ML13210A034

R.E. Ginna, Supplemental Response to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Request for Recommendation 2.3, Seismic Information

ML13210A034
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	07/25/2013
From:	Korsnick M G Constellation Energy Nuclear Group, EDF Group, Ginna
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
Download: ML13210A034 (35)

Text

Mary G. KorsnickChief Nuclear OfficerSVP -Chief Operations OfficerCENG.a loint venture ofConset 1. 6eafOffice 410-470-5133 Fax 443-213-6739 E-mail: Maria.Korsnick@cengllc.com July 25, 2013U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 11555 Rockville PikeRockville, MD 20852ATTENTION:

SUBJECT:

Document Control DeskR.E. Ginna Nuclear Power PlantRenewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-1 8Docket No.50-244Supplemental Response to 10 CFR 50.54(f)

Request forRecommendation 2.3, SeismicInformation,

REFERENCES:

(a) Letter from E. J. Leeds (NRC) and M. R. Johnson (NRC) to All PowerReactor Licensees and Holders of Construction Permits in Active orDeferred Status, dated March 12, 2012, Request for Information Pursuant toTitle 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f)

Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review ofInsights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi

Accident, MLI2073A348 (b) Letter from M. G. Korsnick (CENG) to Document Control Desk (NRC),dated November 27, 2012, Response to 10 CFR 50.54(f)

Request forInformation, Recommendation 2.3, Seismic(c) Letter from J. A. Spina (CENG) to Document Control Desk (NRC), datedDecember 21, 2012, Supplemental Response to 10 CFR 50.54(f)

Request forInformation, Recommendation 2.3, Seismic, ML 12362A448, ML12362A451, and ML12362A452 (d) Memo from L. M. Regner (NRC) to M. A. Mitchell (NRC), dated June 5,2013, Summary of the May 7, 2013, Public Conference Call on the DelayedInspection Items Associated with Japan Lessons Learned Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.3, Seismic Walkdowns, ML13136A003 On March 12, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Reference (a) to all powerreactor licensees.

The NRC letter requests further information from addressees to support the evaluation of NRC Staff Recommendation 2.3: Seismic from the Near-Term Task Force review of the accident atthe Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear facility.

Constellation Energy Nuclear Group, LLC100 Constellation Way, Suite 200C, Baltimore, MD 21202Aýmf Document Control DeskJuly 25, 2013Page 2Reference (b) is the R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, LLC (Ginna) response to the request inReference (a). In that response a regulatory commitment was made to submit an updated walkdownreport in December 2012. Reference (c) closed that Regulatory Commitment.

As stated in Appendix E of Attachment (1) of Reference (c), Ginna completed walkdowns for all SeismicWalkdown Equipment List (SWEL) I items except for four electrical components that required specificmaintenance configurations to complete the internal inspections.

Table E-1 of Reference (c) summarized the four remaining electrical components subject to supplemental internal inspections.

Two Regulatory Commitments were made in Reference (c) to submit the seismic walkdown results of thesupplemental internal inspections.

This letter closes the first Regulatory Commitment by providing theseismic walkdown results for the supplemental internal inspections of Diesel Generator A Exciter Cabinet(DGAEC) and FOXBORO Instrument Rack Diesel Generator KDGO 1 A Day Tank Level (FOXDGA 1).Two more components (480 VAC Motor Control Center C (MCCC) and Bus 14 480 VAC Power(BUS 14)) remain to be inspected in conjunction with maintenance as described in the second Regulatory Commitment of Reference (c).In response to Reference (d), we are revising the second Regulatory Commitment in Reference (c) tosubmit the seismic walkdown results for the supplemental internal inspections of MCCC and BUS 14 byJuly 31, 2014. This is 18 months sooner than committed to in Reference (c). MCCC and BUS14 willnow be inspected during our next refueling outage, which is scheduled for Spring 2014. Since theremaining walkdown items will be completed by the next scheduled refueling outage, the otherinformation requested by Reference (d) is not applicable to Ginna.Attachment (1) to this submittal is the seismic walkdown results for the supplemental internal inspections of DGAEC and FOXDGA I.This letter contains a regulatory commitment as listed in Attachment (2).If there are any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Everett (Chip) Perkinseverett.perkins(acengllc.com at 410-470-3928.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on July 25, 2013.Sincerely, Mary G. KrncMGK/STDAttachments:

(1) Supplemental Seismic Walkdown Report(2) Regulatory Commitments Contained in this Correspondence cc: B. K. Vaidya, NRC W. M. Dean, NRCM. C. Thadani, NRC Resident Inspector, GinnaN. S. Morgan, NRC ATTACHMENT (1)SUPPLEMENTAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORTConstellation Energy Nuclear Group, LLCJuly 25, 2013 ATTACHMENT 1SUPPLEMENTAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORTTable of ContentsL ist o f T ab le s .........................................................................................................

iExecutive Summary .................................................................................................

iiI Personnel Qualifications

................................................................................................

