NOTE: The next event can occur once the crew has restored BC or at the discretion
of the lead evaluator.
SXGNRC3 Page 6 Revision 0
EVENT 2: Giventhatthe
unitisinmode
1 and the median/select
Tave unit has failed, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance.withl-AP-1
,"Continuous
Uncontrolled
Rod Motion" and annunciators
B-A 7 and B-A8.TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR
REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials)
- Rods stepping in at maximum speed*Annunciators
B-A 7 and B-A8 are illuminated
- Status light M-E4 illuminates
RO identifies
B-A7, MEDIAN/HI TA VG<>TREF DEVIATION and B-A8, LOOP1A-B-C
TAVG DEVIATION.
RO identifies
control rods stepping in at maximum speed.RO identifies
median/select
Tave unit failed.US directs crew to enter AP-l.l.Crew takes action to stop rod motion and stabilize the unit.Rrupi1iies
RO verifies rod motion stoooed.RO verifies that 1-RC-TI-1408 is normal.(NO)Crew initiates action of AR B-A7, while continuing.
Crew verifies control rods above the 10-10 insertion limit.RO checks RCS Tave and adjusts as directed by the US.RO checks PRZR pressure.RO checks PRZR level.Crew checks controls rods above the 10 insertion limit.Crew maintains stable plant conditions.
NOTE: The following actions are fA W annunciators
B-A 7.RO places PRZR level control in MANUAL and controls PRZR level.Critical Task See actions below SXGNRC3 Page 7 Revision 0
EVENT 2: Given that the unit is in mode 1 and the median/select
Tave unit has failed, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance
with l-AP-l.l,"Continuous
Uncontrolled
Rod Motion" and annunciators
B-A7 and B-A8.RO transfers condenser steam dumps to steam pressure mode.US informs Work Control Center of failure and requests assistance
WR, and CR.NOTE: If the US requests permission
to withdraw rods to restore temperature, it will be Q"iven.NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew has stabilized
the plant, or as directed bv the lead evaluator.
SXGNRC3 Page 8 Revision 0
E\TEN"T3:(}iventhatthe
unitisa.tpo\Veriand
indications
exist of a loss of instrument
air, the crew will resDondiniaccordance
with l-AP-28"Loss of Instrument
Air." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR
REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials)
- Annunciator
lJ-D2 illuminates
- IA pressure drops*l-IA-C-l will not start automatically, if required*Annunciators
J-E8 and F-F8 illuminate
ROIBOP identifies
J-D2, INST AIR COMPR/DRYER
TROUBLE.NOTE: Crew may not enter AP-28 until low air pressure alarms come in.US directs entry into l-AP-28.NOTE: l-IA-C-l will not automatically
start.but can be started in HAND.Crew starts all available air Critical Task
I";c:c,!;;;:;:;;;C)<":
X;S" CliC.l-IA-C-2A, and*l-IA-C-2B Crew verifies instrument
air pressure>70 psig.NOTE: If sent, after approximately
5 minutes, the auxiliary building operator will report a MOTOR OVERLOAD annunciator
lit on the local panel for 2-IA-C-l and an air leak at the compressor.
He will request permission
to close 2-IA-7 to isolate 2-IA-6, check valve, which is annarentlv
failed.Crew verifies loss of instrument
air corrected.
Crew verifies instrument
air pressure>94 psig.(NO)BOP isolates IA to containment
by closing l-IA-TV-102A.
BOP checks IA pressure outside containment
increasing.
NOTE: Whether the leak location has been reported and direction made to isolate it will determine how the crew proceeds through l-AP-28.Once the leak has been isolated the crew should reopen the containment
IA TVs if closed.SXGNRC3 Page 9 Revision 0
EVENT.3: Giventhat the unit is at power and indications
exist of a lossofinstmment
air, the crew will respond in accordance
with l-AP-28.."Loss of Instrument
Air." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR
REMARKS NOTE: The next event will occur after instrument
air pressure is returned to normal, or as directed by the lead evaluator.
SXGNRC3 Page 10 Revision 0
EYENT 4: Given that the unit is at power and a selected pressurizer
level channel has failed, the crew will be ex ected to res ond in accordance
with l-AP-3"Loss of Vital Instrumentation." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR
REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials)
- Annunciators
B-F8, B-G7, and B-E2 are illuminated
- l-RC-LI-1461
fails low*Letdown isolates RO identifies
B-F8, PZR LO LEYEL and B-G7, PZR LO L YL HTRS OFF-LETDOWN
ISOL.NOTE: Identification
of failure may not occur at this time.RO identifies
l-RC-L T-1461 failing low and the loss of letdown.RO notifies US of failure.US directs crew to perform the immediate actions of AP-3.Crew verifies redundant indication
normal.Crew verifies SG control parameters
normal.Crew verifies first stage pressure indications
normal.RO verifies/places
l-CH-FCY-1122
in manual and adjusts to control pressurizer
level at ro am.RO selects operable pressurizer
level channel.RO verifies letdown in service.(NO)*RO establishes
at least 25 gpm of charging*RO opens l-CH-LCY-1460A
and 1460B*RO puts l-CH-PCY-1145
in manual*RO fully opens l-CH-PCY-1145
- RO opens l-CH-HCY-1200B
- RO adjusts l-CH-PCY-1145
to maintain 300 psig*RO laces l-CH-PCY-1145
in Auto.Critical Task Normal Event SXGNRC3 Page 11 Revision 0
EVENT 4:0iven thattheunitisatpowerand
a selected pressurizer
level channel has failed, the crew will be expected to resnondin accordance
with l-AP-3"Loss of Vital Instrumentation." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR
REMARKS RO verifies PRZR level control in auto.(NO)RO restores pressurizer
level to program.RO verifies/adjusts
output of I-RC-LCV-1459G.Crew discusses need to leave charging control in manual due to previous failure.RO verifies pressurizer
control heaters not tripped.(NO)RO resets control heaters by placing switch to START.BOP verifies both first stage pressure channels normal.BOP verifies operable channels selected for SGWLCS.Crew identifies
the correct MOP (55.72)for placing channel in trip.US refers to TS.3.3.1 (Function9-72 hours)and TS 3.3.3 (Function 13-Info action).US/SS make notifications
about failed channel.NOTE: When the crew reestablishes
letdown and the US has reviewed TS, then the next event will occur.SXGNRC3 Page 12 Revision 0
EVE}'\JT 5: (}iventhat
the unit isatpower anciaS(}PORVhas
failed open, the crew will respond in accordance
with 1-AP-3 8'1Excessive
Load Increase." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR
REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials)
- Reactor power slowly increases.*Megawatts slowly decrease.RO/BOP identifies
increase in reactor power/decrease
in MW.US directs crew to enter 1-AP-38.RO verifies all steam dumps closed.NOTE: Crew may identify"B" PORV open from PCS alarm and PNID screen.NOTE: BOPmayplace"B" PORVin manual and press the"Down" button.BOP verifies all SG PORVs indicate closed.BOP verifies turbine load normal.RO verifies reactor power is less than or equal to 100%power.(NO)BOP ramps down turbine to reduce power to<100%.Crew dispatches
operators to check for the source of steam.NOTE: The operator will report that the"B" steam 2enerator PORV is open.Crew directs the operator to locally close the"B" SGPORY.Crew checks power level reduced to the power level before the event started.Crew stops ramp.BOP places turbine in IMP-IN, if required.BOP checks main generator output.BOP checks all steam flow indications
normal.BOPchecksturbine
control in operator auto.SXGNRC3 Page 13 Revision 0
EVENT 5: Given that the unit is at power and a SG PORV has failed open, the crew will respond in accordance
with l-AP-38"Excessive
Load Increase." TIME EXPECTED ACTION Crew checks plant steam systems: SGPORVs SG safeties MSR inlet FCV s ASPCV.US/STA consult tech spec 3.7.4.A and determine that the PORV is operable as it can be manuallv oDerated.Crew references
Reactivity
admin300), as time permits.NOTE: US may request permission
to restore reactor Dower.NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew has stabilized
the unit, or at the direction of the lead evaluator.
INSTRUCTOR
REMARKS SXGNRC3 Page 14 Revision 0
EVENT 6: Given the plant is in Mode 1 with indications
of a loss of"A" Main Feedwater Pump and a failure of"B" Main Feedwater Pump to automatically
start, the crew will respond in accordance
with l-AP-31,"Loss of Main Feedwater," and l-E-O,"Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
" TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR
REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials)
- Annunciator
E-H5 illuminates
- Available feed flow is less than steam flow BOP identifies
lE-H5, FW PUMP lA LUBE OIL PRESS LOW.BOP identifies
trip of"A" MFP.BOP informs US ofMFP trip.BOP identifies
start failure of"B" MFP.US direct the BOP to take actions of31.BOP checks reactor power greater than 70%.(YES)BOP checks 2 feed pumps running.(NO)US direct crew to enter l-E-O.NOTE: The next event will be initiated when the reactor is tripped.SXGNRC3 Page 15 Revision 0
EVENT 7: Given that a main feed suction line has broken, the will respond in accordance
with l-E-O Reactor Trio or Safety Injection." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR
REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials)
- The reactor does not trip automatically, if required*Annunciators
F-B6, G-F6, F-Dl, F-D2,F-D3,F-A4, F-B5, F-Fl, F-F2, F-F3 illuminate
- Main feed pump suction pressure rapidly decreases*Standby main Condensate
pump starts*Various turbine building sump alarms illuminate
NOTE: The reactor will not automaticall
tri if re uired.f-----t--:
=------+------------------1
Critical Task BOP verifies/trips
turbine.RO verifies AC emergency busses energized.
BOP identifies
IF-B6, MAIN FD PUMPS SUCT HDR LO PRESS.BOP identifies
auto-start
of the standby condensate
pump.BOP informs crew that feed pump suction pressure is rapidlv decreasing.
RO verifies power to AC emergency busses.Crew checks if SI has actuated.(NO)Crew checks if SI is required.(NO)US directs team to transition
to l-ES-O.l.NOTE: Crew may use O-AP-39.1 for Turbine Building Flooding to direct securin!!of secondarY oumos.US directs BOP to secure main feed, condensate
and heater drain pumps.BOP secures main feed, condensate, and heater drain pumps.SXGNRC3 Page 16 Revision 0
EVENT7:Giventhat.a
main feed suction linehas*broken,*the*crew
will respond in accordance
with l-E-O Reactor TriD or SafetvIniection." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR
REMARKS NOTE: The terry turbine will trip 2 minutes after starting.A break will occur on"A" AFW pump discharge line in the MSVH, and the"B" AFW pump will degrade after starting.These are to set up for the next event that will be handled when identified.
NOTE: The next event can occur once secondary pumps have been stopped.SXGNRC3 Page 17 Revision 0
main andauxiliarVfeed
water pumps has occurred, the crew will respond in accordance
with*I-FR..H.1"Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR
REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials)
- Annunciators
F-D8 illuminates
- I-FW-P-3B degrades and flow drops to zero*RO checks RCS average temperature
stable or trending to desired temperature.
BOP identifies
F-D8, TURBINE DRIVEN AFW PUMP TROUBLE OR LUBE OlL TRBL.NOTE: Once H.I is entered, any operator sent to the vicinity of the MSVH will report that water and steam are issuin!!out the door.Crew identifies
that"B" SG WR level is not increasing.
Crew identifies
that I-FW-P-3B flow is degrading.
BOP identifies
there is no AFW flow available.
Crew identifies
that there has been a loss of the heat sink critical safety function.US directs crew to transition
to I-FR-H.1.Crew checks if secondary heat sink is required.(YES)Crew dispatches
an operator to check I-FW-P-3A and the terry turbine.NOTE: Operator will report"B" AFW pump does not sound right, mechanics suspect internal damage.The terry turbine trio valve is closed.NOTE: The operator instructed
to reset the overspeed trip valve will report that the he can't 2et it to stav reset.SXGNRC3 Page 18 Revision 0
EVENT 8: Given that a loss of all main and auxiliary feed water pumps has occurred, the crew will res ond in accordance
with I-FR-H.1"Res onse to Loss of Second Heat Sink." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR
REMARKS Crew tries to establish AFW flow to at least one SG:*BOP checks SG Blowdown and sample isolation valves closed*Crew reviews control room indications
to determine loss of AFW flow*Crew determines
that they cannot start an AFW pump from the MCR*Crew determines
that they do not have ade uate AFW flow Crew sto s reactor coolant pumps.Critical Task*Crew dispatches
an operator with AP-22 series rocedures.
Crew attempts to establish main feed flow to the SGs:*Crew determines
that there are no condensate
um s runnin.BOP checks SG wide range levels in 2/3 SGs less the 14%.0 US returns to step 1.NOTE: The operator dispatched
to reset the overspeed trip valve will now inform the crew that I-FW-P-2 has been reset.Crew establishes
adequate AFW flow to SGs.*Crew verifies core-exit TCs decreasing
and"A" SG W/R level increasin.US directs transition
to l-ES-O.l.NOTE: An SI may occur on delta P if AFW flow is not throttled to"A" SG.NOTE: The scenario may be terminated
once the crew has established
adequate AFW flow, or at the discretion
of the lead evaluator.
