Information Notice 2010-04, Diesel Generator Voltage Regulation System Component Due to Latent Manufacturing Defect: Difference between revisions

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Created page by program invented by StriderTol
StriderTol Bot change
 
Line 14: Line 14:
| page count = 5
| page count = 5
}}
}}
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES
{{#Wiki_filter:ML093340392 UNITED STATES


NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Line 24: Line 24:
OFFICE OF NEW REACTORS
OFFICE OF NEW REACTORS


WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 February 26, 2010
WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001  
NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2010-04:                   DIESEL GENERATOR VOLTAGE REGULATION
 
February 26, 2010  
 
NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2010-04:  
DIESEL GENERATOR VOLTAGE REGULATION


SYSTEM COMPONENT DUE TO LATENT
SYSTEM COMPONENT DUE TO LATENT
Line 51: Line 55:
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice (IN) to alert
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice (IN) to alert


addressees to possible latent manufacturing defects in emergency diesel generator (EDG)
addressees to possible latent manufacturing defects in emergency diesel generator (EDG)  
voltage regulation components. The NRC expects that recipients will review the information for
voltage regulation components. The NRC expects that recipients will review the information for


applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.
applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.
Line 65: Line 69:
Nuclear Generating Station Unit 2, the train A EDG tripped on a generator differential
Nuclear Generating Station Unit 2, the train A EDG tripped on a generator differential


protective relay trip shortly after paralleling it to offsite power. The licensee declared the EDG
protective relay trip shortly after paralleling it to offsite power. The licensee declared the EDG


inoperable.
inoperable.
Line 71: Line 75:
Licensee troubleshooting revealed damage to the excitation control system for the generator on
Licensee troubleshooting revealed damage to the excitation control system for the generator on


one of the three phase alternating current voltage inputs to the rectifier bridge. The damaged
one of the three phase alternating current voltage inputs to the rectifier bridge. The damaged


electrical component was found to be the C phase linear power reactor. A linear power reactor
electrical component was found to be the C phase linear power reactor. A linear power reactor


is an electrical component consisting of a magnetic coil (inductor). The linear power reactor
is an electrical component consisting of a magnetic coil (inductor). The linear power reactor


function is to limit the magnitude of the current through the excitation bridge, which supplies the
function is to limit the magnitude of the current through the excitation bridge, which supplies the


generator field during operation. The licensee inspection of the failed magnetic coil found burnt
generator field during operation. The licensee inspection of the failed magnetic coil found burnt and charred copper conductors and insulation materials. No additional electrical components in
 
and charred copper conductors and insulation materials. No additional electrical components in


the cabinet were found damaged or operating out of specifications. Troubleshooting also
the cabinet were found damaged or operating out of specifications. Troubleshooting also


revealed that the failure was isolated to this component and not caused by any other component
revealed that the failure was isolated to this component and not caused by any other component
Line 91: Line 93:
The licensee sent the failed linear power reactor to an external laboratory for an equipment
The licensee sent the failed linear power reactor to an external laboratory for an equipment


failure analysis. The analysis determined the cause of the component failure to be a latent
failure analysis. The analysis determined the cause of the component failure to be a latent


manufacturing defect. An iron core lamination was slightly out of alignment with the other
manufacturing defect. An iron core lamination was slightly out of alignment with the other


laminations in the transformers E core assembly. The slight misalignment created a sharp, thin metal edge that, coincident with existing lamination vibration, slowly cut into and degraded
laminations in the transformers E core assembly. The slight misalignment created a sharp, thin metal edge that, coincident with existing lamination vibration, slowly cut into and degraded


the internal insulation around the coil wire. The internal insulation was found to be cut/worn
the internal insulation around the coil wire. The internal insulation was found to be cut/worn


below the required voltage withstand level resulting in a winding-to-winding fault. The high fault
below the required voltage withstand level resulting in a winding-to-winding fault. The high fault


current caused very high temperatures and melting of the copper windings. Due to the relatively
current caused very high temperatures and melting of the copper windings. Due to the relatively


small amount of run time (approximately 3000 hours) on the EDG, the insulation degradation
small amount of run time (approximately 3000 hours) on the EDG, the insulation degradation


