|
|
| Line 17: |
Line 17: |
|
| |
|
| =Text= | | =Text= |
| {{#Wiki_filter:10CFR50.73Virginia Electric and Power CompanySurry Power Station5570 Hog Island RoadSurry, Virginia 23883March 30, 2015U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Serial No.: 15-127Attention: Document Control Desk SPS: JCPWashington, D. C. 20555-0001 Docket No.: 50-28050-281License No.: DRP-32DPR-37Pursuant to 10CFR50.73, Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits thefollowing Licensee Event Report applicable to Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2.Report No. 50-280, 50-281/2015-001-00This report has been reviewed by the Station Facility Safety Review Committee and willbe forwarded to the Management Safety Review Committee for its review.Very truly yours,N. L. LaneSite Vice PresidentSurry Power StationEnclosureCommitment contained in this letter: Nonecc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region IIMarquis One Tower, Suite 1200245 Peachtree Center Ave., NEAtlanta, GA 30303-1257NRC Senior Resident InspectorSurry Power Station NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 01/31/2017(02-2014)(02-2014) Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours.Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections.LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LEBranch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or byLE EP (LEmR) internet e-mail to and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and(See Page 2 for required number of RegulatoryAffairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMBdigits/characters for each block) control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to,the information collection.1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. PAGESurry Power Station, Unit 1 05000280 1 OF 34. TITLEInadequate Missile Protection Due to Failure to Procedurally Control Sliding Missile Shields5. EVENT DATE 6. LER NUMBER 7. REPORT DATE 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVEDMO D YEAR I SEQUENTIAL REV FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBERM NUMBER NO. MONTH DAY YEAR Surry Power Station, Unit 2 05000281FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER01 27 2015 2015- 001 -00 3 30 2015 050009. OPERATING MODE 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)El 20.2201(b) [I 20.2203(a)(3)(i) [1 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) El 50.73(a)(2)(vii)N[ 20.2201(d) E] 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)NEl 20.2203(a)(1) El 20.2203(a)(4) El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)__ 20.2203(a)(2)(i) El 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) El 50.73(a)(2)(iii) El 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)10. POWER LEVEL El 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) El 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) El 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) El 50.73(a)(2)(x)El 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) El 50.36(c)(2) [ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) El 73.71(a)(4)El 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) El 50.46(a)(3)(ii) [ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) " l 73.71(a)(5)100El 20.2203(a)(2)(v) El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) ED 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) El OTHER[E 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) [ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) speciinAbsfact belowFor in12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LERLICENSEE CONTACT TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)N. L. Lane, Site Vice President (757) 365-200113. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORTCAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU- REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU- REPORTABLEFACTURER TO EPIX FACTURER TO EPIXD XX DR -- N14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 15. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEARSUBMISSIONEl YES (Ifyes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) [ NO DATEABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)On January 27, 2015, with Units 1 and 2 operating at 100 percent power, it was identified that foursliding missile shields on the Main Steam Valve House (MSVH) were not included in the AbnormalEnvironmental Conditions procedure to be closed upon the threat of high winds. The shields arenecessary to meet the design function of the MSVH for protection of the safety-related equipmentand must be closed to perform their design function. A missile penetrating the MSVH could haveprevented the MS and/or AFW systems from being able to mitigate the consequences of -anaccident. Therefore, this event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v). The shields wereinappropriately excluded from the original revision of the procedure, which has now been revised toinclude the shields. This event posed no significant safety implications due to the low probability ofmissile damage inside the MSVH with the shields open. Therefore, the health and safety of thepublic were not affected by this event.NRC FORM 366 (02-2014) | | {{#Wiki_filter:10CFR50.73 Virginia Electric and Power CompanySurry Power Station5570 Hog Island RoadSurry, Virginia 23883March 30, 2015U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Serial No.: 15-127Attention: |
| NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 01131/2017(02-2014)Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours.Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information CollectionsBranch (T.5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or byLICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) internet e-mail to lnfocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Informationand Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget,CONTINUATION SHEET Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display acurrently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is notrequired to respond to, the information collection.1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGEYEAR SEQUENTIAL REVSYrEAR INUMBER NO.Surry Power Station 05000-280 __NUMBER _ NO. 2 OF 32015 -001 00NARRATIVE1.0 DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENTOn January 27, 2015, with Units 1 and 2 operating at 100 percent power, it was identifiedthat the sliding missile shields [EIIS XX-DR] for the four Main Steam Valve House (MSVH)access doors were not included in the Abnormal Environmental Conditions procedure to beclosed upon the threat of high winds in the event of a hurricane or tornado watch or warning.The shields are necessary to meet the design function of the MSVH for protection of theequipment inside the MSVH (e.g., auxiliary feedwater pumps [EllS BA-P] or other safety-related components in the Main Steam (MS) [EllS SB] and Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) [EIISBA] systems) from high wind generated missiles. These shields are normally maintainedopen and must be closed upon the threat of high winds from a hurricane or tornado in orderto perform their design function. This issue was discovered during a procedure revisionwalk-through.There have been approximately ten instances in the past three years when the AbnormalEnvironmental Conditions procedure was entered and it was determined that closure ofsliding missile shields would have been appropriate due to local weather conditions. Duringthese times, a missile could have penetrated the unprotected access doors and interactedwith the auxiliary feedwater pumps or other safety-related components in the MS and AFWsystems located inside the MSVH. 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vi) includes events caused byprocedural inadequacies. Since the Abnormal Environmental Conditions procedure did notensure sliding missile shield closure, a missile could have prevented the AFW and/or MSsystem from performing their safety functions and is therefore reportable pursuant10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v).2.0 SIGNIFICANT SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONSThe MSVH sliding missile shields are part of the Class 1 structure designed to protectsafety-related components inside the MSVH from the effects of tornados and high winds. Ifthe doors are not closed upon the threat of high winds, the potential exists for a tornado-generated missile to disable a combination of MS lines and AFW trains which wouldchallenge the ability to remove decay heat. Contingencies exist in Surry's functionrestoration procedures to provide alternate means of Decay Heat Removal, such asestablishing Bleed and Feed Cooling or operation of the AFW crosstie from the other Unit.Based on an assessment of this event, the increase in risk was determined to be of lowsignificance due to the low probability of a missile entering the MSVH and disabling Surry'sability to remove decay heat. As a result, the health and safety of the public were notaffected.NRC FORM 366A (02-2014) | | Document Control Desk SPS: JCPWashington, D. C. 20555-0001 Docket No.: 50-28050-281License No.: DRP-32DPR-37Pursuant to 10CFR50.73, Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits thefollowing Licensee Event Report applicable to Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2.Report No. 50-280, 50-281/2015-001-00 This report has been reviewed by the Station Facility Safety Review Committee and willbe forwarded to the Management Safety Review Committee for its review.Very truly yours,N. L. LaneSite Vice President Surry Power StationEnclosure Commitment contained in this letter: Nonecc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region IIMarquis One Tower, Suite 1200245 Peachtree Center Ave., NEAtlanta, GA 30303-1257 NRC Senior Resident Inspector Surry Power Station NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: |
| NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION(02-2014) LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)CONTINUATION SHEET1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGEYEAR SEQUENTIAL REVYEAR NUMBER NO.Surry Power Station 05000- 280 3 OF 32015 -001 -00NARRATIVE3.0CAUSEThe Main Steam Valve House sliding missile shields were not included in original version ofthe Abnormal Environmental Conditions procedure. No documentation could be identifiedthat indicated the reason these doors were not included in the procedure. No similarprocedure could be identified to exist prior to issuance of the original revision of the currentprocedure.4.0 IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION(S)The abnormal environmental conditions procedure has been revised to include the fourMSVH sliding missile shields in the list of sliding missile shields to be closed upon the threatof high winds.5.0 ADDITIONAL CORRECTIVE ACTIONSAn extent of condition review was completed and verified that the station sliding missileshields are included in the Abnormal Environmental Condition procedure.6.0 ACTIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCENo additional actions are required.7.0 SIMILAR EVENTSNone8.0 MANUFACTURER/MODEL NUMBERNot applicable9.0 ADDITIONAL INFORMATIONNoneNRC FORM 366 (02-2014)}} | | 01/31/2017 (02-2014) |
| | (02-2014) |
| | Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: |
| | 80 hours.Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. |
| | Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections |
| | .LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LEBranch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or byLE EP (LEmR) internet e-mail to and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and(See Page 2 for required number of RegulatoryAffairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), |
| | Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMBdigits/characters for each block) control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to,the information collection. |
| | : 1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. PAGESurry Power Station, Unit 1 05000280 1 OF 34. TITLEInadequate Missile Protection Due to Failure to Procedurally Control Sliding Missile Shields5. EVENT DATE 6. LER NUMBER 7. REPORT DATE 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVEDMO D YEAR I SEQUENTIAL REV FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBERM NUMBER NO. MONTH DAY YEAR Surry Power Station, Unit 2 05000281FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER01 27 2015 2015- 001 -00 3 30 2015 050009. OPERATING MODE 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)El 20.2201(b) |
| | [I 20.2203(a)(3)(i) |
| | [1 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) |
| | El 50.73(a)(2)(vii) |
| | N[ 20.2201(d) |
| | E] 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) |
| | El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) |
| | El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) |
| | NEl 20.2203(a)(1) |
| | El 20.2203(a)(4) |
| | El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) |
| | El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) |
| | __ 20.2203(a)(2)(i) |
| | El 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) |
| | El 50.73(a)(2)(iii) |
| | El 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) |
| | : 10. POWER LEVEL El 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) |
| | El 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) |
| | El 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) |
| | El 50.73(a)(2)(x) |
| | El 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) |
| | El 50.36(c)(2) |
| | [ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) |
| | El 73.71(a)(4) |
| | El 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) |
| | El 50.46(a)(3)(ii) |
| | [ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) |
| | " l 73.71(a)(5) 100El 20.2203(a)(2)(v) |
| | El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) |
| | ED 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) |
| | El OTHER[E 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) |
| | El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) |
| | [ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) speciinAbsfact belowFor in12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LERLICENSEE CONTACT TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)N. L. Lane, Site Vice President (757) 365-200113. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORTCAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU- REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU- REPORTABLE FACTURER TO EPIX FACTURER TO EPIXD XX DR -- N14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED |
| | : 15. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEARSUBMISSION El YES (Ifyes, complete |
| | : 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) [ NO DATEABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)On January 27, 2015, with Units 1 and 2 operating at 100 percent power, it was identified that foursliding missile shields on the Main Steam Valve House (MSVH) were not included in the AbnormalEnvironmental Conditions procedure to be closed upon the threat of high winds. The shields arenecessary to meet the design function of the MSVH for protection of the safety-related equipment and must be closed to perform their design function. |
| | A missile penetrating the MSVH could haveprevented the MS and/or AFW systems from being able to mitigate the consequences of -anaccident. |
| | Therefore, this event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v). |
| | The shields wereinappropriately excluded from the original revision of the procedure, which has now been revised toinclude the shields. |
| | This event posed no significant safety implications due to the low probability ofmissile damage inside the MSVH with the shields open. Therefore, the health and safety of thepublic were not affected by this event.NRC FORM 366 (02-2014) |
| | NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: |
| | 01131/2017 (02-2014) |
| | Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: |
| | 80 hours.Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. |
| | Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T.5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or byLICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) internet e-mail to lnfocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory |
| | : Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), |
| | Office of Management and Budget,CONTINUATION SHEET Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display acurrently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is notrequired to respond to, the information collection. |
| | : 1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGEYEAR SEQUENTIAL REVSYrEAR INUMBER NO.Surry Power Station 05000-280 |
| | __NUMBER |
