Text

Exam 05000338/2008301 - Draft Simulator Scenarios
	ML082381133
Person / Time
Site:	North Anna
Issue date:	08/21/2008
From:	; NRC/RGN-II
To:	;
References
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Draft Submittal

(Pink Paper)

SIMULATOR SCENARIOS

NORTH ANNA JUNE 2008 EXAM

05000338/2008301 & 05000339/2008301

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1

Facility: North Anna Scenario No.: 1 Op-Test No.: 1

Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: Reactor is at 45 % power MOL ready to start a second feed pump. Unit was returned to power

yesterday following feed train work, and cleared chemistry hold 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months ago. Rods are in manual due to a problem

with auto rod control. The letdown radiation monitor is OOS. 1-FW-P-2 (terry turbine) was tagged out during the

chemistry hold and was just returned to service. 2-CC-P-1A is tagged out for seal work.

Turnover: Start the "C" feed pump: the pump seals have already been vented in preparation for the start.

Continue to ramp unit to 100% using manual rods until instrument shop is finished troubleshooting the rod control

problem.

Event Malf. No. Event Event

No. Type* Description

1 N (8) Start a second feed pump per OP

N (R)

2 Ramp unit up using normal ramping OP

R (8) (S)

3 CN0201 C (8) (S) Condensate pump trips with no auto-start of standby pump

3a RD0121 TS (S) Several minutes later IRPI indication for C8 "A" rod K2 drops to 0

4 CH08 I (R) (S) Failure of 1-CH-FT-1122 high

I (8) (S) Failure of "A" SG steam pressure channel III low (which also fails steam

5 MS1701

TS (S) flow)

6 CH13 C (R) (S) Tube leak in non-regenerative HX

7 MS1001 C (8) (S) "A" SG Steam leak outside containment

8 MS1001 M (ALL) "A" SG MSL8 outside containment

RD32

9 C (ALL) Reactor doesn't trip automatically or manually (or with AMSAC)

RD38

10 RD14 C (R) (S) Rods will not insert in auto

FW2601

11 I (8) (S) Motor-driven AFW pumps don't auto-start

FW2602

Scenario may be ended when safety injection has been terminated

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

DOMINION

NORTH ANNA POWER STATION

INITIAL LICENSED OPERATOR EXAMINATION

SIMULATOR EXAMINATION GUIDE

SCENARIO NRC 1

SIMULATOR EXAMINATION GUIDE

EVENT DESCRWTION

1. Start a second feed pump using OP

2. Ramp unit up using normal ramping OP

3. Trip of a running Condensate pump with no auto-start of standby pump w/ IRPI for

control bank "A" rod K-2 dropping to 0

4. Failure of l-CH-FT-1122 high

5. Failure of steam pressure channel low

6. Tube leak in non-regenerative HX

7. Steam leak outside containment

8. MSLB outside containment

Scenario Recapitulation:

Malfunctions after EOP entry 2 (Reactor will not trip automatically or manually/rods will not

insert in auto, motor-driven aux feed pumps do not auto-start)

Total Malfunctions 9 (Running condensate pump trips/standby pump doesn't auto-

start, IRPI failure, l-CH-FT-1122 failure, SG steam pressure

channel failure, tube leak in non-regen HX, steam leak outside

containment, MSLB, reactor will not trip automatically or

manually/rods will not insert in auto, motor-driven aux feed

pumps do not auto-start)

Abnormal Events 5 (Running condensate pump trips/standby pump doesn't auto-

start, l-CH-FT-1122 failure, SG steam pressure channel failure,

tube leak in non-regen HX, steam leak outside containment)

Major Transients 1 (MSLB outside containment)

EOPs Entered 3 (FR-S.l, E-2, ES-l.l)

EOP Contingencies 1 (FR-S.l)

Critical Tasks 3

SCENARIO DITRATION

130 Minutes

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SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO SUMMARY

SCENARIO NRC 1

The scenario starts with the unit at 45% power ready for a second Main Feed Water pump

to be started. The unit was returned to power last shift following feed train work and cleared a 30%

chemistry hold 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months ago. Rods are in manual due to a problem with auto rod control that I&C is

currently investigating. The letdown radiation monitor is OOS. The turbine-driven auxiliary

feedwater pump, I-FW-P-2, was tagged out during the chemistry hold and has just been returned to

service, PMT was SAT. 2-CC-P-IA is tagged out for seal work.

First, the crew will start a second Main Feed Pump in accordance with I-OP-2.I, "Unit

Startup from Mode 2 to Mode 1," and I-OP-3I.I, "Main Feedwater System."

Next, the crew will ramp the unit up in accordance with I-OP-2.I, "Unit Startup from Mode

2 to Mode 1." Once the reactor power has increased approximately 5%, the first failure will occur.

During the ramp, I-CN-P-IA will trip and I-CN-P-IB will not auto-start. The crew will

enter I-AP-3I, "Loss of Main Feedwater," and start the "B" Condensate pump. Several minutes

into the event, an IRPI for rod K-2 in control bank "A" will drop to zero. The US will review

technical specification 3.1.7 and notify the instrument shop. Once condensate flow has been re-

established and tech specs reviewed, the next event can occur.

At this time, charging flow transmitter, I-CH-FT-1122, will fail high. The crew will

respond in accordance with the AR for C-C5 and take manual control of I-CH-FCV-II22. Once

charging flow has been restored to normal the next event can occur.

Next, the Channel III steam pressure transmitter for "A" SG (I-MS-PT-I475) fails low.

The crew should enter I-AP-3, "Loss of Vital Instrumentation," swap steam generator level control

channels, and refer to technical specifications. At this time the next event can occur.

Due to the earlier oscillation on the charging system, a tube leak will develop in the non-

regenerative heat exchanger. The crew will respond in accordance with I-AP-I6, "Increasing

Primary Plant Leakage." The crew will isolate letdown and make preparations to place excess

letdown in service. At this time the next event can occur.

Asmall steam leak will develop in the main steam valve house on the "A" steam line

between the main steam trip valve and the containment wall. The crew will notice a decrease in

megawatts and an increase in reactor power and enter I-AP-38, "Excessive Load Increase," and

begin to ramp the unit down. At this time the next event can occur.

The "A" main steam line will rupture and the crew will be expected to enter I-E-O,

"Reactor Trip and Safety Injection." The reactor will fail to trip, requiring the crew to transition

to FR-S.I, "Response to Nuclear Power GenerationJATWS." Rods will not be able to be inserted

in auto. Once the reactor has tripped the crew will return to I-E-O and then transition to I-E-2,

"Faulted Steam Generator Isolation." The crew will then transition to I-ES-I.I, "SI

Termination." The scenario may be ended once SI has been terminated, or at the discretion of the

lead evaluator.

SXGNRC 1. Page 3 Revision 0

SCENARIO TJIRNOVER SHEET

Read the following to the crew:

Purpose: This examination is intended to evaluate the crew's performance of various tasks

associated with the Initial License Operator Training Program. All activities should

be completed in accordance with approved operations standards.

1. You are on a day shift during the week.

2. When conditions allow, utilize the computer log systems as you would in the plant.

Unit Status:

Unit 1 is at 45% power. RCS boron is 1202 ppm and core age is 9000 MWD/MTU. Aux steam is

on unit 2.

Unit 2 is at 100% power.

Equipment Status:

The unit was returned to power last shift following feed train work and cleared a 30% chemistry

hold 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months ago. Control rods are in manual while the Instrument Department investigates a

problem with auto rod control. 1-CH-RI-128 is out of service. The turbine-driven auxiliary

feedwater pump, 1-FW-P-2, was tagged out during the chemistry hold and was just returned to

service, PMT was SAT. 2-CC-P-1A is tagged out for seal work. Maintenance rule window is

green.

Shift Orders:

Start "C" main feedwater pump and then commence a ramp to 100% power. The 2 non-running

Main Feed Pumps have been vented per the OP. An operator is standing by at the feed pump.

Control rods are to remain in Manual at this time due to the problem with auto rod control.

SXGNRC 1 Page 4 Revision 0

SPD Verified: (Initials)

I-FW-P-ICstarts and runs normally

BOP places "B" Condensate pump in PTL.

BOP places both control switches for 1-

FW-P-IC in PTL.

BOP closes I-FW-MOV-I50C.

BOP verifies/places switches for "B" MFP

inPTL.

BOP verifies/aligns feed recircs.

BOP starts each "C" MFP motor.

BOP opens discharge MOV.

BOP instructs field operator to monitor

local lube oil tern erature.

BOP places the "B" MFP in AUTO and

verifies its dischar e MOV 0 ens.

BOP places "B" Condensate pump in

AUTO.

Crew directs initiation of O-GOP-2.I8.

NOTE: The next event can occur once

the crew has laced "C" MFP in service.

SXGNRC 1 Page 5 Revision 0

SPD Verified: (Initials)

Reactor power increases

Turbine power increases

Tavg/Tref increase

Generator megawatts increase

NOTE: The crew may raise primary

temperature prior to ramping the

turbine.

BOP verifies/sets desired ramp rate.

BOP increases turbine setter to desired

osition.

BOP presses GO on turbine.

BOP monitors turbine ramp.

BOP adjusts limiter position, as required.

RO starts a dilution when required.

RO withdraws control rods to maintain

rima tern erature.

RO places AMSAC in "Normal" when

rocedure criteria met.

NOTE: The next event can occur once

the crew has ramped approximately 5°;6

as determined b the lead evaluator.

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Main Condensate pump has tripped w'

cted to* respond in accordance

INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SPD Verified: (Initials)

Annunciators G-G6 and, later, G-F6 illuminate

I-CN-P-IA has amber breaker disagreement light lit

I-CN-P-IB does not auto-start

Feed pump suction pressure decreases

After several mintues: annunciators A-G2 and AFI will illuminate

IRPI for rod K-2 in Control Bank A will drop to zero

Rod Bottom Light for K-2 will illuminate

BOP identifies annunciator G-G6,

CONDENSATE PP IA-IB-IC AUTO

TRIP illuminated.

BOP identifies that I-CN-P-IA has tripped

and I-CN-P-IB has not auto-started.

NOTE: Crew may not stop the ramp

until immediate actions of AP have been

com leted.

US directs crew to stop ramp and secure

an on- oin dilution.

US directs entry into AP-31.

BOP checks power> 70%. (NO)

BOP verifies 2 main feed pump running.

BOP checks MFW pump suction pressure

>300 si. 0

BOP starts "B" Condensate pump.

BOP checks any MFW pumps tripped.

o

Crew evaluates reducing power < 55%.

BOP stabilizes SG levels.

Crew verifies MFP performance:

Suction pressure adequate

<550 amps on motors

Annunciator F-B5 NOT lit.

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NOTE: Report from field will be that

the "B" pump is running fine. Nothing

to see locally on the" A" pump. If sent

to breaker will report an overcurrent

dro .

Crew maintains stable plant conditions.

NOTE: Several minutes after the

Condensate pump trip, IRPI K-2 will

dro to zero.

RO identifies annunciators A-G2, RPI

ROD BOT ROD DROP, and A-FI,

CMPTR ALARM ROD DEV/SE .

NOTE: If unsure of conditions, the crew

may enter l-AP-l.2 for a dropped rod.

Steps in this procedure were not

included.

RO identifies IRPI K-2 in control bank "A"

is readin zero.

RO checks for other indications of a

dro ed rod.

RO identifies that no rod has dropped, IRPI

roblem.

NOTE: If I&C is asked to investigate the

K-2 rod, they will report that it is an

IRPI roblem.

US refers to TS 3.1.7A and determines that

a flux map must be done within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months (if

current power is >50%) or power reduced

to <50%.

US makes notifications on Condensate

pump trip/auto-start failure, and IRPI

indication.

NOTE: The next event may occur once

the standby Condensate pump has been

started and tech specs have been

reviewed.

SXGNRC 1 Page 8 Revision 0

TIME EXPECTED*ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SPD Yerified: (Initials)

Annunciator C-C5 will illuminate

1-CH-FI-1122 will indicate full scale high

1-CH-FCY-1122 will indicate minimum demand

Later C-B3 may alarm if 1-CH-FCY-1122 not vet in manual and ooen.

RO identifies annunciator C-C5, CH PP

TO REGEN HX HI-LO FLOW.

RO identifies charging flow indicates high

on 1-CH-FI-1122.

RO identifies actual charging flow

indicates low.

NOTE: RO will need to monitor

pressurizer andVCT levels, and/or

letdown temperature, to adjust charging

flow.

RO takes manual control of 1-CH-FCY-

1122 and restores charging flow to normal.

Crew makes report of instrument failure

and requests assistance.

NOTE: The next event can occur once

the crew has restored charging flow to

normal.

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f a failed steam pressure transmitter

"tal Instrumentation."

INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SPD Verified: (Initials)

Annunciators F-Hl and F-El illuminate

Status lights N-C3 and N-D3 illuminate

I-MS-PI-1475 fails low

1-MS-FI-1474 fails low

"A" MFRV ramps closed

"A" SG level decreases

BOP identifies annunciators F-Hl, HI STM

LINE ~P SG lA LO and F-El, STM

GENIA FW > STM FLOW CH III-IV.

BOP identifies I-MS-PI-1475 and I-MS-FI-

1474 failin low.

US directs the crew to enter 1-AP-3.

BOP verifies redundant channels normal.

BOP takes manual control of the "A" Main

Feed Re Valve to control SG level.

Crew verifies first stage pressure indications

normal.

Crew verifies systems affected by PRZR

level channels normal:

RO verifies operable pressurizer level

channel selected

RO verifies letdown in service

Crew leaves l-CH-FCV-1122 in

manual due to previous failure

RO verifies control group heaters are

not tri ed.

Crew verifies both first stage pressure

channels normal.

Crew verifies all SGWLC channels

selected to an 0 erable channel. 0

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Crew swaps to operable SGWLC channels.

RO verifies control rods in manual

Crew places steam dumps in either OFF

or steam pressure mode

BOP checks all bypass MRFVs in

manual

BOP places all MFRVs in manual

Crew selects channel IV on SGWLCS

Crew verifies all SG level channels are

operable

BOP verifies steam generator levels are

on program

BOP places MFRVs in Auto

RO returns steam dumps to Tave mode

Crew leaves control rods in manual due

to auto rod control roblem.

Crew verifies operation of instruments and

enters applicable MOPs (I-MOP-55.77 for

steam flow and 55.79 for steam ressure.

US refers to Technical Specification 3.3.1

(function 15 -72 hours to place in trip),

3.3.2 (functions Ie, If, 4d, 4e - 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months to

place. in trip), 3.3.3 (function 17 - Info

action), 3.3.4 (Table B 3.3.4-1, Instrument

3c - Info action .

US reports failure and requests assistance,

WR,andCR.

NOTE: The next event can occur once

TS have been reviewed, or as directed by

the lead evaluator.

SXGNRC 1 Page 11 Revision 0

SPD Verified: ' (Initials)

Letdown flow decreases

VCT level slowly decreases

CC sur e tank level slowl increases

RO identifies a decrease in letdown flow

and/or a decrease in VCT level.

NOTE: Crew may also check Aux

Building and Containment sump levels

at this time.

US announces entry into AP-16.

Crew verifies unit in modes 1,2, or 3.

RO verifies parameters under his control:

PRZR level

RCS subcooling

VCT level.

RO checks 1-CH-LCV-1115A not

diverted.

NOTE: Crew may also notice increase in

CC sur e tank level at an time.

Crew checks letdown parameters normal

for plant conditions:

Letdown flow. 0

RO isolates letdown:

Closes 1-CH-HCV-1200B

Closes 1-CH-LCV-1460A and 1460B.

Crew checks excess letdown temperature

and ressure.

Crew checks charging parameters normal:

Pump discharge pressure

Flow

Regen HX outlet temperature

Seal Injection flow

AB sum level.

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ry plantleakage due to a tube leak iIi the non

ons in accordance with 1-AP-16'l "Increasing

EXPECTED ACTION

Crew checks containment parameters:

Sump pumping rate

Temperature

Pressure

Radiation

Dispatches operator with AB

attachment as time ermits.

Crew checks safeguards parameters:

Sump alarms

Radiation monitors

Temperatures

Locall check for leaks as re uired.

Crew verifies 1-CH-FCV-1122 in auto

(and determines that it is not desired to

lace in AUTO due to revious failure.

Crew checks sample system.

Crew checks no CVCS manipulations in

ro ress.

Crew makes preparations to place excess

letdown in service.

NOTE: The next event can occur once

letdown has been isolated and the crew

is making preparations to place excess

letdown in service.

SXGNRC 1 Page 13 Revision 0

SPD Verified: (Initials)

Main steam pressure decreasing.

Tave decreasing.

Power increasing.

RO identifies Tave decreasing

unex ectedl .

Crew identifies that power is increasing.

US directs crew to enter 1-AP-38.

RO verifies all steam dumps closed.

BOP verifies all SO PORVs closed.

Crew verifies main turbine load normal

and reactor ower ~ 100% and stable.

NOTE: When operators have been

dispatched, a call will be made stating

that there is steam coming out the door

of the Unit one main steam valve house.

RO commences lowering Tave using

borationlcontrol rods.

BOP commences lowering main turbine

load.

NOTE: Once the crew is informed of the

steam issuing from the MSVH they may

choose to trip the reactor due to safety

concerns and because a power reduction

will cause SG ressures to increase.

Crew checks reactor power reduced to the

ower level before the event started.

NOTE: The next event will occur when

ramp has been stopped, the unit has

been tripped, or as directed by the lead

evaluator.

SXONRC 1 Page 14 Revision 0

Annunciators F-Fl, F-F2, F-F3 illuminate

"A" steam generator pressure decreases until generator is blown down

The reactor does not trip automatically or manually

Control rods do not insert in auto

Neither motor-driven AFW urn auto-starts

Crew identifies a main steam line break has

occurred.

US directs crew to enter 1-E-O.

RO/BOP attempt to trip the reactor.

US directs the crew to transition to FR-8.1.

Crew identifies reactor did not Critical Task

trip, transitions to I-FR-S.l,

"Response to Nuclear Power

Generation/ATWS,"

RO/BOP manually trips the reactor.

(NO)

BOP tri s the turbine

BOP checks all AFW pumps running, (NO)

Critical Task

Crew identifies reactor did not CT Continued

trip, transitions to I-FR-S.l,

"Response to Nuclear Power

Generation/ATWS,"

RO verifies at least one charging pump

runnln .

Crew verifies adequate negative

reactivi insertion or in* ects the BIT.

SXGNRC 1 Page 15 Revision 0

EXPECTED ACTION

NOTE: Once the steam leak is reported

the crew ma close the MSTVs.

NOTE: A safety injection will likely

occur before the reactor is tripped. The

crew will initiate attachment for SI after

the reactor has been shutdown.

NOTE: Approximately two minutes

after operator is dispatched the reactor

will be locall tri ed.

Crew dispatches operator to locally trip

reactor.

NOTE: If reactor is subcritical the crew

will transition to E-O at this time, see

below for ste s.

Crew checks if reactor is subcritical.

NOTE: Crew may throttle auxiliary feed

in this or subse uent ste s.

BOP checks SG levels.

Crew verifies all dilution paths isolated.

Crew checks for reactivity insertion from

uncontrolled cooldown.

BOP closes the MSTVs and Bypass

Valves.

Cre_w checks for faulted SG.

Crew checks CETCs less than 1200 o P.

Crew verifies the reactor is subcritical.

US directs transition to 1-E-O. E-O steps

RO verifies reactor tripped.

BOP verifies turbine tripped.

RO verifies AC emergency busses

ener ized.

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RO/BOP check if SI has actuated or is

re uired. YES

BOP verifies feedwater isolation:

MFRVs closed

MFRBVs closed

Main feed MOVs closed

Standby MFP in PTL

Main feed pumps tripped

MFP discharge MOVS closed

SG BD TVs closed.

Crew verifies phase A isolation:

Manually initiates Phase A

Initiates Attachment to veri isolation.

BOP verifies aux feed pumps running.

RO verifies charging pumps running.

BOP verifies low head pumps running.

BOP verifies all SW pumps running.

Crew checks if main steamlines should be

isolated.

Crew verifies SI flow.

BOP verifies aux feed flow.

RO checks Tave stable at or trending to

desired temperature and Aux Feed flow is

ad* usted if re uired.

RO checks pressurizer PORVs and spray

valves.

RO checks RCP trip and charging pump

recirc criteria.

Crew checks SG not faulted. (NO)

US directs transition to 1-E-2.

BOP closes the MSTVs and Bypass If not done in FR-S.1 or using a focused

Valves. brief.

SXGNRC 1 Page 17 Revision 0

ak has' occurred and the

will be* expected to respond

"Response to Nuclear

an -ES-l.l., "S1

BOP checks pressure in all SGs.

Crew identifies "A" as faulted SG.

NOTE: Crew may have already isolated

feed flow to the faulted generator using

a focused brief.

Crew isolates the faulted SG. Critical Task

BOP verifies MFW isolated.

BOP verifies I-FW-MOV-I00A and 1-

FW-HCV-I00A closed.

BOP verifies "A" SG PORV closed.

BOP verifies all SG blowdown trip

valves closed.

Crew dispatches an operator to locally

close I-MS-18.

BOP checks ECST level.

BOP verifies 1A established to

containment.

Crew checks secondary radiation.

RO resets S1

RO resets phase A

RO resets AMSAC (if necessary)

BOP checks secondary radiation

normal.

Crew checks if S1 can be terminated.

YES

US directs transition to l-ES-l.l.

RO stops all but one charging pump.

RO checks RCS pressure.

SXGNRC 1 Page'18 Revision 0

EVENT 8: Given that the unitis at power, and am** steallllin.e break has occUll"edand the

reactor cannot be tripped either automatically nor ually, the crew will be e ected to respond

in ac danoe withl-E-:O, " ct?r .. r Safe tion," I-FR-S.l, "Resp se to Nuclear

nerationJATWS -2" "Faulted'Stea ' enerator Isolation,," and 1- 8-1.1" "81

'EXPECTED ACTION

Crew terminates SI:

BOP verifies LHSI suctions from sump

closed

RO checks charging pump recirc flow

path aligned

BOP closes BIT inlet valves l-SI-MOV-

1867A and 1867B

BOP closes BIT outlet valves l-SI-

MOV-1867C and 1867D

BOP verifies alternate SI valves closed.

NOTE: The scenario may be terminated

after the crew terminates SI, or as

directed b the lead evaluator.

SXGNRC 1 Page 19 Revision 0

REFERENCES

Operating Procedure 1-0P-31.1, " Main Feedwater System." 42

Operating Procedure 1-0P-2.1, "Unit Startup from Mode 2 to Mode 1." 86

Abnormal Procedure l-AP-3, "Loss .0fVital Instrumentation." 22

Abnormal Procedure l-AP-16, "Increasing Primary Plant Leakage." 24

Abnormal Procedure l-AP-31, "Loss of Main Feedwater." 4

Abnormal Procedure l-AP-38, "Excessive Load Increase." 14

Functional Restoration Procedure I-FR-S.l, "R.esponse to Nuclear Power 14

Generation!ATWS."

Emergency Procedure l-E-O, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection." 36

Emergency Procedure l-E-2, "Faulted Steam Generator Isolation." 11

Emergency Procedure l-ES-l.l, "SI Termination." 18

Station Annunciator Response Procedures. N/A

Guide and Reference Document PI-AA-5000, "Human Performance." 1

INPO, Guideline for Teamwork and Diagnostic Skill Development: INPO 88-003, Jan. 1988

INPO, ACAD 07-002 Simulator Training Guidelines Jan. 2007

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ATTACHMENTS

ATTACHMENT 1 - SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM

ATTACHMENT 2 - SCENARIO PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

ATTACHMENT 3 - SIMULATOR PERFORMANCE DATASHEET (Last page of scenario)

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ATTACHMENT 1

SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM

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SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM

NRCl

Injtjalcondjtjons

1. Recall IC 161

2. Ensure Tave (555-565), Tref, PDTT level, and VCT level are selected on trend recorders.

3. Place a WRmagnet on l-CH-RI-128.

4. Set D bank to 155 steps in PCS.

5. I-OP-2.I and I-OP-31.I filled out to appropriate steps.

6. Reactivity plan available.

7. Rods in manual.

8. Rackout 2-CC-P-IA and verify 2-CC-P-IB is running. Close U2_CC_ll, U2_CC_4.

Letdown rad monitor failure Malfunction:

RM0207, Severity = -1

Auto-start failure of l-CN-P- Switch override:

IB CNPIB ASTOP = OFF

Auto-start failure of I-FW-P- Malfunctions:

3AJ3B FW260I

FW2602

Failure of rods to move in Malfunction:

auto RD14

Failure of Auto or Manual Malfunctions:

Reactor Trip RD32

RD38

Remote function: RP

AMSAC DEFEAT = TRUE

SXGNRC 1 Page 23 Revision 0

1) Start a MFW pump Give appropriate cues as WCC and field operator.

MFW pump suction flows are available on ExtremeView.

2) Unit ramp Give appropriate cues as WCC and field operators.

3) Trip of "A" Condensate Malfunctions:

pump/IRPI failure CN0201, Delay time == 5, Trigger == 3

RDO 121, Delay time == 185, Severity == -1, Trigger == 3

NOTE: When sent to Condensate pumps, report that "B" is

running fine. Can see no nothing wrong with A" locally.

If sent to Condensate pump breaker, report that 15A4 has an

overcurrent drop on it.

NOTE: If I&C technicians are called about rod, can report

back that it is an IRPI problem. As they would be standing by

for IRPI adjustments during the ramp, this communication can

be given in a timely manner.

NOTE: The next event can occur once Condensate flow has

been re-established and tech specs have been reviewed.

4) Failure of 1-CH-FT-1122 Malfunction:

CH08, Delay time == 5, Severity == 1, Ramp == 10, Trigger == 4

NOTE: If dispatched to look at valve, transmitter, etc, report

that everything looks normal.

NOTE: The next event can occur once charging has been

returned to normal, or as directed by the lead evaluator.

5) Failure of "A" SG CH. III Malfunction:

steam pressure MS 1701, Delay time == 5, Ramp == 5, Severity == -1, Trigger == 5

NOTE: The next event can occur once Tech Specs have been

reviewed.

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6) Tube leak in non-regen Malfunction:

HX CH13, Delay time = 5, Ramp = 120, Severity = 50, Trigger = 6

NOTE: The next event can occur once letdown has been

isolated and preparations are being made to place excess

letdown in service. Do not close breaker for excess letdown

procedure until after next event initiated.

7) Steam leak outside Malfunction:

containment MS1001, Delay time = 5, Ramp = 180, Severity = 2.5, Trigger = 7

NOTE: When operators have been dispatched, a call will be

made stating that there is steam coming out the door of the

Unit one main steam valve house.

NOTE: The next event can occur once reactor power has been

stabilized, or the unit has been tripped.

8) MSLB with ATWS/Rods Malfunctions:

will not insert in auto Update MSI001 to a severity of 20 using trigger 8

On trigger screen set up trigger 8 as follows:

IMP MS1001 (0 5) 20 300

NOTE: Trigger 10 will open the RTBs TWO minutes after it is

inserted.

Remote functions:

SP_RTA_BKR = F, Delay time = 120, Trigger = 10

SP_RTB_BKR = F, Delay time = 121, Trigger = 10

NOTE: Check SG pressure and decide if you could safely enter

MSVH at that time.

NOTE: The scenario may be terminated once the crew has

terminated safety injection, or at the direction of the lead

evaluator.

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ATTACHMENT 2

SCENARIO PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

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SIMULATOR REQUALIFICATION EXAMINATION

TERMINAl, PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE

Given equipment failures and operational situations, operate the plant in aGcordance with

Technical Specifications to bring the unit to a safe condition, using applicable procedures,

and applying effective teamwork, communication, and diagnostic skills.

GENERIC PERFORMANCE OBIF,CTIVES

A. During shift operations the shift manager will take a conservative course of action,

especially when uncertain conditions exist, when dealing with core cooling or heat sink

availability, primary system and containment integrity, and reactivity control associated

with plant evolutions.

B. During shift operations the shift manager will provide overall crew guidance by prioritizing

and integrating the actions of the shift crew in accordance with administrative procedures.

C. During shift operations each crew member will participate in a team effort that resolves

conflicts, provides input into the team decision and communicates all the necessary

information to enhance teamwork in accordance with administrative procedures.

D. During shift operations the Shift Technical Advisor will independently assess events and

based on those assessments make recommendations to the crew regarding mitigation

strategy.

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EVENT 1 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

Given that the unit is at 45% power, the crew will start a second Main

Feedwater P~mp in accordance with 1-0P-31.1, "Main Feedwater

System."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R406 Start a standby main feedwater pump.

CRITICAl, TASK:

N/A

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EVENT 2 PERFORMANCE OB,IECTlVES

EVENT GOAl,; Given that the unit is at 45% power and the crew has been instructed to

increase power, the crew will ramp the unit up in accordance with 1-0P-

2.1, "Unit Startup from Mode 2 to Mode 1."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS;

R705 Dilute the RCS using the blender.

CRITICAl, TASK;

N/A

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EVENT 3 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

EVENT GOAl J: Given that the unit is at power and a Main Condensate pump has tripped

with no auto-start of the standby pump, the crew will be expected to

respond in accordance with l-AP-31,"Loss of Main Feedwater."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R781 Respond to a loss of main feedwater.

S70 Evaluate compliance with technical specifications.

CRITICAl, TASK:

N/A

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EVENT 4 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

Given that the charging flow transmitter has failed high, the crew will

respond in accordance with AR for C-C5 annunciator

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

None

CRITICAl, TASK:

N/A

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EVENT 5 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

EVENT GOAl,: Given the plant is in mode one with indications of a failed steam pressure

transmitter, the crew will respond in accordance with l-AP-3, "Loss of Vital

Instrumentation. "

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R626 Respond to a steam generator water level control channel failure.

S70 Evaluate compliance with technical specifications.

CRITICAl, TASK:

N/A

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EVENT 6 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

Given that there are indications of primary plant leakage due to a tube leak

in the non-regenerative heat exchanger, the crew will take actions in

accordance with l-AP-16, "Increasing Primary Plant Leakage."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R520 Respond to increasing primary-plant leakage.

CRITICAIJ TASK:

N/A

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EVENT 7 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

EVENT GOAl,; Given a steam leak between a MSTV and containment, the crew will

respond in accordance with l-AP-38, "Excessive Load Increase."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS;

R539 Perform the immediate operator actions in response to an excessive load increase.

CRITICAl, TASK;

N/A

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EVENT 8 PERFORMANCE OB,IECTIVES

EVENT GOAl,: Given that the unit is at power, and a main steam line break has occurred

and the reactor cannot be tripped either automatically nor manually, the

crew will be expected to respond in accordance with l-E-O, "Reactor Trip

or Safety Injection," I-FR-S.l, "Response to Nuclear Power

Generation/ATWS," I-E-2, "Faulted Steam Generator Isolation," and 1-

ES-I.I, "SI Termination."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R224 Perform the immediate operator actions in response to a nuclear power generation/ATWS.

RI83 Identify and isolate a faulted steam generator.

RI89 Terminate safety injection.

CRITICAl, TASK:

See Following Pages

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CT Statement*

Crew identifies reactor did not trip, transition to I-FR-S.l, "Response to Nuclear Power

GenerationlATWS," and take actions to bring the reactor subcritical.

Safety Significance*

Failure to insert negative reactivity under the postulated plant conditions results in an

unnecessary situation in which the reactor remains critical. Failure to insert negative

reactivity constitutes "mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect

reactivity control. "

Valid indication of a required reactor trip by the presence of a first out annunciator, with a

failure of the reactor to trip automatically or manually from the control room.

Performance Indicator*

RO inserts control rods in manual

RO places in-service boric acid transfer pump in fast speed.

RO opens emergency borate valve l-CH-MOV-1350

-OR-

Crew dispatches operator to locally trip the reactor using attachment, Remote Reactor Trip.

Feedback*

Control rods moving in or fully inserted.

Emergency boration flow indicated.

Neutron flux decreasing.

Pressurizer pressure less than 2335 psig.

WOO Reference*

FR-S.l Background.

Conditions*

Prior to completion of step requiring its performance.

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CT Statement-

Crew starts all AFW pumps_

Safety Significance-

Failure to start at least the minimum required number of AFW pumps under the postulated

plant conditions can lead to violation of the RCS emergency stress limit.

Valid indication of a required reactor trip by the presence of a first out annunciator, with a

failure of the reactor to trip automatically or manually from the control room.

Perfonnance Indicator-

BOP places motor driven AFW pump control switches to start

Feedback-

Minimum AFW flow indicated to SGs_

WOO Reference-

FR-S.l Background

Conditions*

Before completing step requiring its performance

SXGNRC 1 Page 37 Revision 0

CT Statement*

Crew isolates faulted Steam Generator.

Safety Significance*

Failure to isolate a faulted SG that can be isolated causes challenges to the integrity CSF

beyond those irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. For the reference plant,

neither of these transients (blowdown of a single SG with or without RCPs running)

constitutes an orange-path challenge to the integrity CSF. However, if the faulted SG is not

isolated, the cooldown transient for reactor vessel inlet temperature could result in an

orange-path challenge to the integrity CSF, especially if RCPs are not running.

"A" SG is depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner or is completely depressurized and

Valve position and flow rate indication that AFW continues to be delivered to the faulted

SG

Perfonnance Indicator*

BOP closes I-FW-MOV-IOOD to secure AFW flow to "A" steam generator.

Feedback*

AFW flow indication to "A" steam generator decreases to zero.

WOG Reference*

E-2 Background.

Conditions*

Prior to transitioning out ofE-2.

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ATTACHMENT 3

SThJULATORPERFORMANCEDATASHEET

t------------~-----

Scenario Performance Datasheet

EV , the crew will start a S'cond Ma

P Feedwater System. f1

SPD Verified: (Initials)

I-FW-P-IC starts and runs normally

SPD Verified: (Initials)

Reactor power increases

Turbine power increases

Tavg/Tref increase

Generator megawatts increase

SPD Verified: (Initials)

Annunciators G-G6 and, later, G-F6 illuminate

I-CN-P-IA has amber breaker disagreement light lit

I-CN-P-IB does not auto-start

Feed pump suction pressure decreases

After several mintues: annunciators A-G2 and AFI will illuminate

IRPI for rod K-2 in Control Bank A will drop to zero

Rod Bottom Light for K-2 will illuminate

EVENT 4: Giventhatthe charging flow transmitter has failed high .the crew will respond in

4l

accordance with ARfar C-C5 annunciator

SPD Verified: (Initials)

Annunciator C-C5 will illuminate

I-CH-FI-II22 will indicate full scale high

I-CH-FCV-II22 will indicate minimum demand

Later, C-B3 may alarm if I-CH-FCV-II22 not yet in manual and open.

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SPD Verified: (Initials)

Letdown flow decreases

VCT level slowly decreases

CC surge tank level slowly increases

SPD Verified: (Initials)

Main steam pressure decreasing.

Tave decreasing.

Power increasing.

SPD Verified: (Initials)

Annunciators F-Fl, F-F2, F-F3 illuminate

"A" steam generator pressure decreases until generator is blown down

The reactor does not trip automatically or manually

Control rods do not insert in auto

Neither motor-driven AFW pump auto-starts

SXGNRC 1 Date - - - - Revision 0

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1

Facility: North Anna Scenario No.: 2 Op-Test No.: 1

Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: Unit at 100% power MOL. The letdown rad monitor is OOS and 1-FW-P-2 (terry turbine) was

just returned to service last shift. 2-CC-P-1A is tagged out for seal work.

Turnover: Maintain 100% power and support maintenance on 2-CC-P-1A

.-. nt Malf. No. Event Event

~

Type* Description

C (B) (S)

1 SW0104 SW pump trips

TS (S)

2 ROO? I (R) (S) Uncontrolled inward rod motion

R (R) (S) Loss of condenser vacuum due to loss of air ejector loop seal. Will need to

3 N (B) ramp unit back.

3a FW0801 I (B) (S) During ramp will lose error signal to "A" MFRV

CH2201 C (R) (S) Running charging pump degrades, auto-start defeated on standby pump,

4 CH2101 TS (S) discharqe check valve will stick on deqraded pump

C (All)

5 RC04 RCS leak

TS (S)

6 RC0101 M (All) SBLOCA

? Sl08 I (All) Auto SI will not actuate if required

8 C (B) (S) BIT valves will not open automatically

(N)ormal, (R)eactivitv, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent (M)aior

DOMINION

NORTH ANNA POWER STATION

INITIAL LICENSED OPERATOR EXAMINATION

SIMULATOR EXAMINATION GUIDE

SCENARIO NRC 2

SIMULATOR EXAMINATION GUIDE

EVENT DESCRIPTION

1. SW pump trips

2. Uncontrolled inward rod motion

3. Loss of condenser vacuum. During ramp will lose level error signal to "A" MFRV

4. Running charging pump degrades, auto-start defeated on standby pump,

discharge check valve will stick on degraded pump

5. RCS leak

6. SBLOCA

Scenario Recapitulation:

Malfunctions after EOP entry 2 (Failure of auto SI, BIT inlets do not open)

Total Malfunctions 8 (SW pump trip, uncontrolled rod motion, loss of condenser

vacuum, loss oflevel error signal to MFRV, degradation of

running charging pump/stuck open check valve, RCS leak,

SBLOCA, failure of auto SI, BIT inlets do not open)

Abnormal Events 5 (SW pump trip, uncontrolled rod motion, loss of condenser

vacuum, loss of level error signal to MFRV, degradation of

running charging pump/stuck open check valve, RCS leak)

Major Transients 1 (SBLOCA)

EOPs Entered 1 (E-l)

EOP Contingencies o

Critical Tasks 6

SCENARIO Dr IR ATION

90 Minutes

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SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO SUMMARY

SCENARIO NRC 2

The scenario begins with the unit at 100% power. The letdown radiation monitor is OOS

and the terry turbine was returned to service last shift. 2-CC-P-IA is tagged out for seal

maintenance.

After the crew assumes the watch, the unit 2 "A" service water pump will trip resulting in a

loss of service water to "B" header. The crew should respond in accordance with I-AP-I2, "Loss of

Service Water," and after checking system integrity, start the unit 1 "B" SW pump. After the

service water system has been verified stable, the next event will occur.

The next event will be a failure of the automatic rod control system. Control rods will start

inserting for no known reason. The crew will be expected to perform the immediate operator

actions of AP-I.I, "Continuous Uncontrolled Rod Motion," and place rod control in manual. After

the crew stabilizes the unit and directs I&C department to investigate, the next event will occur.

The crew should identify an increase in Main Condenser pressure and enter I-AP-I4, "Low

Condenser Vacuum," to respond to the event. As directed by I-AP-I4, the crew should reduce

main turbine load until main condenser vacuum stabilizes. During the ramp the "A" MFRV will

lose its level error signal. Due to this failure the valve will not automatically control level at

program during transient conditions. When sent to investigate the vacuum loss, the turbine building

operator will report that the "A" Air Ejector loop seal is hot to the touch. He will be directed to

isolate the loop seal. Once this has been done, vacuum will start to improve and the crew will stop

the ramp. When the unit is stable the next event can occur.

Next, the running charging pump, I-CH-P-IA, will degrade. The crew will start another

charging pump. When the crew secures the degraded pump its discharge check valve will stick

open. The crew should enter I-AP-49, "Loss ofNormal Charging." The crew will close the "A"

charging pump discharge and restore charging to normal. The crew will then use AP-49 to

reestablish letdown and stabilize the plant. The Unit Supervisor should refer to Technical

Specifications and declare the "A" charging pump inoperable. Due to "C" pump having no auto-

start capability, and thus only being operable when running, the crew will make preparations to start

this pump. At this point the next event will occur.

The transient on the charging system will cause an RCS leak to occur inside the

containment. The crew should respond in accordance with I-AP-I6, "Increasing Primary Plant

Leakage." The US should refer to Technical Specifications and either direct the crew to commence

a unit shutdown or make preparations for a containment entry due to excessive RCS leakage. Once

the crew has commenced either a ramp or started preparations for a containment entry, the next

event will occur.

The RCS leak will worsen and the crew will trip the reactor and enter I-E-O, "Reactor Trip

or Safety Injection." Safety injection will fail to actuate automatically, but can be manually

initiated. The BIT inlet valves will fail to open automatically and will have to be manually opened.

The crew will stop the RCPs and close the charging pump recirc valves. The crew will transition

to I-E-I, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant." Once the crew has performed some actions in I-

E-I, the scenario can be terminated.

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SCENARIO TURNOVER SHEET

Read the following to the crew:

Purpose: This examination is intended to evaluate the crew's performance of various tasks

associated with the Licensed Operator Training Program. All activities should be

completed in accordance with approved operations standards.

1. You are on a day shift during the week.

2. When conditions allow, utilize the computer log systems as you would in the plant.

Unit Status:

Unit 1 is at 100% power. RCS boron is 978 ppm and core age is 9000 MWD/MTU. Aux steam is

on unit 1.

Unit 2 is at 100% power.

Equipment Status:

1-CH-RI-128, Letdown radiation monitor, is OOS. 1-FW-P-2 was returned to service last shift,

PMT was SAT. 2-CC-P-1A is tagged out for seal maintenance. Maintenance rule window is

green.

Shift Orders:

Maintain current plant conditions and support maintenance on 2-CC-P-1A.

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g\T:E:}J"Tl:Giventhe plant in model and indications of alossof one service water pump, the crew

willresDond in accordance withO-AP-I2"LossofService Water."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SPD Verified: (Initials)

Annunciators J-D3 and J-B3 illuminate

"B"SW header pressure and flow decrease

BOP identifies annunciators J-D3, SW PP

I-PIA, 2-PIA AUTO TRIP, and J-B3,

SERV WTR RETURN HDR LO FLOW.

BOP identifies low flow condition on "B"

SW header.

BOP identifies unit-2 "A" SWpump

tripped.

US directs entry into O-AP-I2.

BOP checks SW reservoir level.

Crew determines no flooding is indicated.

Crew verifies SW headers are intact.

BOP verifies at least one SW pump

running on each header. (NO)

BOP starts "B" SWpump.

BOP verifies return header flow is

indicated.

BOP verifies SW system stable.

US makes notifications.

US refers to TS-3.7.8 and determines that

action "B" applies, which allows 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months to

verify SW throttled.

NOTE: The next event will occur after

the US refers to technical specifications,

or as directed bv the lead evaluator.

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EVENT 2: Given that the unit is operatingatpowerandcontrol rods are inserting for no apparent

reason, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with l-AP-l.l"Continuous

Uncontrolled Rod Motion."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SPD Verified: (Initials)

Rods step in at maximum speed

RO identifies control rods stepping in at

maximum speed.

RO/BOP identify no known cause of rod

insertion.

US directs crew to enter AP-l.l.

Crew takes action to stop rod Critical Task

motion and stabilize the unit.

R()1~liit~IriJd?~~ii~t~31rirlI~J(Th~

RO verifies rod motion stoDDed.

Crew verifies control rods above the 10-10

insertion limit.

RO checks RCS Tave and adjusts as

directed by the US.

RO checks PRZR pressure.

RO checks PRZR level.

Crew checks controls rods above the 10

insertion limit.

Crew maintains stable plant conditions.

US notifies I&C to investigate.

The US reports the failure to the Wark

Control Center and requests that the

reactivity management admin procedure be

referenced, appropriate notifications made,

and Work Request and Condition Report

be initiated.

NOTE: The next event will occur after

the crew has stabilized the plant, or as

directed bv the lead evaluator.

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.E~J',IT3:Given that the unit is at power andlossof condenser vacuum is occurring, the crew will

resDond(in accordance withl ..AP-14 "Low Condenser Vacuum."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SPD Verified: (Initials)

Condenser vacuum worsens

Annunciator A-G 1 alarms if vacuum reaches setpoint

"A" MFRV will not control in auto

Crew identifies worsening condenser

vacuum.

US directs crew to enter l-AP-14.

BOP removes turbine from valve position

limiter, as required.

BOP places turbine control in IMP-IN.

BOP commences manual turbine load

reduction.

US directs entry into either 1-0P-2.2 or 1-

AP-2.2 while continuing with l-AP-14.

Crew monitors condenser vacuum 3.5" or

less.

BOP verifies condenser vacuum breaker

closed.

BOP verifies all condenser waterboxes in

service. (YES)

NOTE: During the ramp the BOP will

identify the failure of the "A" MFRV to

automatically control SG level at

program. This valve will need to be

adiusted in manual durin!! the ramD.

BOP verifies air ejector lineup.

BOP verifies gland steam operation.

Crew dispatches watchstander to perform

local actions.

NOTE: When dispatched, the field

operator will isolate the loop seal per the

AP-14 attachment and then inform the

control room. At this time vacuum will

beQ"in to imnrove.

RO controls RCS temperature with blender

or control rods.

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EVENT 3: Given thatthe unitisatpoWerand loss of condenservacuum is occurring, the crew will

resDond in accordance with l-AP-14 "Low Condenser Vacuum."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

Crew checks vacuum stable or improving.

Crew checks condensate and circ water

systems.

Crew verifies vacuum stable or improving.

Crew verifies main turbine on line

Crew checks cause of vacuum loss

identified and repaired.

US makes report to Wark Control Center

and requests that WR, CR, and

management notifications be made.

NOTE: Once the crew has stabilized the

unit the next event can occur.

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EVENT 4: Given that the unit is at power and there is a degradation of the running charging

pump and a failed open discharge check valve occurs when the pump is secured, the crew will

res ond in accordance with l-AP-49 "Loss of Normal Char in ."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SPD Verified: (Initials)

Charging flow initially decreases

Charging pump discharge pressure decreases

Temperature increases on I-SW-TI-I03A

Annunciator C-B6 illuminates

Annunciators C-B3, C-B5, and C-C5 illuminate when "A" charging pump is stopped

Charging flow goes to zero when "A" charging pump is stopped

RO identifies degrading conditions on 1-

CH-P-IA.

RO identifies annunciator C-B6, CH-P-IA-

B-C LUBE OIL HI TEMP.

NOTE: Report from the field will be

that l-CH-P-IA is makin a lot of noise.

US directs starting of l-CH-P-IB (C).

US directs stopping of l-CH-P-IA.

Crew identifies loss of charging flow.

NOTE: The crew may isolate letdown

based on AR instructions. If so, step 6

will restore letdown.

US directs crew to enter l-AP-49.

Critical Task

RO verifies charging conditions returning to

normal.

US reviews TS 3.5.2 for having only one

operable HHSI pump (if l-CH-P-IB was

started.

US reports failures and requests WR, CR,

and mana ement notifications be made.

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E~N'I'4:GiYenthatth.eunifisatPowerand there is a degradation of the running charging

PumP and a failed opendischarge checkvalve occurs when the pump is secured, the crew will

resnond in accordance with l-AP-49 "Loss of Normal Charging."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

NOTE: Crew may also discuss an entry

into TS 3.0.3, which was applicable until

the "A" discharl!e MOVs were closed.

NOTE: Crew may discuss starting the

"C" pump on the IH bus (if not initially

started),

NOTE: Once the US has referred to Tech

Specs or as directed by the Lead

Evaluator. the next event will occur.

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EVENT 5: Given that the unitisatpower andanRCS leak has developed, the crew will be

expected to respond in accordance with l-AP-16,I'Primarv Plant Leakage."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SPD Verified: (Initials)

Pressurizer level decreases (B-F8 alarms)

Containment sump level increases

Charging flow increases

Radiation levels on l-RM-RMS-160 and l-RM-RMS-163 increase

Annunciators K-D2, and later, K-D4 alarm

NOTE: Any of the following indications

may be identified first.

RO identifies charging flow increasing.

BOP identifies containment sump level

increasing.

Crew identifies containment radiation levels

are increasing.

US directs entry into l-AP-16 and l-AP-5.

Crew verifies unit in mode 1. AP-16

RO verifies primary parameters under

operator control.

NOTE: Crew may isolate letdown at this

time.

RO checks LCV-1115A not diverted.

RO verifies letdown in service with normal

indications.

RO checks excess letdown parameters.

RO checks charging system parameters

normal.

BOP checks Auxiliary Building sump level

normal.

Crew checks containment conditions.

Crew identifies increasing containment

radiation and sump pumping rate.

US/STA refers to Tech. Spec. 3.4.13.

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EVENT 5: Given that the unit is at power and an RCS leak has developed, the crew will be

expected to respond in accordance with l-AP-16, "Primary Plant Leakage."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

US directs crew to either commence a unit

shutdown or make preparations for a

containment entIy.

US makes report to Work Control Center

and requests CR and management

notifications.

Health Physics department is informed of AP-5 steps for l-RM-RMS-160 alarm

the high reading on l-RM-RMS-160 and

asked to take containment gaseous and

oarticulate samoles if required.

A primary leak rate calculation is initiated.

HP is requested to take containment sump

samples.

NOTE: The next event will occur after

the crew either makes preparations to

ramp, makes preparations for a

containment entry, or as directed by the

lead evaluator.

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EVENT 6: Given that the unit is at power and a LOCAhas occurred, the crew will respond in

accordance with 1-E-O, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and 1-E-1, "Loss of Reactor or

SecondarY Coolant."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SPD Verified: (Initials)

Pressurizer level and pressure rapidly decrease

Containment pressure slowly increases

SI does not automatically actuate, if required

BIT inlet valves do not open automatically

RO identifies PRZR pressure and level

rapidly decreasing.

US directs crew to enter 1-E-O.

Crew manually trips the reactor.

BOP verifies turbine trip.

RO verifies AC emergency busses

energized.

Crew checks if safety injection has actuated,

or should have actuated.

r Critical Task

SI will not automaticallY actuate.

BOP verifies feedwater isolation:

MFRVs closed

MFRBVs closed

Main feed MOVs closed

Standby MFP in PTL

Main feed pumps tripped

MFP discharge MOVS closed

SG BD TVs closed.

ROIBOP manually initiate phase A

isolation.

BOP verifies AFW pumps running.

NOTE: Crew may have previously held

a focused briefed and started t-CH-P-

tC.

Crew verifies SI pumps running. (NO)

Crew starts 1-CH-P-1C.

BOP verifies SW pumps running.

SXGNRC2 Page 13 Revision °

EVENT 6: Given that the unit is at power and a LOCA has occurred, the crew will respond in

accordance with l-E-O, "Reactor Trip or Safety Iniection," and l-E-l, "Loss of Reactor or

Secondm: v Coolant."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

Crew checks if MS should be isolated.

(YES)

Crew verifies/closes MSTVs.

Crew checks if CDA required. (NO)

NOTE: The following is a continuous

action step and actions will be

performed when containment pressure

has exceeded 20 Dsia.

Crew checks if QS is required.

Crew manually starts QS:

QS discharge valves are opened

QS pumps are started

CAT outlet valves are ouened

NOTE: Crew may have aligned BIT

usine CAP.

Crew verifies SI flow. (NO)

US directs initiation of attachment 6.

Crew manually aligns the BIT: Critical Task

RO verifies charging pump line-up Attachment 6 steps

BOP verifies BIT reCITe valves

closed.

BOP verifies BIT outlet valves open.

BOP verifies AFW flow.

RO checks RCS Tave stable at or trending

to required temperature.

BOP adjusts AFW flow, if required.

RO checks PRZR PORVs and spray

valves.

RO checks RCS subcooling.

NOTE: The RCPs may have already

been stopped usine the CAP.

Crew checks at least one charging pump

running and flowing to the RCS.

SXG NRC 2 Page 14 Revision °

EVENT 6: Given that the unit is at power and a LOCA has occurred, the crew will respond in

accordance with l-E-O, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and l-E-l, "Loss of Reactor or

Second Coolant."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

Critical Task

BOP checks SGs not faulted. (YES)

BOP checks SGs not ruptured. (YES)

Crew checks ifRCS is intact inside

containment. 0

US directs crew to transition to l-E-l.

RO checks RCP trip and charging pump

recirc criteria.

BOP checks SGs not faulted. (YES)

BOP checks intact SG levels.

Crew checks secondary radiation:

RO resets SI, Phase A

Crew verifies IA trip valves open

RO resets AMSAC

Crew checks SG Blowdown, AE,

Main steamline, and terry turbine

exhaust radiation monitors normal

BOP checks SG levels

Crew initiates attachment to place

BD rad monitors in service

BOP opens SG surface sample trip

valves and informs chemist .

NOTE: The scenario may be terminated

after the crew checks secondary

radiation, or as directed by the lead

evaluator.

SXGNRC2 Page 15 Revision °

REFERENCES

PROCEDURE REV.

Abnonnal Procedure 0-AP-12, "Loss of Service Water." 31

Abnonnal Procedure 1-AP-1.1, "Continuous Uncontrolled Rod Motion." 8

Abnonnal Procedure 1-AP-13, "Loss of One or More Circulating Water Pumps." 13

Abnonnal Procedure 1-AP-14, "Low Condenser Vacuum." 20

Abnonnal Procedure 1-AP-49, "Loss ofNonnal Charging." 14

Abnonnal Procedure 1-AP-16, "Increasing Primary Plant Leakage." 24

Abnonnal Procedure 1-AP-5, "Unit 1 Radiation Monitoring System." 26

Emergency Procedure 1-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection." 36

Emergency Procedure 1-E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant." 22

Station Annunciator Response Procedures. N/A

Guide and Reference Document PI-AA-5000, "Human Perfonnance." 1

INPO, Guideline for Teamwork and Diagnostic Skill Development: INPO 88-003, Jan. 1988

INPO, ACAD 07-002 Simulator Training Guidelines Jan. 2007

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ATTACHMENTS

AITACHMENT 1 - SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM

AITACHMENT 2 - SCENARIO PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

AITACHMENT 3 - SIMULATOR PERFORMANCE DATASHEET (Last page of scenario)

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ATTACHMENT 1

SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM

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SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM

SXGNRC2

Initial conditions

1. Recall IC 162

2. Ensure Tave, Tref, PDTT level, and VCT level are selected on trend recorders.

3. Place WRmagnet on l-CH-RI-128.

4. Rackout 2-CC-P-IA and verify 2-CC-P-IB is running. Close U2_CC_4, U2-CC_11.

PRELOADS PRIOR TO SCENARIO START

CONDITION MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDEIETC.

Letdown RM failure Malfunction:

RM0207, Severity = -1

Failure of BIT inlets to open Switch Override (SI): (Keeps valves from opening on SI)

onSI MOV867A CLOSE=ON

MOV867B CLOSE=ON

Setup so that valves will open when OPEN burton pressed:

Set up trigger 10 as follows

MOV867A_OPEN(1)=1 (you need the (1) for this valve only)

DOR MOV867A CLOSE

Set up trigger 11 as follows

MOV867B OPEN=1

DOR MOV867B CLOSE

Failure of auto SI Malfunction:

S108

l-CH-P-IB will not auto- Switch Override:

start CHPIB ASTP = OFF

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SCENARIO EVENTS

EVENT MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/COMMUNICATIONS

1) Loss of service water Malfunction:

SWOI04, Trigger = 1

NOTE: When sent to pump can report that 2-SW-P-IA looks

normal and I-SW-P-IB is running normally.

NOTE: When sent to breaker for 2-SW-P-IA (25H5) can

report an overcurrent trip.

NOTE: The next event will occur after the US refers to

technical specifications, or as directed by the lead evaluator.

2) Rod Insertion. Malfunction:

RD07, Delay time = 5, Trigger = 2

NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew has stabilized

the plant, or as directed by the lead evaluator.

3) Loss of Condenser Malfunction:

Vacuum CN0901, Delay time = 5, Ramp = 120, Severity = 100, Trigger =

Failure oflevel signal to "A" 3

MFRV

NOTE: When sent to perform attachment, verify that enough

of a ramp has occurred, then close I-VP-21 either on

ExtremeView or a monitor screen. (If no one dispatched with

attachment in hand, than initially report the loop seal is hot

and get direction to isolate.)

Malfunction:

FW0801, Delay time = 5, Trigger = 3

NOTE: Allow the crew to stabilize the unit before proceeding

with next event, or as directed by the Lead Evaluator.

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EVENT MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/COMMUNICATIONS

4) Degradation of 1-CH-P- Malfunctions:

1A with check valve failure CH2201, Delay time = 5, Ramp = 120, Severity = 50, Trigger = 4

CH2101, Delay time = 5, Trigger = 4

NOTE: If operator sent to l-CH-P-IA, can report that it is

making a lot of noise. If asked, can also report that I-SW-

TCV-I02A is full open.

NOTE: If asked to check on l-CH-P-IB (C), can report that the

pump appears to running satisfactorily, with no seal leakage.

NOTE: Once the US has referred to Tech Specs or as directed

by the Lead Evaluator, the next event will occur.

5) RCS leak Malfunction:

RC04, Delay time = 5, Ramp = 300, Severity = 10, Trigger = 5

(Thwbrtot ~20754)

NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew either makes

preparations to ramp, makes preparations for a containment

entry, or as directed by the lead evaluator.

6) SBLOCA Malfunction:

RC0101, Delay time = 5, Ramp = 30, Severity = 0.3, Trigger = 6

NOTE: The scenario may be terminated after the crew checks

SI termination criteria or as directed bv the lead evaluator.

SXGNRC2 Page 21 Revision °

ATTACHMENT 2

SCENARIO PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

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SIMULATOR REQUALIFICATION EXAMINATION

TERMINAL PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE

Given equipment failures and operational situations, operate the plant in accordance with

Technical Specifications to bring the unit to a safe condition, using applicable procedures,

and applying effective teamwork, communication, and diagnostic skills.

GENERIC PERFORMANCE OB JECTIVES

A. During shift operations the shift manager will take a conservative course of action,

especially when uncertain conditions exist, when dealing with core cooling or heat sink

availability, primary system and containment integrity, and reactivity control associated

with plant evolutions.

B. During shift operations the shift manager will provide overall crew guidance by prioritizing

and integrating the actions of the shift crew in accordance with administrative procedures.

C. During shift operations each crew member will participate in a team effort that resolves

conflicts, provides input into the team decision and communicates all the necessary

information to enhance teamwork in accordance with administrative procedures.

D. During shift operations the Shift Technical Advisor will independently assess events and

based on those assessments make recommendations to the crew regarding mitigation

strategy.

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EVENT 1 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

EVENT GOAL: Given the plant in mode 1 and indications of a loss of one service water

pump, the crew will respond in accordance with 0-AP-12, "Loss of Service

Water."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R653 Respond to a loss of a service water pump.

S70 Evaluate compliance with technical specifications.

CRITICAl, TASK:

N/A

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EVENT 2 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

Given that the unit is operating at power and control rods are inserting for no

apparent reason, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-

AP-l.l, "Continuous Uncontrolled Rod Motion."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R474 Restore stable plant conditions following continuous uncontrolled rod motion.

S70 Evaluate compliance with technical specifications.

CRITICAL TASK:

See next page

SXGNRC2 Page 25 Revision 0

CT Statement*

Crew takes action in accordance with AP-I.I, to stop rod motion and stabilize the unit.

Safety Significance'

Core reactivity is not under control of the operator due to the failed control channel. "It is

expected that the operator will attempt to take manual actions to correct for anomalous

conditions during power operation."

Continuous inward control rod motion with T AVE and T REF matched.

Perfonnance Indicator

RO places rod control to manual.

Feedback

Rod motion stops

WOG Reference'

E-O Background Document

Conditions'

Prior to receiving an automatic reactor trip on low pressure.

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EVENT 3 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

Given that the unit is at power and loss of condenser vacuum is occurring,

the crew will respond in accordance with l-AP-14, "Low Condenser

Vacuum."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R517 Perform the immediate operator actions in response to a loss of one or more circulating

water pumps.

R518 Respond to a partial loss of condenser vacuum.

CRITICAl! TASK:

N/A

SXGNRC2 Page 27 Revision a

EVENT 4 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

EVENT GOAl,: Given that the unit is at power and there is a degradation of the running

charging pump and a failed open discharge check valve occurs when the

pump is secured, the crew will respond in accordance with l-AP-49, "Loss

of Normal Charging."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R704 Respond to a loss of normal charging.

S70 Evaluate compliance with technical specifications.

CRITICAL TASK:

See next page

SXGNRC2 Page 28 Revision 0

CT Statement*

Crew takes action to prevent charging pump run-out due to a stuck open discharge check

valve on a non-running charging pump.

Safety Significance*

Failure to prevent charging pump run-out constitutes a "mis-operation or incorrect crew

performance which leads to degraded ECCS capacity."

Indication/annunciation that one charging pump has tripped or been shutdown with a

stuck open discharge check valve.

High amps on the running charging pump.

Low/no charging flow or seal injection indicated.

Perfonnance Indicator

Crew closes charging pump discharge MOVs on the previously running charging pump.

Feedback

Discharge MOVs for the previously running pump indicate closed and charging and seal

injection flow returns to normal.

WOG Reference*

None.

Conditions*

Prior to Safety Injection being required by degraded plant conditions.

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EVENT 5 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

Given that the unit is at power and an RCS leak has developed, the crew will

be expected to respond in accordance with l-AP-16, "Primary Plant

Leakage."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R520 Respond to increasing primary-plant leakage.

S70 Evaluate compliance with technical specifications.

CRITICAL TASK;

N/A

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EVENT 6 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

EVENT GOAl,; Given that the unit is at power and a LOCA has occurred, the crew will

respond in accordance with l-E-O, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and

l-E-l, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS;

Rl85 Perfonn the immediate operator actions in response to a reactor trip or safety injection.

Rl84 Restore the Blowdown radiation monitors.

R730 Verify safety injection flow.

CRITICAl, TASK;

See Following Pages

SXGNRC2 Page 31 Revision °

CT Statement*

Crew manually initiates safety injection.

Safety Significance'

Failure to manually actuate SI under the postulated conditions constitutes "mis-operation or

incorrect crew performance that leads to degraded ECCS capacity."

Indication/annunciation that SI is required, with NO indication that SI has actuated.

Perfonnance Indicator

RO/BOP manually actuates safety injection.

Feedback

Indication/annunciation that SI has actuated.

WOG Reference'

E-O Background.

Conditions'

Prior to transitioning out ofE-O.

SXGNRC2 Page 32 Revision 0

CT Statement-

Crew aligns Charging pumps.

Safety Significance'

Failure to manually establish flow from at least one HHSI pump constitutes "mis-operation

or incorrect crew performance which leads to degraded ECCS...capacity."

Indication/annunciation that SI is in progress with no HHSI flow indicated.

Perfonnance Indicator

RO manually opens MOVSI 1836.

Feedback

HHSI flow to the cold legs is indicated.

WOG Reference'

E-O Background.

Conditions'

Prior to completion of step requiring its performance.

SXGNRC2 Page 33 Revision 0

CT Statement*

Crew stops Reactor Coolant Pumps.

Safety Significance*

Tripping RCPS at this time "prevents excessive depletion ofRCS water inventory through a

small break in the RCS which might lead to severe core uncovery if the RCPs were tripped

for some reason later in the accident." The RCPs should be tripped "before RCS inventory

is depleted to the point where tripping the pumps would cause the break to immediately

uncover."

Indication of:

Subcooling less than 25°P [85°P].

At least one charging pump running and flowing to the RCS.

Performance Indicator

RO/BOP places control switch(es) for all running RCPs in STOP.

Feedback

Indication/annunciation of no RCPs running.

WOG Reference*

RCP Trip/Restart Background Document.

Conditions*

Prior to completing the step directing its performance.

SXGNRC2 Page 34 Revision 0

CT Statement*

Crew takes action to prevent HHSI pump runout.

Safety Significance'

Failure to prevent HHSI pump runout constitutes a "mis-operation or incorrect crew

performance which leads to degraded ECCS capacity."

Indication/annunciation that SI is actuated and is required and

Indication ofRCS pressure less than 1275 psig [1475 psig] and

RCPs tripped

Perfonnance Indicator

RO closes charging pump recirc valves:

1-CH-MOV-1275A

l-CH-MOV-1275B

1-CH-MOV-1275C.

Feedback

Charging pump recirc valves indicate closed.

WOG Reference'

None.

Conditions'

Prior to RCS pressure reaching 1000 psig OR completion of transfer to recirculation mode,

whichever comes fust.

SXGNRC2 Page 35 Revision a

ATTACHMENT 3

SnJULATORPERFORMANCEDATASHEET

Scenario Performance Datasheet

EVENT. 1: Given the plant in mode lalld indications ofa lossof one service water pump, the crew

will respond in accordance withO-AP-12, "Loss ofService Water."

SPD Verified: (Initials)

Annunciators J-D3 and J-B3 illuminate

"B"SW header pressure and flow decrease

EVENT 2: Given that the unit isoperating atpower and control rodsare inserting for no apparent

reason, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-1.1, "Continuous

Uncontrolled Rod Motion."

SPD Verified: (Initials)

Rods step in at maximum speed

EVB:NT3:Given thatthe unit is at power and loss of condenservacuum is occurring, the crew will

respond in accordance withl-AP-14, "Low Condenser Vacuum."

SPD Verified: (Initials)

Condenser vacuum worsens

Annunciator A-G 1 alarms ifvacuum reaches setpoint

"A" MFRV will not control in auto

EVENT 4: Given. that the*unitis at. power and there is.adegradation of the running charging

pUlllP(li1dafailed open dischargecheckvalveoccurswhenthe pump is secured, the crew will

resDondin accordance with l-AP-49 "Loss ofNormal CharQinQ."

SPD Verified: (Initials)

Charging flow initially decreases

Charging pump discharge pressure decreases

Temperature increases on I-SW-TI-I03A

Annunciator C-B6 illuminates

Annunciators C-B3, C-B5, and C-C5 illuminate when "A" charging pump is stopped

Charging flow goes to zero when "A" charging pump is stopped

EVENT 5: Giventhat the unit is at power and an RCS leak has developed, the crew will be

expected to respond in accordance with1-AP-16, "Primary Plant Leakage."

SPD Verified: (Initials)

Pressurizer level decreases (B-F8 alarms)

Containment sump level increases

Charging flow increases

Radiation levels on l-RM-RMS-160 and l-RM-RMS-163 increase

Annunciators K-D2, and later, K-D4 alarm

SXGNRC2 Date - - - - Revision 0

Scenario Performance Datasheet

EVENT 6: Given that the unit is at power and a LOCA has occurred, the crew will respond in

accordance withl-E-O, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection,"and l-E-l, "Loss of Reactor or

SecondarY Coolant."

SPD Verified: (Initials)

Pressurizer level and pressure rapidly decrease

Containment pressure slowly increases

SI does not automatically actuate, if required

BIT inlet valves do not open automatically

SXGNRC2 Date - - - - Revision 0

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1

Facility: North Anna Scenario No.: 3 Op-Test No.: 1

Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: Unit at 100% power MOL. The letdown rad monitor OOS and1-FW-P-2 (terry turbine) was just

returned to service last shift. 2-CC-P-1A is tagged for seal maintenance.

Turnover: Maintain current plant conditions and support maintenance on 2-CC-P-1A.

nt Malf. No. Event Event

Type* Description

1 C (B) (S) BC pump trips and standby pump does not auto-start

2 RC1501 I (R) (S) Tavg unit fails high causing rods to step in

3 C (B) (S) Running IA compressor trips with no auto-start of standby compressor

I (R) (S)

4 RC0803 Selected pressurizer level channel fails low, letdown isolates

TS (8)

4a N (R) (S) Return letdown to service

R (R) (S)

5 N (B) SG PORV fails partially open, unit is ramped back

TS (S)

Running feed pump trips with no auto-start of standby pump, unit must be

6 FW2201 C (All)

tripped

FW2101

7 FW2102 M (All) Main feed line suctions all break

FW2103

8 RD32 I (All) No auto reactor trip will occur if required

Terry turbine will trip on overspeed and can't immediately be reset,

9 FW1102 C (All) discharge line break on one MDAFW pump and the other MDAFW pump

FW1402 will deqrade - FR-H.1

Terminate scenario when feed flow has been restored from Terry Turbine

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument (C)omponent (M)ajor

DOMINION

NORTH ANNA POWER STATION

INITIAL LICENSED OPERATOR EXAMINATION

SIMULATOR EXAMINATION GUIDE

SCENARIO NRC 3

SIMULATOR EXAMINATION GUIDE

EVENT DESCRIPTION

1. BC pump trips and standby pump does not auto-start

2. Tavg unit fails high causing rods to step in

3. Running IA compressor trips with no auto-start of standby compressor

4/4a. Selected pressurizer level channel fails low/restore letdown

5. SG PORV fails partially open, unit is ramped back

6. Running feed pump trips with no auto-start of standby pump, unit must be tripped

7. Main feed line suctions will break

8. Terry turbine will trip on overspeed, discharge line break on one MDAFW pump and

the other will degrade, ending in an H.l scenario

Scenario Recapitulation:

Malfunctions after EOP entry 2 (Main feed line break, AFW pumps not available)

Total Malfunctions 8 (BC pump trips/standby pump does not auto-start, Tavg unit

fails high, running IA compressor trips/standby compressor does

not auto-start, pressurizer level channel fails low, SG PORV fails

open, main feed pump trips/standby pump does not auto-start,

main feed line break, AFW pumps not available)

Abnormal Events 6 (BC pump trips/standby pump does not auto-start, Tavg unit

fails high, running IA compressor trips/standby compressor does

not auto-start, pressurizer level channel fails low, SG PORV fails

open, main feed pump trips/standby pump does not auto-start)

Major Transients 1 (Main feed line suction break)

EOPs Entered 2 (ES-O.!, FR-H.l)

EOP Contingencies 1 (FR-H.l)

Critical Tasks 6

SCENARIO Dr IR ATION

100 Minutes

SXGNRC3 Page 2 Revision a

SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO SUMMARY

SCENARIO NRC 2

The scenario begins with the unit at 100% power. The letdown radiation monitor is OOS

and the terry turbine was returned to service last shift. 2-CC-P-IA is tagged out for seal

maintenance.

The "A" bearing cooling pump, I-BC-P-IA, will trip. The crew should identifY the loss of

bearing cooling and respond in accordance with l-AP-19, "Loss of Bearing Cooling Water." The

crew should determine that the "B" bearing cooling pump did not automatically start, and per the

RNO start I-BC-P-IB. Once the crew has verified that the BC System has been restored, or as

directed by the Lead Evaluator, the next event will occur.

The next event will be the failure of the median/select Tave unit. The crew will be

expected to respond lAW l-AP-l.l, "Continuous Uncontrolled Rod Motion," and place rod

control in MANUAL. Crew should address annunciator response for B-A7, MEDIANIHI TAVG

< > TREF DEVIATION, and take manual control of charging flow, and place steam dumps in

steam pressure mode. After these actions have been completed and plant conditions are stable, or

as directed by the lead evaluator, the next event will occur.

A loss of instrument air will occur when 2-IA-C-l trips. The crew will enter l-AP-28,

"Loss of Instrument Air," and start all available air compressors. (l-IA-C-l will not start

automatically, but will start in HAND). Once instrument air pressure is returned to normal, the next

event will occur.

Next, PRZR level transmitter, l-RC-LT-1461, will fail low. The crew will respond to the

failed channel IAW l-AP-3,"Loss of Vital Instrumentation." The crew will swap to an operable

level channel, restore letdown (Normal event), and review Tech Specs.

The next failure to occur will be the "B" SG PORV failing open due to the failure of the

E/P. The crew will reduce power per l-AP-38, "Excessive Load Increase." They will restore

reactor power to less than 100% and dispatch an operator to fmd the cause of the power increase,

close the valve locally, and stabilize the unit. The next event will occur after the crew has

stabilized the unit, or at the direction of the lead evaluator.

Shortly after the unit is stablized, I-FW-P-IA will trip due to low oil pressure. The BOP

must identifY the pump trip, recognize that "B" MFP did not automatically start and take actions

IAW l-AP-31, "Loss of Main Feedwater." The crew will trip the reactor in accordance with the

immediate actions of l-AP-31 and enter l-E-O, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection." The next event

will take place on the reactor trip.

The reactor will not automatically trip, if required, and as a result of the transient placed

on the main feedwater system, a feed line break will occur on the main feed pump suction line

resulting in a loss of all main feed pumps. Several minutes after the reactor is tripped, I-FW-P-2

will trip on overspeed and will not be able to be immediately reset. Since a safety injection will

not be required at this time, the crew will transition to l-ES-O.l, "Reactor Trip Response." Once

SXG NRC 3 Page 3 Revision 0

the crew transitions to 1-ES-0.1, "Reactor Trip Response," the last event will occur.

"A" MDAFW pump discharge line will break in the MSVH and no flow will reach the

SG. The "B" MDAFW pump will degrade due to impeller damage. The crew should identify the

loss of all feedwater and transition to 1-FR-H.1, "Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink." On

their first pass through 1-FR-H.1, the crew will not be able to restore main feed, auxiliary feed, or

condensate flow to the steam generators. At this point, 1-FW-P-2 will be reset and the crew

should establish adequate auxiliary feedwater flow to the SGs, allowing them to transition out of

1-FR-H.1. The scenario may be terminated after transition, or at the direction of the lead

evaluator.

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SCENARIO TURNOVER SHEET

Read the following to the crew:

Purpose: This examination is intended to evaluate the crew's perfonnance of various tasks

associated with the Licensed Operator Training Program. All activities should be

completed in accordance with approved operations standards.

1. You are on a day shift during the week.

2. When conditions allow, utilize the computer log systems as you would in the plant.

Unit Status:

Unit 1 is at 100% power. RCS boron is 978 ppm and core age is 9000 MWD/MTU. Aux steam is

on unit 1.

Unit 2 is at 100% power.

Equipment Status:

Letdown radiation monitor, 1-CH-RI-128, is OOS. 1-FW-P-2, terry turbine, was returned to

service last shift, PMT was SAT. 2-CC-P-1A is tagged out. Maintenance rule window is green.

Shift Orders:

Maintain current plant conditions and support maintenance on 2-CC-P-1A.

SXGNRC3 PageS Revision 0

EVENTl:Giventheplant is.in Mode 1 andthe."A"ibearingcooling water pump has tripped the

crewwill resDondin accordance with l-AP-19."Loss ofBearing Cooling Water."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SPD Verified: (Initials)

Annunciators F-F4, F-E4, F-R8 illuminate

I-BC-P-IA has a breaker misalignment (amber and green lights lit)

I-BC-P-IB does not auto-start

BOP identifies annunciator F-F4, BC WTR

PP lA-IB AUTO TRIP SYS

MISALIGNED.

BOP identifies I-BC-P-IA has tripped.

BOP identifies that I-BC-P-IB did not

automatically start.

US directs crew to enter l-AP-19.

BOP checks status ofBC pumps.

BOP starts I-BC-P-IB.

BOP verifies at least one BC pump running

normally.

Crew verifies that BC system is operating

tower-to-tower.

Crew verifies that BC system is operating

normally.

Crew monitors main generator temperatures.

Crew dispatches operator to check

equipment supplied by BC:

MFP Cond DumDS ERC HPs. LPs.

US reports loss ofBC pump and failure of

standby pump to auto-start and requests

assistance, Work Request, and Condition

ReDort.

NOTE: When sent to investigate, the

operator will report that there is an

overcurrent trip on the breaker for I-BC-

P-IA.

NOTE: The next event can occur once the

crew has restored BC or at the discretion

of the lead evaluator.

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EVENT 2: Giventhatthe unitisinmode 1 andthe median/select Tave unit has failed, the crew

will be expected to respond in accordance.withl-AP-1 ,"Continuous Uncontrolled Rod

Motion" and annunciators B-A7 and B-A8.

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SPD Verified: (Initials)

Rods stepping in at maximum speed

Annunciators B-A7 and B-A8 are illuminated

Status light M-E4 illuminates

RO identifies annunciators B-A7,

MEDIAN/HI TAVG < > TREF

DEVIATION and B-A8, LOOP1A-B-C

TAVG DEVIATION.

RO identifies control rods stepping in at

maximum speed.

RO identifies median/select Tave unit

failed.

US directs crew to enter AP-l.l.

Crew takes action to stop rod Critical Task

motion and stabilize the unit.

Rrupi1iies i:8dl~~ht~~tinJ\1~A£J

RO verifies rod motion stoooed.

RO verifies that 1-RC-TI-1408 is normal.

(NO)

Crew initiates action of AR B-A7, while See actions below

continuing.

Crew verifies control rods above the 10-10

insertion limit.

RO checks RCS Tave and adjusts as

directed by the US.

RO checks PRZR pressure.

RO checks PRZR level.

Crew checks controls rods above the 10

insertion limit.

Crew maintains stable plant conditions.

NOTE: The following actions are fAW

annunciators B-A7.

RO places PRZR level control in

MANUAL and controls PRZR level.

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EVENT 2: Given that the unit is in mode 1 and the median/select Tave unit has failed, the crew

will be expected to respond in accordance with l-AP-l.l, "Continuous Uncontrolled Rod

Motion" and annunciators B-A7 and B-A8.

RO transfers condenser steam dumps to

steam pressure mode.

US informs Work Control Center of failure

and requests assistance WR, and CR.

NOTE: If the US requests permission to

withdraw rods to restore temperature, it

will be Q"iven.

NOTE: The next event will occur after

the crew has stabilized the plant, or as

directed bv the lead evaluator.

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E\TEN"T3:(}iventhatthe unitisa.tpo\Veriand indications exist of a loss of instrument air, the crew

will resDondiniaccordance with l-AP-28 "Loss ofInstrument Air."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SPD Verified: (Initials)

Annunciator lJ-D2 illuminates

IA pressure drops

l-IA-C-l will not start automatically, if required

Annunciators J-E8 and F-F8 illuminate

ROIBOP identifies annunciator J-D2, INST

AIR COMPR/DRYER TROUBLE.

NOTE: Crew may not enter AP-28 until

low air pressure alarms come in.

US directs entry into l-AP-28.

NOTE: l-IA-C-l will not automatically

start. but can be started in HAND.

Crew starts all available air Critical Task

r:r(l)]"'~~v

X;S" CliC.I ";c:c,!;;;:;:;;;C)<":

l-IA-C-2A, and

l-IA-C-2B

Crew verifies instrument air pressure> 70

psig.

NOTE: If sent, after approximately 5

minutes, the auxiliary building operator

will report a MOTOR OVERLOAD

annunciator lit on the local panel for 2-

IA-C-l and an air leak at the compressor.

He will request permission to close 2-IA-7

to isolate 2-IA-6, check valve, which is

annarentlv failed.

Crew verifies loss of instrument air

corrected.

Crew verifies instrument air pressure> 94

psig. (NO)

BOP isolates IA to containment by closing

l-IA-TV-102A.

BOP checks IA pressure outside

containment increasing.

NOTE: Whether the leak location has

been reported and direction made to

isolate it will determine how the crew

proceeds through l-AP-28. Once the leak

has been isolated the crew should reopen

the containment IA TVs if closed.

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EVENT.3: Giventhat the unit is at power andindications exist of a lossofinstmment air, the crew

will respond in accordance with l-AP-28 . "Loss of Instrument Air."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

NOTE: The next event will occur after

instrument air pressure is returned to

normal, or as directed by the lead

evaluator.

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EYENT 4: Given that the unit is at power and a selected pressurizer level channel has failed, the

crew will be ex ected to res ond in accordance with l-AP-3 "Loss of Vital Instrumentation."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SPD Verified: (Initials)

Annunciators B-F8, B-G7, and B-E2 are illuminated

l-RC-LI-1461 fails low

Letdown isolates

RO identifies annunciators B-F8, PZR LO

LEYEL and B-G7, PZR LO LYL HTRS

OFF-LETDOWN ISOL.

NOTE: Identification of failure may not

occur at this time.

RO identifies l-RC-LT-1461 failing low

and the loss of letdown.

RO notifies US of failure.

US directs crew to perform the immediate

actions of AP-3.

Crew verifies redundant indication normal.

Crew verifies SG control parameters

normal.

Crew verifies first stage pressure

indications normal.

RO verifies/places l-CH-FCY-1122 in

manual and adjusts to control pressurizer

level at ro am.

RO selects operable pressurizer level

channel.

RO verifies letdown in service. (NO)

Critical Task

Normal Event

RO establishes at least 25 gpm of

charging

RO opens l-CH-LCY-1460A and

1460B

RO puts l-CH-PCY-1145 in manual

RO fully opens l-CH-PCY-1145

RO opens l-CH-HCY-1200B

RO adjusts l-CH-PCY-1145 to

maintain 300 psig

RO laces l-CH-PCY-1145 in Auto.

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EVENT 4:0iven thattheunitisatpowerand a selected pressurizer level channel has failed, the

crew will be expected to resnondin accordance with l-AP-3 "Loss of Vital Instrumentation."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

RO verifies PRZR level control in auto.

(NO)

RO restores pressurizer level to program.

RO verifies/adjusts output of I-RC-LCV-

1459G.

Crew discusses need to leave charging

control in manual due to previous failure.

RO verifies pressurizer control heaters not

tripped. (NO)

RO resets control heaters by placing switch

to START.

BOP verifies both first stage pressure

channels normal.

BOP verifies operable channels selected

for SGWLCS.

Crew identifies the correct MOP (55.72) for

placing channel in trip.

US refers to TS. 3.3.1 (Function 9 - 72

hours) and TS 3.3.3 (Function 13 - Info

action).

US/SS make notifications about failed

channel.

NOTE: When the crew reestablishes

letdown and the US has reviewed TS,

then the next event will occur.

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EVE}'\JT 5: (}iventhat the unit isatpower anciaS(}PORVhas failed open, the crew will respond

in accordance with 1-AP-3 8'1Excessive Load Increase. "

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SPD Verified: (Initials)

Reactor power slowly increases.

Megawatts slowly decrease.

RO/BOP identifies increase in reactor

power/decrease in MW.

US directs crew to enter 1-AP-38.

RO verifies all steam dumps closed.

NOTE: Crew may identify "B" PORV

open from PCS alarm and PNID screen.

NOTE: BOP may place "B" PORVin

manual and press the "Down" button.

BOP verifies all SG PORVs indicate

closed.

BOP verifies turbine load normal.

RO verifies reactor power is less than or

equal to 100% power. (NO)

BOP ramps down turbine to reduce power

to < 100%.

Crew dispatches operators to check for the

source of steam.

NOTE: The operator will report that the

"B" steam 2enerator PORV is open.

Crew directs the operator to locally close

the "B" SGPORY.

Crew checks power level reduced to the

power level before the event started.

Crew stops ramp.

BOP places turbine in IMP-IN, if required.

BOP checks main generator output.

BOP checks all steam flow indications

normal.

BOP checks turbine control in operator

auto.

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EVENT 5: Given that the unit is at power and a SG PORV has failed open, the crew will respond

in accordance with l-AP-38 "Excessive Load Increase."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

Crew checks plant steam systems:

SGPORVs

SG safeties

MSR inlet FCVs

ASPCV.

US/STA consult tech spec 3.7.4.A and

determine that the PORV is operable as it

can be manuallv oDerated.

Crew references Reactivity admin (OP-AP-

300), as time permits.

NOTE: US may request permission to

restore reactor Dower.

NOTE: The next event will occur after

the crew has stabilized the unit, or at the

direction of the lead evaluator.

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EVENT 6: Given the plant is in Mode 1 with indications of a loss of "A" Main Feedwater Pump

and a failure of"B" Main Feedwater Pump to automatically start, the crew will respond in

accordance with l-AP-31, "Loss of Main Feedwater," and l-E-O, "Reactor Trip or Safety

Injection."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SPD Verified: (Initials)

Annunciator E-H5 illuminates

"A" MFP breakers have amber and green lights lit

"B" MFP does not auto-start

Available feed flow is less than steam flow

BOP identifies annunciator lE-H5, FW

PUMP lA LUBE OIL PRESS LOW.

BOP identifies trip of "A" MFP.

BOP informs US ofMFP trip.

BOP identifies start failure of "B" MFP.

US direct the BOP to take actions of l-AP-

31.

BOP checks reactor power greater than

70%. (YES)

BOP checks 2 feed pumps running. (NO)

US direct crew to enter l-E-O.

NOTE: The next event will be initiated

when the reactor is tripped.

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EVENT 7: Given that a main feed suction line has broken, the will respond in accordance

with l-E-O Reactor Trio or Safety Injection."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SPD Verified: (Initials)

The reactor does not trip automatically, if required

Annunciators F-B6, G-F6, F-Dl, F-D2, F-D3, F-A4, F-B5, F-Fl, F-F2, F-F3 illuminate

Main feed pump suction pressure rapidly decreases

Standby main Condensate pump starts

Various turbine building sump alarms illuminate

NOTE: The reactor will not

automaticall tri if re uired.

f-----t--: =------+------------------1

Critical Task

BOP verifies/trips turbine.

RO verifies AC emergency busses

energized.

BOP identifies annunciator IF-B6, MAIN

FD PUMPS SUCT HDR LO PRESS.

BOP identifies auto-start of the standby

condensate pump.

BOP informs crew that feed pump suction

pressure is rapidlv decreasing.

RO verifies power to AC emergency busses.

Crew checks if SI has actuated. (NO)

Crew checks if SI is required. (NO)

US directs team to transition to l-ES-O.l.

NOTE: Crew may use O-AP-39.1 for

Turbine Building Flooding to direct

securin!! of secondarY oumos.

US directs BOP to secure main feed,

condensate and heater drain pumps.

BOP secures main feed, condensate, and

heater drain pumps.

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EVENT7:Giventhat.a main feed suction linehas*broken,*the*crew will respond in accordance

with l-E-O Reactor TriD or SafetvIniection."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

NOTE: The terry turbine will trip 2

minutes after starting.

A break will occur on "A" AFW pump

discharge line in the MSVH, and the "B"

AFW pump will degrade after starting.

These are to set up for the next event that

will be handled when identified.

NOTE: The next event can occur once

secondary pumps have been stopped.

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~\TE1\lT8:Giventhatalossofall main andauxiliarVfeed water pumps has occurred, the crew

will respond in accordance with *I-FR..H. 1 "Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SPD Verified: (Initials)

Annunciators F-D8 illuminates

No flow indicated to "A" SG

Flow from I-FW-P-3A is not reaching the "C" SG, WR level decreasing

I-FW-P-3B degrades and flow drops to zero

RO checks RCS average temperature

stable or trending to desired temperature.

BOP identifies annunciator F-D8,

TURBINE DRIVEN AFW PUMP

TROUBLE OR LUBE OlL TRBL.

NOTE: Once H.I is entered, any

operator sent to the vicinity of the

MSVH will report that water and steam

are issuin!! out the door.

Crew identifies that "B" SG WR level is

not increasing.

Crew identifies that I-FW-P-3B flow is

degrading.

BOP identifies there is no AFW flow

available.

Crew identifies that there has been a loss of

the heat sink critical safety function.

US directs crew to transition to I-FR-H.1.

Crew checks if secondary heat sink is

required. (YES)

Crew dispatches an operator to check I-FW-

P-3A and the terry turbine.

NOTE: Operator will report "B" AFW

pump does not sound right, mechanics

suspect internal damage. The terry

turbine trio valve is closed.

NOTE: The operator instructed to reset

the overspeed trip valve will report that

the he can't 2et it to stav reset.

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EVENT 8: Given that a loss of all main and auxiliary feed water pumps has occurred, the crew

will res ond in accordance with I-FR-H.1 "Res onse to Loss of Second Heat Sink."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

Crew tries to establish AFW flow to at least

one SG:

BOP checks SG Blowdown and

sample isolation valves closed

Crew reviews control room indications

to determine loss of AFW flow

Crew determines that they cannot start

an AFW pump from the MCR

Crew determines that they do not have

ade uate AFW flow

Crew sto s reactor coolant pumps. Critical Task

Crew dispatches an operator with AP-22

series rocedures.

Crew attempts to establish main feed flow

to the SGs:

Crew determines that there are no

condensate um s runnin .

BOP checks SG wide range levels in 2/3

SGs less the 14%. 0

US returns to step 1.

NOTE: The operator dispatched to reset

the overspeed trip valve will now inform

the crew that I-FW-P-2 has been reset.

Crew establishes adequate AFW

flow to SG s .

Crew verifies core-exit TCs decreasing and

"A" SG W/R level increasin .

US directs transition to l-ES-O.l.

NOTE: An SI may occur on delta P if

AFW flow is not throttled to "A" SG.

NOTE: The scenario may be terminated

once the crew has established adequate

AFW flow, or at the discretion of the lead

evaluator.

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REFERENCES

PROCEDURE REV.

Abnonnal Procedure l-AP-19, "Loss of Bearing Cooling Water." 16

Abnonnal Procedure l-AP-l.l, "Continuous Uncontrolled Rod Motion." 8

Abnonnal Procedure l-AP-28, "Loss of Instrument Air." 30

Abnonnal Procedure l-AP-3, "Loss of Vital Instrumentation." 22

Abnonnal Procedure l-AP-38, "Excessive Load Increase." 14

Abnonnal Procedure l-AP-31, "Loss of Main Feedwater." 4

Emergency Procedure l-E-O, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection." 36

Emergency Procedure 1-ES-O.l, "Reactor Trip Response." 26

Functional Restoration Procedure I-FR-H.l, "Response to Loss of Secondary Heat 17

Sink."

Station Annunciator Response Procedures. N/A

Guide and Reference Document PI-AA-5000, "Human Perfonnance." 1

INPO, Guideline for Teamwork and Diagnostic Skill Development: INPO 88-003, Jan. 1988

INPO, ACAD 07-002 Simulator Training Guidelines Jan. 2007

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ATTACHMENTS

ATTACHMENT 1 - SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM

ATTACHMENT 2 - SCENARIO PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

ATTACHMENT 3 - SIMULATOR PERFORMANCE DATASHEET (Last page of scenario)

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ATTACHMENT 1

SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM

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SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM

SXGNRC3

Initial conditions

1. Recall IC 163

2. Ensure Tave, Tref, PDTT level, and VCT level are selected on trend recorders.

3. Place a WR magnet on 1-CH-RI-128.

4. Rackout 2-CC-P-1A and verify 2-CC-P-1B is running. Close U2_CC_11, U2_CC_4.

PRELOADS PRIOR TO SCENARIO START

CONDITION MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDEIETC.

Failure of"B" MFP to auto- Switch override:

start FWP1B1 ASTOP = OFF

FWP1B2 ASTOP = OFF

Failure of auto reactor trip Malfunction:

RD32

Letdown rad monitor failure Malfunction:

RM0207, Severity = -1

Failure of 1-IA-C-1 to auto- Switch override:

start IAC1_AUTO, Override = OFF

SCENARIO EVENTS

EVENT MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/COMMUNICATIONS

1) Loss ofBC Remote functions:

BCP1A_PROTECT = T, Delay time = 5, Trigger = 1

BCP_AUTO_DEFEAT = T, Delay time = 5, Trigger = 1

NOTE: When sent to investigate, the operator will report that

there is an overcurrent drop on the breaker for "A" BC pump.

NOTE: The next event will occur once BC is restored, or at the

discretion of the lead evaluator.

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EVENT NMLFUNCTION~VE~E~O~CATIONS

2) Median/select Tave failure Malfunction:

RC1501, Delay time = 5, Ramp = 5, Severity = 1, Trigger = 2

NOTE: If the US requests permission to withdraw rods to

restore temperature, it can be given.

NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew has stabilized

the plant, or as directed by the lead evaluator.

3) Loss of instrument air Remote function:

U2_IACl_FAULT = TRUE, Trigger = 3

Malfunction:

CA0402, Delay time = 8, Ramp = 10, Severity = 10, Trigger = 3

NOTE: If sent to investigate, then report that the MOTOR

OVERLOAD annunciator is lit on the local panel for 2-IA-C-l.

Can also report that 2-IA-6, a check valve, is apparently failed

and air is blowing back through the compressor. Isolating 2-

IA-7 should stop the air leak.

NOTE: If sent to check 2-IA-TV-211 can report it either open

or closed (opens when IA pressure at the dryer is <90 psig). If

open report was made, can later report that reset was pressed

when so directed.

NOTE: When told to close 2- IA-7, wait 1 minute then delete

malfunction CA0402 and report that leak is isolated.

NOTE: The next event will occur after instrument air pressure

is returned to normal, or as directed by the lead evaluator.

4) PRZR level Ch I, LT-461 Malfunction:

fails low RC0803, Delay time =5, Ramp = 30, Severity = -1, Trigger = 4

NOTE: When the crew reestablishes letdown and identifies the

correct MOP and TS action, then the next event will occur.

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EVENT ~FUNCTIONroVERroDE~O~CATIONS

5) Stuck open SG PORV Remote function:

MSPCVIOIB_K, Delay time = 5, Ramp = 5, Value = 100,

Trigger = 5

NOTE: Approximately two minutes after crew dispatches an

operator to the MSVH, report that the "B" steam generator

PORV is open.

NOTE: When the crew directs the operator to isolate the

valve, wait one minute, then ramp MSPCVIOIB_K to 0 over

120 seconds.

NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew has stabilized

the unit, or at the direction of the lead evaluator.

6) Trip of "A" MFP Malfunction:

FW0401, Delay time = 5, Ramp = 60, Severity = 100, Trigger = 6

NOTE: When requested to investigate cause for loss of oil

pressure informs US that oil is leaking from a flanged

connection on the south end ofthe MFP.

NOTE: The next event will occur when the reactor is tripped.

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EVENT MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/COMMUNICATIONS

7) Loss ofMFW Malfunctions:

FW2101, 2102, 2103, Delay time = 5, Ramp = 0, Severity = 100,

Trigger = 7

Alarm overrides:

VIDF8_W, Delay time = 15, Override = ON, Trigger = 7

VIDG8_W, Delay time = 20, Override = ON, Trigger = 7

VIAD6_W, Delay time = 20, Override = ON, Trigger = 7

V2GC8_W, Delay time = 25, Override = ON, Trigger = 7

VIAD3_W, Delay time = 30, Override = ON, Trigger = 7

Set up trigger 7 to occur when the reactor is tripped.

RX_RTA_52 .EQ. 0

NOTE: A security officer, or operator if one has been sent to

area, will call the MCR on the gaitronics and inform the crew

that there is a large amount of steam in the east end of the

turbine building basement.

NOTE: The following trips the Terry Turbine on overspeed 2

minutes after the reactor is tripped:

Remote function:

MSTV115 = 0, Delay time = 120, Trigger = 10

Set up trigger 10 to actuate on reactor trip breaker being

open.

RX- RTA- 52 .EQ. 0

NOTE: Operator will report the terry turbine trip valve is

closed.

NOTE: The operator instructed to reset the overspeed trip

valve will report that the valve will not stay reset and request

assistance.

NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew secures FW

and CN pumps, or as directed by the lead evaluator.

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EVENT MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/COMMUNICATIONS

8) Loss of heat sink Malfunction:

FW1402, Delay time = 5, Severity = 30, Ramp = 30, Trigger = 8

FW1102, Delay time = 10, Severity = 30, Ramp = 120, Trigger = 8

NOTE: Operator will report "B" AFW pump is noisy. If

sent, mechanics can report suspected impeller damage.

NOTE: Once operators have determined that they have a loss

of heat sink and have entered H.1, any operator dispatched to

the vicinity of the MSVH can report that steam and water are

coming out the door.

NOTE: Watch SG WR levels, reset terry turbine before feed

and bleed criteria are met.

NOTE: After the crew has looped back to step 1 of 1-FR-H.1,

reset overspeed trip valve using remote function:

MSTV115 = 100, Ramp = 30

NOTE: The operator dispatched to reset the overspeed trip

valve will inform the crew that 1-FW-P-2 has been reset.

NOTE: The scenario may be terminated once the crew has

established adequate AFW flow, or at the discretion of the

lead evaluator.

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ATTACHMENT 2

SCENARIO PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

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SIMULATOR REQUALIFICATION EXAMINATION

TERMINAL PERFORMANCE OBIECTIVE

Given equipment failures and operational situations, operate the plant in accordance with

Technical Specifications to bring the unit to a safe condition, using applicable procedures,

and applying effective teamwork, communication, and diagnostic skills.

GENERIC PERFORMANCE OB IECTIVES

A. During shift operations the shift manager will take a conservative course of action,

especially when uncertain conditions exist, when dealing with core cooling or heat sink

availability, primary system and containment integrity, and reactivity control associated

with plant evolutions.

B. During shift operations the shift manager will provide overall crew guidance by prioritizing

and integrating the actions of the shift crew in accordance with administrative procedures.

C. During shift operations each crew member will participate in a team effort that resolves

conflicts, provides input into the team decision and communicates all the necessary

information to enhance teamwork in accordance with administrative procedures.

D. During shift operations the Shift Technical Advisor will independently assess events and

based on those assessments make recommendations to the crew regarding mitigation

strategy.

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EVENT 1 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

EVENT GOAL: Given the plant is in Mode 1 and the "A" bearing cooling water pump has

tripped the crew will respond in accordance with l-AP-19, "Loss of Bearing

Cooling Water."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R522 Stabilize the unit following a loss of bearing cooling water.

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A

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EVENT 2 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is in mode 1 and the median/select Tave unit has failed,

the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-1.1,

"Continuous Uncontrolled Rod Motion," and annunciators B-A7 and B-

A8.

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R248 Respond to a T-AVG/-REF DEVIATION annunciator alarm.

R475 Perform the immediate operator actions in response to a continuous uncontrolled rod

motion.

CRITICAL TASK:

See next Page

SXGNRC3 Page 31 Revision 0

CT Statement*

Crew takes action in accordance with AP-I.I, to stop rod motion and stabilize the unit.

Safety Significance'

Core reactivity is not under control of the operator due to the failed control channel. "It is

expected that the operator will attempt to take manual actions to correct for anomalous

conditions during power operation. "

Indication of a failed MMS Unit.

Continuous inward control rod motion with Tave and Tref matched.

Perfonnance Indicator

RO places rod control in manual.

Feedback

Rod motion stops.

WOG Reference'

None

Conditions'

Prior to a PRZR low pressure reactor trip.

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EVENT 3 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power and indications exist of a loss of instrument

air, the crew will respond in accordance with l-AP-28, "Loss of Instrument

Air."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R530 Respond to a loss of instrument air outside containment.

CRITICAL TASK:

See next page

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CT Statement*

Crew starts all available air compressors.

Safety Significance'

Failure to start all available air compressors under the postulated plant conditions

constitutes mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to degradation of plant

conditions which could result in a unit trip and/or safety injection. In this case, the

instrument air pressure can be maintained above the trip set point by starting the air

compressors. Therefore, failure to start the air compressors also represents a "demonstrated

inability by the crew to take an action or combination of actions that would prevent a

challenge to plant safety."

Instrument air low pressure alarm.

Meter indication of low instrument air pressure.

Perfonnance Indicator

BOP starts all available air compressors.

Feedback

Instrument air pressure stabilizes above the trip set point.

WOG Reference'

None.

Conditions'

Prior to reaching the trip set point of70 PSIG.

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EVENT 4 PERFORMANCE OB,TECTlVES

EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power and a selected pressurizer level channel has

failed, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with l-AP-3,

"Loss of Vital Instrumentation."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R633 Respond to a failure ofthe controlling pressurizer level channel.

S70 Evaluate compliance with technical specifications.

CRITICAL TASK:

See next page

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CT Statement*

Crew takes manual control ofPRZR level, minimizes charging, and restores letdown.

Safety Significance'

Failure to take manual control ofPRZR level constitutes a "mis-operation or incorrect crew

performance" which will result in an unnecessary reactor trip on high PRZR level.

The controlling PRZR level channel is failed low, letdown is isolated.

Perfonnance Indicator'

RO verifies/places controller for l-CH-FCV-1122 in manual and controls PRZR level.

RO performs RNO step and selects operable channel.

RO restores charging and letdown as directed by the US.

Feedback

PRZR level does not exceed trip setpoint.

WOG Reference'

None.

Conditions'

Prior to a PRZR high level reactor trip.

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EVENT 5 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power and a SG PORV has failed open, the crew

will respond in accordance with l-AP-38, "Excessive Load Increase."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R539 Perfonn the immediate operator actions in response to an excessive load increase.

S70 Evaluate compliance with technical specifications.

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A

SXGNRC3 Page 37 Revision 0

EVENT 6 PERFORMANCE OB,TF,CTIVES

EVENT GOAL: Given the plant is in Mode 1 with indications of a loss of "A" Main

Feedwater Pump and a failure of "B" Main Feedwater Pump to

automatically start, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-31,

"Loss of Main Feedwater," and 1-E-O, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R781 Respond to a loss of main feedwater.

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A

SXGNRC3 Page 38 Revision °

EVENT 7 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

Given that a main feed suction line has broken, the crew will respond in

accordance with I-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS;

RI85 Perform the immediate operator actions in response to a reactor trip or safety injection.

CRITICAl! TASK:

See next page

SXGNRC3 Page 39 Revision °

CT Statement

Crew manually trips the Reactor.

Safety Significance*

Failure to manually trip the reactor causes a challenge to the subcriticality CSF beyond that

irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. Additionally, it constitutes an

"incorrect performance that necessitates the crew taking compensating action which

complicates the event mitigation strategy and demonstrates the inability by the crew to

recognize a failure of the automatic actuation ofthe RPS."

Indication and/or annunciation that plant parameter(s) exist that should result in automatic

reactor trip but reactor does not automatically trip.

Perfonnance Indicator

RO/BOP opens both reactor trip breakers.

Feedback

Reactor trip breakers open, rod bottom lights lit, IRPls at zero steps, reactor power <5%.

WOG Reference*

E-O Background.

Conditions*

Prior to a transition to FR-S.1.

SXGNRC3 Page 40 Revision 0

CT Statement

Crew stops reactor coolant pumps.

Safety Significance'

Tripping the RCPs when entering this guideline"...can appreciably delay the need for bleed

and feed and loss of secondary heat sink... " Failure to trip the RCPs "...can also reduce the

effectiveness of bleed and feed. RCP heat input to the RCS will result in increased steam

generation hindering the depressurization of the RCS during bleed and feed."

Indication of:

Reactor trip and

total feedwater flow less than 340 gpm, and

all SG levels less than 11 % NR.

Perfonnance Indicator

RO/BOP puts control switch(es) for all running RCPs in STOP.

Feedback

Indication/annunciation of no RCPs running.

WOG Reference'

FR-H.I background document.

Conditions'

Prior to being required to initiate RCS bleed and feed.

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EVENT 8 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

Given that a loss of all main and auxiliary feed water pumps has occurred,

the crew will respond in accordance with 1-FR-H.I, "Response to Loss of

Secondary Heat Sink."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

None.

CRITICAII TASK:

See Following Pages

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CT Statem ent'

Crew establishes Feed Flow to at least one SG.

Safety Significance*

Failure to establish feedwater flow to any SG results in the crew's having to rely upon the

lower-priority action of establishing RCS bleed and feed to minimize core uncovery. This

constitutes incorrect performance that "leads to degradation of any barrier to fission product

release."

Extreme (red-path) challenge to the heat sink CSF

Indication that RCS pressure remains above the pressure of all SGs

Indication that RCS temperature remains above the temperature for placing the RHR system

. .

III servIce

Indication and/or annunciation that no AFW flow is available after repeated attempts to

establish

-AND-

Level indication that SG dryout has not yet occurred.

Perfonnance Indicator

Crew directs operator to locally reset terry turbine trip valve and establish flow with I-FW-

P-2. BOP establishes adequate AFW flow as indicated by core-exit TCs decreasing and SG

wide-range level increasing.'

Feedback

Indication of AFW flow, increasing wide-range SG level and decreasing core-exit

thermocouples.

WOG Reference*

FR-H.1 Background document.

Conditions*

Prior to being required to perform RCS feed and bleed.

SXGNRC3 Page 43 Revision 0

ATTACHMENT 3

S~ATORPERFORMANCEDATASHEET

Scenario Performance Datasheet

EVENT 1: Given the plant is in Mode 1 and the "A" bearing cooling water pump has tripped the

crew will respond in accordance with l-AP-19, "Loss of Bearing Cooling Water."

SPD Verified: (Initials)

Annunciators F-F4, F-E4, F-H8 illuminate

I-BC-P-IA has a breaker misalignment (amber and green lights lit)

I-BC-P-IB does not auto-start

EVENT 2: Given that the unit is in mode 1 and the median/select Tave unit has failed, the crew

will be expected to respond in accordance with l-AP-l.l, "Continuous Uncontrolled Rod

Motion" and annunciators B-A7 and B-A8.

SPD Verified: (Initials)

Rods stepping in at maximum speed

Annunciators B-A7 and B-A8 are illuminated

Status light M-E4 illuminates

EVENT 3: Given that the unit is at power and indications exist of a loss of instrument air, the crew

will respond in accordance with l-AP-28, "Loss of Instrument Air."

SPD Verified: (Initials)

Annunciator lJ-D2 illuminates

IA pressure drops

l-IA-C-l will not start automatically, if required

Annunciators J-E8 and F-F8 illuminate

EVENT 4: Given that the unit is at power and a selected pressurizer level channel has failed, the

crew will be expected to respond in accordance with l-AP-3, "Loss of Vital Instrumentation."

SPD Verified: (Initials)

Annunciators B-F8, B-G7, and B-E2 are illuminated

l-RC-LI-1461 fails low

Letdown isolates

EVENTS: Given that the unit isin model and the medianiselectTave unit has failed, the crew

willbeexpected.torespond in .accordance with l-AP.. l.l, "Continuous Uncontrolled Rod

Motion!' and annunciators B-A7and B-A8.

SPD Verified: (Initials)

Rods stepping in at maximum speed

Annunciators B-A7 and B-A8 are illuminated

Status light M-E4 illuminates

SXGNRC 3 Date - - - - Revision 0

EVENT 6: Given the plant is in Mode 1with indications of a loss of "A" Main FeedwaterPump

and a failure of "B" Main Feedwater Pump to automatically start, the crew will respond in

accordance with l-AP-31 "Loss of Main Feedwater," and l-E-O, "Reactor Trip or Safety

Iniection."

SPD Verified: (Initials)

Annunciator E-H5 illuminates

"A" MFP breakers have amber and green lights lit

"B" MFP does not auto-start

Available feed flow is less than steam flow

EVENT 7: Given that a main Jeed suction line has broken, the crew will respond.in accordance

with l-E-O, Reactor Trip orSafetylniection."

SPD Verified: (Initials)

The reactor does not trip automatically, if required

Annunciators F-B6, G-F6, F-Dl, F-D2, F-D3, F-A4, F-B5, F-Fl, F-F2, F-F3 illuminate

Main feed pump suction pressure rapidly decreases

Standby main Condensate pump starts

Various turbine building sump alarms illuminate

EVENT 8: Giventhat a loss of all main and auxiliaryJeed water pumps has occurred, the crew

will respond in accordance with I-FR-H.1, "Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink."

SPD Verified: (Initials)

Annunciators F-D8 illuminates

No flow indicated to "A" SG

Flow from I-FW-P-3A is not reaching the "C" SG, WR level decreasing

I-FW-P-3B degrades and flow drops to zero

SXG37 Date - - - - Revision 7

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1

Facility: North Anna Scenario No.: 4 Op-Test No.: 1

Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: Unit at approximately 22% power with ramp held to allow turnover. Unit was returned to service

last shift after an outage to repair a leak on the EHC interface valve. 1-FW-P-2 (terry turbine) was tagged out

during the outage and was just returned to service. The letdown radiation monitor is 005. 2-CC-P-1A is tagged

out for seal maintenance. Control rods are in Manual while I&C verifies proper operation due to a prior problem.

Turnover: Shift orders are to ramp unit to 100% power.

Event Malf. No. Event Event

No. Tvpe* Description

R (R) (S)

1 Commence ramping unit to 100% power

N (B)

Running EHC pump trips and standby pump does not auto-start

2 TU1101 C (B)(S) (Crew will be informed during this time that rods can now be placed in

AUTO.)

C (R) (S)

3 RC29 Master pressure controller fails high causing PORV and sprays to open

TS (S)

I (B) (S)

4 FW0106 Failure of "B" SG channel III level transmitter

TS (S)

I (R) (S)

5 NI0104 N-44 failure

TS (S)

5a N (R) (S) N-44 is placed in trip

6 RC2402 C (All) "B" SGTL increasing until reactor trip is required

7 RC2402 M (All) "B" SGTR after unit stabilizes from trip

8 TU03 I (B) (S) Turbine does not trip automatically

9 RC1201 C (R) (S) Seal leak on "A" RCP after reactor trip

Terminate scenario once crew completes cooldown in E-3

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

DOMINION

NORTH ANNA POWER STATION

INITIAL LICENSED OPERATOR EXAMINATION

SIMULATOR EXAMINATION GUIDE

SCENARIO NRC 4

SIMULATOR EXAMINATION GUIDE

EVENT DESCRIPTION

I. Commence ramping unit to 100% power

2. Trip of running ERC pump/Failure of standby pump to auto-start

3. Master pressure controller fails high causing PORV and sprays to open

4. "B" SG channel III level transmitter fails low

5/5a. N-44 fails and is placed in trip

6. "B" SGTL increasing until reactor trip is required. Turbine does not trip automatically.

RCP seal failure.

7. "B" SGTR

Scenario Recapitulation:

Malfunctions after EOP entry 2 (Failure of turbine to trip automatically, RCP seal failure)

Total Malfunctions 8 (Trip of running ERC pump/failure of standby pump to auto-

start, master pressure controller fails high, SG level channel fails

low, N-44 fails, SGTL requiring reactor trip, SGTR, failure of

turbine to trip automatically, RCP seal failure)

Abnormal Events 4 (Master pressure controller fails high, SG level channel fails

low, N-44 fails, SGTL requiring reactor trip)

Major Transients 1 (SGTR)

EOPs Entered 2 (ES-O.!, E-3)

EOP Contingencies o

Critical Tasks 5

SCENARIO DITRATION

120 Minutes

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SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO SUMMARY

SCENARIO NRC 2

Scenario begins with the unit at approximately 22% power with a power increase held for

turnover. Unit was returned to service last shift after an outage to repair a leak on the EHC

interface valve. The terry turbine was tagged out during the outage and has just been returned to

service. The letdown radiation monitor is OOS. 2-CC-P-IA is tagged out for seal maintenance.

Shift orders are to ramp to 100%. Control rods are in manual while the instrument shop verifies

proper operation due to a previous problem.

The crew will increase reactor power in accordance with 1-0P-2.1, "Unit Startup from

Mode 2 to Mode 1."

Once a satisfactory power increases has been seen, the running EHC pump will trip with a

failure of the standby pump to auto-start. The crew will start the standby pump per AR for T-B4 or

US direction. At this time the crew will be informed that control rods can be placed in AUTO.

Once the standby pump is running the next event can occur.

The PRZR master pressure controller will fail causing 1-RC-PCV-1455C and both spray

valves to open. The US should direct the crew to enter 1-AP-44, "Loss ofRCS Pressure." The RO

will manually close 1-RC-PCV-1455C and use the master pressure controller to close the spray

valves. Once the crew has stabilized RCS pressure and consulted Tech Specs, or at the direction of

the lead evaluator, the next event will occur.

Channel ill level transmitter for the "B" steam generator will fail low. The crew should

identify this failure and take manual control of the "B" main feed reg. valve to restore level in the

"B" SG. The crew should enter 1-AP-3, "Loss of Vital Instrumentation," and refer to technical

specifications to determine operability of the transmitter. Once the crew has identified the

applicable MOP and referred to Tech Specs, the next event will occur.

Next, Nuclear Instrument channel N-44 will fail high causing the control rods to drive in at

maximum speed. The RO must identify N-44 as failing and place rod control in MANUAL. The

crew will enter 1-AP-4.3, "Malfunction of Nuclear Instrumentation (power Range)," and place N-

44 in trip (Normal event). The US/STA should review Technical Specification 3.3.1. After N-44

has been placed in trip, the next event will occur.

A tube leak will occur on "B" SG. The first indication will be the N-16 radiation monitor

for "B" SG indicating increased leakage. The US should direct the crew to enter 1-AP-5, "Unit 1

Radiation Monitoring System," and direct HP/Chemistry to obtain and analyze a "B" SG blowdown

sample. Eventually, the main steamline header N-16 monitor indication will increase and the crew

will have backup indication of a tube leak in the "B" SG. Based on confIrmed leakage, the US

should direct the crew to enter 1-AP-24, "Steam Generator Tube Leak." The tube leakage will

increase until a reactor trip is necessary. The crew will enter 1-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety

Injection."

The turbine will not trip automatically and must be tripped using pushbuttons. Following a

transition to ES-O.l, "Reactor Trip Response," a SGTR will develop in the "B" steam generator.

SXG NRC 4 Page 3 Revision 0

Following identification of degrading primary plant conditions the crew will manually safety inject

and transition back to E-O, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection." The crew will proceed through E-O

and transition to and perform E-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture." During this time the "A" RCP

will develop a seal failure and the crew will need to secure it and close the sealleakoff valve per 1-

AP-33.1, "Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Failure." The crew will cooldown the RCS using E-3. At

this time the scenario can be terminated.

SXGNRC4 Page 4 Revision °

SCENARIO TURNOVER SHEET

Read the following to the crew:

Purpose: This examination is intended to evaluate the crew's performance of various tasks

associated with the Licensed Operator Training Program. All activities should be

completed in accordance with approved operations standards.

I. You are on a day shift during the week.

2. When conditions allow, utilize the computer log systems as you would in the plant.

Unit Status:

Unit 1 is at approximately 22% power. The unit was returned to service last shift after an outage to

repair a leak on the EHC interface valve. The ramp was held for turnover. RCS boron is 1412 ppm

and core age is 9000. Aux steam is on unit 2.

Unit 2 is at 100% power.

Equipment Status:

Letdown rad monitor, I-CH-Rl-128, is OOS. I-FW-P-2, terry turbine, was tagged out during

outage and has just been returned to service. 2-CC-P-IA is tagged out for seal maintenance.

Control rods are in manual while the instrument shop verifies proper operation due to a previous

failure. They are currently monitoring rod motion and will inform the crew when rods may be

returned to auto. The maintenance rule window is green.

Shift Orders:

Ramp the unit to 100%.

SXGNRC4 Page 5 Revision 0

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SPD Verified: (Initials)

Reactor power increases

Turbine power increases

Tavg/Tref increase

Generator output increases

BOP increases turbine setter to desired

osition.

BOP presses GO on turbine.

BOP monitors turbine ramp.

RO starts a dilution when required.

RO withdraws control rods to maintain

rima tern erature.

NOTE: The next event can occur once

the crew has ramped approximately 5%

as determined b the lead evaluator.

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EVENT2: Given thatthe running ERCpump hastripped and the backup ERC pump has not

auto-started the crew willresoond in accordance with the AR.

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SPD Verified: (Initials)

Annunciators K-F5 and T-B4 will illuminate

"A" ERC pump trips

"B" ERC pump does not auto-start.

BOP identifies K-F5, TURB SUPERV

PANEL TROUBLE.

Crew identifies T-B4, ER FLUID

RESERVOIR LOW-PRESSURE.

Crew refers to AR for T-B4.

US directs BOP to start the standby ERC

pump.

NOTE: Crew may hold the ramp and

stoD the dilution at this time.

BOP manually starts 1-TM-P-4.

NOTE: If crew dispatches and operator

to look at ERC pumps, the operator will

report that I-TM-P-3 is unusually hot,

and I-TM-P-4 annears normal.

NOTE: The Work Control Center will

inform the crew at this time that rods

mav be returned to AUTO.

US requests Work Request, Condition

Report, and appropriate notifications be

made to Operations management and

maintenance.

NOTE: The next event will occur after

the backup ERC pump is running, or at

the direction of the lead evaluator.

SXGNRC4 Page 7 Revision 0

EVENT 3: Given the unit is at power and the PRZR pressure master controller fails high, the

crew will res ond in accordance with 1-AP-44 "Loss of Reactor Coolant S stem Pressure."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SPD Verified: (Initials)

Annunciator B-E6 illuminates

Master pressure controller fails high

1-RC-PCV-1455C indicates open

RCS pressure decreases

NOTE: If the ramp was not previously

stopped, the crew should stop the ramp

and dilution once immediate actions

have been com leted.

Crew identifies annunciator B-E6, PRZR

PRESS CONT HI OUTPUT.

US directs crew to enter 1-AP-44.

RO verifies PRZR PORV'S closed. (NO)

Crew stops RCS pressure Critical Task

decrease:

t~~>'l~',!@"i!:!n:::Jn:,D';iH;,,-,t:,,§Jf~f;;tW:I-~7~r;1'~h~Z"J\~rg,,7C:07~!

R@lclos_es 1~lt~fReYi11i~55£~

RO checks master pressure controller

controllin ro erl. 0

RO verifies PRZR spray valves closed.

RO verifies all PRZR heaters energized.

RO verifies auxiliary spray valve closed.

Crew verifies PORV and safety valves

closed.

RO verifies RCS pressure stable or

. .

mcreasm .

RO verifies RCS pressure normal and

ad'usts s ra s or heaters as re uired.

US refers to TS-3.4.1 (DNB), TS 3.4.13

(RCS Leakage), and TS 3.4.11. He

determines that PORV is 0 erable.

Crew evaluates malfunction and requests a

work request and condition report be

submitted.

SXGNRC4 Page 8 Revision 0

EVENT 3: Given the unit is at power and the PRZR pressure master controller fails high, the

crew will resDond in accordance with l-AP-44 "Loss of Reactor Coolant Svstem Pressure."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

NOTE: The next event will occur after

the crew has stabilized ReS pressure

and consulted Tech Specs, or at the

direction of the lead evaluator.

SXGNRC4 Page 9 Revision 0

EVENT 4: Given that the unit is at power and a steam generator level transmitter has failed, the

crew will be exnected to resnond in accordance with l-AP-3 "Loss of Vital Instrumentation."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SPD Verified: (Initials)

Annunciators F-F2 and F-B2 are illuminated

"B" Channel III SG level indicator is reading off-scale low

"B" MFRV is ramping open

BOP identifies annunciator IF-F2, SG lB

LEVEL ERROR.

BOP identifies "B" MFRV is ramping

open.

US directs entry into l-AP-3.

Crew identifies "B" SG level channel III

has failed low.

Crew checks redundant instrumentation

normal.

Crew checks SGWLC parameters normal.

(NO)

BOP takes manual control of the "B"

MFRV to restore SG level.

Crew verifies first-stage pressure

indications normal.

RO verifies systems affected by PRZR level

channels normal:

RO verifies operable pressurizer level

channel selected

RO verifies letdown in service

RO verifies pressurizer level control

in AUTO

RO verifies control group heaters are

not trinoed.

Crew verifies both turbine first stage

pressure channels normal.

Crew verifies operable channels selected

for SGWLC.

Crew verifies that no other instrumentation

has failed.

US refers to tech specs 3.3.1 (Functions 14

and 15) and 3.3.2 (Functions 5b and 6b)

and reports that channel must be placed in

trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . Info action is entered

on TS 3.3.3

SXGNRC4 Page 10 Revision 0

EVENT 4: Given that the unit is at power and a steam generator level transmitter has failed, the

crew will be exnected to resnond in accordance with l-AP-3 "Loss of Vital Instrumentation."

Crew identifies I-MOP-55.76.

US infonns Work Control Center of failure

and requests WR, CR, and craft assistance.

NOTE: The next event will occur after

the crew has identified the appropriate

MOP, or at the direction of the lead

evaluator.

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EVENT 5: Given that theunitisstableatpowerandpo\Ver-range channel N-44 has failed high

resulting in rods stepping in, thecrew-will respond in accordance with l-AP-4.3, "Malfunction of

Nuclear Instrumentation (Power Range)."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SPD Verified: (Initials)

N-44 indicates> 120%

Control rods step in at maximum speed

RCS pressure and TAVE decrease

NOTE: Verify control rods are in AUTO

before this event.

RO identifies control rods stepping in.

RO identifies N-44 failed high.

US directs entry into l-AP-4.3.

Crew stops control rod movement Critical Task

due to N-44 failure.

.C::r~~yerifi~"s p0\Y.er 110t increasing.

R@llilif~s~tij'ia~i)m"'on{mM~ufil

BOP verifies MFRVs in MANUAL.

Crew verifies three power-range

instruments operable.

Crew verifies unit in mode 1.

Crew verifies I-hour permissives.

RO places N-44 in trip. Normal event

N-44 is selected on Comparator

Channel Defeat

N-44 is defeated on Rod Stop Bypass

N-44 is defeated on Upper section

N-44 is defeated on Lower section

Control power fuses are removed.

Crew selects N-43 on the N-16 panel, if

required.

Crew checks reactor power greater than 5%

and removes computer points from scan.

Crew notifies chemistry N-44 input to

OLCMS is unreliable.

US reviews TS 3.3.1 (Functions 2 and 3).

QPTR will be required once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months

when power is >50%.

SXGNRC4 Page 12 Revision 0

EVENT 5: Given that the unit is stableatpo\Verandpower-range channel N-44 has failed high

resulting illfodsstepping in, the crew will respond in accordance with l-AP-4.3, "Malfunction of

Nuclear InstrumentationCPowerRange)."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

Crew verifies N-44 placed in trip within 72

hours.

RO verifies TAVE and TREF matched

within 1.5°F.

Crew determines if rod control should be

placed in AUTO.

US reports failure to Work Control Center

and requests WR CR, and craft assistance.

NOTE: The next event will occur after

the crew places N-44 in trip, or as

directed bv the lead evaluator.

SXGNRC4 Page 13 Revision 0

EVENT 6: Given that the unit is at power and indications exist of a SG tube leak, the crew

will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-5, "Unit 1 Radiation Monitoring

System," 1-AP-24, "Steam Generator Tube Leak," and 1-E-O, "Reactor Trip or Safety

In;ection. "

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SPD Verified: (Initials)

1-MS-Rl-191, "B" SG N-16, in Alert

Annunciator K-G6 illuminated

Annunciator K-G6 reflashes

Indications of increasing leakage on all N-16 RMs

Charging flow slowly increases

Later: Annunciators C-G7 and C-G5 illuminate

"A" RCP sealleakoffflow indication is neQQed hiQh

RO/BOP identifies annunciator K-G6, N-

16 RAD DET.

Crew identifies an Alert alarm on 1-MS-

Rl-191, "B" SG main steamline N-16

radiation monitor.

NOTE: US may not immediately break

off an ooerator to address l-AP-5.

US directs entry into 1-AP-5,"Unit 1

Radiation Monitoring System," and/or 1-

AP-24 "Steam Generator Tube Leak."

STA is notified to evaluate SG leak rate AP-5 steps

trend data.

NOTE: If crew requests HP to perform

local radiation surveys on the MS lines,

HP will inform the crew that contact

readings on the "B" MS line are

elevated.

US notifies the Ops Manager or Operations

Manager On Call (OMOC).

Crew monitors radiation on N-16 trend

recorder and determines leakage is

increasinQ.

Crew identifies increasing radiation on

main steamline header N-16 radiation

monitor.

US directs crew to initiate the 1-AP-5

attachment for monitoring primary to

secondary leakaQe and enter 1-AP-24.

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EVENT 6: Given that the unit is at power and indications exist of a SG tube leak, the

will be expected to respond in accordance with l-AP-5, "Unit 1 Radiation Monitoring

System," l-AP-24; "Steam Generator Tube Leak," and l-E-O, "Reactor Trip or Safety

Injection."

TIME nxpJ-<,t I 1-<,1 J At I It 'N mSTRUCTORREMARKS

Crew checks if reactor should be tripped: AP-24

Valid indication of high radiation on a

secondary radiation monitor

AND any of the following:

Noticeably increased charging flow

Increase in VCT makeup frequency

Unexpected SG level increase

Unexnected feed flow decrease.

Crew identifies reflash on annunciator K-

G6 N-16 RAD DET.

Crew identifies all N-16 RM indications

increasing.

US directs crew enter E-O, while

continuing with l-AP-24.

RO/BOP trip the reactor.

BOP trips the turbine using the turbine trip Turbine will not trip automatically

pushbuttons.

RO verifies AC emergency busses

energized.

Crew checks if SI has actuated.

Crew checks if SI is required. (NO)

US directs transition to l-ES-O.l.

Crew initiates monitoring of critical safety

function status trees.

RO checks RCS Tave stable at or trending

to expected value.

BOP adjusts AFW flow as required

NOTE: At this time the "A" Rep will

develop a seal leak.

RO identifies annunciators C-G7 RCP lA-

B-C SEAL LEAK HI FLOW, and C-G5,

RCP lA-B-C SHAFT SEAL WATERLO

DP.

RO identifies "A" RCP sealleakoffflow is

pegged high.

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EVENT 6: Given that the unit is at power and indications exist of a SG tube leak, the crew

will be expected to respond in accordance with l-AP-5, "Unit 1 Radiation Monitoring

System," l-AP-24, "Steam Generator Tube Leak," and l-E-O, "Reactor Trip or Safety

In' ection."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTORREMARKS

US directs crew to enter l-AP-33.1.

Crew determines RCP must be tripped.

Crew isolates affected Reactor Critical Task

Coolant Pump sealleakoff

NOTE: RCP should be tripped and sea

leakoff valve should be closed within lve

minutes of initial seal failure.

US reports seal failure to Work Control

Center and requests WR, CR, and craft

assistance.

US announces continuation ofES-O.l.

NOTE: The next event will occur once

the Rep is stopped and auxiliary feed

flow has been throttled, or as directed by

the lead evaluator.

SXGNRC4 Page 16 Revision °

EVENT 7: Given that the unit is shutdown following a reactor trip, and indications exist of a

SGTR, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-E-O, "Reactor Trip or Safety

Iniection" and 1-E-3 "Steam Generator Tube Ruoture.

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SPD Verified: (Initials)

"B" SG level increases unexpectedly

Pressurizer level and pressure decreases unexpectedly

Crew observes indications that the SG tube

leak has worsened.

US directs entry into 1-E-O.

RO/BOP verify reactor tripped.

BOP verifies turbine trip.

RO verifies AC emergency busses

energized.

NOTE: l-AP-24 is no longer applicable

once SI has been actuated.

Crew manually actuates S1.

BOP verifies feedwater isolation:

MFRVs closed

MFRBVs closed

Main feed MOVs closed

Standby MFP in PTL

Main feed pumps tripped

MFP discharge MOVS closed

SG BD TVs closed.

Crew verifies phase A isolation:

Manually initiates Phase A

Initiates Attachment to verify isolation.

BOP verifies AFW pumps are running, as

required.

Crew verifies SI pumps are running.

Crew checks if main steamlines should be

isolated.

Crew verifies SI flow.

BOP verifies AFW flow.

RO checks RCS average temperature.

SXGNRC4 Page 17 Revision 0

EVENT 7: Given that the unit is shutdown following a reactor trip, and indications exist of a

SGTR, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with l-E-O, "Reactor Trip or Safety

In'ection" and l-E-3 "Steam Generator Tube Ru ture.

RO checks pressurizer PORVs and spray

valves.

RO checks RCP trip and charging pump

recirc criteria.

Crew checks SGs not faulted. (YES)

Crew checks SG tubes not ruptured. (NO)

US directs transition to l-E-3.

RO checks RCP trip and charging pump

recirc criteria.

Crew identifies "B" SG as the ruptured SG.

NOTE: Crew may have closed I-FW-

MOV-IOOB earlier in the scenario. SG

level >11 %.

Crew isolates ruptured SG by Critical Task

performing/directing the

following:

BOP adjusts "B" SG PORV setpoint at

1050 PSIG

BOP checks "B" SG PORV closed

i

RO checks decay heat release valve

closed

BOP verifies "B" SG blowdown valves

closed

Crew initiates attachment for turbine

buildin actions.

RO checks PRZR PORVs and block

valves and safe valves.

BOP checks intact SG levels.

RO resets both trains of S1.

SXGNRC4 Page 18 Revision 0

EVENT 7: Given that the unit is shutdown following a reactor trip, and indications exist of a

SGTR, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety

Iniection" and 1-E-3 "Steam Generator Tube Runture.

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

Crew aligns air ejectors to containment:

Crew removes fuses from AE RM

RO resets phase A

Crew places AE divert switches to

DIVERT

Crew verifies valve alignment

Crew opens steam supply to air

eiectors.

BOP establishes IA to containment.

Crew verifies flow from "B" SG isolated:

Procedure step 3 complete

Attachment 7 complete through step 3

Runtured SG nressure >350 nsill.

RO checks interlock blocks and blocks SI

signals when required.

Crew initiates RCS cooldown: Critical Task

Crew detennines required CETC

temperature based on ruptured SG

R,~;~~"~J;~*'.*JWi"Z;;m)1"!J'0}?',,,*,mms,*r:ijcW71

Jf0ZB~)R;;~aumpsEste'am~1

RO verifies CETCs < required

temperature.

RO/BOP stop dumping steam.

NOTE: Scenario may be terminated

after crew completes cooldown, or as

directed bv the Lead Evaluator.

SXGNRC4 Page 19 Revision 0

REFERENCES

1'K 11'1-< TRP

Operating Procedure 1-0P-2.1, "Unit Startup from Mode 2 to Mode 1." 87

Abnormal Procedure l-AP-44, "Loss of Reactor Coolant System Pressure." 19

Abnormal Procedure l-AP-4.3, "Malfunction ofNuclear Instrumentation (power 18

Range)."

Abnormal Procedure l-AP-3, "Loss of Vital Instrumentation." 22

Abnormal Procedure l-AP-24, "Steam Generator Tube Leak." 20

Abnormal Procedure l-AP-33.1, "Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Failure." 13

Emergency Procedure l-E-O, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection." 36

Emergency Procedure l-E-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture. "23 23

Station Annunciator Response Procedures. N/A

Guide and Reference Document PI-AA-5000, "Human Performance." 1

INPO, Guideline for Teamwork and Diagnostic Skill Development: INPO 88-003, Jan. 1988

INPO, ACAD 07-002 Simulator Training Guidelines Jan. 2007

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ATTACHMENTS

ATTACHMENT 1 - SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM

ATTACHMENT 2 - SCENARIO PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

ATTACHMENT 3 - SIMULATOR PERFORMANCE DATASHEET (Last page of scenario)*

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ATTACHMENT 1

SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM

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SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM

SXGNRC4

Initial condjtjons

1. Recall IC 164

2. Ensure Tave, Tref (550-560), PDrr level, and VCT level are selected on trend recorders.

3. Place a WR magnet on l-CH-RI-128.

4. Set rods on PCS to 140 steps on D bank.

5. 1-0P-2.l filled out to correct step.

6. Reactivity plan available.

7. Rackout breaker for 2-CC-P-IA and verify 2-CC-P-IB running. Close U2_CC_11, U2_CC_4.

PRELOADSPRIORTO SCENARIO START

CONDITION MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDEIETC.

Letdown rad monitor failure Malfunction:

RM0207 Severity = -1

Auto-start failure ofEHC Switch override:

pump TMP4_ASTP, Delay time = 0, Value = False

Failure of auto turbine trip Malfunction:

TU03

SCENARIO EVENTS

EVENT MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/COMMUNICATIONS

1) Unit ramp NOTE: The next event will occur once the crew has ramped

approximately 5%.

SXGNRC4 Page 23 Revision 0

EVENT MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/COMMUNICATIONS

2) EHC pump trip Malfunction:

TUIIOI, Delay time = 5, Trigger = 2

NOTE: If crew dispatches and operator to look at EHC

pumps, the operator will report that 1-TM-P-3 is unusually

hot, and I-TM-P-4 appears normal.

NOTE: When the US reports the failure the WCC can tell

him that all I&C paperwork has been signed off for the

previous control rod problem and rods may be placed in

AUTO at this time.

NOTE: The next event will occur after the backup EHC

pump is running, or at the direction of the lead evaluator.

3) PRZR master pressure Malfunction:

controller failure RC29, Delay time = 5, Ramp = 5, Severity = 2, Trigger = 3

NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew has stabilized

RCS pressure and consulted Tech Specs, or at the direction of

the lead evaluator.

4) "B" SG level transmitter Malfunction:

failure FW0106, Delay time = 5, Ramp = 5, Stop = -1, Trigger = 4

NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew has reviewed

TS, or at the direction of the lead evaluator.

5) Power-range channel IV NOTE: Verify control rods have been returned to AUTO

failure before inserting this event.

Malfunction:

NI0204, Delay time = 5, Ramp = 0, Severity = 1, Trigger = 5

NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew stabilizes unit

and places N-44 in trip, or as directed by the lead evaluator.

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EVENT MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/COMMUNICATIONS

6) Steam generator tube leak Malfunctions:

requiring shutdown/"A" RCP RC2402, Delay time = 5, Ramp = 300, Severity = 1.0, Trigger = 6

seal leak

RC1201, Delay time = 180, Ramp = 5, Severity = 100, Trigger = 25

NOTE: Put in trigger 25 when crew transitions to ES-O.l and

starts to throttle AFW.

NOTE: HP surveys should take approximately 5 minutes.

Chemistry samples should take approximately 30 minutes.

NOTE: HP will initially inform the crew that there is

increasing radiation in contact readings on the "B" MS line.

NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew throttles AFW

and stops the "A" RCP, or at the direction of the lead

evaluator.

7) SGTR Update tube leak using trigger 7 on trigger screen:

IMP RC2402 (7 5) 50 60

Remote Function:

MS_57, Delay time = 120, Ramp = 60, Value = 0, Trigger = 15

NOTE: Scenario may be terminated after the RCS cooldown

has been completed, or as directed by the Lead Evaluator.

SXGNRC4 Page 25 Revision °

AITACHMENT 2

SCENARIO PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

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SIMULATOR REQUALIFICATION EXAMINATION

TERMINAl (PERFORMANCE OB JECTIVE

Given equipment failures and operational situations, operate the plant in accordance with

Technical Specifications to bring the unit to a safe condition, using applicable procedures,

and applying effective teamwork, communication, and diagnostic skills.

GENERIC PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

A. During shift operations the shift manager will take a conservative course of action,

especially when uncertain conditions exist, when dealing with core cooling or heat sink

availability, primary system and containment integrity, and reactivity control associated

with plant evolutions.

B. During shift operations the shift manager will provide overall crew guidance by prioritizing

and integrating the actions of the shift crew in accordance with administrative procedures.

C. During shift operations each crew member will participate in a team effort that resolves

conflicts, provides input into the team decision and communicates all the necessary

information to enhance teamwork in accordance with administrative procedures.

D. During shift operations the Shift Technical Advisor will independently assess events and

based on those assessments make recommendations to the crew regarding mitigation

strategy.

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EVENT 1 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at approximately 22% power and it is desired to

increase reactor power, the crew will ramp the unit in accordance with 1-

OP-2.1, "Unit Startup Mode 2 to Mode 1."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R705 Dilute the RCS using the blender.

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A

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EVENT 2 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

EVENT GOAL: Given that the running EHC pump has tripped and the backup EHC pump

has not auto-started, the crew will respond in accordance with the AR.

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS;

N/A

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A

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EVENT 3 PERFORMANCE OB,IECTIVES

EVENT GOAl,; Given the unit is at power and the PRZR pressure master controller fails

high, the crew will respond in accordance with l-AP-44, "Loss of Reactor

Coolant System Pressure."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS;

R634 Respond to a loss of reactor coolant system pressure.

S70 Evaluate compliance with technical specifications.

CRITICAL TASK;

See next page

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( CT Statem ent"

Crew stops RCS pressure decrease.

Safety Significance'

Failure to close the PORV and spray valves under the postulated plant conditions

constitutes "mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to degradation of any

barrier to fission product release." In this case, the RCS fission-product barrier can be

restored to full integrity simply by closing the PORV and spray valves. Therefore, failure to

close the PORV and spray valves also represents a "demonstrated inability by the crew to

take an action or combination of actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety."

Valid indication of pressure decreasing by the presence of various annunciators, indication

ofPORV and spray valves open, and RCS pressure indication decreasing.

Perfonnance Indicator

RO manually closes PORV and sprays valves.

Feedback-

RCS pressure decrease stopped.

WOG Reference'

E-O - Background Document.

Conditions'

Prior to receiving an automatic reactor trip on low pressure.

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EVENT 4 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power and a steam generator level transmitter has

failed, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with l-AP-3,

"Loss of Vital Instrumentation."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R626 Respond to a steam generator water level control channel failure.

S70 Evaluate compliance with technical specifications.

CRITICAl, TASK:

N/A

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EVENT 5 PERFORMANCE OBJECTNES

EVENT GOAI/: Given that the unit is stable at power and power-range channel N-44 has

failed high resulting in rods stepping in, the crew will respond in

accordance with l-AP-4.3, "Malfunction ofNuc1ear Instrumentation

(Power Range)."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R713 Perform the immediate operator actions in response to a malfunction of power-range

nuclear instrumentation.

S70 Evaluate compliance with technical specifications.

CRITICAl, TASK:

See next page

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CT Statem ent'

Crew takes action to stop rod motion and stabilize the unit.

Safety Significance*

Core reactivity is not under control of the operator due to the failed control channel. "It is

expected that the operator will attempt to take manual actions to correct for anomalous

conditions during power operation."

Indication of a failed power range NI.

Continuous inward control rod motion with TAVE and TREF matched.

Perfonnance Indicator

RO places rod control in manual.

Feedback

Rod motion stops.

WOG Reference*

None.

Conditions*

Prior to a PRZR low pressure reactor trip.

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EVENT 6 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

EVENT GOAl,; Given that the unit is at power and indications exist of a SG tube leak, the

crew will be expected to respond in accordance with I-AP-5, "Unit I

Radiation Monitoring System," I-AP-24, "Steam Generator Tube Leak,"

and I-E-O, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS;

RI85 Perform the immediate operator actions in response to a reactor trip or safety injection.

R533 Respond to a reactor coolant pump seal failure.

S70 Evaluate compliance with technical specifications.

CRITICAl, TASK;

See next page

SXGNRC4 Page 35 Revision °

( CT Statement*

Crew isolates affected Reactor Coolant Pump sealleakoff.

Safety Significance'

"...an indication of a failure ofthe # 1 seal in any RCP with controlled sealleakoff requires

prompt action to secure the leakoff path as soon as is practical and in no case longer than

five minutes after sealleakoff exceeds the high flow alarm setpoint. Failure to isolate the

affected RCP sealleakoff in a timely manner may subject the RCP shaft, lower radial

bearing, and seals to high temperature conditions which could lead to premature failure of

the remaining seals, failure of the lower radial bearing, and warping of the RCP shaft...."

Indication and annunciation of:

Affected RCP #1 seal DP less than 200 psid

OR

Valid indication of # 1 sealleakoff greater than alarm setpoint.

Perfonnance Indicator

Crew stops affected RCP (once reactor is tripped).

Crew closes affected RCP #1 sealleakoffvalve (once loop flow indicates affected RCP

is stopped).

Feedback

Indication of:

decreasing or zero flow for loop with affected RCP

affected RCP sealleakoffvalve closed.

WOG Reference'

Westinghouse RCP vendor manual- addendum #3.

Conditions'

Within 5 minutes of sealleakoff exceeding alarm setpoint.

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EVENT 7 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

EVENT GOAL; Given that the unit is shutdown following a reactor trip, and indications

exist of a SGTR, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with

l-E-O, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and l-E-3, "Steam Generator

Tube Rupture.

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R187 Identify and isolate a ruptured steam generator.

R759 Cool down the Reactor Coolant System during the response to a steam generator tube

rupture.

CRITICAL TASK:

See Following Pages

SXGNRC4 Page 37 Revision °

CT Statement"

Crew isolates flow to/from ruptured SG.

Safety Significance'

Failure to isolate the ruptured SG causes a loss of differential pressure between the ruptured

SG and the intact SGs. Upon loss of differential pressure, the crew must transition to a

contingency procedure that constitutes an incorrect performance that" ...necessitates the

crew taking compensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy... "

Indication and annunciation of:

Increasing SG water level and radiation; and

a reactor trip; and

a safety injection.

Perfonnance Indicator

BOP adjusts ruptured SG PORV setpoint at 1050 PSIG.

BOP checks ruptured SG PORV closed.

RO checks decay heat release valve closed.

BOP checks "B" SG blowdown trip valves closed.

BOP closes ruptured SG MSTV and Bypass valve.

RO/BOP directs an auxiliary operator to locally close I-MS-57, Steam to the Terry Turbine

from "B" SG.

BOP closes I-FW-MOV-lOOB.

Feedback

Indication of:

stable or increasing pressure in the ruptured SG.

decreasing or zero feedwater flow rate to the ruptured SG.

WOG Reference'

E-3 Background.

Conditions'

Isolate before a transition to ECA-3.1 occurs.

SXGNRC4 Page 38 Revision 0

CT Statem ent'

Crew initiates RCS Cooldown.

Safety Significance'

Failure to establish and maintain the correct RCS temperature during a SGTR leads to a

transition from E-3 to a contingency procedure, which constitutes an incorrect performance

that" ...necessitates the crew taking compensating action which complicates the event

mitigation strategy...."

Procedurally directed by E-3.

Perfonnance Indicator

ROIBOP dumps steam.

Feedback

Indication of steam flow rate greater than zero.

Indication of RCS temperature decreasing

OR

Indication ofRCS temperature less than target temperature.

WOG Reference'

E-3 Background.

Conditions'

Crew maintains adequate subcooling.

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ATTACHMENT 3

S~LATORPERFORMANCEDATASHEET

Scenario Performance Datasheet

EVENT.l: Given that theunitis.atapproxirnately22% povver.anditis *. desiredto increasereactor

power,the crew will ramp the unit in accordance with 1-0P-2.1, "Unit Startup Mode 2 to.Mode

1."

SPD Verified: (Initials)

Reactor power increases

Turbine power increases

Tavg/Tref increase

Generator output increases

EVENT 2: Given that the running ERC pump has tripped and the backup ERC pump has not

auto-started, the crew will respond in accordance with the AR.

SPD Verified: (Initials)

Annunciators K-F5 and T-B4 will illuminate

"A" ERC pump trips

"B" ERC pump does not auto-start.

EVENT 3: Given the unit is at povverandthe PRZRpressure master controller fails high, the

crew will respond in accordance with l-AP-44, "Loss of Reactor Coolant System Pressure."

SPD Verified: (Initials)

Annunciator B-E6 illuminates

Master pressure controller fails high

l-RC-PCV-1455C indicates open

RCS pressure decreases

EVENT 4: Given that the unit is at power and a steam generator level transmitter has failed, the

crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-3, "Loss of Vital Instrumentation."

SPD Verified: (Initials)

Annunciators F-F2 and F-B2 are illuminated

"B" Channel III SG level indicator is reading off-scale low

"B" MFRV is ramping open

EVENT 5: Given that the unit is stable at power and power-range channel N-44 has failed high

resulting in rods stepping in, the crew will respond in accordance with l-AP-4.3, "Malfunction of

Nuclear Instrumentation (Power Range)."

SPD Verified: (Initials)

N-44 indicates> 120%

Control rods step in at maximum speed

RCS pressure and TAVE decrease

SXGNRC4 Date - - - - Revision 0

EVENT 6: Given that the unit is at power and indications exist of a SG tube leak, the crew will

be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-5, "Unit 1 Radiation Monitoring System," 1-

AP-24 "Steam Generator Tube Leak" and 1-E-O "Reactor Tri or Safe In' ection,"

SPD Verified: (Initials)

1-MS-RI-191, "B" SG N-16, in Alert

Annunciator K-G6 illuminated

Annunciator K-G6 reflashes

Indications of increasing leakage on all N-16 RMs

Charging flow slowly increases

Later: Annunciators C-G7 and C-G5 illuminate

"A" RCP sealleakoff flow indication is e ed hi h

SPD Verifies : (Initials)

"B" SG level increases unexpectedly

Pressurizer level and pressure decreases unexpectedly

SXGNRC4 Date - - - - Revision 0

DOMINION

NORTH ANNA POWER STATION

INITIAL LICENSED OPERATOR EXAMINATION

SIMULATOR EXAMINATION GUIDE

SCENARIO NRC 5

SIMULATOR EXAMINATION GUIDE

EVENT DESCRIPTION

1. Failure of l-CH-LT-1112, VCT level transmitter, high

2. "A" High Pressure Heater Drain Tank high-level divert fails open. Standby

Condensate pump will not auto-start. Rods will not work in auto.

3. l-RC-PCV-1455B, spray valve, fails open and will not close with controller

4. Main Generator voltage regulator fails

5. Loss of IH bus requiring crew to reduce power

6. Loss of switchyard with failure of 11 EDG to start in AUTO-REMOTE

7. LOCA outside containment with failure of"B" train of Phase A

Scenario Recapitulation:

Malfunctions after EOP entry 3 (Failure of 11 EDG to start in AUTO-REMOTE, LOCA outside

containment, failure of "B" train of Phase A to function in auto)

Total Malfunctions 10 (Failure of l-CH-LT-1112 high, "A" HPHDT HLD fails

open/standby Condensate pump does not auto-start if required, no

auto rod control, "B" pressurizer spray valve fails open, MG VR

failure, loss of IH emergency bus, loss of switchyard, lJEDG fails

to start in AUTO-REMOTE, LOCA outside containment, failure

of "B" train Phase A)

Abnormal Events 4 ("A" HPHDT HLD fails open/standby Condensate pump does

not auto-start if required, "B" pressurizer spray valve fails open,

MG VR failure, loss of IH emergency bus)

Major Transients 1 (Loss of switchyard)

EOPs Entered 1 (ES-O.1)

EOP Contingencies 2 (ECA-O.O, ECA-1.2)

Critical Tasks 3

SCENARIO DITRATION

Minutes

SXGNRC5 Page 2 Revision 0

SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO SUMMARY

SCENARIO NRC 2

The scenario begins with the unit at 100% power. The letdown radiation monitor is OOS

and the terry turbine was returned to service last shift. 2-CC-P-1A is tagged out for seal

maintenance.

VCT Level transmitter 112 will fail high. The crew will respond in accordance with the AR

for VCT HI-LO LEVEL L-112, by placing 1-CH-LCV-1115A in manual and raising the output to

100% to stop diverting to the stripper. The crew should discuss the loss of the RWST swapover

on low level. Once the crew has stopped the VCT divert the next event can occur.

The high-level divert for the "A" HP heater drain tank will fail open. The "A" HP heater

drain pump will trip. The "B" Condensate pump will not start in auto, if required. Power will

increase due to the colder water entering the SGs. The crew will enter 1-AP-31, "Loss of Main

Feedwater," and start the standby Condensate pump along with 1-AP-38, "Excessive Load

Increase," to ramp the unit down slightly to reduce power to less than 100%. Rods will not step in

auto if required and will have to be operated in manual. An operator will report that the controller

was found to be loose, and level can be restored to within the normal band. The next event will

occur once the crew has stabilized the unit and restored the high-level divert.

The "A" pressurizer spray valve will fail open. The crew will enter 1-AP-44, "Loss of

Reactor Coolant System Pressure," and the RO will be required to use the remote close SOV in

order to close the spray valve. Once the crew has stabilized RCS pressure, the next event can

occur.

The main generator voltage regulator will fail and the crew will be expected to respond in

accordance with 1-AP-26, "Loss of Main Generator Voltage ControL" The BOP will turn off the

voltage regulator and control voltage using base adjust. After generator voltage has been brought

under control, the next event will occur.

A loss of 1H bus will occur. Due to a fault on the bus the 1H EDG output breaker will not

close to reenergize the bus. This will result in the High-Level Divert Valves failing open and a loss

of CC to the RCP thermal barriers. The crew will need to enter 1-AP-38, "Excessive Load

Increase," and ramp the unit to reduce reactor power. Reminder: Rods will not step in auto. As

time permits, the crew will enter 0-AP-10, "Loss of Electrical Power," to diagnose the power loss.

The crew will eventually be informed that the electricians will need a tagout in order to examine the

bus for damage. Once reactor power has been reduced to the previous power level, the next event

can occur.

A loss of the switchyard will occur as a result of problem on the grid. The 1J EDG will not

start in automatic. The crew will enter 1-ECA-0.0, "Loss of All AC," and will be able to restore the

11 bus using the attachment. They will be able to transition to 1-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety

Injection," and then to 1-ES-0.1, "Reactor Trip Response." At this time the 1H bus will be restored.

Once the crew has stabilized the unit and reenergized 1H bus, a leak will develop in the

Safeguards area. The crew will transition back to 1-E-0 and eventually to 1-ECA-1.2, "LOCA

Outside Containment," where they will isolate the leak. At this time the scenario can be terminated.

SXG NRC 5 Page 3 Revision 0

SCENARIO TURNOVER SHEET

Read the following to the crew:

Purpose: This examination is intended to evaluate the crew's perfonnance of various tasks

associated with the Licensed Operator Training Program. All activities should be

completed in accordance with approved operations standards.

1. You are on a day shift during the week.

2. When conditions allow, utilize the computer log systems as you would in the plant.

Unit Status:

Unit 1 is at 100% power. RCS boron is 978 ppm and core age is 9000 MWD/MTD. Aux steam is

on unit 1.

Unit 2 is at 100% power.

Equipment Status:

1-CH-RI-128, Letdown radiation monitor, is OOS. 1-FW-P-2 was returned to service last shift,

PMT was SAT. 2-CC-P-1A is tagged out for seal maintenance. Maintenance rule window is

green.

Shift Orders:

Maintain current plant conditions and support maintenance on 2-CC-P-1A.

SXGNRC5 Page 4 Revision 0

EVENT 1: Given that the. unit is at power and VCT level transmitter, l-CH-LT- 1112, has failed

hillh the crew will resoondin accordance with the aoolicable annunciator resoonse.

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SPD Verified: (Initials)

Annunciator C-A4 will illuminate

l-CH-LI-1112 will indicate off-scale high

l-CH-LCV-1112C output will go to zero

VCT level will decrease

"A" Stripper level will increase

RO identifies annunciator C-A4, VCT HI-

LO LEVEL L-112.

RO identifies LT-1112 is failed high and

VCT is diverting to stripper.

US reads note in AR about l-CH-LT-1115

failing high - loss of auto swapover

caoabilitv. full divert to striooer.

RO places l-CH-LCV-1112C in manual and

raises output to 100%.

US makes notifications about LT-1112

failure and requests instrument shop

assistance alonll with WR CR.

NOTE: The next event may occur once

the letdown divert valve has been closed,

or at the discretion of the lead evaluator.

(

SXGNRC5 Page 5 Revision 0

EVENT 2: Given that "A" HP heaterdraintank high-level divert has Jailed open, the crew will

be expected to respond in accordance with l-AP-31, "Loss of Main Feedwater," and l-AP-38,

"Excessive Load Increase."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SPD Verified: (Initials)

Annunciator Q-E3 illuminates

I-SD-P-IA trips as indicated by amber light lit

Reactor power increases

Main feed pump suction pressure decreases

l-CN-P-IB does not auto-start, if required

BOP identifies level decreasing in "A" HP

heater drain tanle

ND

Crew identifies annunciator Q-E3, 2 PT

HTR DR RECVR TK A HI-La LEVEL.

BOP identifies trip of I-SD-P-IA.

US directs entry into AP-31.

BOP verifies power> 70%.

BOP verifies 2 main feed pump running.

NOTE: Feed pump suction pressure

may initially be greater than 300 psig,

but it will be decreasin1!.

BOP checks main feed pump suction

pressure> 300 psig.

rd

BOP starts 3 condensate pump.

Crew identifies increase in reactor power.

US directs entry into AP-38.

RO verifies steam dumps closed.

BOP verifies SG PORVs indicate closed.

NOTE: Rods will not operate in auto if

required and will have to be stepped in

manual.

Crew ramps turbine down until power

indicates < 100%.

NOTE: pes will indicate opening of

several hi1!h-Ievel diverts.

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EVENT 2: Given that "A" HPheaterdrain tank high-level divert has failed open, the crew will

be expectedto respondinaccordance with l-AP-31, "Loss of Main Feedwater,"and 1-AP-3 8,

"Excessive Load* Increase."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

Watchstander is dispatched to investigate

cause for trip of "A" HP.

NOTE: Watchstander will report l-SD-

LCV-I07A was open with dial for

setpoint loose. Setpoint has now been

returned to normal.

US reports failures to WCC and requests

WK CR, and maintenance assistance.

NOTE: The next event will occur once

the unit is stable and 1-SD-LCV-I07A

has been isolated, or at the discretion of

the lead evaluator.

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EVENT 3: Given that the unit is at power and a PRZR spray valve has failed open, the crew will be

exoected to resoond in accordance with l-AP-44 "Loss of Reactor Coolant Pressure."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SPD Verified: (Initials)

PRZR spray valve l-RC-PCV-1455B has full open indication.

Master pressure controller output decreases.

PRZR pressure decreases.

Annunciators B-F7, B-H6 illuminate

RO identifies annunciator B-F7, PRZ HI-LO

PRESS.

RO identifies RCS pressure decreasing.

US directs crew to enter l-AP-44.

RO monitors RCS pressure greater than

1870 psig.

RO checks PRZRPORVs closed.

RO checks master pressure controller not

failed.

RO checks spray valves closed. (NO)

NOTE: Valve cannot be manually closed.

Crew must use SOV.

Crew stops RCS pressure decrease:

.

RO verifies all PRZR heaters are energized.

RO checks that aux spray valve is closed.

RO checks PRZR safety valves closed.

RO verifies RCS pressure stable or

increasing.

RO verifies RCS pressure returned to

normal.

RO adjusts sprays and heaters, as required,

to maintain normal pressure.

US refers to DNB 3.4.1, Action A (2 hour2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ),

if pressure went below 2205 psig.

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EVENT3 : Giventhattheullitis at power and a PRZR.spray valve has failed open, the crew will be

exoected to resoondinaccordance withl-AP-44. "Loss of Reactor Coolant Pressure."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

US requests Work Control Center

supervisor to infonn the OMOC of the

failure and initiate WR and CR.

NOTE: The next event will occur after

the crew has returned ReS pressure to

normal, or at the direction of the lead

evaluator.

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EVENT 4: Given that the unit is at power, and the main generator voltage regulator has failed, the

crew will be expected to respond in accordance with l-AP-26, "Loss of Main Generator Voltage

Control."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SPD Verified: (Initials)

Annunciators K-B4 and K-C7, and K-CI illuminate

Generator output voltage increases

BOP identifies annunciator K-B4,

EXCITER FIELD FORCING.

US directs entry into l-AP-26.

BOP identifies generator output voltage

and MYARS increasing with MW stable.

BOP places voltage regulator control

switch to OFF.

Crew notifies system operator.

US requests Work Control Center

supervisor to inform the OMOC of the

failure and to initiate WR and CR.

NOTE: The next event will occur after

the crew has stabilized the plant, or at

the direction of the lead evaluator.

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EVENT 5: Given thatalossof IH emergency bus has occurred at power, the crew will respond

in accordance with l-AP-38, "Excessive Load Increase," and O-AP-l 0, "Loss of Electrical

Power."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SPD Verified: (Initials)

Various annunciators light indicating a loss of IH bus including: C-Cl/2/3/4, F-C7, H-F5

IH diesel is running, but not loaded onto bus

Breakers 15Hll and 15F3 are open

IH emergency bus has no voltage

lA semi-vital bus has not voltage

Reactor power is increasing

Crews identifies various annunciators

which indicate a loss of the IH emergency

bus.

NOTE: Entry into AP-38 will be

required due to high-level divert valves

failiD!! ODen.

US directs entry intol-AP-38.

Crew checks steam dumps closed.

Crew checks SG PORVs closed.

Crew verifies main turbine load turbine load

normal and reactor power is < 100% and

stable.

BOP ramps the turbine to return power to

the power level before the event started.

RO inserts rods to maintain RCS

temperature.

Crew checks turbine load control:

Reactor power reduced to the power

level before the event started

Load control in IMP-IN

Places turbine in IMP-IN if reauired.

Crew checks that plant is stable:

Main Generator output stable

Tave on program (RO inserts rods or

borates, as required.)

Steam flow indications normal

Turbine in Onerator Auto.

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EVENT 5: Given that a loss of lH emergency bus has occurred at power, the crew will respond

in accordance with l-AP-38, "Excessive Load Increase," and O-AP-lO, "Loss of Electrical

Power."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

Crew checks plant steam systems:

PORVs

Safeties

MSR inlets

ASPCV.

US directs entry into O-AP-lO, as manpower

permits.

Crew reviews annunciators and notes that

there is no thermal barrier flow. U-l RMs,

MGPIs, and N-16s are deenergized. Also,

the in-service BATP is deenemized.

US makes report of conditions to WCC

and requests assistance, WR CR.

US reviews tech spec 3.8.lA.

NOTE: Crew will eventually be

informed that there is an overcurrent

drop on 15Hll and the electricians will

need 15H2 to placed in PTL so they can

examine the bus for dama!!e.

NOTE: Once US has reviewed TS the

next event can occur.

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EVENT 6: Given that with the unit at power and both emergency busses have been lost, the crew

will be ex ected to res ond in accordance with I-ECA-O.O "Loss of All AC Power."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SPD Verified: (Initials)

A loss of switchyard occurs

1J EDG does not start

Crew identifies a loss of the switchyard.

Crew recognizes a loss of the "J" 4160V

emer enc bus.

US directs the crew to enter ECA-O.O.

RO verifies reactor trip.

BOP verifies turbine trip.

Crew verifies all RCPs are stopped.

Crew restores power to any AC

Emergency bus.

Crew verifies Emergency Diesel

running. (NO)

Crew checks RCP seal water outlet

temperatures.

Crew performs RCS isolation:

RO verifies PZR PORVs closed.

RO verifies Letdown isolation valves

closed.

RO verifies Excess Letdown isolation

valves closed.

RO closes RHR to Letdown isolation

valve.

BOP verifies RCS sample valves

closed

BOP verifies RCS Head vents closed.

BOP verifies PZR vent valves closed.

Crew verifies AFW flow.

Crew verifies no fire in emergency

switch ear.

Crew verifies power restored to an

emer enc bus.

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EVENT 6: Given that with the unit at power and both emergency busses have been lost, the crew

will be exnected to resnond in accordance with l-ECA-O.O "Loss of All AC Power."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

US directs crew to transition to E-O.

Crew verifies reactor and turbine trips.

Crew verifies one emergency bus energized.

Crew checks that no SI has occurred, or is

required.

US directs transition to l-ES-O.1.

Crew checks RCS average temperature

trending to expected value.

Crew throttles AFW, as required.

NOTE: During this time, VCT level will

be decreasing. An auto makeup will

commence, but there will be no boric acid

flow. Crew should also discuss the fact

that there will be no auto-swap to the

RWST.

Crew checks feedwater status:

RCS temperature

MFRVs

AFWpumps

AFWflow.

NOTE: At this time the crew will be

informed that a relay problem caused the

loss of the IH bus. At this time, if

desired, the crew can reenergize the bus

by taking the EDG output breaker out of

PTL.

Crew checks SG levels.

Crew verifies charging in service.

NOTE: Once power has been restored to

the IH bus, the next event can be

inserted.

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( EYENT7:Withthe unit stabilizedin l-ES-O.1, "ReactorTripResponse," and indications exist ofa

SBLOCA outside containment, the crew will respond in accordance with "l-E-O, "Reactor Trip or

Safety Inlection,"and l-ECA-l.2 "LOCAOutside Containment."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SPD Verified: (Initials)

Annunciators A-Cl, E-F8, then A-C4 illuminate

RCS pressure and pressurizer level decrease

Charging flow increases, when required

Vent stack "B" radiation increases to alarm setpoint

Crew continues in ES-O.l.

Crew checks pressurizer level control.

Crew checks pressurizer pressure control.

Crew identifies annunciator A-Cl, SFGDS

AREA SUMP HIIHI-HILEVEL.

RO identifies charging flow increasing and

PRZR level decreasing.

NOTE: Crew may not enter AP-16.

US directs entry into l-AP-16.

NOTE: If crew dispatches an operator

to check the safeguards building, the

operator will report that the door is hot

and steam is issuing from around the

door seals.

Crew verifies unit in mode 3.

RO verifies primary parameters under

operator control. (NO)

RO isolates letdown and maximizes

charging flow.

RO commences a VCT makeup from the

blender.

RO informs US that PRZR level is still

decreasing.

Crew identifies Vent Stack "B" high

radiation alarm.

Crew identifies annunciator A-C4, AREA

AMBIENT AIR TEMP HIGH.

Crew identifies high temperature in U-l

SFGDS.

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EVENT 7: With the unit stabilized inl-ES-O.l, "ReactorTripResponse:'and indications exist of a

SBLOCA outside containment, thecre\Vwill respond in accordance with" l-E-O, "Reactor Trip or

Safety In'ection "and l-ECA-1.2 "LOCAOutside Containment."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

US directs crew to manually initiate SI and E-O

return to 1-E-O.

RO/BOP manually initiate S1.

Crew verifies 1-E-O immediate operator

actions.

NOTE: The crew may hold a brief and

perform actions in l-ECA-1.2 before the

nrocedure transition.

BOP verifies feedwater isolation:

MFRVs closed

MFRBVs closed

Main feed MOVs closed

Standby MFP placed in PTL

Main feed pumps tripped

MFP discharge MOVS closed

SG BD TVs closed.

RO/BOP manually initiate phase "A".

Crew initiates attachment for phase "A"

isolation.

BOP verifies AFW pumps running.

Crew verifies SI pumps running.

BOP verifies SW pumps running.

Crew checks if MS should be isolated.

(NO)

Crew verifies SI flow.

BOP verifies AFW flow.

RO checks RCS Tave stable at or trending

to 547°F.

RO checks PRZR PORVs and spray

valves.

RO checks RCP trip and charging pump

recirc criteria.

BOP checks SGs not faulted. (YES)

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EVENT 7: .With the unit stabilized in l-ES-O.l.I'Reactor TripResponse," and indications exist of a

SBLOCAoutsidecontairunent, the crewwillrespondin accordance with "1-E-O, "Reactor Trip or

Safe In'ection "and 1..ECA-l,2 "LOCA Outside Containment."

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

BOP checks SGs not ruptured. (YES)

Crew checks ifRCS is intact inside

containment. YES

Crew checks for outside containment

invento loss. YES

US directs crew to transition to 1-ECA-1.2.

BOP verifies LHSI pump hot-leg valves

closed.

BOP verifies SI accumulator sample valves

closed.

Crew isolates LOCA outside

containment.

BOP closes LHSI pump discharge

valves.

RO checks RCS pressure increasing. (YES)

US directs crew to transition to 1-E-1.

NOTE: The scenario may be terminated

after the crew isolates the leak, or as

directed b the lead evaluator.

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REFERENCES

PROCEDURE REV.

Abnormal Procedure l-AP-31, "Loss of Main Feedwater." 4

Abnormal Procedure l-AP-44, "Loss of Reactor Coolant System Pressure." 19

Abnormal Procedure l-AP-26, "Failure of Main Generator Voltage Regulator 9

High."

Abnormal Procedure l-AP-38, "Excessive Load Increase." 14

Abnormal Procedure O-AP-lO, "Loss of Electrical Power." 59

Abnormal Procedure l-AP-16, "Increasing Primary Plant Leakage." 25

Maintenance Operating Procedure I-MOP-6.70, "1-EE-SW-IH, 4160-Volt 31

Emenlencv Bus."

Emergency Contingency Action l-ECA-O.O, "Loss of All AC." 21

Emergency Procedure l-E-O, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection." 36

Emergency Procedure l-ES-O.l, "Reactor Trip Response." 26

Emergency Contingency Action 1-ECA-1.2, "LOCA Outside Containment." 6

Station Annunciator Response Procedures. N/A

Guide and Reference Document PI-AA-5000, "Human Performance." 1

INPO, Guideline for Teamwork and Diagnostic Skill Development: INPO 88-003, Jan. 1988

INPO, ACAD 07-002 Simulator Training Guidelines Jan. 2007

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ATTACHMENTS

AITACHMENT 1 - SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM

AITACHMENT 2 - SCENARIO PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

AITACHMENT 3 - SIMULATOR PERFORMANCE DATASHEET (Last page of scenario) *

(

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ATTACHMENT 1

SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM

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SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM

SXGNRC5

Injtjal conditions

1. Recall IC 165

2. Ensure Tave, Tref, PDrr level, and VCT level are selected on trend recorders.

3. Place a WR magnet on l-CH-RI-128.

4. Rackout breaker for 2-CC-P-IA and verify 2-CC-P-IB running. Close U2_CC_ll, U2_CC_4.

PRELOADS PRIOR TO SCENARIO START

CONDITION MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDEIETC.

Letdown rad monitor failure Malfunction:

RM0207, Severity =-1

Rods will not move in auto Malfunction:

RD14

"B" Condensate pump will Switch override:

not auto-start CNPIB ASTOP = OFF

1J EDG does not start in Switch override:

auto-remote EG 11- AUTO- REMOTE = OFF

Train "B" of Phase A does Malfunction:

not function with SI S11304

Set up triggers to delete this malfunction when the manual switches

are used.

Trigger 10

PHASEA- ISOI - INIT=1 .OR. PHASEA- IS02- INIT=1

DMF S11304

(

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SCENARIO EVENTS

EVENT MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/COMMUNICATrONS

1) l-CH-LT-1112 fails high Malfunction:

CH1201, Delay time = 5, Ramp = 10, Severity = 1, Trigger = 1

NOTE: The next event may occur once the letdown divert

valve has been closed, or at the discretion of the lead

evaluator.

2) High level divert for 1- Remote function:

SD-TK-IA fails open SDLCVI07A_SETPT, Delay time = 5, Value = 0, Ramp = 5,

Trigger = 2

NOTE: When dispatched, wait 5 minutes and slowly increase

setpoint to stabilize drain tank level. Report I-SD-LCV-I07A

was open with dial for setpoint loose. Setpoint has now been

returned to normal.

NOTE: The next event will occur once the unit is stable and

I-SD-LCV-I07A has been returned to normal, or at the

discretion of the lead evaluator.

3) "B" spray valve fails open Malfunction:

RC2002, Delay time = 5, Value = True, Trigger = 3

NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew has returned

RCS pressure to normal, or at the direction of the lead

evaluator.

4) VR failure Malfunction:

EL09, Delay time = 5, Ramp = 35, Severity = 50, Trigger = 4

NOTE: If called, can report that no abnormalities can be seen

at the VR panel.

NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew stabilizes the

plant, or as directed by the lead evaluator.

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EVENT MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/COMMUNICATIONS

( 5) Loss of 1H emergency bus Malfunction:

EL1901, Delay time = 5, Value = True, Trigger = 5

NOTE: Once electricians have been dispatched wait about 10

minutes and then inform the crew that there is an overcurrent

drop on 15Hll and the electricians need to have 15H2 placed

in PTL while they examine the bus for damage.

NOTE: Once the unit has been stabilized and the US has

reviewed TS, the next event can occur.

6) Loss of off-site power Malfunction:

with failure of 11 EDG to EL01, Delay time = 5, Value = True, Trigger = 6

start

NOTE: If dispatched, can report that IJ EDG looks normal.

NOTE: Once the crew has performed some actions in l-ES-O.l,

the IH bus can be reenergized as follows:

Delete malfunction EL1901

Report to crew that a faulty relay caused to bus loss

Inform crew that 15H2 can be taken out of PTL, this should

allow it to close and reenergize the bus.

NOTE: Once power has been restored to the IH bus the next

event can occur.

7) LOCA outside Malfunction:

containment S1116, Delay time = 5, Ramp = 120, Severity = 50, Trigger = 7

NOTE: Verify pressurizer pressure continues to decrease. If

not, then increase leak size as necessary.

NOTE: If sent to Safeguards, report that door is hot. If leak

has already been isolated can report that there was a loud

noise, but it has not stopped.

NOTE: The scenario may be terminated after the crew isolates

the leak, or as directed by the lead evaluator.

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ATTACHMENT 2

SCENARIO PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

(

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SIMULATOR REQUALIFICATION EXAMINATION

TERMINAl, PERFORMANCE OB IECTNE

Given equipment failures and operational situations, operate the plant in accordance with

Technical Specifications to bring the unit to a safe condition, using applicable procedures,

and applying effective teamwork, communication, and diagnostic skills.

GENERIC PERFORMANCE OBIECTIVES

A. During shift operations the shift manager will take a conservative course of action,

especially when uncertain conditions exist, when dealing with core cooling or heat sink

availability, primary system and containment integrity, and reactivity control associated

with plant evolutions.

B. During shift operations the shift manager will provide overall crew guidance by prioritizing

and integrating the actions of the shift crew in accordance with administrative procedures.

C. During shift operations each crew member will participate in a team effort that resolves

conflicts, provides input into the team decision and communicates all the necessary

information to enhance teamwork in accordance with administrative procedures.

D. During shift operations the Shift Technical Advisor will independently assess events and

based on those assessments make recommendations to the crew regarding mitigation

strategy.

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EVENT 1 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

EVENT GOAL; Given that the unit is at power and VCT level transmitter, 1-CH-LT- 1112,

has failed high, the crew will respond in accordance with the applicable

annunciator response.

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS;

NA

CRITICAL TASK;

N/A

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EVENT 2 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

EVENT GOAL: Given that "A" HP heater drain tank high-level divert has failed open, the

crew will be expected to respond in accordance with l-AP-31, "Loss of

Main Feedwater," and l-AP-38, "Excessive Load Increase."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R781 Respond to a loss of main feedwater.

R539 Perform the immediate operator actions in response to an excessive load increase.

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A

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EVENT 3 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power and a PRZR spray valve has failed open, the

crew will be expected to respond in accordance with l-AP-44, "Loss of

Reactor Coolant Pressure."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R634 Respond to a loss of Reactor Coolant System pressure

CRITICAL TASK:

See next page

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( CT Statement*

Crew stops RCS pressure decrease.

Safety Significance'

Failure to close the RCS spray valve under the postulated plant conditions constitutes

"mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to degradation of any barrier to

fission product release." In this case, DNBR is reduced. Therefore, failure to close the

spray valve represents a "demonstrated inability by the crew to take an action or

combination of actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety."

Valid indication of pressure decreasing by the presence of various annunciators, indication

ofRCS spray valve open, and RCS pressure indication decreasing and procedurally directed

by I-AP-44.

Perfonnance Indicator

RO places REMOTE CLOSE SOV in CLOSE for associated spray

Feedback"

RCS pressure decrease stopped.

WOG Reference'

N/A

Conditions'

Prior to reaching an automatic reactor trip on low pressure.

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EVENT 4 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

C'

Given that the unit is at power, and the main generator voltage regulator has

failed, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with l-AP-26,

"Loss of Main Generator Voltage Control."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R675 Respond to a failure of main generator voltage regulator high.

CRITICAl, TASK:

N/A

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EVENT 5 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

EVENT GOAL: Given that a loss of lH emergency bus has occurred at power, the crew

will respond in accordance with 1-AP-38, "Excessive Load Increase," and

O-AP-10, "Loss of Electrical Power."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R539 Perform the immediate operator actions in response to an excessive load increase.

CRITICAL TASK:

NIA

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EVENT 6 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

Given that with the unit at power and both emergency busses have been lost,

the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-ECA-0.0, "Loss

of All AC Power."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

N1561 Re-start an emergency diesel generator with an emergency start signal present.

R214 Perform the immediate operator actions in response to a loss of all AC power.

CRITICAL TASK:

See Next Page

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CT Statement*

Crew restores power to any AC Emergency bus.

Safety Significance'

Failure to energize an ac emergency bus constitutes "mis-operation or incorrect crew

performance which leads to degraded...emergency power capacity." Failure to perform the

critical task also results in needless degradation of a barrier to fission product release,

specifically of the RCS barrier at the point of the RCP seals. Additionally, failure to

perform the critical task results in the unnecessary continuation of a situation in which RCS

inventory is being lost uncontrollably and cannot be replaced. This situation is equivalent to

"mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to degraded ECCS...capacity" at

a time when a small-break LOCA is in progress.

Indication of loss of both 4160V emergency buses.

No voltage indicated on emergency buses.

Loss of various emergency equipment.

Numerous annunciators.

Perfonnance Indicator

Crew manually starts"J" EDG

Feedback

Indication of Voltage indicated on the "J" 4160 emergency bus.

WOG Reference'

E-O - Background

Conditions'

To be performed prior to depressurizing all intact SGs.

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EVENT 7 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

(

EVENT GOAl,: With the unit stabilized in l-ES-O.1, "Reactor Trip Response," and

indications exist of a SBLOCA outside containment, the crew will respond

in accordance with "l-E-O, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and 1-ECA-

1.2, "LOCA Outside Containment."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R520 Respond to increasing primary plant leakage.

R761 Respond to a LOCA outside containment.

CRITICAL TASK:

See next page

SXGNRC5 Page 34 Revision 0

CT Statement*

Crew isolates LOCA outside containment.

Safety Significance'

Failure to isolate a LOCA outside containment (that can be isolated) degrades containment

integrity beyond the level of degradation irreparably by the postulated conditions. It also

constitutes a "mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to degradation of a

barrier to fission product release" and eventually "to degraded ECCS capacity.

Indication/annunciation that SI is actuated and is required

AND

Indication and/or annunciation of abnormally high temperature in the safeguards building

AND

Indication and/or annunciation of abnormally high sump level in the safeguards building

Perfonnance Indicator

BOP closes LHSI pump Cold Leg Injection valves.

I-SI-MOV-1890C

I-SI-MOV-1890D

Feedback-

RCS pressure increasing.

WOG Reference'

ECA-1.2 - Background Document

Conditions'

When directed by procedure.

(

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ATTACHMENT 3

S~LATORPERFORMANCEDATASHEET

Scenario Performance Datasheet

EVENT 1: Given that the unit is at power and VCT level transmitter, 1-CH-LT- 1112, has failed

high, the crew will respond in accordance with the applicable annunciator response.

SPD Verified: (Initials)

Annunciator C-A4 will illuminate

1-CH-LI-1112 will indicate off-scale high

1-CH-LCV-1112C output will go to zero

VCT level will decrease

"A" Stripper level will increase

EVENT 2: Given that "A" HPheater drain tank high-level divert has failed open, the crew will

be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-31, "Loss of Main Feedwater," and 1-AP-38,

"Excessive Load Increase."

SPD Verified: (Initials)

Annunciator Q-E3 illuminates

1-SD-P-1A trips as indicated by amber light lit

Reactor power increases

Main feed pump suction pressure decreases

1-CN-P-1B does not auto-start, if required

EVENT 3: Given that the unit is at power and a PRZR spray valve has failed open, the crew will be

expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-44, "Loss of Reactor Coolant Pressure."

SPD Verified: (Initials)

PRZR spray valve 1-RC-PCV-1455B has full open indication.

Master pressure controller output decreases.

PRZR pressure decreases.

Annunciators B-F7, B-H6 illuminate

EVENT 4: Given thatthe unitis atpower,and the main generator voltage regulator has failed, the

crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-26, "Loss of Main Generator Voltage

Control."

SPD Verified: (Initials)

Annunciators K-B4 and K-C7, and K-C1 illuminate

Generator output voltage increases

SXGNRC 5 Date - - - - Revision 0

EVENT 5: Given that a loss of IH emergency bus has occurred at power, the crew will respond

in accordance with l-AP-38, "Excessive Load Increase," and O-AP-IO, "Loss of Electrical

Power."

SPD Verified: (Initials)

Various annunciators light indicating a loss of IH bus including: C-Cl/2/3/4, F-C7, H-F5

IH diesel is running, but not loaded onto bus

Breakers 15Hll and 15F3 are open

IH emergency bus has no voltage

IA semi-vital bus has not voltage

Reactor power is increasing

E VENT6: Giventhatwith the unit at power and both emergencybusses have been lost, the crew

will be expected to respond in accordance with I-ECA-O.O, "Loss of All AC PoweL"

SPD Verified: (Initials)

A loss of switchyard occurs

IJ EDG does not start

EVENT7: With the unit stabilized in I-fS-O.1,"Reactor Trip Response,"iand indicationsexistof a

SBLOCAoutside containment, the cre>>,willrespond in accordance with "l-E-O, "Reactor Trip or

SafetvIniection,".and l-ECA-I.2"LOCA Outside Containment."

SPD Verified: (Initials)

Annunciators A-CI, E-F8, then A-C4 illuminate

RCS pressure and pressurizer level decrease

Charging flow increases, when required

Vent stack "B" radiation increases to alarm setpoint

SXGNRC 5 Date - - - - Revision °

ML082381133

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