developed slowly over a period of approximately 25 years. Manufacturing defects normally
developed slowly over a period of approximately 25 years. Manufacturing defects normally


manifest as an early failure, however the limited actual in-service energized time of the EDG
manifest as an early failure, however the limited actual in-service energized time of the EDG


delayed the appearance of the defect. However, once a coil winding-to-winding fault develops, it is postulated that it grows quickly, resulting in sudden component failure in a relatively short
delayed the appearance of the defect. However, once a coil winding-to-winding fault develops, it is postulated that it grows quickly, resulting in sudden component failure in a relatively short


period of time.
period of time.


Palo Verde licensee corrective actions include the following:
Palo Verde licensee corrective actions include the following:  


* Adding a preventive maintenance task for thermography of EDG excitation system silicon
* Adding a preventive maintenance task for thermography of EDG excitation system silicon
Line 119: Line 121:
controlled bridge rectifiers, power diode bridge rectifiers, current transformers, power
controlled bridge rectifiers, power diode bridge rectifiers, current transformers, power


transformers, and linear reactors. Additionally, performing these new thermography surveys
transformers, and linear reactors. Additionally, performing these new thermography surveys


may necessitate a plant modification to install new viewing ports for safely performing
may necessitate a plant modification to install new viewing ports for safely performing
Line 135: Line 137:
detect degrading insulation integrity.
detect degrading insulation integrity.


* Periodically replacing some power magnetic components based on service time. Availability
* Periodically replacing some power magnetic components based on service time. Availability


of spares for the excitation system components can increase EDG availability.
of spares for the excitation system components can increase EDG availability.


Other actions to be considered by licensees may include:
Other actions to be considered by licensees may include:


* Performing visual inspections for burn marks on the linear power reactors, conductors, cabinet and electrical connections.
* Performing visual inspections for burn marks on the linear power reactors, conductors, cabinet and electrical connections.
Line 158: Line 160:
The licensee's preventive maintenance strategy included a visual inspection and cleaning at a
The licensee's preventive maintenance strategy included a visual inspection and cleaning at a


frequency of once every three fuel cycles. The visual inspection was non-intrusive and would
frequency of once every three fuel cycles. The visual inspection was non-intrusive and would


not reveal latent manufacturing defects. There are no vendor recommendations that specify
not reveal latent manufacturing defects. There are no vendor recommendations that specify


predictive maintenance to identify degrading magnetic components prior to failure.
predictive maintenance to identify degrading magnetic components prior to failure.
Line 172: Line 174:
Reviews by the licensee and the NRC revealed past industry experience with degraded voltage
Reviews by the licensee and the NRC revealed past industry experience with degraded voltage


regulation magnetic components. However, these prior events did not conduct detailed
regulation magnetic components. However, these prior events did not conduct detailed


laboratory analyses to determine the failure mechanisms. In most cases, the failures were
laboratory analyses to determine the failure mechanisms. In most cases, the failures were


attributed to age related degradation. However, the DuPont Nomex insulation material used for
attributed to age related degradation. However, the DuPont Nomex insulation material used for


the linear reactor coils was found to be rated for an extended life while in service up to
the linear reactor coils was found to be rated for an extended life while in service up to


428 degrees Fahrenheit (220 degrees Celsius). In this case, the manufacturing defect was
428 degrees Fahrenheit (220 degrees Celsius). In this case, the manufacturing defect was


attributed to poor workmanship and assembly techniques during original component
attributed to poor workmanship and assembly techniques during original component


construction. The failed component was originally assembled in the 1970s and installed in the
construction. The failed component was originally assembled in the 1970s and installed in the


1980s. The defect went undetected until its ultimate failure under loaded conditions. The
1980s. The defect went undetected until its ultimate failure under loaded conditions. The


relatively small amount of run time on the EDGs, over several years, facilitates characterizing
relatively small amount of run time on the EDGs, over several years, facilitates characterizing
Line 197: Line 199:
S
S


This IN requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any questions about this
This IN requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any questions about this


matter to the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor
matter to the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor
Line 203: Line 205:
Regulation project manager.
Regulation project manager.