| | _ NO. 2 OF 32015 -001 00NARRATIVE 1.0 DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENTOn January 27, 2015, with Units 1 and 2 operating at 100 percent power, it was identified that the sliding missile shields [EIIS XX-DR] for the four Main Steam Valve House (MSVH)access doors were not included in the Abnormal Environmental Conditions procedure to beclosed upon the threat of high winds in the event of a hurricane or tornado watch or warning.The shields are necessary to meet the design function of the MSVH for protection of theequipment inside the MSVH (e.g., auxiliary feedwater pumps [EllS BA-P] or other safety-related components in the Main Steam (MS) [EllS SB] and Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) [EIISBA] systems) from high wind generated missiles. |
| | These shields are normally maintained open and must be closed upon the threat of high winds from a hurricane or tornado in orderto perform their design function. |
| | This issue was discovered during a procedure revisionwalk-through. |
| | There have been approximately ten instances in the past three years when the AbnormalEnvironmental Conditions procedure was entered and it was determined that closure ofsliding missile shields would have been appropriate due to local weather conditions. |
| | Duringthese times, a missile could have penetrated the unprotected access doors and interacted with the auxiliary feedwater pumps or other safety-related components in the MS and AFWsystems located inside the MSVH. 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vi) includes events caused byprocedural inadequacies. |
| | Since the Abnormal Environmental Conditions procedure did notensure sliding missile shield closure, a missile could have prevented the AFW and/or MSsystem from performing their safety functions and is therefore reportable pursuant10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v). |
| | 2.0 SIGNIFICANT SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS The MSVH sliding missile shields are part of the Class 1 structure designed to protectsafety-related components inside the MSVH from the effects of tornados and high winds. Ifthe doors are not closed upon the threat of high winds, the potential exists for a tornado-generated missile to disable a combination of MS lines and AFW trains which wouldchallenge the ability to remove decay heat. Contingencies exist in Surry's functionrestoration procedures to provide alternate means of Decay Heat Removal, such asestablishing Bleed and Feed Cooling or operation of the AFW crosstie from the other Unit.Based on an assessment of this event, the increase in risk was determined to be of lowsignificance due to the low probability of a missile entering the MSVH and disabling Surry'sability to remove decay heat. As a result, the health and safety of the public were notaffected. |
| | NRC FORM 366A (02-2014) |
| | NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (02-2014) |
| | LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)CONTINUATION SHEET1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGEYEAR SEQUENTIAL REVYEAR NUMBER NO.Surry Power Station 05000- 280 3 OF 32015 -001 -00NARRATIVE 3.0CAUSEThe Main Steam Valve House sliding missile shields were not included in original version ofthe Abnormal Environmental Conditions procedure. |
| | No documentation could be identified that indicated the reason these doors were not included in the procedure. |
| | No similarprocedure could be identified to exist prior to issuance of the original revision of the currentprocedure. |
| | 4.0 IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION(S) |
| | The abnormal environmental conditions procedure has been revised to include the fourMSVH sliding missile shields in the list of sliding missile shields to be closed upon the threatof high winds.5.0 ADDITIONAL CORRECTIVE ACTIONSAn extent of condition review was completed and verified that the station sliding missileshields are included in the Abnormal Environmental Condition procedure. |
| | 6.0 ACTIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE No additional actions are required. |
| | 7.0 SIMILAR EVENTSNone8.0 MANUFACTURER/MODEL NUMBERNot applicable 9.0 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NoneNRC FORM 366 (02-2014)}} |
Similar Documents at Surry |
|---|
Category:Letter
MONTHYEARIR 05000280/20244012024-02-0606 February 2024
Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000280/2024401, 05000281/2024401 and 07200002/2024401
IR 05000280/20230102024-01-18018 January 2024
Age Related Degradation Inspection Report 05000280-2023010 and 05000281-2023010
ML23312A1922024-01-18018 January 2024
Issuance of Amendment Nos. 316 & 316 Regarding a Risk Informed Approach for Tornado Classification of the Fuel Handling Trolley Support Structure
ML24003A9022024-01-0303 January 2024
Stations, Units 1 and 2, Emergency Plan Revision - Relocation of the Technical Support Center (TSC) - Editorial Correction
IR 05000280/20233012023-12-28028 December 2023
NRC Operator License Examination Report 05000280/2023301 and 05000281/2023301
ML23283A3052023-12-20020 December 2023
Review of Appendix F to DOM-NAF2, Qualification of the Framatome ORFEO-GAIA and ORFEO-NMGRID CHF Correlations in the Dominion Energy VIPRE-D Computer Code (EPID L-2022-LLT-0003) (Nonproprietary)
ML23352A3692023-12-18018 December 2023
Associated Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation, Revision to Emergency Plan Report of Change
ML23334A2342023-11-30030 November 2023
Request for Exemption from Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications Implementation
ML23242A2292023-11-0707 November 2023
Issuance of Amendment Nos. 315 and 315, Regarding Emergency Procedure Relocation of the Technical Support Center
ML23200A2622023-11-0202 November 2023
Issuance of Amendment Nos. 314 and 314, Regarding Technical Specification and Spent Fuel Pool Criticality Change
IR 05000280/20230032023-10-25025 October 2023
Integrated Inspection Report 05000280/2023003 and 05000281/2023003
ML23286A0372023-10-13013 October 2023
Annual Submittal of Technical Specifications Bases Changes Pursuant to Technical Specification 6.4.J
ML23285A0922023-10-12012 October 2023
Inservice Testing Program for Pumps and Valves Sixth Interval Update and Associated Relief and Alternative Requests
ML23277A1172023-10-0303 October 2023
Operator Licensing Examination Approval 05000280/2023301 and 05000281/2023301
ML23230A0502023-10-0202 October 2023
5 of the Quality Assurance Topical Report - Review of Program Changes
ML23256A2672023-09-21021 September 2023
Review of the Fall 2022 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report
ML23244A2352023-09-18018 September 2023
Request to Use a Subsequent Edition of the ASME Code, Section XI
ML23230A0012023-09-15015 September 2023
Request to Use a Provision of a Previous Edition of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI, for Non-Destructive Examinations
IR 05000280/20220042023-09-0101 September 2023
Reissue - Surry Power Station - Integrated Inspection Report 05000280/2022004 and 05000281/2022004
ML23244A0142023-08-30030 August 2023
Inservice Inspection Owner'S Activity Report
IR 05000280/20230052023-08-23023 August 2023
Updated Inspection Plan for Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2 (Report 05000280/2023005 and 05000281/2023005)
ML23226A1862023-08-10010 August 2023
Proposed License Amendment Request - Reclassification of Regulatory Guide 1.97 Variable for Low Head Safety Injection Flow Instrumentation
ML23220A1492023-08-0707 August 2023
Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation - Submittal of Cask Registrations for Spent Fuel Storage
ML23220A1482023-08-0707 August 2023
Proposed Emergency Plan Revision - Relocation of the Technical Support Center (TSC) Response to Request for Additional Information
IR 05000280/20230022023-08-0404 August 2023
Integrated Inspection Report 05000280/2023002 and 05000281/2023002
ML23208A0922023-07-26026 July 2023
Request for Approval of Appendix F of Fleet Report DOM-NAF-2-P Qualification of Framatome ORFEO-GAIA and OORFE-NMGRID CHF Correlations in the Dominion Energy Vipre-D Computer Code Response
ML23207A1102023-07-26026 July 2023
NRC Regulatory Issues Summary 2023-01 Preparation and Scheduling of Operator Licensing Examinations
ML23198A0322023-07-18018 July 2023
Regulatory Audit Report Regarding Review of License Amendment to Modify Emergency Plan Staff Augmentation Times
ML23193A9382023-07-18018 July 2023
Closeout of Generic Letter 2004-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized-Water Reactors
ML23173A0602023-07-11011 July 2023
Audit Summary for License Amendment Request Revision of the Emergency Plan to Support Relocation of the Technical Support Center
ML23136B1392023-06-29029 June 2023
Issuance of Amendment No. 313 Administrative Changes to Subsequent Renewed Operating Licenses and Technical Specifications
ML23178A1682023-06-26026 June 2023
2022 Annual Report of Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Model Changes Pursuant to the Requirements of 10 CFR 50.46
ML23152A0432023-06-22022 June 2023
Audit Plan License Amendment Requests to Change Emergency Plan Staff Augmentation Times
ML23153A1732023-06-16016 June 2023
Correction to Amendment Nos. 346 & 286 Millstone, 294 & 277 North Anna, 311 & 311 Surry, and 225 Summer to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-554,Rev Reactor Coolant Leakage Requirement
ML23163A2352023-06-12012 June 2023
Request to Use a Later Edition of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI, for the SPS Sixth Inservice Inspection (Isi) Intervals and VCSNS Fifth ISI Interval
ML23151A6612023-05-31031 May 2023
ES-2.1-1, Surry 2023-301 Corporate Notification Letter (Revised)
ML23167B0072023-05-31031 May 2023
Proposed Emergency Plan Revision - Relocation of the Technical Support Center (TSC) Supplemental Information - LOCA Dose Calculation Summary
ML23117A0952023-05-10010 May 2023
Audit Plan License Amendment Request to Support Relocation of the Technical Support Center
ML23130A3742023-05-10010 May 2023
Request to Delay NRC Intial Licensing Examination
2024-02-06
[Table view]
Category:Licensee Event Report (LER)
MONTHYEAR05000281/LER-2020-001, Cancellation of LER 2020-001-00 for Surry Power Station Unit 2 Re Loss of Containment Cooling Affecting Containment Partial Pressure Indication2020-11-0606 November 2020
Cancellation of LER 2020-001-00 for Surry Power Station Unit 2 Re Loss of Containment Cooling Affecting Containment Partial Pressure Indication
05000280/LER-2019-0022020-02-0404 February 2020
LER 2019-002-00 for Surry Power Station Unit 1, Items Non-Conforming to Design for Tornado Missile Protection
05000280/LER-2017-0012017-10-0606 October 2017
1 OF 3, LER 17-001-00 for Surry, Unit 1, Regarding Shutdown due to an Unisolable Leak in Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary
05000281/LER-2016-0012016-12-0202 December 2016
Unit 2 Reactor Trip due to Generator Differential Lockout, LER 16-001-00 for Surry Power Station, Unit 2, Regarding Reactor Trip Due to Generator Differential Lockout
05000280/LER-2016-0012016-07-11011 July 2016
1 OF 4, LER 16-001-00 for Surry Power Station, Unit 1 and 2, Regarding Emergency Service Water Pump Inoperable Due to Corrosion of Valve Support
ML1015505662009-03-0404 March 2009
Event Notification for Surry on Relief Valve Failure Results in Tritium and Cesium Spill
ML0702501902007-01-17017 January 2007
Special Report on Qpt Not Less than Two Percent for Twenty Four Hours
ML19105B1281979-08-21021 August 1979
LER 1979-011-03X for Surry Units 1 & 2 Loss of Power with Both Units at Cold Shutdown, Observed Radiation Monitors Without Power
ML19093B4141978-09-26026 September 1978
Reporting Condenser Cooling Water Outlet Temperature to James River Decreased by 3.5oF as Measured at Station Discharge Structure
ML19105A3001978-09-0808 September 1978
LER 78-013-03X-1, LER 78-029-03L-0, & LER 78-031-03L-0 for Surry 2 Re Critical Below Minimum Insertion Limit on D Control Bank
ML19105A3011978-09-0101 September 1978
LER 1978-028-03L-0 for Surry 2 Re Containment Pressure Exceeded Allowable Limit
ML19095A4971978-08-25025 August 1978
Submit Licensee Event Report No. LER 78-024/03L-0 Re No Alarm During a Planned Release of Liquid Radioactive Waste
ML19095A4981978-08-22022 August 1978
Submit Licensee Event Report Nos. LER 1978-019/03L-0, LER 1978-021/03L-0, LER 1978-022/03L-0, LER 1978-023/03L-0, LER 1978-025/03L-0, LER 1978-026/03L-0 for Surry Unit No. 1
ML19105A0771978-08-16016 August 1978
Submit LER 78-027/03L-0 Re Seven Snubbers Not Meeting Inspection Criteria
ML19105A0781978-08-16016 August 1978
Submit LER 78-027/03L-0 Re Seven Snubbers Not Meeting Inspection Criteria
ML19105A0791978-08-11011 August 1978
LER 78-026/03L-0. Follow-up Inspection for Valve Cleanliness, Discovered That Containment Spray Isolation Valves (MOV-CS-201C and D) Contained No More That Five Milliliters. Technical Specification TS 6.6.2.b.(3)
ML19095A4991978-08-0404 August 1978
Sutmit Licensee Event Report No. LER 78-018/03L-0 Re Two Main Steam Safety Valves Were Not within Plus or Minus 3% of Setpoint as Required
ML19105A0801978-07-28028 July 1978
LER 1978-022-03L-0 Re Axial Power Distribution Monitoring Was Exceeded,& Three LERs 1978-021-03L-0, LER 1978-023-03L-0, & LER 1978-024-03L-0 Re Inlet Circulating Water Temperature Exceeded
ML19095A5001978-07-28028 July 1978
Submit Licensee Event Report Nos. LER 78-017/03L-0 Re Not Documenting Four Electric Maintenance Procedures & Two Periodic Tests, & 78-020/03L-0 Re Suspended Air Bubbles in Reservoir Fluid
ML19095A2281978-07-27027 July 1978
Reporting & Providing Additional Information on Incidence of Missing Two Steam Generator Tube Plugs Found During Inspection
ML19095A2291978-07-26026 July 1978
Reporting of Cooling Water Discharge Temperature Change Rate on 7/9/1978 & Found No Evidence of Any Detrimental Effects in River or Its Inhabitants
ML19095A5011978-07-21021 July 1978
Submit Licensee Event Report No. LER 78-016/03L-0 Re Valve MOV-RH-100 Was Not Opening
ML19105A0821978-07-17017 July 1978
LER 1978-025-03L for Surry Unit 2 Excessive Gap Around Battery Room Ventilation Duct
ML19105A0811978-07-17017 July 1978
LER 1978-025-03L for Surry Unit 2 Excessive Gap Around Battery Room Ventilation Duct
ML19095A5021978-07-0707 July 1978
Submit Licensee Event Report Nos. LER 78-013/03L-0 Re Six Snubbers Not Meeting Test Criteria, & 78-014/03L-0 Re Mount Plate Was Warped, & 3 of 8 Bolts Were Insufficiently Embedded
ML19095A5031978-06-27027 June 1978
Submit Licensee Event Report No. LER-78-015/03L-0 Re Valve Cleanliness Inspection Found Foreign Material on Valve Seating Surfaces
ML19095A5041978-06-27027 June 1978
Submit Licensee Event Report No. LER-78-015/03L-0 Re Valve Cleanliness Inspection Found Foreign Material on Valve Seating Surfaces
ML19105A0831978-06-23023 June 1978
LER 1978-017-03L, LER 1978-018-03L, LER 1978-019-03L, & LER 1978-020-03L for Surry Unit 2 Related to Snubbers
ML19095A2481978-06-19019 June 1978
06/19/1978 Letter Reporting Increase of Condenser Cooling Water Discharge
ML19095A5051978-06-0707 June 1978
Submit Licensee Event Report No. LER-78-012/03L-0 Re Inside Recirculation Spray Pump 1-RS-P-1A, Failure to Rotate by Hand
ML19105A0851978-05-23023 May 1978
LER 1978-015-03L for Surry Unit 2 Finding of Air Leak on Header of Control Room Emergency Air Supply Bank
ML19095A5061978-05-23023 May 1978
Submit Licensee Event Report Nos. LER-78-008/03L-0, LER-78-009/03L-0, LER-78-010/03L-0, LER-78-011/03L-0 for Surry Unit No. 1
ML19105A0861978-05-12012 May 1978
LER 1978-013-03L for Surry Unit 2 Reactor Brought Critical Below Minimum Insertion Limit on D Control Bank
ML19105A0871978-05-0505 May 1978
LER 1978-014-03L for Surry Unit 2 Charging Pump Service Water Pump a Tripped on High Current
ML19095A5071978-05-0505 May 1978
Submit Licensee Event Report No. LER-78-007/03L-0 Re Leak on Body to Bonnet Joint Diaphragm Valve 1-CH-98
ML19105A0881978-04-19019 April 1978
LER 1978-006-01T for Surry Unit 2 Review of Fire Protection Yard Piping Revealed That Two Pipe Extensions May Not Have Been Seismically Qualified
ML19095A5081978-04-19019 April 1978
Submit Licensee Event Report No. LER-78-006/01T-0 Re Seismically Disqualified Two Pipe Extensions on Fire Protection Yard Piping
ML19095A5091978-04-0707 April 1978
Forwarding Licensee Event Report No. LER-78-005/01T-0 Re Westinghouse'S Error in LOCA-ECCS Evaluation Model, Which Will Result in Higher Calculated Peak Clad Temperature
ML19105A0901978-04-0606 April 1978
LER 1978-012-01T for Surry Unit 2 Failure to Meet Containment Integrity
ML19105A0921978-04-0404 April 1978
LER 1978-011-03L for Surry Unit 1 Loss of Service Water Flow Through Charging Pump Intermediate Seal Cooler
ML19095A5101978-04-0404 April 1978
Submit Licensee Event Report No. LER-78-004/03L-0 Re Loss of Service Water Flow Through Charging Pump Intermediate Seal Cooler
ML19105A0931978-03-30030 March 1978
LER 1978-008-03L Re Snubber Body in Contact with Structure; LER 1978-009-03L Re Trip of Boric Acid Transfer Pump; & LER 1978-010-03L Re Failure of Pressurizer Channel
ML19095A5111978-03-28028 March 1978
Submit Licensee Event Report No. LER-78-003/03L-0 Re Failed Heat Tracing, Panel 8 Circuit 24
ML19095A5121978-03-21021 March 1978
Submit Licensee Event Report No. LER-78-002/01T-0 Re Additional Radial Peaking Factor Surveillance
ML19105A0941978-02-27027 February 1978
LER 1978-006-03L Re Failure of Sola Transformer, & LER 1978-007-03L Re Trip of Boric Acid Transfer Pump on Thermal Overload
ML19095A5131978-02-24024 February 1978
Submit Licensee Event Report No. LER-78-001/03L-0 Re Hydraulic Shock Suppressor Found Inverted with Empty Reservoir
ML19105A0951978-02-16016 February 1978
LER 1978-003-03L Re Erroneous Readings of Loop a Hot Leg Temperature Protection Channel; LER 1978-004-03L Re Unqualified Welding of Two Diaphragm Welds on Heat Exchanger; & LER 1978-005-03L Re Low Current Condition from Heat Tracing
ML19105A0971978-02-0202 February 1978
LER 1978-001-03L for Surry Unit 2 Inoperability of Condenser Circulating Water Outlet Valve
ML19095A5141978-01-0909 January 1978
Submit Licensee Event Report Nos. LER-77-021/03L-0 & LER-77-022/03L-0
ML19105A0991978-01-0909 January 1978
LER 1977-021-03L Re Routine Sampling of Bast a Revealed Tank Was at Concentration of 11.5%, & LER 1977-022-03L Re Failure of Comparator to Trip During Routine Test of a Steam Generator Level Protection Channel II
2020-02-04
[Table view] |
Text
10CFR50.73 Virginia Electric and Power CompanySurry Power Station5570 Hog Island RoadSurry, Virginia 23883March 30, 2015U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Serial No.: 15-127Attention:
Document Control Desk SPS: JCPWashington, D. C. 20555-0001 Docket No.: 50-28050-281License No.: DRP-32DPR-37Pursuant to 10CFR50.73, Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits thefollowing Licensee Event Report applicable to Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2.Report No. 50-280, 50-281/2015-001-00 This report has been reviewed by the Station Facility Safety Review Committee and willbe forwarded to the Management Safety Review Committee for its review.Very truly yours,N. L. LaneSite Vice President Surry Power StationEnclosure Commitment contained in this letter: Nonecc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region IIMarquis One Tower, Suite 1200245 Peachtree Center Ave., NEAtlanta, GA 30303-1257 NRC Senior Resident Inspector Surry Power Station NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES:
01/31/2017 (02-2014)
(02-2014)
Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request:
80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />.Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.
Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections
.LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LEBranch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or byLE EP (LEmR) internet e-mail to and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and(See Page 2 for required number of RegulatoryAffairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104),
Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMBdigits/characters for each block) control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to,the information collection.
- 1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. PAGESurry Power Station, Unit 1 05000280 1 OF 34. TITLEInadequate Missile Protection Due to Failure to Procedurally Control Sliding Missile Shields5. EVENT DATE 6. LER NUMBER 7. REPORT DATE 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVEDMO D YEAR I SEQUENTIAL REV FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBERM NUMBER NO. MONTH DAY YEAR Surry Power Station, Unit 2 05000281FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER01 27 2015 2015- 001 -00 3 30 2015 050009. OPERATING MODE 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)El 20.2201(b)
[I 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
[1 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
El 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
N[ 20.2201(d)
E] 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
NEl 20.2203(a)(1)
El 20.2203(a)(4)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
__ 20.2203(a)(2)(i)
El 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
- 10. POWER LEVEL El 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)
El 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(x)
El 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
El 50.36(c)(2)
[ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)
El 73.71(a)(4)
El 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
El 50.46(a)(3)(ii)
[ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
" l 73.71(a)(5) 100El 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
ED 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
El OTHER[E 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
[ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) speciinAbsfact belowFor in12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LERLICENSEE CONTACT TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)N. L. Lane, Site Vice President (757) 365-200113. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORTCAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU- REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU- REPORTABLE FACTURER TO EPIX FACTURER TO EPIXD XX DR -- N14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED
- 15. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEARSUBMISSION El YES (Ifyes, complete
- 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) [ NO DATEABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)On January 27, 2015, with Units 1 and 2 operating at 100 percent power, it was identified that foursliding missile shields on the Main Steam Valve House (MSVH) were not included in the AbnormalEnvironmental Conditions procedure to be closed upon the threat of high winds. The shields arenecessary to meet the design function of the MSVH for protection of the safety-related equipment and must be closed to perform their design function.
A missile penetrating the MSVH could haveprevented the MS and/or AFW systems from being able to mitigate the consequences of -anaccident.
Therefore, this event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v).
The shields wereinappropriately excluded from the original revision of the procedure, which has now been revised toinclude the shields.
This event posed no significant safety implications due to the low probability ofmissile damage inside the MSVH with the shields open. Therefore, the health and safety of thepublic were not affected by this event.NRC FORM 366 (02-2014)
NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES:
01131/2017 (02-2014)
Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request:
80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />.Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.
Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T.5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or byLICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) internet e-mail to lnfocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory
- Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104),
Office of Management and Budget,CONTINUATION SHEET Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display acurrently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is notrequired to respond to, the information collection.
- 1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGEYEAR SEQUENTIAL REVSYrEAR INUMBER NO.Surry Power Station 05000-280
__NUMBER
_ NO. 2 OF 32015 -001 00NARRATIVE 1.0 DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENTOn January 27, 2015, with Units 1 and 2 operating at 100 percent power, it was identified that the sliding missile shields [EIIS XX-DR] for the four Main Steam Valve House (MSVH)access doors were not included in the Abnormal Environmental Conditions procedure to beclosed upon the threat of high winds in the event of a hurricane or tornado watch or warning.The shields are necessary to meet the design function of the MSVH for protection of theequipment inside the MSVH (e.g., auxiliary feedwater pumps [EllS BA-P] or other safety-related components in the Main Steam (MS) [EllS SB] and Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) [EIISBA] systems) from high wind generated missiles.
These shields are normally maintained open and must be closed upon the threat of high winds from a hurricane or tornado in orderto perform their design function.
This issue was discovered during a procedure revisionwalk-through.
There have been approximately ten instances in the past three years when the AbnormalEnvironmental Conditions procedure was entered and it was determined that closure ofsliding missile shields would have been appropriate due to local weather conditions.
Duringthese times, a missile could have penetrated the unprotected access doors and interacted with the auxiliary feedwater pumps or other safety-related components in the MS and AFWsystems located inside the MSVH. 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vi) includes events caused byprocedural inadequacies.
Since the Abnormal Environmental Conditions procedure did notensure sliding missile shield closure, a missile could have prevented the AFW and/or MSsystem from performing their safety functions and is therefore reportable pursuant10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v).
2.0 SIGNIFICANT SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS The MSVH sliding missile shields are part of the Class 1 structure designed to protectsafety-related components inside the MSVH from the effects of tornados and high winds. Ifthe doors are not closed upon the threat of high winds, the potential exists for a tornado-generated missile to disable a combination of MS lines and AFW trains which wouldchallenge the ability to remove decay heat. Contingencies exist in Surry's functionrestoration procedures to provide alternate means of Decay Heat Removal, such asestablishing Bleed and Feed Cooling or operation of the AFW crosstie from the other Unit.Based on an assessment of this event, the increase in risk was determined to be of lowsignificance due to the low probability of a missile entering the MSVH and disabling Surry'sability to remove decay heat. As a result, the health and safety of the public were notaffected.
NRC FORM 366A (02-2014)
NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (02-2014)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)CONTINUATION SHEET1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGEYEAR SEQUENTIAL REVYEAR NUMBER NO.Surry Power Station 05000- 280 3 OF 32015 -001 -00NARRATIVE 3.0CAUSEThe Main Steam Valve House sliding missile shields were not included in original version ofthe Abnormal Environmental Conditions procedure.
No documentation could be identified that indicated the reason these doors were not included in the procedure.
No similarprocedure could be identified to exist prior to issuance of the original revision of the currentprocedure.
4.0 IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION(S)
The abnormal environmental conditions procedure has been revised to include the fourMSVH sliding missile shields in the list of sliding missile shields to be closed upon the threatof high winds.5.0 ADDITIONAL CORRECTIVE ACTIONSAn extent of condition review was completed and verified that the station sliding missileshields are included in the Abnormal Environmental Condition procedure.
6.0 ACTIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE No additional actions are required.
7.0 SIMILAR EVENTSNone8.0 MANUFACTURER/MODEL NUMBERNot applicable 9.0 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NoneNRC FORM 366 (02-2014)