1-11 .1 O v erv iew ................................................................................................................

1 -11.2 W alkdown Personnel

................................................................................................

1-12 Selection of SSCs ..............................................................................................................

2-12 .1 O v erv iew ................................................................................................................

2 -13 Seismic Walkdown Internal Inspections

.........................................................................

3-13 .1 O v erv iew ................................................................................................................

3 -13.2 Electrical Cabinet Internal Inspections

........................................................................

3-13.3 Status of Items Previously Entered into the CAP ..........................................................

3-24 Licensing Basis Evaluations

..............................................................................................

4-15 Peer Review .....................................................................................................................

5-15.1 Peer Review Introduction

..........................................................................................

5-15.2 Review of checklist

..................................................................................................

5-15.3 Review of licensing basis evaluations

.........................................................................

5-25.4 Peer Review Team Process Summary .........................................................................

5-25.5 Review of final submittal Report & Sign-off

...............................................................

5-26 References

.......................................................................................................................

6-IA SWC'sfor Supplemental Internal Inspections of Electrical Cabinets

...............................

A-1 ATTACHMENT (1)SUPPLEMENTAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORTList of TablesTable 1-1. Personnel Included in NTTF 2.3 Supplemental Walkdown

...............................

Page 1-1Table 3-1. Table of Potentially

Degraded, Nonconforming or Unanalyzed Conditions forSupplemental Internal Inspection of Electrical Equipment

.............................

Page 3-3Table 3-2. Status of Open Corrective Action Program Items Identified in References I and 2.. Page 3-4Table 5-1. Table of Peer Review Comments for SW C's ..............................................

Page 5-1Table A-I. Summary of Supplemental Internal Inspections Completed by Ginna .................

Page A-I ATTACHMENT (1)SUPPLEMENTAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORTExecutive SummaryThis Supplemental Seismic Walkdown Report documents two internal inspections of electrical cabinetsperformed at R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant (Ginna) for components that were not accessible during theinitial and supplemental walkdowns and were not included in the Response to 10 CFR 50.54(f)

Requestfor Information, Recommendation 2.3, Seismic [Reference 1] or the Supplemental Response to 10 CFR50.54(f)

Request for Information, Recommendation 2.3, Seismic [Reference 2]. These two internalinspections did not identify any adverse seismic conditions that required licensing basis evaluations.

Oneissue for a potentially missing fastener was entered into the station's corrective action program.Two (2) Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL) electrical components (480 VAC Motor ControlCenter C (MCCC) and Bus 14 480 VAC Power (BUSI4))

remain deferred as described in the secondRegulatory Commitment of Reference 2, as they require specific maintenance configurations for theinternal inspections.

In response to Reference 5 we are revising the second Regulatory Commitment inReference 2 to submit the seismic walkdown results for the supplemental internal inspections of MCCCand BUS 14 by July 31, 2014. This is 18 months sooner than committed to in Reference

2. MCCC andBUS14 will now be inspected during our next refueling outage, which is scheduled for Spring 2014.Since the remaining walkdown items will be completed by the next scheduled refueling outage, the otherinformation requested by Reference 5 is not applicable to Ginna.EPRI Technical Report 1025286 [Reference 3] was used to perform the engineering walkdowns andevaluations described in this report. In accordance with Reference 3, the following topics are addressed in the subsequent sections of this report.* Personnel Qualifications

• Selection of Systems, Structures, and Components (SSCs)* Seismic Walkdowns

• Seismic Licensing Basis Evaluations

• Peer ReviewPersonnel Qualifications Personnel qualifications are discussed in Section 1 of this report. The personnel who performed the keyactivities required to fulfill the objectives and requirements of the 50.54(f) letter are qualified and trainedas required in Reference

3. These personnel were responsible for:* Performing the Seismic Walkdowns,

• Performing the seismic licensing basis evaluations, as applicable,

• Performing the peer reviewsSelection of SSCsThe selection of SSCs was completed and documented within References I and 2.ii ATTACHMENT (1)SUPPLEMENTAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORTSeismic Walkdowns Section 3 of this report documents the supplemental seismic walkdown internal inspections of electrical cabinets.

The supplemental seismic walkdown internal inspections for Ginna were performed during thefirst half of 2013. The walkdown team consisted of two Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWE) from thestation's Design Engineering group. Operations/Maintenance personnel were also available and calledupon as needed.The seismic walkdowns documented within this report focused primarily on the internal inspection ofelectrical components.

Seismic Walkdown Checklists (SWCs) were completed for the components thatwere inspected.

During the internal inspections there were no adverse seismic conditions discovered that challenged thelicensing basis for the plant. No formal Licensing Basis Evaluations were performed.

Under this supplemental inspection One (1) Condition Report (CR) was issued to address a potentially missing fastener.

This issue was identified in the Seismic Walkdown Checklists (SWCs) of this report.Disposition of the identified issue was completed within the station's corrective action process.The status of previously identified issues that were entered into the Corrective Action Program (CAP) inReferences I and 2 (with outstanding actions) is updated in Section 3.Seismic Licensing Basis Evaluations Reference 3, Section 5: Seismic Licensing Basis Evaluation provides a detailed process to perform anddocument seismic licensing basis evaluations of SSCs when potentially adverse seismic conditions areidentified during the equipment Seismic Walkdowns.

The process provides a means to identify, evaluateand document how the identified potentially adverse seismic condition meets a station's seismic licensing basis without entering the condition into a station's CAP. Further, the process directs that if a condition cannot be readily shown to meet the seismic licensing basis, then the identified condition should beentered into the station's CAP where it will be determined that the condition does or does not meet theseismic licensing basis.Constellation Energy Group/Ginna staff did not utilize the process provided in Reference 3 to performand document seismic licensing bases evaluations of SSCs with potentially adverse seismic condition.

Instead, all questionable conditions identified by the SWEs during the equipment Seismic Walkdowns were entered into the station CAP to be further evaluated and addressed as required.

Therefore, noseismic licensing basis evaluations were completed in accordance with the process documented inReference 3, Section 5: Seismic Licensing Basis Evaluation.

Table 3-1 of Section 3 of this report lists thecondition identified during the Seismic Walkdowns.

iii ATTACHMENT (1)SUPPLEMENTAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORTPeer ReviewsA peer review team consisting of two qualified individuals, one of whom has seismic engineering experience as it applies to nuclear power plants, was assembled and peer reviews were performed inaccordance with Reference 3, Section 6: Peer Reviews.

The Peer Review process included the following activities:

• Review of the SWCs* Review of Licensing basis evaluations, as applicable

• Review of the decisions for entering the potentially adverse conditions into the CAPprocess* Review of the submittal report* Provide a summary report of the peer review process in the submittal reportSection 5 of this report contains the Peer Review summary report. The Peer Review determined that theobjectives and requirements of the 50.54(f) letter [Reference 4] are met. Further, the efforts completed and documented within this report are in accordance with Reference 3.SummaryIn summary, the supplemental seismic walkdown internal inspections were performed in accordance withthe NRC-endorsed walkdown methodology.

All potentially

degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions identified as a result of the seismic walkdowns have been entered into the corrective actionprogram to be addressed.

iv ATTACHMENT (1)SUPPLEMENTAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORTIPersonnel Qualifications 1.1 OVERVIEWThis section of the report identifies the personnel that participated in the supplemental inspections for theNTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown effort. A description of the responsibilities of each Seismic Walkdownparticipant's role(s) is provided in Section 2 of Reference

3. Note that for this report the only rolesrequired were for the walkdown team, licensing basis reviewer, and peer reviewer.

Personnel responsible for equipment selection and IPEEE review are noted within Section 3 of Reference 1.1.2 WALKDOWN PERSONNEL Table 1-1 below summarizes the names and corresponding roles of personnel who participated in thisNTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown effort. These are the same personnel with the corresponding roles asprovided in Reference

2. A short synopsis of each individual's qualifications is provided in Reference 2.Table 1-1 Personnel Included in NTTF 2.3 Supplemental WalkdownPersonnel

."Mr. Jeffrey Gardiner x xMr. Francis Peterson x xMr. Mark Fitzsimmons XMr. John Traynor xNotes:I.Peer Review Team Leader.1-1 ATTACHMENT (1)SUPPLEMENTAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT2Selection of SSCs2.1 OVERVIEWSelection of SSCs was completed and documented within References 1 and 2.2-1 ATTACHMENT (1)SUPPLEMENTAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT3Seismic Walkdown Internal Inspections 3.1 OVERVIEWSeismic Walkdown Internal Inspections were conducted by a two-person team of Seismic WalkdownEngineers trained in accordance with Reference

3. Each engineer has completed the 5-day SQUGWalkdown Training course, a recognized equivalent to the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown TrainingCourse per Section 2 of Reference 3.3.2 ELECTRICAL CABINET INTERNAL INSPECTIONS The initial walkdowns at Ginna were completed prior to NRC direction to perform internal inspections ofelectrical cabinets.

During this supplemental inspection Ginna personnel opened and inspected electrical cabinets DGAEC and FOXDGA 1.3.2.1 Supplemental Internal Inspection Checklists Supplemental internal inspections of the electrical cabinets are documented with Appendix A of thisreport. These internal inspections concentrated on adverse internal mounting and missing fasteners.

Table 3-1 lists the issue identified during the supplemental internal inspections.

The SWCs are denoted to identify that anchorage inspection and interaction effects were documented under previous seismic walkdowns.

To avoid conflict, the checklists identify criteria that have alreadybeen evaluated under the previous walkdowns submitted within Reference 1.The supplemental internal inspections were performed during maintenance activities.

Digitalphotography was utilized to document internal cabinet conditions.

All photographs taken were reviewedby the SWEs to ensure the intent of the guidance was met. These criteria included identifying:

" Degraded Internal Anchorage:

The internal anchors of cabinets are not credited in the anchorage analysis of these components.

Internal anchors were not verified nor inspected.

" Loose or missing fasteners, to the extent possible.

Wiring and internal components were not movedor relocated to verify underlying fastener condition in accordance with PPE and qualification requirements.

" Large, heavy components mounted to a cabinet not typically included by the original equipment manufacturer.

• Cabinet doors or panels not latched or fastened:

All of the access doors are secured with a latchingmechanism, lock or supplemental bolting hardware required by specific engineering analysis.

" Other adverse conditions 3-1 ATTACHMENT (1)SUPPLEMENTAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT3.2.2 Issues Identification during Supplemental Internal Inspections There were no issues identified that were ultimately judged to be a "Potentially Adverse SeismicCondition."

Table 3-1 lists the issue identified during the Seismic Walkdowns.

3.3 STATUS OF ITEMS PREVIOUSLY ENTERED INTO THE CAPThe current status of open CAP items identified in References I and 2 is listed in Table 3-2.3-2 ATTACHMENT (1)SUPPLEMENTAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORTTable 3-1: Table of Potentially

Degraded, Nonconforming or Unanalyzed Conditions for Supplemental Internal Inspection of Electrical Equipment Component ID Potentially Adverse Seismic Condition Action Taken to Address the Current StatusCondition DGAEC, Diesel During performance of supplemental internal Team was able to view blind side Hands-on trouble shootingGenerator A inspection of DGAEC for Fukushima seismic mounting of TS-6 through vents performed under CA-2013-000913 Exciter Cabinet walkdown, the seismic walkdown team identified an of cabinet and conferred with confirmed that TS-6 is affixed toempty mounting hole immediately below and to the electricians to the design of the backing board by blind-right of terminal strip TS-6. Team questioned the terminal strip, providing mounting hardware covered by themounting configuration of terminal strip TS-6 given reasonable assurance that terminal terminal strip blocks. Theexposed hole and mounting bracket.

The mounting strip was reasonably affixed to additional hole next to the terminalconfiguration of the terminal strip TS-6 is below the the cabinet mounting plate. strip appears to be an original errorlevel of detail of available design drawings.

CR-2013-001808 was written to leftover from original cabinetCR-213-0188 wa wrtte to construction.

Currentperform hands-on troubleshooting to verify terminal strip configuration is acceptable.

was affixed to mounting plate.3-3 ATTACHMENT (1)SUPPLEMENTAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORTTable 3-2: Status of Open Corrective Action Program Items Identified in References 1 and 2Component ID Identified Condition Action Taken to Address the Current StatusCondition PCHOIA, Charging Anchor bolt thread engagement issues identified on CR-2012-005522 was issued. Enhancement CA-2012-002262 Pump A 2 bolts. One anchor bolt about half way through nut Documentation within CR has been issued to revise SEWS-Previously identified in SQUG evaluation, One presented basis for anchorage form (PCHO1A SEWS) to clarifyother bolt not completely through nut (about 2/3rds remaining within design as-built thread engagement of theof bolt engaged).

allowable limits while anchor bolt. This administrative discrediting the 2 bolts. documentation corrective actionhas no effect on the operability ofthe system.As a corrective action theSEWS sheet will be updated toreflect the margin change. Thisanchorage change will bedocumented within the on-goingcharging pump upgrade project.P1HOI-A, Three ladders leaning against wall adjoining pump. CR-2012-006918 was issued. Ginna has initiated work orderPACO I B,. Residual No ladder station provided.

Potential for ladders to Team laid ladders down on C91044795 to install ladder racksHeat Removal fall and impact pumps. Inspection team laid ladders ground to remove interaction to prevent recurrence Pump on ground to remove interaction

concern, concern.(Typographic error within Table 4-2 of Reference 2.This condition was identified during the inspection of Confirmed on 11/12/2012 that thePACO 1 B not PCHO IA. Walkdown sheet provided ladders were properly stagedwithin Reference 2 for PACO 1 B correctly identifies against floorthis condition, which was also identified within areawalk-by.)

3-4 ATTACHMENT (1)SUPPLEMENTAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORTTable 3-2: Status of Open Corrective Action Program Items Identified in References 1 and 2Component ID Identified Condition Action Taken to Address the Current StatusCondition BYCAI, Battery Original design calculation specified Maxi-bolts.

CR-2012-005089 written to Engineering has issued ECP- 13-Charger Al Hilti bolts were specified per ECPCN-09-000001; document lack of design 000131 with details to installhowever no design calculations could be located to documentation.

Calculation supplemental brackets for BYCA1justify change. This condition was also noted on perfonned within CR provides and BYCB I. These bracketsBYCB I, Battery Charger B I. basis for operability of restore anchorage demand tocomponent.

within design allowable limits.The supplemental bracket forBYCB I has been installed underWO C91963484.

The supplemental bracket forBYCAI will be installed underWO C92158209.

This work willbe completed within the T-weekscheduling process.PT-2027, Left anchor plate on rack has surface rust. CR-2012-005003 was issued to WO C91962133 initiated toDischarge Pressure address concern.

correct condition.

Transmitter forService WaterPumps A and B3-5 ATTACHMENT (1)SUPPLEMENTAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORTTable 3-2: Status of Open Corrective Action Program Items Identified in References 1 and 2Component ID Identified Condition Action Taken to Address the Current StatusCondition EACO0A, Seismically unqualified block walls could result in a CR-2012-007447 was issued to This outlier will be addressed asComponent seismic interaction with safety related equipment.

address concern.

The redundant part of the NTTFCooling Water CCW Hx B, EACO I B, is located Recommendation 2.1 SeismicHeat Exchanger A on a platform above the height to response and is tracked by actionDuring the IPEEE submittal to the NRC, the block be potentially impacted by a AI-2013-00735-001.

wall interaction relative to the CCW HX "A" was not block wall and is expected to beidentified.

This occurred due to a change in scope available after a design basisbetween SQUG (safe shutdown) and IPEEE (small ground motion event. The CCWbreak LOCA). This is a beyond design basis system is designed such thatassessment.

IPEEE evaluates a 0.3g review level either CCW Pump can be alignedearthquake, vs. Ginna's design basis 0.2g safe to EACOIB so that theshutdown earthquake.

This should have been listed as Component Cooling functionan IPEEE vulnerability, remains available if EAC01A isimpacted by a design basisground motion event coincident with a small break LOCA.CB, Control Room Cabinet not anchored near PLP PRESSZR P&L -CR-2012-005136 written.

PLP WO C91979567 initiated toevaluate or anchor. determined not to contain any anchor cabinet in the controlessential relays room.AB, Auxiliary Corrosion on conduit supports for conduit routed CR-2012-008409 was issued. WO C91239307 was initiated toBuilding, Residual along Sub-basement floor Team judged that conduit track replacement of conduitHeat Removal Sub- supports were still capable of supports.

basement performing their function3-6 ATTACHMENT (1)SUPPLEMENTAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORTTable 3-2: Status of Open Corrective Action Program Items Identified in References 1 and 2Component ID Identified Condition Action Taken to Address the Current StatusCondition AB, Auxiliary Switch gear accessories mounted to BUS 14 (can CR-2012-005002 written.

Engineering has issued ECP-13-Building, Operating rattle) are seismic interaction concern.

Justification for as-found 000038 with design outputs toFloor East End configuration provided.

relocate switchgear accessories.

WO C91985686 is currently WO C91985686 initiated to tracking implementation via therelocate tools for BUS 14. online-scheduling process.AB, Auxiliary Switch gear accessories mounted to BUS16 (can CR-2012-005002 written.

Engineering has issued ECP-13-Building, rattle) are seismic interaction concern.

Justification for as-found 000038 with design outputs toIntermediate Level configuration provided.

relocate switchgear accessories.

East End WO C91985686 is currently WO C91985686 initiated to tracking implementation via therelocate tools for BUS16. online-scheduling process.AB, Auxiliary Fire hose reel threads on bolts not completely CR-2012-005522 initiated, WO C91962134 replaced boltsBuilding, engaged.

evaluation determined with correct length bolts to achieveIntermediate Level configuration was acceptable as- required thread engagement.

West End found. Work completed 5/6/20133-7 ATTACHMENT (1)SUPPLEMENTAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT4Licensing Basis Evaluations There were no issues identified during the supplemental Seismic Walkdown Internal Inspections determined to be a "Potentially Adverse Seismic Condition" that could have potentially challenged thesite's licensing basis.4-1 ATTACHMENT (1)SUPPLEMENTAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT5Peer Review5.1 PEER REVIEW INTRODUCTION 5.1.1 OverviewThe peer review was performed in accordance with Reference

3. Scope of the Peer Review was limitedto the following activities as the SWEL development process was peer reviewed by the original peerreview team and the peer review team is the same as the peer review team documented in Reference 2:* Review of all the checklists completed for the Seismic Walkdown Internal Inspections

• Review of any licensing basis evaluations

• Review of the decisions for entering the potentially adverse conditions in to the plant'sCorrective Action Plan (CAP)* Review of the final submittal report* The inclusion of a summary of the peer review process in the submittal report5.2 REVIEW OF CHECKLIST 5.2.1 Walkdown Review and Review of Checklists Mr. Fitzsimmons and Mr. Traynor completed a peer review of all SWC's completed by the team. Thepeer review comments shown are those provided to the SWE walkdown team at the time of the review.All comments have been addressed in the final SWCs.Table 5-1: Table of Peer Review Comments for SWC'sComponent Equipment Walkdown Item Location Observations ID. (GIP) ClassDGAEC 20 DIESEL DG-253 Team properly identified emptyGENERATOR A mounting hole, evaluated designEXCITER requirements and confirmed CABINET acceptance through trouble shooting, including documentation.

FOXDGAI 20 FOXBORO DG-253 Team properly questioned emptyINSTRUMENT mounting hole on card. Agree withRACK DIESEL team's evaluation of condition basedGENERATOR on manufacturer's "as-supplied" KDGO 1 A DAY configuration of mounting hardwareTANK LEVEL for the card.5-1 ATTACHMENT (1)SUPPLEMENTAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT5.2.2 Evaluation of FindingsThe issue identified in Table 3-1 would not prevent the equipment from performing its safety-related function.

The peer review team has reviewed the identified issue and associated disposition and agreewith the conclusions of Section 3.5.3 REVIEW OF LICENSING BASIS EVALUATIONS 5.3.1 Overview of Licensing Basis Evaluations The issue identified during the Seismic Walkdowns as shown in Table 3-1 was determined not to be a"Potentially Adverse Seismic Condition" in that the issue identified would not prevent the equipment from performing its safety-related function or the plant from achieving safe shutdown.

Therefore, noadditional formal Licensing Basis Evaluation was required.

5.4 PEER REVIEW TEAM PROCESS SUMMARY" No Licensing Basis Evaluations were performed so peer review was not applicable.

• Provided review and comments to final report submittal.

• The qualification of team personnel reflected experience and great familiarity with the Ginnanuclear power block. Walkdown data sheets were thoroughly filled out and completed.

Corrective actions were employed using the Corrective Action Program.

Documentation was developed andcompiled such that it is recorded and retrievable.

5.5 REVIEW OF FINAL SUBMITTAL REPORT & SIGN-OFFThe supplemental inspection report has been reviewed by Mark Fitzsimmons and John Traynor and isfound to meet the requirements of the EPRI 1025286 -Seismic Walkdown Guidance

[Reference 3] andthe objectives and requirements of the 50.54(f) letter [Reference 4].5-2 ATTACHMENT (1)SUPPLEMENTAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT6References

1. Letter from M. G. Korsnick (CENG) to Document Control Desk (NRC) dated November 27, 2012,Response to 10 CFR 50.54(f)

Request for Information, Recommendation, Seismic2. Letter from J. A. Spina (CENG) to Document Control Desk (NRC) dated December 21, 2012,Supplemental Response to 10 CFR 50.54(f)

Request for Information, Recommendation 2.3, Seismic3. EPRI Technical Report 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, dated June 20124. NRC (E Leeds and M Johnson)

Letter to All Power Reactor Licensees et al., "Request forInformation Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f)

Regarding Recommendation 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from theFukushima Dai-ichi Accident,"

Enclosure 2.3, "Recommendation 2.3: Seismic."

5. Letter from L. M. Regner (NRC) to M. A. Mitchell (NRC) dated June 5, 2013, Summary of the May7, 2013, Public Conference Call on the Delayed Inspection Items Associated with Japan LessonsLearned Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3, Seismic Walkdowns, ML 13136A003 6-1 ATTACHMENT (1)SUPPLEMENTAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORTASWC's for Supplemental Internal Inspections of Electrical CabinetsTable A-i: Summary of Supplemental Internal Inspections Completed by GinnaEquipment Component ID Description Class20 DGAEC DIESEL GENERATOR A EXCITER CABINETFOXBORO INSTRUMENT RACK DIESELGENERATOR KDGO1A DAY TANK LEVELA-1 ATTACHMENT (1)SUPPLEMENTAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORTStatus: Y E] N Z U rDSeismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No.: DGAECEquipment Class: (20) Instrumentation and Control Panels and CabinetsEquipment

==

Description:==

DIESEL GENERATOR A EXCITER CABINETProject:

Ginna SWEL 1 (Supplemental Internal Inspection of Cabinet)Location (Bldg, Elev, Room/Area):

Diesel Generator

Building, 253.00 ft, Area 09Manufacturer/Model:

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results ofjudgments and findings.

Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting othercomments.

Anchorage

1. Is anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50%of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

N/A Supplemental inspection of cabinet internals.

Anchorage is external to thecabinet and was inspected under previous Seismic Walkdown Report2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware Y ElYDN [N E U E N/A EIIN/A Supplemental inspection of cabinet internals.

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surfaceoxidation?

N/A Supplemental inspection of cabinet internals.

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near theanchors?N/A Supplemental inspection of cabinet internals.

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation?

(Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for whichan anchorage configuration verification is required.)

N/A Supplemental inspection of cabinet internals.

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free ofpotentially adverse seismic conditions?

N/A Supplemental inspection of cabinet internals.

Y El N [-I U El N/A ElY El N El U [I N/A [LIY [I N [LI U ELI N/A ELIYYlNElUElI A-2 ATTACHMENT (1)SUPPLEMENTAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORTStatus:Y [1N EU F-Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No.: DGAECEquipment Class: (20) Instrumentation and Control Panels and CabinetsEquipment

==

Description:==

DIESEL GENERATOR A EXCITER CABINETInteraction Effects7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

Y F1 N El U D N/A EDN/A Supplemental inspection of cabinet internals.

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution

systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

N/A Supplemental inspection of cabinet internals.

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?Y [-] N [-] U F1 N/A F1Y [] N I U El N/A L[IN/A Supplemental inspection of cabinet internals.

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment freeof potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?N/A Supplemental inspection of cabinet internals.

Y El Nn UElIOther Adverse Conditions

11. Have you looked for and found no adverse seismic conditions that could Y E] N E U n]adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?

Supplemental internal inspection:

Several relays are mounted to the door ofthe cabinet.

Walkdown confirmed that supplemental stiffeners and boltingwere installed on the interior of the door. Team noted that the bottom ofterminal strip TS-6 appeared to have a missing mounting bolt (See attachedphotos),

CR-2013-001808 written.CommentsSupplemental internal inspection:

Neat cabinet, free of FME.Evaluated by: Date: 3/14/2013 3/14/2013 A-3 ATTACHMENT (1)SUPPLEMENTAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORTStatus: Y E] N Z U Z]Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No.: DGAECEquipment Class: (20) Instrumentation and Control Panels and CabinetsEquipment

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Description:==

DIESEL GENERATOR A EXCITER CABINETPhotosDGAEC Internal Cabinet Inspection, Top-Front A-4 ATTACHMENT (1)SUPPLEMENTAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORTStatus:YL1NHULSeismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No.: DGAECEquipment Class: (20) InstEquipment

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Description:==

DIESELrumentation and Control Panels and CabinetsGENERATOR A EXCITER CABINETDGAEC Internal Cabinet Inspection, Bottom-Front A-5 ATTACHMENT (1)SUPPLEMENTAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORTStatus: Y F] N 0 U RSeismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No.: DGAECEquipment Class: (20) Instrumentation and Control Panels and CabinetsEquipment

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Description:==

DIESEL GENERATOR A EXCITER CABINETDGAEC Intemal Cabinet Inspection, TS-6 and Missing MountingA-6 ATTACHMENT (1)SUPPLEMENTAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORTStatus: Y El N [K U L]Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No.: DGAECEquipment Class: (20) Instrumentation and Control Panels and CabinetsEquipment

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Description:==

DIESEL GENERATOR A EXCITER CABINETTS-6 and Missing MountingA-7 ATTACHMENT (1)SUPPLEMENTAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORTStatus: Y IZ N Z U F1Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No.: DGAECEquipment Class: (20) Instrumentation and Control Panels and CabinetsEquipment

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Description:==

DIESEL GENERATOR A EXCITER CABINETDGAEC Door Mounted Relays and Supplemental Door Stiffeners A-8 ATTACHMENT (1)SUPPLEMENTAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORTStatus: Y 0 N El U F]Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No.: FOXDGA1Equipment Class: (20) Instrumentation and Control Panels and CabinetsFOXBORO INSTRUMENT RACK DIESEL GENERATOR KDG01A DAYEquipment

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Description:==

TANK LEVELProject:

Ginna SWEL 1 (Supplemental Internal Inspection of Cabinet)Location (Bldg, Elev, Room/Area):

Diesel Generator

Building, 253.00 ft, Area 09Manufacturer/Model:

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results ofjudgments and findings.

Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting othercomments.

Anchorage

1. Is anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50% Y [D N [of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

N/A Supplemental inspection of cabinet internals.

Anchorage is external to thecabinet and was inspected under previous Seismic Walkdown Report2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware Y [L N LI U [_ N/A LIN/A Supplemental inspection of cabinet internals.

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface Y El N El U El N/A [Loxidation?

N/A Supplemental inspection of cabinet internals.

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the Y El N LI U El N/A E]anchors?N/A Supplemental inspection of cabinet internals.

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation?

Y E] N E] U LI N/A El(Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for whichan anchorage configuration verification is required.)

N/A Supplemental inspection of cabinet internals.

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of Y [] N E] U E]potentially adverse seismic conditions?

N/A Supplemental inspection of cabinet internals.

A-9 ATTACHMENT (1)SUPPLEMENTAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORTStatus: Y 0 N EI U []Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No.: FOXDGA1Equipment Class: (20) Instrumentation and Control Panels and CabinetsFOXBORO INSTRUMENT RACK DIESEL GENERATOR KDG01A DAYEquipment

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Description:==

TANK LEVELInteraction Effects7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

Y El N El U [I N/A ElN/A Supplemental inspection of cabinet internals.

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution

systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, Y El N El U El N/A Eland masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

N/A Supplemental inspection of cabinet internals.

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage? Y [: N [] U [] N/A ElN/A Supplemental inspection of cabinet internals.

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free Y [] N [] U Elof potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?N/A Supplemental inspection of cabinet internals.

Other Adverse Conditions

11. Have you looked for and found no adverse seismic conditions that could Y M N El U Eladversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?

Supplemental internal inspection:

Team questioned open mounting hole forcard LC-2050A/LC-205OA-2 (See photos).

Team pulled spare duplex cardfrom stock and determined that this mounting hole was left open bymanufacturer.

All mounting hardware as provided by the manufacturer iscaptured by retaining pins and cannot be removed from the card. Teamconcluded the mounting hole was open by design, no adverse conditions noted.CommentsSupplemental internal inspection:

Neat cabinet, free of FME, no components mounted to door.Evaluated by: 4/17/2013 4/17/2013 A-10 ATTACHMENT (1)SUPPLEMENTAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORTStatus: YON Lj U nSeismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No.: FOXDGAlEquipment Class: (20) Instrumentation and Control Panels and CabinetsFOXBORO INSTRUMENT RACK DIESEL GENERATOR KDG01A DAYEquipment

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Description:==

TANK LEVELPhotosFOXDGA 1 Internal Cabinet Inspection A-1 1 ATTACHMENT (1)SUPPLEMENTAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORTStatus: Y ON El U MSeismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No.: FOXDGA1Equipment Class: (20) Instrumentation and Control Panels and CabinetsFOXBORO INSTRUMENT RACK DIESEL GENERATOR KDG01A DAYEquipment

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Description:==

TANK LEVELFOXDGA 1 Internal Cabinet Inspection, Open Mounting HoleA-12 ATTACHMENT (2)REGULATORY COMMITMENTS CONTAINED IN THISCORRESPONDENCE Constellation Energy Nuclear Group, LLCJuly 25, 2013 ATTACHMENT (2)REGULATORY COMMITMENTS CONTAINED IN THIS CORRESPONDENCE The following table identifies actions committed to in this document.

Any other statements in thissubmittal are provided for information purposes and are not considered to be regulatory commitments.

Regulatory Commitment DateSubmit seismic walkdown results to the NRC for supplemental internal July 31, 2014inspections of MCCC and BUS 14 as part of the response to the Fukushima recommendation 2.3 Request for Information.

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