/RA/                                           /RA by MTschiltz for/
/RA/  
Timothy J. McGinty, Director                 Daniel H. Dorman, Director
 
/RA by MTschiltz for/  
 
Timothy J. McGinty, Director
 
Daniel H. Dorman, Director
 
Division of Policy and Rulemaking
 
Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards
 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation


Division of Policy and Rulemaking            Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards
Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards


Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation          Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
/RA/


/RA/
Glenn Tracy, Director


===Glenn Tracy, Director===
Division of Construction Inspection
Division of Construction Inspection


and Operational Programs
and Operational Programs


===Office of New Reactors===
Office of New Reactors
Technical Contacts:   Joseph Bashore                       Prem Sahay
 
Technical Contacts: Joseph Bashore
 
Prem Sahay
 
623-393-3737 
 
301-415-8439


623-393-3737                          301-415-8439 E-mail: Joseph.Bashore@nrc.gov       email: Prem.Sahay@nrc.gov
E-mail: Joseph.Bashore@nrc.gov email: Prem.Sahay@nrc.gov


Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web site, http://www.nrc.gov, under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections.
Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web site, http://www.nrc.gov, under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections.


==CONTACT==
==CONTACT==
S
S


This IN requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any questions about this
This IN requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any questions about this


matter to the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor
matter to the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor
Line 233: Line 252:
Regulation project manager.
Regulation project manager.


/RA/                                           /RA by MTschiltz for/
/RA/  
Timothy J. McGinty, Director                   Daniel H. Dorman, Director
 
/RA by MTschiltz for/  
 
Timothy J. McGinty, Director
 
Daniel H. Dorman, Director
 
Division of Policy and Rulemaking
 
Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards
 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation


Division of Policy and Rulemaking              Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards
Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards


Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation          Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
/RA/


/RA/
Glenn Tracy, Director


===Glenn Tracy, Director===
Division of Construction Inspection
Division of Construction Inspection


and Operational Programs
and Operational Programs


===Office of New Reactors===
Office of New Reactors
Technical Contacts:   Joseph Bashore                         Prem Sahay
 
Technical Contacts: Joseph Bashore
 
Prem Sahay
 
623-393-3737 
 
301-415-8439
 
E-mail:  Joseph.Bashore@nrc.gov  email:  Prem.Sahay@nrc.gov
 
Note:  NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web site, http://www.nrc.gov, under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections.
 
ADAMS Accession Number: ML093340392 
 
ME2313 OFFICE
 
EEEB:DE
 
Tech Editor
 
BC:EEB:DE:NRO BC:EEEB:DE D:DE
 
NAME
 
PSahay
 
KAzariah-Kribbs APal
 
GWilson
 
PHiland
 
DATE
 
01/19/2010
12/15/09 email
 
01/20/2010 email
 
01/20/2010
01/25/2010
 
OFFICE
 
PGCB:DPR
 
PGCB:DPR
 
BC:PGCB:DPR
 
D:DCIP:NRO
 
D:FCSS:NMSS D:DPR
 
NAME
 
DBeaulieu


623-393-3737                            301-415-8439 E-mail: Joseph.Bashore@nrc.gov          email: Prem.Sahay@nrc.gov
CHawes


Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web site, http://www.nrc.gov, under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections.
MMurphy


ADAMS Accession Number: ML093340392                                                  ME2313 OFFICE    EEEB:DE      Tech Editor    BC:EEB:DE:NRO    BC:EEEB:DE  D:DE
GTracy


NAME      PSahay        KAzariah-Kribbs APal            GWilson      PHiland
DDorman


DATE      01/19/2010    12/15/09 email  01/20/2010 email 01/20/2010  01/25/2010
(MTschitlz for)
OFFICE    PGCB:DPR      PGCB:DPR        BC:PGCB:DPR      D:DCIP:NRO  D:FCSS:NMSS    D:DPR
TMcGinty


NAME      DBeaulieu    CHawes          MMurphy          GTracy      DDorman        TMcGinty
DATE