SXGNRC3 Page 19 Revision 0
REFERENCES
PROCEDURE REV.Abnonnal Procedure l-AP-19,"Loss of Bearing Cooling Water." 16 Abnonnal Procedure l-AP-l.l,"Continuous
Uncontrolled
Rod Motion." 8 Abnonnal Procedure l-AP-28,"Loss of Instrument
Air." 30 Abnonnal Procedure l-AP-3,"Loss of Vital Instrumentation." 22 Abnonnal Procedure l-AP-38,"Excessive
Load Increase." 14 Abnonnal Procedure l-AP-31,"Loss of Main Feedwater." 4 Emergency Procedure l-E-O,"Reactor Trip or Safety Injection." 36 Emergency Procedure 1-ES-O.l,"Reactor Trip Response." 26 Functional
Restoration
Procedure I-FR-H.l,"Response to Loss of Secondary Heat 17 Sink." Station Annunciator
Response Procedures.
N/A Guide and Reference Document PI-AA-5000,"Human Perfonnance." 1 INPO, Guideline for Teamwork and Diagnostic
Skill Development:
INPO 88-003, Jan.1988 INPO, ACAD 07-002 Simulator Training Guidelines
Jan.2007 SXGNRC3 Page 20 Revision 0
ATTACHMENTS
ATTACHMENT1-SIMULATOR OPERA TOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM ATTACHMENT2-SCENARIO PERFORMANCE
OBJECTIVES
ATTACHMENT3-SIMULATOR PERFORMANCE
DATASHEET (Last page of scenario)SXGNRC3 Page 21 Revision 0
SXGNRC3 ATTACHMENT
1 SIMULATOR OPERA TOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM Page 22 Revision 0
SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S
COMPUTER PROGRAM SXGNRC3 Initial conditions
1.Recall IC 163 2.Ensure Tave, Tref, PDTT level, and VCT level are selected on trend recorders.
3.Place a WR magnet on 1-CH-RI-128.
4.Rackout 2-CC-P-1A and verify 2-CC-P-1B is running.Close U2_CC_11, U2_CC_4.PRELOADS PRIOR TO SCENARIO START CONDITION MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDEIETC.
Failure of"B" MFP to auto-Switch override: start FWP1B1 AS TOP=OFF FWP1B2 ASTOP=OFF Failure of auto reactor trip Malfunction:
RD32 Letdown rad monitor failure Malfunction:
RM0207, Severity=-1 Failure of 1-IA-C-1 to auto-Switch override: start IAC1_AUTO, Override=OFF SCENARIO EVENTS EVENT MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/COMMUNICATIONS
1)Loss ofBC Remote functions:
BCP1A_PROTECT
=T, Delay time=5, Trigger=1 BCP_AUTO_DEFEAT
=T, Delay time=5, Trigger=1 NOTE: When sent to investigate, the operator will report that there is an overcurrent
drop on the breaker for"A" BC pump.NOTE: The next event will occur once BC is restored, or at the discretion
of the lead evaluator.
SXGNRC3 Page 23 Revision 0
EVENT
2)Median/select
Tave failure Malfunction:
RC1501, Delay time=5, Ramp=5, Severity=1, Trigger=2 NOTE: If the US requests permission
to withdraw rods to restore temperature, it can be given.NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew has stabilized
the plant, or as directed by the lead evaluator.
3)Loss of instrument
air Remote function: U2_IACl_FAULT
=TRUE, Trigger=3 Malfunction:
CA0402, Delay time=8, Ramp=10, Severity=10, Trigger=3 NOTE: If sent to investigate, then report that the MOTOR OVERLOAD annunciator
is lit on the local panel for 2-IA-C-l.Can also report that 2-IA-6, a check valve, is apparently
failed and air is blowing back through the compressor.
Isolating 2-IA-7 should stop the air leak.NOTE: If sent to check 2-IA-TV-211 can report it either open or closed (opens when IA pressure at the dryer is<90 psig).If open report was made, can later report that reset was pressed when so directed.NOTE: When told to close 2-IA-7, wait 1 minute then delete malfunction
CA0402 and report that leak is isolated.NOTE: The next event will occur after instrument
air pressure is returned to normal, or as directed by the lead evaluator.
4)PRZR level Ch I, LT-461 Malfunction:
fails low RC0803, Delay time=5, Ramp=30, Severity=-1, Trigger=4 NOTE: When the crew reestablishes
letdown and identifies
the correct MOP and TS action, then the next event will occur.SXGNRC3 Page 24 Revision°
EVENT
5)Stuck open SG PORV Remote function: MSPCVIOIB_K, Delay time=5, Ramp=5, Value=100, Trigger=5 NOTE: Approximately
two minutes after crew dispatches
an operator to the MSVH, report that the"B" steam generator PORV is open.NOTE: When the crew directs the operator to isolate the valve, wait one minute, then ramp MSPCVIOIB_K
to 0 over 120 seconds.NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew has stabilized
the unit, or at the direction of the lead evaluator.
6)Trip of"A" MFP Malfunction:
FW0401, Delay time=5, Ramp=60, Severity=100, Trigger=6 NOTE: When requested to investigate
cause for loss of oil pressure informs US that oil is leaking from a flanged connection
on the south end ofthe MFP.NOTE: The next event will occur when the reactor is tripped.SXGNRC3 Page 25 Revision°
EVENT MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/COMMUNICA
TIONS 7)Loss ofMFW Malfunctions:
FW2101,2102,2103, Delay time=5, Ramp=0, Severity=100, Trigger=7 Alarm overrides:
VIDF8_W, Delay time=15, Override=ON, Trigger=7 VIDG8_W, Delay time=20, Override=ON, Trigger=7 VIAD6_W, Delay time=20, Override=ON, Trigger=7 V2GC8_W, Delay time=25, Override=ON, Trigger=7 VIAD3_W, Delay time=30, Override=ON, Trigger=7 Setuptrigger 7 to occur when the reactor is tripped.RX_RTA_52.EQ.0 NOTE: A security officer, or operator if one has been sent to area, will call the MCR on the gaitronics
and inform the crew that there is a large amount of steam in the east end of the turbine building basement.NOTE: The following trips the Terry Turbine on overspeed 2 minutes after the reactor is tripped: Remote function: MSTV115=0, Delay time=120, Trigger=10 Set up trigger 10 to actuate on reactor trip breaker being open.RX RTA 52.EQ.0--NOTE: Operator will report the terry turbine trip valve is closed.NOTE: The operator instructed
to reset the overspeed trip valve will report that the valve will not stay reset and request assistance.
NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew secures FW and CN pumps, or as directed by the lead evaluator.
SXGNRC3 Page 26 Revision 0
EVENT MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/COMMUNICATIONS
8)Loss of heat sink Malfunction:
FW1402, Delay time=5, Severity=30, Ramp=30, Trigger=8 FW1102, Delay time=10, Severity=30, Ramp=120, Trigger=8 NOTE: Operator will report"B" AFW pump is noisy.If sent, mechanics can report suspected impeller damage.NOTE: Once operators have determined
that they have a loss of heat sink and have entered H.1, any operator dispatched
to the vicinity of the MSVH can report that steam and water are coming out the door.NOTE: Watch SG WR levels, reset terry turbine before feed and bleed criteria are met.NOTE: After the crew has looped back to step 1 of 1-FR-H.1, reset overspeed trip valve using remote function: MSTV115=100, Ramp=30 NOTE: The operator dispatched
to reset the overspeed trip valve will inform the crew that 1-FW-P-2 has been reset.NOTE: The scenario may be terminated
once the crew has established
adequate AFW flow, or at the discretion
of the lead evaluator.
SXGNRC3 Page 27 Revision°
SXGNRC3 ATTACHMENT
2 SCENARIO PERFORMANCE
OBJECTIVES
Page 28 Revision 0
SIMULATOR REQUALIFICATION
EXAMINATION
TERMINAL PERFORMANCE
OBIECTIVE Given equipment failures and operational
situations, operate the plant in accordance
with Technical Specifications
to bring the unit to a safe condition, using applicable
procedures, and applying effective teamwork, communication, and diagnostic
skills.GENERIC PERFORMANCE
OB IECTIVES A.During shift operations
the shift manager will take a conservative
course of action, especially
when uncertain conditions
exist, when dealing with core cooling or heat sink availability, primary system and containment
integrity, and reactivity
control associated
with plant evolutions.
B.During shift operations
the shift manager will provide overall crew guidance by prioritizing
and integrating
the actions of the shift crew in accordance
with administrative
procedures.
C.During shift operations
each crew member will participate
in a team effort that resolves conflicts, provides input into the team decision and communicates
all the necessary information
to enhance teamwork in accordance
with administrative
procedures.
D.During shift operations
the Shift Technical Advisor will independently
assess events and based on those assessments
make recommendations
to the crew regarding mitigation
strategy.SXGNRC3 Page 29 Revision 0
EVENT GOAL: EVENT 1 PERFORMANCE
OBJECTIVES
Given the plant is in Mode 1 and the"A" bearing cooling water pump has tripped the crew will respond in accordance
with l-AP-19,"Loss of Bearing Cooling Water." NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS: R522 Stabilize the unit following a loss of bearing cooling water.CRITICAL TASK: N/A SXGNRC3 Page 30 Revision 0
EVENT GOAL: EVENT 2 PERFORMANCE
OBJECTIVES
Given that the unit is in mode 1 and the median/select
Tave unit has failed, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance
with 1-AP-1.1,"Continuous
Uncontrolled
Rod Motion," and annunciators
B-A7 andA8.NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS: R248 Respond to a T-AVG/-REF
DEVIATION annunciator
alarm.R475 Perform the immediate operator actions in response to a continuous
uncontrolled
rod motion.CRITICAL TASK: See next Page SXGNRC3 Page 31 Revision 0
CT Statement*
Crew takes action in accordance
with AP-I.I, to stop rod motion and stabilize the unit.Safety Significance'
Core reactivity
is not under control of the operator due to the failed control channel."It is expected that the operator will attempt to take manual actions to correct for anomalous conditions
during power operation.
" Indication
of a failed MMS Unit.Continuous
inward control rod motion with Tave and Tref matched.Perfonnance
Indicator RO places rod control in manual.Feedback Rod motion stops.WOG Reference'
None Conditions'
Prior to a PRZR low pressure reactor trip.SXGNRC3 Page 32 Revision 0
EVENT GOAL: EVENT 3 PERFORMANCE
OBJECTIVES
Given that the unit is at power and indications
exist of a loss of instrument
air, the crew will respond in accordance
with l-AP-28,"Loss of Instrument
Air." NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS: R530 Respond to a loss of instrument
air outside containment.
CRITICAL TASK: See next page SXGNRC3 Page 33 Revision 0
CT Statement*
Crew starts all available air compressors.
Safety Significance'
Failure to start all available air compressors
under the postulated
plant conditions
constitutes
mis-operation
or incorrect crew performance
which leads to degradation
of plant conditions
which could result in a unit trip and/or safety injection.
In this case, the instrument
air pressure can be maintained
above the trip set point by starting the air compressors.
Therefore, failure to start the air compressors
also represents
a"demonstrated
inability by the crew to take an action or combination
of actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety." Instrument
air low pressure alarm.Meter indication
of low instrument
air pressure.Perfonnance
Indicator BOP starts all available air compressors.
Feedback Instrument
air pressure stabilizes
above the trip set point.WOG Reference'
None.Conditions'
Prior to reaching the trip set point of70 PSIG.SXGNRC3 Page 34 Revision 0
EVENT GOAL: EVENT 4 PERFORMANCE
OB,TECTlVES
Given that the unit is at power and a selected pressurizer
level channel has failed, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance
with l-AP-3,"Loss of Vital Instrumentation." NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS: R633 Respond to a failure ofthe controlling
pressurizer
level channel.S70 Evaluate compliance
with technical specifications.
CRITICAL TASK: See next page SXGNRC3 Page 35 Revision 0
CT Statement*
Crew takes manual control ofPRZR level, minimizes charging, and restores letdown.Safety Significance'
Failure to take manual control ofPRZR level constitutes
a"mis-operation
or incorrect crew performance" which will result in an unnecessary
reactor trip on high PRZR level.The controlling
PRZR level channel is failed low, letdown is isolated.Perfonnance
Indicator'
RO verifies/places
controller
for l-CH-FCV-1122
in manual and controls PRZR level.RO performs RNO step and selects operable channel.RO restores charging and letdown as directed by the US.Feedback PRZR level does not exceed trip setpoint.WOG Reference'
None.Conditions'
Prior to a PRZR high level reactor trip.SXGNRC3 Page 36 Revision 0
EVENT GOAL: EVENT 5 PERFORMANCE
OBJECTIVES
Given that the unit is at power and a SG PORV has failed open, the crew will respond in accordance
with l-AP-38,"Excessive
Load Increase." NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS: R539 Perfonn the immediate operator actions in response to an excessive load increase.S70 Evaluate compliance
with technical specifications.
CRITICAL TASK: N/A SXGNRC3 Page 37 Revision 0
EVENT GOAL: EVENT 6 PERFORMANCE
OB,TF,CTIVES
Given the plant is in Mode 1 with indications
of a loss of"A" Main Feedwater Pump and a failure of"B" MainFeedwaterPump
to automatically
start, the crew will respond in accordance
with 1-AP-31,"Loss of Main Feedwater," and 1-E-O,"Reactor Trip or Safety Injection." NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS: R 781 Respond to a loss of main feedwater.
CRITICAL TASK: N/A SXGNRC3 Page 38 Revision°
EVENT 7 PERFORMANCE
OBJECTIVES
Given that a main feed suction line has broken, the crew will respond in accordance
with I-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection." NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS;RI85 Perform the immediate operator actions in response to a reactor trip or safety injection.
CRITICAl!TASK: See next page SXGNRC3 Page 39 Revision°
CT Statement Crew manually trips the Reactor.Safety Significance*
Failure to manually trip the reactor causes a challenge to the sub criticality
CSF beyond that irreparably
introduced
by the postulated
conditions.
Additionally, it constitutes
an"incorrect
performance
that necessitates
the crew taking compensating
action which complicates
the event mitigation
strategy and demonstrates
the inability by the crew to recognize a failure of the automatic actuation ofthe RPS." Indication
and/or annunciation
that plant parameter(s)
exist that should result in automatic reactor trip but reactor does not automatically
trip.Perfonnance
Indicator RO/BOP opens both reactor trip breakers.Feedback Reactor trip breakers open, rod bottom lights lit, IRPls at zero steps, reactor power<5%.WOG Reference*
E-O Background.
Conditions*
Prior to a transition
to FR-S.1.SXGNRC3 Page 40 Revision 0
CT Statement Crew stops reactor coolant pumps.Safety Significance'
Tripping the RCPs when entering this guideline"...can appreciably
delay the need for bleed and feed and loss of secondary heat sink..." Failure to trip the RCPs"...can also reduce the effectiveness
of bleed and feed.RCP heat input to the RCS will result in increased steam generation
hindering the depressurization
of the RCS during bleed and feed." Indication
of:*Reactor trip and*total feedwater flow less than 340 gpm, and*all SG levels less than 11%NR.Perfonnance
Indicator RO/BOP puts control switch(es)
for all running RCPs in STOP.Feedback Indication/annunciation
of no RCPs running.WOG Reference'
FR-H.I background
document.Conditions'
Prior to being required to initiate RCS bleed and feed.SXGNRC3 Page 41 Revision 0
EVENT 8 PERFORMANCE
OBJECTIVES
Given that a loss of all main and auxiliary feed water pumps has occurred, the crew will respond in accordance
with 1-FR-H.I,"Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink." NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS: None.CRITICAII TASK: See Following Pages SXGNRC3 Page 42 Revision 0
CT Statem ent'Crew establishes
Feed Flow to at least one SG.Safety Significance*
Failure to establish feedwater flow to any SG results in the crew's having to rely upon the lower-priority
action of establishing
RCS bleed and feed to minimize core uncovery.This constitutes
incorrect performance
that"leads to degradation
of any barrier to fission product release." Extreme (red-path)
challenge to the heat sink CSF Indication
that RCS pressure remains above the pressure of all SGs Indication
that RCS temperature
remains above the temperature
for placing the RHR system..III servIce Indication
and/or annunciation
that no AFW flow is available after repeated attempts to establish-AND-Level indication
that SG dryout has not yet occurred.Perfonnance
Indicator Crew directs operator to locally reset terry turbine trip valve and establish flow withP-2.BOP establishes
adequate AFW flow as indicated by core-exit TCs decreasing
and SG wide-range
level increasing.'
Feedback Indication
of AFW flow, increasing
wide-range
SG level and decreasing
core-exit thermocouples.
WOG Reference*
FR-H.1 Background
document.Conditions*
Prior to being required to perform RCS feed and bleed.SXGNRC3 Page 43 Revision 0
ATTACHMENT
3
Scenario Performance
Datasheet EVENT 1: Given the plant is in Mode 1 and the"A" bearing cooling water pump has tripped the crew will respond in accordance
with l-AP-19,"Loss of Bearing Cooling Water." SPD Verified: (Initials)
- Annunciators
F-F4, F-E4, F-H8 illuminate
- I-BC-P-IA has a breaker misalignment (amber and green lights lit)*I-BC-P-IB does not auto-start
EVENT 2: Given that the unit is in mode 1 and the median/select
Tave unit has failed, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance
with l-AP-l.l,"Continuous
Uncontrolled
Rod Motion" and annunciators
B-A 7 and B-A8.SPD Verified: (Initials)
- Rods stepping in at maximum speed*Annunciators
B-A 7 and B-A8 are illuminated
- Status light M-E4 illuminates
EVENT 3: Given that the unit is at power and indications
exist of a loss of instrument
air, the crew will respond in accordance
with l-AP-28,"Loss of Instrument
Air." SPD Verified: (Initials)
- Annunciator
lJ-D2 illuminates
- IA pressure drops*l-IA-C-l will not start automatically, if required*Annunciators
J-E8 and F-F8 illuminate
EVENT 4: Given that the unit is at power and a selected pressurizer
level channel has failed, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance
with l-AP-3,"Loss of Vital Instrumentation." SPD Verified: (Initials)
- Annunciators
B-F8, B-G7, and B-E2 are illuminated
- l-RC-LI-1461
fails low*Letdown isolates EVENTS: Given that the unit isin model and the medianiselectTave
unit has failed, the crew willbeexpected.torespond
in.accordance
with l-AP..l.l,"Continuous
Uncontrolled
Rod Motion!'and annunciators
B-A7and B-A8.SPD Verified: (Initials)
- Rods stepping in at maximum speed*Annunciators
B-A 7 and B-A8 are illuminated
- Status light M-E4 illuminates
SXGNRC 3 Date----Revision 0
EVENT 6: Given the plant is in Mode 1 with indications
of a loss of"A" Main FeedwaterPump
and a failure of"B" Main Feedwater Pump to automatically
start, the crew will respond in accordance
with l-AP-31"Loss of Main Feedwater," and l-E-O,"Reactor Trip or Safety Iniection." SPD Verified: (Initials)
- Annunciator
E-H5 illuminates
- Available feed flow is less than steam flow EVENT 7: Given that a main Jeed suction line has broken, the crew will respond.in
accordance
with l-E-O, Reactor Trip orSafetylniection." SPD Verified: (Initials)
- The reactor does not trip automatically, if required*Annunciators
F-B6, G-F6, F-Dl, F-D2, F-D3, F-A4, F-B5, F-Fl, F-F2, F-F3 illuminate
- Main feed pump suction pressure rapidly decreases*Standby main Condensate
pump starts*Various turbine building sump alarms illuminate
EVENT 8: Given that a loss of all main and auxiliaryJeed
water pumps has occurred, the crew will respond in accordance
with I-FR-H.1,"Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink." SPD Verified: (Initials)
- Annunciators
F-D8 illuminates
- I-FW-P-3B degrades and flow drops to zero SXG37 Date----Revision 7
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: North Anna Scenario No.: 4 Op-Test No.: 1 Examiners:
Operators:
Initial Conditions:
Unit at approximately
22%power with ramp held to allow turnover.Unit was returned to service last shift after an outage to repair a leak on the EHC interface valve.1-FW-P-2 (terry turbine)was tagged out during the outage and was just returned to service.The letdown radiation monitor is 005.2-CC-P-1A is tagged out for seal maintenance.
Control rods are in Manual while I&C verifies proper operation due to a prior problem.Turnover: Shift orders are to ramp unit to 100%power.Event Malf.No.Event Event No.Tvpe*Description
1 R (R)(S)Commence ramping unit to 100%power N (B)Running EHC pump trips and standby pump does not auto-start
2 TU1101 C (B)(S)(Crew will be informed during this time that rods can now be placed in AUTO.)3 RC29 C (R)(S)Master pressure controller
fails high causing PORV and sprays to open TS (S)4 FW0106 I(B)(S)Failure of"B" SG channel III level transmitter
TS (S)5 NI0104 I (R)(S)N-44 failure TS (S)5a N (R)(S)N-44 is placed in trip 6 RC2402 C (All)"B" SGTL increasing
until reactor trip is required 7 RC2402 M (All)"B" SGTR after unit stabilizes
from trip 8 TU03 I (B)(S)Turbine does not trip automatically
9 RC1201 C (R)(S)Seal leak on"A" RCP after reactor trip Terminate scenario oncecrewcompletes
cooldown in E-3*(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
DOMINION NORTH ANNA POWER STATION INITIAL LICENSED OPERA TOR EXAMINATION
SIMULATOR EXAMINATION
GUIDE SCENARIO NRC 4
SIMULATOR EXAMINATION
GUIDE EVENT DESCRIPTION
I.Commence ramping unit to 100%power 2.Trip of running ERC pump/Failure
of standby pump to auto-start
3.Master pressure controller
fails high causing PORV and sprays to open 4."B" SG channel III level transmitter
fails low 5/5a.N-44 fails and is placed in trip 6."B" SGTL increasing
until reactor trip is required.Turbine does not trip automatically.
RCP seal failure.7."B" SGTR Scenario Recapitulation:
Malfunctions
after EOP entry Total Malfunctions
Abnormal Events Major Transients
EOPs Entered EOP Contingencies
Critical Tasks 2 (Failure of turbine to trip automatically, RCP seal failure)8 (Trip of running ERC pump/failure
of standby pump tostart, master pressure controller
fails high, SG level channel fails low, N-44 fails, SGTL requiring reactor trip, SGTR, failure of turbine to trip automatically, RCP seal failure)4 (Master pressure controller
fails high, SG level channel fails low, N-44 fails, SGTL requiring reactor trip)1 (SGTR)2 (ES-O.!, E-3)o 5 SCENARIO DITRATION 120 Minutes SXGNRC4 Page 2 Revision 0
SIMULATOR EXAMINATION
SCENARIO SUMMARY SCENARIO NRC 2 Scenario begins with the unit at approximately
22%power with a power increase held for turnover.Unit was returned to service last shift after an outage to repair a leak on the EHC interface valve.The terry turbine was tagged out during the outage and has just been returned to service.The letdown radiation monitor is OOS.2-CC-P-IA is tagged out for seal maintenance.
Shift orders are to ramp to 100%.Control rods are in manual while the instrument
shop verifies proper operation due to a previous problem.Thecrewwill increase reactor power in accordance
with 1-0P-2.1,"Unit Startup from Mode 2 to Mode 1." Once a satisfactory
power increases has been seen, the running EHC pump will trip with a failure of the standby pump to auto-start.
The crew will start the standby pump per AR for T-B4 or US direction.
Atthistime the crew will be informed that control rods can be placed in AUTO.Once the standby pump is running the next event can occur.The PRZR master pressure controller
will fail causing 1-RC-PCV-1455C
and both spray valves to open.The US should direct the crew to enter 1-AP-44,"Loss ofRCS Pressure." The RO will manually close 1-RC-PCV-1455C
and use the master pressure controller
to close the spray valves.Once the crew has stabilized
RCS pressure and consulted Tech Specs, or at the direction of the lead evaluator, the next event will occur.Channel ill level transmitter
for the"B" steam generator will fail low.The crew should identify this failure and take manual control of the"B" main feed reg.valve to restore level in the"B" SG.The crew should enter 1-AP-3,"Loss of Vital Instrumentation," and refer to technical specifications
to determine operability
of the transmitter.
Once the crew has identified
the applicable
MOP and referred to Tech Specs, the next event will occur.Next, Nuclear Instrument
channel N-44 will fail high causing the control rods to drive in at maximum speed.The RO must identify N-44 as failing and place rod control in MANUAL.The crew will enter 1-AP-4.3,"Malfunction
of Nuclear Instrumentation (power Range)," and place44 in trip (Normal event).The US/STA should review Technical Specification 3.3.1.After N-44 has been placed in trip, the next event will occur.A tube leak will occur on"B" SG.The first indication
will be the N-16 radiation monitor for"B" SG indicating
increased leakage.The US should direct the crew to enter 1-AP-5,"Unit 1 Radiation Monitoring
System," and direct HP/Chemistry
to obtain and analyze a"B" SG blowdown sample.Eventually, the main steamline header N-16 monitor indication
will increase and the crew will have backup indication
of a tube leak in the"B" SG.Based on confIrmed leakage, the US should direct the crew to enter 1-AP-24,"Steam Generator Tube Leak." The tube leakage will increase until a reactor trip is necessary.
The crew will enter 1-E-0,"Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
" The turbine will not trip automatically
and must be tripped using pushbuttons.
Following a transition
to ES-O.l,"Reactor Trip Response," a SGTR will develop in the"B" steam generator.
SXG NRC 4 Page 3 Revision 0
Following identification
of degrading primary plant conditions
the crew will manually safety inject and transition
back to E-O,"Reactor Trip or Safety Injection." The crew will proceed through E-O and transition
to and perform E-3,"Steam Generator Tube Rupture." During this time the"A" RCP will develop a seal failure and the crew will need to secure it and close the sealleakoff
valve perAP-33.1,"Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Failure." The crew will cooldown the RCS using E-3.At this time the scenario can be terminated.
SXGNRC4 Page 4 Revision°
SCENARIO TURNOVER SHEET Read the following to the crew: Purpose: This examination
is intended to evaluate the crew's performance
of various tasks associated
with the LicensedOperatorTraining
Program.All activities
should be completed in accordance
with approved operations
standards.
I.You are on a day shift during the week.2.When conditions
allow, utilize the computer log systems as you would in the plant.Unit Status: Unit 1 is at approximately
22%power.The unit was returned to service last shift after an outage to repair a leak on the EHC interface valve.The ramp was held for turnover.RCS boronis1412 ppm and core age is 9000.Aux steam is on unit 2.Unit 2 is at 100%power.Equipment Status: Letdown rad monitor, I-CH-Rl-128, is OOS.I-FW-P-2, terry turbine, was tagged out during outage and has just been returned to service.2-CC-P-IA is tagged out for seal maintenance.
Control rods are in manual while the instrument
shop verifies proper operation due to a previous failure.They are currently monitoring
rod motion and will inform the crew when rods may be returned to auto.The maintenance
rule window is green.Shift Orders: Ramp the unit to 100%.SXGNRC4 Page 5 Revision 0
TIME EXPECTED ACTION SPD Verified: (Initials)
- Reactor power increases*Turbine power increases*Tavg/Tref increase*Generator output increases BOP increases turbine setter to desired osition.BOP presses GO on turbine.BOP monitors turbine ramp.RO starts a dilution when required.RO withdraws control rods to maintain rima tern erature.NOTE: The next event can occur once the crew has ramped approximately
5%as determined
b the lead evaluator.
INSTRUCTOR
REMARKS SXGNRC4 Page 6 Revision 0
EVENT2: Given thatthe running ERCpump has tripped and the backup ERC pump has not auto-started
the crew willresoond
in accordance
with the AR.TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR
REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials)
- Annunciators
K-F5 and T-B4 will illuminate
BOP identifies
K-F5, TURB SUPERV PANEL TROUBLE.Crew identifies
T-B4, ER FLUID RESERVOIR LOW-PRESSURE.
Crew refers to AR for T-B4.US directs BOP to start the standby ERC pump.NOTE: Crew may hold the ramp and stoD the dilution at this time.BOP manually starts 1-TM-P-4.NOTE: If crew dispatches
and operator to look at ERC pumps, the operator will report that I-TM-P-3 is unusually hot, and I-TM-P-4 ann ears normal.NOTE: The Work Control Center will inform the crew at this time that rods mav be returned to AUTO.US requests Work Request, Condition Report, and appropriate
notifications
be made to Operations
management
and maintenance.
NOTE: The next event will occur after the backup ERC pump is running, or at the direction of the lead evaluator.
SXGNRC4 Page 7 Revision 0
EVENT 3: Given the unit is at power and the PRZR pressure master controller
fails high, the crew will res ond in accordance
with 1-AP-44"Loss of Reactor Coolant S stem Pressure." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR
REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials)
- Annunciator
B-E6 illuminates
- Master pressure controller
fails high*1-RC-PCV-1455C
indicates open*RCS pressure decreases NOTE: If the ramp was not previously
stopped, the crew should stop the ramp and dilution once immediate actions have been com leted.Crew identifies
B-E6, PRZR PRESS CONT HI OUTPUT.US directs crew to enter 1-AP-44.RO verifies PRZR PORV'S closed.(NO)Crew stops RCS pressure Critical Task decrease:
- R@lclos_es
- RO checks master pressure controller
controllin
ro erl.0*RO verifies PRZR spray valves closed.RO verifies all PRZR heaters energized.
RO verifies auxiliary spray valve closed.Crew verifies PORVandsafety valves closed.RO verifies RCS pressure stable or..mcreasm.RO verifies RCS pressure normal and ad'usts s ra s or heaters as re uired.US refers to TS-3.4.1 (DNB), TS 3.4.13 (RCS Leakage), and TS 3.4.11.He determines
that PORV is 0 erable.Crew evaluates malfunction
and requests a work request and condition report be submitted.
SXGNRC4 Page 8 Revision 0
EVENT 3: Given the unit is at power and the PRZR pressure master controller
fails high, the crew will resDond in accordance
with l-AP-44"Loss of Reactor Coolant Svstem Pressure." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR
REMARKS NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew has stabilized
ReS pressure and consulted Tech Specs, or at the direction of the lead evaluator.
SXGNRC4 Page 9 Revision 0
EVENT 4: Given that the unit is at power and a steam generator level transmitter
has failed, the crew will be exnected to resnond in accordance
with l-AP-3"Loss of Vital Instrumentation." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR
REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials)
- Annunciators
F-F2 and F-B2 are illuminated
IF-F2, SG lB LEVEL ERROR.BOP identifies"B" MFRV is ramping open.US directs entry into l-AP-3.Crew identifies"B" SG level channel III has failed low.Crew checks redundant instrumentation
normal.Crew checks SGWLC parameters
normal.(NO)BOP takes manual control of the"B" MFRV to restore SG level.Crew verifies first-stage
pressure indications
normal.RO verifies systems affected by PRZR level channels normal:*RO verifies operable pressurizer
level channel selected*RO verifies letdown in service*RO verifies pressurizer
level control in AUTO*RO verifies control group heaters are not trinoed.Crew verifies both turbine first stage pressure channels normal.Crew verifies operable channels selected for SGWLC.Crew verifies that no other instrumentation
has failed.US refers to tech specs 3.3.1 (Functions
14 and 15)and 3.3.2 (Functions
5b and 6b)and reports that channel must be placed in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.Info action is entered on TS 3.3.3 SXGNRC4 Page 10 Revision 0
EVENT 4: Given that the unit is at power and a steam generator level transmitter
has failed, the crew will be exnected to resnond in accordance
with l-AP-3"Loss of Vital Instrumentation." Crew identifies
I-MOP-55.76.
US infonns Work Control Center of failure and requests WR, CR, and craft assistance.
NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew has identified
the appropriate
MOP, or at the direction of the lead evaluator.
SXGNRC4 Page 11 Revision 0
EVENT 5: Given that theunitisstableatpowerandpo\Ver-range
channel N-44 has failed high resulting in rods stepping in, thecrew-will
respond in accordance
with l-AP-4.3,"Malfunction
of Nuclear Instrumentation (Power Range)." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR
REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials)
- N-44 indicates>
120%*Control rods step in at maximum speed*RCS pressure andTA VE decrease NOTE: Verify control rods are in AUTO before this event.RO identifies
control rods stepping in.RO identifies
N-44 failed high.US directs entry into l-AP-4.3.Crew stops control rod movement Critical Task due to N-44 failure.*
p0\Y.er 110t increasing.
- BOP verifies MFRVs in MANUAL.Crew verifies three power-range
instruments
operable.Crew verifies unit in mode 1.Crew verifies I-hour permissives.
RO places N-44 in trip.Normal event*N-44 is selected on Comparator
Channel Defeat*N-44 is defeated on Rod Stop Bypass*N-44 is defeated on Upper section*N-44 is defeated on Lower section*Control power fuses are removed.Crew selects N-43 on the N-16 panel, if required.Crew checks reactor power greater than 5%and removes computer points from scan.Crew notifies chemistry N-44 input to OLCMS is unreliable.
US reviews TS 3.3.1 (Functions
2 and 3).QPTR will be required once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> when power is>50%.SXGNRC4 Page 12 Revision 0
EVENT 5: Given that the unit is stableatpo\Verandpower-range
channel N-44 has failed high resulting illfodssteppin
g in, the crew will respond in accordance
with l-AP-4.3,"Malfunction
of Nuclear InstrumentationCPowerRange)." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR
REMARKS Crew verifiesN-44placed
in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.RO verifies TAVE and TREF matched within 1.5°F.Crew determines
if rod control should be placed in AUTO.US reports failure to Work Control Center and requests WR CR, and craft assistance.
NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew places N-44 in trip, or as directed bv the lead evaluator.
SXGNRC4 Page 13 Revision 0
EVENT 6: Given that the unit is at power and indications
exist of a SG tube leak, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance
with 1-AP-5,"Unit 1 Radiation Monitoring
System," 1-AP-24,"Steam Generator Tube Leak," and 1-E-O,"Reactor Trip or Safety In;ection.
" TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR
REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials)
K-G6 illuminated
- AnnunciatorK-G6 reflashes*Indications
of increasing
leakage on all N-16 RMs*Charging flow slowly increases*Later: Annunciators
C-G7 and C-G5 illuminate
- "A" RCP sealleakoffflow
indication
is neQQed hiQh RO/BOP identifies
K-G6,16 RAD DET.Crew identifies
an Alert alarm onRl-191,"B" SG main steamline N-16 radiation monitor.NOTE: US may not immediately
break off an ooerator to address l-AP-5.US directs entry into 1-AP-5,"Unit
1 Radiation Monitoring
System," and/orAP-24"Steam Generator Tube Leak." STA is notified to evaluate SG leak rate AP-5 steps trend data.NOTE: If crew requests HP to perform local radiation surveys on the MS lines, HP will inform the crew that contact readings on the"B" MS line are elevated.US notifies the Ops Manager or Operations
Manager On Call (OMOC).Crew monitors radiation on N-16 trend recorder and determines
leakage is increasinQ.
Crew identifies
increasing
radiation on main steam line header N-16 radiation monitor.US directs crew to initiate the 1-AP-5 attachment
for monitoring
primary to secondary leakaQe and enter 1-AP-24.SXGNRC4 Page 14 Revision 0
EVENT 6: Given that the unit is at power and indications
exist of a SG tube leak, the will be expected to respond in accordance
with l-AP-5,"Unit 1 Radiation Monitoring
System," l-AP-24;"Steam Generator Tube Leak," and l-E-O,"Reactor Trip or Safety Injection." TIME nxpJ-<,t I 1-<,1 J At I It'N Crew checks if reactor should be tripped:*Valid indication
of high radiation on a secondary radiation monitor*AND any of the following:
- Noticeably
increased charging flow*Increase in VCT makeup frequency*Unexpected
SG level increase*Unexnected
feed flow decrease.Crew identifies
reflash on annunciatorG6 N-16 RAD DET.Crew identifies
increasing.
US directs crew enter E-O, while continuing
with l-AP-24.RO/BOP trip the reactor.mSTRUCTORREMARKS
AP-24 BOP trips the turbine using the turbine trip Turbine will not trip automatically
pushbuttons.
RO verifies AC emergency busses energized.
Crew checks if SI has actuated.Crew checks if SI is required.(NO)US directs transition
to l-ES-O.l.Crew initiates monitoring
of critical safety function status trees.*RO checks RCS Tave stable at or trending to expected value.BOP adjusts AFW flow as required NOTE: At this time the"A" Rep will develop a seal leak.RO identifies
C-G7 RCPB-C SEAL LEAK HI FLOW, and C-G5, RCP lA-B-C SHAFT SEAL WATERLO DP.RO identifies"A" RCP sealleakoffflow
is pegged high.SXGNRC4 Page 15 Revision 0
EVENT 6: Given that the unit is at power and indications
exist of a SG tube leak, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance
with l-AP-5,"Unit 1 Radiation Monitoring
System," l-AP-24,"Steam Generator Tube Leak," and l-E-O,"Reactor Trip or Safety In'ection." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR
REMARKS US directs crew to enter l-AP-33.1.
CrewdeterminesRCP
must be tripped.Critical Task US reports seal failure to Work Control Center and requests WR, CR, and craft assistance.
Crew isolates affected Reactor Coolant Pump sealleakoff
- NOTE: RCP should be tripped and sea leakoff valve should be closed within lve minutes of initial seal failure.US announces continuation
ofES-O.l.NOTE: The next event will occur once the Rep is stopped and auxiliary feed flow has been throttled, or as directed by the lead evaluator.
SXGNRC4 Page 16 Revision°
EVENT 7: Given that the unit is shutdown following a reactor trip, and indications
exist of a SGTR, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance
with 1-E-O,"Reactor Trip or Safety Iniection" and 1-E-3"Steam Generator Tube Ruoture.TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR
REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials)
- "B" SG level increases unexpectedly
- Pressurizer
level and pressure decreases unexpectedly
Crew observes indications
that the SG tube leak has worsened.US directs entry into 1-E-O.RO/BOP verify reactor tripped.BOP verifies turbine trip.RO verifies AC emergency busses energized.
NOTE: l-AP-24 is no longer applicable
once SI has been actuated.Crew manually actuates S1.BOP verifies feedwater isolation:
- MFRV s closed*MFRBVs closed*Main feed MOVs closed*Standby MFP in PTL*Main feed pumps tripped*MFP discharge MOVS closed*SG BD TV s closed.Crew verifies phase A isolation:
- Manually initiates Phase A*Initiates Attachment
to verify isolation.
BOP verifies AFW pumps are running, as required.Crew verifies SI pumps are running.Crew checks if main steamlines
should be isolated.Crew verifies SI flow.BOP verifies AFW flow.RO checks RCS average temperature.
SXGNRC4 Page 17 Revision 0
EVENT 7: Given that the unit is shutdown following a reactor trip, and indications
exist of a SGTR, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance
with l-E-O,"Reactor Trip or Safety In'ection" and l-E-3"Steam Generator Tube Ru ture.RO checks pressurizer
PORVsandspray valves.RO checks RCP trip and charging pump recirc criteria.Crew checks SGs not faulted.(YES)Crew checks SG tubes not ruptured.(NO)US directs transition
to l-E-3.RO checks RCP trip and charging pump recirc criteria.Crew identifies"B" SG as the ruptured SG.NOTE: Crew may have closedMOV-IOOB earlier in the scenario.SG level>11%.Crew isolates ruptured SG by Critical Task performing/directing
the following:
- BOP adjusts"B" SG PORV setpoint at 1050 PSIG*BOP checks"B" SG PORV closed*i*RO checks decay heat release valve closed*BOP verifies"B" SG blowdown valves closed**Crew initiates attachment
for turbine buildin actions.*RO checks PRZR PORVs and block valves and safe valves.*BOP checks intact SG levels.RO resets both trains of S1.SXGNRC4 Page 18 Revision 0
EVENT 7: Given that the unit is shutdown following a reactor trip, and indications
exist of a SGTR, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance
with 1-E-0,"Reactor Trip or Safety Iniection" and 1-E-3"Steam Generator Tube Runture.TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR
REMARKS Crew aligns air ejectors to containment:
- Crew removes fuses from AE RM*RO resets phase A*Crew places AE divert switches to DIVERT*Crew verifies valve alignment*Crew opens steam supply to air eiectors.BOP establishes
IA to containment.
Crew verifies flow from"B" SG isolated:*Procedure step 3 complete*Attachment
7 complete through step 3*Runtured SG nressure>350 nsill.*RO checks interlock blocks and blocks SI signals when required.Crew initiates RCS cooldown: Critical Task*Crew detennines
required CETC temperature
based on ruptured SG
- RO verifies CETCs<required temperature.
- RO/BOP stop dumping steam.NOTE: Scenario may be terminated
after crew completes cooldown, or as directed bv the Lead Evaluator.
SXGNRC4 Page 19 Revision 0
REFERENCES
TRP 1'K 11'1-<Operating Procedure 1-0P-2.1,"Unit Startup from Mode 2 to Mode 1." 87 Abnormal Procedure l-AP-44,"Loss of Reactor Coolant System Pressure." 19 Abnormal Procedure l-AP-4.3,"Malfunction
of Nuclear Instrumentation (power 18 Range)." Abnormal Procedure l-AP-3,"Loss of Vital Instrumentation." 22 Abnormal Procedure l-AP-24,"Steam Generator Tube Leak." 20 Abnormal Procedure l-AP-33.1,"Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Failure." 13 Emergency Procedure l-E-O,"Reactor Trip or Safety Injection." 36 Emergency Procedure l-E-3,"Steam Generator Tube Rupture."23 23 Station Annunciator
Response Procedures.
N/A Guide and Reference Document PI-AA-5000,"Human Performance." 1 INPO, Guideline for Teamwork and Diagnostic
Skill Development:
INPO 88-003, Jan.1988 INPO, ACAD 07-002 Simulator Training Guidelines
Jan.2007 SXGNRC4 Page 20 Revision 0
ATTACHMENTS
ATTACHMENT1-SIMULATOR OPERA TOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM ATTACHMENT2-SCENARIO PERFORMANCE
OBJECTIVES
ATTACHMENT3-SIMULATOR PERFORMANCE
DATASHEET (Last page of scenario)*
SXGNRC4 Page 21 Revision 0
SXGNRC4 ATTACHMENT
1 SIMULATOR OPERA TOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM Page 22 Revision 0
SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S
COMPUTER PROGRAM SXGNRC4 Initial condjtjons
1.Recall IC 164 2.Ensure Tave, Tref (550-560), PDrr level, and VCT level are selected on trend recorders.
3.Place a WR magnet on l-CH-RI-128.
4.Set rods on PCS to 140 steps on D bank.5.1-0P-2.l filled out to correct step.6.Reactivity
plan available.
7.Rackout breaker for 2-CC-P-IA and verify 2-CC-P-IB running.Close U2_CC_11, U2_CC_4.PRELOADSPRIORTO
SCENARIO START CONDITION MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDEIETC.
Letdown rad monitor failure Malfunction:
RM0207 Severity=-1 Auto-start
failure ofEHC Switch override: pump TMP4_ASTP, Delay time=0, Value=False Failure of auto turbine trip Malfunction:
TU03 SCENARIO EVENTS EVENT MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/COMMUNICATIONS
1)Unit ramp NOTE: The next event will occur once the crew has ramped approximately
5%.SXGNRC4 Page 23 Revision 0
EVENT MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/COMMUNICATIONS
2)EHC pump trip Malfunction:
TUIIOI, Delay time=5, Trigger=2 NOTE: If crew dispatches
and operator to look at EHC pumps, the operator will report that 1-TM-P-3 is unusually hot, and I-TM-P-4 appears normal.NOTE: When the US reports the failure the WCC can tell him that all I&C paperwork has been signed off for the previous control rod problem and rods may be placed in AUTO at this time.NOTE: The next event will occur after the backup EHC pump is running, or at the direction of the lead evaluator.
3)PRZR master pressure Malfunction:
controller
failure RC29, Delay time=5, Ramp=5, Severity=2, Trigger=3 NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew has stabilized
RCS pressure and consulted Tech Specs, or at the direction of the lead evaluator.
4)"B" SG level transmitter
Malfunction:
failure FW0106, Delay time=5, Ramp=5, Stop=-1, Trigger=4 NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew has reviewed TS, or at the direction of the lead evaluator.
5)Power-range
channel IV NOTE: Verify control rods have been returned to AUTO failure before inserting this event.Malfunction:
NI0204, Delay time=5, Ramp=0, Severity=1, Trigger=5 NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew stabilizes
unit and places N-44 in trip, or as directed by the lead evaluator.
SXGNRC4 Page 24 Revision 0
EVENT MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/COMMUNICATIONS
6)Steam generator tube leak Malfunctions:
requiring shutdown/"A" RCP RC2402, Delay time=5, Ramp=300, Severity=1.0, Trigger=6 seal leak RC1201, Delay time=180, Ramp=5, Severity=100, Trigger=25 NOTE: Put in trigger 25 when crew transitions
to ES-O.l and starts to throttle AFW.NOTE: HP surveys should take approximately
5 minutes.Chemistry samples should take approximately
30 minutes.NOTE: HP will initially inform the crew that there is increasing
radiation in contact readings on the"B" MS line.NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew throttles AFW and stops the"A" RCP, or at the direction of the lead evaluator.
7)SGTR Update tube leak using trigger 7 on trigger screen: IMP RC2402 (7 5)50 60 Remote Function: MS_57, Delay time=120, Ramp=60, Value=0, Trigger=15 NOTE: Scenario may be terminated
after the RCS cooldown has been completed, or as directed by the Lead Evaluator.
SXGNRC4 Page 25 Revision°
SXGNRC4 A IT ACHMENT 2 SCENARIO PERFORMANCE
OBJECTIVES
Page 26 Revision 0
SIMULATOR REQUALIFICATION
EXAMINATION
TERMINAl (PERFORMANCE
OB JECTIVE Given equipment failures and operational
situations, operate the plant in accordance
with Technical Specifications
to bring the unit to a safe condition, using applicable
procedures, and applying effective teamwork, communication, and diagnostic
skills.GENERIC PERFORMANCE
OBJECTIVES
A.During shift operations
the shift manager will take a conservative
course of action, especially
when uncertain conditions
exist, when dealing with core cooling or heat sink availability, primary system and containment
integrity, and reactivity
control associated
with plant evolutions.
B.During shift operations
the shift manager will provide overall crew guidance by prioritizing
and integrating
the actions of the shift crew in accordance
with administrative
procedures.
C.Duringshiftoperations
each crew member will participate
in a team effort that resolves conflicts, provides input into the team decision and communicates
all the necessary information
to enhance teamwork in accordance
with administrative
procedures.
D.During shift operations
the Shift Technical Advisor will independently
assess events and based on those assessments
make recommendations
to the crew regarding mitigation
strategy.SXGNRC4 Page 27 Revision 0
EVENT GOAL: EVENT 1 PERFORMANCE
OBJECTIVES
Given that the unit is at approximately
22%power and it is desired to increase reactor power, the crew will ramp the unit in accordance
withOP-2.1,"Unit Startup Mode 2 to Mode 1." NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS: R705 Dilute the RCS using the blender.CRITICAL TASK: N/A SXGNRC4 Page 28 Revision 0
EVENT GOAL: EVENT 2 PERFORMANCE
OBJECTIVES
Given that the running EHC pump has tripped and the backup EHC pump has not auto-started, the crew will respond in accordance
with the AR.NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS;N/A CRITICAL TASK: N/A SXGNRC4 Page 29 Revision 0
EVENT GOAl,;EVENT 3 PERFORMANCE
OB,IECTIVES
Given the unit is at power and the PRZR pressure master controller
fails high, the crew will respond in accordance
with l-AP-44,"Loss of Reactor Coolant System Pressure." NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS;R634 Respond to a loss of reactor coolant system pressure.S70 Evaluate compliance
with technical specifications.
CRITICAL TASK;See next page SXGNRC4 Page 30 Revision 0
(CT Statem ent" Crew stops RCS pressure decrease.Safety Significance'
Failure toclosethe PORV and spray valves under the postulated
plant conditions
constitutes"mis-operation
or incorrect crew performance
which leads to degradation
of any barrier to fission product release." In this case, the RCS fission-product
barrier can be restored to full integrity simply by closing the PORV and spray valves.Therefore, failure to close the PORV and spray valves also represents
a"demonstrated
inability by the crew to take an action or combination
of actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety." Valid indication
of pressure decreasing
by the presence of various annunciators, indication
ofPORV and spray valves open, and RCS pressure indication
decreasing.
Perfonnance
Indicator RO manually closes PORV and sprays valves.Feedback-RCS pressure decrease stopped.WOG Reference'
E-O-Background
Document.Conditions'
Prior to receiving an automatic reactor trip on low pressure.SXGNRC4 Page 31 Revision 0
EVENT GOAL: EVENT 4 PERFORMANCE
OBJECTIVES
Given that the unit is at power and a steam generator level transmitter
has failed, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance
with l-AP-3,"Loss of Vital Instrumentation." NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS: R626 Respond to a steam generator water level control channel failure.S70 Evaluate compliance
with technical specifications.
CRITICAl, TASK: N/A SXGNRC4 Page 32 Revision 0
EVENT GOAI/: EVENT 5 PERFORMANCE
OBJECTNES Given that the unit is stable at power and power-range
channel N-44 has failed high resulting in rods stepping in, the crew will respond in accordance
with l-AP-4.3,"Malfunction
ofNuc1ear Instrumentation (Power Range)." NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS: R713 Perform the immediate operator actions in response to a malfunction
of power-range
nuclear instrumentation.
S70 Evaluate compliance
with technical specifications.
CRITICAl, TASK: See next page SXGNRC4 Page 33 Revision 0
CT Statem ent'Crew takes action to stop rod motion and stabilize the unit.Safety Significance*
Core reactivity
is not under control of the operator due to the failed control channel."It is expected thattheoperator
will attempt to take manual actions to correct for anomalous conditions
during power operation." Indication
of a failed power range NI.Continuous
inward control rod motion with TA VE and TREF matched.Perfonnance
Indicator RO places rod control in manual.Feedback Rod motion stops.WOG Reference*
None.Conditions*
Prior to a PRZR low pressure reactor trip.SXGNRC4 Page 34 Revision 0
EVENT GOAl,;EVENT 6 PERFORMANCE
OBJECTIVES
Given that the unit is at power and indications
exist of a SG tube leak, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance
with I-AP-5,"Unit I Radiation Monitoring
System," I-AP-24,"Steam Generator Tube Leak," and I-E-O,"Reactor Trip or Safety Injection." NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS;RI85 Perform the immediate operator actions in response to a reactor trip or safety injection.
R533 Respond to a reactor coolant pump seal failure.S70 Evaluate compliance
with technical specifications.
CRITICAl, TASK;See next page SXGNRC4 Page 35 Revision°
(CT Statement*
Crew isolates affected Reactor Coolant Pump sealleakoff.
Safety Significance'
"...an indication
of a failure ofthe#1 seal in any RCP with controlled
sealleakoff
requires prompt action to secure the leakoff path as soon as is practical and in no case longer than five minutes after sealleakoff
exceeds the high flow alarm setpoint.Failure to isolate the affected RCP sealleakoff
in a timely manner may subject the RCP shaft, lower radial bearing, and seals to high temperature
conditions
which could lead to premature failure of the remaining seals, failure of the lower radial bearing, and warping of the RCP shaft...." Indication
and annunciation
of:*Affected RCP#1 seal DP less than 200 psid OR*Valid indication
of#1 sealleakoff
greater than alarm setpoint.Perfonnance
Indicator*Crew stops affected RCP (once reactor is tripped).*Crew closes affected RCP#1 sealleakoffvalve (once loop flow indicates affected RCP is stopped).Feedback Indication
of:*decreasing
or zero flow for loop with affected RCP*affected RCP sealleakoffvalve
closed.WOG Reference'
Westinghouse
RCP vendor manual-addendum#3.Conditions'
Within 5 minutes of sealleakoff
exceeding alarm setpoint.SXGNRC4 Page 36 Revision 0
EVENT GOAL;EVENT 7 PERFORMANCE
OBJECTIVES
Given that the unit is shutdown following a reactor trip, and indications
exist of a SGTR, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance
with l-E-O,"Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and l-E-3,"Steam Generator Tube Rupture.NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS: R187 Identify and isolate a ruptured steam generator.
R759 Cool down the Reactor Coolant System during the response to a steam generator tube rupture.CRITICAL TASK: See Following Pages SXGNRC4 Page 37 Revision°
CT Statement" Crew isolates flow to/from ruptured SG.Safety Significance'
Failure to isolate the ruptured SG causes a loss of differential
pressure between the ruptured SG and the intact SGs.Upon loss of differential
pressure, the crew must transition
to a contingency
procedure that constitutes
an incorrect performance
that"...necessitates
the crew taking compensating
action which complicates
the event mitigation
strategy..." Indication
and annunciation
of:*Increasing
SG water level and radiation;
and*a reactor trip;and*a safety injection.
Perfonnance
Indicator BOP adjusts ruptured SG PORV setpoint at 1050 PSIG.BOP checks ruptured SG PORV closed.RO checks decay heat release valve closed.BOP checks"B" SG blowdown trip valves closed.BOP closes ruptured SG MSTV and Bypass valve.RO/BOP directs an auxiliary operator to locally close I-MS-57, Steam to the Terry Turbine from"B" SG.BOP closes I-FW-MOV-lOOB.
Feedback Indication
of:*stable or increasing
pressure in the ruptured SG.*decreasing
or zero feedwater flow rate to the ruptured SG.WOG Reference'
E-3 Background.
Conditions'
Isolate before a transition
to ECA-3.1 occurs.SXGNRC4 Page 38 Revision 0
CT Statem ent'Crew initiates RCS Cooldown.Safety Significance'
Failure to establish and maintain the correct RCS temperature
during a SGTR leads to a transition
from E-3 to a contingency
procedure, which constitutes
an incorrect performance
that"...necessitates
the crew taking compensating
action which complicates
the event mitigation
strategy...." Procedurally
directed by E-3.Perfonnance
Indicator ROIBOP dumps steam.Feedback Indication
of steam flow rate greater than zero.Indication
of RCS temperature
decreasing
OR Indication
ofRCS temperature
less than target temperature.
WOG Reference'
E-3 Background.
Conditions'
Crew maintains adequate subcooling.
SXGNRC4 Page 39 Revision 0
ATTACHMENT
3
Scenario Performance
Datasheet EVENT.l: Given that theunitis.atapproxirnately22%
povver.anditis
- .desiredto increasereactor
power,the crew will ramp the unit in accordance
with 1-0P-2.1,"Unit Startup Mode 2 to.Mode 1." SPD Verified: (Initials)
- Reactor power increases*Turbine power increases*Tavg/Tref increase*Generator output increases EVENT 2: Given that the running ERC pump has tripped and the backup ERC pump has not auto-started, the crew will respond in accordance
with the AR.SPD Verified: (Initials)
- Annunciators
K-F5 and T-B4 will illuminate
EVENT 3: Given the unit is at povverandthe
PRZRpressure
master controller
fails high, the crew will respond in accordance
with l-AP-44,"Loss of Reactor Coolant System Pressure." SPD Verified: (Initials)
- Annunciator
B-E6 illuminates
- Master pressure controller
fails high*l-RC-PCV-1455C
indicates open*RCS pressure decreases EVENT 4: Given that the unit is at power and a steam generator level transmitter
has failed, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance
with 1-AP-3,"Loss of Vital Instrumentation." SPD Verified: (Initials)
- Annunciators
F-F2 and F-B2 are illuminated
- "B" Channel III SG level indicator is reading off-scale low*"B" MFRV is ramping open EVENT 5: Given that the unit is stable at power and power-range
channel N-44 has failed high resulting in rods stepping in, the crew will respond in accordance
with l-AP-4.3,"Malfunction
of Nuclear Instrumentation (Power Range)." SPD Verified: (Initials)
- N-44 indicates>
120%*Control rods step in at maximum speed*RCS pressure andTA VE decrease SXGNRC4 Date----Revision 0
EVENT 6: Given that the unit is at power and indications
exist of a SG tube leak, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance
with 1-AP-5,"Unit 1 Radiation Monitoring
System,"AP-24"Steam Generator Tube Leak" and 1-E-O"Reactor Tri or Safe In'ection," SPD Verified: (Initials)
K-G6 illuminated
- Annunciator
K-G6 reflashes*Indications
of increasing
leakage on all N-16 RMs*Charging flow slowly increases*Later: Annunciators
C-G7 and C-G5 illuminate"A" RCP sealleakoff
flow indication
is e ed hi h SPD Verifies: (Initials)
- "B" SG level increases unexpectedly
- Pressurizer
level and pressure decreases unexpectedly
SXGNRC4 Date----Revision 0
DOMINION NORTH ANNA POWER STATION INITIAL LICENSED OPERATOR EXAMINATION
SIMULATOR EXAMINATION
GUIDE SCENARIO NRC 5
SIMULATOR EXAMINATION
GUIDE EVENT DESCRIPTION
1.Failure of l-CH-LT-1112, VCT level transmitter, high 2."A" High Pressure Heater Drain Tank high-level
divert fails open.Standby Condensate
pump will not auto-start.
Rods will not work in auto.3.l-RC-PCV-1455B, spray valve, fails open and will not close with controller
4.Main Generator voltage regulator fails 5.Loss of IH bus requiring crew to reduce power 6.Loss of switchyard
with failure of 11 EDG to start in AUTO-REMOTE
7.LOCA outside containment
with failure of"B" train of Phase A Scenario Recapitulation:
Malfunctions
after EOP entry Total Malfunctions
Abnormal Events Major Transients
EOPs Entered EOP Contingencies
Critical Tasks 3 (Failure of 11 EDG to start in AUTO-REMOTE, LOCA outside containment, failure of"B" train of Phase A to function in auto)10 (Failure of l-CH-LT-1112
high,"A" HPHDT HLD fails open/standby
Condensate
pump does not auto-start
if required, no auto rod control,"B" pressurizer
spray valve fails open, MG VR failure, loss of IH emergency bus, loss of switchyard, lJEDG fails to start in AUTO-REMOTE, LOCA outside containment, failure of"B" train Phase A)4 ("A" HPHDT HLD fails open/standby
Condensate
pump does not auto-start
if required,"B" pressurizer
spray valve fails open, MG VR failure, loss of IH emergency bus)1 (Loss of switchyard)
1 (ES-O.1)2 (ECA-O.O, ECA-1.2)3 SCENARIO DITRATION#Minutes SXGNRC5 Page 2 Revision 0
SIMULATOR EXAMINATION
SCENARIO SUMMARY SCENARIO NRC 2 The scenario begins with the unit at 100%power.The letdown radiation monitor is OOS and the terry turbine was returned to service last shift.2-CC-P-1A is tagged out for seal maintenance.
VCT Level transmitter
112 will fail high.The crew will respond in accordance
with the AR for VCT HI-LO LEVEL L-112, by placing 1-CH-LCV-1115A
in manual and raising the output to 100%to stop diverting to the stripper.The crew should discuss the loss of the RWST swapover on low level.Once the crew has stopped the VCT divert the next event can occur.The high-level
divert for the"A" HP heater drain tank will fail open.The"A" HP heater drain pump will trip.The"B" Condensate
pump will not start in auto, if required.Power will increase due to the colder water entering the SGs.The crew will enter 1-AP-31,"Loss of Main Feedwater," and start the standby Condensate
pump along with 1-AP-38,"Excessive
Load Increase," to ramp the unit down slightly to reduce power to less than 1 00%.Rods will not step in auto if required and will have to be operated in manual.Anoperatorwill
report that the controller
was found to be loose, and level can be restored to within the normal band.The next event will occur once the crew has stabilized
the unit and restored the high-level
divert.The"A" pressurizer
spray valve will fail open.The crew will enter 1-AP-44,"Loss of Reactor Coolant System Pressure," and the RO will be required to use the remote close SOV in order to close the spray valve.Once the crew has stabilized
RCS pressure, the next event can occur.The main generator voltage regulator will fail and the crew will be expected to respond in accordance
with 1-AP-26,"Loss of Main Generator Voltage ControL" The BOP will turn off the voltage regulator and control voltage using base adjust.After generator voltage has been brought under control, the next event will occur.A loss of 1H bus will occur.Due to a fault on the bus the 1H EDG output breaker will not close to reenergize
the bus.This will result in the High-Level
Divert Valves failing open and a loss of CC to the RCP thermal barriers.The crew will need to enter 1-AP-38,"Excessive
Load Increase," and ramp the unit to reduce reactor power.Reminder: Rods will not step in auto.As time permits, the crew will enter 0-AP-10,"Loss of Electrical
Power," to diagnose the power loss.The crew will eventually
be informed that the electricians
will need a tagout in order to examine the bus for damage.Once reactor power has been reduced to the previous power level, the next event can occur.A loss of the switchyard
will occur as a result of problem on the grid.The1J EDG will not start in automatic.
The crew will enter 1-ECA-0.0,"Loss of All AC," and will be able to restore the 11 bus using the attachment.
They will be able to transition
to 1-E-0,"Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and then to 1-ES-0.1,"Reactor Trip Response." At this time the 1H bus will be restored.Once the crew has stabilized
the unit and reenergized1H bus, a leak will develop in the Safeguards
area.The crew will transition
back to 1-E-0 and eventually
to 1-ECA-1.2,"LOCA Outside Containment," where they will isolate the leak.At this time the scenario can be terminated.
SXG NRC 5 Page 3 Revision 0
SCENARIO TURNOVER SHEET Read the following to the crew: Purpose: This examination
is intended to evaluate the crew's perfonnance
of various tasks associated
with the Licensed Operator Training Program.All activities
should be completed in accordance
with approved operations
standards.
1.You are on a day shift during the week.2.When conditions
allow, utilize the computer log systems as you would in the plant.Unit Status: Unit 1 is at 100%power.RCS boron is 978 ppm and core age is 9000 MWD/MTD.Aux steam is on unit 1.Unit 2 is at 100%power.Equipment Status: 1-CH-RI-128, Letdown radiation monitor, is OOS.1-FW-P-2 was returned to service last shift, PMT was SAT.2-CC-P-1A is tagged out for seal maintenance.
Maintenance
rule window is green.Shift Orders: Maintain current plant conditions
and support maintenance
on 2-CC-P-1A.
SXGNRC5 Page 4 Revision 0
(EVENT 1: Given that the.unit is at power and V CT level transmitter, l-CH-LT-1112, has failed hillh the crew will resoondin accordance
with the aoolicable
resoonse.TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR
REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials)
- Annunciator
C-A4 will illuminate
- l-CH-LI-1112
will indicate off-scale high*l-CH-LCV-1112C
output will go to zero*VCT level will decrease*"A" Stripper level will increase RO identifies
C-A4, VCT HI-LO LEVEL L-112.RO identifies
LT-1112 is failed high and VCT is diverting to stripper.US reads note in AR about l-CH-LT-1115
failing high-loss of auto swap over caoabilitv.
full divert to striooer.RO places l-CH-LCV-1112C
in manual and raises output to 100%.US makes notifications
aboutLT-1112 failure and requests instrument
shop assistance
alonll with WR CR.NOTE: The next event may occur once the letdown divert valve has been closed, or at the discretion
of the lead evaluator.
SXGNRC5 Page 5 Revision 0
EVENT 2: Given that"A" HP heaterdraintank
high-level
divert has Jailed open, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance
with l-AP-31,"Loss of Main Feedwater," and l-AP-38,"Excessive
Load Increase." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR
REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials)
- Annunciator
Q-E3 illuminates
- I-SD-P-IA trips as indicated by amber light lit*Reactor power increases*Main feed pump suction pressure decreases*l-CN-P-IB does not auto-start, if required BOP identifies
level decreasing
in"A" HP heater drain tanle Crew identifies
Q-E3, 2 ND PT HTR DR RECVR TK A HI-La LEVEL.BOP identifies
trip of I-SD-P-IA.
US directs entry into AP-31.BOP verifies power>70%.BOP verifies 2 main feed pump running.NOTE: Feed pump suction pressure may initially be greater than 300 psig, but it will be decreasin1!.
BOP checks main feed pump suction pressure>300 psig.BOP starts 3 rd condensate
pump.Crew identifies
increase in reactor power.US directs entry into AP-38.RO verifies steam dumps closed.BOP verifies SG PORVs indicate closed.NOTE: Rods will not operate in auto if required and will have to be stepped in manual.Crew ramps turbine down until power indicates<100%.NOTE: pes will indicate opening of several hi1!h-Ievel
diverts.SXGNRC5 Page 6 Revision 0
EVENT 2: Given that"A" HPheaterdrain
tank high-level
divert has failed open, the crew will be expected to respondinaccordance
with l-AP-31,"Loss of Main F eedwater,"and 1-AP-3 8,"Excessive
Load*Increase." TIME EXPECTED ACTION Watchstander
is dispatched
to investigate
cause for trip of"A" HP.NOTE: Watchstander
will reportLCV-I07A was open with dial for setpoint loose.Setpoint has now been returned to normal.US reports failures to WCC and requests WK CR, and maintenance
assistance.
NOTE: The next event will occur once the unit is stable and 1-SD-LCV-I07A
has been isolated, or at the discretion
of the lead evaluator.
INSTRUCTOR
REMARKS SXGNRC5 Page 7 Revision 0
EVENT 3: Given that the unit is at power and a PRZR spray valve has failed open, the crew will be exoected to resoond in accordance
with l-AP-44"Loss of Reactor Coolant Pressure." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR
REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials)
- PRZR spray valve l-RC-PCV-1455B
has full open indication.
- Master pressure controller
output decreases.
- PRZR pressure decreases.
- Annunciators
B-F7, B-H6 illuminate
RO identifies
B-F7, PRZ HI-LO PRESS.RO identifies
RCS pressure decreasing.
US directs crew to enter l-AP-44.RO monitors RCS pressure greater than 1870 psig.RO checks PRZRPORVs closed.RO checks master pressure controller
not failed.RO checks spray valves closed.(NO)NOTE: Valve cannot be manually closed.Crew must use SOV.Crew stops RCS pressure decrease:*.RO verifies all PRZR heaters are energized.
RO checks that aux spray valve is closed.RO checks PRZR safety valves closed.RO verifies RCS pressure stable or increasing.
RO verifies RCS pressure returned to normal.RO adjusts sprays and heaters, as required, to maintain normal pressure.US refers to DNB 3.4.1, Action A (2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />), if pressure went below 2205 psig.SXGNRC5 Page 8 Revision 0
EVENT3: Giventhattheullitis
at power and a PRZR.spray
valve has failed open, the crew will be exoected to resoondinaccordance
withl-AP-44."Loss of Reactor Coolant Pressure." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR
REMARKS US requests Work Control Center supervisor
to infonn the OMOC of the failure and initiate WR and CR.NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew has returned ReS pressure to normal, or at the direction of the lead evaluator.
SXGNRC5 Page 9 Revision 0
EVENT 4: Given that the unit is at power, and the main generator voltage regulator has failed, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance
with l-AP-26,"Loss of Main Generator Voltage Control." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR
REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials)
- Annunciators
K-B4 and K-C7, and K-CI illuminate
- Generator output voltage increases BOP identifies
K-B4, EXCITER FIELD FORCING.US directs entry into l-AP-26.BOP identifies
generator output voltage and MY ARS increasing
with MW stable.BOP places voltage regulator control switch to OFF.Crew notifies system operator.US requests Work Control Center supervisor
to inform the OMOC of the failure and to initiate WR and CR.NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew has stabilized
the plant, or at the direction of the lead evaluator.
SXGNRC 5 Page 10 Revision 0
EVENT 5: Given thatalossof
IH emergency bus has occurred at power, the crew will respond in accordance
with l-AP-38,"Excessive
Load Increase," and O-AP-l 0,"Loss of Electrical
Power." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR
REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials)
- Various annunciators
light indicating
a loss of IH bus including:
C-Cl/2/3/4, F-C7, H-F5*IH diesel is running, but not loaded onto bus*Breakers 15Hll and 15F3 are open*IH emergency bus has no voltage*lA semi-vital
bus has not voltage*Reactor power is increasing
Crews identifies
various annunciators
which indicate a loss of the IH emergency bus.NOTE: Entry into AP-38 will be required due to high-level
divert valves failiD!!ODen.US directs entry intol-AP-38.
Crew checks steam dumps closed.Crew checks SG PORVs closed.Crew verifies main turbine load turbine load normal and reactor power is<100%and stable.BOP ramps the turbine to return power to the power level before the event started.RO inserts rods to maintain RCS temperature.
Crew checks turbine load control:*Reactor power reduced to the power level before the event started*Load control in IMP-IN*Places turbine in IMP-IN if reauired.Crew checks that plant is stable:*Main Generator output stable*Tave on program (RO inserts rods or borates, as required.)
- Steam flow indications
normal*Turbine in Onerator Auto.SXGNRC5 Page 11 Revision 0
EVENT 5: Given that a loss of lH emergency bus has occurred at power, the crew will respond in accordance
with l-AP-38,"Excessive
Load Increase," and O-AP-lO,"Loss of Electrical
Power." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR
REMARKS Crew checks plant steam systems:*PORVs*Safeties*MSR inlets*ASPCV.US directs entry into O-AP-lO, as manpower permits.Crew reviews annunciators
and notes that there is no thermal barrier flow.U-l RMs, MGPIs, and N-16s are deenergized.
Also, the in-service
BATP is deenemized.
US makes report of conditions
to WCC and requests assistance, WR CR.US reviews tech spec 3.8.lA.NOTE: Crew will eventually
be informed that there is an overcurrent
drop on 15Hll and the electricians
will need 15H2 to placed in PTL so they can examine the bus for dama!!e.NOTE: Once US has reviewed TS the next event can occur.SXGNRC5 Page 12 Revision 0
- EVENT 6: Given that with the unit at power and both emergency busses have been lost, the crew will be ex ected to res ond in accordance
with I-ECA-O.O"Loss of All AC Power." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR
REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials)*A loss of switchyard
occurs*1J EDG does not start Crew identifies
a loss of the switchyard.
Crew recognizes
a loss of the"J" 4160V emer enc bus.US directs the crew to enter ECA-O.O.RO verifies reactor trip.BOP verifies turbine trip.Crew verifies all RCPs are stopped.Crew restores power to any AC Emergency bus.*Crew verifies Emergency Diesel running.(NO)*Crew checks RCP seal water outlet temperatures.
Crew performs RCS isolation:
- RO verifies PZR PORVs closed.*RO verifies Letdown isolation valves closed.*RO verifies Excess Letdown isolation valves closed.*RO closes RHR to Letdown isolation valve.*BOP verifies RCS sample valves closed*BOP verifies RCS Head vents closed.*BOP verifies PZR vent valves closed.Crew verifies AFW flow.Crew verifies no fire in emergency switch ear.Crew verifies power restored to an emer enc bus.SXGNRC5 Page 13 Revision 0
EVENT 6: Given that with the unit at power and both emergency busses have been lost, the crew will be exnected to resnond in accordance
with l-ECA-O.O"Loss of All AC Power." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR
REMARKS US directs crew to transition
to E-O.Crew verifies reactor and turbine trips.Crew verifies one emergency bus energized.
Crew checks that no SI has occurred, or is required.US directs transition
to l-ES-O.1.*Crew checks RCS average temperature
trending to expected value.Crew throttles AFW, as required.NOTE: During this time, VCT level will be decreasing.
An auto makeup will commence, but there will be no boric acid flow.Crew should also discuss the fact that there will be no auto-swap to the RWST.Crew checks feedwater status: RCS temperature
MFRVs AFWpumps AFWflow.NOTE: At this time the crew will be informed that a relay problem caused the loss of the IH bus.At this time, if desired, the crew can reenergize
the bus by taking the EDG output breaker out of PTL.Crew checks SG levels.Crew verifies charging in service.NOTE: Once power has been restored to the IH bus, the next event can be inserted.SXGNRC5 Page 14 Revision 0
(EYENT7:Withthe
unit stabilized
in l-ES-O.1,"ReactorTripResponse," and indications
exist ofa SBLOCA outside containment, the crew will respond in accordance
with"l-E-O,"Reactor Trip or Safety Inlection,"and
l-ECA-l.2"LOCAOutside
Containment." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR
REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials)
- Annunciators
A-Cl, E-F8, then A-C4 illuminate
- RCSpressureand
pressurizer
level decrease*Charging flow increases, when required*Vent stack"B" radiation increases to alarm setpoint Crew continues in ES-O.l.Crew checks pressurizer
level control.Crew checks pressurizer
pressure control.Crew identifies
A-Cl, SFGDS AREA SUMP HIIHI-HILEVEL.
RO identifies
charging flow increasing
and PRZR level decreasing.
NOTE: Crew may not enter AP-16.US directs entry into l-AP-16.NOTE: If crew dispatches
an operator to check the safeguards
building, the operator will report that the door is hot and steam is issuing from around the door seals.Crew verifies unit in mode 3.RO verifies primary parameters
under operator control.(NO)RO isolates letdown and maximizes charging flow.RO commences a VCT makeup from the blender.RO informs US that PRZR level is still decreasing.
Crew identifies
Vent Stack"B" high radiation alarm.Crew identifies
A-C4, AREA AMBIENT AIR TEMP HIGH.Crew identifies
high temperature
in U-l SFGDS.SXGNRC5 Page 15 Revision°
EVENT 7: With the unit stabilized
inl-ES-O.l,"ReactorTripResponse:'and
indications
exist of a SBLOCA outside containment, thecre\Vwill
respond in accordance
with" l-E-O,"Reactor Trip or Safety In'ection"and l-ECA-1.2"LOCAOutside
Containment." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR
REMARKS US directs crew to manually initiate SI and E-O return to 1-E-O.RO/BOP manually initiate S1.Crew verifies 1-E-O immediate operator actions.NOTE: The crew may hold a brief and perform actions in l-ECA-1.2 before the nrocedure transition.
BOP verifies feedwater isolation:
- MFRV s closed*MFRBVs closed*Main feed MOV s closed*StandbyMFPplaced in PTL*Main feed pumps tripped*MFP discharge MOVS closed*SG BD TV s closed.RO/BOP manually initiate phase"A".Crew initiates attachment
for phase"A" isolation.
BOP verifies AFW pumps running.Crew verifies SI pumps running.BOP verifies SW pumps running.Crew checks if MS should be isolated.(NO)Crew verifies SI flow.BOP verifies AFW flow.RO checks RCS Tave stable at or trending to 547°F.RO checks PRZR PORVs and spray valves.RO checks RCP trip and charging pump recirc criteria.BOP checks SGs not faulted.(YES)SXGNRC 5 Page 16 Revision 0
EVENT 7:.With the unit stabilized
in l-ES-O.l.I'Reactor
TripResponse," and indications
exist of a SBLOCAoutsidecontairunent, the crewwillrespondin
accordance
with"1-E-O,"Reactor Trip or Safe In'ection"and 1..ECA-l,2"LOCA Outside Containment." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR
REMARKS BOP checks SGs not ruptured.(YES)Crew checks ifRCS is intact inside containment.
YES Crew checks for outside containment
invento loss.YES US directs crew to transition
to 1-ECA-1.2.
BOP verifies LHSI pump hot-leg valves closed.BOP verifies SI accumulator
sample valves closed.Crew isolates LOCA outside containment.
to 1-E-1.NOTE: The scenario may be terminated
after the crew isolates the leak, or as directed b the lead evaluator.
SXGNRC 5 Page 17 Revision 0
REFERENCES
PROCEDURE REV.Abnormal Procedure l-AP-31,"Loss of Main Feedwater." 4 Abnormal Procedure l-AP-44,"Loss of Reactor Coolant System Pressure." 19 Abnormal Procedure l-AP-26,"Failure of Main Generator Voltage Regulator 9 High." Abnormal Procedure l-AP-38,"Excessive
Load Increase." 14 Abnormal Procedure O-AP-lO,"Loss of Electrical
Power." 59 Abnormal Procedure l-AP-16,"Increasing
Primary Plant Leakage." 25 Maintenance
Operating Procedure I-MOP-6.70,"1-EE-SW-IH, 4160-Volt 31 Emenlencv Bus." Emergency Contingency
Action l-ECA-O.O,"Loss of All AC." 21 Emergency Procedure l-E-O,"Reactor Trip or Safety Injection." 36 Emergency Procedure l-ES-O.l,"Reactor Trip Response." 26 Emergency Contingency
Action 1-ECA-1.2,"LOCA Outside Containment." 6 Station Annunciator
Response Procedures.
N/A Guide and Reference Document PI-AA-5000,"Human Performance." 1 INPO, Guideline for Teamwork and Diagnostic
Skill Development:
INPO 88-003, Jan.1988 INPO, ACAD 07-002 Simulator Training Guidelines
Jan.2007 SXGNRC 5 Page 18 Revision 0
(ATTACHMENTS
A IT ACHMENT1-SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S
COMPUTER PROGRAM A IT ACHMENT2-SCENARIO PERFORMANCE
OBJECTIVES
A IT ACHMENT3-SIMULATOR PERFORMANCE
DATASHEET (Last page of scenario)*SXGNRC 5 Page 19 Revision 0
SXGNRC5 ATTACHMENT
1 SIMULATOR OPERA TOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM Page 20 Revision 0
(SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S
COMPUTER PROGRAM SXGNRC5 Injtjal conditions
1.Recall IC 165 2.Ensure Tave, Tref, PDrr level, and VCT level are selected on trend recorders.
3.Place a WR magnet on l-CH-RI-128.
4.Rackout breaker for 2-CC-P-IA and verify 2-CC-P-IB running.Close U2_CC_ll, U2_CC_4.PRELOADS PRIOR TO SCENARIO START CONDITION MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDEIETC.
Letdown rad monitor failure Malfunction:
RM0207, Severity=-1 Rods will not move in auto Malfunction:
RD14"B" Condensate
pump will Switch override: not auto-start
CNPIB ASTOP=OFF1J EDG does not start in Switch override: auto-remote
EG 11 AUTO REMOTE=OFF--Train"B" of Phase A does Malfunction:
not function with SI S11304 Set up triggers to delete this malfunction
when the manual switches are used.Trigger 10 PHASEA ISOI INIT=1.OR.PHASEA IS02 INIT=1----DMF S11304 SXGNRC5 Page 21 Revision 0
SCENARIO EVENTS EVENT MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/COMMUNICA
TrONS 1)l-CH-LT-1112
fails high Malfunction:CH1201,Delay
time=5, Ramp=10, Severity=1, Trigger=1 NOTE: The next event may occur once the letdown divert valve has been closed, or at the discretion
of the lead evaluator.
2)High level divert for 1-Remote function: SD-TK-IA fails open SDLCVI07A_SETPT, Delay time=5, Value=0, Ramp=5, Trigger=2 NOTE: When dispatched, wait 5 minutes and slowly increase setpoint to stabilize drain tank level.Report I-SD-LCV-I07A
was open with dial for setpoint loose.Setpoint has now been returned to normal.NOTE: The next event will occur once the unit is stable and I-SD-LCV-I07A
has been returned to normal, or at the discretion
of the lead evaluator.
3)"B" spray valve fails open Malfunction:
RC2002, Delay time=5, Value=True, Trigger=3 NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew has returned RCS pressure to normal, or at the direction of the lead evaluator.
4)VR failure Malfunction:
EL09, Delay time=5, Ramp=35, Severity=50, Trigger=4 NOTE: If called, can report that no abnormalities
can be seen at the VR panel.NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew stabilizes
the plant, or as directed by the lead evaluator.
SXGNRC5 Page 22 Revision°
(EVENT 5)Loss of 1H emergency bus 6)Loss of off-site power with failure of 11 EDG to start 7)LOCA outside containment
MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/COMMUNICA
TIONS Malfunction:EL1901,Delay
time=5, Value=True, Trigger=5 NOTE: Once electricians
have been dispatched
wait about 10 minutes and then inform the crew that there is an overcurrent
drop on 15Hll and the electricians
need to have 15H2 placed in PTL while they examine the bus for damage.NOTE: Once the unit has been stabilized
and the US has reviewed TS, the next event can occur.Malfunction:
EL01, Delay time=5, Value=True, Trigger=6 NOTE: If dispatched, can report that IJ EDG looks normal.NOTE: Once the crew has performed some actions in l-ES-O.l, the IH bus can be reenergized
as follows: Delete malfunction
EL1901 Report to crew that a faulty relay caused to bus loss Inform crew that 15H2 can be taken out of PTL, this should allow it to close and reenergize
the bus.NOTE: Once power has been restored to the IH bus the next event can occur.Malfunction:
S1116, Delay time=5, Ramp=120, Severity=50, Trigger=7 NOTE: Verify pressurizer
pressure continues to decrease.If not, then increase leak size as necessary.
NOTE: If sent to Safeguards, report that door is hot.If leak has already been isolated can report that there was a loud noise, but it has not stopped.NOTE: The scenario may be terminated
after the crew isolates the leak, or as directed by the lead evaluator.
SXGNRC5 Page 23 Revision a
(SXGNRC5 ATTACHMENT
2 SCENARIO PERFORMANCE
OBJECTIVES
Page 24 Revision a
SIMULATOR REQUALIFICATION
EXAMINATION
TERMINAl, PERFORMANCE
OB IECTNE Given equipment failures and operational
situations, operate the plant in accordance
with Technical Specifications
to bring the unit to a safe condition, using applicable
procedures, and applying effective teamwork, communication, and diagnostic
skills.GENERIC PERFORMANCE
OBIECTIVES
A.During shift operations
the shift manager will take a conservative
course of action, especially
when uncertain conditions
exist, when dealing with core cooling or heat sink availability, primary system and containment
integrity, and reactivity
control associated
with plant evolutions.
B.During shift operations
the shift manager will provide overall crew guidance by prioritizing
and integrating
the actions of the shift crew in accordance
with administrative
procedures.
C.Duringshift
operations
each crew member will participate
in a team effort that resolves conflicts, provides input into the team decision and communicates
all the necessary information
to enhance teamwork in accordance
with administrative
procedures.
D.During shift operations
the Shift Technical Advisor will independently
assess events and based on those assessments
make recommendations
to the crew regarding mitigation
strategy.SXGNRC 5 Page 25 Revision 0
EVENT GOAL;EVENT 1 PERFORMANCE
OBJECTIVES
Given that the unit is at power and VCT level transmitter, 1-CH-LT-1112, has failed high, the crew will respond in accordance
with the applicable
response.NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS;NA CRITICAL TASK;N/A SXGNRC 5 Page 26 Revision 0
EVENT GOAL: EVENT 2 PERFORMANCE
OBJECTIVES
Given that"A" HP heater drain tank high-level
divert has failed open, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance
with l-AP-31,"Loss of Main Feedwater," and l-AP-38,"Excessive
Load Increase." NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS: R781 Respond to a loss of main feedwater.
R539 Perform the immediate operator actions in response to an excessive load increase.CRITICAL TASK: N/A SXGNRC 5 Page 27 Revision 0
EVENT GOAL: EVENT 3 PERFORMANCE
OBJECTIVES
Given that the unit is at power and a PRZR spray valve has failed open, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance
with l-AP-44,"Loss of Reactor Coolant Pressure." NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS: R634 Respond to a loss of Reactor Coolant System pressure CRITICAL TASK: See next page SXGNRC 5 Page 28 Revision 0
(CT Statement*
Crew stops RCS pressure decrease.Safety Significance'
Failure to close the RCS spray valve under the postulated
plant conditions
constitutes"mis-operation
or incorrect crew performance
which leads to degradation
of any barrier to fission product release." In this case, DNBR is reduced.Therefore, failure to close the spray valve represents
a"demonstrated
inability by the crew to take an action or combination
of actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety." Valid indication
of pressure decreasing
by the presence of various annunciators, indication
ofRCS spray valve open, and RCS pressure indication
decreasing
and procedurally
directed by I-AP-44.Perfonnance
Indicator RO places REMOTE CLOSE SOV in CLOSE for associated
spray Feedback" RCS pressure decrease stopped.WOG Reference'
N/A Conditions'
Prior to reaching an automatic reactor trip on low pressure.SXGNRC5 Page 29 Revision 0
C'EVENT 4 PERFORMANCE
OBJECTIVES
Given that the unit is at power, and the main generator voltage regulator has failed, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance
with l-AP-26,"Loss of Main Generator Voltage Control." NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS: R675 Respond to a failure of main generator voltage regulator high.CRITICAl, TASK: N/A SXGNRC 5 Page 30 Revision 0
EVENT GOAL: EVENT 5 PERFORMANCE
OBJECTIVES
Given that a loss of lH emergency bus has occurred at power, the crew will respond in accordance
with 1-AP-38,"Excessive
Load Increase," and O-AP-10,"Loss of Electrical
Power." NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS: R539 Perform the immediate operator actions in response to an excessive load increase.CRITICAL TASK: NIA SXGNRC5 Page 31 Revision°
EVENT 6 PERFORMANCE
OBJECTIVES
Given that with the unit at power and both emergency busses have been lost, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance
with 1-ECA-0.0,"Loss of All AC Power." NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS: N1561 Re-start an emergency diesel generator with an emergency start signal present.R214 Perform the immediate operator actions in response to a loss of all AC power.CRITICAL TASK: See Next Page SXGNRC 5 Page 32 Revision 0
CT Statement*
Crew restores power to any AC Emergency bus.Safety Significance'
Failure to energize an ac emergency bus constitutes"mis-operation
or incorrect crew performance
whichleadsto degraded...emergency power capacity." Failure to perform the critical task also results in needless degradation
of a barrier to fission product release, specifically
of the RCS barrier at the point of the RCP seals.Additionally, failure to perform the critical task results in the unnecessary
continuation
of a situation in which RCS inventory is being lost uncontrollably
and cannot be replaced.This situation is equivalent
to"mis-operation
or incorrect crew performance
which leads to degraded ECCS...capacity" at a time when a small-break
LOCA is in progress.Indication
of loss of both 4160V emergency buses.*No voltage indicated on emergency buses.*Loss of various emergency equipment.
- Numerous annunciators.
Perfonnance
Indicator Crew manually starts" J" EDG Feedback Indication
of Voltage indicated on the"J" 4160 emergency bus.WOG Reference'
E-O-Background
Conditions'
To be performed prior to depressurizing
all intact SGs.SXGNRC5 Page 33 Revision 0
(EVENT GOAl,: EVENT 7 PERFORMANCE
OBJECTIVES
With the unit stabilized
in l-ES-O.1,"Reactor Trip Response," and indications
exist of a SBLOCA outside containment, the crew will respond in accordance
with"l-E-O,"Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and1.2,"LOCA Outside Containment." NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS: R520 Respond to increasing
primary plant leakage.R761 Respond to a LOCA outside containment.
CRITICAL TASK: See next page SXGNRC5 Page 34 Revision 0
(CT Statement*
Crew isolates LOCA outside containment.
Safety Significance'
Failure to isolate a LOCA outside containment (that can be isolated)degrades containment
integrity beyond the level of degradation
irreparably
by the postulated
conditions.
It also constitutes
a"mis-operation
or incorrect crew performance
which leads to degradation
of a barrier to fission product release" and eventually"to degraded ECCS capacity.Indication/annunciation
that SI is actuated and is required AND Indication
and/or annunciation
of abnormally
high temperature
in the safeguards
building AND Indication
and/or annunciation
of abnormally
high sump level in the safeguards
building Perfonnance
Indicator BOP closes LHSI pump Cold Leg Injection valves.I-SI-MOV-1890C I-SI-MOV-1890D
Feedback-RCS pressure increasing.
WOG Reference'
ECA-1.2-Background
Document Conditions'
When directed by procedure.
SXGNRC5 Page 35 Revision 0
ATTACHMENT
3
Scenario Performance
Datasheet EVENT 1: Given that the unit is at power and VCT level transmitter, 1-CH-LT-1112, has failed high, the crew will respond in accordance
with the applicable
response.SPD Verified: (Initials)
- Annunciator
C-A4 will illuminate
- 1-CH-LI-1112
will indicate off-scale high*1-CH-LCV-1112C
output will go to zero*VCT level will decrease*"A" Stripper level will increase EVENT 2: Given that"A" HPheater drain tank high-level
divert has failed open, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance
with 1-AP-31,"Loss of Main Feedwater," and 1-AP-38,"Excessive
Load Increase." SPD Verified: (Initials)
- Annunciator
Q-E3 illuminates
- 1-SD-P-1A trips as indicated by amber light lit*Reactor power increases*Main feed pump suction pressure decreases*1-CN-P-1B does not auto-start, if required EVENT 3: Given that the unit is at power and a PRZR spray valve has failed open, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance
with 1-AP-44,"Loss of Reactor Coolant Pressure." SPD Verified: (Initials)
- PRZR spray valve 1-RC-PCV-1455B
has full open indication.
- Master pressure controller
output decreases.
- PRZR pressure decreases.
- Annunciators
B-F7, B-H6 illuminate
EVENT 4: Given thatthe unitis atpower,and
the main generator voltage regulator has failed, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance
with 1-AP-26,"Loss of Main Generator Voltage Control." SPD Verified: (Initials)
- Annunciators
K-B4 and K-C7, and K-C1 illuminate
Generator output voltage increases SXGNRC 5 Date----Revision 0
EVENT 5: Given that a loss of IH emergency bus has occurred at power, the crew will respond in accordance
with l-AP-38,"Excessive
Load Increase," and O-AP-IO,"Loss of Electrical
Power." SPD Verified: (Initials)
- Various annunciators
light indicating
a loss of IH bus including:
C-Cl/2/3/4, F-C7, H-F5*IH diesel is running, but not loaded onto bus*Breakers 15Hll and 15F3 are open*IH emergency bus has no voltage*IA semi-vital
bus has not voltage*Reactor power is increasing
E VE NT6: Giventhatwith
the unit at power and both emergency busses have been lost, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance
with I-ECA-O.O,"Loss of All AC PoweL" SPD Verified: (Initials)*A loss of switchyard
occurs*IJ EDG does not start EVENT7: With the unit stabilized
in I-fS-O.1,"Reactor
Trip Response,"iand
indications
exist of a SBLOCAoutside
containment, the cre>>,willrespond
in accordance
with"l-E-O,"Reactor Trip or SafetvIniection,".and
l-ECA-I.2"LOCA
Outside Containment." SPD V erified: (Initials)
- Annunciators
A-CI, E-F8, then A-C4 illuminate
- RCS pressure and pressurizer
level decrease*Charging flow increases, when required*Vent stack"B" radiation increases to alarm setpoint SXGNRC 5 Date----Revision°