Information Notice 2010-07, Welding Defects in Replacement Steam Generators
ML100070106 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Issue date: | 04/05/2010 |
From: | David Beaulieu Office of New Reactors |
To: | |
Beaulieu, D P, NRR/DPR, 415-3243 | |
References | |
IN-10-007 | |
Download: ML100070106 (5) | |
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS
OFFICE OF NEW REACTORS
WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 April 5, 2010
NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2010-07: WELDING DEFECTS IN REPLACEMENT STEAM
GENERATORS
ADDRESSEES
All holders of an operating license or construction permit for a nuclear power reactor issued
under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Domestic Licensing of
Production and Utilization Facilities, except those who have permanently ceased operations
and have certified that fuel has been permanently removed from the reactor vessel.
All holders of or applicants for an early site permit, standard design certification, standard
design approval, manufacturing license, or combined license issued under 10 CFR Part 52, Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants.
All holders of or applicants for a license for a fuel cycle facility issued pursuant to
10 CFR Part 70, Domestic Licensing of Special Nuclear Material.
PURPOSE
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice (IN) to inform
addressees to the problem of welding defects that were associated with the manufacturing of
replacement steam generators (RSGs). The NRC expects that recipients will review the
information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid
similar problems. Suggestions contained in this IN are not NRC requirements; therefore, no
specific action or written response is required.
DESCRIPTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES
The licensee, Southern California Edison (SCE), contracted Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI),
to manufacture four RSGs in Japan for installation at San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station
(SONGS) Units 2 and 3. MHI completed manufacturing and testing of the first two RSGs in
2008 and shipped them to SONGS Unit 2 for scheduled installation in October 2009. MHI was
scheduled to complete manufacturing and testing of the two RSGs for SONGS Unit 3 in 2009.
On March 18, 2009, MHI conducted a routine visual inspection after completion of the American
Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (ASME Code),Section III
primary and secondary side hydrostatic pressure test on the SONGS Unit 3 B RSG and
discovered a 5-inch long surface flaw (crack) in the dissimilar metal weld between the divider
plate, made from Alloy 690, and the channel head, made from low-alloy steel (LAS). The flaw
formed between the LAS and the Alloy 152 butter. A photograph of flaw and a schematic
diagram of the weld joint are shown in the enclosure.
After discovering this weld flaw, MHI conducted additional inspections with dye penetrant test
(PT) and ultrasonic test (UT) examinations on all the divider plate to channel head welds in both
SONGS Unit 3 RSGs. With the expanded inspections, MHI found several small surface flaws in
the Unit 3 A RSG that was being manufactured at the same time. In addition, in both Unit 3 RSGs, UT examinations revealed that almost all of the Alloy 152 butter under the divider plate
and some stainless steel cladding adjacent to the divider plate had separated from the LAS
substrate. SCE performed the same PT and UT examinations on the two RSGs made for
SONGS Unit 2 by MHI in 2008 and did not find any indication of flaws.
SCE and MHI investigated the root cause of the cracking in the SONGS Unit 3 RSGs. SCE and
MHI determined that the separation in the SONGS Unit 3 RSGs followed the fusion line
between the Alloy 152 butter/stainless steel cladding and the LAS substrate. The weld joint was
prepared by removing the stainless steel cladding from the RSG surface using air carbon-arc
gouging (ACAG) and surface grinding to prepare for the deposition of Alloy 152 as a butter
pass. The root cause of the separation was associated with the ACAG technique. The ACAG
resulted in higher carbon content and areas of higher hardness in the vicinity of the fusion line
between the butter pass and the LAS substrate. During subsequent surface preparation by
grinding, MHI did not ensure that all of the surface carbonized material was removed. The
regions of higher hardness and variations in surface conditions led to unfavorable metallurgical
properties at the interface between the Alloy 152 butter and LAS substrate. Separation between
the Alloy 152 butter and LAS was subsequently identified during the inspections following the
primary side hydrostatic testing of the SONGS Unit 3 RSGs. The cladding in the SONGS Unit 2 RSGs was removed by machining without using ACAG. As a result, the RSGs for SONGS Unit
2 passed the ASME Code Section III secondary side hydrostatic pressure test without any
inspection issues.
SCE and MHI presented the results of their root cause investigation at a public meeting with the
NRC on September 15, 2009. The presentation slides are available through the NRCs
Agencywide Documents Access and Management System, under Accession No.
DISCUSSION
The welding defects identified at the fabrication facility on the RSGs for SONGS Unit 3 are
unlike the weldability issues that are typically observed in the welding of nickel-based alloys.
For the SONGS Unit 3 RSGs, surface preparation for the Alloy 152 butter was inadequate.
Contamination from the ACAG, used to remove the stainless steel cladding, resulted in elevated
hardness of the material adjacent to the fusion line that remained on the surface after the
grinding step. When the butter pass was applied, the metallurgical bond between the LAS and
Alloy 152 butter weld pass was not as strong as it should have been.
The fabricator followed approved welding procedures for dissimilar metal welding of Alloy 690 to
LAS and had recently built two RSGs for SONGS Unit 2 according to these procedures without
problems. However, for the SONGS Unit 3 RSGs, the fabricator requested and the licensee
approved a deviation to allow using an alternative method (in this case ACAG) to prepare the LAS surface for butter application. According to the ASME Code,Section IX, this deviation did
not require the requalification of the welding procedure because this aspect of the weld joint
preparation was not considered an essential variable.
ACAG could be used in the manufacturing or repair of any ASME Code Class 1, 2, or 3 component. The ACAG technique is an accepted procedure for removing metal. American
Welding Society (AWS) C5.3:2000, Recommended Practices for Air Carbon Arc Gouging and
Cutting, states that welding on a surface after ACAG may generally be performed with a
minimum of grinding or cleaning. However, the standard also notes the limitation that the
process increases the surface hardness on cast iron and air hardenable metals. This may be
objectionable.
ACAG is not specifically covered in Section III of the ASME Code; however, ASME Code,Section XI, IWA-4461 covers the qualification and use of a thermal removal process like ACAG.
In addition, 10 CFR 50.55a(b)(2)(xxiii) states:
The use of provisions to eliminate the mechanical processing of thermally cut
surfaces in IWA-4461.4.2 of Section XI, 2001 Edition through the latest edition
and addenda incorporated by reference in paragraph (b)(2) of 10 CFR 50.55a
are prohibited.
Although all specific requirements or standards were met, this event illustrates that control over
all aspects of welding ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 components can prevent welding defects
like those found in the RSGs for SONGS Unit 3 from occurring.
CONTACT
This IN requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any questions about this
matter to the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation (NRR) project manager.
/RA/ /RA/
Timothy J. McGinty, Director Daniel H. Dorman, Director
Division of Policy and Rulemaking Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
/RA/
Glenn M. Tracy, Director
Division of Construction Inspection
and Operational Programs
Office of New Reactors
Technical Contact:
Patrick T. Purtscher, NRR
301-415-3942 E-mail: Patrick.Purtscher@nrc.gov
Enclosure: San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS)
Replacement Steam Generator Welding Defects
Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Website, http://www.nrc.gov, under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections.
CONTACT
This IN requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any questions about this
matter to the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation (NRR) project manager.
/RA/ /RA/
Timothy J. McGinty, Director Daniel H. Dorman, Director
Division of Policy and Rulemaking Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
/RA/
Glenn M. Tracy, Director
Division of Construction Inspection
and Operational Programs
Office of New Reactors
Technical Contact:
Patrick T. Purtscher, NRR
301-415-3942 E-mail: Patrick.Purtscher@nrc.gov
Enclosure: San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS)
Replacement Steam Generator Welding Defects
Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Website, http://www.nrc.gov, under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections.
ADAMS ACCESSION NO.: ML100070106 TAC ME2447 OFFICE CVIB:DCI TECH EDITOR BC:CVIB:DCI D: DCI BC:CIB1:DE:NRO
NAME PPurtscher CHsu MMitchell MEvans DTerao
DATE 2/4/10 1/19/10 email 2/4/10 2/12/10 2/12/10
OFFICE PGCB:DPR PGCB:DPR BC:PGCB:DPR D:DCIP:NRO D:FCSS:NMSS D:DPR
NAME DBeaulieu CHawes MMurphy GTracy DDorman TMcGinty
DATE 2/16/10 2/18/10 3/1/10 3/30/10 3/19/10 4/05/10
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
IN 2010-07 San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS)
Replacement Steam Generator Welding Defects
SONGS Unit 3 B Replacement Steam Generator
Cold-Side Crack in Divider Plate-to-Channel Head Weld
Enclosure