(MTschitlz for)
01/26/10  
DATE      01/26/10     01/27/10       01/27/10         02/23/10     02/26/10       02/26/10
01/27/10  
                                    OFFICIAL RECORD COPY}}
01/27/10  
02/23/10  
02/26/10  
02/26/10  
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY}}


{{Information notice-Nav}}
{{Information notice-Nav}}

Latest revision as of 09:03, 14 January 2025

Diesel Generator Voltage Regulation System Component Due to Latent Manufacturing Defect
ML093340392
Person / Time
Issue date: 02/26/2010
From: Dan Dorman, Mcginty T, Tracy G
NRC/NMSS/FCSS, Division of Construction Inspection and Operational Programs, Division of Policy and Rulemaking
To:
Beaulieu, D P, NRR/DPR, 415-3243
References
IN-10-004
Download: ML093340392 (5)


ML093340392 UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

OFFICE OF NEW REACTORS

WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001

February 26, 2010

NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2010-04:

DIESEL GENERATOR VOLTAGE REGULATION

SYSTEM COMPONENT DUE TO LATENT

MANUFACTURING DEFECT

ADDRESSEES

All holders of an operating license or construction permit for a nuclear power reactor issued

under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Domestic Licensing of

Production and Utilization Facilities, except those who have permanently ceased operations

and have certified that fuel has been permanently removed from the reactor vessel.

All holders of or applicants for an early site permit, standard design certification, standard

design approval, manufacturing license, or combined license issued under 10 CFR Part 52, Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants.

All holders of or applicants for a license for a fuel cycle facility issued pursuant to

10 CFR Part 70, Domestic Licensing of Special Nuclear Material.

PURPOSE

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice (IN) to alert

addressees to possible latent manufacturing defects in emergency diesel generator (EDG)

voltage regulation components. The NRC expects that recipients will review the information for

applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.

Suggestions contained in this IN are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or

written response is required.

DESCRIPTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES

On November 12, 2008, during the performance of a monthly surveillance test at Palo Verde

Nuclear Generating Station Unit 2, the train A EDG tripped on a generator differential

protective relay trip shortly after paralleling it to offsite power. The licensee declared the EDG

inoperable.

Licensee troubleshooting revealed damage to the excitation control system for the generator on

one of the three phase alternating current voltage inputs to the rectifier bridge. The damaged

electrical component was found to be the C phase linear power reactor. A linear power reactor

is an electrical component consisting of a magnetic coil (inductor). The linear power reactor

function is to limit the magnitude of the current through the excitation bridge, which supplies the

generator field during operation. The licensee inspection of the failed magnetic coil found burnt and charred copper conductors and insulation materials. No additional electrical components in

the cabinet were found damaged or operating out of specifications. Troubleshooting also

revealed that the failure was isolated to this component and not caused by any other component

in the voltage regulation system.

The licensee sent the failed linear power reactor to an external laboratory for an equipment

failure analysis. The analysis determined the cause of the component failure to be a latent

manufacturing defect. An iron core lamination was slightly out of alignment with the other

laminations in the transformers E core assembly. The slight misalignment created a sharp, thin metal edge that, coincident with existing lamination vibration, slowly cut into and degraded

the internal insulation around the coil wire. The internal insulation was found to be cut/worn

below the required voltage withstand level resulting in a winding-to-winding fault. The high fault

current caused very high temperatures and melting of the copper windings. Due to the relatively

small amount of run time (approximately 3000 hours0.0347 days <br />0.833 hours <br />0.00496 weeks <br />0.00114 months <br />) on the EDG, the insulation degradation

developed slowly over a period of approximately 25 years. Manufacturing defects normally

manifest as an early failure, however the limited actual in-service energized time of the EDG

delayed the appearance of the defect. However, once a coil winding-to-winding fault develops, it is postulated that it grows quickly, resulting in sudden component failure in a relatively short

period of time.

Palo Verde licensee corrective actions include the following:

controlled bridge rectifiers, power diode bridge rectifiers, current transformers, power

transformers, and linear reactors. Additionally, performing these new thermography surveys

may necessitate a plant modification to install new viewing ports for safely performing

thermography in difficult locations similar to the cabinet housing the linear power reactors.

  • Using a data recorder to capture various EDG parameters during startup and provide

trending for troubleshooting can enhance the licensees corrective action program.

  • Inspecting linear power reactors for signs of defects such as observing splits in the

laminated windings of the transformers E core and by performing surge/meggar testing to

detect degrading insulation integrity.

  • Periodically replacing some power magnetic components based on service time. Availability

of spares for the excitation system components can increase EDG availability.

Other actions to be considered by licensees may include:

  • Performing visual inspections for burn marks on the linear power reactors, conductors, cabinet and electrical connections.
  • Incorporating into plant maintenance procedures the industry's preventive maintenance

recommendations contained in Technical Report/Maintenance Guide for the individual

voltage regulator model.

DISCUSSION

This IN describes the failure of a linear power reactor in an EDG voltage regulation system at

plant where the licensees preventive maintenance program did not address the EDG excitation

system magnetic components that can be subject to deterioration with age or time in service.

The licensee's preventive maintenance strategy included a visual inspection and cleaning at a

frequency of once every three fuel cycles. The visual inspection was non-intrusive and would

not reveal latent manufacturing defects. There are no vendor recommendations that specify

predictive maintenance to identify degrading magnetic components prior to failure.

Thermography, surge testing, or other maintenance practices may reveal a potential fault

developing after the insulation sufficiently degrades, but it might not be enough in advance to

prevent an equipment failure in-service.

Reviews by the licensee and the NRC revealed past industry experience with degraded voltage

regulation magnetic components. However, these prior events did not conduct detailed

laboratory analyses to determine the failure mechanisms. In most cases, the failures were

attributed to age related degradation. However, the DuPont Nomex insulation material used for

the linear reactor coils was found to be rated for an extended life while in service up to

428 degrees Fahrenheit (220 degrees Celsius). In this case, the manufacturing defect was

attributed to poor workmanship and assembly techniques during original component

construction. The failed component was originally assembled in the 1970s and installed in the

1980s. The defect went undetected until its ultimate failure under loaded conditions. The

relatively small amount of run time on the EDGs, over several years, facilitates characterizing

these types of defects as age related failures whereas latent component manufacturing defects

can actually result in failures earlier than what is their expected service life.

CONTACT

S

This IN requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any questions about this

matter to the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation project manager.

/RA/

/RA by MTschiltz for/

Timothy J. McGinty, Director

Daniel H. Dorman, Director

Division of Policy and Rulemaking

Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

/RA/

Glenn Tracy, Director

Division of Construction Inspection

and Operational Programs

Office of New Reactors

Technical Contacts: Joseph Bashore

Prem Sahay

623-393-3737

301-415-8439

E-mail: Joseph.Bashore@nrc.gov email: Prem.Sahay@nrc.gov

Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web site, http://www.nrc.gov, under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections.

CONTACT

S

This IN requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any questions about this

matter to the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation project manager.

/RA/

/RA by MTschiltz for/

Timothy J. McGinty, Director

Daniel H. Dorman, Director

Division of Policy and Rulemaking

Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

/RA/

Glenn Tracy, Director

Division of Construction Inspection

and Operational Programs

Office of New Reactors

Technical Contacts: Joseph Bashore

Prem Sahay

623-393-3737

301-415-8439

E-mail: Joseph.Bashore@nrc.gov email: Prem.Sahay@nrc.gov

Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web site, http://www.nrc.gov, under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections.

ADAMS Accession Number: ML093340392

ME2313 OFFICE

EEEB:DE

Tech Editor

BC:EEB:DE:NRO BC:EEEB:DE D:DE

NAME

PSahay

KAzariah-Kribbs APal

GWilson

PHiland

DATE

01/19/2010

12/15/09 email

01/20/2010 email

01/20/2010

01/25/2010

OFFICE

PGCB:DPR

PGCB:DPR

BC:PGCB:DPR

D:DCIP:NRO

D:FCSS:NMSS D:DPR

NAME

DBeaulieu

CHawes

MMurphy

GTracy

DDorman

(MTschitlz for)

TMcGinty

DATE

01/26/10

01/27/10

01/27/10

02/23/10

02/26/10

02/26/10

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY