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| | number = ML20136C957 | | | number = ML20136C957 |
| | issue date = 05/27/1983 | | | issue date = 05/27/1983 |
| | title = Cost Analysis Group Review of Draft Commission Paper, 'Moderation of Protection for Spent Fuel Shipments.' | | | title = Cost Analysis Group Review of Draft Commission Paper, Moderation of Protection for Spent Fuel Shipments |
| | author name = | | | author name = |
| | author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (ORM) | | | author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (ORM) |
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| {{#Wiki_filter:. . . | | {{#Wiki_filter:}} |
| COST AtlALYSIS GROUP'S REVIEW 0F ORAFT C0 mISSI0tl PAPER M00ERATI0ft 0F PROTECTION FOR SPENT FUEL SHIPMEllTS 4
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| ! pared by:
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| Cost Analysis Group Division of Budget and Analysis Office of Resource Management
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| : 5. Nuclear Regulatory mmission ps c%q
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| .g; f 8511210194 851022 PDR FOIA BELL 85-361 PDR
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| | |
| ;.-.-. u.- - - =. - - - - - -* -
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| 1 . .
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| 'j '
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| 1 COST ANALYSIS GROUP'S REVIEW 0F MODERATION OF PROTECTION OF SPENT FUEL SHIPMENTS - DRAFT COMMISSION PAPER 4
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| Introduction This report is in response to a request from the Ccmmittee to Faview Generic
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| ,, Requirements (CRGR) to review the Draft Commission Pater entitled " Moderation of Protection Requirements for Spent Fuel Shipments" (see attached). The Commission Paper recommends the relaxation of certain safeguards for fuel that is a allowed to cool for 150 days or more. The costs and benefits identified in the Commission Paper that are associated with the proposed rule change are as follows: '
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| Costs -
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| An unspecified increased likelihood of successful explosive sabotage of a spent fuel shipment in a heavily populated area 4
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| , resulting in an average one to four latent cancer fatalities
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| ; per event.
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| Benefits -
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| Savings to licensees:
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| Removal of armed escorts . . . . . . . $27,000 per year Reduced planning and administrative 4
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| expenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $13,000 per year Savings to NRC l Reduced manpower (1.5 S/Y per year)
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| ; Reduced travel expenses . . . . . . . $ 8,000 per year
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| ! Although the Cost Analysis Group (CAG) does not question the reasonableness of these costs and benefits, we.do believe an attempt to quantify these impacts in commensurate units would contribute substantially to the ultimate decision on this proposed action. The following is the CAG's review and recommendations on providing a direct comparison of the costs and benefits.
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| d
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| * CAG Review i The CAG has not attempted any_ independent evaluation of the cost associated with the proposed rule cringe, but rather was struck by the failure of the Commission Paper to include any comparison of costs and benefits. Without such a compari-son, it may not be intuitively obvious to all that the proposed rule change is desirable. What follows is our attempt to provide an integrated cost benefit framework. It must be stressed that this represents a very quick and gross presentation of the facts wherein certain speculative assumptions are employed in an attempt to monetize health effects and assign probabilities to largely
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| , unknown events. Given the uncertainty of our assumptions, the results should be viewed as only illustrative; however, our use of, what are viewed as, highly conservative assumptions leads us to the conclusion that the benefits of the proposed rule change outweigh the likely costs.
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| i a *
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| | |
| . 2 Following are our assumptions concerning the benefits and costs associated with the proposed rule change.
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| Benefits -
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| The CAG adopts the Commission Paper's representation of the benefits associated with the rule change. The NRC manpower savings is converted to dollars based on an assumed $100',000 per professional man-year and associated overhead. Total benefits (savings) equal $198,000 per year which is rounded to $200,000. All benefits are assumed to be in 1983 dollars and assuming all costs escalate at the rate of general inflation, the annual benefit is a constant $200,000 (in 1983 constant dollars).
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| Costs -
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| The costs are currently expressed as an increased likelihood of an average one to four latent cancer fatalities resulting from a success-ful explosive sabotage. For conservatism, our analysis assumes a successful sabotage results in an average of four latent cancer fatali-ties. To convert to comparable dollars, one must assign a dollar value to a latent cancer fatality and make certain assumptions concerning the absolute magnitude of the probability of a successful explosive sabo-tage, and the change in that probability resulting from the relaxation of specified safeguards. These are all highly subjective values and the CAG has no special insight into their true magnitude. However, for the purposes of this illustrative analysis, the following assumptions are made.
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| (1) Dollar value of latent cancer fatality:
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| Low -
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| $ 100,000*
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| Medium - $ 300,000*
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| High - $1,000,000*
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| All dollar values are assumed to be in 1983 dollars and to escalate with general inflation in subsequent years. Thus, these costs, expressed in 1983 constant dollars will be constant over time.
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| (2) Annual probability of a successful explosive sabotage of a spent fuel shipment with existing safeguards in effect:
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| For illustrative purposes, we have conservatively assumed proba-bilities of 1 x 10-3, 1 x 10-6 , and 1 x 10~9 per year for all shipments made over the course of a given year. Intuitively, we believe the real probability is very low and may well be less than 10-9 per year. In the event this is the case, the expected annual cost would be even less than the range of values appearing in Table 1, and therefore would produce benefit cost ratios in excess of those appearing in Table 1.
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| *0ollar values for latent cancer fatalities are those used in the Indian Point Shutdown Hearing, March 1983. Direct Testimony of Frank Rowsome Concerning Com-mission Q. 5, Part B; Perspectives on the Acceptability of Risk, Table Al-1,
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| : p. 5.
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| ~
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| .. .J ~ J ' i .J 1 ~
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| l 3
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| (3) The change in the probability of a successful explosive sabotage -
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| as a result of moderation of safeguards:
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| t The following safeguards would be dropped under the proposed rule l l <
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| change:
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| : a) Armed guards in cities (NOTE: Unarmed escort and surveil-i lance will be retained.)
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| ! b) Advance coordination with local law enforcement agency (LLEA)
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| (NOTE: Based on past experience, NRC believes LLEAs would j respond promptly to all calls for assistance, and NRC would still coordinate in advance with governors or designated p state officials who typically inform LLEAs in any event.)
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| I c) Advance approval of route (NOTE: A recent 00T routing rule provides similar assurance on adequacy of routes.)
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| d) Communication center and two-hour call-ins -(NOTE: On-board comunication equipment would still be maintained.)
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| e) Information protection A review of the impacted safeguards suggests that they are not critical to the safety of the shipment, and, in most instances, i other measures would still provide a similar level of protection.
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| 7 Further, it appears that the probability is overwhelmingly con-trolled by the existence of a highly skilled and dedicated force
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| +
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| , that is committed to inflicting maximum damage, and that the safeguards listed above would not materially alter the probability of success. For these reasons, the CAG believes the probability would only be affected by some small fractional amount, perhaps 10 to 25 percent on the high end. However, for conservatism, we F have assumed that for each of the baseline probabilities identified above (1 x 10-3, 1 x 10-6, 1 x 10-9), the annual. probability of l
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| ' successful explosive sabotage increases 100 percent, 500 percent, and 1000 percent if the relaxed safeguards are adopted. Thus, l'
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| for example, where the probability of success is 1 x 10-6 without the proposed moderations in safeguards, the probability is assumed to range over 2 x 10-6 , 5 x 10-6 and 1 x 10-5 with the safeguards moderations in effect. The net incremental cost is then the dif-ference in expected values resulting from the change in probability.
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| " Had smaller adjustments been used, the expected annual cost would be substantially less than the range of values appearing in Table 1, o and the benefit cost ratios would be even larger.
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| Results The comparison of costs and benefits in comensurate units appears in Table 1.
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| As evidenced in that table, the proposed rule change ;roduces benefits in excess of-costs over a wide range of underlying assumptions. For the range of. assump-
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| ! tions used, the benefit cost ratio varies from about 5.5 to 500 million. That is, for every $1 of cost, there is a benefit of between $5.50 to $500,000,000..
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| | |
| 4 One might . interpret such results as an indication of great uncertainty, which, in turn, raises serious questions concerning the value to attach to our results.
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| Another interpretation, however, and one which we prefer, is that the underlying cost variables were deliberately allowed to vary dramatically to show that their 4"
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| bottom-line impact on the benefit cost ratio. is not sufficient to alter the conclusion that net benefits will result from the proposed rule change.
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| Further, it is the CAG's view that the assumptions are conservative, such that there is little likelihood that the true benefit cost ratio is less than one, and that benefit cost ratios toward the upper end of our range are more probable.
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| t L
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| | |
| TABLE 1 - BENEFIT COST ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED RULE CHANGE FOR MODERATION OF PROTECTION OF SPENT FUEL SilIPMENTS BENEFIT ,
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| Dollar Savings to Licensees and NRC (per year) $200,000 COST Low Medium liig_h Dollar Value of Latent Cancer Fatalities $106700 $ 300,000 $1,660,000 Number of Latent Cancer Fatalities Per Event 4 4 4 Total Dollar Value of llealth Effects $400,000 $1,200,000 $4,000,000 Expected Cost of Safeguard Moderation (Assuming absolute probability of 10-3 per year with moderation resulting in change in probability of:)
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| 100% $ 400 $ 1,200 $ 4.000 500% $ 1,600 $ 4,800 $ 16,000 1000% $ 3.600 $ 10,800 $ 36,000 ui Expected Cost of Safeguard Moderation (Assuming absolute probability of 10-6 per year with moderation resulting in change in probability of:)
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| 100% $ 0.40 $ 1.20 $ 4.00 500% '$ 1.60 $ 4.80 $ 16.00 1000% $ 3.60 $ 10.80 $ 36.00 Expected Cost of Safeguard Moderation (Assuming absolute probability of 10-9 per year with moderation resulting in change in probability of:)
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| 100% 0.4 mils 1.2 mils 4 mils 500% 1.6 mils 4.8 mils 16 mils
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| . 1000% 3.6 mils 10.8 mils 36 mils Range of Expected Cost Per Year Nil (.4 mils) to $ 36,000 Benefit / Cost Ratios 200,000 200,000 t
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| .0004 36,000
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| | |
| b .f. , ,
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| . 7 -m.+.,'.-
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| .L d
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| July 29, 1983 * '
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| ' .' a s. L > -\.\.
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| SEC'?-83-311 For:
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| The Comeissioners Feds: William J. Dircks *
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| , Executive Of rector'for Operations Sub!ect:
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| PROPOSED INSIDER SAFEGUAROS RULES Purcose:
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| To present for Ccmmission consideration, three related ruiemaking actions c ncarning revised requirements for safeguarding po er reactors. Cne of the rulemaking actions, the Accass ~
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| Authoritation Rule, was preparea in response to Commission direction dated June in 30, a memorandum 1980. to the Acting ECO feca the Secretary Discussion:
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| This pacer covers proposed rules in three areas related to safa-guards requirements for power reactors. These are:
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| o Accass Authorication Rule (Screening Requirements) o Search Requirements Rule (Pat-lJewn Search Issue) o Miscallanecus Safeguarcs-Relatad Amendments (Access Centrols, Vital Area Designatien, etc.) .
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| This rule package was studied by a multi-offica Safety / Safeguards Cornittee which was formed in respense to the Chairman's request
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| . of August 16, 1982. The Committaa had the overall task of study- .
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| - ing power reactor safeguards requirements and practices 'A detar-aine whether actual or potantial c:nflicts exist with plant safety objectives. The Committae's rec:mmendatiens have been ac::mmodated in this package.
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| Centacts:
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| T. R. Allen or .
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| H. S. Siementhal, SGP''
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| 42-74010 K. I. Jamgechi.- -
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| W. C. Floyd.
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| c4-3SS76
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| .r. . . - S.
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| Y! i ''
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| i .
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| l
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| .; The Commissioners ..
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| 1 2
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| .1 -
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| .l Access Authori:stion gute j
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| i This proposed rule would estabitsh a personnel screening program
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| < for licensee employees and contractor personnel.
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| j to provide increased assurance of trustworthiness. It is designed are provided in Enclosure A. Xey elaaents of the program Further details are:
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| o
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| ; Background Investigations to look for past behavior that would indicat.e that the individual is unreliable or untrustworthy. _
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| o
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| ] A Continual Behavioral Observation Program designed to detect changes in an individual's behavior pattarn which indicates a
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| , potential for committing acts detrimental to the pucife health .
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| . and safety. (On June 24, 1982, the Commission toproved publishing for public comment a complementary rule concern-ing " fitness for duty." That program will also depend on behavioral observation. ) .
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| o Support measures such as review procedures, grandfathering,
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| . protection of infonnation, guidance, and treatment of tamparary workers.
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| A Hearing Soard established in 1978 to examine the issue et
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| ~!
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| aedess authorization later recommended that the Commiss' ion inclu '
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| 4 psychological programs. assessment as a component of personnel screeding In developing this rule,* however, the staff infccmally ,
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| sought the opinions of various authorities concerning the value of psychological assessment for precicting behavior inimical to the pubite health and safety. Because of tha wide variety of opinions expressed, the staff preposes to solicit further puolic d
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| comment on this issue in the Supplementary Information accompany -
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| ing the time. " rule rather than proposing specific requirements at this Search Recuirements Rule i
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| f This amendment would clarify the role of pat-down searches as a .
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| safeguards measure to be used only for suspicion or malfunction of search equipment and would complete outstancing action on i
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| industry petitions unich have been pending since 1977. Although -
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| 4 this rule has been previously published as a proposed rule in
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| - 1980, it appears appropriate to repualish it (along with the j other related rules) for a second round of public comment in ,
| |
| light of the Safety / Safeguards Committee's findings that most
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| . "The Office of Policy Evaluation acvises that the NRC contractor who provided the
| |
| } study on the behavioral observation program states a revised program would be ,
| |
| l necessary if psychological assessment is not ' required. The staff plans to consider this position along with ;ublic comments when received. -
| |
| 1
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| , e' s ;
| |
| w --na w - - ~ -- v , , -en, +we- - -ww~ ---en-aw'
| |
| | |
| . . . _ , . . ~ . . . . . - - - - - - " ~ * ' ' ^
| |
| jt a 1 -
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| * The Commissicners 3
| |
| ' i s
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| licensees have successfully adjusted to 100% equipment searches, .
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| j .. .
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| and believe that changing to randem seayches would be disruptive. )
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| I Hisce11aneous Safecuards-Related Amendments 4
| |
| . These Xey featuresproposed are:changes are discussed in detail in Enclosure C.
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| \
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| i t I *
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| ' . o A revised concept of vital area designation and protection.'
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| j This would result in a reduction in the number of vital .
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| areas at most' sites by grouping and protecting selected
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| ] items of vital equipment in fewer vital areas. Safety would be enhanced through fewer access control points.
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| ~
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| o .,
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| . Improved provisions for vital equipment access c:ntrol .
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| during both routine and emergency c:nditions.
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| * l i*
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| * j o ,
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| Provision for licansees to have .the authority to suspend .,
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| j safeguards measures to facilitata response to emergency c:nditions. !
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| o
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| ' Revised changes. critaria for detarmining the need for lock and key i Locks and keys would be changed annually, unon lj
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| .
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| * suspicion ,of compromise, or when an individual terminates employment under unfavorable circumsta,nces. j i I CRGR Recommendation -
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| * The CRGR has rec:mmended publication of the preposed ruis; hewave [t!
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| it believes that puolic c:mment should be sougnt en the use of a government-operated clearance program similar to that prsseribed in 10 CFR Part 11 for "Q" clearances as an alternative to the i proposed industry-administered screening program. The CRGR suggested that government clearances would provide increased f' 1
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| . assurance of trustworthiness, thereby permitting a reduction in .
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| access controls and other security measures. -
| |
| i The issue uf an industry-operated program versus a government- I 3
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| operated program was previously consicerad by a Hearing Soard ;
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| c nvened at the Ccamission's direction and in detail by the Commission itself. The Hearing Board rec mmended a private i sector program such as proposed in the attachment. The C:mmission recognized that controversy existed concerning its authority under section 151(i)(2) of the Atomic Energy Act to require government ;
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| clearances for individuals working at power reactors (CLI-SO-37),
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| j 12 HRC 523, 536, footnota 13 (1980). While the staff believed 4
| |
| that such authority existad, the Office of General Counsel advised .
| |
| that the battar legal view was that sec.ica 151(f)(2) c:uld not be read broadly enough to consider the sabotage of light water I reactors as c:nstituting a threat to the national security, i
| |
| I
| |
| ...~t..-..., ~.
| |
| ..s.
| |
| | |
| _ i.__ ,
| |
| - ,i . .
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| t The Commissioners ..
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| 4
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| .I I
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| j thereby not permitting the use of a government-acministered .
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| clearance program (CGC legal coinion, Septemcer 11,1979). It may be that the Commission will wish te rec:nsider this issue at this time.
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| Value/Imoact I
| |
| This rulemaking package is designed to improve the practicality and effectiveness of measures to protect against the insider threat at power reactor facilities while enhancing plant safety.
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| The staff believes that costs associated with these changes can be minimized because many reactor licensees are either presently using similar safeguards programs (e.g., personnel background ,
| |
| screening under ANSI 18.17) or can acccamodate the proposed ,
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| amendments (e.g.', re configuration of the interior layout of ,
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| +
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| their plants to protect vital safety equipment under the " vital 9
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| island" approach) without undue expense.
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| * I ? The enclosures indicate that costs to the licensee of these amend-
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| - sents will be approximately 31.Dt per site on an initial basis with annual maintenance cost of $300K. It will initially cost new plants, which receive their operating license after the effec-tive date of this rule, approximately 3603K to screen their 4
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| employees with the same annual maintenance cost as existing plants. These expenditures are partially offset by cast savings associated with licensees establisning a reciprocity program for personnel screening and reduced key and lock c:ntrol requirements.
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| Such reductions are estimated to reduce the c:st to each site by a: proximately 5200K per year. Costs to the NRC are estimated at 4 - $760K in staff time initially with annual matetenance approximat-i ing 5170K. It is anticipated that no occupational radiation exposure will be associated with implementation of this proposed rule package.
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| Interrelationshio As previously stated, these proposed rule changes are presented together because of their marked interrelationship. Any major changes to the principal components of the procesed access authorization program could imoact the proposal to relax require-ments for lock and key controls and other current requirements. . .
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| ; Ree:mmendations: That the Commission:
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| * 1. Acoreve the amendments as set forth in Enclosures A, 3, and C for publication as proposed rules in the .:ederal Register, with a 90-day public c:mment period. .
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| S 4
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| 8
| |
| ,- . y
| |
| , - , , - , . . .w,.,.,..m.,
| |
| - - , _ - , , . , - - - ,-- --m.--,,-,+w -
| |
| m,, ,
| |
| | |
| The Commissioners 5 i, .
| |
| d' 2.
| |
| fn order to satisfy the requirements of the Requiatory'
| |
| , ., - Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 605(b), certifv that this rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial
| |
| 'j number of small entities. This certification is incluced i in the enclosed Federal Register noticas contained in Enclo-sures A, 8, and C. -
| |
| .y -
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| , j , 3. Note: -
| |
| 't
| |
| ' a. That the staff will revise the supplemental informa.tton
| |
| *i .
| |
| of the Access Authorization Rule as necessary and '
| |
| appropriata to reflect any of the Commission's instruc-q tions pertaining to the question of a government run i clearance program for power reactors resulting frem l
| |
| * the Commission's review of this proposal. .
| |
| .j b.
| |
| ,' f - That the value/ impact stataments which appear as attach- .
| |
| a ments to Enclosures A, B, and C will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
| |
| : c. That draft guidance materials for the enciesed rule-j making actions will be made publicly available concur-
| |
| '; . rently with publication of these amendments (Attach-g, .
| |
| ment'2 to Enclosures A and C).
| |
| : d. That, in accordance with 10 CFR 51.5(c)(3), neither environmental impact stataments nor negative declara-
| |
| . l, tions need be prepared since the proposed a=endments '
| |
| are not significant from the stancooint of environ-mental impact.
| |
| e.
| |
| .i That these amendments contain information collection:
| |
| and reporting requirements tact are subiect to review i j by the Office of Management and Zudget. Upon Commis-i sion affirmation, formal request for CMS review and
| |
| * clearance will be initiated. CHE review may take 60-90 days from the date of publication in the Federal 4
| |
| Register. If approval is denied by CMS, the Commis-sion will be notified. '
| |
| ' f. That appropriate Congressional Carmittees will be .
| |
| advised of these actions (see drafts provided as attach-1,, ments to Enclosures A, 3, and C).
| |
| ~ ^
| |
| : g. That public announcaments will be issued (see drafts j
| |
| provided as attachments to Enclosures A, 3, anc C.).
| |
| That copies of the Federal Register notices will be
| |
| : h. -
| |
| distributed by ACH:TIOC to all affected licansees anc other interestad persons.
| |
| i ,
| |
| t
| |
| | |
| _. ..._m.__.._ _ _ . _ . - --
| |
| e 9 ,
| |
| 1 The Commissioners -
| |
| ..; 6
| |
| > 1
| |
| )
| |
| .sa i' -
| |
| : 1. That the Chief Counsal for Advocacy of the Small
| |
| . Susiness Administration will be informed of the
| |
| ' '' ~
| |
| certification and the reasons for it as required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
| |
| y' Schedulino:
| |
| The . staff requests scheduling at an early policy session.
| |
| .',l
| |
| /
| |
| W11 1 J. OfrdI's
| |
| * l Executive Director for Operations 1
| |
| | |
| ==Enclosures:==
| |
| * A - Access Autherfration Rule 3 - Search Requirements Rule 4 - -
| |
| ; . C - Miscellaneous Related Amendments 3 .
| |
| Commissioners' comments or ccusent should he provided directly to the Office of the Secretary by c.c.h. Friday, Aucrust 26, 1983.
| |
| i i eto-the thsion Staff office cemments, if any, should be submitted Commissioners NLT Friday, Auerust 19, 1983, with an infor-i mation copy to the Office of che Secretary. If the paper is of 1
| |
| review and c - ant,such a nature that it requires additicnal time for analytical he apprised of when ccaments may be expected.the Commissioners and the S DISTRI30TICN:
| |
| 4
| |
| ; F = 4*sioners -
| |
| CGC
| |
| ; CPE
| |
| - CCA OIA CPA :
| |
| REGICNAL OFFICES [
| |
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| .. . ACCESS AUTHORI*.ATION RULE j
| |
| BACXGRCUNO i
| |
| d In March 1977, the staff proposed a rule requiring an accass authoM:ation .
| |
| j program for individuals having unescorted access to or control over special nuclear material.
| |
| y 7 The Commission referred the matter to a Hearing Board which recommended rule development incorporating standards more specific than those d contained in ANSI N18.17, the industrial standard for secuMty of power plants.
| |
| j The Hearing (Attachment 1).Board's recomunndation forms the basis for this proposed rule l The proposed program would be administered by industr/. It is designed to
| |
| . reduce the possibility of malevolent acts endangeMng the pualic health and safety.
| |
| ; SCOPE OF p9CGRAM .
| |
| i i 4
| |
| !. Backoreund Investications - These are designed to determifne an individual's 4 '3
| |
| , trustnortniness tnrougn inquf Mas into his past history. It requires , as a -
| |
| i minimum, that the 11cansee investigate an individual's past smoloyment, educa-tion, charactar, vidual's identity.militar/, crecit, and criminal historyd and varief the indi-5 year period. It is also recommended that investigations cover the past Continual Behavioral Observation - This feature would provide increased assur-
| |
| .' anca :nat personnel remain trustworthy and reliadie.
| |
| 1.icansee and contractor
| |
| {
| |
| whfen could lead to acts detrimental to the public health an RE!.ATED FEATURES
| |
| , protec ed Areas vs. Vital _ Areas (Vital Islands) - 1.icansees indicata that nost .
| |
| ! personnel or islands. grantaa access to protec.ac areas also require accass to vital areas j
| |
| for unescortad access to protected areas and vital islands.Therefore, e
| |
| ~ n
| |
| ; Several cottons information. are being considered to help licansees octafn criminal histor The staff is developing draft legislation that would provide for the direct transfer of cMainal history information frca the FBI to ifcansees .
| |
| i could recaive input on the exis anca of cMainal history info FBI, nottejing ifcansees when no record exis.s.
| |
| "i When a record oces exist, the *
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| , licensee coulo be advised througn guidance to octain additional background data on the incividual through stata agencies, additional reference checks, etc. If the Ofvisfon of SecuMty handles cMainal histor/ checks in this fasnion , addi-
| |
| , tional staff resourcas amounting to 5.6 man years per year would be recuired .
| |
| 06/15/33 1
| |
| Enclosure A
| |
| ! h l
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| 1 -- - - - --- i V
| |
| : r. ,
| |
| i !-
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| ~1 f;
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| 1 * , Temoorarv Workers - Tescorarf workers needing unescorted accass authorization
| |
| '; -i snould seet tne same screening and continual behavior observation requirements as permanent workers.
| |
| ') Once recafved, this authorization may be transferred between nuclear power reactor licensees.
| |
| j Under cold sh'atdown or refueling conditions, however, licansees would have the option of granting a temporary
| |
| : unescartad access authori:ation to unscreened individuals provided that all requirements is conducted of section 73.55 are met and a thorough search of affected areas j[ .:,1 prior to restart.
| |
| Psycholocical Assessment - The Hearing Board recommended to the Commission that 9
| |
| 1 psycnological programs. assessments be included as a component of personnel screening 1 In developing this rule, howver, questions concarning the validity
| |
| ; of psychological assessment arose which have not been fully resolved. Accord-a ingly, the staff proposes to seek specific comment on this issue in the Stats-ment of Considerations.
| |
| i -
| |
| protection of Information - Provisions are included to ensure that information ei of a sonst:1ve nature contained in personnel records is handled with discretion
| |
| .i and confidentiality. Licensees would be required to provide an appropriata
| |
| , : level of privacy protection during the handling, storage, and destruction of sensitive personnel information. - .
| |
| "n
| |
| - 1
| |
| " Grandfatherina "Grandfathering" of all employees with prevfous accass authori-i rations would be allowed. Such individuals would therefore not be subject to 3
| |
| 3 i + a background investigation but would be subject to ongoing behavioral observation.
| |
| . . a. , . .
| |
| ./; -
| |
| Criteria and Guidance - Basic criteria are contained in the rule to afd l 1 licensees in.tne uniform foolementation of screening pregrams. Guidance which
| |
| , provides additional detailed criteria for use in conducting background investi-gations and behavioral observation programs has been developed, f-i Review Procedures - The proposed rule provides for review procedures which can follow collective bargaining agreements or a ifconsee-designed review process.
| |
| - The review process is designed to ensure that a person whose unescorted accass .
| |
| has been denied or revoked will be provided basic due process and fair treataent.
| |
| a i .
| |
| VALUE/ IMPACT CONSIDERATIONS I The screening program would cost each individual applicant and licensee accroximately $155K initially and $300K per year thereafter. It will . initially cost new plants, which receive their operating ifcense after the effective i -
| |
| e data of this rule, approximately 3603K to screen their employees with the
| |
| . same annual maintenance cost as existing plants. These costs are offsat by s
| |
| cost savings associated with Ifconsees estantishing a reciprocity program .
| |
| -t^ (aS190K) and the e ion in key and lock control requirements (aS15K), which i
| |
| are being proposed concurrently (see Enclosure C). Details concerning costs i and benefits "Value/ Impactfor both the industry and the NRC are contained in Attacament 3, Statament."
| |
| F
| |
| .l t
| |
| w6/21/S3 2
| |
| } Enclosure A I '
| |
| i _ - . - ,-?.*- -."*. # ~
| |
| ^
| |
| ''Y
| |
| | |
| 4
| |
| *) GUIDANCE
| |
| ]' j Oraft guidanca (At.ac.' ment 2) has been developed for issuance for public
| |
| ! comment concurrent with the publication of the proposed rule.
| |
| Attachments:
| |
| 1 - Federsi Reefster Notica
| |
| : 2 - Oraft Guicance Y, 3 - Value Impact Statement 2 4 - Oraft Public Announcament 5 - Oraft Congressional Latter 5 - Supporting Statement for Recorekeecing and Reporting Requirements 2
| |
| 1 i
| |
| t 9
| |
| i
| |
| 'b
| |
| ?
| |
| i i -
| |
| 1 Et i'
| |
| I i
| |
| i .
| |
| -f* ,
| |
| I 1 1
| |
| C6/15/83 3 Enclosurs A l ;
| |
| . -- m - - - -. -- - _
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| | |
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| i f
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| I
| |
| -i ATTAQWENT 1 TO THE ACCESS AUTHORIZATION RULE ENCLOSUR 4.!
| |
| FE ERAL assIsTra .wTIcg e
| |
| .8-j-
| |
| i .
| |
| .O J
| |
| 1.
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| ,- i T
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| e I.
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| t , ,
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| .. .:. . . . -. - ..- ...-.,.. -,---4, .-,m.--.--.~,-: . ~ ~ . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ ~ ~ - - - - - - -
| |
| | |
| (7590-01] .
| |
| 1 i
| |
| .i ,
| |
| 4
| |
| { NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCMMISSION 1
| |
| 10 CFR Par *.s 50 and 73 i
| |
| Accass Authorization Program
| |
| ; AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission. '
| |
| .1 j ACTICN: Proposed rule.
| |
| t SUl#4ARY:
| |
| . The Nuclear Regulator / Commission (NRC) is proposing amendments to its regulations which would require an accass authorization program 3
| |
| for individuals seeking unescorted accass to protected areas and vital islands at nuclear power plants. These amendments represent the culmina-tion of several years of development which included pubitcation of an earlier proposed rule; public hearings; .the establishment and recommenda-1
| |
| ! tions of a Hearing Board, which received additional oral and writtan
| |
| ' comunications regarding the proposed rule; and the establishment and recommendations of the NRC Safety / Safeguards Review Committee. Adoption of the proposed amencments, which will affect all nuclear power plant licansees, will result in increased assurance of the trustworthiness of j licansee emoloyees and contractor personnel.
| |
| 1
| |
| ! OATES: Comments aust be received on or before ,
| |
| Comments received after this data will be considered if it is practical
| |
| .i to do so, but assurance of consideration cannot be given excsot as to comments received on or before this date.
| |
| i .
| |
| ADDRESSES:
| |
| I Intarestad persons are invited to submit written comments and suggestions on the proposed rule and/or 'Je sur, porting value/imoact analysis to the Secretary of the CommissfG 3 5 3. Maclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, OC 20555, Attin W ,1cketing and Servica '
| |
| e Branch. Coments may also be delivered to Room 1121, 1717 H Street NW.,
| |
| t 06/20/83 1 Attachment 1 to Enclosure A '
| |
| i q
| |
| | |
| , [. \ . -- -- - ~-
| |
| o .
| |
| ~
| |
| * l l (7590-01] .-
| |
| , i a Washington, DC, between 8:15 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. Single copies of the
| |
| ~q' l i value/ impact analysis may be catained on request from Kristina Z. 1 j )
| |
| ! Jamgochian, Human Factors and Safeguards Branch, Division of Facility ,
| |
| Operations, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regula-
| |
| ]j torf Comeission, Washington, DC 20555, telephone (301)4a3-5976. Single copies of draft guidance material may be obtained from U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20$55, Attention: Of rector, Ofvi-
| |
| '.j sion of Technical Information and Document Control. Copies of the value/
| |
| j impact analysis and of comments received by the Commission say be exanrined
| |
| [I' and copied for a fee in the Commission's Public Occument Room at 1717 H
| |
| ,', Street NW. , Washington, CC.
| |
| -3' 4
| |
| FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Tom R. Allen, Chief, Regulatory l
| |
| Activities Section, or Henr/ S. Blumenthal III, Division of Safeguards,
| |
| * i i
| |
| ' Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, OC 20555, talephone (301)427-4010; or for infor-i aation of a legal nature, Robert 1..
| |
| i Fonner, Offica of the Executive Legal Otractor, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, OC 20555, talephone (301)492-8692.
| |
| j
| |
| ~
| |
| . SUPPLEMENTARY DIFORMATION 4
| |
| , Backcround On March 17,1977 (42 FR 14880), the NRC pubisPshed proposed amend -
| |
| a I
| |
| ments to its regulations which would estabitsh an access authorf:ation -
| |
| program for individuals who have unescartad accass to or control over
| |
| -}
| |
| special nuclear material. WH tten comments were invited and recaived.
| |
| d On Decaster 28, 1977 (42 FR 64703), the Commission issued a notice of
| |
| ~j public hearing on the proposed regulations and sucsequently estacifshed a Hearing Board to gather additional tastimony. A final rule, based
| |
| , .] upon recommendations o
| |
| ' f the Hearing Board regarding nnly fuel. cycle
| |
| .J facilities and transportation, was published in 10 CFR Parts 11, 50, and-
| |
| ~1 n 70 on November 21, 1980 (45 FR 76368).
| |
| 4-As a result of information gathered at the public heaMng and its
| |
| ' own uamination of the 1977 proposed accans autho M zation program, the HeaMng Board made recommendations in its April 1979 report to the 06/20/83 2
| |
| : Attachment 1 to Enclosure A
| |
| _ . rr ;.. . --
| |
| : e. ''
| |
| ~1
| |
| {
| |
| i - _ _ _ .._._ _ _
| |
| | |
| ~
| |
| . . 1
| |
| .g .
| |
| (7590-01] .
| |
| Commission concerning future personnel screening requirements applicaole
| |
| ]j' to nuclear power reactors ("AuthoHty for Accass to or Control Over Special Nuclear Matarial" (RM50-7). Copies may be obtained from the 1
| |
| Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Consission, Washington, OC 20555).
| |
| The Board's recommendations are summarf:ed as follows:
| |
| 1.
| |
| 1 That the Commission determine, if it adopts a full-field back-
| |
| ' ground investigation program, whether f t is required by law to use 10 CFR J Part 10 Department of Energy derogatory information cMtaMa. Further 1egal analysis resulted in the conclusion that the NRC has statutorf -
| |
| authority to establish different cMteria from those used by the Depart-d ment of Energy for access authoH zation (see Commission Decisfon CLI-30-37, 1 12 NRC 523, 535 fn 16 (1980)).
| |
| 4 2.
| |
| That the derogatory information cM aria contained in 10 CFR 3
| |
| d 10.11(b)(6), (b)(8), and (b)(9) not be adopted in their present form.
| |
| a 3.
| |
| 1 That any future access authoritation rule for nuclear power
| |
| ; reactors not utilite the security background investigation system, eM-l taMa, or staffs now existing at the Department of Defense or the Depart-j ment of Energy.
| |
| d 4.
| |
| d That personnel screening to ensure employee suitabfif ty,and
| |
| ! trustworthiness at nuclear power plants be done by the pMvate sector.
| |
| : 5. .
| |
| That the NRC 1ssue a rule, in lieu of seeking a revised
| |
| ( AmeMean National Standarts Instituta Standard N18.17, "IndustMal Security for Nuclear Power Plants" (ANSI N18.17), to set specific standards for the conduct of screening programs by ifcensees and prescribe the minimum com-ponents of an investigation process.
| |
| { 6.
| |
| j That the NRC consider conducting National Agency Checks (NACs) on all aspitcants on a reimbursaale basis.
| |
| Y: 7. That a future screening rule contain:
| |
| } (a) a requirement for a background investigation of the personal i
| |
| I and emoloyment history of the acpifcant, including any criminal histor/ .
| |
| i t information; ,
| |
| 1 (b) a requirement for a psychologfcal screening program, which
| |
| .i should include as a minimum: a writtan psychological tast, an interview f
| |
| ' by a psychologist with any apolicant indicatac by the tast to have possible emotional proolems, and a systas for continued casarvation by sucervisors:
| |
| 4 05/20/33 3 Attacament 1 to Enclosure A l
| |
| l
| |
| | |
| . . . ; i .*, _ s ;,n - + ~ . - * * = * * '' " ~ ' ' '~
| |
| j ,- ,-
| |
| 1 ' '
| |
| ,I (7590-013 .,
| |
| i 3
| |
| 3 (c) a requirement for an appeal procedure, which could be througn
| |
| . :l ' an industrj management systam or to a central NRC offfce; and li , - \
| |
| i J
| |
| (d) a requirement for protacting information and personal pMvacy by prescMbing specific pMvacy requirements for all psychological, i
| |
| personal, or derogatory information in an individual's file.
| |
| $.s .
| |
| j g
| |
| Prooosed Amendments
| |
| ;- On June 24, 1980, these recommendations were accepted by the
| |
| .[
| |
| 3 Commission and have provided the basis for this proposed personnel Accass j Authorization Rule. The Commission has also issued a final opinion in
| |
| '. 41 the ruiemaking procaeding (12 NRC 523 (1980)), adopting the major recom-j mandations of the HeaHng Board with respect to nuclear power reactors, .
| |
| i
| |
| .j
| |
| ' with a specific prohibition, however, against the promulgation of a rule j
| |
| that would infringe upon an individual's Hght of free speech, association, '
| |
| d ' and pMyacy protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution. The j Commission also stated that the record of the decision for this proposed j
| |
| rule. will include the Hearing Board's report as it relates to power reactors and the record compiled in the hearing on which the Board relied
| |
| .' d.9 for its recommendation on nuclear power reactor ac:ess authorization. -
| |
| ; Consistant with the Hearing Soard recommendations and its opinion, the Commission is proposing to amend 10 CFR Parts 50 and 73 to estaalfsh new requirements for an ac:sss authoM:stion program for those individ-uals requiM ng unescartad access,to protacted areas and vital islands at
| |
| ,j .
| |
| ' nuclear power plants and to make minor conforming r.mendments not previ -
| |
| .]
| |
| ously made. It is anticipated that no occupational exposure will be -
| |
| associated with implementation of this proposed rule. The ifcansee wf11 l
| |
| be required to submit for Comeission approval an Access Authorization f Plan descH bing how the requirements of this rule will be met. .Thess q
| |
| proposed requirements will consist of two safor industrf-run components:
| |
| }
| |
| I 1 ~
| |
| background investigation and continual behavioral observation programs.
| |
| : s j j -
| |
| Psycholocical Assessment j
| |
| I
| |
| ' A third component, psychological assessment, which was re :camended .
| |
| by the Hearing Board, was initially considered but has not bee 1 included in the precosed rule. In developing this proposed rule, the (.ommission l i, 06/20/83 a i Attachment 1 to Enclosure A i
| |
| i l
| |
| 1
| |
| .. ,.- ,. .x.-..,.
| |
| . . . . s. L T T- "-
| |
| ' " ' ^' " "'' 1
| |
| \
| |
| . _ ~ . ._ --. ,. . _, . - _ - . _ _, _. _ ..-- ~ _ - . .-
| |
| | |
| c . .;
| |
| (7590-01]
| |
| ] informally sought the opinions of various authorities concerning the .
| |
| 'i value of psychological tasting for predicting behavior inimical to the i public health and safety. A wide variety of coinions were expressed, i
| |
| which has led the Commission to seek additional pu'bife comment on this issue.
| |
| i While comment on any aspect of psychological tasting is invited, j the Commission is particularly interested in answers to the followinq !
| |
| 3{ questions, which arose during its initial analysis of the costs and q
| |
| " benefits of such testing:
| |
| 1.
| |
| When used in conjunction with backgrcund investigations and .
| |
| behavioral observation programs, can psychological tasting provide a m
| |
| l significant additional contribution to estabitshing trustworthiness and reliability?
| |
| 2.
| |
| What personality and behavioral traits should be identtfied and
| |
| :.i eval'satad for detarmining an individual's trustwrtainess and reliability
| |
| * in a nuclear industrial setting?
| |
| 3.
| |
| What experienca exists with psychological assessment programs such as that proposed for identifying individuals having behavioral or emotional characteristics unsuitable for work in an environment analogous to nuclear power reactors?
| |
| ; 4.
| |
| .{
| |
| Is there a single written psychological test which is better than any other for detarmining trustwrthiness and reifability in an
| |
| } industrial setting? If not, what comoinations of written psychological
| |
| {- tasts5.work best for detarmining individual trustworthiness and reliaci2f ty?
| |
| ;} What is the validity of writtan personality tests (such as the
| |
| ] Minnesota Multiphasic Persona 11ty Inventory (MMPI), Sixteen Personality
| |
| :j Factor Questionnaire (ISPF), California Personality Inventory (CPI),
| |
| Personnel Selection Inventory (PSI), or the Thurstone Temperament Scale)
| |
| ] when used in conjunction with professionally conducted clinical interviews i
| |
| for predicting behaviors inimical to the puolic health and safety that
| |
| " would be analogous a a nuclear setting?
| |
| 6.
| |
| Do psychological tasts and clinical intarviews used for '
| |
| j j personnel screening discriminata against any groups? Are there any legal ramifications?
| |
| ] 7.
| |
| Are there any alternative programs to psychological assessment which would help in predicting that an inoivicual's benavior mignt ::e 1
| |
| ' 06/20/83 5 Attacnment I to inclosure A l
| |
| oths ape
| |
| ..m.. _ . , _ . _ - , . - . . . . - - - . - ~ - , . . . , - . . - . _ . . ~ . . . , , ._ - . , _ - , . .r.-
| |
| | |
| . . ~ .. - . .
| |
| ~ . - . = --
| |
| l 1
| |
| a *
| |
| [7590-01 . '
| |
| , ,, l i
| |
| inimical to the public health and safety in a nuclear power plant? What
| |
| , j-
| |
| -j are they?
| |
| ,9
| |
| :j .
| |
| (t
| |
| " 1 Temoorerv Markers The Commission recognizes that tamparary workers represent a unique I
| |
| problem in regard to granting and then transferring to other sitas their unescorted accass authori:ation. The proposed rule specifies how manufac-
| |
| ] turers, contractors, or equipment suppliers may o~btain unescartad access
| |
| ; 'i-authorization. Specifically, the ifcensee may prepare and include a
| |
| [! generic plan in the Access Authori:ation Program Plan which contractors, '
| |
| manufacturers, or suppliers would use to screen and observe their j employees. The 1.icenses would still be responsible for granting, denying, -
| |
| i}:: or revoking the access authorization to these individuals based on results a
| |
| 1 of the contractors', manufacturers', or suopliers' findings or observa-tions. In addition, the licensee would be responsible for auditing all i j licensee-accepted contractor, manufacturer, or supplier administered 1 -
| |
| program. to determine compatibility with the requirements of this rule.
| |
| 1 1 Alternatively, the licensee "may screen and grant unescartad access j
| |
| authorization to employees of manufacturers, contractors, or suppliers
| |
| ! directly. Once an employee is grantad unescorted access authori:ation
| |
| . .i by a licensee, a second or subsgquent licensee may then grant unescorted
| |
| .~ .
| |
| access authorization to this same individual provided that the indi-vidual's emp,1cyment under the Access Authori:ation Plan. has not been
| |
| ; j interrupted for more than 365 days. This time period is consistent with f Depar*. ment of Defensa requirements. The second or subsequent Ifeensee
| |
| 'j will be required to secure from the original licensee a photograph of i i t
| |
| the individual along with certification that the individual has been screened and currently holds a valid unescorted acesss authorization in -
| |
| ,] accordance with the requirements of the proposed rule. Tempo ^rary 1
| |
| i '
| |
| employees, itka permanent employees, will be subject to the behavioral i observation program. In those cases where an unescorted access authori-
| |
| :ation is not obtained or granted, the licensee is required to escort 4
| |
| : the individual as provided in 5 73.55.
| |
| t .
| |
| 07/20/23 6 Attachment 1 to Enclosure A i i l ,
| |
| ! r p
| |
| | |
| r (7590-01] ,
| |
| I l
| |
| During cold shutdown or refueling operations, the licensee would not
| |
| ]- be required to meet the access authori:ation requirements of the proposed j '
| |
| rule for individuals if:
| |
| ,j (1) The requirements of f 73.55 remain in forca; (2)
| |
| ; Prior to start-up, a thorough visual inspection of the affected 3 protected areas and vital islands is made by ifcensee personnel who
| |
| $ normally work in those areas to identify signs of tampering or sabotage; and (3)
| |
| Appropriate safety start-up procedures are followed to assure i
| |
| l that all operating and safety systans are functioning nonna11y.
| |
| ' The Commission be11 eves that this procadure will provide adequata protaction of the puof fe health and safety and ce cost effective for
| |
| .- licensees. -
| |
| The proposed rule also addresses individuals who have recaived their
| |
| * unescorted accass authori:ation to protected areas and vital islands prior to the effective data of this rule. These individuals are not required
| |
| .; to undergo a background investigation, but are subject to the behavioral observation requirements.
| |
| i Backareund Investication The proposed background investigation requirements estsalish minimum areas of background investigation which are designed to provide a t. asis for desarmining an individual's trustworthiness and reif anfif ty. This' !
| |
| program would be industry administered.
| |
| A Regulatory Guide is also being.
| |
| {' published for punlic comment which provides guidanca on the scope of the -
| |
| background investigation criteria that can be used by the ifcensee to 3
| |
| detaraine an individual's history of trustworthiness and relianfif ty.
| |
| This guidanca closely parallels the proposed ANSI N18.17 standard, dated Cecameer 1980.
| |
| For inquiry into an individual's true identity, military history, educational history, and charactar, the Commission considers that the a retrospective period of examination should be sufficient to assure that
| |
| .I the investigation is adequate for making the necassary determinations.
| |
| i, ANSI N18.17 differentiatas between the retrospective background investi-gative time period required for a protactad area authori:ation and for a 06/20/83 7 l Attachment i to inclosure A l
| |
| l i
| |
| -~ .r -n--- -- ,,,, , , -, , , , , n- . .- -,-v . , , .,-. ,- - +,--r--- - - .-- - - - . , - , ,
| |
| | |
| ., . . . _ - - - - - - ~ - - - ~ ~~ ''
| |
| m
| |
| (- .
| |
| . (7590-01]
| |
| l4 l
| |
| ,f ,
| |
| i vital area authorization. A two year retrospective background investiga-
| |
| . .(
| |
| tion of prov1ous employment, education, credit, and criminal history is !
| |
| :1
| |
| ,]
| |
| ~4 recommended for a protacted area authorization, while a five year retro-spective investigation of these same types of histories is recommended 9.;' for a vital area authorization. The Commission is recommending in supporting guidance, for both protected and vital area (vi*al island) .
| |
| authorization, a five year retrospective time frame for estahlfshing employment, credit, educational, and criminal histories. This approach 1
| |
| d.g is based on the Commission's belief that there would be no significant q
| |
| difference in resourca impact to the licensee between the two programs.
| |
| l.l The Comeission has detar.nined, based on informal industry input, that l'j the majority of licansee emolayees require access to both the protectad-areas and vital fstands of f.he site. Pubite comments on this provision j ,3 are specifically solicited. ,
| |
| ; ']
| |
| The proposed regulation includes information evaluation critaria.
| |
| j These critaria have been developed to serve as a meenanisa for the evalu-ation of collected background history information and are based primarily lI-l ,
| |
| 4 .
| |
| on an individual's direct actions rather than the individual's ideas, l
| |
| beliefs, reading habits, or social, educational,. or political associa-tions.
| |
| 4 These criterla, however, do not preclude intarviews with the indf-
| |
| ] vidual seeking access authorization that could elicit information concarn-
| |
| )
| |
| t ing intantions, attitudes and beliefs to explain or :sitigata derogatorf information that may have been developed by the background investigation.
| |
| .l i
| |
| Each critacion contains direct safeguards implications which could, if discrvered in the individual's background, cause that individual to be a
| |
| f '
| |
| considered a potential risk to the public health and safety if authorized unescorted access to a nuclear power reactor's protected areas and vital I
| |
| ; 1slands.
| |
| 1 .
| |
| i~ 3 j i. Continual Behavioral Obser mtion Proerts ,
| |
| t 1
| |
| : 1 Because human behavfor is dynamic, a continual behavforal observation fj program is proposed.
| |
| As recommended by the Hearing Board and an NRC study, l
| |
| ]j "Sehavioral Reif anfif ty Program for the Nuclear Industry," NUREG/CR-2076, this program is needed to detect changes in an individual which say o'ecur and be manifested as behavioral changes in feb performance, comoetanca, or 3 judgment escabilities. The Commission believes the existanca of a continual e
| |
| j C6/20/83 3 i Attaenment I. to Enclosure A
| |
| | |
| ~ _. - - - . - . - --
| |
| tl,
| |
| [7590-01]
| |
| Y -
| |
| behavioral observation program would also P.elp detar screened individuals
| |
| ]-
| |
| from engaging in acts of sabotage. The proposed continual behavioral
| |
| .] observation program consists of two basic elentents. These elements are:
| |
| j 1.
| |
| a The detection by an individual's famediata suoervisor of those ~
| |
| j behavforal patterns which may lead to acts detrimental to the public health j
| |
| i and sufety in a nuclear power plant operating environment. After detecting 4 such behavior pattarns, the individual's immediate supervisor will refer
| |
| ] .
| |
| the individual to the individual responsible for administration of the licensee's accass authorization program. This person will make an impar-
| |
| :i tial detarsination whether referral of the individual to competent medical d
| |
| authorities with suspension of the individual's unescorted access author-1:ation is warranted. If a supervisor believes that an individual's
| |
| * l .
| |
| actions represent an faminent potantial danger to the pub 11c health and l safety, the supervisor has the authority to famediately suspend the ~
| |
| l i
| |
| individual's unescortad accass authori:ation on a temporarf basis and then refer the individual to the licenses management official responsible
| |
| .t .or the access authorization program; and i 2.
| |
| 'I The decision by the licensee management on whether to suspend 3
| |
| an individual's unescorted access authorization to nuclear power plant
| |
| 'f protacted area and vital islands. The proposed Regulatory Guide supporting i
| |
| this rulemaking action clearly indicatas that this decision may be revised l after a consultation between the ifcansee and a qualiffed codical person.
| |
| i The proposed Regulatorf Guide recommends and provides guidance for j
| |
| the training of supervisors to detect certain behavioral changes in an
| |
| : individual which could possibly lead to actions detrimental to the public -
| |
| ! i -
| |
| i health and safety. This guide also recommends that the ifcensee establish procedures for making individuals aware of the continual behavforal obser-
| |
| .]
| |
| vation program and the decision-making process used for determining an 1
| |
| individual's suitantif ty for maintaining unescorted accass to protacted areas and vital islands.
| |
| II j Review Procedure ''
| |
| ' ' The Hearing Scard recommended that the rule include an appeal procedure through either an industoj management system or a cantral MRC offica. A review of samole labor management collective bargaining agree- )
| |
| i -
| |
| ments covering workers in nuclear power plants has demonstrated that the 06/20/83 3 At.achment 1 to nclosure A I
| |
| f e -
| |
| | |
| (7590-01.] .-
| |
| grievance procedures contained therein provide an adequata mechanism for review of access authorization denials or revocations. The usual griev-
| |
| ~i' d ance procedure includes notice and an evidentiary hearing before a neutral arbitrator with full exploration of factual issues. The Commission believes
| |
| ,f
| |
| ~
| |
| such procadures at least meet the minimal requirements of procedural due i.;;
| |
| process and may be used in review of access authorization denials or 'evo-( cations.
| |
| As an alternative, however, and for cases where an employee is
| |
| -q not covered by a collective bargaining agreement or where the collective
| |
| .j bargaining agreement's grievance procedure is inadequata, the ifconsee'
| |
| ,]
| |
| shall provide a review procedure that provides notice and a fair evidentiary
| |
| .;j hearing. The Office of the Executive Legal Of rector will participate in g ,
| |
| examining the review procedures submitted in the ifcensee's Access Authori-
| |
| 'j zation Progres Plan.
| |
| ) Such review procedures are not intended to preempt any Federal or Stata procedures for the enview of allegations of discrimi-nation in employment based upon raca, religion, national origin, sex, or
| |
| .i age.
| |
| .]
| |
| , ;{ Protection of Information
| |
| ; .{ -
| |
| The Hearing Board recommended that the rule contain requirements for i
| |
| protacting information and personal privacy for all recorded personal or derogatory information on an individual maintained in a file. The i ' Commission agrees that this protection should be given. The Congress of the United States stated in the Privacy Act of 1974 that the rignt of d privacy is a personal and fundamental right protected by the Constitution -
| |
| li of the U71 tad States. While the Privacy Act does not apply to personal ~
| |
| l .
| |
| Information kept by privata parties, the pubife policy it expresses leads
| |
| ')
| |
| j j the Comeission to conclude that information of a sensitive nature in personal records, resulting from the appifcation of this rule, should be A
| |
| 3 handled with discretion and disseminated to persons, other than the indi-vidual involved,. only if they have a legitimate *need to know'' in acmin-j .
| |
| istering the access authorization program. Because it is impossible to j
| |
| identify in advance who in a licensee's organization will need acesss to i d
| |
| ' *1 this personal information, the rule is draftad in general terms, stating l ] the principle to be applied rather than detailing procedures. It is ''
| |
| I
| |
| ? -
| |
| C6/20/S3 10 m
| |
| At acament 1 to Enclosure A fe l 1
| |
| --wer - -
| |
| md y - ,,. ----e. .. * + , - . - . - . . . - , , - - , m. w,, _ _ , , - - , - e v - - 9, 4 9--
| |
| | |
| _ . _ _. . . _ _ . . ~ . - - - - ---
| |
| 3 .
| |
| (7590-01]
| |
| l 1
| |
| s anticipated that licansees will develop procedures to provide an appro-
| |
| {. priate level of privacy protaction for the handling, storage, and destruc-i J
| |
| tion of personal information.
| |
| , j The Commission believes that the prooosed Accass Authorization Rule is consistent with the recommendations of the Hearing Soard for estab- ;
| |
| 3 t lishing an accass authorization rule based on ANSI N18.17. 1 I
| |
| ; Related Actions Afmed at Assurino Individual Fitness for Outy i -
| |
| In a complementarf action, the Commission, on August 5,1983, i published for public comment additional measures afmed at assuring indi-
| |
| ]4 vicual fitness for duty at nuclear power plants (47 FR 33980). The fit-ness for duty program would employ similar techniques (e.g., tenavioral observation), and is being made the subject of a separata rulemaking action.
| |
| a Conformino Amendments The Commission has included in this rulemaking action revisions to 10 CFR 50.34(d). The amended language removes the terminology "indus-trial sabotage" and substitutes the tenn " radiological sabotage." This
| |
| {
| |
| change is necessary because " industrial ' sabotage" is not defined in 10 CFR Part 73.
| |
| ; i The Commission has also included in this rulemaking action revisions to 10 CFR 50.54(p). Theamendedlanguagea[lowslicenseestopropose changes, on a non-fee basis, to guard trafning and qualiffcation plans
| |
| { that do not decrease the effectiveness of these plans.
| |
| g PAPERWORK REDUCTION STATE *ENT 1
| |
| i
| |
| ' The preposed rule has been summittad to the Office of Management and Budget for clearancs of the information esilection requirements that i
| |
| 2 may be appropriata under the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. 3501 et '
| |
| seq.). The SF-83, " Request for Clearance," Supporting Statament, and
| |
| ~
| |
| related documentation submitted to CM8 will be placed in the NRC Public l Occument Room at 1717 H Street NW. , Washington, OC 20555.
| |
| The matarial wfil be avaiiante for inspection or cocying.
| |
| I 06/20/83 11 Attachment 1 to 5nclosurt A t
| |
| en
| |
| ,w--. ~.- - g- g,. m -- - -g -.-- .-%----y- ---%m .g *-e 4.4p1,----
| |
| m .--m---g .yg-.e--i -
| |
| | |
| ._.. . _ _ _ . _ -- - ~-
| |
| , o .
| |
| .s . .
| |
| C7590-01] ' ,
| |
| .:4 i
| |
| ?
| |
| REGULATORY FLEXI3ILITY CERTIFICATICN
| |
| - d. ..
| |
| 7 4
| |
| In accordance with the Regulator / Flexibtitty Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C.
| |
| ] 605(b), the Commission hereby cartifies that these proposed regulations j '
| |
| will not, if promulgated, have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. These proposed ragulations affect 1 electric utilities that are dominant in their respective service areas and that own and. operate nuclear power plants. These utilities do not "
| |
| ..l ,
| |
| fall within the definition of small businesses set forth in Section 3 of
| |
| .'.1 the Small Business Act,15 U.S.C. 632, or within the Small Business Size q 5tandards set forth in 10 CFR Part 121. These preposed regulations will
| |
| ].}
| |
| affect some nuclear power industry contractors and vendors all of which -
| |
| are large concerns which servica the industry.
| |
| .1 - .
| |
| -]
| |
| ' LIST OF SU8JECTS IN 10 CFR PARTS 50 ANO 73 i
| |
| -}
| |
| Part 50 - Antitrust, Classiffed information, Fire prevention,
| |
| .).
| |
| Intargovernmental relations, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Penalty, j .
| |
| Radiation protection, Reactor siting criteria, Reporting requireJents.
| |
| ' Part 73 - Hazardous materials-transportation, Nuclear materials, Nuclear power pfants and reactors, Penalty,' Reporting requirements, Security measures.
| |
| For the reasons set out in the preamole and under the authority of
| |
| :l ' the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorganization Act
| |
| [j of 1974, as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 553, notice is hereey given that adop-j ,
| |
| q tien of the following amendments to 10 CFR Parts 50 and 73 is contemplated.
| |
| ,e i
| |
| :j 1
| |
| - PART 50-0CMESTIC LICENSING CF PRODUCTION ANO UTILIZATICN FACILIT
| |
| .4 ,
| |
| 1
| |
| ..- 1. The authority citation for Part 50 is revised to read as
| |
| } follow:n ll AUTHORITY: Secs. '103,104,161,182,183,186,189, 68 Stat. 936, 937, lj 948, 953, 954, 955, 956, as amended, sec. 234, 83 Stat. 1244, as amen,ded A
| |
| ^
| |
| 1 06/20/83 12 Attachment 1 to inclosure A i
| |
| : 1. - - -
| |
| -- . - . ~ _ , , _
| |
| | |
| __ - ._ . _ . . - - .- - - - - - - - '' ' ~ ~ ~ ~
| |
| m C7590-013 1 i
| |
| ; q (42 U.S.C. 2133, 2134, 2134, 2201, 2232, 2233, 2236, 2239, 2232);
| |
| }- secs. 201, 202, 206, 88 Stat. 1242, 1244, 1246, as amenced (42 U.S.C.
| |
| 1 5841, 5842, 5846), unless otherwise notad.
| |
| Section,50.7 also issued under Pun. L. 95-501, sec.10, 92 Stat.
| |
| j i
| |
| 295L (42 U.S.C. 5851). Sections 50.58, 50.91, and 50.92 also issued
| |
| ' *' under Pub. L. 97-415, 96 Stat. 2073 (42 U.S.C. 2239). Section 50.78 1
| |
| also issued under sec.122, 68 Stat. 939 (42 U.S.C. 2152). Sections 50.80-50.81 also issued under sac.184, 68 Stat. 954, as amended
| |
| ! d
| |
| ! (42 U.S.C. 2234). Sections 50.100-50.102 also issued under sec. 186, .
| |
| 68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. 2238).
| |
| 1 I For the purposes of sec. 223, 68 Stat. 958, as amended (42 U.S.C.
| |
| 2273), 55 50.10(a), (b), and (c), 50.44, 50.46, 50.48, 50.54, and 50.S0(a) are issued under sec.161b, 68 Stat. 948, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(b));
| |
| " 55 50.10(b) and (c) and 50.54 are issued under sec. 1511, 68 Stat. 949, -
| |
| as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(f)); and 55 50.55(e), 50.59(h), 50.70, 50.71, l 50.72, and 50.78 are issued under sec.161o, 68 Stat. 950; as amended
| |
| ?
| |
| : (42 U.S.C. 2201(o)).
| |
| ,, 2.
| |
| In 5 50.34, paragraph (d) is revised and paragraph (h) is 1
| |
| added to read as follows:
| |
| 4 I
| |
| 5 50.34 Contants ot appifcations; technical information.
| |
| n = = = =
| |
| t ^
| |
| (d) Safeguards contingency plan. Each appitcation for a Ifcense i to operate a production or utilization facility that shall be subject to 55 73.50, 73.58, or 73.60 of this chapter shall include a Ifeenses safe-1 guards contingency plan in accordanca with the critaria set forth in i
| |
| Appendix C to 10 CFR Part 73. 7he safeguards contingency plan shall
| |
| ' include plans for dealing with threats, thefts, and CineustHe+] rsefo-looical" sanotage, as deffned in Part 73 of thf s chantar, estating to the 1
| |
| =
| |
| * i Comparative taxt: additions to existing regulations are underlined and deletions are dashed through and enclosed in brackets.
| |
| i I
| |
| i l 06/20/83 13 Attacament 1 ..,c!csurs A !
| |
| . ~ . . -
| |
| A
| |
| | |
| w
| |
| +
| |
| 4 .I - . .
| |
| [7590-01] ..
| |
| ' special nuclear material and nuclear faciif ties licensed under this j
| |
| 4 chapter and in the applicant's possession and control. Each application
| |
| ! for such a ifconse shall include t' 4 first four catagories of informa-tion contained in the applicant's safeguards contingency glan. (The first four categories of information, as sat forth in Appendix C to a
| |
| 10 CFR Part 73, are Background, Generic Planning Base, Licensee Planning N Base, and Responsibility Matrix. The fifth category of information, -
| |
| 1
| |
| } %
| |
| Procedures, does not have to be submitted for approval.)?
| |
| M A r
| |
| -t R R
| |
| ' R .
| |
| 'j.
| |
| f (h) Access Authorization Plan. Each acolication for a ifeense to j} ooerste a nuclear oower reac*or oursuant to 4 50.22 of this chaotar shall include an Access Authori stion Plan. The Access Authorization Plan is to orovida detaf f s for meetino the recuirements of 4 73.56 of this chaotar.
| |
| 7]' The Access Authorization Plan shall describe in detaf f the crocram used "
| |
| for*
| |
| oerformino a backcround investication on an individual, erecedures established for the continual behavioral observation crocram, crievance 1
| |
| 4
| |
| :1
| |
| * review orocedures. cretaction of information, erecedures to be used witn
| |
| ] ]
| |
| recard to temocrar / and transient workers. and the other recuirements of I 73.56 of this chanter.
| |
| * 11 -
| |
| el 3.
| |
| .1 In 5 50.54, paragraph (p) 'is revised to ' read as fo11cws:
| |
| i i
| |
| i .: . 9 50.54 Conditions of ifcansas.
| |
| .3 (p)(1) The Itcensee shall prepare and maintain safeguards contin -
| |
| 4
| |
| . ]!
| |
| gency plan procedures in accordance with Appendix C of 10 CFR Part 73 -
| |
| y .
| |
| for effecting the actions and decisions contained in the Responsibility
| |
| ' M m Matrix of the safeguards contingency plan. The ifconses say make no i
| |
| { g i l change which would decrease the effectiveness of a security plan, cuard ,
| |
| .1 8
| |
| trainino and oualification olan or access authori:stfon clan, preoared 1 pursuant to $ 50.34(c), 50.34f1 or Part 73 of this chapter, or of the j j -
| |
| first four catagories of information (Background, Generic Planning Base, j j Licensee Planning Base, Responsibility Matrix) contained in a ifconsee
| |
| , [.']
| |
| j safeguards contingency plan prepared pursuant to $ 50.54(d) or Part 73,
| |
| : . i j ' A pnysical security plan that contains all the information recuired in '
| |
| both 6 73.55plan.
| |
| contingency and Apoendix C o Part 73 satisfies the recuirement for a i
| |
| 06/20/33 14 Attacament 1 to Enclosure A f
| |
| i I
| |
| ~ .
| |
| \ n
| |
| | |
| -- A---
| |
| . - .. _ . - - I - - - ~~
| |
| o -
| |
| 4 a
| |
| i (7590-01]
| |
| as applicable, without pMor approval of the Ccasission. A licensee
| |
| .- desiring to make such a change shall submit an appifcation for an amend-
| |
| '} ment to his Itcense pursuant to $ 50.90.
| |
| t (2) The Itcansee may make changes to olans referenced in eartersch (g)(1) of this section (the-security pian or-to-the-sefeguards-contingency p+en] without prior Comeission approval if the changes do not decrease a the safeguards effectiveness of the plan.
| |
| (3) The ifcansee shall maintain records of changes to the plans i made without prior Commission approval for a period of two years from. <
| |
| j the data of the change, and shall furnish to the Ofrector of Nuclear j Material Safety, and Safeguards (for enrichment and reprocessing facil-d ities) or the Director of Nuclear Reactor Requiation (for nuclear reac- '
| |
| tors), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, QC 20555, with 4
| |
| a copy to the appropriata NRC Regional Offica specified in Appendix A
| |
| * j of Part 73 of this chaptar, a report containing a description of each change within two months after the change is made. Prior to the safe-j guards contingency plan being put into effect, the Ifeenses shall have:
| |
| i LilCtti] All safeguards capanilities specified in the safeguards i contingency plan avaffable and functional; -
| |
| i (11)C(23] Detailed procedures developed according to Appendix C to J Part 73 available at the licansee's sita; and .
| |
| (iii)C(St] All appropriata personnel trained to respond to safeguarcs i
| |
| incidents as outlined in the plan and specified in the detailed Procedures.
| |
| ; j
| |
| - (4) The licenses shall provide for the development, revisson, imple-mentation, and maintananca of his safeguards contingency plan. To-this i ,
| |
| l end, the licenses shall provide for a review at least every 12 months of the safeguards contingency plan by individuals independent of both security 3
| |
| program management and personnel who have direct responsibility for isole-
| |
| " mentation of the security program. The review shall include a review j and audit of safeguards contingency procedures and pesetices, an audit of the security system tasting and maintananca program, and a test of '
| |
| j the safeguards systas along with constitments estabitshed for response by
| |
| ! local law enforcement authorities. The results of the review and audit,
| |
| * along with recommendations for imorovements, shall be documented, recorted to the 11cansee's corporata and plant management, and kept availaole at the plant for insoection for a period of two years.
| |
| = = n
| |
| = =
| |
| f .
| |
| 06/20/83 15 At.achment i to Enclosure A n.----
| |
| J e.
| |
| p w e ,.
| |
| : m.
| |
| * v A
| |
| 3
| |
| ._._.,,,c_ _y .., , _ _ . . . , , . . . , . _ _ . , , -
| |
| | |
| ,a .
| |
| 1 . .
| |
| . .; (7590-01] -
| |
| b PART 73-PHYSICAL PROTECTICN OF PLANTS ANO MATERIALS 4
| |
| 4
| |
| : 4. The authority citation for Part 73 is revised to read as c'I follows:
| |
| }
| |
| *11 .
| |
| 1 ,*,
| |
| AUTHORITY: Secs. 53, 161, 68 Stat. 930, 948, as amended, sec. 147,
| |
| , ?
| |
| 94 Stat. 780 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2167, 2201); sec. 201, 88 Stat.1242, as f.f amended, sec. 204, 88 Stat.1245 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5844).
| |
| j Section 73.37(f) is' also issued under sec. 301, Pub. L. 96-295, 94 Stat. 789 (42 U.S.C. 5841 note).
| |
| ' ' For the purposes of sec. 223, 68 Stat. 958, as amended (42 U.S.C.
| |
| 2273); II 73.21, 73.37(g), 73.55 are issued under sec.161b, 68 Stat.
| |
| }.j 948, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(b)); 55 73.20, 73.24, 73.25, 73.25, 73.27, i
| |
| j 73.37, 73.40, 73.45, 73.46, 73.50, 73.55, 73.67 are issued under sec.
| |
| 1811, 68 Stat. 949, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(f)); and 55 73.20(c)(1), '
| |
| ]' 73.24(b)(1), 73.26(b)(3), (h)(6), and (k)(4), 73.27(a) and (b), 73.37(f),
| |
| .j 2
| |
| 73.40(b) and (d), 73.46(g)(6) and (h)(2), 73.50(g)(2), (3)(fff)(S) and
| |
| -1 (h), 73.55(h)(2), and (4)(iff)(B), 73.70, 73.71, 73.72 are issued under
| |
| )
| |
| 4.)
| |
| sec. 106o, 68 Stat. 950, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(o)).
| |
| ':{ .
| |
| : 5. '
| |
| Remove the authority citation following 55 73.2. 73.4. 73.40, j 73.50, 73.35, 73.80, Accendices A, 8, and C.
| |
| t
| |
| : 6. In 5 73.55, the introduc.or/ text of parsgrash (d) is revised j;; and paragraph (1) is added to read as follows: *
| |
| ; ,j ,
| |
| f
| |
| ' 5 73.55 Requirements for physical protection of ifconsed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage.
| |
| -] = n n n =
| |
| l ,-
| |
| (d) Access Recufrements.
| |
| ' In addition to the reouf rements of 8 73.56
| |
| , of this Part:
| |
| i I a a n .
| |
| *l n n
| |
| :.j j (1) Durine cold shutdown or refuelino coerations. as soecified in I
| |
| the facility's technical soeciffeations as reouf red in 10 CFR 50.36, the i
| |
| i , Ifeensee has the cotion under 4 73.56(e)(3) of this Part to ersnt -
| |
| l temocrery unescor*ed sc:ess authorizations to unscreened individuals cro-
| |
| { vfded that:
| |
| i 06/20/83 16 Attachmen*, I to Enclosure A i
| |
| 1
| |
| ;. . ,. . . . .. -m: . c. . n -
| |
| | |
| . . . . . . .-. _ n --- - = ~ - ~~~- ' ' " " ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ '
| |
| j- ,.
| |
| I. [7590-01] .
| |
| - ' (1) Acolicable recufrements of this section are followed:
| |
| (2) Prior to start-uo, a thorouch visual inscoction of all affected protected areas and vital islands is conducted bv ifcensee eersonnel who j
| |
| normally work in these areas to identif*/ anv signs of tameerino or g sabotace: and (3) Accrocriate safety start-uo crocedures are followed to assure j
| |
| that all ooeratine and safety systems are functionino normally.
| |
| :s 4
| |
| 7.
| |
| : A new $ 73.56 is added to read as follows:
| |
| $ 73.56 Personnel access authorf:stion recuirements for nuclear cower plants.
| |
| i I
| |
| (a) General.
| |
| s (1) Each licensee who f's authorited on (data that a final rule is *
| |
| } published in the Federal Recistarl to coerate a nuclear cower reactor j i under Part 50 4 50.22 of this chantar shall comotv with the recuirements
| |
| ! of this section.
| |
| ! The ifcansee shall suesit bv (120 davs after this effective rule is oub1fshed in the Federal Recistarl an Access Authoriza-tion Plan describine how the ifconsee will comely with all of the recufre
| |
| :nents of this section. By C360 days after this effective rule is cublished in the Federal Recistar! or 120 davs after the Ac: ass Authori-
| |
| :stion Plan has been accreved by the Commission, w:11chever is later, the licansae shall comolv vith the recuf rements of this section and withits olan.
| |
| 3 j
| |
| ,) .
| |
| (2) Each acclicant for a ifcanse to coerata a nuclear oower reactor I !
| |
| . cursuant to 8 50.22 of this chanter, whose toolication was suosittad orier i
| |
| ' to (data that a final rule is oublished in the Federal Recisteri, shall submit bv C120 days after a final rule f s oublished in the Federsi Racistarl an Ac:sss Authoritation Plan describine how the acclicant clans to comolv with the recuirements of this section. 8v C360 days after a final evie is cualf shed in the Federsi Recisteri, or on the date of .
| |
| i i ;
| |
| i ' recaiot of the coerttino license, whichever is later, the Ifeensee shall e
| |
| ') comolv with the recuirements of thf s section and with its Commission accreved clan.
| |
| I (3) Each ano11esnt for a ifcanse to oeerste e nuclear oower haetor cursuant to ss 50.21(b) and 50.22 of this chaeter. whose soolication is
| |
| . submi* ad aftar (data a final aule is oublished in the Federst Recister?.
| |
| 06/20/83 17 Attac.. ment I to Enclosurs A -
| |
| t i l
| |
| .' i 6
| |
| _ _.. ~ - -.-. $
| |
| | |
| - _ _ =_ _ - _ _ _ - -
| |
| 4 . .
| |
| ~
| |
| 4 (7590-01] . -
| |
| i
| |
| ], i shall include in its acolication an Access Authorf:stion Plan describfnc {
| |
| how the acclicant olans to meet the recuirements of this section. The l
| |
| 'I anolicant shall comolv with the recuirements of this section and with i its Commission acoroved olan uoan recafot of an coeratinc ifcense.
| |
| !. (4) Licensees may include in their Access Authorization Plan a ceneric olan to be used by all ifeensee contractors, manufacturers, or
| |
| /j
| |
| - sucoliers for screenino and observine their emolovees. The 11censee
| |
| - - - shall be resoonsible for crantino, denvino, or revokinc unescorted access f
| |
| authoritation to these individuals based on results of the contractor 58, manufacturers', or sucof f ers' findinos or observations.
| |
| (b) General aerformance obfective and recuirements. -
| |
| I
| |
| { (1)
| |
| The 1teensee shall establish and maintain an accass authoriza-tion cros.
| |
| i which has as its obfective creventfnc unescorted access to .
| |
| ' orotected area and vital islands to those individuals whose history of behavioral catterns indicate a potential for committino acts that are infaicai to the cubife health and safety or cresent a dancer to life or crecerty. The unescorted access authorization crocram snali con-
| |
| ' sist of a backcround investication crocres and a continual behavioral observation crocras. The backcround investication crocess shall be .
| |
| ' desianed to identifv oast actions that would be credictive of an individual's future reliabilitV within a cratec ad area or vital island
| |
| '
| |
| * of a nucteer oower reactor. The continual behaviors 1 1eservation orecram
| |
| ! I shall be desicned to detect certain individual benavior or behaviors 1
| |
| ! chances within the context of the feb environment which. if left unde-tacted, could lead to acts inimical to the oublic health and safety or
| |
| * could oresent a dancer to 11fe or orecerty. This behavioral observation
| |
| [ orocram shall include a suoervtsor trefnire crocras. Individuals who have received an unescorted access authori t ation to orotected areas and vital f stands erfor to the effectfve date of these amendments are exemot free havino to meet the recuirements of earscraoh (c) for a backcround ,
| |
| Investication. -
| |
| j (2) This section does not authorize anv activity bv the ifcensee '
| |
| I,
| |
| ! or any other oorson that would infrince uoan the efehts of any individual under the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United Statas. *nor '
| |
| 'any activity that would discrf 5 f nate amonc individuals on the basis of 06/20/83 13 Attachment 1 to inclosure A i
| |
| I e
| |
| .l
| |
| . . _ _ _ _ . , , . _ , , _ _ _ . _ _ - . - . , ._.____.~.___._.___,m____.____mm 4. .~,_m___,,,__,..,., ._.,,.~_,_-_r .._m,.....____.,,. _ , . _ , . _ . . _ _
| |
| | |
| , . _ _ . . _ . - - ~ ~ - - - -- ~ ~" ~ '~ ~^ ~~ ~ '~ ~ ~ ~
| |
| 'i * '
| |
| .I *
| |
| ; . o
| |
| [7590-01]
| |
| i j .
| |
| race, relicion, national oricin. sex, or ace. Any denfal, revocation, or i suscension of access authoritation resultino f*om information derived from a backcround investication and for which this section is cited as authority shall be based solelv uoan acolfcation of the cM tem a enumersted below.
| |
| l (3) In makinc a determination under this section for the denfal,
| |
| 'I revocation or suspension of access authorization based uson data deMved
| |
| ]
| |
| T.- a backcround investication. the ifcensees shall consider whether
| |
| .the individual!
| |
| ' (1) Has committad or attempted to commit, or aided, or abetted i .
| |
| another who committed or attamoted to commit, any act of sabotace or
| |
| {
| |
| other un' lawful destruction of crocertv:
| |
| 3 i (11) Has deliberstely omitted material information or falsiffed his i,
| |
| emolovment or sita access acolfcation:
| |
| j t (111) Has or has had anv 111 ness of a nature which, in the oofnfon -
| |
| 4 of a cualified and, if acolfcable, stata-licensed osvenolocist, or osv-i 4
| |
| chiatrist, or medical doctor, may cause sicnificant defect in the fudement i t or relianility of the individual:
| |
| (iv) Has been convicted of any felony or ft .s of lesser offenses indicatino habitual criminal tendencies:
| |
| (v) i Is a habitual user of a controlled suostancs.(as defined and
| |
| ! - listed in91-513, Pub. t.
| |
| the Comorehensive 21 Oruc Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970.
| |
| i U.S.C. Sees. 801 et sec.) wfthout a creseMation or has 4
| |
| been without adecuata evidence of renaef11tation: '
| |
| (vi)
| |
| Is a user of afechol habituallv and to excess. or has been so
| |
| [ in the cast without adequata evidence of rehabfif tation; or
| |
| ; (vii) .
| |
| Has encaced in any other conduct, or f's suefect to any other j
| |
| i circ:asstance, which fur tishes reason to believe that the individual may I
| |
| act in a manner contrary to the 'orotection of health ano sinimization of cancer to 1ife and oronerty.
| |
| i i
| |
| - ' (a) No corson may cite this section as authority for the de'nfal.
| |
| revocation, or suscensfon of an access authorf:ation based uoan information *
| |
| {
| |
| deMved frem a backcround investication when the basis for the denial .
| |
| i
| |
| ' I revocation, or suscensfon is other than acoifcation of a eMtarian listed t
| |
| i : in carscrich (b)(3) of this section. .
| |
| k
| |
| -: ed
| |
| %p 4 4
| |
| t i
| |
| w -
| |
| --ww.-----w,,----y--- ,,-y,w-m,--.-w-.ep.oe,, , .g,wy-.eg--g.,,9..,-y-g, ,, 9 %y,wm,9-ge9y,wm. g. --,ma.y,,-p ee--a y-qw--.eq.-%,y - yo e w- m- 9
| |
| | |
| _ - - - = . - ._. _ - _ _- - =. - _ _ _ _ -
| |
| , , e, . .
| |
| y
| |
| (
| |
| i (7590-01] ,
| |
| i j i
| |
| 9 (c) Backcround Investication.
| |
| eq The licenses shall conduct, or make ar*ancements for backcround
| |
| 'N
| |
| ~! investications that crevide assurance that individuals seekine unescorted access to orotected areas and vital islands at nuclear cower reactors
| |
| [f.)
| |
| i v' are reliable, trustworthy, and would act irf a manner that would orotect
| |
| ' health and einimize dancer to life and orecerty. As a minimum, this l
| |
| backcround investication must verify an individual's true identity. -
| |
| emolovnent histon, educational historv, credit historf, criminal historv, M -
| |
| silf tary service and charactar and recutation. -
| |
| d (d) Continual 8ehavioral Observation Procras.
| |
| 9 1 (1) 4 The licensee shall estabifsh and maintain a c'ontinual behavioral i observation crocram for individuals which is desicned to have suoervisors l
| |
| i detect chances in an individual's on-the-fob cerformance, fudament level.
| |
| or behavior and, aftar detectino a cattern of abnormal behavior, refer *
| |
| ; the individual to senfor Ifeensee manacement to make an initial decision I on whether to maintain or temocrarily suscend the individual's unescorted 4
| |
| ' access authorization to orotected areas and vital islands. In the case j where the individual's benavioral actions reoresent an faminent' dancer to the audite health and safety, the individual's suoervisor shall f immediatelv suscend the individual's unescorted access authorization f; -
| |
| j on a tamocrar/ basis and then refer the individual to senior Ifeensee sanacement.
| |
| (2) j
| |
| * The recufrements of caracraoh (d)(1) of this section sucolant the recuirements of Accendix 9 carscraoh I.B.2.e. of this Part for s
| |
| nuclear cower reactor securf tv corsonnel.
| |
| I (e) Non-ficensee Emolovees. .
| |
| (1) Thelicenseemayaccootanunescortedaccessaut.korization 1
| |
| ' crented an emolovee of a sanufac*urer, contrac*ar, or ecufement sucof f er j
| |
| 1 by another licensee, or a orevious emolovee of another ifconsee. if the 1
| |
| individual's emoloveent in ifcensed nuclear cower reec*oes has not been
| |
| * d interruoted for a continuous ceriod of more than 365 davs and if the 1,
| |
| oricinal crantinc licensee sends to the caininc licensee a chotocesch
| |
| .'1i 1 of the individual and a written verification of the individual's i
| |
| unescorted access authorization alonc with a statement which indicates Its curMnt validity. For individuals whose emolovment irr if censed nuclear cower esac*ces has been inter-uoted for a continuous ceriod if 46/20/83 20 Attachment 1 to inclosurs A t !
| |
| 4 7
| |
| | |
| __. . __ _ _ ,. .-_-- _ - - - - - - "' ^ " ~~ ~
| |
| e cj -
| |
| .- C7590-01] .
| |
| .i ,
| |
| * sore than 365 davs. the individuat's activities must be investicated accordinc(2) to the acclicable recuf remenca of caracraoh (c) of this section.
| |
| ' Consistent with the recufrements of oaracrach 50.70(b1(3) of ,
| |
| I this chacter, the licensee shall crant unescorted access authori:ation to 'l
| |
| ,3 protected areas and vital islands without further investication bv the l
| |
| +
| |
| t licenses with recard to the recuirements of thf s section af f emolovees of the Commission who have been certified by the MRC to have set the intent of the recufrements of this section.
| |
| , (3) Ourino cold shutcown or refueline coerstions, as scocified (A
| |
| , j the facility's technical soecifications, as recuired in 10 CFR 50.36,
| |
| .i, the licensee has the ontfon to erant a temocrare unescorted access authori:stion to an unscreened individual f f: '
| |
| (1)
| |
| The recuirements of 4 73.55 of this chaeter art followed: and (if) a The affected individual is subiect to the continual behavior
| |
| * 1 observation recuirements of oaracrach (d1 of this section.
| |
| 4
| |
| ; i (f) Review Procedures.
| |
| i The licens ee's clan submitted oursuant to car- sch 73.56(a) of this section must int lude a crocedure for the Ptview of a denial or revocation under this section of an access authorization of an emoloves of the
| |
| ) ,
| |
| i i licensee, contrtetor', or succif er that has an adverse effect on the indi-vidual's employment.
| |
| The orecedure must orovide notice and an occortunity 1 for a fair evidentiarv hearine and be consonant with fundamental orinciales of due orocess.
| |
| } The crievance review oreceduct contained in the collec-tive barcaining ar reement coverinc the bargaining unit of which the i ; emoloves is a memoer will nortally meet this recuirement, and may be used i
| |
| * for this euroese whether or not the denial or revocation of access authori-zation is a orievable action under the contreet. -
| |
| (c) Protection of Information.
| |
| (1) Each licensee, contesctor or succif er who co11ects eersonal 4
| |
| information on an ecolovee for the ourcose of ecmotvine with this section shall estabif sh and maintain a system of files and e*ocedures for the .
| |
| i i orotection of the eersonal information. -
| |
| ?
| |
| 1 i
| |
| l 06/20/33 21 i
| |
| Attach. tent i to Enclosure A l
| |
| i
| |
| *~ ''
| |
| -----,,--,,-----e. _ - _ _ . , . ,, - - - - . ,. --,,._,c _
| |
| ,- e -
| |
| -*+ww'4-w-e-ma +p-%y e- .m s---e-*-gr= ell----- 1.sgs-Mr- ++--wegew*M1> ''*--Wg--9vt=''t*r-yore eq &,---,9e w-w--
| |
| | |
| +p h (7590-01] .
| |
| n.
| |
| (2)
| |
| ! J' The licensee, contractor, or sucof fer shall not disclose the d
| |
| personal fnfomation collected and maintained to corsons other than the
| |
| ,j subiect individual or those who have a need to have access to the informa-II tion in cerformine assioned duties in the crocess of crantine or denvino i2 access to orotected areas and vital islands.
| |
| q}. (3) The licensee shall have access to and periodfeallv audit con-
| |
| . . .1 5 2J j tractor records to ensure that the recuirements of 5 73.56 are beine met
| |
| - - in accordance with the licensee's accreved ohvsical orotection olan --
| |
| (4) i Ei The ifcensee shall make available files or documents relied 'uoan by the licensee. includino records of audits done on the contractor's
| |
| 'd screeninc crocram. for examination by an NRC insooctor to allow the NRC
| |
| .;)
| |
| to determine the licensee's comolf ance in imolementina its aceroved olan.
| |
| % (5) 4 3 The ifcensee shall retain the access authorization ff te of an 3
| |
| .1 fndividual for three years after termination of the unescorted acesss
| |
| * j 1 .
| |
| ,i autherfzation for orotected areas and vital istands.
| |
| 8.
| |
| j Appendix S of Part 73 is amended by revising paragraph I.S.2.c.
| |
| - to read as follows: .
| |
| .,' .' t.
| |
| 3 .
| |
| ! 4 APPDOIX 8 - GDERAL CRITERIA FOR
| |
| .i SECURITI PERSONNEL 1 .
| |
| n n n n- n
| |
| } .
| |
| I. Employment suitanility and qualffication.""" - '
| |
| 1 8.
| |
| i c,1 Physical and mental qualification.**"
| |
| : 2. Mental qualifications:a"" .
| |
| i y] c.
| |
| M The licenses shall arrange for continued observation of security, personnel and for appropriate corrective sessures by responsible supervi-
| |
| .; sors for indications of emotional instanif f ty of individuals in the course
| |
| ! 7
| |
| ,; of performing assigned security job duties. Identification of emotiona.1 instanility by responsible supervisors must be subject to verification .
| |
| by a ifcensed, trained person. This cartersch does not acolv to securftv i
| |
| 3e t
| |
| :i n 4
| |
| il '
| |
| i 1
| |
| ; . i 06/23/83 22
| |
| ! Attacament i to Enclosure A T
| |
| l
| |
| _ __-. _- - _ . - . _ -__.,____-,._.___..__-.._,__..--m. ~ _ _ - . _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ -m.. . . . _ . _ _ _ _
| |
| | |
| . _ . _ . . . _ . . - . . . _ -. - --- - - - ~ - - ~"~----"-'~~~~'--''-'~^~~~ ~ ~ ~ ~
| |
| 0 l
| |
| .I
| |
| .: (7590-01]
| |
| 't 3
| |
| personnel at nuclear oowe mactors ifcansed under 10 C.~4 Pset 50. These licensees shall consult 4 73.56(d).
| |
| *
| |
| * n s s Dated at Washington, OC this day of
| |
| -, , 1983. -
| |
| . For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
| |
| .t 1
| |
| t . . . .
| |
| - Samuel J. Chilk, Secretar/ of the Cometss1on.
| |
| 9 i
| |
| . i i
| |
| l .
| |
| 06/20/83 23 Attseb=ent1toinclosunA e . _ _ _ _ _ . . . . . . . . _ _ .- = - - - .
| |
| Y
| |
| | |
| . . . . . . _ . _ - . ~ . . . . . . . .. - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - ~ ~ - - " - ~ '~~ ~ ~~ ~
| |
| . , l
| |
| .t . o- p i
| |
| .f
| |
| .3 .
| |
| l t.
| |
| . i>
| |
| t i
| |
| I
| |
| \
| |
| s s i
| |
| .i 1
| |
| 4 I i -
| |
| ]. ATTACHMENT 2 TO THE ACCESS AUTHORIZATION RULE ENCLOSdRE .
| |
| s ORAFT GUIDE 0
| |
| ''STAN0ARD FORMAT AND CONTENT GUIDE FOR THE NUCLEAR REACTOR AUTHORIZATION RULE" 5
| |
| ~
| |
| e
| |
| , G
| |
| ;e
| |
| * 1 9
| |
| 4 O
| |
| +
| |
| i -4 ,
| |
| 1 e
| |
| e k
| |
| a 9
| |
| 9 9
| |
| 9 6
| |
| I a .
| |
| - F -- ~'
| |
| ,_, _ , . _ - - . ._ ._._ . r , _ ._
| |
| | |
| - .-- - , .- - -- - - - - ~ - - ~ - - -
| |
| = e J
| |
| 4
| |
| .i -
| |
| i at 1
| |
| =8
| |
| ) ,
| |
| REGULATORY GUIDE 5.XX ,
| |
| , STANDARD FORMAT ANO CONTENT GUIDE FOR THE
| |
| , NUCt. EAR REACTOR ACCESS AUTHORIZATION Pf.AN e
| |
| 4 6
| |
| e t
| |
| 9 f
| |
| t .
| |
| 4 i
| |
| +
| |
| h 1
| |
| r i ,
| |
| 4
| |
| .t a i
| |
| I i
| |
| Attac. ment 2 to inclosure A 1
| |
| i 4 6 4
| |
| *.- ,, __w._
| |
| e
| |
| | |
| A.
| |
| _y . .
| |
| I e 1
| |
| TABLE OF CONTENTS a
| |
| i J
| |
| Pace e
| |
| -l . LNTRC 0 UCTI ON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1. . . . . . . . . . . . .
| |
| : CHAPTER 1:
| |
| . GENERAL PERFORMANCE 08.:ECTIVE AND REQUIREMENTS. 7 .........
| |
| '-i
| |
| ': CHAPTER 2: - BACXGROUNO INVESTIGATION. . . . . . . . . . . 9. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
| |
| 2.1 General........................................................
| |
| ; 2. 2 Investigative Cri teria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 .
| |
| , 2. 3 10 d Informati on Eval uation Criteria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .............. ............. . 15 M CHAPTER 3:
| |
| 1 3
| |
| CONTINUAL SEHAVIORAL CSSERVATION PROGRAM.21. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~
| |
| 3.1
| |
| : 3. 2 General........................................................
| |
| Detection of Senavioral Change................................. 21
| |
| ,3 3.3 Security 23
| |
| -1 Personne1............................................. 23 j CHAPTER 4:
| |
| NON-LICENSEE EMP LOY EES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 ..............
| |
| 4.1 Genera 4.2 1......................................................... 29
| |
| . Accantanca Another of Unescorted Accass Authorication Grantad by
| |
| !- 4.3 Licansee.....................................
| |
| Unescorted Access for Cartain NRC Employees. . . . . . . . . . . . .... .......
| |
| 30
| |
| : 4. 4 31 Unescartad Access During Majo r 0utages. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... ... 31
| |
| * CHAPTER 5:. REVIEW
| |
| , 1 PROCEDURES....................................... 33 5.1 Genera 4
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| 1........................................................ 33 CHAPTER 6: PROTECTION OF INFORMATION............................... 35 i 6.1
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| . .i 5.2 General........................................................ 35 t Precadures and Records for the Protec .f on of Information....... 36 APPENOIX I..........................................................
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| 3 Al-1 4
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| i Attac.9 ment 2 to inclosurs A I
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| j e .
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| 1 4 .
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| d INTRCOUCTICN 1
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| j The Energy Reorgant:ation Act of 1974 directs the Nuclear Regulatory Ccesission to perform pMncipal Itcansing and regulation involving all facil-ities and matarials, licensed under the Atomic Energy Act of 1S54, as amended, 6 associated with the construction and operation of nuclear power reactors.
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| The principal requirements with respect to the development of an access
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| ]! authori:ation plan are found in 10 CFR Part 50, "Comestic Licensing of Produc-i tion and Utilization Facilities,* and Part 73, " Physical Protection of Plants f and MataM als."
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| Paragraph 50.34(f) of 10 CFR Part 50 identifies the informa-
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| ' tion which must be provided in an Accass Authorf:stion Plan as part of a licanse application.
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| Paragraph 73.56(c) of 10 CFR Part 73 requires a back-ground investigation for all employees grantad unescorted ac:sss to power plant
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| * jj protected areas and vital islands. Paragrapn 73.56(d) of 10 CFR Part 73 requires a continual observation program which monitors the behavior of employees onca unescorted accass to power plant protectad. areas and vital
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| : islands is granted.
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| In addition, paragraphs 73.56(e), (f), and (g) contain provisions'for granting unescorted protected area and vital island acesss
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| {
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| authorization to tamcorary employees,,for a review precadure for individuals '
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| whose unescorted ac: ass authoM:ation is revoked, and for tne protection of-j personal information generstad as part of the ac: ass authori:ation program, respectively.
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| I This regulatory guide descMbes the information required in the acesss authoH:ation plan submitted as part of an appiteation for licanse to operste a
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| ., nuclear power plant.
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| ; In addition to providing guidance for the standard format and content of ac: ass authorization plans, this regulatory guide explains the intant of the vaMous provisions of Section 73.56 of 10 CFR Part 73. The intant of each requirement is found in the discussion of eacn subsection along.
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| with an examole of measures and procadures that can be used to fulfill the requfrecent.
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| 1 This guide is divided into six caaotars. Each enaotar addresses one of the key elements of the ac ass authori:ation program required in 'Section 73.56.
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| 06/15/83 1
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| Attacament 2 to Enclosure A 7
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| , . - _ . .- - - . - . ~ _ . . - .
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| : j. Purcose and Acolicabilftv 0
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| ! 1' j This regulatory guide describes the standard format and contant suggested by the NRC for use in preparing an access authori:ation plan for ifcensees wna
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| !.} operate nuclear power reactors.
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| By using this guide as a basis for preparing
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| ,' J an access authorization plan, the Itcensee will reduce the chance of submitting an incomplete plan. Preparation of an access authorization plan in conformance
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| +
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| : d. with this guide will assist the NRC assessment of the plan and will standardize
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| -t
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| . J the licensing and review process. Conformance with this guide is not required
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| .[.{
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| by the NRC. An applicant can use an alternate plan. This standard format and
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| ,.j content guide represents a format acceptable to the NRC and describes the j .,
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| information needed for the review of the access authorization plan. Additional
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| {~ ' . '{ information may be required for completing the staff review of a particular
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| .j -
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| plan and should be included if appropriate. It is the applicant's responsibil-
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| .i ;
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| ' -; ity to maintain an awareness of new and revised NRC regulations wnich may influence his ifcense.
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| .g f.'_ .,{
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| I This standard format and content guf4s has been prepared as an aid to
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| ..j uniformity and completeness in the preparation and review of the access author-i 1:ation section of the ifcense application. The information in this guide will .
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| help the applicant prepare an access authori:ation progrsa designed to reduce
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| { j the opportunity for an individual who is behaviorally unreif aale to gain authorized unescorted access to power plant protected areas and vital islands.
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| Specific procedures, criteria, and measures delineated in 10 CFR b.56 are '
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| ; } intended to assure that the appropriate programs and measures are isolemented. '
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| t.t
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| '. q If the applicant believes that his circumstances are such that certain proca-j ;j dures, criteria, or sessures are not needed or that they can be replaced by
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| [ { others without comorosising the integrity of the program, he is encouraged to i !
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| ! J address specific departures from these provisfons in his apolication for
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| . A
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| : licacse. The Ifeensee may wish to incorporate infomation or procedures
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| * r
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| -i .
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| i delineated in the regulatory guides in Division 5 "Materfals and P1' ant Protec-tion."
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| If so, these guides can. he incorporated by reference in the appropriate i
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| i sections of the plan.
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| , 06/16/83 2 e
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| Attacr.mont 2 to Enclosure A I ,
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| . _ . _ . - . . - , _ . . , . . - , y _ _ ,-- --.-,.-+.-,,,.____-,,,-.,,--~~..,,.,_-,.--.~.-.-__,.--._-..-r._u-_,-,...,--..,--. . . . . . .
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| i l The ifcensee should submit the application to the Of rector, Nuclear '
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| ['
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| * Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccamission, Vasnington, OC 20555.
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| Upon recafpt of an application, the NRC staff will perform a preifminary M review to determine whether the application provides a reasonably comotete pre-
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| ' sentation of the information needed to form a basis for the findings required before issuance of a Itcense. This standard format and content guide will be t ,
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| used by the staff as a guideline for identifying the type and detail of infor-j mation needed.
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| ' If an application does not provide a reasonably complete pre-sentation of the necessary inforsation, further review of an app 1tcation wil1 M
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| he suspended until this needed information is provided.
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| * Use of the Standard Format The applicant should divide his plan into five sections which correspond
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| ,' to the chaptars of this standard format and cor tant guide. In each section he i
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| should provide all of the information requestad in the content sections of this guida and numeer them sequentially. Under some circumstances certain sections may not be applicable to a specific appifcation. If so, this should be clearly stated and sufficient information should be provided to support that conclus1on.
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| The applicant may wish to submit, in support of his application, informa-tion that is not required by regulations and is not essential to the descrip-tion of the appifcant's access authorization plan. Such information could
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| { include, for example, historical data submitted in demonstration of certain -
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| l
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| ' criteria, discussion of alternatives considered by the applicant, or supple-mentary data regarding assumed models, data, or calculations. This information should be provided as an appendix to the appifcation.
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| Stvle and Ccmoesition A table of contents should be included in each submittal.
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| 1 t
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| 06/15/83 3 At achment 2 to Enclosure A j
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| The applicant should provide a clear, concise presentation of information.
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| i
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| :t Confusing or amoiguous statements and general stataments of intent should be
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| .] avoided.
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| Definitions and abbreviations should be consistent througnout the l ',.j submittal and conform to generally accepted usage.
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| .4
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| , 0:;
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| N
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| , 3 Ouplication of information should be avoided and, if necessary, different
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| ,'j]
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| sections of the plan should reference each other. The applicant should assure
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| ,; q that such references are specific and directly provide the requested
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| , information. 4 Where numerical values are stated, the number of significant figures ,
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| 1' d should reflect the accuracy or precision to 'which the nuacer is known. The .1 units in which such figures are provided should be cIoarly indicatad.
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| [;
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| Orawings, diagrams, and tables should be used when information may be presented
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| * 3
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| .. -1 acre adequately or conveniently by such means. These fliustrations should be n located in the section where they are first referenced. Care should be taken to ensure that all information presented in drawings is legible and that
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| "? 5.l symbols are defined. *
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| ,.4 .
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| Physical Soecifications of Submittals
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| ' M, -
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| All Access Authori:ation plans submitted as part of an acplication should conform to the following physical dimensions of.page size, quality of paper and
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| $ inks, and numbering of pages: f d -
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| .!, 1. Paper Size 4
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| ; Text pages: 8-1/2 x 11 inches.
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| c; Orawings and graphics: 8-1/2 x 11 inches preferred; however, a larger size is acceptable provided the' finished copy when folded does not
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| ; exceed 8-1/2 x 11 inches.
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| : j. '
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| : 2. Paper Stock and Ink a
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| * Suitable quality in substance, paper color, and ink density for handling and for reproduction by microffiming. -
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| b =
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| 06/15/83 4 Attachment 2 to belosure A
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| : m. m 1 MW
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| , 3. Page Margins A margin of no less than 1 inch is to be maintained on the too, bottom, j and binding side of all pages submittad.
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| ~
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| . 4 Printing I
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| Composition: text pages should be single spaced.
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| Type face and style: sust be suitable for microfilming.
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| +
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| Reproduction: may be mechanfcally or photographically recreduced. !
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| ' All pages of the text may be printed on both sides, and images should be printed head to head. '
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| l.
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| : 5. Sindings Pages should be punched for loose-leaf ring binding.
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| l .
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| i 6.
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| f Page Numbering i
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| Pages should be numbered by section and sequentially within the section.
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| Do not numner the entire plan sequentfally' (this entire Standard Format has been numbered sequentially because the individual chapters j ,
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| , were too short for sequential numbering within each section to be y
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| meanin.gful). .
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| P-eendures for Uedatino or Revisino Paces e
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| 1 5 The updating or revising of data and text should be on a replacement page basis. "
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| j The changes or revised portion of each page should be highlighted by a -
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| vertical ifne. The Ifne should be on the margin opposite the binding margin
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| ~
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| for each line changed or added. All pages submitted to update, revise, or add *
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| ' pages to the report are to show the data of change. The transmittal letter should include an index page Ifsti.g the pages to be inserted and the pages to
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| ! be removed.
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| When major changes or additions are made, pages forTrevised -
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| Table of Contents should be provided.
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| I Number of Cocios
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| ~
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| i The applicant should sutaft three canies of each required submfttal.
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| 06/15/83 5 Attacament 2 to Enclosurs A
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| l Pubite Ofselosurs Any procrietary or classified information should be clearly identified and
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| .I
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| " sutaitted in separata enclosures. Each such submission of proprietary
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| . information should request exemption from public disclosure, as required in Paragraph 2.790(b) of 10 CFR Part 2.
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| e 06/15/83 5 Attac. ment 2 :s Enclosure A I
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| I 1_ __ ___ . . . _ . __ -
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| T y, y ~.~ . .
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| l 1
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| j, I CHAPTER 1 GENERAL PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE AND RECUIREMENTS Paragraph 73.56(b) of 10 CFR Part 73 requires that:
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| 'a 1 The licensee shall estabitsh and maintain an access autho H :ation program which has as its objective preventing unescorted access to protected areas and
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| .j vital islands to those individuals whose history of behavioral patterns
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| 'i indicates a potential for comeitting acts that are inimical to the pub 11c health i
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| and safety or present a danger to life or property. The unescorted access
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| ; ?!
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| authorization program shall consist of a background investigation program and a continual behavioral observation program. The background investigation program shall be designed to identify past actions that would be predictive of an individual's future. reliability within a protected area or vital island of a nuclear power reactor. The continual behavioral observation program shall j
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| be designed to detect certain individual behavior or behavioral changes within the contaxt of the job environment which, if left undetected, could lead to
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| ; acts inimical to the pubife health and safety or could present a danger to life or property. This behavioral observation program shall include a supervisor training program. Individuals wno have received an unescorted access authorf-
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| :ation to protected areas and vital islands prior to the effective data of these amendments are exempt from having to meet the requirements of paragraph (c) for y '
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| a background investigation.
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| i 1.1 General
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| 'i .
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| This section describes the general objectives and major components of the licensee's accass authorization program. It includes a provision for the d
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| ' " grandfather 1eg of cartain employees who have received unescorted accass authorf:ations pHor to the effective data of the rule. Preservation of an individual's rights under the First Amenoment to the Constitution, e.g. , free .
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| speech, association and privacy, should be of primary concern to the' licensee
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| . in the development and implementation of the access authori:ation program.
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| )
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| 1 06/20/83 7 At.achment 2 to Enclosure A I
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| I
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| 2' 4 . .
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| 'A, Centent -
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| 1 i In this section the licensee should:
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| 5, 1.
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| ' Describe the general performance cbjective and intent of the access
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| [.l authorization program.
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| .: 2.
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| 3 Describe in general tarus the basic components of the program.
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| (j 3.
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| Indicate the class of individuals exemoted from the requirements of
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| ; the ,rogra.. .
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| : s. ; 4 Affirm that the rights of individuals under the First Amendment to the Constitution will not be infringed upon through implementation j ,
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| of the program and that discriminary practices will not be employed.
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| 06/15/83 3 Attac. ment 2 to Enclosure A l
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| *0 O .
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| 1 1
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| :' CHAPTER 2 BACXGROUNO INVESTTGATION
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| {' Paragraph 73.56(c) of 10 CFR Part 73 requires that:
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| i The ifcensee shall conduct, or make arrangements for, background investi-
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| . s gations that provide assurance that individuals seeking unescorted access to i protected areas and vital islands at nuclear power reactors are reif able, i
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| trust: worthy, and would act in a manner that would protect health and minimize danger to life and property. As a minimum, this background investigation
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| .shall verify an individual's true identity, employment historf, educational j
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| histor/, credit historj, criminal history, military service, and charactar and a reputation.
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| i
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| .) 2.1 Genera) .
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| }
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| The background investigation which is required pursuant to paragraph 73.56(c)
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| ] of 10 CFR Part 73 is designed to provide a basis for detarmining an individual's l
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| ~ trust: worthiness and reifability through inquiry into specific areas of an indi-q vidual's past history and background. Areas of inquiry relevant to such a determination are emoloyment, afif tary service, credit, educational, and criminal h histories.
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| A retrospective period of 5 years or sinca the individual's eightaenth birthday, whichever is shortar, is considered generally sufficient to achieve this objective. Extreme care should be exercised in the conduct of the back-i groundinvest17ationtoassurethatareasofinquiryandanyunfavorableinforma-j tion developed relata to an individual's past actions and not his ideas or beliefs. In the promulgation of t2:e Accass Authorization Rule, the NRC dcas .
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| j not in any way intand to infringe ucon an individual's right of free speeca,
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| } association, and privacy protacted by tne First Amendment to the Ccnstitution.
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| ' Information evaluation critaria, each having df ract safegu-2res imlica- . !
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| tient, should be developed for use by the 11cansee in evaluating the collected
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| : background information. These critaria should relate to an indivioual's direct' a actions, not his ideas, beliefs, reading habits or sccial, ocucational, or
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| ;olitical associations. 1 These evaluation critaria snould be used by the 11'cansee '
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| { for determining if an individual should be grantad or denied unescor*ad access to protactac areas or vital islands.
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| 05/15/83 9 Attacnment 2 to inclosurs A
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| It is the intant of these regulat*cns that the licensee carefully examine
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| '] and evaluate the information developed through the investigative precass and
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| 'I.
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| make a conscientious determination whether an individual's behavf oral proffle indicates that he or she may pose an unacceptable danger to the pualic health and safety if unescorted protected area and vital island accass is granted.
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| f
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| :3
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| .i. 2. 2 Investicative CriteH a 7"
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| Intent ,
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| 'N.
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| ~i The intant of 5 73.5a(c) is to determine f f information exists which would j .
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| indicata that the prospective employee afght commit an act detH mental to the 4 public health and safety if grantad unescorted protected area and vital island access. .
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| The rule sets forth a nuncer of areas in which information should be j.t sought, sucn as past employment, militar/ service, education, credit record,
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| _j and criminal historf. In the event that a particular ifne of inquirj cannot be
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| .] fully explored (e.g., the recorcs were destroyed by fire or are maintained in j files not accassible to the investigator), the licensee should document in the i -
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| employee's access authorization file the actions taken to obtain such informa-
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| "3.
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| tion. The ifcansee should make a " good faitha ef' fort to fully satisfy all' l investigative criteria. In the absence of relevant information,' the licansee is responsible for making the best datarmination possible concerning the reif ability and trustworthiness of the individual using the information available ij to him. s-i
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| : It is recommended that all information submitted on the employment apolf-n
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| -.a H
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| cation be verified to ensure that matarial infonsation has not been omitted or falsified. The licensee should assure that the individuals who are responsible for conducting such investigations are qualified and trained and that the
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| . program established is adequata to detar: sine whether the investigative critar.ia f of trustworthiness and reifability are met. .
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| , 1.4 i .t
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| ?
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| Ut
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| .i -
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| :- 05/15/82 10 Attachment 2 to Enclosure A I
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| ;- n s . .. r ." . * *W " " " '
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| i i
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| . 1 1
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| m .
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| To provide sufficient background information to establish a past history of trustworthiness and reliability, the background investigation must accress the following areas:
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| TRt!E IDENTITY. -:
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| .i a
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| The appifcant's present name and any alfases, social
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| .1' security number, and data and place of birth should be verified to assure that the applicant is who he purports to be. A presentation of a birth certificata i 1
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| -] ,
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| 1 or driver's ifconse is not considered to be sufficient. A fingerprint check with the local ro11ca or the Federal Bureau of Investigation is the preferred
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| ],
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| means of verifying identity. As an alternative, the appifcant should be asked j to supply a recent photograph with his application for unescorted access. This 9
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| photograoh should be positively identiffed by at least two individuals, such as 3
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| a previous supervisor or coworker and a previous teacher. In the event that f.
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| 1 the applicant's identity cannot be verified through either his photograph or
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| -J 1 his fingerprints, unescartad vital island and protectad area access 3 authorization should not be grantad.
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| l 1 EMPt.0YMENT HISTORY.
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| Employment history during the last 5 years or since l
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| J, the age of 18, whichever period is shortar, should be verified.
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| The employment histcr/ investigation is not primarily intanded to datar-
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| ! I mine whether an individual is qualffied for a certain position. The primary intant of the requirement is to determine whether such a history contains info'rsation which indicatas that the individual would not be trustworthy or j reliable in a nuclear environment.
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| Pertinent information would include any .
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| record of disciplinary action taken against the incividual, unusual safety or accident recorcs, psychological and medical records, the reason for the indi-
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| .} vfdual's tamination, and his/her re-employment potantial. The information j
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| mentioned acove need only be collected for the previous 5 years. However, all claimed ersioyment should ba verified. Such a verification procedure increases the assuranca that the individual has not falsified the employment acclication '
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| ' to conceal relevant background information, such as a dishonorsala afscharge from the armed forces more than 5 years earlier. This investigation wculd ordinarily be accomolfshed througn personal intarvfews with previous emolayers and a eneck of employment records. ,
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| t
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| ~
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| 06/15/83 11 Attachment 2 to Enciosure A
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| ) ;
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| .-o-v- er y e --p -y---- , w w -- -w y 9- -wy w-r -- ea--y--- r y 9- - - y yw-9 y 9- --wr--w--- vy,-w ,-erir=wp ,y
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| | |
| _ w..- .a.. . - - - - - ^~
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| l j
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| EDUCATIONAL HISTORY. Attandance at all secondary and higner level l' institutions during the previous 5 year peMod should be verified. The type j of information sought should include disciplinary, psychological, or medical j problems, and the circumstancas under which the fridividual left the institu-
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| :j tions (e.g. , graduated, expelled, dropped out, etc.). Educational records
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| 'l
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| -ll may also afd in the veMfication of the individual's name(s), and data and
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| . .j place of birth.
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| This investigation would ordinarily be conduc*ad through 7
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| .J ' personal intarviews with school' officials and an investigation of the indf-t vidual's records. *
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| :y CREDIT HISTORY. The purpose of thfs portion of the background investiga-l tion is to detarmine whether an individual is financially responsible. Large
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| :l j indebtedness or the inability to obtain credit may create significant stress, causing unreif able beh'avior, or cause an individual to be more susceptible to '
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| l coercion. Ordinarily a check with a local credit bureau and chi.racter refer-
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| .) ences will' he sufficient to dotarmine financial responsibf11ty. However, if
| |
| .j unfavorable financial information is obtained through the credit bureau, the
| |
| .y investigator should attampt to verify the infansation through investigation of i individual accounts. Such verification is considered appropMate to ensure
| |
| .{ :
| |
| that credit information is completa, up ti cate, and as accurata as possible.
| |
| i CRIMINAL HISTORY.
| |
| The purpose of the portion of the background invesciga-tion which deals with criminal history is to datannine whether an individual
| |
| :1 a has committed cMainal offenses of a type which would indicate that an
| |
| . .'} unescorted accass authorization to vital islands and protected areas may be .
| |
| .] contrary to the public health and safety. The ifconsee should consider the
| |
| ; ;]
| |
| nature of a given conviction to detarmine its relevancy to protecting the
| |
| , d; public health and safety. Although a single felony conviction may be. grounds
| |
| .]. to deny unescorted protacted area and vital island access authorization, a '
| |
| { patt rn of other lessar offenses, indicative of hanitual law violation, say j also be cause to deny unescorted protacted area and vital island access t
| |
| A 5
| |
| authoM zation. Pattarns of lesser offanses used to deny vital islanc and j
| |
| protected area accass should be keyed *4 the appropriata informatinn evaluation l} critaria discussed in paragrach 1.3 of thf s guide. It is intended that the
| |
| ; . individual be protactad from the denial of accass for isolated instancas'of, 1 C6/15/83 12 Attacament 2 to inclosure A
| |
| ~
| |
| I i
| |
| i y_ ,,e y,
| |
| ~
| |
| y pgS37.eJ7. *e I*.
| |
| *E *T O' '**f"
| |
| ^
| |
| s.- . m em -- - i
| |
| ^
| |
| | |
| e A -
| |
| I-unaccantable behavior wnich may not be relevant to his or her suitability for unescorted protected area and vital island access. However, in cases where the unacceptacle benavior has a direct relationship to the nuclear industr/, such infomation alone may be used to deny unescorted protectad area and vital
| |
| . island access authorization.
| |
| i Sinca criminal histor/ records typically contain if ttle detaf fed infoma-
| |
| [
| |
| - tion about an offense, the licensee should make an effort to determine the circ.usstancas surrounding the offense.
| |
| l The licensee should not base the denial of protected area and vital island access authorization solely on an indi-i vidual's conviction record.
| |
| The ifcansee should determine whether the convic- .
| |
| tion record, when intagrated with other information from the investigation, j
| |
| creates a personality profile which is unsuitable for unescartad access to
| |
| .. i 3
| |
| nuclear power plant protected area and vital islands.
| |
| Obtaining criminal history information may take seversi months. As a I consequence, the ifcansee may grant an individual an Interim Unescorted Access I - Authorization for 6 months or until this information is received, whichever period is shortar, providad'the other background investigative criteria are satis'factorily . set.
| |
| Upon recaint of the criminal history information, the licenses should eiher grant or deny unescartad accass authori:ation to the individual.
| |
| j * (Further guidance on the availabfif ty of criminal history
| |
| ; information to be provided in subsequent drafts.)
| |
| * MILITARY SE.WICE.
| |
| The purpose of the portion of the background investiga-tion which deals with militar/ service is to verify such servica, identify and record disciplinary problems and the reasons and circumstances under wnich an incividual separated from the armed forcas. The ifcansee's inquiry should be -
| |
| limitad to these ;oints. -
| |
| i
| |
| '. Information ccncarning an individual's past af1ftary servica may be octained from: ~
| |
| i :
| |
| l l
| |
| l l
| |
| l
| |
| \
| |
| 06/15/33 13 Attachment 2 to Enclosure A l
| |
| __ ,_,_,m,--,
| |
| | |
| s a. ,_, . a - .- -- - _ __ -
| |
| a . ,
| |
| ~
| |
| National Personnel Recorca Cantar 9700 Page Boulevard
| |
| .; St. t.ouis, MO 63134 1
| |
| ]!
| |
| The affected indivioual say sign an authorf ation permitting the contar j .
| |
| to furnish military history information directly to the ifcensee. Each request J.} should be signed by the individual, notarized and include the following
| |
| *5 information:
| |
| l .
| |
| Sj
| |
| : Name(s) the individual used whfie in aflitary service
| |
| ,3 , Social Security and Military Serial numbers
| |
| , j Sranch of the aflitary servica to which assigned j
| |
| Datias of servica li
| |
| *t There is no charge for information if the individual was honorably dis-
| |
| .l charged. Fees for other categories of discharges depend on the volume of
| |
| , j
| |
| .fg satarial which must be reproduced as determined *on a case-by-case basis.
| |
| a
| |
| '1
| |
| 'j
| |
| ~ CHARACTER ANO REPUTATION. Interviews should be conducted with persons acquaintad with the appifcant to detarmine the appifcant's gener,a1 character and reputation as it relates to the information evaluation critarf a discussed in paragraph 1.3 of this guide.
| |
| 'I since the applicant is expected to ifst references who will provide l
| |
| favoracle information, the primary value of such references is to assist the *
| |
| -j investigator in identifying other, developed, charactar referencas. At least i .
| |
| 'two individuals who know the appifcant but who were not Ifstad as charactar
| |
| : l. *$
| |
| references should be identified and intarviewed. Information elicited through 3
| |
| 4 Jose intarviews should be used to obtain an integrated behavioral proffie of i
| |
| ' the incividual and should not normally be used to deny unescorted protacted t
| |
| ]
| |
| , area and vital istand acesss wf thout further veriffcation.
| |
| : i. ?)
| |
| 8 l , .
| |
| l
| |
| ( .
| |
| 06/15/83 14 Attac:: ment 2 to Enclosure A 4
| |
| h q;, . y. ,, - ...s - - " " *
| |
| ~
| |
| '~ " * '
| |
| | |
| 1 . .
| |
| ~l . . . )
| |
| fl - ;
| |
| i ,
| |
| Contant
| |
| 'I In this section, the ifcansee should:
| |
| 1 1.
| |
| i Confirm that the background investigation will include the last
| |
| .j 5 years or the peMod since the appifcant's signteenth birthday, whichever is shorter.
| |
| l
| |
| : 2. .
| |
| Confirm that the individuals who wf11 be perfoming the background investigations will be trained to adequately perform such investigations and I knowledgeable of the licensee's infomation evaluation cMtaMa.
| |
| j 3.
| |
| .; DescM be how information will be ectiected and identify the types of .
| |
| records or other sources of information which will be used to satisfy each of the investigative cMtaMa.
| |
| i 4.
| |
| Describe the type of infomation which will be collectad from the identified records or other sourcas of information and explain its relationship
| |
| '{ to the information evaluation cH taria.
| |
| : 2. 3 Information Eva}uation CMtaMa 4
| |
| I Intant .
| |
| ,1 5
| |
| 4 The 11canses should review.the background investigation information against .
| |
| ~j fnformation evaluation critaM a'in 5 73.56(t)(3) to detarmine if an individual may pose an unacceptable risk to the public health and safety if granted
| |
| . unescartad accass to a nuclear power plant's protacted area and vital islands.
| |
| 'n making a dotarmination for the granting of. an ur. escorted access - -
| |
| -, authoritation, the 11canses shall specifically consider unetter the incividual:
| |
| il
| |
| : i. 1.
| |
| has cassaitted or attampted to commit, or aided or asettad another who committed or attameted to chemit, any act of sacotage or other e
| |
| unlawful destruction of procerty; C6/15/33 15 Attachment 2 to Enclosurs A
| |
| _ - . . . . _ . - - = ----
| |
| U
| |
| | |
| .- ~ -.-- - - - - - - - - -
| |
| , O I l l '
| |
| l 3
| |
| :. , 2.
| |
| has deliberately omitted material information from or falsified his
| |
| . employment or sita access application; 3.
| |
| has or has had any illness of a nature which, in the coinion of a
| |
| .h qualified and, if appifcable, state-licensed psychologist or psy-2
| |
| .;.j chiatrist, or medical doctor, may cause significant defect in the -
| |
| ^i: judgment or reliability of the individual;
| |
| , N 4. has been convicted of any felony or series of lesser offenses 4l indicating habitual criminal tandencies; 4 5.
| |
| j is a habitual user of a controlled substanea (as defined and listed in the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and control Act of 1970, 1
| |
| Pub. L 91-513, 21 U.S.C. Sees. 801 et seq.) without a prescription .
| |
| or has been without adequata evidenca of rehacilitation;
| |
| -) 6.
| |
| j is a user of alcohol habitually and to excass, or has been so in the past without adequata evidence of rehabilitation;
| |
| '.j 7.
| |
| has engaged in any other conduct, or is subject to any other circumstanca, which furnishes reason to believe that the individual 3
| |
| may act in a manner contrary to the protection of health and the
| |
| .] ainimization of danger to life and property.
| |
| I Tne licansee should evaluata the specific information received against
| |
| } documented critaria whicn contain direct safeguards implications. 7he criteria d
| |
| ' listad above have been developed with this objective in mind and are believed to be relevant for the following reasons.
| |
| U Acts of Sacotace "
| |
| i.I A history of involvement in acts of sabotage or destruction of property is j indicative of an individual's disregard for the law and order to achieve his j own ends.
| |
| ; j Fenedulent Aeolicatiens 4
| |
| . 'i
| |
| : f. - 1 j
| |
| An individual who deliberstaly falsiffes his aoplication or purposefully 1
| |
| l caits relevant and esquestad information does so because the disclosure might a fecoarti:e approval of the accass authori:ation. The signature block on the-s t -
| |
| 1 . 06/16/S3 16
| |
| ! Attacnment 2 to inclosurs A i
| |
| l i
| |
| !1 ,. ,, , _ . .- . .
| |
| - n t
| |
| | |
| f I
| |
| I, appifcation should clearly stata that the acpifcant veriff es, to the best of his knowledge, the c:mpletanass and accuracy of the ampifcation and that access f authorization may be denied or revoked if matarial falsifications or omissions
| |
| , are discovered.
| |
| /j i
| |
| Emotional or Mental Illnesses d
| |
| * Emotional or mental fliness may impair the individual's judgment or reliability. A qualified and, if appifcable, state-licensed psychologist or psychiatrist may review information developed during the background investi-
| |
| .}
| |
| gation and detarmine that no further information about the well-being of the individual is needed before recommending dental of the ac: ass authorf:ation.
| |
| In such cases, the ifcansee may deny unescartad ac:ess based on this finding.
| |
| , ,J .
| |
| d
| |
| ' If avafiaele rec rds are c:mplete and indicata an emotional problem, then j a qualified psychologist or psychf atrist snould use the following critaria for recommending dantal of access on the basis of the psychiatric records alone.
| |
| 4 ~!
| |
| t j
| |
| i (1) There is avfdance of the inotvidual having left the hospital or
| |
| ' treatment cantar against medical advica after voluntary acmission for treat- -
| |
| sent of an emotional disorder or of chemical decencency.
| |
| ; ]' (2)
| |
| .; The discharge summary pregnosis (after c moleting treat.y. nt for an emotional disorder or chemical dependency) is poor or guarded.
| |
| , 1 .
| |
| i (3) There is evidence of the individual not complying with orders for i
| |
| > medications prescribed for major emotional disorders.
| |
| (4)
| |
| There is evidence that the individual has failed to fo11ew througn on prescribed outpatient treatment.
| |
| 1 (5) The indivicual has been c:mmittad or hospita11:sd involuntarity.
| |
| i
| |
| ?
| |
| (6) There is evidenca of the individual having been ciagnosed but not'
| |
| : ; treated for a chemical decendency problem or an emotional disorder.
| |
| 06/15/33 17 Attacament 2 to Sciosure A
| |
| .. -- -~
| |
| . "l
| |
| _ __.__ _ _ . _ _ _ - - -- - _ _ - , . ..- . - - - ~ - - * " ~
| |
| | |
| _ _ _ . .. - .. ~-- -
| |
| l <
| |
| q .
| |
| l
| |
| . i
| |
| '.i .
| |
| : (7)
| |
| There is strong evidenca thati the individual is taking a medically prescribed drug which could have side effects which will interfere with the l individual's judgment or reliantitty. The specific effects of such medica-tions should be determined through a personal interview with either a
| |
| $ psychiatrist or qualiffed medical doctor.
| |
| 2,
| |
| #d
| |
| '5 However, if available records raise questions as to the individual's emotional stanility and are incomplete, then the individual should undergo a J
| |
| psychological assessment by a qualified psychologist or psychiatrist. Results
| |
| '5 i
| |
| of the psychological assessment should then be used by the qualified psychol-ogist or psychiatMst to support any recommendation to deny the individual '
| |
| access authorization to protected areas or vital islands.
| |
| 4 j .
| |
| Convictions for Felonies or t.asser Offenses 1.1 t
| |
| 3 Conviction of a felony or a series of lesser offenses indicating hanitual criminal tandencies may be sufficient cause to deny unescorted access.
| |
| i Some state. laws define habitual criminal tendencies. In such cases, the state's
| |
| _ definition shculd be used as one of the ifcensee's criteria for granting or -
| |
| denying the access authorization. In cases where the stata does not define habitual criminal tendencies or the state's definition involves criminal acts over more than a 3 year period, the ifcensee may deny unescorted accass
| |
| ] authorization to an individual on the basis of two or more criminal convictions
| |
| < i within the 3 year retrospective period. No attempt is made here to define a felony 1 therefore, the licensee shr- d use the definition appifcante to the '
| |
| } state in which the offense occurred.
| |
| .: Use of Cont elled Substances
| |
| .j %citual abuse of controlled sucstances may seriously fmoair an individ-' '
| |
| ual's judgment and reliability. In addi';fon, an individual may be driven to
| |
| ]
| |
| perfors criminal acts in order-to sustaf3 the habitual use of such substances and be more suscentible to t.oercion. If the background investigation indicatas that the indivioual has been detected using a. controlled suns ance on two or
| |
| * : acre instances in the precading 3 years without ,sitner a prescMption or under a doctor's direction, accass authori:ation to protacted areas and vital fstancs 06/15/S3 ist Atuchment 2 to Enclosure A l 1 i~'' ''' ' - -'
| |
| r
| |
| | |
| ~-
| |
| i may be denied.
| |
| The presumotion is that the individual, knowing that the use of
| |
| .j' ~ such substances is not legal, will attamat to conceal such use. While a single detection signt not ordinarily be adequata for denial of access privileges (an
| |
| ,),
| |
| exception might be a heroin user detected while selling the drug), two detections a are considered sufficient to conclude that the individual is a haottual user.
| |
| '6.
| |
| y Use of Alcohol -
| |
| .1 -
| |
| The intent of this criterion is to exclude habitual, unrehacilitated abusers of alcohol. The individual who uses afechol habitually and to excess may present
| |
| ; a risk by either appearing for work intoxicated or suffering from the effects i q of such use. In either casa, behavioral reif abfif ty cannot be assured.
| |
| : t. Other Conduct 1
| |
| * The intant of this critarion is to provide the ifcensee with guidelines for denying an unesdtrted access authorization to individuals wno may be susceptible i
| |
| to coercion to, act in a manner contrary to the protection of health and the j
| |
| minimization of danger te life and property. The ifcenses should exercise extreme caution in this mattar since " susceptibility to coercion" is, at best, an imprecise tara. For example, some homosexuals openly admit their sexual preferencas and, therefore, might not be suscaptible to coercion as a result.
| |
| Unless disclosure of the in1''ormation would reasonaoly result in undesiracle
| |
| ; consequences for the individual or result in extreme embarrassment, fts usefulness as a coercive instrument is limitad. . .
| |
| l Receiot of Derocatory Inforw.ation i
| |
| In the event of receipt of derogatory information, ifcansee managemenc 1
| |
| should conscientiously strive to validata the information bearing in mind the.
| |
| possible legal implications should the information latar be detarmined false. .
| |
| j Possible staps to be taken in the confirmation or dental of derogatory -
| |
| information include:
| |
| 06/15/83 19 Attachment : to Enclosure A
| |
| . g
| |
| - . . r-- - , , . , --. -_ . , ,--, ,---- - . ,
| |
| | |
| i
| |
| :1
| |
| .3
| |
| .j , 1.
| |
| Judgment on the reliability of source of derogatory infor: nation.
| |
| .:i '
| |
| If the sourca may be of questionable reif ability, e.g. , a personal
| |
| ". reference, the information should be confi m ed by at least two
| |
| .j.' additional sources.
| |
| 4
| |
| .) 2.
| |
| Inspection of other infomation received as part of the background investigation to discover conflicts with or confirmation of derogatory infomation.
| |
| .t 3. Confidential intarview with the' individual to deny or confirm the
| |
| .1 information and develop possible leads to assist in the review. *
| |
| ] 4.
| |
| Follow-up investigation as a result of the intarview if additional
| |
| : j. Teeds have been uncovered.
| |
| : 5. .
| |
| Occumented detarmination, using Information Evaluation Critaria, on whether to allow unescorted accass to the facility by the individual.
| |
| : Content.-
| |
| i In this section, the Itcansee should:
| |
| } 1.
| |
| Identify how the criter'ia will be used in evaluating information
| |
| ),
| |
| obtained througn the bacxground investigation, including frequencies and time frames for repetitive conduct.
| |
| 2.
| |
| Identify the safeguards relevancy of any proposed unique applica+.fons
| |
| -' of the information evaluation criteria and affirm that no individual's First Amendment rights of free speech and association will be violated by application .
| |
| q of the evaluation criteria.
| |
| .- 3.
| |
| Identify procedures to be followed in the event derogatory information j is recafved on an individual. ~
| |
| 5 2 .
| |
| a l
| |
| 3 l
| |
| ! 06/15/83 20 l Attac.. ment 2 to belosurs A 1
| |
| i
| |
| .. . .. . - . . - . . , - n ~ - - - - -
| |
| | |
| ~
| |
| . =
| |
| .j ,
| |
| i* .
| |
| 't
| |
| }, CHAPTER 3 CONTINUAL BEHAVIORAL CBSERVATTCN PRCGRAN
| |
| -f This chaptar provides guidance for meeting the requirements of para-
| |
| [, graph 73.55(d) which are as follows:
| |
| 'a *
| |
| -j (d)(1) The ifcansee shall estacifsh and maintain a continual behavioral observation program for individuals which is designed to have supervisors
| |
| , j
| |
| " detect changes in an individual's on-the-job performance, judgment level, or behavior, and after detecting a pattern of abnormal behavfor, refer the '
| |
| j individual to senior licensee management for a decision on whether to maintain or tamporarily suspend the individual's unescartad accass authori:ation to
| |
| ] protacted areas and vital islands.
| |
| In the case where the individual's behavioral actions represent an imminent danger to the puolic health and 1
| |
| j safety, the individual's supervisor shall immediately suspend the individual's unescartad accass authorication on a tamparary basis and t'en refer the individual to senior ifcansee management.
| |
| (2) The requirements of paragraph (d)(1) of this section supplant the requirements of Appendix 8, paragraph I.S.2.c of this part for nuclear power
| |
| { reactor security personnel.
| |
| 9 4
| |
| 3.1 General The intant of the requirement in 5 73.56(d) for a behavioral observation -
| |
| 3 program is to ensure the continuing reliability of employees having unescartad -
| |
| i accass to protected areas and vital islands. The background investigation
| |
| ' described in Chapter 1 of thfs gufde is a method of estab1ishing initial reliability and trustworthiness but wf11 not detect behavioral enange over time.
| |
| The objective of the behavioral observation program is to detact cenavioral .
| |
| change before job perfor*.sanca deterioratas substantially. Supe ~.fsors are in .
| |
| i a unique position to ocserve bcth positive ar.d negative changas in the behavfor of their subordinatas. The behavioral observation program sakes use of this j fact by requiring supervisors to be alert to benaviorsi changes in their .
| |
| 06/15/23 21 Attacnmsnt 2 to Enclosure A
| |
| ,M9W-r--- -- m - .-,e
| |
| | |
| 4 4
| |
| * subordinates that may be precursors of a decrease in the employee's anfif ty to
| |
| ,i perform job ' tasks in a reliable manner.
| |
| i
| |
| ..} The behavioral observation program should be nonpunitive to operate in an f, effective manner.
| |
| One recommended means of enhancing the nonpunitive aspect
| |
| 's of the behavioral observation program is to estabitsh an. employee. assistance
| |
| .. program.
| |
| Although the NRC does not require an employee assistance program, the
| |
| ]4 Commission believes that providing assistanca to emoloyees with identified
| |
| ~
| |
| problems will increase the acceptability and effectiveness of the behavioraf
| |
| ?{ .
| |
| obsertation program.
| |
| =1 2
| |
| If an employee assistanca program is established, its scope should be
| |
| 'i d clearly ' efined and should include incidents involving theft, vandalism, sabotage,
| |
| ! or the breaking of work rules. Major incidents should be handled on a site-y specific basis according to existing labor relation policies and disciplinary procadures.
| |
| Minor disciplinarf actions, such as a formal warning to the i -
| |
| employee, may also be accompanied by a mandator / referral to the employee lj assistance program if the supervisor has noticed a pattern of decifning work performanca.
| |
| The employee assistance prcgram should operate outside of other
| |
| * human resource, departments and provide complete confidentiality to emolayees who wish to use the sortica. Under no circumstances should emoloyee assistance 4
| |
| personnel be required to make a judgment concarning the suitability of accass
| |
| { authorization. Employee assistanca personnel should be a counseling,'not an ,
| |
| j; evaluative, resource.
| |
| 1 .
| |
| ]7 Another important facto- in daveloping an effective, nonpunitive behavioral
| |
| ' 1 observation program is the devotessent of a consul't ant /consultee relationship a
| |
| between the person responsible for administaring the acesss authorf:stion program i and the supervisors. The supervisor should feel free to discuss behavioral 4
| |
| 0 j observations he has made and to seek advice without fesr that the sucject emoloyee .
| |
| will automatically have his access authorizatton suspended. Also, the supervisors M,
| |
| should not be made to feel that referral of an individual to ifcansee management 4
| |
| will necessarily result in suspension of the individual's access authorf:ation.
| |
| ' The attitude should be that the supervisor has detected certain behaviors 1" changes and is referring the matter to an individual mere qualified than himself to decide '
| |
| wnat staos snould be taken. The suservisors must be made awars tnat the e.'::alcyee's
| |
| : 06/15/83 22 Attachment 2 to Enclosurs A 4
| |
| k I
| |
| m
| |
| . - . n .-- - -
| |
| -~ - - -
| |
| ~
| |
| | |
| .]
| |
| I j
| |
| rights and well-being are important considerations and that efforts should be
| |
| : d. '
| |
| .; made to assist and rehabfittata employees whether their accass authori:ation is suspended or revoked or not.
| |
| i Aoditional information on behaviors 1 ocservation j programs can be found in an NRC contractor report entitled "Benavioral Reliability Program for the Nuclear Industry," NUREG/CR-2076.
| |
| It is recommended that each employee be informed about the objectives of the behavioral observation program, how the program works, what records will be kept, who will have access to the records, how confidentf ality of the records will be assured, the consequences of severe behavioral detarforation, how the facility will attampt to bsist an employee who has behavioral problems, and j the extant of an encloyee's appeal rignts if accass is revoked. This employee notification should stress the nonpunitive nature of the program and the contribution it makas to maintaining a safe working environment.
| |
| * I.
| |
| ,i Although it is recommended the accass autherf:ation program be designed so that emoloyees will not suffer monetarily due to the tamporary suspension of l
| |
| unescorted accass, the Commission feels that a lengthy suspension period is both unfair and unnecessary. Therefore, the Commission recommends that a deci-i ~
| |
| sion be made within 20 workdays to either reinstate or revoke the individuals' f
| |
| unescorted access authorization. This time is sufficient for the ifcensee to review the appropriata infornation and make a final decision.
| |
| j 3.2 Detection of Behavorial Chance Intant
| |
| * l
| |
| -i 4
| |
| * Appendix I to this guide contaf,ns a suggestad " Supervisor's Guide to Observing Behavior Change." This matarial say be useful in helping suoervisors focus on relevant indicators of behavioral change. If the supervisor noticas negative changes in job perfomanca (which are not so extreme as to warrant . ,
| |
| inmediata suspension of accass), in an employee's r11ationship with cthers, or fn an accioyee's emetional or physical health, the sucervisor should: first, j
| |
| q continue to observe the employee; second, discuss the cenavfor with the emoloyee;
| |
| . I 06/16/83 23 Attacamen: 2 to inclosure A l
| |
| - reye - , __
| |
| -= y e..,.r,-y, m, - ,-w,. - ,...,,,--,.__,n-.,m.
| |
| | |
| - . . _- - . - . - . _ _ . -- . =_ .
| |
| + e.A. #
| |
| : v. . ,
| |
| m-1
| |
| , i
| |
| '1
| |
| ;{'
| |
| third, refer the employee to the employee assistanca program, if one is avail- !
| |
| able; and fourth, report the changes to senior ifcensee management, if the supervisor believes the employee's behavior or series of behaviors pose a risk
| |
| : j. to reliable operations.
| |
| [G .
| |
| e It is the intent of this requirement that the supervisor's responsibil-ities include observing employee behavior on a day-to-day basis. The suoer-i visor should be familiar with the various types of employee behavior of safe-
| |
| ] guards and safety interest and say use Appendix I of this guide as a refresher for this purpose. In addition, Appendix I say be consulted when a supervisor h has a suspicion of behavioral change but cannot pinpoint the problem, or when
| |
| .a !
| |
| .3 he detects a change in one area and needs guidanca to detarmine f f there are i
| |
| j changes in other areas as well. It should be noted that Appendix I f s a guide j
| |
| 'l to behavioral change and not a psychometric instrument. Thus, supervisors *
| |
| 'j
| |
| ; j should not attaset to make inferences about an individual's emotional stabf1-ity based on the use of this gufde. Judgments or diagnosis on emotional stability are normally medical judgments and therefore should be reserved to Sj qualiffed medical personnel.
| |
| -4
| |
| ~}
| |
| JJ To have an effective program, ehch ifcensee snould develop a behavioral i observation training progrsa for supervisors which .f s designed to meet the
| |
| ~
| |
| i following objectives: (1) enable supervisors to identify and cascribe key behavior in the workplaca; (2) help supervisors recognize benavior enange; j
| |
| (3) caution supervisors against attampting to diagnose themselves or their
| |
| .l employees; (4) help supervisors recognize signs and symptcas of chemical dependency; (5) help supervisors become more aware of and overcome common
| |
| { l excuses for not taking action with employees who show signs of behavioral i
| |
| unreif ability; (6) help supervisors understand tne acministrative staps to be ,
| |
| i followed when signs of behavioral unreifanfif ty are caserved; (7) help sucer-visors develop practical tacnniques for appecacning the werker wno shows benavioral change; (S) help supervisors identify signs of stress in themselves
| |
| .i and others; and (9) enable supervisors to be more aware of their role in creating
| |
| 'i a positive work environment and in ensuring plant safety.
| |
| C6/15/S3 24 Attacnment 2 to belosure A l
| |
| E
| |
| . -,..n.
| |
| | |
| .. - .- -.-- -- " - ~ ~ - - * ~~ '~ ~
| |
| 3 A -
| |
| 1 1
| |
| This training should be sevnral days in length and involve sucereisors
| |
| ] from a variety of decartments and different levels in the plant hierarchy.
| |
| ' Videotapes and films should be used so superif sors can practica observing and noting behaviors. The ifcanses should ensure that at least one of the indi-viduals involved in the design of the training is a behavforal scientist with expeMence in an assessment program. If the Itcensee bss an employee assistance I program, someone from that program should attend or be part of the training staff.
| |
| - Materials itka the Supervisor's Guide to Observing Behavior Changes (see Appendix I) should be introduced and used during the workshop so that supervisors understand which behaviors require monitoMng. The licsnsee should 3
| |
| -j ensure that the supervisors are trained to obserie and refer, not to diagnose.
| |
| The training session should cover the problems of chemical dependency and 4
| |
| symptcas that may be observed in the workplaca. Superrisors should be trained to recognize and deal with the dilema they faca in obseriing and confronting versus covering up for their employees. The fact that monitoring the behavior of subordinatas is c:ntributing to the safe operation of the faciif ty and thus contributing to the maintananca of a safe work environment should be stressed
| |
| { in this training. The behavioral observation program should be presented as
| |
| : helpful and nqncunitive.
| |
| t j
| |
| : The ifcansee should conduct an evaluation of the training to monitor its effectiveness.
| |
| The itcansee should also ensure that trainers have an under-standing of the nuclear industr/ and employee reliability issues.
| |
| i Supervisors should consult senior ifcanses management concerning any gradual .
| |
| behavioral detaMoration obseriod in subordinatas. However, the superifscr
| |
| ' aust refer a subordinata to senior ifcanses management when signf ficant changes in the behavioral areas cutlined in Appendix I are detected. The superifsor sust make judgments acout both the seveMty and the prevalenca of suca benavioral j change. For examole, if the employee has made a ver/ serious mistake and fatis .
| |
| to report it or caliberstaly damages facility equipment, immediata referral to senior ifcansee management should result or the supervisor should imediataly
| |
| { suspend the indivicual's unescorted access authoHzation and then refer him/her to senior ifcansae management. However, if the incidents are of a relatively minor nature (e.g. , the empicyee sucdenly starts c:molaining aoout minor sleecing 05/16/83 25 At.actment 2 to & closure A f
| |
| I
| |
| | |
| .a M difficulties), the supervisor should document this but should nct. refer the individual to senior licansee management on that basis alone. The NRC recommends j that in cases where the behavioral change has not caen severs and no pattarn
| |
| } has yet emerged, the supertisor should consider scme interim measure *J assist j the employee. If there is an employee assistance program, the supervisor may 1 recomeand the employee seek help. In the absence of an esplayee assistance 1 + progree, the ifcensee is encouraged to have supervisors counsel the employee.
| |
| j NUREG/CR-2076 contains guidanca on how to conduct such intarviews for performance
| |
| , and discipline type situations. 4
| |
| }; -
| |
| q For individuals referred to sanfor licensee management, the decision to
| |
| .g maintain or tamoorarily suspend an individual's unescartad accass authorization ~
| |
| should only be made after consultation with a qualified and, if appifcable, 4
| |
| I stata-licensed' psychologist, psychiatrist, or medical doctor, as approorf ats.
| |
| * Temporarf suspension of an individual's access authorization should not result
| |
| , , in a monetarf penalty or loss of seniority to that individual.
| |
| t i
| |
| ' The supervisors may also periodically prepare a behavioral caservation report *
| |
| .-l -
| |
| for each subordinate. In preparing such a report, the supervisor may query himself about changes in each of the benavioral areas identified in Appendix I and document the results. Then an assessment should be made of both the severity and prevalence of any behavioral change and a conclusion reached concarning any action which should be taken, such as referral to senior licensee management.
| |
| } Prior to making this decision, the supervisor may consult previous behavioral j
| |
| obsersation reports on the employee to refresh his memory on the emolayee's prior .
| |
| j behavior and his own previous concerns. 'These reports should be confidential and discussed only with the employee and, when appropriata, with senior licensee
| |
| ; management, the psychologist, psychiatrist or medical doctor, or professionals frca the employee assistance program.
| |
| i l Contant '
| |
| 5 j In this section the licansee should:
| |
| t (1) Describe the procedures to be follcwed to continually 'obserie the ;
| |
| . behavior of individuals having unescortad protectad area and vital island ac: ass: '
| |
| C6/15/83 25 Attachment 2 to Enclosure A l
| |
| ?
| |
| ' , . . = .. n . = . . - + . . . . . = = .; :- ..~- --
| |
| ,.7,
| |
| | |
| j i
| |
| ,k .
| |
| .' Include a discussion of: .
| |
| I-(a) The frequency of review by supervisors of the list of types of behavior to look for, !
| |
| 9 (b) The records which will be kept on each affected individual.
| |
| (c) 4 To whom and under what circumstances these records will be released.
| |
| (2) Provide a description of the training to be provided to supervisors so that they may detect relevant behavioral change in their sunordinates. .
| |
| . Include a discussion of:
| |
| s
| |
| } (a) The topfes to be covered.
| |
| (b)
| |
| - The qualifications of individuals who will present the training.
| |
| I (c) The manner in which supervisors will practice observing -
| |
| behavioral change.
| |
| , (3) Discuss the objectives of the training and how they will be achfeved.
| |
| .i j (4)
| |
| Otscuss how the effectiveness of the behavioral observation program will be evaluated.
| |
| i (5) Identify and describe any procedures which may be instituted for the preparation of periodic behavioral observation reports.
| |
| * i (6)
| |
| Describe the follow-up actions to be taken when behvioral changes .
| |
| i occur not serious enough for referral to senior ifcensee management. .
| |
| (7) Describe, if appifcaole, any employee assistance program and proca-dures, or other form of employee counseling which will be employed to attemot i
| |
| to rehanflf tate emoloyees or to reverse the process of behavioral deterioration.
| |
| (8) Ofscuss the criteria to be used by sucervisors to decide whether to I
| |
| refer individuals to senior licenses management.
| |
| (3) Discuss the procedures to be followed after an individual has been
| |
| ,- referred to senior licensee management.
| |
| 06/15/83 27 Attacament 2 to Erclosurs A
| |
| . - - ~
| |
| , . . . . , . _ . _.. _, , ..,. _y, _ . , , . _ . , , , . ._e ,, , , , , . . . , . - ._y--
| |
| | |
| l
| |
| .l, 3.3 Securf tv Personnel
| |
| .1
| |
| : Intent y:3 ,
| |
| This intent of this requirement is to assure that security personnel are f.}:. subject to the continual behavioral observation program of f 73.56 rather than
| |
| : g. .g the behavioral observation requirements of Appendix 8.
| |
| .a
| |
| ;.j'. Content '
| |
| 1 g% j I
| |
| In this section, the ifcensee should assure that all security personnel
| |
| * will be tubject to the continual behavioral observation requirements of 5 73.56
| |
| $ paragisch (d).
| |
| .~ 4
| |
| 'i S
| |
| -i I
| |
| * n '
| |
| .I .
| |
| :1
| |
| .}
| |
| 4 4
| |
| 1,.
| |
| I
| |
| ~l k
| |
| 06/'.5/83 ZS At.act. ment 2 to Enclosure A i, ,
| |
| -- m - - - - m ~~~- -
| |
| | |
| t l
| |
| .]
| |
| ~
| |
| q CHAPTER 4 NON-t.ICENSEE EMPt.0YEES 4.1 General This section provides guidanca for meeting the requirements of 10 CFR
| |
| ; 73.56(e) which are as follows:
| |
| (e)(1) The licensee may accept an unescorted accass authorization granted
| |
| ' an employee of a manufacturer, contractor, or equipment suoplier by another ..
| |
| licensee, or a previous employee of another ifcansee, if the individual's employment in licensed nuclear power reactors has not been interrupted for a continuous period of more than 365 days and if the oHginal granting licanses sands to the gaining licansee .a photograpn of the individual and a written verification of the individual's unescorted access authorization along with a -
| |
| ' statament which indicates its current validity. For individuals whose employ-ment in licansed nuclear power reactors has been interrupted for a continuous period of more than 365 days, the individual's activities shall be investigated j
| |
| according to the appifcable requirements of paragraph (c) of this sec* ion.
| |
| ' (2) Consistent with the requirements of paragraph 50.70(b)(3) of thfs
| |
| 'chantar, employees of the Commission, who have been cartiffed by the NRC to have set tne intant of the requirements of tais section, shall be granted 4
| |
| . ' unescartad accass authori:ation to protected areas and vital islands without
| |
| ' further investigation by the licansee with regards to the requirement of this .
| |
| section.
| |
| (3) During cold shutdown or refueling operations, as specified in the
| |
| ' facility's technical specifications, as required in 10 CFR 50.36, the ifcansee has the option to grant a tamporary unescorted accass authori:ation to an unscreened individual if:
| |
| l -
| |
| (f) the requirements of 8 73.55 of this chapter are fol'1 owed, and (11) the affected individual is suhfect to the continual behavior observa-tion requf renents of paragraph (d) of this section.
| |
| ~
| |
| 4' l
| |
| l 1
| |
| 06/15/83 29 Attac. ment 2 to inclosure A I
| |
| = h - = - . ..,
| |
| . .-.h i
| |
| _ 1
| |
| | |
| ~
| |
| ,i . * . . .
| |
| i 'p '
| |
| ~~
| |
| 4.2 )
| |
| Acceotance of Unescorted Accass Authori:ation Granted bv Another t.feensee I
| |
| j Intent i.:
| |
| . .,t It is the intant of paragraph 73.56(e)(1) that, since licensees will be
| |
| [i employing uniformly effective programs in determining an individual's eligi-bility for unescorted access to power reactor protected areas and vital islands, eligibility should be transferable. This option is available only if the individual's authorizad unescorted accass has not been interrupted for a continuous period of more than 365 calendar days. The licensee who grantad the hj d:: access authorization must furnish the ifcansee to whom the access authorization is being transferred with a pnotograph of the empicy.e of a quality equivaient j
| |
| j to normal-industrial identification badges and with a writtan certification that s
| |
| (1) the individual was ' creened in accordance with an approved Access Authoriza-i '
| |
| * tion Plan and grantad unescorted protected area and vital island access authoriza-tion, and (2) the unescorted access authorization has not been suspended, revoked,
| |
| '. ] and is not being reviewed for possible suspension or revocation. Additionally, j it is incumbent upon the employing ifcansee, but not required, to determine to the licensee's satisfaction the activities and employment of the individual desiring unescorted access for the interval of time (less than 365 days) when i
| |
| ' the individual did not hold unescartad access authorization. The'cartification i should also contain the last data that the individual exercised the unescartad 9 accass authorization by actually entering a protected area or vital island.
| |
| d
| |
| ; Contant
| |
| : j. -
| |
| ;}'
| |
| 1 In this section the ifcansee should describe the methods to be used in
| |
| .j obtaining, reviewing, and acting upon information from another licensee con-1 3
| |
| j carning an individual who claf as to have previously been granted unescortec protected area and vital island accass. The licansee should indicata taat, in
| |
| }j cases where the individual's unescorted access authorization has not been
| |
| ~
| |
| exercised for more than 365 calendar days, the background investigation will be I.
| |
| i j .
| |
| i
| |
| ~
| |
| C6/15/33 30 Attact. ment 2 to Enclosure A l
| |
| ..- -~
| |
| -^
| |
| | |
| ... _ . . . . . - ~ ~ - -~- - -- '---- ' -~ ~ ^ -~~ ~ '''~~ ~ ~ ' ~ ~
| |
| A .
| |
| "m . .
| |
| 1 . * .
| |
| 4 g
| |
| i 4 'I 3
| |
| ' updated to cover the individual's activities from the date of the previous I Dackground investigation.
| |
| i 4. 3 Unescorted Access for Cartain NRC Emolovees
| |
| . 1
| |
| : Intent .
| |
| i- :
| |
| .1 It is the intant of 5 73.56(e)(2) that certain NRC employees, such as inspectors, who require unescorted protected area or vital island access fod the effective performance of their official duties will be identiffed to the i licensee by the NRC. These employees will be certified by the NRC and should-be granted unescartad accass without further investigatton by the ifcensee. '
| |
| i J
| |
| [ Content
| |
| * i In this section the licansee should describe the methods to be used in granting unescartad access authorization to NRC employees based on a Commission-
| |
| { supplied cartification of screening.
| |
| : 4. 4 Unescorted Access Durine Mafor Outaces Intent J
| |
| i Sections 73.55(1) and 73.56(e)(3) recognize that during major outages, such as cold shutdown or refueling operations, most equipment will not be vital within the setning of 10 CFR 73.2(1). In such instances, the ifcansee may elect to grant unescorted access authorization to unscreened tamporary workers provided that:
| |
| (1) all other provisions of 10 CFR Part 73 remain in effect; this includes:
| |
| (a) the maintenance of all security organization requirements, (b) maintenanca of all physical barrier requirements, (c) maintenanca of full.
| |
| : j. ,
| |
| access controls and badging requirements to the extent that the individual is
| |
| ; i t
| |
| issued a numbered badge indicating the area (s) to which unescartad access is grantad,' (d) key and lock control to the extant practicable, (e) use of detec-i l
| |
| tion aids to the extant practicable; compensatory measures, f.e., the posting of guards, should be in placa in the event alarm equipment is placed in the i i 06/15/83 31 Attachment 2 to Enclosurs A i
| |
| I
| |
| - -w - - -
| |
| p y 9 y ,wy+ g my--,- -, , ----r y- -w* ge='
| |
| | |
| j a] access mode to silenes nuisance alanas, (f) maintaiiance of consunications requirements, (g) tasting and maintenance, and (h) maintananca of the response 3
| |
| function; (2) these unsenened individuals are subject to the continual ij behavior observation requirements of 10 CFR 73.56(d); and (3) procedures are 1
| |
| : v. employed to ensure that areas and safety / safeguards equipment which were l accessible to unscreened persons are examined and performance tasted before '
| |
| .j they are used in plant operations. These measures should include a visual
| |
| , di
| |
| * examination of areas and equipment by knowledgeable individuals for the purpose i
| |
| of locating apparent sanotage devices or signs of mechanical or electrical
| |
| .j g tampering and functional tasting of safety-related or vital equipment. '
| |
| .:., Contant
| |
| * J
| |
| .i In this section the licensee should describe how a deter:sination will be made that granting unscreened persons unescorted access to certain plant areas
| |
| ~{ and equipment will not endanger the public health and safety. The ifcansee 2
| |
| should confirm that all other protection measures (f.e. protected area entry A
| |
| searches, control of accass to plant areas) contained in the ifcansee's
| |
| ]l 1 physical security plan will remain in full effect and describe the inspections *
| |
| .of areas and.tasts of equipment that will be made following unescorted access
| |
| ' by unscreened persons. The ifcansee should describe the steps which wif1 he taken to ensure that unscreened tamparar/ workers are sucject to a- continual I behavioral observation program.
| |
| : i.
| |
| ~i.-
| |
| {. *
| |
| 'i .
| |
| 1 *t 1
| |
| -i.
| |
| A 9
| |
| l 06/16/83 22 ttact. ment 2 to Enclosure A if i
| |
| 0.-- - - ._ _ _ . . - _ ._
| |
| | |
| O - -
| |
| f . . ,
| |
| CHAPTER 5 REVIEW PROCEDURE 5 This chapter provides guidanca for meeting the requirements of 73.56(f)
| |
| . which are as follows:
| |
| (f) Any denial or revocation of access authorf:ation of an employee of a
| |
| the licensee, contractor, or supp11er that has an adverse effect on the indi-vidual's employment shall be considered as if it were a matter subject to review under the review procedure contained in the collective bargaining
| |
| ( agreement covering the bargaining unit of which the employee is a memoer provided such procadure is consonant with fundamental principles of due procass.
| |
| Alternatively, and for cases where the individual is not a member of a bargaining unit or where contract review procedures are not adequata, the
| |
| * licensee shall include in his plan, required to be suosittad pursuant to para-graph 73.56(a), a procedure for review of dentals and revocations that provides I
| |
| notica and an opportuntty for a fair evidentiary hearing.
| |
| I 5.1 Gevieral i
| |
| Section 73.56(f) provides for a review procadure, to be used upon the request of a ifcansee empicyes, or contractor emoloyee wnese ac:sss authori:a-i .
| |
| tion has been revoked. Individuals who are not yet emoloyees of the licensee or a contractor need not be provided with a review procedure. The grievance l
| |
| procadures contained in typical collective bargaining agreements are generally acceptable for this purpose. As an alternative, or if the affected individual i is not covered by such a collective bargaining agreement or the agreement's j precadure is inadequata, the ifcensee can provide a review procedure that i includes the fundamental elements of procedural due process. Regardless of whether a collective bargaining agreement grievance procedure or a licensee-designed review is used, the review of an access authorization denta.1 or .
| |
| j revocation should include notica and opportunity for a fair evidentiary hear-
| |
| ] ing presided over by an cajective and impartial person or persons. Such
| |
| { persons say be selected according to generally accepted procadures for arot-I trator selection, such as under the Voluntary Lacor Arcitration Rules of
| |
| ; 06/15/83 33 Attachment 2 to Enclosurs A
| |
| , i i-1
| |
| -- . - - , - - - . - - , , . ,, , , - , ,-.w.r--,-,,- , , -, #- ,.w ,-
| |
| | |
| U -
| |
| ~..Y .
| |
| *l .
| |
| k the American Arbitration Association, or the rules of the Federal Mediation and
| |
| ]'
| |
| * Conciliation Service, or by any other reasonable method that insures cofactivity
| |
| ;.j and impartiality on part of the presiding person.
| |
| :)
| |
| h Intent
| |
| 'M 9
| |
| The intent of these requirements is to assure that the individual has the fullest opportunity to respond to and refute information which leads to a denial
| |
| 'j or revocation of an unescorted access authori ation and is protected from abuses e
| |
| I-(
| |
| of power and errors in judgment or integretation on the part of licenses personnel.
| |
| $.l Content '
| |
| ::)
| |
| 1
| |
| -] The licensee should: '
| |
| 'i '
| |
| j 1.
| |
| Provide copies of the collective bargaining agreement grievance j
| |
| i;3 procedures to be used to review ac:sss authori:ation revocations.
| |
| 2.
| |
| e l
| |
| Provide a description of the alternative review procedures, if any, to be used in lieu of such an agreement procedure.
| |
| The ifcansee should confirm that all procedures provide the due precass
| |
| ?j elements described above.
| |
| 1
| |
| 'l .
| |
| 'i 1
| |
| :.f I e 2l. .
| |
| 9.
| |
| .{
| |
| 06/15/83 34 l At.acament 2 to Enclosure A r
| |
| I l -l
| |
| -m-
| |
| - ~-
| |
| ' * - ' " " " ~ ~
| |
| ( '
| |
| | |
| i i .
| |
| .. CHAPTER 6 POOTECTION OF INFORMATION l This section provides guidanca for meeting the requirements of para-
| |
| .' graph 73.56(g) of 10 CFR Part 73 which are as felicws:
| |
| Each licansee, contractor or supplier who collects personal information on an esplayee for the purpose of complying with this section shall establish and 4
| |
| saintain a system of files and procedures for the protection of the personal-
| |
| : information. Such personal information collected and maintained shall not be disclosed to persons other than the subject individual or those who have a need
| |
| " to have accass to the information in perfoming assigned duties in the procass of granting or denying accass to protectad areas and vital islands. The ifcansee i .
| |
| should also confidentially maintain the records of those audits perfomed on contractor screening programs. Files or documents relied upon by the licansee shall be available, at the ifcansee's sita, for examination by the NRC to deter-l aine the licensee's complianca in impleselising its approved plan. The accass authorization file of an individual should be kept for a minimum of 3 years after tamination of unescartad access authorization for protected areas and vital islands.
| |
| 6.1 Genarsi In connection with the accass authorization program and eacn of its ele-ments, the if cansee should establish an effective privacy protection program which aintai:ss intrusiveness, maximizes fairness, and creates legitimate, .
| |
| enforceabla expectations on confidentiality. In all cases in which personal information about an 'esployee or appifcant is generated as part of the back-i [
| |
| ground investigation, psychological assessment, behavioral observation program, or an employee assistanca program, such information should be kept separata from emoloyment data and genersi personnel records. Consent foms should be -
| |
| required prior to gathering such information. Also, the individual 'should be tr. formed of the types of records which wf11 be kept, where the records will be
| |
| ' 1 3
| |
| maintained, how long the records will be retained, what right the individual t
| |
| has to accass the information, and to wnom and under what circumstancas the information will be released. In addition, the ifcansee should ensure that the privacy protaction program comnif es with all federal ano stata privacy laws.
| |
| l 06/29/83 35 1 Attachment 2 to Enclosure A i
| |
| . i
| |
| . il 4 ( __ - _ - - .. ..-==== -
| |
| I l
| |
| | |
| i
| |
| . 1
| |
| ] Upon request, the ifcensee should make available to NRC inspectors any files
| |
| .{,
| |
| which would assist in datarmining a ifcansee's comolf ance with the regulations.
| |
| y j 6. 2 Procedures and Records for the Pretection of Information 1 Intent 1 1
| |
| ]. The intent of this requirement is to have licensees establish procedures to limit distribution of records generated in comolf ance with the requirements
| |
| : of Section 73.56 of 10 CFR Part 73.
| |
| j' a
| |
| 3
| |
| ; ,; Background investigation information should be transmittad directly from .
| |
| i the individuals or organizations conducting the investigation to a designated individual within the licansee's organization. The information should be '
| |
| ]
| |
| * stored in a locked file cabinet and the key to the storage location in which
| |
| !, these records are maintained should be controlled. The use of information shou
| |
| : be limited to decisions on unescartad access authori:ation. If the applicant *
| |
| ' is denied unescorted access due to derogatory information in his background, 7 s the background investigation file should be retained for 5 years or until the
| |
| - applicant has exhaustad all of his appeal rights. If unescartad accass is grantad, l
| |
| but questionable info'rmation was discovered, this should be documented in the individual's access authoritation file. An individual's file should not be transmitted to a future employer unless specifically requested in writing by a
| |
| the individual. The information in at individual's file should not be tsade available to any other employee of the ifcensee except as necessary in the .
| |
| i exercising of an individual's appeal rights. In those cases, the ifcensee may
| |
| } sake the information upon which he based his denial or revocation of access authorization available to the individual and his representatives, if any, and to the individuals ajudicating the appaal. Random summary inforsation may be provided individuals performing facility quality assurance audits.
| |
| 1 .
| |
| .1 As part of the behaviora-1 observation program, individual supervisors may-l ', ,
| |
| be filling out reports on each subordinate. These reports should be compared
| |
| ' with other reports, particularly the most recent, to identify potential behavioral change. The individual's supervisor and senior ifcen'see management should be the only pocole having access to suen reports and should maintain them at tne 06/16/83 35 l
| |
| i Attacament 2 to Enclosure A
| |
| ~
| |
| ,,,.m -
| |
| m -- - -
| |
| S. . - -
| |
| ~ ,
| |
| | |
| _ ..._ - . . - . . . - -- - - ^- ^~' - ~ ~
| |
| L same level of protection as the background investigation data.
| |
| j -
| |
| of audits, random sumary information may be made available to facility quality For the purpose
| |
| }'
| |
| assuranca auditors.
| |
| Upon termination of an emoloyee's accass authori:stion, these records may be destroyed unless they form the basis upon which the employee was tarminated.
| |
| 9
| |
| 'l
| |
| ] If the licansee establishes an employee assistance program as part of the i
| |
| behavioral observation program, great care in information handling should be exercised, particularly if the espicyee refers himself to the employee assist-
| |
| -3 ance program. All records associated with the employee assistanca program should be secure and treated with the strictest of confidentiality. If the emolayee seeks assistanes either through the suggestion or direction of the supervisor, the supervisor should be periodically notified of the progress of the rehabilitation. The fact that an individual was or was not seeking assist-j anca, either voluntarily or aandatorially, should have no bearing on whether j his unescorted protacted area and vital island accass authorization is sustained j or revoked through the behavioral observation program.
| |
| I
| |
| ,1, The access authorization file which the ifcenses maintains for each employee granted unescartad protected ares and vital island authorization should be
| |
| ! retained for '3 years after the last instance of the use of such authorization.
| |
| j .
| |
| Content '
| |
| 'i In this section the Ifcansee should discuss the following for each type of -
| |
| ] record generated through the access authorization program:
| |
| j e
| |
| : 1. The types of records to be stored.
| |
| ; 2. The manner in which they will be stored. .
| |
| : 3. The placa they will be stored.
| |
| 4.
| |
| The individuals by position or title who will have accass.
| |
| 5.
| |
| To whom they will be transmittad and under what conditions, j 6. The employee's right to accass and under what conditions.
| |
| : 7. The length of time they will be retained. .
| |
| : 8. The manner in whfen they will be destroyed.
| |
| 06/29/83 37 Attachment 2 to inclosure A l
| |
| d
| |
| - 2
| |
| | |
| j . .
| |
| 4 ..
| |
| .]- APPSDIX I
| |
| ]. SUP SVISOR'S GUIDE TO CBS E VING BEHAVICR CHANGES
| |
| :1 ~
| |
| 3 This guide may be used by the supervisor as a resource. The behaviors listed f.) are intochanges that can be observed in an individual employee, and are categorized three areas: work performance, social interactions, and personal health.
| |
| WORK PEFORMANCE:
| |
| .] ,
| |
| Employee's on-the-job behavior and work hanits that directly
| |
| . impact on efficiency and effectiveness of task accomp11shment.
| |
| 1.
| |
| Has the individual's work OUALITY or CUANTITY changed?
| |
| . .I
| |
| ;q -
| |
| Greatly changed speed of working
| |
| ~3 a Changed level of work involvement 2.
| |
| Has the employee made more MISTAKES or E JUDGMENTS?
| |
| .j -
| |
| Has nuestous accidents Laughs off errors or reprimands -
| |
| 3 ~
| |
| Denies mistakes Unnecessarily condemns self for afstakes
| |
| : 3. Has the employee's EFFICIENCY lessened?
| |
| ;i -
| |
| Has trouble arriving at decisions
| |
| - Often fails to* meet deadifnes Needs repeated directions for easy tasks 4
| |
| Does the ihdividual have more difficulty CONCENTRATING 7 l -
| |
| Forgets imocrtant or obvious things ~
| |
| Acts without thinking Daydreams too much j -
| |
| Ooodles excessively
| |
| " Repeats same action over and over -
| |
| 5.
| |
| How much is the worker ASSENT FROM M 108,7 -
| |
| : . .t
| |
| (, Lata or absent especially Monday or Friday Often takes off half-days Leaves work without notice *
| |
| * Falsified attendance records 2
| |
| Takes a lot of sick leave Gives imprceable excuses for ansences .
| |
| i
| |
| ] 6. Is the employee ASSENT 3 pg J08"?
| |
| ' ,l Wanders around the plant a lot Takes excessively long lunches and breaks
| |
| * 1 Avoids a part of the plant because of fear Gets sick wnflo at work 06/27/33 Al-1 Attacnment 2 to Enclosure A i
| |
| f i_ , ,, , .,
| |
| .n. *** "- -
| |
| A
| |
| | |
| A 1, .
| |
| .j 1
| |
| I
| |
| , 7. Does the employee adhere to COMPANY POLICY 7 Staals or damages properr/
| |
| Ofsregards rules
| |
| . Bands the rules
| |
| ,- 8. Have you noticed the individual becoming OVERCAUTICUS7
| |
| - Overreacts to normal conditions
| |
| '* Freezes or disappears in an emergenef Overly concerned about detafis/accurae/
| |
| Doublechecks work too much
| |
| : 9. Has the employee become OVERZEALOUS?.
| |
| Never takes breaks i -
| |
| Comes to work early Hangs around aftar shift
| |
| ! - Volunteers for excassive amounts of overtime Suddenly exceeds work expectattons
| |
| 'l 10. Does the employee engage in a lot of RISX-TAKING7 Drives recklessly i -
| |
| : - Operatas equipment carelessly on or off the job
| |
| ;I - Shows poor judgment fn dangerous phys 1 cat activities Gasoles a lot
| |
| -; 11. ,
| |
| Has the individual's COOPERATION with <0-WORXERS changed?
| |
| RefusestoshaIeequipmentorinformation Refuses to taka directfons Refuses to accapt help from others SOCIAL IMTERACTIONS:
| |
| j Type and quality of emolayee's relationsnip with work associatas that may impact on team performancs.
| |
| : 1. Does the employee appear LESS SOCIABLE than before?
| |
| l -
| |
| Isolatad/ withdrawn -
| |
| Poor eye contact 4 Shallow friendships -
| |
| Smiles and talks to self Lacks a sensa of humor Overly susofcious of others
| |
| . Refuses social contacts -
| |
| Holds grudges / sulks 2.
| |
| Has the individual become 700 SOCIABLE 7 Talks too much with other employees j Plays pranks / jokes Monopolizes conversations l
| |
| Inappropriata sax behavfor Flashes money 06/27/83 Al-2 Attaenment 2 to Enclosurt A r r
| |
| , 4,; j , c, . ,W " - ..TT""*F"~"*""~""~ * '
| |
| | |
| . n
| |
| . l
| |
| . _ , . l
| |
| ^
| |
| .11 g . 3.
| |
| Are there changes in the employee's choica of FRIENOS7
| |
| .1,
| |
| -j -
| |
| Especially for breaks / lunch or transportation Only those younger or easily dominated Has separata set of friends just for drinking or gamoling
| |
| ?
| |
| q 4 Are there changes in the way OTHER WORKERS react to him/her?
| |
| Ignore or avoid -
| |
| Mistrust d -
| |
| Get angr/ with ij - .
| |
| Play pranks on Secome condescanding -
| |
| Joke about 4
| |
| Complain about k .; 5. Does the employee show more ANGER?
| |
| h
| |
| >i Ir. patient -
| |
| Argumentative Overreacts to real or -
| |
| Physical fights 1
| |
| imagined criticis.3 -
| |
| Temper outhursts
| |
| * 1 Irritable N 6.
| |
| -" Does the individual . MANIPULATE others? "
| |
| J Suilds up brownie points Lies Brags /exaggeratas Shows off Acts. naive or innocent -
| |
| Sorrows money
| |
| : 7. Have you noticed any changes in the employee's SPEECH BEHAVIOR?
| |
| Talks slower /fastar
| |
| ] -
| |
| Talks more/less j Stammers .
| |
| : 8. Has the emoloyee's SPEECH CONTENT changed?
| |
| Jumps from topic to topic Talks about hopeless future Occupied with suicide, disastars, destruction h(I -
| |
| Occupied with one topic .
| |
| f.) Never caats about family / interests s, !,
| |
| j 9.
| |
| 3 Does the employee br e more COMPLAINTS about:
| |
| q -
| |
| Physical ailments -
| |
| Family / money problems Back pain / muscle aches Co workers or superiors Lack of privileges .
| |
| 1 -
| |
| 2eing ignored /left out Ffiling out required forms
| |
| 'I Or has stopoed complaining '
| |
| ]
| |
| i .
| |
| ! 06/27/83 Al-3 Attachment 2 to Enclosure A e .
| |
| t
| |
| , _ _ _ _ _ , ,y. . - - - ,- - - - - - - - - - - - -
| |
| i
| |
| | |
| 'l i -
| |
| *O O ,
| |
| PERSONAL HEALTH:
| |
| Fmployee's physical and emotional statas that affect work behavior.
| |
| , 1.
| |
| 1 Oces the individual show any signs of " NERVES" or ENTIONAL UPSET 7 i
| |
| s
| |
| * Headaches Starties easily Cries easily Shaky voice --
| |
| 2.
| |
| _; Does the individual use ALCOHOL or ORUGS differently? .
| |
| 14 -
| |
| Drinks too much Alcohol on breath
| |
| * Preoccupied with drinking or drugs Gulps drinks, especially the first few Encourages others to use 6
| |
| ~
| |
| Frequently "on the wagon" }
| |
| : 3. '
| |
| t Has the individual had unusual ILLNE557 '
| |
| ,t 4 - -
| |
| Clates large amounts of cantal/ medical, emotional benefits Slow recovery from illness Preoccuoiad with death or suddenly reifgious Ignores own illness '
| |
| t
| |
| : 4. Has the indtvidual's M M changed?
| |
| i t: -
| |
| '~' - Yawning Fatigue .
| |
| Restlessness Fidgeting .
| |
| 5.
| |
| Are you aware of any changes in DAILY LIVING ROUTINE?
| |
| fn WORK ROUTINE?
| |
| Sleeg difficulties Change in aftar-work hebtfes, activities Change in amount / pattern of eating
| |
| . Rigidly follows same pattarn without reason
| |
| , 6.
| |
| Have you noticed any changes in the individual's GENERAL APPEARANCE? '
| |
| Accears better/more poorly groomed Walks differently (slower, stuadles)
| |
| Change in ::osture
| |
| : 7. Have you noticed any M changes? .
| |
| Slushing or paleness Red eyes
| |
| ;~ -
| |
| On south (frequent swallowing / lip wetting) 0114 tad pupfis ,
| |
| Puffy faca .
| |
| Offficulty hearing .
| |
| j 06/27/23 Al-4 I Attaenhent 2 to Enclosure A l
| |
| e t
| |
| . , . . . __ . . - . _h-----
| |
| i
| |
| | |
| )
| |
| i . . .
| |
| . . 1
| |
| ;g , .
| |
| 1
| |
| -l 8. Have you noticed any changes in the individual's BODY or LI!157 c1 ' -
| |
| Shaky hands 9 -
| |
| Nail biting
| |
| :.], -
| |
| Weight loss / gain 4 -
| |
| Cold, swaty hands
| |
| ? -
| |
| Twitching
| |
| ' ,1;4 -
| |
| Sweating, especially nonseasonal 9.
| |
| f.1 Has the employee had any GASTR 0 INTESTINAL changes? -
| |
| j- tf.,:
| |
| Nausea / vomiting Stomach aches / gas a -
| |
| Frequent trips to the restroom i "c, -
| |
| Excessive use of antacids, coffee /taa or other ifquids, aspirin, -
| |
| v.j cigarettes W'
| |
| : 10. Does the employee have any CARDIOVASCtJLAR difficulties? '
| |
| Dizziness / fainting 1 -
| |
| Breathing irrequiarities
| |
| * Y{
| |
| j i
| |
| : 11. Have you noticed any changes in the employee's THINKING PATTERN 7 4
| |
| .) -
| |
| Sees things that aren't there (hallucinations) j
| |
| :'j
| |
| .; Falso beliefs delusions) 7 Bizarre or unus(ual ideas -
| |
| .i, s -
| |
| .I 3
| |
| :.j
| |
| }
| |
| e
| |
| .s .
| |
| g .
| |
| l
| |
| .1
| |
| , .l; 1
| |
| b -
| |
| 06/27/63 Al-5 t Attac5. ment 2 to Enclosure A I
| |
| ?
| |
| ; ?
| |
| __ . _ . ,_ _ . , . - . - - ~ ~ .
| |
| ~ - - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - - ' -
| |
| : , ~
| |
| | |
| . . - . . .~. ..= . _ - . - .. -_._. . - -. , . . . . . . ..... . . -.. .. - . . .-..
| |
| r . -- - -
| |
| : s. . .
| |
| 4
| |
| -.l,-. - ,. . .
| |
| 1 .
| |
| 1 l
| |
| ; e t
| |
| i
| |
| .4 . .
| |
| e 4 1
| |
| : 2. .
| |
| I 4 4 3 1
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| e' ,
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| 1 u - .
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| 4 ,.
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| i i
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| ; s, li %
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| 4 i .
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| l l
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| 4 i',
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| i 1 . I a 3 ,
| |
| i . .s .
| |
| 1 i
| |
| i-
| |
| : j. q:
| |
| (
| |
| t' 4 ATTAQ9eIT 3 TO THE ACCES3 AUTHORIZATION IRALE ENCLOSURE (EN .
| |
| 1 t-l -}
| |
| VALUE/IMAACT STATIMENT 1 i i-1 1
| |
| I 4 , 6 r a ic y
| |
| i : . .
| |
| 4 I i .?
| |
| *e 5
| |
| ' j' p I ,[ j
| |
| $ e
| |
| {
| |
| 1 a
| |
| 1
| |
| * j 4
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| 4 m
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| ' ,1 e
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| s f i- ;
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| l
| |
| * i .
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| i P
| |
| 5
| |
| , (
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| I e T
| |
| ~
| |
| I, j.
| |
| l, h
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| I s [
| |
| 4 i *
| |
| *
| |
| * w
| |
| _ _. .,~ r -- . -- . -
| |
| , 1 J, . . . 3
| |
| , - , -,-aw-._w.y.__,- ..,--, - %- ,w-,e,m.,,,,..m,.w.,.r.-w.,%.,-.,crye,,.,rm,+9,. em>.r,.m,-,.,my,.~, y, -%., w,.-m,,y,yn,---i
| |
| | |
| ~
| |
| s: -
| |
| .e
| |
| , .I i
| |
| VALUE/ IMPACT STATEMENT 3 POWER REACTOR ACCESS AUTHORIZATION RULE
| |
| ~
| |
| : 9) --
| |
| Q 1. THE PROPOSED ACTION
| |
| %) -
| |
| y- L1. Descriotion lj The Commission proposes to amend 10 CFR Part 73 to estan11sh unifom 3
| |
| minimum critaria for granting individuals unescorted access to protectad areas and vital islands at nuclear power plants. "
| |
| ; }
| |
| i
| |
| :) 1. 2 Background of and Need for Procosed Action
| |
| * 3 .
| |
| j ;
| |
| The Commission has long endorsed an industry-run clearanca program for
| |
| ! J, personnel at nuclear power plants and has reited for this purpose on Ifeensee l .j
| |
| ' adherence to the employee screening guidance contained in American National 1
| |
| 4 ',!
| |
| Standard Institute (ANSI), " Industrial Security for Nuclear Power Plants" (ANSI N18.17). This endorsement and reifance is given in Regulatory Guide 1.17 -
| |
| j
| |
| ] " Protection of Nuclear Power Plants Against Industrial Sabotage," June 1973; supplementary information published in connection with amendments to 10 CFR
| |
| ! l Parts 50 and 73 concarning tae physical protection of nuclear power reactors
| |
| ] (42 FR 10836, February 24,1977); NUREG-0207, "Intaria Fomat and Contant for -
| |
| i j a Physical Security Plan for Nuclear Power Plants"; and NUREG-0220, "Intarim -
| |
| j Acceptanca Critaria for a Physical Security Plan for Nuclear Power Plants."
| |
| .];
| |
| As a result of a recommendation contained in the final report of the Joint I ERDA-MRC Task Force on Safeguards (NUREG-0095) and other factors, the Commission, in Maren 1977, proposed amenomen1f.s to 10 CFR Parts 11, 50, and 70 to estantish critaria for determining an individual's eligibility for accass to or control .
| |
| over special nuclear satorial. As a result of comments recaived, tae Commission I ,
| |
| established a hearing board to consider additional oral and writtan communica-
| |
| . ions on the proposed rule.
| |
| After reviewing the recommendations of tae Hearing
| |
| , ( Board, the Commission issued amendments to its regulations requiring that cartain
| |
| ,' . individuals be subject to a federal clearance program. These individuals included 3
| |
| those invcived in the operation of licsnsed fuel manufacturing and faorication .
| |
| 06/15/83 1 Attacament 3 to inclosure A i
| |
| T
| |
| - . . - - - - - - - - . . - - - . . - - . .- - , , , ,. . , - . , . , ,- - - . _ , , .,, , . -- , - , ..- . - - - - - - - . -,-,-.n,
| |
| | |
| ~ '
| |
| -Q facilities using, processing, or stoMng cartain quantities of special nuclear J, '
| |
| ' mateMal or the transportation by the privata sector of cartain quantities of l
| |
| 4 special nuclear matarial. In puolishing the amendments, the Cennission notad cj that nuclear power plants (except for the Ft. St. Vrain facility) were not 1 covered by the amendments, but would be the suaject of a separata rulemaking 1 action (45 FR 76968, November 21, 1980). -
| |
| .i In discussing the question of screening personnel at nuclear power plants, cj
| |
| . the Hearing Board.noted it was " persuaded by the discussion of those who favor 9
| |
| the use of personnel screening in order to ensure employee suitability and .
| |
| i trustworthiness," and agreed "that it is important to assess current emotional f.3
| |
| .* stability in any program designed to screen out potential saboteurs." (HeaMng '
| |
| }
| |
| Board Report, pp. 33, 63.) The HeaH ng Board examired the results of a staff '
| |
| survey of existing personnel screening programs at 39 power reactor facilities
| |
| ; i
| |
| - Nl (see Figure 1) and, noting "the disuniformity in pMvata industry compliance ,
| |
| .t with screening standards," concluded that "this checklist of varied solutions j ;
| |
| demonstrates the need for a more explicit standard than that contained in
| |
| [i 'j ANSI N18.17."
| |
| (Hearing Board Report, pp. 33-34.) The Board noted that, "there
| |
| .; ,I '
| |
| was general agreement among the participants that there is a need to have greater i j, * ,-
| |
| uniformity in industry conducted screening programs and that the present
| |
| ] ANSI N18.17 standard is too vague to accomplish that purpose." (Headng. Board Report, p. 65. ) Accordingly, the Soard agreed withsthe suggestion made by several participants that the NRC issue a rule riqufMng all entities suofect ,
| |
| to the rule to meet specific standards which would build upon and improve those j ,
| |
| i
| |
| - contained in ANSI N18.17, in the conduct of their screening programs. The HeaH ng
| |
| ;. Soard recommended that the NRC mandata such standards rather than revising .
| |
| }
| |
| ANSI N18.17, since the latter 1,s issued by industry and is not mandatory.
| |
| i (HeaH ng Board Report, p. 65.)
| |
| (
| |
| j , ,
| |
| The HeaMng Soard's recommendations were accepted by tae Commission in i June 1980 and provide the basis for the prooosed action.
| |
| l I
| |
| : 1. 3 Value/*moact of Precosed M ion : '
| |
| i l .
| |
| .i 1 1.3.1 NRC Coeretions i :
| |
| : .. A codified access authori:ation program will assure that a uniform anproaca I seeting minimum requirements will be applied in screening personnel for t
| |
| ,l l 06/16/83 2 Attacament 3 to Enclosure A i
| |
| t
| |
| | |
| , j .- ..
| |
| 1 g
| |
| unescorted access to protected areas and vital islands at power plants. The i'
| |
| program will provide increased assurance that persons, whose behavioral history or pattarns indicata a potential for consitting acts detrimental to the public health and safety, would be identified before harmful acts were committed.
| |
| g.j The impact on NRC operations will occur in the areas of review of the 1
| |
| : s. licensee's Access Authorization Plan and additional inspection effort, M The initial cost to the NRC is estimated to be:
| |
| 2 1.fcansing review and approval of Access Authorization d .
| |
| e Plans (assuming 14 staff-days / plan x 48 planst x'3480/
| |
| y staff-day) u . *
| |
| $322.5K 1 ;.j Additional inspectica effort (preparation of revised i
| |
| $ inspection procedures (0.5 man year] and additional j .
| |
| ' inspector hours (1 man yearD (1.5 man years @ su4,800/
| |
| , man year)
| |
| : =
| |
| $187.2X l'
| |
| l Total estimated initial cost to the !!RC t $509.7K2
| |
| . a $510.0K -
| |
| 3 g
| |
| 'it is assumec tnat the program will be organized and administered on a sita j rather reactors power than a reactor were located unit basis. on 48 Assites,of the summer of 198:e. all licansed e
| |
| ~
| |
| s5everal information. options are being considered to help ifcansees obtain criminal history ~
| |
| The NRC is developing draft legislation that would provide for
| |
| '~
| |
| 4 reactor licensees. of the direct transfer criminal history information from the FBI to power Failing passage of this or similar legislation, the NRC Division of security could receive input on the existance of criminal history 1
| |
| information at the FBI, notifying licensees when no record exists. When a record does exist, the licensee could be advised through guidance to octain additional reference checks, etc. If the NRC Division of Security handles criminal history checks in this fashion, the additional resource impact would
| |
| )l ,
| |
| be 5.6 man years (3699.0K) per year.
| |
| !s 1
| |
| ji j
| |
| 1 06/16/83 3 Att.scrment 3 to inclosure A t
| |
| t 9.e , 6 e, M _ --
| |
| .-e-- ww, ,,e+,q. -t-, ., e-%m--yg%-m-r---y,.--, -.--~~m-i .e, v www. e,-.,y- r*~- . - y*.=e, - > - + - - - - - v -
| |
| .,--3,ww
| |
| -+- , _
| |
| | |
| ^
| |
| M . .'
| |
| i
| |
| 'l
| |
| ~f i
| |
| :s '
| |
| ] The estimatad annual cost to the NRC in subsequent years 3 is:
| |
| (I
| |
| ,j t.icansing review and approval of Access Authori:ation
| |
| -i Plans (assuming six new plants are Itcanseu each year) 3
| |
| . 'l ($40.3X [14 staff-days / plan x 6 new plans x $440/ staff-
| |
| : i. _ d day] + $46.1K amintenance [2 staff-days / plan x $480/ staff- .
| |
| j . day x 48 plans])
| |
| 3 $ 86.4K -
| |
| Additional inspection effort (1.0 man year 9 $124,300/
| |
| ; man year).
| |
| $124.8k
| |
| .]..; ,
| |
| Total estimated annual cost to the NRC in subsequent
| |
| * years
| |
| .., $211.2X4
| |
| : j. i ' a $211.0K -
| |
| 1 1.3.2 Other Government Acencies
| |
| ' The proposed action will affect the FBI (criminal history checks) and 4 .
| |
| . the General Services Administration (aflitarf history checks). The impact on
| |
| .a the RI is judged to be minimal inasmuch as the estimated 11,000 checks per
| |
| ' year represent a 0.18% increase in the number of criminal history checks cur-j rently conducted by that agency. The General Sersicas Administration's National Personnel Recorcs Canter has indicatad that the preposed military histor/ check would not present an undue burcen on their operations.
| |
| 3 1.3.3 Industri In addition.to the safeguards objective, each element of the pecposed I
| |
| screening program (background investigation and continual observation) has i potential safety benefits for the industry.
| |
| The background investigation elements and their associated beneff ts are:
| |
| ; 1.
| |
| True identity - Assures that the individual seeking unescorted accass is not assuming the identity of another.
| |
| l j 2.
| |
| i Employment history - Veriff es the individual's claimed experience
| |
| .f and qualifications and identifies possible past behavioral actions
| |
| .J
| |
| 'j .
| |
| i
| |
| % clue 1ng cost increase due to inflation.
| |
| 1 1 6 *!ee page 3, footnota 2.
| |
| ; 06/16/a3 4 Attachment 3 to Sciosure A
| |
| }
| |
| ! i a
| |
| n_ . -_._.= - .- .
| |
| .e- * .. --
| |
| _ - . . . ~ . . ~ . _ _ _ . _ . . . . . . . . , _ _ . , . _ . . _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ . _ _ _ . . - . . . - . . . _ _ _ ,-. ,,... ~ _.,_ __
| |
| | |
| , . . ~ . .
| |
| q .. , . . .
| |
| I s which would be predic*ive of future actions that could be detrimental to the public health and safety.
| |
| 3.
| |
| i Educational history - Verifies the individual's training, crecentials, and true identity.
| |
| . 4.
| |
| 1 Credit history - Estanitshes financial responsibility and relates to l
| |
| the possibility that the individual may be sucject to coercion, t
| |
| influence, or pressure to act in a manner contrary to the protection
| |
| .1 i of the public health and the minimization of danger to iffe and property.
| |
| 'i 5.
| |
| .1 Criminal history - Determines if the individual:
| |
| .j (a) Has been involved in any act of sabotage or other unlawful destruc-
| |
| *i .
| |
| tion of property; -
| |
| (b) Has been convicted of any felony or a series of lesser offenses
| |
| : indicating a pattern of criminal behavior; or .
| |
| -] (c) Is a habitual abuser of a controlled substanca or alechol.
| |
| ; The continual observation program exists *,.o detect changes in an individual's t.
| |
| -' behavior oc emotional condition which could lead to the commission of acts
| |
| ' detrimental to the public health and safety. The program requires that indi-l viduals exhibiting such behavioral changes be. referred to the person responsible f for administration of the 11cansee's access authorization program. This person i ?
| |
| would datarsine if either further referral of the individual to compe ant .
| |
| ; i
| |
| ' medical authorities with suspensfon or revocation of the individual's accass authorization is appropriata.
| |
| j The proposed rule provides the licensee with a previously unavailable opportunity to provide unescorted accass to unscreened tamocrary workers under
| |
| * cartain plant conditions, waives the background investigation requirement for 1
| |
| persons employed prior to the effective data of the rule, and provides for licensee accaptance of an accass authorization granted under an approved plan by another ifcansee.
| |
| i The estimated cost savings associated with ifconsees estan1f shing a reciprocity program for exchanging screening records is as follows:
| |
| * 4 3 I .
| |
| 4 06/15/33 $ Attac[ ment 3toinclosureA i
| |
| , , _ _ _ _ _ ====
| |
| I -
| |
| | |
| . 4 . . _ _ _
| |
| g s . .
| |
| (
| |
| .j -
| |
| ::1
| |
| ~} Ut111:ation of 750 prescreened people q per sita per year at 3250.00 per
| |
| '. investigation Savings $137.5K 1
| |
| Ij Estimated cost per sita to licensees 1 ..i
| |
| , a for transferring of records among
| |
| :l Ifcansees ($50 per check X 750 people) - S 37.5K
| |
| . ~7 4
| |
| p .
| |
| Estimated not savings per sita per year $150.0K -
| |
| j Estimated net annual savings to the industry (48 sitas) 3 7.2M
| |
| ./ ,
| |
| In generating the cost estimatas shown below, the staff did not consider-
| |
| ,[
| |
| the fact that licensees presently have screening programs containing some ele-
| |
| * sents of the proposed action. For example, 48*.' of the utilities in the staff i
| |
| survey submitted to the Hearing Board conducted background investigations which j went beyond a sispie check of personal references (see Figure 1). S fxty-four
| |
| ;j
| |
| ' percent had a formal behavior observational program. Given the wide variation .
| |
| 1 2 t '
| |
| in the screening programs presently in place, both in general makeup and in details of implementation, a sita-by-sita survey would be necassar/ to detar-
| |
| '.i
| |
| ' aine the actual additional cost to the industr/ of the proposed program. The staff has not undertaken such a study due to the large numeer of staff and licensee resources which would be required. However, the information reflected j
| |
| in Figure 1. indicatas that the actual cost to the industr/ will be less than **
| |
| the costs shown here. -
| |
| 4 The initial costs per licensee sita for existing operating reactors are estimated to be:
| |
| {
| |
| Preparation of the Accass Authorization Plan and associated procacures (100 person-days /sita x 3480/
| |
| person-day)s .
| |
| . I, , g4gg 4
| |
| . t.
| |
| 1
| |
| 'j
| |
| * Fully loacea salar/.
| |
| i
| |
| ;, 06/15/83 6 Atticament 3 to inclosure A i
| |
| * a 0
| |
| . . . - . , . . . . . . . 9. . mn # ~~-
| |
| ' = "" m
| |
| | |
| ;'~. -
| |
| l -
| |
| }
| |
| Licensee management staff effort and clerical f* support ($42X/yr' for program director + $21K f for clerical and support costs) 563K
| |
| ] Training necassarf for isolementation of the continual behavioral observation program (330K
| |
| $ 7 d [150 persons /sita x 3200/ person [ assumed average salary for trainees for a 2-day period)) + $4K
| |
| } (instructor cost and overhead for 10 training <
| |
| ti . classes of 15 trainees each]) 334K
| |
| '1
| |
| , Storage of each individual's accass authorization
| |
| ; file (assuming that the average file size is l 1/2" thick x 9" hign x 12" wide C1,500 files
| |
| * l 1 i
| |
| , x 0.0312 ft8/ file x 3209.17 storage /ft33) $9.8K Total estimated initial cost per sita $ 154.8K
| |
| ! l I
| |
| Total estimated initial cost for the industry a 155K i I (assuming 48 sitas fnitially) 37,440K The initial costs for reactors licensed after the effective data of the rule are estimated to be:8 Preparation of the Access Authorization Plan and i associated procedures (100 person-days /sita x $480/
| |
| I person-day) .
| |
| i $48K Licensee program director and clerical support
| |
| ($42K/yr for program director + 21X for clerical and supper. costs) l $63K l
| |
| * t 1 :
| |
| ' Assuming tnese outies consume one-half of the person's time.
| |
| flicansee and contractor suoervisors (foremen and above). .
| |
| e sExcluding cost increases due to inflation.
| |
| C6/16/83 7 Attachment 3 to inclosure A i
| |
| .. .. . _ w . ..,.-. - ..>-- - - - ~- ~~ ~**
| |
| * ~ m7 ""'.m 1
| |
| | |
| . - . ~ , . . , . . - . . .
| |
| r .
| |
| ?.' __.
| |
| , Background investigation (assuming an average of 1500 persons /sita x 5250/inves 1gation)s $375g Criminal history requests to FBI (1500 checks x
| |
| ] $5/ check).
| |
| 37.5K
| |
| 't''
| |
| Review process (assuming: direct casts of SIX/ day, indirect costs of $500/ day, an average of 3 days /
| |
| g review, and that 8 persons (or 0.5% of all persons
| |
| -i being screened] are danted the access authorization '
| |
| si
| |
| .r! and appeal) 1 $36K j
| |
| Training necassary for implementation of the continual behavioral observation program ($30K
| |
| .l (150 persons 10/sita x $200/ person (assumed average i
| |
| salary for trainees for a 2-day period)) + $4K
| |
| ! Cinstructor cast and overhead for 10 training classes of 15 trainees each]) 334K' 4
| |
| i .
| |
| j
| |
| . Starage of each individual's access authorization ..
| |
| ; :3 -
| |
| file (assuming that the average file si:e is 2" thick x 9" high x 12" wide (1,500 files x 0.125 ft2/ file x 3209.17 storage /ft3]) 139.2K
| |
| ; Total estimated initial costs for sitas which
| |
| ! do not benefit from "grandfathering" $602.7K .
| |
| a $603K t
| |
| i
| |
| ' l The estimated annual maintenanca cost per Ifcensee site in subsequent
| |
| .; years 11 is:
| |
| i Maintenance of the Access Authori:ation i -
| |
| Plan and associated procedures (25 person-days / -
| |
| j j sita x $480/ person-day)
| |
| '} $12K i :
| |
| j j ' Cost estimates cased on informal data recafved from tno private investigative '
| |
| firms, seven utilities, and the Atomic Industrial Forum. ~
| |
| 10Atomic CostIndustrialestimates Forum. based on informal data received from seven util'ities and the
| |
| [
| |
| 11 Excluding cost increases due to inflation.
| |
| i .
| |
| j 06/16/83 3 Attac.*: ment 3 to inclosurs A E
| |
| . . -. ~
| |
| --o w:s . .. ,
| |
| | |
| j . .
| |
| l .
| |
| Licensee program director and clerical support
| |
| ; ($42K/yr for program director + $21K [50% for clerical and support costs])
| |
| 363X i Background investigation for new personnel I
| |
| (375 persons [ assuming a 20% turnover in an average of 1500 persons / site and 5% growth rate]
| |
| x 3250/ investigation)18 .
| |
| 393.8K Criminal history requests to FBI for new personnel $
| |
| [ (375-checks x $5/ check) $2K Initial training of new personnel for the continual ,
| |
| ooservation program (40 persons /sita x 3200/ person +
| |
| i
| |
| $1.2K [ instructor cost]) $9.2K 1
| |
| Refresher training for suoervisors for continual i
| |
| , . obsgrvation program (150 persons /sita x $100
| |
| '. [ assumed salary for 1-day training period] + 54K
| |
| [ instructor cost]) , $19K i
| |
| * Review process (assuming: direct costs of 31.L' day, indirect costs of $500/ day, an average of.3 days / review, '
| |
| and that 15 Cor 0.5% of employed personnel and .05% of new personnel being screened] are denied the ac:ess authorization or have the authorization revoked and appeal) l $67.5K -
| |
| , , Storage of each individual's access authorization l file (assuming that the average file size is 2* thick x 9" high x 12" wide [1500 files *
| |
| [
| |
| x 0.125 ft4/ file x 3209.17 storage /ft4 ] $39.2K e
| |
| t Total estimated annual eatntenance cost per site $305.7K i
| |
| 1 d
| |
| 1 a $306.0K
| |
| ' \
| |
| " Cost estimate assed on informal data received free teo private investigative firms, seven ut 11 ties, and tne Atomic Industrial Forum.
| |
| 06/16/83 9 Attacnment 3 to inclosurs A .
| |
| l
| |
| ?
| |
| .,__ ,. rg1P**e w i- -*
| |
| *' '' ' ~ ~ ~
| |
| ~- '
| |
| , _ . - . -..-....._,y y-,_. . %,, _.,_._m, , ,_ _-. , , - - - . . _ , , . - . . . , . - _ _ . - , .
| |
| | |
| . . _ . _ _. . r ._ _ _ . . _ _ _ _
| |
| x . . . . _ . . . . _ - -. - .-.
| |
| a ,
| |
| .i
| |
| ?. ' Total estimated annual maintenance cost for the
| |
| .J
| |
| .j . industr/ (assuming 48 sites initially) 314,481.GK
| |
| ' .i
| |
| ) A cost summar/ table is included as Figure 2.
| |
| I
| |
| . , - l).
| |
| }~ :] 1.3.4 The Public j ' The public would benefit from increased protection against the insider threat and from greater assurance that only reifable individuals have unescorted access to protected areas and vital equipment at nuclear power plants. '
| |
| i !,
| |
| The cost to the general pubite would be in the form of higher electric j bills as a result of increased electrical generating cost.
| |
| Sased on generation of 208,007 aflifon not kilowatt hours of electricity i
| |
| . .' by nuclear reactors and a generating cost of 1.9 cents per kilowatt hour (Monthly Energy Review, Januar/1981), the industr/ presently spends $3.95 .
| |
| billion to cover generating costs. The estimated initial cost would represent an increase of approximately 0.2"4 in electrical generating costs and the maintenanca costs would represent an increase of approximately 0.4%. The j
| |
| increases would not represent a significant increase in the cost of electricity i to the public.
| |
| : i. I t . .
| |
| 4
| |
| * t
| |
| : 1. 4 Decision on the orecosed Action I
| |
| I The proposed action will provide increased protection against the insider threat and will provide increased assurance that only trustworthy and rettante
| |
| ['
| |
| l personnel have access to vital, safety-related equipment at nuclear power plants. ~ .
| |
| The costs associated with achieving this increased protection and assurance
| |
| }
| |
| are net considered to be majcr. It is anticipated that no occupational 3
| |
| ; exposure will be associated with implementation of this proposed rule, s
| |
| t l 2.
| |
| IDENTIFTCATION ANO ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATTVE C: URSES OF ACTION .
| |
| j [j 2.1 Mef ntain status Quo '
| |
| I .?
| |
| { j
| |
| ' As noted by the Hearing Board, there is great diversity in the ways fn
| |
| , wntch the industr/ has implemented the recommendations of ANSI N18.17. The, i !
| |
| Hearing Board also reported that "most utilities agree with the NRC that this 06/16/83 10 Attachment 3 4 Enclosure A I .
| |
| , 4 l $
| |
| i
| |
| , ._ _ _ -. m .-y ,
| |
| - . , _ ~ . . _ . _ . . . _ _ _ , . _ _ _ _ , _ , - . . . _ . _ _ . . , _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . . , _ _ _ _ . . , . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ - _ _ _ - _ . _ _ _ . _ _
| |
| | |
| ~^
| |
| j
| |
| }
| |
| 4 I standard (ANSI N13.173 is probably too vague and should contain more specific guidelines in order to achieve greater uniformity in appiteation throughout the industrf." (Hearing Board Report, p. 51.)
| |
| Thus, the Commission and the Hearing Board, as well as the regulated industr/ itself , has found the status quo less than satisfactory in achieving the intended goal. s 1
| |
| 4
| |
| : 2. 2 Government Clearanca Proccam The proposed regulations pub 11shed by the Commission in March 1977 would have established a government-run clearanca program for the privata nuclear industr/. In considering the 1977 preposed rule, especially as it relatas to power reactors, the Hearing Soard concluded that the need for a rule of such scope had not been satisfactorily established. Additionally, the Hearing Soard observed that the proposed government-run progrsa had greatar social and i i econct c costs than the indust:=/-run program now proposed.
| |
| a 4
| |
| . 2. 3 Induster Clearance procram Consideration was *given to establishing differing investigative critaria
| |
| )
| |
| for unescorted protacted and vital area (vital island) access. A program of this type is included in a December 1980 draft revision to ANSI N13.17 and calls for a two year retrospective period for granting protacted area accass and
| |
| ' five years for vital area acesss. Such a graded program has logical appeal in that persons with accass to more sensitive areas (vital areas) are investi-gated to a greater degree than other persons. The Commission staff has attempted to deteraine the relative cost of a multi-level venus a single-level screening program. While specific dollar amounts were not known, repre-sentatives of private security agencies indicated that the oversti cost differ-ence between a two- and a five year retrospective period would be slight. Adai- ,
| |
| tienelly, the multi-level program would be somewhat more complex, and there-fore somewhat more expensive, for the ifcansee to administer. Discussion with j
| |
| seven Ifeensees also indicated that a single-level program would provide the j .
| |
| 4 ,
| |
| r l
| |
| * 06/16/33 11 Attachment 3 to Enclosure A f
| |
| l
| |
| _t
| |
| ___ _ _ . _ _ _ - . - - ~ -
| |
| | |
| i . . - ,
| |
| ~
| |
| * licensee greater operational flexibility and efficiency in the use and assign-ment of personnel, which would offset the difference in cost.
| |
| :I.
| |
| i I
| |
| : 2. 4 Decision on the Alternative Courses of Action
| |
| ".l'
| |
| * 3 The proposed action is considered to be more cost-effective in achieving .
| |
| -]44 the program objective than any faentified alternative.
| |
| l l 3. TECHNICAL ALTERNATIVES 1 r i
| |
| 3 The proposed action is procedural in nature. Therefore, a discussion of technical alternativts is not applicable.
| |
| .', 4 PROCEDURAL APPROAC"4 4 '
| |
| 4.1 Procedural Alternatives i 4.1.1 Reculation
| |
| ?
| |
| The Commissian intends this action to be an agency statement of general s sopitcahtitty and future effect which is designed to prescribe policy and practice requirements for granting persons unescorted acesss to protacted areas l and vital islands at nuclear power plants. An action undertaken with such a purpose and intant is defined by the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. 551) 4 as a rule. Therefore, the appropriata procecural approach is an amenoment to.
| |
| j the Commistion's rules and regulations.
| |
| .I 4.1.2 ANSI Standard Endorsed by Reculatorv Guide j
| |
| This approach has been eesleyed in the past. ANSI Standard M18.17 has been endorsed by Regulatory Guide 1.17., As noted by the Hearing Board, this approach has not produced a uniformly effective program to aset the general l performance requirements for physical protection of nuclear power p1, ants. '
| |
| The Hearing Board also considered the question of continuing this approach in conjunction with a revised ANSI Standard and concluded tha. an NRC-estadifshed l rule was prefersble.
| |
| l i
| |
| 06/15/83 12
| |
| . Attacnment 3 to Enclosure A I
| |
| I
| |
| .--,.--------r--~~~
| |
| + -
| |
| | |
| , _ . _. _. . . . . . - ~ . . - -
| |
| 1
| |
| . j l
| |
| i 4 !
| |
| 1 .
| |
| i, 4.1.3 Staff Positfen Staff positions have been set forth in specific comments to licansees and !
| |
| j I
| |
| ' applicants regarding screening commitments contained in submitted physical
| |
| '' ' security plans and in general guidance. This approach has also failed to produca uniformly satisfactory and effective results.
| |
| l 4.1. 4 t.fcense Cdndition
| |
| ! I An attempt to implement the actions recommended by the Hearing Board by license condition would result in the imposition of generic ifcanse conditions.
| |
| I 1
| |
| Such an approach is both an inefficient use of staff time and resources and t contrary to the Administrative Procedure Act.
| |
| 4.2 Decision on Procedursi Alternatives The proper approach under the requirements of the Administrative Procedure
| |
| ' Act is publication for public comment of a proposed amendment to thra Commission's regulations.
| |
| +
| |
| Furthermore, any other approach would be retention of the present situation which has not been satisfactory.
| |
| : 5. STATUTORY CONSIDERATICNS a
| |
| 5.1 NR'C Autherftv 1
| |
| The proposed action is within the Commission's authority under sec-tions 151h and 1511(3) of the Atemic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, to -
| |
| prescribe regulations designed to protect the pubite health and sinimi:e
| |
| , danger to 1ifa or property.
| |
| : 5. 2 Need for NE?4 Assessment The proposed action is not a major action as coffned by 10 CFR 51.5(a)(10) and does not require an environmental impact statement.
| |
| 06/'.,5/83 13 Attact. ment 3 to inclosurs A 4
| |
| . _ .. ~ ~,
| |
| .- * = - *
| |
| ==**~"~'****'""*** ~'
| |
| 0
| |
| .- _ . . . . . _ -, ,_-_ - - . _ _ . _ - _ ~ _ . - . . - . . . . - - _ . . . .,. -.- _ _ _ -. -
| |
| | |
| . s 3., . .
| |
| . 6.
| |
| M' REl.ATIONSHIP TO OTHER EXISTING OR PROPOSED REGULATIONS
| |
| .~;!
| |
| There are no identified conflicts or overlaps with other existing or pro-
| |
| [i posed NRC regulations.
| |
| S
| |
| . .t.
| |
| j 7.
| |
| | |
| ==SUMMARY==
| |
| AND CONCLUSION 4
| |
| j The Commission has thoroughly studied the matter of screening personnel at nuclear power plants. A codified accass authern ation program will materfally
| |
| }
| |
| 'j.l assist in assuring that a satisfactory, uniform approach meeting minimum require-monts will be appifed in determining an individual's cifgibility for unescartad access to nuclear power plant protected areas and vital islands. The pronosed 1 program increases the ability of ifconsees, within the framework of the 1
| |
| Commission's regulations, to detect an individual at a power reactor whose i' behavioral history or patterns could result in the commission of acts detrimental to the pubite health and safety. The codiffed access authori:ation program I
| |
| will also permit reciprocity in granting an access authorization to a contractor, j annufacturer, or vender, based upon screening conducted by another licensee, .
| |
| and provides a method of accommodating temporary workers during major outages i for refueling.
| |
| * j . .
| |
| i .
| |
| .i i ,
| |
| t
| |
| .1 i
| |
| .I
| |
| .1 1
| |
| 4 I
| |
| i .
| |
| 06/16/83 14 Attachment 3 to inclosure A i
| |
| 1 -
| |
| i _
| |
| . - _ - - * ~ - --==~m- -" u -: - - ---
| |
| a
| |
| | |
| I .
| |
| i FIGURE 1 Licensees Surveyed -* 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 le 11 12 13 14
| |
| ; Psychological Eval. by Physician M M M
| |
| . M M M M M M Interview with Psychologist M Written Psychological Testing only f g Weltten Test & laterview by Psych.
| |
| [ M I
| |
| Personal Refarence Check fM M M M M M Previous Employment Check X E
| |
| M M M M
| |
| = M M M Eskication Records Check I I A I Court (Convictlan) Record Check -
| |
| Pallcq Record Check I M M '
| |
| Credit Reference Check X X 18.17 Previous Residence Check X I X i
| |
| Formal On-Jub Dhservallon Prograan X X X X X X X 5-
| |
| . +
| |
| e
| |
| , e, E.
| |
| | |
| . -- . . . s - a - -- - a n. . . :- v--=L : ' ' * > ~ ' - - 't''
| |
| _ . . . . . . . . .:. . w :a. . - ..
| |
| '' '- ' Mi-~ ' ~ " ' " * ' ~ ~ ~ - ' - ' ~
| |
| l I
| |
| FIGURE 1
| |
| * L.lcansees Surveyed --* 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Psycholoolcal Eval by' Physician X X X X X Interview with Psychologist Written Psychological Testing only X X H E
| |
| Written Test & Interview by Psych. E Personal Reference Check X X X X X A X X H
| |
| Previous Employment Check X X X 5 X X X X E X X I X fahacation Records Check X X X X X X X 3
| |
| Court (Conviction) Record Check k X X X X 18.17 Police Record Check X X
| |
| t Credit Hoference Check X i
| |
| Previous Residence Check M M M formal on-Joh Observation Pro 0raa X X X X X X X X X X X
| |
| 6 e WO e
| |
| e *
| |
| . . 8
| |
| | |
| . - . - - . ---+'--n=---"<- * ' '
| |
| ---"};-~'-*~~-''-"--~-
| |
| FIGURE 1 * ~
| |
| Licensees Surveyed -+ 29 30 31 32 I 33 34 35
| |
| * 36 37 38 39
| |
| ~
| |
| i Psychological Eval by Physicleo X X X X X .
| |
| X X i
| |
| : f. Interview with Psychologist E Q
| |
| Urltten Psychological Testing only U
| |
| ! g l
| |
| \
| |
| Urltten Test & Interview by Psych. V t
| |
| A Personal Reference Check X hX
| |
| ; Previous Employment Check X X X a X X X Education Records Check X
| |
| . y X 0
| |
| s 1 Court (Conviction) Record Check X X
| |
| A H
| |
| i Police Record Check X X X S
| |
| X s
| |
| i 1 CredlL Reference Check X
| |
| * X X i
| |
| Previous Residence Check X X X i
| |
| forma [Dn-JobDbse'rvallonProgram X X X X X 18.17 X --
| |
| t 4
| |
| O ..
| |
| | |
| y .
| |
| .i 1
| |
| *8 1 FIGURE 213
| |
| 'iv ._
| |
| f
| |
| ; COST
| |
| | |
| ==SUMMARY==
| |
| | |
| INITIAL MAINTENANCE Ii E .
| |
| J.j Licensing Review $322.5K $86.4K l,. Additional Inspection Effort $187.2K $124.8K
| |
| , Total $509.7K
| |
| : $211.2N
| |
| : or or a$510.OK 23211.OK a s, i INITIAL MAINTENANCE -
| |
| 1 Industrv (cost per sita) Ex1stino Plants New Plants .
| |
| * Precaration of Access Authori:ation Plan $48K $48K
| |
| '. $12K Licensee Program Director and
| |
| ,. Clerical Support $63K $63K $63K l Background Investigation $0
| |
| " $375K $93.SK Criminal History Requests
| |
| .i to the. FBI 1
| |
| , 30 $7.5K $2K 3ehavforal Observation Training $34K $34K
| |
| $28.2K -
| |
| 1 Reevaluation of Personnel
| |
| * Referred under the Senavioral
| |
| -b Observation Program and Appeals SO $36K
| |
| $67.!K
| |
| ~
| |
| Storage of Files $9.SK $39.2K $39.2K Total $154.aK $602.7K $305.7K
| |
| ~
| |
| q' or or or '
| |
| z$155.0K a3603.0K a5306.0K i Industry (savings per site)
| |
| Cost savings associated with licansees l estaclishing a reciprocity program $187.5K Cla7.5K --
| |
| z$190K us1SOK --
| |
| ! I
| |
| 'i i -In generating the cost estimatas shown, the staff assumed that no screening
| |
| ' was presently being conducted by the licansed industry. As indicated in Figure employed 1, various elements of the proposed program are currently being by licensees. ,
| |
| 06/15/83 IS At achment 3 to Enclosure A l 5 -l i
| |
| ., n- . -- . . .,... .
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| I
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| # - - * * - * * - 4....w,...%c.,.,,,J%.,',,,,, .,. +~ew.v..-..,. .,._m. , . ,. - . . . . . . .
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| # 4 M HE ACCESS AUTHORIZATION RULE SCL,05URE (SCL M ,
| |
| t ,
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| DRAFT pugLIC ANNoune w O
| |
| j -i 4 e d
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| _ _ ._ __.. .. . - . - - - - - - - - - - - ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ '
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| i i
| |
| ; ' (DRAFT PU8l.IC ANNCUNC E ENT)
| |
| NRC CONSIDERS ACCES3 AUTHORIZATION PROGRAM FOR EMPLOYEES AT NUCLEAR PCWER SITES .,
| |
| i s
| |
| The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is considering amending its regulations i
| |
| i to establish an acesss authorization program for persons who have access-to ~
| |
| l controlled areas within nuclear powe sitas.
| |
| The proposed regulations would require that nuclear power plant ifconsees j
| |
| 1 implement an access authorization program with two parts--background investiga-
| |
| ' tion and continual behavioral observation--for persons who need unescorted accass to "protacted areas and vital istands" of the plant sita.
| |
| I "Protacted areas" are areas that have controlled accass and are enclosed by physical barriers such as fencas or walls. *
| |
| " Vital islands" are areas containing equipment or systams whose failure could result in endangering the pubite health and safety by radf ation exposure.
| |
| Any person who is employed at a,ifcensee sita on the effective data of this rule would not be required to have a background investigation. These
| |
| - employees would, however, still be subject to behavioral observation require-monts, which would be aimed at detecting changes in behavior that could be hazardous to the pualic health and safety.
| |
| * The proposed accass authorization program would se run and acministered by the industry with the ifconsee.having responsibfif ty for granting, denying, i
| |
| suspending, or revoking an individual's unescorted access authorization.
| |
| Licansees would be required to submit for Commission approval an access author-f:ation plan describing how they would meet the new regulations.
| |
| i ,
| |
| The proposed background investigation would inquire into a person's employ-sent, credit, educational, aflitary, charactar, and criminal histories for the past five years.
| |
| The second part of the program, continual behavioral observation, would be i
| |
| designed to detect behavior changes in a person that might be observable as "
| |
| ; changes in job perfor: nance, comoetance, or judgment capabilities, j The NRC is also soliciting public comment on whether psycho?cgical test-
| |
| >g, ing is a valid method for predicting personal behavior inimical to the puette health and safaty.
| |
| 06/16/83 1 Attachment 4 to Enclosure A
| |
| | |
| i , .
| |
| i .
| |
| The NRC first published preposed rules on this subject on March 17, 1977. :
| |
| } Cn December 23, 1977, )
| |
| the Commission issued a notica of pubite hearing on the I proposed regulations. Subsequently, a Hearing Board was established to gather
| |
| {
| |
| additional tastimony. 7he recommendations made in the public hearing and the ~i Board's own examination of the 1977 proposed access authorization program pro-
| |
| .i
| |
| . .: vided the basis for the regulation now being considered.
| |
| ,. '1 Interested persons are invited to submit written comments on the proposed j
| |
| ,I changes, which are to Parts 50 and 73 of the Commission's regulations, by (90 days after R publication). The cosusents should be addressed 1
| |
| ..: to the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, j Attantion: Oceksting and Service Branch.
| |
| :i i
| |
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| .- .. . .. . - - . . . - . . - - --- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - '~ ~ ^ "~~ '~~ ~ ~
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| ATTACHMENT 5 TO THE ACCESS AUTdORIZATION RULE ENCLOSURE (ENCL, A)
| |
| CRAFT CDNGRESSICNAL L a acR f
| |
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| |
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| ~ . . .. . . . . . .- - -~ - - - _ . . . - . . . . ..- ----- - - '
| |
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| |
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| |
| , ORAFT CONGRESSICNAL Lo a tR
| |
| | |
| ==Dear Mr. Chairman:==
| |
| | |
| i Enclosed for the information of the Subcommittae are copies of a proposed amendeont to 10 CFR Parts 50 and 73 which is to be published in the Federal Register.
| |
| i
| |
| - The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is proposing to amend its regulations to require nuclear power reactor ifcensees to establish a screening and con-tinual behavior observation program for employees requiring unescorted access to protacted areas and vital islands. This rule is based on the revised American National Standard Instituta Standard N18.17 " Industrial Security for Nuclear Power Plants" (ANSI N18.17). .
| |
| ! , In line with the recommendations of ANSI NIS.17, the proposed unescortad accass authori:ation rule consis s of two major components:
| |
| bac.tground investigation and continual behavioral observation.
| |
| ; i The proposed critaria have been designed to codify and make more uniform what many licensees are doing either in whole or in part to meet industr/ standard ANSI N18.17.
| |
| ' An NRC survey on the personnel screening programs used by 39 power reactor facilities indicated tha.t the implementation of ANSI N18.17 has not resulted in a'cansistant and uniform program and that a mandatory, more consistant, accass authori:ation program is needed. The proposed rule would address that need, s.
| |
| j Concurrently with the issuanca of the proposed rule, the NRC staff is issuing a Regulatory Guide for public comment which will provide informetton and guidance .
| |
| to the licansee on implementing the proposed requirements. Both the proposed i .
| |
| ; rule and Regulatory Guide will undergo a 90-day public comment period.
| |
| Sincerely, Robert 8. Minogue, Director Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research I
| |
| | |
| ==Enclosures:==
| |
| : 1. Federal Register Notice
| |
| : 2. Draft Regulator / Guide 3
| |
| C6/15/83 1 t Attacnment 5 to Enclosure A
| |
| ,, . . . * * * - ----- * * * * * **8 * *
| |
| * , - . - - . - . - = _m .,,,,,g,- ,,e ea ,. -- w.ww. p w.-- , mes,
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| |
| A
| |
| ; ATTACHMENT 6 TO THE ACCESS AUTHORIZATION RULE E 1
| |
| - SUPPORTING STATEMENT FOR RECOR0 KEEPING ANO REPORTIN 4 REQUIREMENTS FOR 10 CFR PART 50 and 10 CFR PART 73 3
| |
| 2 I
| |
| 1 i -
| |
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| SUPPORTING STAT 8ENT FOR REPORTING REOUIREMENTS -
| |
| I' 3 10 CFR PART SO APPLICANTS TO OPERATE NUCLEAR PCWER REACTORS '
| |
| ,~ . '
| |
| : 1. Justification (i) On March 17, 1977, the Coassission published proposed amendments to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, 42 FR 1480, that. sought to establish an unescorted access authori:ation program for indi~ '
| |
| viduals who have access to or control over special nuclear material.
| |
| Written ecmments were invited and received. On December 23, 1977, the Co= mission issued a notice of public hearing, 42 FR 64703, on the I proposed regulations, and subsequently established a Haaring Soard ,
| |
| ' to gather additional testimony. As a result of information gathered l at the pubite hearing and its own examination of the proposed access authorization program, the Hearing Board made recommendations to the Commission concerning future personnel screening requirements app 11- '
| |
| ' cable to nuclear power reactors. The Hearing Board recommended that the NRC issue a screunjng rule based on the American National Standard T
| |
| nstitute Standard '118.17, " Industrial Security for Nuclear Power ,
| |
| l Plants" (ANSI N18.17), to ensure the trustworthiness and suitability of persons granted unescorted access to protectad areas and vital 3
| |
| islands at nuclear power ,flants. The Commission adopted this l recommendation.
| |
| s -
| |
| It is generally recognized that employees. found to be unsuitable for i
| |
| their job or untrustworthy represent a potential ha:ard to themselves and the- public. This is verified by the results of the Insider Study -
| |
| (see SEcY-80-234). Although results of this study were largely based on incidents occurring at industries analogous to the nuclear industry, the comparability of analogs was carefully consicerad by the Conrnission.
| |
| The following characteristic: were identified as being typical of
| |
| ; insider saboteurs: -
| |
| 07/21/83 1 Attachment 5 to Enclosure A 2
| |
| e q m -~a - - , w-
| |
| | |
| i .- .
| |
| o acted alone
| |
| -1,'
| |
| o were motivated by psychological problems, disgruntlement, and revenge o actad within two years of being hired
| |
| !}
| |
| o acted on impulse
| |
| ?
| |
| o relied on covert action o used some t)pe of equipment available ansita 1
| |
| , i These charactaristics justify the promulgation of an accass authoriza-tion program designed to identify individuals who are unsuitable for unescorted access to protected areas and vital islands.
| |
| ?
| |
| i In line with the reconnendations of ANSI NIS.17, the proposed unescorted acess authorization rule consists of two major comoonents: background '
| |
| I investigation and continual behavioral observation. The proposed critaria have been designed to codify and make more unifor:s what marr/
| |
| ifcensees are doing af ther in.part or in whole to meet industry standard
| |
| [ ANSI N18.17. In the fall of 1978, the staff included in their closing i . statement to the Hearing Board the results of a survey on the personnel screening programs used by 39 power re' actor factif ties. The results i .
| |
| of the survey clearly indicated that ANSI N18.17 did not result in a consistant and uniform program (see Enclosure A, Attachment 3, page 15,
| |
| '"/alue/Imoact Statement") and that a mandatory, more consistant access j
| |
| authorization program was needed. The proposed rule would provide a more consistant and uniform screening program as well as codify much i of what the industry is already doing. .
| |
| (
| |
| l !
| |
| (ii) In the proposed rule,10 CFR 50.34(h), the appiteant is required to prepare an Accass Authorization Plan in accordance with the critaria contained in 10 CFR 73.56 and submit it to the Commission for review
| |
| ~
| |
| and approval. This plan will delineata how 'the ifcensee ,fntands to isolement the various requirements of the Access Authorization Rule.
| |
| A review and approval of the plan by the Commission is needed to C6/16/83 2 4
| |
| Attachmont 6 to Enclosure A I
| |
| t
| |
| ~ ~~ -- l
| |
| ,, y w ,- ,- - - - -
| |
| .,-,,-v-
| |
| | |
| i } .. -
| |
| 1
| |
| ? -
| |
| assure that a uniform and consistant screening program is implemented throughout the industry.
| |
| .]~. The attached draft " Standard Format and Contant Guide for the Nuclear Reactor Access AuthoM:ation Rule" provides a detailed descMption j
| |
| of the requirements for the plan. This standard format will bear i
| |
| 4 the OMB approval data and will be provided to each ifcensee as a
| |
| . guide for use in developing their respective plans.
| |
| !! '(111)
| |
| There are no similar data available in the field which can be used for
| |
| { these purposes.
| |
| : 2. Descriotion of Survey Plan i
| |
| All nuclear power reactor sitas and applicants are required to submit an j
| |
| Access Au'thoM:stion Plan as well as maintain the previously identified records.
| |
| Six new applications are anticipated annually.
| |
| P.
| |
| : 3. Tabulation and Publication Plans
| |
| * e Accast AuthoM:ation Plans suomittad to the Commission will be reviewed, aoproved, and filed by the Commission. Specific licensee Accass Authori-zation Plans will not be published for public review or comment in -
| |
| accordance with 10 CFR 2.790(d). The NRC anticipatas full comolf anca with the regulations. '
| |
| 4.
| |
| Time Schedule for Data Collection and Pub 1feation The license appifcant whose aop11 cation was submitted prior to the pucif-cation data of the final rule in the Federal Register will be required to' -
| |
| submit to the Commission his Accass Authorization Plan for approval within 120 days of the effective date of the rule. '4f thin 360 days after the rule becomes effective or 120 days after approval by the Commission, wnichever is latar, the ifcansee is required to implement the requirements of the aoproved plan.
| |
| 06r.5/83 3 Attacament 6 to Enclosure A i
| |
| (
| |
| . . - - . - - . - - - . . ~ ~ - - - . . - . . - . . ~ ~ . - " ^ . - ~ ~ _
| |
| | |
| , ! l
| |
| ~ * '
| |
| * a .
| |
| j L
| |
| it 1
| |
| 4 The appifcant whose app 1tcation is submitted after the final rule is j' l published in the Federal Registar shall include the Accass Authori:ation
| |
| .?
| |
| Plan with the application submittal.
| |
| ' It is estimated that it will take about 14 Commission staff-days to review and approve each plan submitted and that initially all plans will be reviewed and approved within 360 days after receipt of the plans.
| |
| f.. ,
| |
| , 5. Consultattons outside the Acency -
| |
| e
| |
| - i 3
| |
| Both infor:nal and formal consultations were made with seme licensees,
| |
| > j fnvestigative agencies, psychiatrists, and psychologists to datarzine '
| |
| facacts, receive guidance, and identify and help solve potential problems
| |
| * with the proposed rule. The formal consultations were in the form of NRC '
| |
| contracts made to:
| |
| i Personnel Decisions, Inc. (POI), Minneapolis, Minnesota for guidanca I concarning the behavioral observation program. In developing this .
| |
| {
| |
| ; guidanca, PCI also convened a panel of experts from around the country to make recomendations, including cartain reactar g' licensees.
| |
| t i
| |
| Informally, NRC contacted, via talephone, sever:1 ifcensees to detarmine I
| |
| the types of clearance programs in existance and the impacts of various proposed requirements. Information on these points was also obtained from the Atomic Industrial Forum.
| |
| j All suggestions and recommendations were taken under consideration in developing the rule.
| |
| i .
| |
| i,
| |
| ; i f
| |
| 06/15/83 4 Att$chment 6 to Enclosure A l
| |
| . pp W NW V ^ , .w, ,Y -
| |
| " " ' ~
| |
| ~ * ,. . _ . .. .. . _ _ . - - .. . _ _ . - - -
| |
| | |
| j . .
| |
| l I
| |
| 6.
| |
| Estimation of Rescendent Recortine Burden
| |
| ~-
| |
| Number of Respondents 3
| |
| After Effect-
| |
| '' Reculatory tive Data of Annual Reports
| |
| , Section Rule Total Time Annual Staff Filed /Rescondents Recuired/Resconse Hours
| |
| , i
| |
| : 1. 10 CFR 50.34(g) 6 new plans 1 plan / licensee Access 800 man-hours / plan 4800 hours Authoriza- .
| |
| ,, tion Plan
| |
| ,-j The cost to prepare the Access Authorization Plan is estimated to be 348,000 per applicant-$2SS,000 annually for six new plans / year.
| |
| i .
| |
| : j. 7. Estimata of Cost to Federal Government I
| |
| i 1 It is estimated that six new plants will submit plans for review and
| |
| : approval each year which will cost the NRC about $40,300 to process.
| |
| t 4
| |
| 4 i
| |
| t
| |
| ! )
| |
| . . l l
| |
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| |
| CS/'.5/83 5 Attachment 6 to Enclosurs A
| |
| . . . . - . . . . . - - . - _ . = = - . - =
| |
| ~ ~ - - -
| |
| e
| |
| ,w-- -e , ,Q- -<.,e + < , - -
| |
| | |
| Ji 1
| |
| ,j' SUPPORTING STATBENT FOR RECOR0 KEEPING AND REPCRTING REQUI 3
| |
| 3 10 CFR PART 73 i
| |
| $t 1. Justification
| |
| .3 '
| |
| :q s
| |
| J j
| |
| (1) On March 17, 1977, the Commission published proposed amendments to l Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, 42 FR 14880, that sought to establish an unescorted access authorf:ation program for individuals who have access to or control over special nuclear mateHa1. Writtan
| |
| 'j comments were invited and received. On December 28, 1977, the Commission d~ issued a notice of public hearing, 42 FR 64703, on the proposed regula-
| |
| .i tions, and subsequently established a Hearing Board to gather additional tastimony. As a result of information gathered at the pubife hearing 4
| |
| and its own examination of the proposed access authorization program,
| |
| * j' the Hearing Board made recommendations to the Commission concerning j
| |
| future personnel screening requirements appifcable to nuclear power reactors.
| |
| The Hearing Board recommended that the NRC issue a screening
| |
| : j. rule based on the American National Standard Instituta Standard N18.17 j " Industrial Security for Nuclear Power Plants" (ANSI N18.17), to ensure the trustworthiness and suitabfif ty of persons granted unescorted
| |
| } o access to protected areas and vital islands at nuclear power plants.
| |
| i 1 The Commission adopted thfs recommendation.
| |
| It is generally recognized that employees found to be unsuitaale for .
| |
| .j their job or untrustworthy represent a potential hazard to themselves -
| |
| j and the public. This is verified by the results of the Insider Study
| |
| ; l (see SECY-80-284). Although results of thfs study were largely based.
| |
| i ,
| |
| * on incidents occurring at industries analogous to the nuclear industry, i .
| |
| ' the comparability of analogs was carefully considered by the Comeission.
| |
| * The following enaracteristics were identified as being typical of l 1 all insider sabotaurs- ,
| |
| f 'l '
| |
| fj o acted alone !
| |
| 3
| |
| ; o ,
| |
| were motivated by psychological problems, disgruntlement, and i
| |
| revenge I ,
| |
| . 06/15/83 6 Attachment 6 to Enclosure A 1
| |
| 1
| |
| .: i i
| |
| !.. - m ., . . . . , . , - .
| |
| -e
| |
| -a - -
| |
| ~~ ,
| |
| 1
| |
| .- -.
| |
| * n.. . . , - , . _ -
| |
| | |
| I .
| |
| l,
| |
| , o acted within two years of being hired J
| |
| 3 o
| |
| ! acted on inculse y, o relied on covert action
| |
| ,; o used some type of equipment available onsite 94 4
| |
| ! These charactaristics justify the promulgation of an access authoriza-
| |
| ,3 4 tion program designed to identify individuals who are unsuitable for unescorted access to protected areas and vital istands.
| |
| In Ifne with the recommendations of ANSI N18.17, the proposed unescorted
| |
| ]q
| |
| ? access authorization rule consists of two major components: background investigation and continual behavioral observation. The proposed j
| |
| criteria have been designed to basically codify and make more uniform what many licensees are doing either in part or in whole to meet industry standard ANSI N18.17. In the fall of 1978, the staff included in their closing statement to the Hearing Board the results of a survey on the personnel screening program used by 39 power reactor
| |
| ', j facilities. The results of the survey clearly indicated that f
| |
| ANSI N18.17 did not result in a consistant and uniform program (see
| |
| ' Enclosure B, page 15 "Value/ Impact Statement") and that a mandatory, more consistant accass authorization program was needed. The proposed j
| |
| rule would provide a more censistant and uniform screening program as well as codify much of what the industry is already doing.
| |
| I (ii) The attached draft " Standard Format and Content Guide for the Nuclear -
| |
| Reactor Access Authorization Rule" provides a detailed descrfption of the requirements for the plan. This standard format will bear i
| |
| the CMS approval data and will be provided to each Itcensee as a guide for use in developing their respective plans.
| |
| The licensee is required to maintain certain records developed in i
| |
| the course of administering the Access Authorization Program. These
| |
| ' records are:
| |
| l C6/15/83 7 Attacament 5 to Enclosure A t
| |
| ___ _ _. _. .. ~ -' ~ -
| |
| | |
| I . .
| |
| .) a.
| |
| 1 .
| |
| Paragraph 73.56(c) implies that any derogatory information 4
| |
| obtained on an individual during the background investigation
| |
| .,' he kept on file.
| |
| .- b.
| |
| s .
| |
| i Paragraph 73.56(d) implies that the licensee keep on file behavioral observation records made by the individual's fanediate
| |
| : l ,
| |
| a superior under the Behavioral Observation Program.
| |
| 3
| |
| : c. Paragraph 73.56(e)(1) implies that the ifcansee keep on file .
| |
| l the unescorted accass authorization certification received from
| |
| .i another licensee on a tamparary worker or transferring emolayee.
| |
| j
| |
| : d. Paragraph 73.56(e)(2) implies that the ifcensee keep on file
| |
| : y. the unescorted accass authorizatiton cartification received from -
| |
| the NRC on an NRC employee.
| |
| 3 1 .I -
| |
| : e. Paragraph 73.56(f) implies that the ifcansee keep on file a copy of the unescorted accass authori:ation denial or revocation i notice given an individual, .
| |
| y
| |
| ,j f.
| |
| I Paragraph 73.56(f) implies that the ifcansee keep on file any i
| |
| records used as a basis for denying or revoking an individual's unescorted accass authorization. -
| |
| 1 i
| |
| z g.
| |
| Psragraph 73.56(g) requires that an individual's access authori- .
| |
| i zatfort file be kept a minimum of 3 years after the individual's I !
| |
| , 0 termination of access.
| |
| l j These records need to be maintained by the ifcansee in order:
| |
| a.
| |
| That the NRC can assure ifcensee compliance with the requirements '
| |
| i l of this rule; and 4
| |
| i' b.
| |
| To provide needed records in any grievance review proceedings which may occur _due to implementation of this rule.
| |
| C6/29/83 8 Attachment 6 to Enclosure A I
| |
| ~ '
| |
| ~ '
| |
| ,, __ - s__... .,m..,7 y_ _ _ _ . ,- ,,, _,-.- ,-,m = __, - , _. -
| |
| | |
| i (iii) inere is no similar data available in the field whfen can be used for these purposes.
| |
| : 2. Descriotion of Survev Plan
| |
| ~ . !' ,
| |
| '. There are presently 48 nuclear power reactor sitas which will be subject
| |
| , to this rule. It is assumed that the program will be organized and i '
| |
| administered on a sita rather than a reactor unit basis. The matting
| |
| ' address for these affected sites may be obtained from the Of rector of 5
| |
| Safeguards, Offica of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear
| |
| } Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555.
| |
| . ; 3.
| |
| Tabulation and Publiention Plans 4 .
| |
| Access Authorization Plans submitted to the Commission will be reviewed, approved, and filed by the Commission. Scecific ifcansee Acesss Authori-zation Plans will not be published for puclic review or comment in I accordance with 10 CFR 2.790(d). The NRC anticipatas full compliance with the regulations.
| |
| 4 Time Schedule for Data Collection and P'2bliestien The licansee will be required to submit to the Commission his Access Authori- '
| |
| ration plan for approval within 120 days of the effective date of the rule.
| |
| 'dithin 360 days after the rule becomes effective or 120 days after approval by the Commission, whichever is later, the licensee is required to implenent '
| |
| the requirements of his approved plan.
| |
| It is estimated that it will take about 14 Commission staff-days to review and accreve each plan submittad and that initially all plans will be .
| |
| reviewed and approved within 3f0 days after receipt of the plans.
| |
| e I
| |
| C5/15/83 9 Attaen:nent 5 to Enclosure A s
| |
| 4
| |
| : s. .h *' * "** M--
| |
| . , , _ - . , _ _ , , - . . . , _ . - _ , . . _ . . - . _ - . . , ~ , . . _ -
| |
| | |
| :3 , 3. Consultations Outside the Acenev 5,1 Both informal and femal consultations were made with some ifcensees.
| |
| investigative agencies, psychiatrists, and psychologists to datarmine impacts, d receive guidance, and identify and help solve potential problems with the 5
| |
| proposed rule. The femal consultotions were in the form of NRC contracts made to:
| |
| 1
| |
| ; t; Personnel Decisions, Inc. (POI), Minneapolis, Minnesota for guidance i
| |
| ~
| |
| concerning the behavioral observation program. In developing this guidanca, POI also convened a panel of experts frem around the country
| |
| ~j to make recommendations, including certain reactor ifcensees.
| |
| .I e
| |
| d -
| |
| Informally, NRC contacted, via talephone, several ifconsees to determine the types of clearance programs in existan e and the impacts of various
| |
| .}
| |
| , proposed requiraments.
| |
| .t Infomation on these points was also obtained from the Atomic Industrial
| |
| . - Forts. '
| |
| t 1
| |
| i All suggestions and recommendations were taken uncer consideration in developing the rule.
| |
| l.
| |
| 8 For further infomation on the cost to the nuclear incustry for implementing and maintaining this rule, see Enclosure A, Attachment 3, '"/alue/ Impact -
| |
| I
| |
| : Statament - Power Reactor Ac ass Authorization Rule."
| |
| -l i
| |
| f
| |
| : i. .
| |
| 'i -
| |
| e t
| |
| 06/15/83 10 Attacnment 6 to Enc!osure A i
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| . . . . . .:.. . w -..~..----.-..--~ - - - - ~ - - ~ - - - ':
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| '-l'"'''"*~"';~'^'~"."*~ ' ~~
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| t a .
| |
| gegulatory Section Annual Reports Total llae Annual Staff Number of Respondeng Filed / Respondents Required / Response f
| |
| llours
| |
| : 5. E 73.56(e)(1) 1 Temporary worker =
| |
| i certification review 1,000 certificates sane ,
| |
| aeul filino la min / certificate 167 hours
| |
| : 6. 5 73.56(e)(2)
| |
| HRC employee
| |
| -o certification review and filinD 543 certificates Inillally none 54 certificates annually none 10 aln/ certificate 90h hours lo min / certificate 9 hours D 7. E 73.56(h)(1)
| |
| Appeal llotice -
| |
| : a. Preparation 4,400
| |
| : h. none 30 min / notice
| |
| _ FilinD 4,400
| |
| * none 2,200 hours.
| |
| F#
| |
| 40 sec/filinD 49 hours 1 8.
| |
| ' E 73.56(h)(2) llearino records
| |
| : a. FilinD 400 none 40 sec/filino 5 hours 48 Total Avera0e No. of Total llours initially" 38,490.5 Respondents Annually Averaoe Total llours/ Site 802 Total flours Annually- 259,215 Average Total llours/ Site 5,400 e
| |
| O e wO
| |
| ] ,
| |
| | |
| } - .. . .
| |
| ! 7.
| |
| Estimata of Cost to Federal Government
| |
| ,' ~
| |
| It is estimated that it will initially cost the NRC $322,560 (14 staff-cays /
| |
| plan x $480/ staff-days x 48 sites) to review and approve all submittad
| |
| :4 Access Authorization Plans and 3137.2K additional inspection effort (preparation of revised inspection procedures (0.5 man year) + additional inspection hours (1.0 man-year).
| |
| 1 It is estimated that six new plants will submit plans for review and
| |
| } approval each year which will cost the NRC about $40,300 to process and
| |
| .; . approximataly $30,700 to maintain old plans.
| |
| j COST StjMMARY TABLE 1.
| |
| NRC Initial Maintenance h Licensing Review 5322.6K
| |
| : $ 86.4K 1
| |
| Additional Inspection Effort 5187.2K i - $124.8K *
| |
| ! Total *
| |
| $509.8K 1 -
| |
| $211.2K i
| |
| +
| |
| 4 i
| |
| t l 5 06/16/83 13 Attac.'.:nent 5 to Enclosurs A ll I
| |
| 1
| |
| , . , . , , - , , _ _ _ . _ . _ . - , - - . - , . . _ . . . . . . , . . __#-%, .. ,, ,_ . ,, _ _~_-- --
| |
| | |
| _ __ - . . . ,m.- - - :- -
| |
| * ' ~ ~ " ' '
| |
| ......2.....c. . ' u '. w . - a. .= - - L i -
| |
| A - A:a : ' UM ^ * = '" h M '" a ',' "
| |
| COST St8elARY TABLE / SITE * -
| |
| Initial '
| |
| Industry Costs Existin0 Plants New Plants Maintenance
| |
| ', Preparation of Access Authorization Plan
| |
| $48K $48K $12K Licensee Procram Director Clerical Support
| |
| $63K $63K $63K Background Investleatlan $0 $375K $93.8K e
| |
| Crinical llistory Re<paasts to the FBI $0 $7.5K $2K .
| |
| j Behavioral Observation Trainine $34K $34K $28.2K Reevaluation of Personnel Beferred Usuler the Sahavioral Observation .
| |
| Program and Appeals $8 $36K $67.5K 3 Stora0e of Files
| |
| $9.8K $39.2K $39.2K Total $154.8K $602.7K $305.7K Initial Industry Savines Existine Plants New Plants Maintenance
| |
| .I Licensee Established Reciprocity Pro 0 ras $187.5K
| |
| $187.5K --
| |
| In Generating conducted the by the cost estimates licensed faulustry.shown, the staff assumed that no screenine was presently bein0 of thq proposed proGrae are currently bein0 employed by licensees.As ludicated in the Value/ Impact Statemen ,
| |
| W p . I' e
| |
| * g .
| |
| , e ,
| |
| 4 +-
| |
| | |
| e I
| |
| w- e
| |
| ?
| |
| s i ,
| |
| a i.
| |
| e
| |
| 'l i
| |
| s J
| |
| e ENCLOSURE B SEARCH REQUIREMENTS RULE e
| |
| e e
| |
| e
| |
| * e D
| |
| i 0
| |
| e j
| |
| e 9
| |
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| |
| 3
| |
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| ~
| |
| i , .
| |
| l
| |
| . l f
| |
| .. I
| |
| :t RESOLUTICN OF THE PAT-00Mi SEARCH ISSUE !
| |
| 1,1 i
| |
| .i Sackereund and Scece of Precram W
| |
| Y; The Commission was petitioned in 1977 to suspend a requirement for the use
| |
| '; of pat-down searches as a matter of routine. Interia saaren requirements were established and action was deferred on the petition pending the development of a rule specifying entry search requirements.
| |
| i A proposed rule on this subject was issuea for pubite comment in 1980. The staff has now revised the rule
| |
| * I concerning search requirements in light of the pubife comments and in response
| |
| >j to reemdations made by the Safety / Safeguards Review Committae (see Attach-
| |
| }
| |
| * ment 1).
| |
| This cosaittaa, whien was formed in response to the chairman's reauest of August 15, 1982, had the overall task of stucying power reactor safeguards s
| |
| requirements and practices to datarmine wnether actual or potentf ai conflicts
| |
| > j exist with plant safety objectives.
| |
| t
| |
| ,s 1 .t l ]
| |
| The Safety / Safeguards Review Committee rec:mmnended that all persons entaring k the protected area of nuclear power plants be searched using metal detectors
| |
| { j
| |
| ~ and explosive detectorg. This recommendation, which the staff generally endorses,
| |
| }
| |
| 1 differs from the current intaria precadures in that visitors would be subject i
| |
| ].
| |
| to routine equipment searches rather than physical " pat-dcwn" searches. " Pat-
| |
| , i down" saarenes would be required caly wnen the licensea has cause to suspect j
| |
| t.)at an individual is attempting to introduce centracand (firearms, explosives,
| |
| } cr incendiaries), or when the detection equipment is out-of-servica. The staff-j i has added an exemotion from searches for on-duty law enforcament officars as a setter of practicalf ty. ,
| |
| i The staff has c:nsidered the use of random searches for screened individuals, but the Safety / Safeguards Review Consmittee found that most 11cansees have successfully adjustad to 100% eouipment searches, and believed that changing i = to random searches would be distuottve.
| |
| t Due to its interrelationship with other provisions of the Insider Safeguards Rule Package, these revised saaren requirements are again being punitshed in proposed form.
| |
| 06/15/83 1 Enclosure 3 G
| |
| , - - - - . 3 - - ..,-,.---y-, , - , . - - - - - - . . - ~ ~ , . _ ~ - - . . - - - r- ,_.-% -
| |
| .-w.. , - - y-v3
| |
| | |
| 4 Value/Imoact Consideratiens h
| |
| Implementation of the newly revised pat-down search rule as proposed herein
| |
| .i
| |
| 'i would not represent any increased costs to individual 11cansees. Detaffs
| |
| .6 concerning costs and benefits for both the industry and the NRC are contained N; in Attachment 2. "Value/ Impact Statament."
| |
| 3 J Guidance d Guidance for conducting personnel searches has already been pucif shed ib
| |
| ^1 applicable portions of Regulatory Guide 5.7, " Entry / Exit Control for ' Protected 3
| |
| 1 Areas, Vital Areas, and Material Access Areas." -
| |
| J Attachments:
| |
| . 'l 1 - Federal Recister Notice
| |
| * 2 - Value/ Impact Statement i 3 - Oraft Public Announcement 4 - Oraft Congressional Letter I 5 - Supporting Statament for i
| |
| Recordkeeping and Reporting
| |
| -l Requirements
| |
| ; e I
| |
| i .
| |
| 1
| |
| : i. .
| |
| .i 1
| |
| 4 4
| |
| i
| |
| .1, i
| |
| s
| |
| . ,1 i .
| |
| 06/15/33 2
| |
| Enclosure 3
| |
| - M Sp W -
| |
| N "*" WD g v--' ~
| |
| ~
| |
| '. 'y
| |
| | |
| -r g .o l ~ . .s 2
| |
| e 4
| |
| .t
| |
| ?
| |
| 3
| |
| , ATTACH 4ENT 1 TO THE PAT-00'dN SEARCH ENCLOSURE (ENCL. 3)
| |
| FEDERAL REGISTER NOTICE e
| |
| e W
| |
| D 4
| |
| e 4
| |
| 0 e
| |
| l 9
| |
| " -- - - - - ~ ~ - - - -
| |
| | |
| , =
| |
| r
| |
| : '. s (7590-01] .
| |
| I i .
| |
| NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCMMISSICN 1 10 CFR Part 73 Searches of Individuals at Power Reactor Facilities AGs~.NCY: Nuclear Regulatorf Commission, q..
| |
| , ACTION: Proposed rule.
| |
| | |
| ==SUMMARY==
| |
| The Nuclear Regulatory Ccamission is proposing an amendment to its requirements for entry searches at power reactor fac111 ties. This ,
| |
| regulation is needed to clarify requirements for searches of individuals at these facilities. This amendment requires equipment saarches of all individuals seeking accass to protacted areas except on-duty pesca officars, and pat-down searches when detection equipment fails, or cause to suspect exists.
| |
| This proposed amendment will suoport the Consission's goal of increased assuranca that power reactors lire adecuataly protected against sabotage by an insider.
| |
| DATES: The comment period expires
| |
| . Comments
| |
| ! received aftam-I will be considered if it is practical to
| |
| ( do so, but assurance of consideration cannot be given except as to "
| |
| i comments recafved on or before this data. ,
| |
| ADDRESSES:
| |
| Comments should be sent to the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, OC 20555, Attantion:
| |
| Oceksting and Service Branen.
| |
| Comments e.ay also be deliverso to Room i m , .
| |
| 1717 H Street NW. , Washington, OC, between 8:15 a.m. and 5:00 p.m.
| |
| Copies of consents received are available for examining and copying for a fee at the Cosmission's Punite Document Room ac 1717 H Street NW. ,
| |
| Washington, DC. "
| |
| l 06/21/83 i Attachment i to Enclosure 3 4
| |
| ,, j e ,_ _ - - _
| |
| "o # " ' " - '
| |
| ''{
| |
| | |
| _ _ __ a.- ~. m . h . - - c- - -
| |
| , e *
| |
| [7590-01] ..
| |
| FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CCNTACT: Tom R. Allen, Chief, Regulatory Activ-1 f ties Section, Ofvision of Safeguards, Offica of Nuclear Matarial Safety j
| |
| 4 and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Consission, '4ashington, DC 20555, telephone (301-427-4010).
| |
| *
| |
| * 1 f i
| |
| _: ;; l i
| |
| ,3 SUPPt.!MENTARY INFORMATION: On December 1,1980, the Commission extended j , the implementation data for pat-down searches at power reactors until l
| |
| l ,j revised search procedures could be written in physical protaction plans and approved (45 FR 79410). At the same time, the Commission issued pro-
| |
| ,j posed revisions to 10 CFR 73.55(d)(1) to finalize requirements for
| |
| ,i personnel searches at protacted area entry portals of power reactors,
| |
| [{ (45 FR 79492).
| |
| The Commission invited and recafved public causent on the proposed 4 amendments.
| |
| Comments were received from 25 utilities, three industry
| |
| '! coordination organfzations, one equipaent manufacturer, one government j agency, and two privata citi: ens. The Commission has now revised the 2
| |
| 1 ruta concerning search requirements in If ght of the pubite comments and
| |
| -] in response to recommendations made by the Safety / Safeguards Review y Committee. This Committae had the overall task of studying power reac-tor safeguards requirements and practicas to datar: sine whether actual or j potential contifets exist with plant safety objectives.
| |
| The Commission is now proposing that all persons entaring the f
| |
| protected area of nuclear power plants (except on-duty law enforcement
| |
| ,j officars) be searched using metal detectors and explosive detectors.
| |
| ( ,j This proposed amendment differs from the current interim procadures in l that visitors would be subject to routine equipment searches rather than 1 physical " pat-downd searches.
| |
| " Pat-down" searches would be required only.
| |
| j I when the licensee has cause to suspect that an individual is attameting i
| |
| t to introduca contraband (firearns, explosives, or incandf arfes), or when I
| |
| the detection equipment is out of service. The exemotion for on-duty law i : ,
| |
| J enfcrcament officars has been added as a mattar of practica11.ty.
| |
| 'j
| |
| ' The Commission had considered the use of random searches for screeneo individuals, but the Safety / Safeguards Review Committee found that most
| |
| ' Ifcansees have successfully adjustad to 100% ecufpment searches, and
| |
| :j
| |
| . . believe that changing to random searctes would be disruptive.
| |
| . 06/21/83 2 Attachmen: 1 to Enclosure 3 i
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| e l m.
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| l .
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| M l
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| I (7590-01] .
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| l
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| ' The search recuirement amendment is being repubifshed because of f ts interrelationship with the preposed Accass Authorization Rule.
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| ~
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| 4 PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT l
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| The proposed rule has been submitted to the Office of Management and Budget for clearance of the information collection requirements that may be appropriata under the Paperwork Reduction Act (Pub. L. 96-511). The SF-83, " Request for Clearance," Supporting Statament, and related docu-mentation submitted to CMS will be placed in the NRC Public Occument Room at 1717 H Street NW. , Washington, OC 20555. The material will be available for inspection or copying.
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| i REGULATORY FLEXI3ILITY CERTIFICATICN
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| * In accordanca with the Regulator / Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C.
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| 605(b), the Commission hereby certifies that these preposed regulations
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| ' will not, if promulgated, have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. These proposed rigulations affect electric utilities that are dominant in their respective servica areas and that own and operata nuclear power plants. These utiffties do not
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| - fall within the definition of small businesses sat forth in Section 3 of i
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| the Small Business Act,15 U.S.C. 632, or within the Small Business Size Standards sat forth in 10 CFR Part m - These proposed regulations will.
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| i affect some nuclear power industry contractors and vendors all of wnich are large concarns wnich service the industr/.
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| LIST OF SUBJECTS IN 10 CFR PART 73 Hazardous matarials-transcortation, Nuclear materials, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Penalty, Reporting requirements, Security. measures.
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| For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of I the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorganization Act.
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| of 1974, as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 553, notice is hereby given that adop-tion of the following amendment to 10 CFR Part 73 is contemelated. ~
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| i C6/21/83 3 Attactment I to Enclosure 3
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| . . . , . _ . . . . ~ . . - .
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| q
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| , , __ .. _ ~ -
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| - , (7590-01] ..
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| l
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| .* ' PART 73 - PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS
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| ; 1. 7he authority citation for Part 73 is revised to read as
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| : follows:
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| jj AUTHORITY: Secs. 53, 161, 68 Stat. 930, 948, as amended, sec. 147, j 94 Stat. 780 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2167, 2201); sec. 201, 88 Stat.1242, as 7i amended, sec. 204, 88 Stat.1245 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5844).
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| Section 73.37(f) is also issued under sec. 301, Puc. L. 96-295,
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| ], 94 5 tat. 789 (42 U.S.C. 5841 note).
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| j For the purposes of sec. 223, 68 Stat. 958, as amended (42 U.S.C.
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| ' 2273); 55 73.21, 73.37(g), 73 55 are issued under sec.161b, sa Stat. 948, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(b)); 55 73.20, 73.24, 73.25, 73.25, 73.27 . '
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| .j 73.37, 73.40, 73.45, 73.46, 73.50, 73.55, 73.67 are issued under sec.
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| ] 1611, 64 Stat. 949, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(f)); and 55 73.20(c)(1), *
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| .] 73.24(b)(1), 73.26(b)(3), (h)(6), and (k)(4), 73.27(a) and (b), 73.37(f),
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| j1 i 73.40(b) and (d), 73.46(g)(6) and (h)(2), 73.50(g)(2), (3)(fii)(B) and 4
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| (h), 73.55(h)(2),.and (4)(fit)(B), 73.70, 73.71, 73.72 are issued under sec. 1610, 68 Stat. 950, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(o)).
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| : 2. In 5 73.55, para' graph (d)(1) is revised to read as follows:
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| e M M M M i M 1 (d) Accass Requirements. (1) 7he licansee shall control all 1 points of personnel and vehicle accass into a protected area. Identi-
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| ,]
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| fication and search of all individuals unless otherwise orovided herein.
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| -i
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| .J must be made and authorization must be checked at these points. 7he search- .
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| 3 function for detection of firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices j ?;
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| ~' Csha44-be-w..Jo J sit.t. by s pnysicaf-sesre.t er-by-use-of equipment capenfe-ef-detecting such-deiftes-]* shall be accomoffshed threuch the L use of both fireerms and exclosive detection ecufement cacante of detect-inq those devices. The licansee shall subfect all corsons exeset bona fide federal, state, and local law enforessent eersonnel on official duty ^
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| l
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| : to these ecufement searches uoon entry into a erotec*ed area. When the 1
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| Comoarative taxt snows changes between present and the newly precosed rule. Underlined text shows additions.and dashed through text sacws '
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| I deletions.
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| 3 C6/21/83 t Attachment I to . closure 3-e p g5 4 [#
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| l
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| ._ _ m._.. .- .~ -
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| . l 4 i
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| ' (7590-01] .
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| \
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| \,
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| , ! \
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| Ifeensee has cause to susoect that an individual is attemotine to intro-
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| * duce firearms, exolosives, or incandf arv devices into orotec*ad areas, the licensee shall conduct a ohvsical cat-down search of that individual.
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| _t Whenever firearms or exolosives detection ecuicment at a cortal is out of service or not coeratino satisfactorilv, the Ifcansee shall conduct a j _
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| ohvsical cat-down search of all cersons who would otherwise have been
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| * subject to ecuienant seerenes. The individual responsible for the last i t access control function (controlling admission to the protected area) shall be isolated within a bullet resisting structure as described in paragraph (c)(6) of this section to assure his or her anility to respond or to summon assistance. av (120 davs from the effective data of this ,
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| amendment) each ifcansee shall submit revisions to its security clan which define how the final search reouf rements of this carsersch will be set. .
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| The final search recuirements of this oackace must be imole-mented bv the licensee within 60 davs after Commission accreval of the i
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| crocosed security clan revisions.
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| M R R M R
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| , Cated at Washington, DC, this day of 1883. '
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| For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
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| a e
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| Samuel J. Ch11x, Secretary of the Commission. ~
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| t l .
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| I 06/21/33 5 Attachment 1 to 2.nclosure 5 -
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| . - - ** - - - ~
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| ATTAC.94ENT 2 TO THE PAT-CCWN SEARCH ENCLOSURE (ENCt.. B)
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| +
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| :l YALUE/ IMPACT STATEMENT i i
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| j - ,
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| }
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| i 1
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| VALUE/ IMPACT STATEMENT i
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| NUCLEAR PCWER REACTOR SEARC}i PRCCEDURES RULE
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| : 1. THE P9OPOSED ACTION i
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| . l 1.1 Descriotion
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| : i The Commission is amending 10 CFR 73.55(d)(1) to clarify requirements l for searches of individuals at power reactor protac.ed area entry portals.
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| : 1. 2 Value/Imoact of Procosed Action l
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| 1.2.1 Value - NRC This proposed aim ndment will support the Commission's goal of increased assurance that power reactors are adequataly protactad against sacotage by an j insider.
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| This amendment represents a safeguards measure designed to provide a i
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| measure of datarrance (as well as outright detection) against those persons who
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| !. might otherwise attempt an act of sabotage by the introduction.of firearms, explosives, or incandiary devicas. Each ifcensee is required by the rule, if adopted, to submit an amended security plan, whica states how the.stiarch .
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| requirement will be met, within 45 days of the amendment's effective data. The security plan serves as a medium whereby ifcansees commit to specific perform- ~
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| { ance.
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| ' The information provided will be treated as safeguards information and used by the NRC Ifcansing staff during their security plan evaluation procass.
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| .! 1. 2. 2 Imoact e.
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| t j 1. 2. 2.1 - N,,,RC. R The impact on NRC operations will occur in the area of
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| : ifcensing review of the licensee's securi+y plan.
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| Initial cost to the NRC fs estimated to be:
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| Licensing Review and Approval Security Plan (assuming l
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| 2 staff-days / security plan x 48" plans x Sa80/ staff-day)
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| { Cost Per Plan Review. . . . . 31. 0K '
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| 4 Total Initial Review Costs. . 546.1X i
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| } "All currently licensed power reactors are located at a8 sitas.
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| l t
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| , 06/15/83 1 Attacament 2 to 6 closure 3 49y==*'-**********4"**',* -
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| >+ -~
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| ,- . y -- -,- ,7-, ,. ,.,, _ _ . , . - , , , , . . , ,.-c. , ,w- ,r - . ,-.. - , , , . g
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| | |
| j ..
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| I j, The estimated annual cost to the NRC in subsequent years:
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| l.icensing Review and Approval of Security Plans
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| ] (assuming six new plans are licensed each year) ''
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| -I 4
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| (2 staff-days / plan x 6 plans x $480/ staff-day)
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| Unit Cost Per Plan Review . 31.0K '
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| Total Annual Review Costs . . 45.8K
| |
| : 1. 2. 2. 2 Industrv Ooerations. The required fireams and explosives j detection equipment is currently in placa at most reactor sites. Therefore, 4
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| the most expensive itas in the initial cost has already been absorbed by the
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| ! ! nuclear industry. However, for sitas that do not have the equipment (approximately two facilities are without equipment) and those that are
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| ' scheduled for future licansing, the following estimatas apply:
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| * Cost estimatas were derived by a random polling of seven reactor
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| ,' facilities.
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| Itan Prica Ranci.
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| Fireams/ Metal Detector. . . $1.6K - 35.1<
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| , Explosives Detector. . . . 35.0K - $21.0K 3
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| An arithmetic average of equipment pricas was comoutad for planning purposas.
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| * Because equipment manufacturers are numerous,~ significant price variations were evident.
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| Item Averace Cost -o-Metal Detector. . . . . . . . . . $ 3.4K d
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| e Explosives Detector . . . . . . . $13.0K 4
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| These costs are representative of those that a ficansee say axcect to pay for such equipment. The variation in costs per facility will be based i ,
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| upon site-specific differencas such as the numoer of portals in use at the site.
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| 06/15/83 2 4
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| Attacnment 2 .o inclosurs 3 t
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| I ATTACFMENT 3 TO D E PAT-acw SEARCH ENCLOSURE (ENCL. 3)
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| ; ORAFT PUBLIC ANNGUNCEMENT
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| ?
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| I f
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| 9 I
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| o e o .
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| e (DRAFT PUBLIC ANNCUNCEMENT) l' i-NRC PROPOSES TO AMENO REGULATICNS ON SEARCH REQUIREMENTS FOR NUCLEAR POWER REACTOR FACILITIES
| |
| <i The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is proposing to amend its regulations to
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| 'l clarify requirements governing saare.nes of individuals seeking entry to
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| ,; protected areas at nuclear power reactor facilities.
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| " Protected areas" are areas that have controlled access and are enclosed '
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| by physical barriers such as fences or walls.
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| '1 The newly preposed rule will require utilities that are licensed to operate these facilities to use explosive and firearm detection equipment to search j for contraband. Equipment searches will be required for all individuals. The .
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| i j- newly proposed rule differs frca the current interim procedures in that visi-tors would be subject to routine equipment searches rather than physical '' pct-down" searches.
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| i 3 When detection equipment is not in place or is inoperable, all individuals will
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| ; be subject to physical " pat-down" searches.
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| In addition; any person suspectad t !
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| of carrying contraband will be subject to the " pat-down" search.
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| i Interested persons are invited to submit writtan comments on the proposed '
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| ) .) amendment to Part 73 of the Commission's regulations to the Secretary, U.S.
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| j Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, OC 20555, Attention: Occketing and Services Branch, by (90 days after FR publication).
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| t
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| . C i, -
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| 06/t5/33 1.
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| At:schment 3 to Enclosure 3 a
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| giumusume .
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| l l
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| ATTACiMENT 4 TO THE i
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| t PAT-00WN SEARCH ENCLOSURE (ENCL. 8)
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| , 02 AFT CONGRESSIONAL Lu icR e
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| 5 -
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| ;, (0 RAFT CONGRESSIONAL Las 4 cR)
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| | |
| ==Dear Mr. Chairman:==
| |
| | |
| -i Enclosed for the information of the (Subcommittae) are copies of a newly i proposed amendment to 10 CFR Part 73 which is to-be pub 11shed in the Federal Recistar.
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| The Nuclear Regulator 9/ Commission (NRC) is proposing to amend its regulations to clarify requirements for searches of individuals at the entry portals of .
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| power reactor facilities. These search requirements are intanced to provide protection against radiological sabotage. The Consission previously invited .
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| and received public comment on an eariter proposed amendment on this topic.
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| . After reviewing the comments and discussing the issue with ifcansees, the
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| ' Commission has decided to republish the newly proposed requirsments for public comment.
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| The repuclication is being done because of the interrelationship between revised search requirenents and a proposed personnel screening program.
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| ' The revised search requirements have been designed to maintain the type of
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| ' personnel search program presently practicad by most ifcansees. Under this amendment, licansees will use explosives and firearm cetection equipment to saarch for contracand under routine circumstancas. Physical " pat-down" searches would only be used when ecuipment fails or when the licensee has cause to suspect that contraband is being introduced into its facility.
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| Licensees will be required to submit changes to their security plans reflecting the new search requirements within 45 days following the effective data.
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| Licensees will implement the revised search procadures within 60 days aftar Commission acproval of plan changes.
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| Sincarely, -
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| i John G. Davis, Director .
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| Offica of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguarcs l
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| | |
| ==Enclosure:==
| |
| Feceral Registar Notica .
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| l 06/15/83 1 Attacament 4 to inclosure 3 v-
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| - y M
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| ! . ATTACHMENT 5 70 THE .
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| 4 PAT-0CWN SEARCH ENCLOSURE (ENCL. 8) 7 SUPPORTING STATE 4ENT FOR RECCR0 KEEPING '
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| 4 ANO REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 10 CFR 73.55(d)(1) 1 4
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| e 4
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| | |
| - . ~ - - _. . -. .- . - . . - -
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| , l SUPPORTING STATEMENT FOR RECOR0 KEEPING AND REPORTING REQ
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| .]' , 10 CFR 73.55(d)(1)
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| .i
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| ; _ ,j 1. Justiffeation 1
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| j (1) The Commission was petitioned in 1977 to suspend a requirement for 4 the use of pat-down searches as a mat *ar of routine. Interim search a
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| requirements were established and action was deferred on the petition
| |
| {
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| pending the development of a rule specifying entry search require-
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| ; ] sents.
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| :(
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| A proposed rule on this subject was issued for pubife comment in 1980.
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| 1
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| * The staff has now revised the rule concerning search regaf re-ments in Ifght of the coments and in response to recommendations made by the Safety / Safeguards Review Committae. This Committee, which was
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| .j
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| * I fonned in response to the Chairman's request of August 16, 1982, had the overall task of studying power reactor safeguards requirements and l
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| practicas to detarmine whether actual or potential conflicts exist i
| |
| with plant safety objectives.
| |
| 'l 9
| |
| * i The Safety / Safeguards Review Committee recommended that all persons
| |
| , ( ,
| |
| entaring the protected area of nuclear power plants should be searched
| |
| { '
| |
| using metal detectors and explosive detactors. This recommendatian, wnich the staff endorses, differs from the current interim procadures
| |
| .f in that visitors would be subject to routine equipment searches rather i
| |
| : than physical " pat-down" searches. " Pat-downd searches would be
| |
| ' required only when the licensee has cause to suspect that an indi- .
| |
| l
| |
| .j vidual is attempting to introduce contramand (firearms, explosives, i
| |
| * or incendiaries), or when the detection equipment is out of service.
| |
| j ,
| |
| l j The staff has considered the use of random searches for screened indi-
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| ' viduals, but the Safety / Safeguards Review Committee found ,that most '
| |
| 1 licensees have successfully adjustad to 100% equipment searches, and y
| |
| believed that changing to random searches would be afsruotive. Due
| |
| { to its intarrelationship with other provisions of the Insider Safe-guards Rule Package, these revised search requirements'are again being ~
| |
| published in proposed form.
| |
| 03/29/83 1 4 Attac.. ment i to Enclosure 3 1 <
| |
| --- - = .
| |
| e-, =e e,.e - .--.
| |
| | |
| t , ,
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| 4
| |
| . .),
| |
| ']n .
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| ; 4 (ii) Regulatory Guide 5.7 provides guidance to the licensee for conduct-ing personnel searches. This guide is avafiable to ifcensees for
| |
| ~4 use in developing their respective plans.
| |
| d The licensee is required to prepare and submit a revised security j plan to the Commission for review and approval. This plan will j
| |
| delineate how the ifconsee intends to implement the various rearch j requirements. A review and approval of the plan by the Consission is needed to .ssure that these search requirements have been meet ?
| |
| ) and will be properly carried out, y
| |
| (iii) There are no stafiar data available in the field wnich can ce used for these purposes.
| |
| .[- '
| |
| : 2. Descriotion of Survev Pian i
| |
| There are presently 48 nuclear power reactor sitas which wf11 be suoject to this rule. It is assumed that the program will be organized and admin-
| |
| ]{,' istered on a site rather than a reactor unit basis. The mailing address for inese affected sitas may be obtained from the of rector of Safegua,rds, ,
| |
| * Office of Nuclear Matarial Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,'dashington, DC 20555.
| |
| e
| |
| : 3. Tabulation and Publication Pians
| |
| ' Revised security plans submitted to the Commission will be reviewed, approved, and filed by the Commission. Specific ifconsee revised security .
| |
| plans will not be pubitshed for pubife review or comment in accorcanct.
| |
| with 10 CFR 2.790(d). The NRC anticipatas full compliance with the regulations.
| |
| .1 i
| |
| i .
| |
| 1 03/23/83 2 Attac.aent 5 to inclosure i t
| |
| . . - -,-r- . - - _ ,. . , , - - . - .- , _..-,.._.r.,. _.
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| | |
| s b:-. - - - D _A .-
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| ~% e -
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| , d
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| : 4 Time Schedule for Oata Collection and P"b11 cation l'
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| The 11cansee wi11 be required to submit to the Coastssion his Access Authorization Plan for approval within 120 days of the effective data of
| |
| ; the rule.
| |
| Within 360 days after the rule becomes effective or 120 days
| |
| .j after approval by the Commission, whichever is later, the Ifcansee is l
| |
| required to implement the requirements of his approved plan.
| |
| I.
| |
| . lt It is estimated that it will take about two Commission staff-days to review and approve each plan submitted, and that initially all plans
| |
| .i l will be reviewed and approved within 360 days after recafpt of the plans.
| |
| f
| |
| : 5. Consultatfens Outs 1de the Acency
| |
| ' The Safety / Safeguards Review Committaa, during their task of studying j power reactor safeguards requirements and practicas in order to determine whether actual or potential conflicts existad with plant' safety objec-l
| |
| ' tives, visited several ifcansee sites and informally discussed search requirements.
| |
| 8
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| * The Committae found that most ifcensees have successfully
| |
| * adjusted to 100". equipment searches, and believed that changing to random
| |
| * f searches would be disruptive. The suggestions and rec:cumendations of' the
| |
| ' Ccassittae's findings have been taken into consideration in the proposed revision of the rule.
| |
| ; i 6.
| |
| ! Estimation of Resoondent Recortine aurden l
| |
| * i 2 Number of
| |
| * Respondents Regulator / Annual
| |
| * After Effective Annual Reports Total Time Staff Section Oata of Rule Filed /Rescondents Recuired/Resconse Hours
| |
| : 1. 10 CFR 73.55(d)(1) 48 initially 1 plan / licensee 15 aan-hours / plan 768 1
| |
| l l
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| 03/29/S3 3 Attachment 5 :o inclosurs S N
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| _ . - - . _ . _ _ - -..-r-. -- , _ . - , - . ~ , . - -
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| .4 1 - -
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| 4 l
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| ] ., 7.
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| Estimate of Cost to Federsi Governments
| |
| .I i
| |
| It is estimated that it will cost the NRC 346.1X (2 staff-days / plan x 48 plans x 5480/ staff-days) to review and approve all submittad security
| |
| ] plans.
| |
| .A
| |
| .h ' It is estimated that six new plants will submit plans for review and
| |
| ; approval each year wnich will cost the NRC about SS.8K to peccass
| |
| . (2 staff-days / plan x 6 plans x 5480/ staff-day).
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| 03/29/S3 4 Attacament 5 :s inclosurs 3
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| MISCEleLANECUS AMENCMENTS
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| .i .
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| TO 10 CFR PART 73 l -
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| 4
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| . SACXGROUNO i
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| Staff experience during the implementation of 5 73.55, " Requirements for ,
| |
| Physical Protection of Licensed Activities in Nuclear Power Reactors Against Radiological Sabotage," has indicated a need to clarify and reffne the policy
| |
| ' for (1) the designation and protaction of vital areas containing safety-related
| |
| * equipment, (2) vital area accass controls, (3) authority to suspend safeguards measures during safety emergencies, (4) protection of certain f*,. ass of security
| |
| ; j ,, - -
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| equipment which significantly impact nuclear plant security, and (5) key and j -
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| l lock controls.
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| j These various pronosed changes are intarrelated and are being i
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| I considered to provide a balanced safeguards approach wn11e affording an appro-i
| |
| * ' priata level of protection. The requirements have been designed to accommodata recommendations of the Safety / Safeguards Review Committee estan11shed in
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| , j
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| * response to the Chaf tsan's request of August 18, 1982. This Committee had the t
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| overall task of studying power reactor safeguards rtquirements and practicas to datarmine whether actual or potential confifets exist with plant safety c.2f ectives. i JfCPEOFPROGRAM
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| ~
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| i Vital Aree Desienation Poliev (pages 2-3, Attachment 1) - It is proposed that a
| |
| ' clarified vital area designation policy be adopted which would require protaction only to the extant necassary to prevent a successful act of radioicgical sabotage. i 1.icensees would be given consideran1e latitude in grousing vital areas int: " vital j
| |
| istands" in order to take advantage of existing barriers and access control points. '
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| This approach would protect key vital comoonents instead of continuing to require protection of all vital areas (areas in which radiological sanotage can be q
| |
| accomolished). An NRC provided sita-specific analysis of vital equipment would acc us as the technical basis for designating vital islands. In addition,
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| . certain itams would be deemed vital in all cases. These include ansita diesel 06/27/83 1 inclosure C 4
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| ,, . , . . . seiam man.= - + +*****=****8** ~~
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| -*F'"""***'88*9 4
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| - , _ _ _ . . . - . . - - ,-._._,...,__..,...._-._,_,,,_,_.,,.-...,.,_.,y f ..,,.-.__,..,..,,_w_,_,_r_,. - , _ _ , , _ _ _ . _ , , , _ _ _ , , .
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| | |
| 4 I 1
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| .i
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| (- generators and batteries (excluding electMcal distMbution syst4ms), reactor
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| ] containment, control rooms, central alarm station, and onsita water suoplies (excluding piping) required for safe shut-down.
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| .i h j
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| Vital Island Protection and Access Control (page 3, Attachment 1) - Amendments
| |
| ] to 10 CFR 73.55(d)(7) are proposend that address both nonemergency and emer-
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| -) gency access contrais to vital islands.
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| 1 i
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| Revi_ sed nonemergency_ controls include (1) the estabitshment of uo-to-data j nonemergency ac:ess lists, (2) a requirement that access control devicas be
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| 'j retMoved.frem involuntaH1y tarminatad individuals prfor to or simultaneously -
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| with their, notification of such termination, and (3) a requirement that uncon-trolled exteHor doors leading to vital islands be locked and alarmed.
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| i * .
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| i Vital island accass controls during emergency conditions include: (1) a q
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| requirement that ifcansees periodically review physical protaction and contin-
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| ]
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| t gency plans to insure that they do not conflict with safety objectives, and (2) a requirement that Ifeensees develop procedures to facilitate emergency '
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| ingress to and egress from vital islands (such procedures would include provi-sions for back-un keys to vital islands and methods of opening locked doors in j the event of a computar fatture).
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| 3 I Although the initial proposed amendment to S 73.55(d)(7) was subject to a round j
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| of pubite comment in 1980 (see 45 FR 15937), the staff believes that the revised proposed requirements should also be pubifshed for pualic comment due '
| |
| to significant rewording that is based on the new concept for vital area designation descM bed above.
| |
| t AutheMtv to Suscend Safecuards Measures Durine E:'?emencias (page a, Attach-ment 1) - 7he Safety / Safeguards Commf ttaa recommended that power reactor j licansees be given imoroved flexib13y to facilitata response to s'ita emer-l gencies _ or_ "unusualeyents. " Consequently, the staff is. proposing to revise
| |
| ! 5 73.55(a) to provide authoMty for ifcansees to suspend safeguards ceasures
| |
| ' if required to ac:emnocata emergency resconse.
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| i 06/15/83 2 Enclosure C
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| - - ~ . -
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| y
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| I . . .
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| j . .
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| i 1 -
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| ,l - rotection of Soecified Physical Securf tv Ecufement - (page 4, Attachment 1) -
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| i a
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| The staff recommends protection of specified onsite physical security equip-
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| > - ment that is necessary for the proper functioning of the security systam. This
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| " equipment includes secondary power suppifes for intrusion alarms and nonport- .
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| ' able communications equipment. The staff's recommendation is predicated on
| |
| ' the belief that _ protection of this equipment is ne.c_e_ss.a_ry to achieve the general performance requirements specified in 10 CFR 73.55(a).
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| p Key and t.ock Controis (pages 4-5, Attac.*nnent 1) - These revised requirements
| |
| * propose to amend S 73.55(d)(9) to reduce costs associated with key and lock controls., The present requirements call for keys, locks, and comminations to be changed whenever any individual who had access to those devicas terminates i
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| employment. The staff believes this to be an unnecessary burden and believes I
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| that the intant of the present requirement can be achieved by changing keys, "
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| locks, and combinations: (1) routinely on an annual basts; (2) whenever a person's access authorization is revoked for reasons of lack of trustworthiness, reliability, or inadequate work performance; and (3) wnen compromise of keys, locks, or comofnations is suspected.
| |
| RE!.ATED FEATURES These proposed amencments are c:mplemented by c:mpanion papers being famardee simultaneously which deal with the proposeo Access Authorf:ation Rule (10 CFR 5 73.56) and personal search proca' cures (" pat-down" rule).
| |
| l.
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| i
| |
| , VALUE IMPACT C::NSIDERATIONS -
| |
| ,j Isolamentation of these proposed miscellaneous amenoments would cast individual aceticants and ifcensees acproximately $1.5M initially and would result in $15X savings per year. Detaf f s emncerning essts and benefits for both the industry and the NRC are contained in Attac unent 3. "Value/ Impact Statement."
| |
| s 06/15/83 3 Enclosure C
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| ~
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| - -- - - . - _ . , . - , . _ _ , . - - . -- ,- ,.. - __ - ~ . - - , . . - - . - . . - _ - . , - _ - _ .
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| :) . .
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| i -i
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| 'd. GUIDANCE
| |
| ' il '.
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| l Oraft guidance (Attactment 2) has been developed for issuance for public c:mant concurrently with the puoliestion of the proposed amencments.
| |
| 1 At*achments:
| |
| 1 - Federal Recister Notice 2 - Oraft Guicance
| |
| , 1 3 - Value/ Impact Statement 4 - Oraft Pubite Announcement 5 - Vital Island Illustration
| |
| ,c; 6 - Supporting Statament for Recorckeeping and Reporting Requirements
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| '. i -
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| j 06/15/a3 4
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| ; Enclosurs C 4
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| .? ATTACHMENT 1 TO THE
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| ~j NI3CIN AMOOMENTS ENCLOSURE (ENCL C) f O ME 9
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| ' e h
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| . 8 t e e i
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| 4
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| t (7590-01] .
| |
| i 3
| |
| NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCNMISSION
| |
| 'I l 10 CFR Part 73 Miscellaneous Amendeents Concerning Physical Protection
| |
| : of Nuclear Power Plants
| |
| ;; ?
| |
| , ,j:, AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission. *
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| ~;
| |
| ACTION: Proposed rule. *
| |
| | |
| ==SUMMARY==
| |
| ~ The Nuclear Regulatory Commiss1on is proposing to amend ita nuclear power plant safeguards regulations to clarify and raffne require-ments for the designation and protection of vital locations containing safety-related equipment. The revised requirements are being considered
| |
| * in light of a Commission review of the impact of safeguards requirements on plant safety objectives. The proposed requfresents are desfgned to provide a more safety-conscious safeguards system while maintaining current levels of protaction.
| |
| DATES: The comment period expires .
| |
| Comments received
| |
| , } after
| |
| . 2 will be considered f f f t is practical to do so, but '
| |
| assurance of consideration cannot be given except for comments recafved '
| |
| on or before this date. .
| |
| 1 1 4
| |
| ADDRESSES:
| |
| Comments should be sent to the Secretary of, the Commission, j
| |
| U.S. Nuclear Requiator/ Commission, Washington, OC 20535; Attantion:
| |
| Occketing and Servica Branca. Comments may also be delivered to .
| |
| Room 1121, 1717 H Street, NW. , Washington, QC, between 8:15 a.m. and
| |
| ; 5:00 p.m.
| |
| j Copies of comments received are available for examining and
| |
| '
| |
| * copying at the Commission's Pualic Document Room at 1717 H Street,?M.,
| |
| Washington, CC.
| |
| Single copies of draft quicance matarial may be cotiined from tne U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Wasnington, OC 20535, Atten-tion: Ofractor, Ofvision of Technical Information and Occusant Control.
| |
| 06/21/83 1 Attact. ment *. to Enclosure C e
| |
| . - - - - ---- .- s..m., ,,. _ . . -_ _ . . - , . ~ , _ , ,.._.,_m.,. ~.,w _.,.-,..~m ~.
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| - - ' - ~^ ' - - ~ ^ - '
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| . , -.: ~
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| :1 . .
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| 1 .
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| i .[7590-01] ,
| |
| FOR FURTHER INFORMATICN CONTACT: Tom R. Allen, Chief, Regulatory Activ-
| |
| ' ities Section, Ofvision of Safeguards, Offica of Nuclear Matarial Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comefssion, Washington, CC 20555,
| |
| ; , telephone (301)427-4010.
| |
| 1 '
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| SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Commission experience during the implementa-
| |
| ,j ^
| |
| * tion of $ 73.55, " Requirements for Physical Protection of Licensed Activ-ities in Nuclear Power Reactors Against Radiological Sanctage," has indi-
| |
| ; cated a need to clarify the policy for the designation and protection of j
| |
| I A vital areas containing safety related equiement. 'Particular concern has been focused on ensuring that security measures do not impede plant safety.
| |
| Inspections have also indicated that cartain physical security equipment j' ,
| |
| is not now protected as vital, despf ta the fact that thf s equipment safe-
| |
| { } guards vital areas containing essential safety-related equipment. In
| |
| * 3 addition, experience with present requirements for key and lock controls 1
| |
| [j indicates that $ 73.55 can be modified to provide more flexibility in this area while saintaining adequata plant protection. The Ccamission believes
| |
| [f1 that the clarification and refinement of requirements, as reflected in - i p, ,
| |
| these amendments, is appropriata, because they afford the increased assur-anca of plant safety. A discussion of each of the amendments follows.
| |
| 1 i Clarification of Vf tal Area Oesicnation Polfev (Vital- Islands)
| |
| Section 73.55 now requires esca ifcensee to protect all. vital areas j
| |
| (areas in which radfological sabotage can be accomplished). Security 4
| |
| plans which designate these vital areas were originally accepted by the .
| |
| Cosumission on an intaris basis pending sita specific reviews *J verify
| |
| { these designations. Many site-specific reviews have been completed. The, i
| |
| results indicata that present $ 73.55 requirements may be unnecessarily strict in mancating protaction of all vital areas.
| |
| * Many vital areas are configured so that a sabotaur must entar m or g more areas in order to carry out successful radiological sanotage. In q
| |
| ] .
| |
| such cases, it is necassary to protect all of the areas in order to I thwart sanotage. The Commission is therefore considering adoption of a i i clariffed vital area designation policy whfen would reoutre protection
| |
| ; 06/27/82 2 Attacament I to Enclosurt C t
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| 9
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| _ ,,, . espump - ** %
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| 'f- * * ' '
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| . T i
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| i
| |
| -, - ,- , _,,-n--
| |
| -- - - , - - . , , - . , - - - , , . - -----,,-,-m-- ,,,.---,-r- - - - , , - , . e, ? . , , . -,,,.,-+,------,,er.--,.+,.-----y
| |
| | |
| . - -- . _ - - - = - - __ = .- ~. . .
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| 4 . .
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| (7590-01]
| |
| .i only to the extent necessar/ to interrupt sacotage. Licensees would be
| |
| * I, given considerable latitude to take advantage of existing barriers and
| |
| :J access control points. Cartain itans, however, would be deemed vital i l in all cases. These include ensita diesel generators and battaries j N
| |
| i,l (excluding electrical distribution systems), reactor containment, control
| |
| .1 rooms, central alarm station, and onsite water suppifes (excluding pfpf ng) q4 required for safe shut-down.
| |
| {
| |
| ,"1 i
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| Vital Island Protaction and Access Control 1 ,
| |
| j! On Merch 12, 1980, the NAC published proposed amendments to 10 CFR Part 73 pertaining to nuclear power plant vital access control N
| |
| j (45 FR 15937). Pubite comment was iavitad and received. The Commission
| |
| ' has significantly revised these requirements to assure adequata access j
| |
| j for safety purposes while accomplishing the safeguards obectives. Amend-monts to 10 CFR 73.55(d)(7) are now proposed that address both nonemer-j gene / and emergency access controls to vital istands.
| |
| 1 Revised nonemergene/ controis include (1) the estanitshment of up-to-
| |
| -), .
| |
| data nonemergency accass lists (2) a requirement that access control
| |
| -{ devices be retrieved free involuntarily tarsinated individuals prior to j
| |
| .{ ,
| |
| or simultaneously with their notiff. cation of termination, and (3) a
| |
| : t I.
| |
| requirement that uncontrolled exterior doors leading to vital islands be locked ud alarmed.
| |
| Vital island acesss controls during emergene/ conditions include
| |
| { (1) a requirement that 11"censees periodically review physical protection
| |
| ; j
| |
| ! and cont. gene / plans to insure that they do not conf 1f et with safety objectives, and (2) a requirement that Ilcansees develop procedures to j
| |
| faci 11tata emergency ingress and egress to vital islands (these proco-
| |
| { ,
| |
| dures would include provisions for back-up keys to vital istands and
| |
| ' ' methods of opening locked doors in the event of a concuter failure).
| |
| * Although the amendment to 10 CFR 73.55(d)(7) was suoject to a round of public comment, due to the significant rewording now ceing proposed, '
| |
| { .
| |
| the Commission is asking for additional comments.
| |
| i j 06/15/83 3 Attacament 1 to inclosure C
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| , . . . . _ _ . . . . - - - . =-
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| a
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| . . _ . . _< ~
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| g .
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| ~
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| [7590-01f
| |
| .. i 4
| |
| Authority to Suscend Safeauards Measures Ourina Emereencies
| |
| : i As a result of the Commission's review of potential conflicts I .5 between safeguards and safety requirements, consideration is being given to improving ifcansee's flexibility to respond to sita emergencies or
| |
| " unusual events." The Commission is proposing to revise 10 CFR 73.55(a)
| |
| ] to provide authority to Itcensees to suspend safeguards measures if
| |
| , . .; required to e-Mata emergency response. .
| |
| l 4
| |
| J Protection of Soecified Physical Security Ecutoment -
| |
| 4 Safeguards inspections have indicated that, in some cases, cartain
| |
| }q; security equipment does not appear to qualify for designation as vital
| |
| ] ~j .
| |
| equipment under 10 CFR 73.2(1). The sanotage of this equipment,could
| |
| } l significantly impact the security of the plant. For example, although 1
| |
| 10 CFR 73.55(e)(1) requires that the central alarm station be designated q.
| |
| as vital, there is no specific requirement that the emergency power and
| |
| }#j other support systans necessary for its operation be designated as vital
| |
| ; } equipment.
| |
| . 1i ~
| |
| . ' Accordingly, the Commission is considering requiring protection of
| |
| ] specified onsite physical secuMty equipment necessary for the proper .
| |
| ! 1 functioning of the security systas. This equipment will include second-
| |
| ; y ary power supplies for intrusion alarms and nonportable communications j j equipment. This action by the Commission is predicated on the belief
| |
| ; .j that this protection is necessary to achieve the general performanca
| |
| , -l requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(a).
| |
| I -l
| |
| '!)
| |
| t ,.
| |
| Key and t.ock Controls .
| |
| In a metter associated with access control, the Commission is con-i 4 sideHng amendment of 5 73.55(d)(9) to reduce unnecessary costa asso-
| |
| * 1
| |
| , ciated with key and lock controls. The present requirements call for ,
| |
| j ;
| |
| . key, lock, and combination changes when any employee who had a:cass to these devices is terminatad. '
| |
| s Experience, however, indicates that adequata protection could he i
| |
| 'l ootained by changing keys, locks, and comeinations (1) routinely on an i annual basis; (2) whenever a person's access authorization is revoked for i I s
| |
| l 1, 1 -
| |
| i - .
| |
| i 06/15/83 4 f Attacament 1 to inclosurs C 1 *t t
| |
| t u , . . .~.. ., . - - - --- -
| |
| ,c I _
| |
| | |
| -\
| |
| . I 1
| |
| C7sso-013 .
| |
| i 4
| |
| 4 reasons of lack of trustworthiness, reliability or inadequata performanca; I .
| |
| and (3) when compromise of locks is suspected.
| |
| PAPERWORK REDUCTION STATEMENT j
| |
| The proposed rule has been submitted to the Office of Management and l l l <; Sudget for clearance of the inforestion collection requirements that say he appropriata under the Paperwerk Reduction Act (Pub. Law 96'-511). The i .
| |
| 3F-83, " Request t'or Clearance," Supporting Statament, and related doctd 3
| |
| sentation submitted to CMS will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room
| |
| : 5 at 1717 H Street, W. , Washington, DC 20555. The material wf11 be avail-able for inspection or copying.
| |
| 3' .
| |
| 1 1 REGULATORY FLEXIBII.ITY CZRTIFICATICN i ';
| |
| l In accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C.
| |
| 605(b), the Ccamission hereby certifies that these proposed regulations
| |
| !, ; will not, if promulgated, have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of ses11 entities. These proposed regulations affect I !
| |
| i electric utilities that are dominant in their respective service areas
| |
| .and that own and operata nuclear power plants. These utilities do not i ; .all within the definition of small businesses set forth in Section 3 of the Small Business Act,15 U.S.C. 632, or within the Small Susiness size
| |
| ) . .
| |
| ( ,
| |
| Standards set forth in 10 CFR Part 121. These prooosed regulations wf11' 1 s affect some nuclear power industry contractors and vendors all of which
| |
| * l are large concerns which servics the industry, i i l
| |
| LIST OF SU5JECTS IN 10 CFR PART 73 Hazardous anterials-transportation, Nuclear materials, Nuclear
| |
| ' power planta and reactors, Penalty, Reporting requirements, Security j measures.
| |
| I i
| |
| i *
| |
| - For the reasons set out in th* preamste and under the authority of
| |
| ' the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorganization Act 5 of 1374, as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 553, notica is hereoy given that acon- i tion of the folicwing amenoments to 10 CFR Part 73 is contamolatad.
| |
| -1 i
| |
| t 06/16/83 5 Attachment 1 to inclosure C j ,
| |
| J ,
| |
| i 4 .
| |
| i .
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| ,__ m..._ , _ _ _ _ _ . _ . . . _ _ . . _ . . . _ _ _ , . . _ . _ , _ _ _ , _ . _ _ , _ , _ _ . . . . , . _ . , _ . . _ _ , _ . _ . , . . .. ~ ,.__..___,
| |
| | |
| s ?
| |
| (7590-01] .
| |
| 1 PART 73 - PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATE?tIALS t
| |
| I
| |
| 'j The authority citation for Part 73 is revised to read as fo11cws:
| |
| AUTHORITY:
| |
| 'd Secs. 53,161, 68 Stat. 930, 948, as amended, sec. 147, 94 Stat. 780 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2167, 2201); sec. 201, 88 Stat. 1242, as
| |
| "}j amended, sec. 204, 88 Stat. 1245 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5844).
| |
| Section 73.37(f) fs also isaued under sec. 301, Pub. L. 96-295, i 94 Stat. 789 (42 U.S.C. 5841 note). .
| |
| i
| |
| ~ For the purposes of sec. 223, 68 Stat. 954, as amended (42 U.S.C.
| |
| 2273); SS 73.21, 73.37(g), 73.55 are issued under sec.161b, 68 Stat. 948, 1 l as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(b)); 55 73.20, 73.24, 73.25, 73.25, 73.27, i
| |
| 73.37, 73.40, 73.45, 73.46, 73.50, 73.55, 73.67 are issued under sec.
| |
| 1811, 68 Stat. 949, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(f)); and 55 73.20(c)(1),
| |
| * l 73.24(b)(1), 73.26(b)(3), (h)(6), and (k)(4), 73.27(a) and (b), 73.37(f),
| |
| 73.40(b) and (d), 73.46(g)(6) and (h)(2), 73.50(g)(2), (3)(ift)(S) and
| |
| ., ') (h), 73.55(h)(2), and (4)(it t)(B), 73.70, 73.71, 73.72 are issued under sec. 181o, 68 Stat. 950, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(o)).
| |
| ! ,- {
| |
| t
| |
| : 2. In 5 73.2, paragraph (nn) is added to read as follows.
| |
| ..l
| |
| . 5 73.2 Definitions.
| |
| n a n n n j *(nn) " vital islands" are sets of vital areas in which sabotace ,
| |
| resultino in a sionificant radiolocical release or reactor core danace
| |
| , l ,
| |
| j or both cannot be accomoifsned without entW into at least one vital i
| |
| island. l I
| |
| ! ,i
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| ,; 3.
| |
| 4 In 5 73.55, the introductory paragraon, paragraan (a), para-i grsons (c)(1) and (c)(2), paragraohs (d)(7) and (d)(9), paragraohs (e)(1) j and (e)(3), and paragraphs (h)(4) and (h)(4)(f fi)(A) are revised to read ' '
| |
| ) as follows:
| |
| l l l 4
| |
| l i "Comparstive rule. Underlined text shows enanges between present and the newly proposed j text shows additions and dashed enrougn tax snows
| |
| ; deletions.
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| 1 C6/27/53 6
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| \
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| Attachment 1 :o Enclosurs C l 4 4
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| i '
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| 7
| |
| - +-,.,__,,--..,..m, . _ _ _ . , , . ,- , - - . . ,_-------.-r,- m- , . - -_ _.b-,-
| |
| , .-._ , . , . . , _ , _ _ _ _ _ .- , - . ~ . , . - - - - . . . . , - . _ . _ _ - - . . . - _ . -
| |
| | |
| (7590-01]
| |
| $ 73.55 Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in
| |
| . nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage.
| |
| Sv (120 davs frem the effective data of this amendment or 120 davs
| |
| ~
| |
| after recefot of a Commission orovided sita soeciffe vital area review.
| |
| whichever is later) each ifconsee shall submit orocosed amendments to his security olan which define how the amended vital fstand desicnation and orotection recufrements of earscrechs (a). (e)(1). (e)(2). (d)(2).
| |
| (d)(7) (d)(9). (e)(1) and (31. and (h)(a) will be met. Each submftta+
| |
| shall include a orecosed isolementation schedule for Commf ssion accroval.
| |
| The amended safecuards recufrements of these oarscrachs must be imoleme by the ifcensee within ISO favs after Commission accreval of the crocosed security otan in accordance with the amoreved senedule.
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| ~.
| |
| (a) General perfomance objective and requirements. The ifcansee
| |
| ~;
| |
| shall estabitsh and safntain an onsita physical protaction system and i
| |
| security organization which will have as its objective to provide high i
| |
| assuranca that activities involving special nuclear matarial are not inimical to the comman defense and security and do not constituta an unreasonable risk to the public health and safety. The physical protec-
| |
| * tion system shall be designed to protact against the design' basis threat
| |
| ' of radiological sabotage as stated in 5 73.1(a). To achieve this generst
| |
| - performanta objective, the onsite physical protection system and security
| |
| ~
| |
| organt:ation shall include, but not necessanity be Ifmited to, the cana .
| |
| bilities to meet the specific requirements contained in paragraphs (b) .
| |
| through (h) of this section. The Commission say authori:e an appifcant 2
| |
| or Itcensee to provide measures for protection against radiological sano-tage other than those required by this section if the applicant or licensee demonstratas that the sensures have the same high assurance i
| |
| oejective as specified in this paragraph and that the overs 11 level of systas perfor. nance provides protaction against radiological sabotage equivalent to that which would be provided by paragraohs (b) through (h) 1 of this section and meets the general perfor:nanca requirements of this
| |
| ; section.
| |
| Specifically, in the special cases of ifcensed coerating reac-tors with adjacant reactor power plants under construction; the if cansee
| |
| ~
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| 06/15/83 7 Attace. ment 1 to inclosurs C 4
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| s
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| _ _ . e,emge sseg a _
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| ~
| |
| | |
| i . ,
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| ,(7590-01[ -
| |
| 2 l
| |
| ..]
| |
| .1 ' shall provide and maintain a level of physical protection of the operating 4 reactor against radiological sabotage equivalent to the requirements of
| |
| ' this section. The site sueervisor or other indivioual desienated in the licansee's chvsical orotection clan shall have the authority to susoend t- any safecuards measure oursuant to this section if the susoension is necessarv to facilitate resoonse to amergency conditions, orovided that i
| |
| all safecuards measures are restored as soon as erscticable followine such an esercency. - -
| |
| n a n a n .
| |
| j 4
| |
| (c) Phvsical Barriers. (1) (the-ficensee shaff-feeste-vitsi equipment %4
| |
| ' thin s vitai-sres;-whichT-in-tur r--snaii-b_e-focstes withia i ,.. aated sce such-that-scesss-ts vitai equipment-rsquins i
| |
| passage-tn. 4 -ei. ' wast-two physicai-ber-fers-of safficient strength to-meet-tte ,..i .'orsance-requirements-of paragrepn-1!s)-ef-this-section-j Me.
| |
| 7.Lon one-vitai sree may-he-iocated within-s-singie protected sres-]
| |
| The licensee shall locate vital ecuioment within a vital area, whfeh in
| |
| ; turn shall be located within a orotected area. .One or more vital areas any constitute a vital island.
| |
| I. .
| |
| Access to vital islands must recuire Dassace throuch at least two ohvsical barriers of sufficient strencth to
| |
| { .
| |
| j . -
| |
| meet the cerformance recuirements of carscrach (a) of this section. More
| |
| .i than one vital island may be located within a sincie erotacted area.
| |
| The licensee shall orotect, as indeoendent vital islands, onsite altarnat-inq and direct current emeroency oower sources (excludino elec rical dis-1; A
| |
| tribution systems) recuired to earmit functioning of structures, svstems i and comoonents imoortant to safety, orimary reactor containment, the reac-ter control room, central alarm station. and onsite wate: suco11es (exclud-
| |
| * inc ofoino) recuired for achievino olant hot shut-down or het standbv.
| |
| (2) The physical barriers at the perimetar of the protectad area must be separated from any other barrier designated as a physical bar-ier for a vital Cares] island within the protected area.
| |
| = = = n n '
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| (d) Access requirements. ***
| |
| i (7) (The-ficansee-shafi positiveiy-eentroi sii points ef ;ersennei i and-vehicie-secess-int = vitai svens---Acesss-t= vitai-ersts-sesii-be.
| |
| fisited-ta-incividuais who-sre-suthori ed-scesss-to vitsi eeuipment und i
| |
| 06/15/83 8 Attac..:::ent 1 to Eclosure C
| |
| - . - . - n- .
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| ~~ -
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| ~ "
| |
| ,,,,,_,,n,y. > ,.,,,g__ _ _ _ + - ,
| |
| | |
| I ,
| |
| s .
| |
| -i ,
| |
| (7590-013
| |
| .I
| |
| ] '
| |
| ..e a w re-seen-scusss-to perform-their-duties--Aetheritstien-fer-scen individuais-shafi-be previded-ey-the-issonnee of specisify-codec-nameered j
| |
| hanges-indicating vi*ai srsss-te T.ictrse=3ss-is setherited-- Ae:sss-te vitai-sress-for-the purpose of genersi-fsmi443ritstion sne-etner-norrverk-
| |
| .i
| |
| .4 reisted-setivities-shaii-not-be-setherited-sxespt-for goce-enese snewn-to j
| |
| the-ficenseer--W.ws. ,.iee-vitai sress-shafi-be-focked-and protected-by
| |
| .. I en active-intrusion-siers-systeme] The 11eensee shall:
| |
| ,1 I (1) Establish an access authorization system to limit unescorted -- -
| |
| I access to vital islands durine nonemergency conditions to individuals. .
| |
| 5 who recuire access in order to cerform their duties. To achieve this
| |
| -)
| |
| the licensee must:
| |
| j (A) Estab11sh eur-ent authorization access lists for each vital island. The access lists eust be undated and reaccroved by the coeni-b v
| |
| tant licensee manacer or suoervisor at least everv 31 davs. The -
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| i
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| ' licensee shall include on the access If st oniv individuals wnese soecific duties require access to vital islands durino nonemercenev conditions.
| |
| j .
| |
| (B) 'Postively control, in accordance with the acesss Ifst estab-3 lished oursuant to carscraoh (d)(7)(1) of this section, all oeints of personnel and vehicle access to vital islands.
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| -t .
| |
| (C) Revoke, in the case of an individual's involuntarv termination j for cause, the individual's access authorization and retrieve his/her i
| |
| identification badce and other entrv deviess, as acolicable, erfor to or i simultaneous 1v with notifvine this individual of his/her termination.
| |
| (D) Lock and oretect by an active intrusion alarm system unoccuoied i
| |
| i vital islands and all exterior doors leadine to vital islands whfen are not otherwise controlled. ,
| |
| l' I (11) Desien the access authorization svstam to accornmodate the ooten-l tial need for raeid incress or ecress of individuals durine emercenev i conditions ce situations that could f eed to emereency conditiens. To I hele assur9 this, the licensee sust:
| |
| (A) Ensure oremot access to vital ecufement.
| |
| 3 (3) Periodically review chvsical securi w olans and contineenev i !
| |
| olans and crocedures to evaluate their cotantial imoact on olant and 3
| |
| j oorsonnel safety.
| |
| , = n =
| |
| * n =
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| i 1
| |
| 06/15/83 i i
| |
| 9 Attaenment 1 to Enclosurs C i 1
| |
| -. - - , - - - , - - - ,. ,. ,w, .- ,.w-- , - - , - - - - . - - - . - .--..,,,.----r_----,,.,,,,--.,..-,,,,,.,,-,n,,e-.-,.-,,,,,,,
| |
| | |
| .[7590-01] ,
| |
| (9) All keys, locks, concinations, and related equipment used
| |
| .] ' to control accass to protacted areas and vital [sress] istands must be
| |
| -l
| |
| ' controlled to reduce the probanility of comoremise. All such kevs. Iceks.
| |
| and comoinations must be chanced at least everv 12 months. Whenever
| |
| , j
| |
| *t there is evidence or susofeion that any key, lock, combination, or related equipment may have been compromised, it must be changed. [Wpen-termine-3 tien-ef ,.loyment-of-eny empicyeerkeysr-iecksreemeinationsrsad-refeted d., equipment-to whic.h-0.J.-J,.. h ? &ccess--sha44-be-c.ha;4.e.] g Ifcansee shall issue keys, locks, comoinations, and other access control
| |
| :.j devices to orotected areas and vital islands on1v to corsons who oossess
| |
| ] access authoritation in accordance with 4 73.56 of this cart. Whenever
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| ]
| |
| an individual's access authori:stion is revoked due to his or her lack '
| |
| of trustworthiness, reifability, or inadecuate work eerformance, keys, locks, combinations. and related ecufement to which that oerson had acesss *
| |
| . .' must be chanced.
| |
| * (e) Detection aids. (1) All alarms required purtuant to this part
| |
| ' aust annunicata in a continuously manned central alarm station located J within the protected area and in at least one other continously manned
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| * station (not necesserfiy] onsita, so that a single act cannat remove the l
| |
| * capability of calling for assistanca'or otherwise responding to an alarm.
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| [The-ensite es. J sian station shafi-he-censiderte s-ritsi sven sne a i*.s-weiisrecersr:3444ng--fica. , sne 3ny winee,s-in-g3e ,e433 snd-in j ti.. h. . -shaii-he-butiet-resisting-] The ensita central alarm station
| |
| * shall be located within a butiding such that the interior of the central
| |
| * alarm station is not visible from the perimeter of the protacted area.
| |
| This station shall not contain any operational activities that would j-interfere with the execution of the alarm response function. The walls.
| |
| doors. floor, and any windows in the walls and in the doors of the central -
| |
| 4
| |
| } alarv station shall be buitet resistino. On site secondarv cower suco1v systems for alars annunciator ecufement and non-cortable communciations i ecufement as recuired in caraorsch (f) of this sec*fon must be located
| |
| * within vital islands.
| |
| * *
| |
| * R *n n 1
| |
| ( .
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| t 06/15/83 10
| |
| ( Attachment i to Ecclosurs C l
| |
| l I
| |
| es one ***ye * * *" f1 **''**"***''***'
| |
| a ' **
| |
| - ~"***'
| |
| ,,y. .,%
| |
| } . t l ---__._:
| |
| | |
| (7590-01] .
| |
| i . (3) The licensee shall alarm all emergency exits in each protacted 1
| |
| and each vital Carte] island.
| |
| n n n n =
| |
| l (h) Response requirement. """
| |
| j (4) Upon detection of abnormal presenca of activity or persons or vehicles within an isolation tone, a protected area, material accass l'
| |
| area, or a vital Caree] island; or upon evidence or indication of intru-sion into a protected area, a satarial access area, or a vital Carte]
| |
| island, the licensee security organization must: '
| |
| a = = n =
| |
| (iii)
| |
| (A) Requiring responcing guards or other armed responsa personnel to interpose themselves between vital Caress] islands and material access areas and any adversary attempting entry for the purpose of radiological sabotage or theft of special nuclear material and to intercapt any person exiting with special nuclear matarial, and
| |
| . n n n
| |
| ! a a
| |
| : 4. In 5 73.70, paragraph (d) is revised to read as follows:
| |
| ~
| |
| 5 73.70 Records.
| |
| * n n = = n 1
| |
| (d) A log indicating name, bacge number, time of entry, reason for entry, and time of exf t of all individuals granted accass to a (nermaffy ,
| |
| u.--..,ied] vital Cares] island exceot those individuals entarine or t
| |
| exitinQ the reactor control recm.
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| * a n .
| |
| n n n I
| |
| Dated at Washington, DC, this day of
| |
| ! 1983.
| |
| For the Nuclear Requiatory Commission.
| |
| 1 Samuel J. Chilk,
| |
| . Secretary of the Commission. .
| |
| 06/15/83 11 At schment 1 to In:losura C
| |
| , e sr 4 -, -- ,-- , , , , - - -
| |
| | |
| .m.
| |
| ...~..-m.. . ,.u.-.w-' .1,. ..w......-,,..
| |
| . o t .
| |
| ;= 1 -
| |
| t
| |
| + !. - -
| |
| l i
| |
| ..
| |
| * r
| |
| ?
| |
| e t, . .
| |
| .f
| |
| .i l
| |
| 4 j t'
| |
| * i -
| |
| s
| |
| .i
| |
| .3
| |
| : .i. .
| |
| ATTACHMENT 2 TO THE l
| |
| l 3, MIscEuAMEDUS N3 ENCLOSURE (ENCL C) .
| |
| ORAFT REGU uTORY GUIDE 4
| |
| +
| |
| .i .
| |
| I e t
| |
| !' t t-t i .
| |
| i =
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| l l
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| l 1
| |
| I i
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| 06/16/83 Attachment 2 o Enclosure C I
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| e l+
| |
| i i
| |
| ! F#N N PN' _ . _
| |
| ~
| |
| -*TS**- ,
| |
| ., , . . - , ,. . ..s,., , . , .. -~, ~.e,,-r,-.-,-- - . _ , , , . . - - . , , - , - - , ,,,_,,,,n,~.,., - n, , , ~ , . . , , - - , . , , - - - - -
| |
| | |
| - . . - _ . . ~ . . , _ _ . . _ . . . . . . . . . . . . .
| |
| .t t . .
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| 2 f.
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| s 4
| |
| f I
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| GUIDANCE FOR MISCELLANECUS AMENDMENTS 7010 CFR 73.55 1
| |
| i
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| ?
| |
| t I
| |
| h t
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| G 9
| |
| 4 06/15/83 Attace. ment 2 to I:: closure C
| |
| _ _ _ . _ . . . . . . ~ . . . _ _ _ . . . _ - . _,
| |
| _ - . . - -. c,
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| | |
| .. . : . ._ ~ .
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| -i t
| |
| TABLE OF CONTENTS Pace I.
| |
| : INTRODUCTION................................................... 1 Ir. vITAt AasA DESIaNAT10N.........................................
| |
| 1 A.
| |
| B.
| |
| Introduction...................... .......................
| |
| Vital 1 Islands..................... ....................... 2
| |
| : 1. Description...........................................
| |
| : 2. Independant Vital 2 Islands.............................
| |
| : 3. . Openings in Vital Area Sarriers (Excluding Doors).....
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| 4 4 5
| |
| : Temporary Vi ta 11:ation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
| |
| : 5. Time-Cependent vital Islands (Spent Fuel Pools).......
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| 6 6
| |
| i ,
| |
| III. VITAL ISLAND ACCESS CCNTR0LS................................... 7 A.
| |
| i No n-Er.o rgency Contro l s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
| |
| : 1. Access
| |
| - 2. Lists......................*....................
| |
| Logging Requi rements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
| |
| 7
| |
| : 3. 7
| |
| : 4. Revocation of Access Authori zation. . . . . . . . . . . . ..... . . . . . .7 Locks, Alanas, and Emergency Controls for Uncontroll ed Exterior Doors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8.
| |
| 3.
| |
| Physical Protection Plan and Contingency Plan Interfsca... 8 1.
| |
| Periodic Review of Security and Contingency P]ans..... 10 a.
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| C ross Trai ni ng. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2.
| |
| Facilitate Emergency Access to Vital Islands.......... 10
| |
| , a. Access to Keys. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
| |
| : b. ................. 11 c.
| |
| Access Codes..................... . .... 11 Los s of Electrical Power. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............ ......... 11 IV. AUTHORITY TO SUSPENO SECURITY
| |
| . MEASURES......................... 12 A.
| |
| : 3. Sita Suoervisor or Other Designated Official. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Controis That Can be Suspended Durin i
| |
| C. Us e of Es co rts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . g Eme rgenci e s . . . . . 13 ....
| |
| . ...................... 13 V. PROTECTION OF SECURITY SUIPMENT............................... 13 VI. KEYS AND LCCKS................................................. 14 APPENDIX A.......................................................... 15 i Attac.iment 2 to Enclosure C ;
| |
| l l
| |
| s c --- ,
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| | |
| , , _, _ . . _ . . . .__ . _ - " - - - ~'
| |
| e . . .
| |
| I . .
| |
| ' f
| |
| , . I. INTRODUCTICM i l
| |
| The Miscellaneous Related Amencments published in (FR ) are casigned to clarify safeguards policy for power reactors on: (1) vital area i
| |
| designations (vital island approach); (2) wital island access control during I emergency and nonemergency situations; (3) protection of certain physica; security equipment; and (4) key and lock controls. These revised requirements have been developed in order to clarify and/or modify certain existing physical protection requirements.
| |
| The amendments have been designed to foster plant
| |
| } safety while saintaining adequate safeguards.
| |
| This guida presents approaches for implementing the amendments indicated above with an emphasis or, minimizing the safeguards imcact on safety.
| |
| II. VITAL. AREA DESIGNATION A. Introduction f
| |
| ' The NRC's principle requirements with respect to the protection of items of I
| |
| vital equipment at nuclear power reactors are found in l'0 CFR Part 73, " physical Protaction of Plants and Matarials." These recuirements are aimed at safeguard-ing against sacotage that could cause a radiological release.
| |
| Section 73.55 has undergone significant revision, particularly paragraph (d) wnich has been
| |
| } amended to incorporate the new vital island cancept. At most power reactor facilities, this revised c:ncept should result in a reduction in the numcer of .
| |
| vital areas by grouping and protecting selecte'd items of vital equipment in larger areas referred to as " vital islands." In the protection of vital islands, the licensee should remain alert to any substantial adverse impacts on safety creatad by safeguards requirements and initiate corrective actions necessary to fastar the safety of the plant, its personnel and the public. -
| |
| , 1 C6/'.5/S3 1.
| |
| Attsce. ment 2 to Enclosure C I I
| |
| I i
| |
| -w -
| |
| _i
| |
| | |
| . . . .. ....... . ~.
| |
| a
| |
| ~
| |
| , t I B. Vital Islands
| |
| .1 '
| |
| 4
| |
| : 1. Descriotion
| |
| }l 4
| |
| g As provided in 5 73.2(h), a vital area is "any area whica contains vital equip-i' ment. "
| |
| Further, vital islands, according to S 73.2(nn), "are sets of vital J.! ; areas in which sabotage resulting in a significant radfological release or 1
| |
| i reactor core damage or both cannot be accomplished without entry into at least one vital island."
| |
| i Appifcation of the vital island concapt allows safeguarcs ceasures to be
| |
| .! developed by:
| |
| i 9' a.
| |
| Identifying only selected vital areas (or f tams of vital equipment) -
| |
| ,{
| |
| that require protection, thus providing flexfhility in vital island j configuration.
| |
| 1
| |
| -t
| |
| ] b.
| |
| *rotacting colocated ftans of this selected vital equipment using existing 1
| |
| physical barriers to the maximum extant possible. ,
| |
| 'k The first point recogni::es that in most instancas a significant radfological j
| |
| release (typically excaeding 10 CFR Part 100 criterial) is possible only i
| |
| 1 through the concurrent, failure or sabotage of two or more f tams of vital equip-a ment.
| |
| ~4 This pensits the protection within vital islands of selected itams of 1
| |
| ~ equipment which could result in a significant release or could interrupt the .
| |
| t sabotage chain; The following helps to illustrata this concept, 1
| |
| "I
| |
| '1
| |
| .i l 'Part 100.11 critaria specify referenca values to be used in the evaluation of -
| |
| ; reactor sitas with respect to potential reactor accidents of excaedingly low 4
| |
| probability of occurrence and low risk of pubife exposure to radiation. Those 8 reference values are a total radiation dose in excess of 25 rem whole-body i dose or a total radiation dose in excess of 300 rem to the thyroid from fodine exoosure.
| |
| j (Based on a 2-hour exposure time commencing immediately followjng
| |
| ; the onset of the postulatad fission product releasa.)
| |
| l 06/27/a3 2 l 4
| |
| Attachment 2 to Enclosure C e
| |
| 1 e
| |
| 9
| |
| _ _ q =e s* M .
| |
| _a.~_s_,
| |
| ,> .*9W 88"F. i
| |
| - , - I e -' ~
| |
| b ' ' "
| |
| - - - ~
| |
| | |
| I '
| |
| l i
| |
| i j , SE VITAL C::NPONENTS A Vs Ys Vs
| |
| ''i l
| |
| , j B Vs V, j l
| |
| i C V,
| |
| 'Is ,
| |
| 'i
| |
| ~
| |
| O V. V, V, l
| |
| I j In the illustration above, V represents vital components, the sabotage of which would produca a significant radiological release or core damage. Eaca i
| |
| set shows a chain of vital equipment a sabotaur must tamper with, damage, or
| |
| ' destroy to produca such an effect. As the illustration shows, protaction of equipment. located in Vs interrupts sabotage chains A, 8, and C. Similiarly, 7
| |
| i the protection of equipment located in V, intarruots' sabotage path 0. The e vital island concapt provides the option of protacting only these tw loca-ions and defining one vital island containing them both or incorporating each location within other separata vital islands, whichever is the most effective.
| |
| This contrasts with the philosophy of protacting Vs through V a as vital areas.
| |
| +
| |
| As noted in point B above, the vital island concept also permits the maximum use of existing barriers and accass control points. ~
| |
| Vital island designations should be directed toward minfreizing the opportunity to c mmit sabotage.
| |
| The NRC will be conducting studies on each reactor facility to identify items '
| |
| 4 i of equipment cansidered vital. The rationale for this selection will be dis-cussed with Itcansees for their use in the configuration and designation of 06/.7/83 3 Attacnmen 2 to Enclosure C
| |
| | |
| l .
| |
| .' . t j vital islands. The licansee should then be ante to designata vital islands that:
| |
| 1 a.
| |
| I-Ensure that an adversarf would encounter the vital island protaction system in attempting to cause a successful offsite release of radiation;
| |
| ~.
| |
| i
| |
| ,~ b.
| |
| Minimize unnecassary access to vital equipment and minimize the amount I
| |
| ? of nonvital equipment located within vital islands;
| |
| . c. .
| |
| Facilitate the accountability of personnel access to vital islands; l
| |
| I d.
| |
| Reduce obstacles to ranid emergency ingress and egress; and
| |
| : e. Utilize existing barriers to the extant practicable. .
| |
| ; 2. Indeoendent Vital Islands
| |
| } l j The Commission requires that certain areas and equipment be maintained as independent vital islands to provide protection against the insider threat. '
| |
| i They are as follows:.
| |
| 1 j a.
| |
| Diesel generators or other onsite AC power sources and principle safety-related CC power sourcas (excluding electrical distribution systems).2 e This would require that all diesel generators and batteries connected 'a
| |
| : class 1E loads should be protected as independant vital islands.
| |
| ,! b. Primary contafnment.
| |
| .I j
| |
| ; c. Control room. .
| |
| ; d. Cantral alarm station.
| |
| ., , ~
| |
| l 1
| |
| 8 i ' ensita Electrical systems need not be protected unless designated as such by an analysis.
| |
| 1 i l l
| |
| j 06/15/83 4 Attac$ ment 2 to Enclosure C l
| |
| i l t
| |
| -.g..
| |
| . - .; - 1 :- _ , m,
| |
| , . . .- rs . - . . . - : ww
| |
| | |
| }. _ . , .. . . . . .-. ~ - ~ - - - ~ ~ ~ ~-*~ " ~
| |
| e.
| |
| Onsite water sourca required to achieve and maintain hot shutdown or hot standby. This would entafl the protection of the primarf water sourca for at least one of the systams necessary to mitigata an anticipated opera-tional occurrence as defined in 10 CFR part 50, Appendix A. This would include those conditions of nonsal operation which are expected to occur l
| |
| one or more times during the life of the nuclear power unit and include l but are not limitad to loss of power to all recirculation pumps, tripping of the turofne generator set, isolation of the main condenser, and loss cf all offsite power. If thfs onsite water source is protected as part of" q
| |
| '
| |
| * primary containment, then it need not be protected as an independent vital island.
| |
| 3.
| |
| Coenines in Vital Island Bar-iers (Excludine Doors)
| |
| ] According to 5 73.55(c)(1), "The licensee shall locata vital equipment within a vital area, which in turn shall be locatad within a protectad area. One or more vital areas may constituta a vital island. Access to vital islands must require passage through at least two physical barHers of sufficient strength to meet the performance requirements of paragraph (a) of this section."
| |
| Accordingly, all openings in the vital island barrier that exesed 96 square inches 8
| |
| ' and are greater than 6 inches one way, such as ventilation fans, venti-lation ducts, canieways, and pipe pass-throughs, that lead to an area accas-sible from outside the vital island should be specially protected. In addf-
| |
| ; j tion, the barrier should be constructed of matarf ais that provida delay to
| |
| -forced entry. Such materials should be resistant to cutting, dH11fng, and ~
| |
| puncture by small hand tools or tool substitutes.
| |
| Any such opening into a vital island should meet the minimum level of penetra-tion resistanca of the vital island barrier itself, so as not to lessen the overall integrity of that barrier.
| |
| Examples of hardening techniques are descM bed in Appendix A. These techniques l serve as guide 11nes for several cost-effective ways of increasing penetration "Extrac.ac from American National Standard, ANSI /ANS-3.3-198':, with permis-sion of the publisher, the American Nuclear Society.
| |
| I j C5/15/83 5 Attacnment 2 to inclosure C
| |
| | |
| .__-- l .
| |
| 1 *
| |
| * I resistanca time without impairing the function of an opening. Other techniques 2
| |
| are acceptable, as long as the opening is at least hardened to the level of the weakest part of the barrier.
| |
| 4 The licensee should also ensure that safety systams are not c:mpromised by such barriers. '
| |
| ll
| |
| .; 4. Temocrarv Vitalization i
| |
| 4 The protection of only one part of a redundant safety system poses an inherent d
| |
| 'i weakness when, due to maintenance, repair, or replacament, a 11cansee r.:.; longer reites on the protected primary systam, but instead rsifes on a secondary, '
| |
| unprotected system. The secondary system would automatically bscome vital j because it would then perform a given safety function exclusively. In some -
| |
| } instancas, however, the redundant systas may lack the necessary physical barriers i
| |
| and access control equipment.
| |
| j The 11cansee should have the capability to pro-tact secondary systans which aut:matica11y bec:me vital in the event companion
| |
| } (primarf) vital equipment ceases operation.
| |
| 4 E
| |
| -i .
| |
| ;, 5.
| |
| Time-Decondent vitai Islands (Scent Fuel Dcois)
| |
| Spend fuel pools are currently provided vital protaction in accordanca with 5 73.55.
| |
| 2 However, it is recogni:nd that the radiation levels of spent fuel decay rapidly after removal from the reactor core and eventually do not 1
| |
| .] require vital protaction because the potential for a Part 100 release it ,
| |
| i remota. ,
| |
| Accordingly, undar an alternata safeguards appreach, spent fuel pools
| |
| ... .]' could be included in vital islands during that period when the spent fuel pools t
| |
| 1, pose a threat to public health and safety. Aftar this initial period, ifcansees l
| |
| would have the option of relaxing the spent fuel pool safeguards.
| |
| 1 l .
| |
| i e .
| |
| . .J i
| |
| 1* l
| |
| ' I -
| |
| . l 1
| |
| l .
| |
| e C6/21/83 5 At.acnment 2 :: Enclosurs C l
| |
| b i
| |
| t 1
| |
| % .. p , . - - - . . , . . -.-w-====- .
| |
| * * ' ~* '
| |
| . .DT
| |
| , _ _ , , . . m.- - .~- ---
| |
| | |
| , , q ., , . __ "~ ' '~ ''~ '" ''
| |
| s O s .
| |
| * I .- .
| |
| y .
| |
| III. VITAL ISLAND ACCESS CONTROLS
| |
| : [
| |
| A. Non-Emercency Controls i
| |
| The following are access requirements for power reactor ifcensees operating under routine conditions.
| |
| : 1. Access Lists Paragraph (d)(7)(f)(A) of 5 73.55 requires that the ifcansee establish current authorization access lists for each vital island. The accass list should be -
| |
| updated and reapproved by the cognicant licensee manager or s'ucervisor at least ever/ 31 days. The access Ifst should only include those individuals .
| |
| ' whose duties requin that they have access to the specific vital island during routine operations.
| |
| ', Cartain accass controls may be suspended during emergene/
| |
| or abnormal plant conditions, so that the list would be unnecessary under these cire.ststancas. Therefore, the names of emergency response personnel need not be on the list. "*
| |
| ?
| |
| ; 2. Leccine Recuirements
| |
| * i.
| |
| Licansees are required to keep a log that indicatas name, badge number, time of entr/, reason for entr/, and time of exit of all individuals granted accass to a vital island. The intent is to maintain a record of personal access and egress for each specific vital island. This may be accomolished througn the .
| |
| use of computer-centro 11ed access devices. A separata log doc:nnenting -
| |
| personnel accass/ egress for the reactor control room is not required.
| |
| k
| |
| : 3. Revocation of Acesss Authori:ation t
| |
| ' In accordanca with 5 73.55(d)(7)(f)(c), the Ifeensee should revoke an indf-vidual's accass authorication and retrieve that individual's fa.ntification badge and other entr/ devicas, as appifcable, prior to or sfmultaneously wi,th notifying this individual of his/her termination, wnen the termination is involuntar/ and for cause. The individual should also be provided with an 06/15/83 7 Attactment to inclosure C f 'I
| |
| | |
| e s
| |
| . r
| |
| : c. .
| |
| o '
| |
| i escort to ensure prompt exit from the sita. This provision is intanded to 7.j ''
| |
| reduca opportunities for disgruntled individuals to have ac: ass to the reactor
| |
| .] '
| |
| facility.
| |
| i 1
| |
| > a 4.
| |
| :1. l.ock. Alarms, and Emereency controis for Uncontrolled Extarier Ocors 5
| |
| =J In the interest of controlling accass to vital islands in the ac:caglishment of 21 u ~
| |
| the safeguards objective,10 CFR 73.55(d)(7)(1)(0) requires that the ifcensee
| |
| " Lock and protect by an active intrusion alarm systaa unoccupied vital f. stands
| |
| ..j and all exterior doors leading to vital islands which are not otherwise con-trolled." Exterior doors will be intarpreted as doors on butidings which con-tain a vital island or islands (sunshine dears). See the illustration on '
| |
| page 9.
| |
| ! The licensee should protect a vital island by maintaining locks and alarms on all doors that are not attanded ac:ess control points. Acceptable critaria for the use and selection of casunercially avatiable locks are found in Requiatory
| |
| ] ; Guide 5.12, " General Use of Locks in the Protection and Control of Facilities i
| |
| and Special Nuclear Materials." Descriptions of various surface protection alarms in addition to guidanca on tasting and maintaining alarm systems can be
| |
| .; found in NUREG-0320, *Intarior Intrusion Alarm systems."
| |
| The ficansee should install " panicahardware and estaclish procedures that permit rapid and orderly egress from vital islands in the event of an emergency.
| |
| j a situation. Emergency exit doors that have " panic hardware should be alarmed
| |
| ,' to the central alarm station in arcer to monitor usage of suca doors.
| |
| f j S. Phvsical Protection Plan and Contincency Plan Interfaca Paragrach (d)(7)(ii) of 5 73.55 specifies that tne licenses snail "de' sign ene
| |
| ' access authori:ation system to accommodata the potential need for rapid ingress '
| |
| or egress of individuals during emergency conditions or situations that could lead to emergency conditions." In order to faciiftata ingress / egress during such conditions, the licensee should conduct periodic reviews of security And i
| |
| contingency plans and ensure prompt ac ass to vital equipment.
| |
| l 06/15/83 3 Atitenment 2 to Enclosure C i
| |
| i y -- . .py-e.-= " ***
| |
| , s
| |
| *- . ** t ' ...-m-~ uN 9 - _.
| |
| | |
| . ... . .. . . . . . ~ . .
| |
| -4 , .
| |
| e I *
| |
| ~~
| |
| 1 -
| |
| .i , EXTERIOR 000R ILLUSTRATION
| |
| : j. HYPOTHETICAL CONFIGURATION 2
| |
| 1 -1 i
| |
| MOTECTED .4REA FENCE
| |
| 't .
| |
| l
| |
| .I h:aMor Ccce i 1
| |
| \
| |
| 1
| |
| ! \ '
| |
| I r
| |
| i -
| |
| i Vf:21 Island
| |
| --- h aMce Ccor 2
| |
| _\
| |
| Vital
| |
| .. 6:sMce Ocor ---- Island . Vital Island
| |
| / -
| |
| h:ance Ccce C*
| |
| l
| |
| | |
| . o
| |
| , 1
| |
| ~ .
| |
| ~
| |
| 1 .
| |
| i il
| |
| : 1. Periodic Review of Security and Contineency Plans
| |
| .1 Paragraph (d)(7)(ii)(B) of 5 73.55 requires that the licensee "periodies11y
| |
| ,}
| |
| review physical security plans and contingency plans and procedures to evaluata j their potential impact on plant and personnel safety." The ifcensee should (j
| |
| conduct such review annually to ensure that security procedures do not nega-
| |
| ] tively impact the procedures outifned for emergency or annormal conditions.
| |
| i t.fcansees should also review the plans any time changes are made which could
| |
| 'j affect plant or personnel safety or when the ficansee becomes aware of a proca-
| |
| : f. dure which could impact safety. 1.fcansees say use the Plant Operations Review 1
| |
| Committee (PCRC), quality assurance audit programs, corrective actfon report-1 ing systems or other appropriata programs to monitor the potential. for safety /
| |
| j security impacts.
| |
| i .
| |
| ; a. Cross Training i
| |
| 4 j
| |
| -i Interfaca problems between security and operations are reduced when the respec-j tive staffs are made aware, through cross-training and indoctrination, of the '
| |
| roles, responsibilities and general practicas of both organizations. The '
| |
| , Itcansam should provide personnel witn exposure to the other organizations.
| |
| l i 2.
| |
| Facilitate Emereenev Ac: ass to vital Islands i
| |
| ! i I During emergency or annormal conditions, it may be necessary for certain i ( Ifcensee personnel to gain quick access to vital equipment in order to mitigate -
| |
| I i or terminata scoe adverse plant condition. Also, it is important *4 ensure that personnel can quickly egress vital islands if the emergency condition j f results in high radiation or other dangerous conditions within the vital island.
| |
| i j Thus, 5 73.55(d)(7)(ti)(A) requires that licensees ensure promet accass to j vital equipment during emergency or abnormal conditions. Licensees can provide for rapid ingress / egress during such conditions by providing back-up keys to i
| |
| : vital istands and methods of opening locked doors in the case of computar or *
| |
| ] power failure.
| |
| E l -
| |
| 3
| |
| ~
| |
| 06/15/83 10 Attacament 2 to Enclosure C i
| |
| i 8
| |
| .=. - . , . . a. .n : . .- -x: - ~; - ''
| |
| '* " ~ '
| |
| | |
| l 4
| |
| : a. Access to Keys In the event of an emergency or abnormal condition at a power reactor, it may be necessary for cartain personnel, particularly an operator, be assured
| |
| }
| |
| prompt access to vital islands or equipment. To facilitate access, operating '
| |
| personnel should be provided with access keys necassary to open doors which are locked for security or other purposes.
| |
| : b. Access Codes .
| |
| It has been observed that the use of individual manually entared identifica- .
| |
| tion codes hamper ingress due to mistaken entries, poor memories, etc. In order to minimi:e the impact on safety by assuring promot accass, the use of
| |
| ! Individual manually entered codes in vital area access control systams is not required or rec:ausended by the NRC.
| |
| 3 1
| |
| .'. c. Loss of Electrical Power la order to facilitiata safety, the ifcansee should provide for raafd ingress /
| |
| .1 egress during a conicutar or power , outage. Upon loss of electrical power, if j
| |
| intarior vital island doors are not specifically required by the ifcansee's l
| |
| Physical Protection Plan to fafi in the closed position, procacures should be established which provida for prompt compensatory measures in opening locked
| |
| .i doors.
| |
| The following are acceptable procedures for providing for safe ingress /
| |
| egress during a power or comoutar outage:
| |
| ; 1.
| |
| ' Have locks fail open during an outage or emergency and have guards dep'loyed to monitor ingress / egress.
| |
| 2.
| |
| Utili:e an unintarructible power suoply system for electrical locking -
| |
| devices.
| |
| 4 3.
| |
| ' ~ Provide keyed bypass locks for vital islands and ensure that all necessarf personnel have keys. ~
| |
| i 06/15/83 11 At.acament 2 o belosure C 9
| |
| - - - . -9 . . - - . ,
| |
| , - . - ,. -v- --- - - - - - ,,v.
| |
| | |
| g .
| |
| 4 Install crash (" panic") bars on doors which should then be alarmed for
| |
| .j' emergency ingress / egress.
| |
| -l 1
| |
| 1 1 IV. AUTh0RITY TO SUSPEND SECURITf MEASURES
| |
| ...9.-
| |
| 4 Paragraph (a) of 5 73.55 statas, in part, that "the sita supervisor or other 3 individual designated in the ifcensee's physical protection plan shal; have the j authority to suspend any safeguards measures pursuant to thf s section if such
| |
| .i suspension is necessary to facilitate response to emergency conditions, pro .
| |
| j .
| |
| -! vided that all safeguards measures are restored as soon as practicable follow-
| |
| ';.j ing such emergency.'' This flexibility will accommodata the potential need for J rapid response to emergency or abnormal conditions.
| |
| c'
| |
| -j A.
| |
| t Site Suoervisor or Other Desienated Official -
| |
| .(
| |
| 1 The licensee should specify in its physical security or contingency plan, by title, the individual responsible for relaxing security requirements during .
| |
| .l
| |
| ~i emergency or abnormal conditions. This individual should typically be the i
| |
| site supenisor. The plan should also specify a chain of responsibility for
| |
| * l suspension of safeguards requirements in the event that the first designated
| |
| * individual fs unavailable.
| |
| * The authority to suspend safeguards measures should only be exercised when sita conditions are or may soon pose a danger to public health and safety 1 which would result unless the controis are suspended. Relaxation of security i ,
| |
| measures should be only to the extant necessary to accomplished the emergency
| |
| 'i situation. In instances where an internal emergency exists which would not j result in harm to public health and safety, but has the potantial of endanger-I .
| |
| ing plant personnel, accass controls can also be suspended. Such conditions would include fire onsita, sudden emoloyee health problems, e.g. , heart attack,
| |
| 'etc. Each instance in which safeguards requirements are suspended without "
| |
| approved compensatory measures aust be reported to the NRC under the provi-sfons of 10 C.*R 73.71(c), as an event that lessens the effectiveness of
| |
| $ safeguards.
| |
| .i
| |
| ! 06/07/83 l
| |
| * 12 Attac . ment 2 to Enclosure C l
| |
| I
| |
| ' .t
| |
| -.=e*===w-=.*.-?r*
| |
| .?'*. ;=*- . -..;--
| |
| f
| |
| | |
| m ,
| |
| .]' .
| |
| 1
| |
| ' 8.
| |
| 1 Controls That Can be Suscended Ourine Emercenefes I
| |
| j The types of c=ntrols that would be suspended in an emergency afgnt include,
| |
| .] but are not ifmitad to the following:
| |
| 3
| |
| :t 1 a.
| |
| 4 sj Search and identification of personnel as specified in 5 73.55(d)(1),
| |
| ] b.
| |
| Search of handcarried items as specified in 5 73.55(d)(2),
| |
| 4
| |
| ~.1 c. Search of vehicles required by 5 73.55(d)(4),
| |
| 4
| |
| ~'
| |
| d.
| |
| i Usa of a badge identification system as required by 5 73.55(d)(5),
| |
| >.j e. .
| |
| ss y; Registration of personnel as specified in S 73.55(d)(6), and
| |
| '!; l f.
| |
| . ; Access controls for vital islands as required by 5 73.55(d)(7).
| |
| i
| |
| ; . C. Use of Escorts i.
| |
| q' In the event safeguards centrols are suspended, the licensee should use escorts ta the extant possible.
| |
| Offsite responsa personnel should be escartad by desig-natad licansee personnel with operable two-way radio communications to the central and secondary alarm stations.
| |
| C At least one escort should accomoany .
| |
| 1 each emergency vehicle, and all offsita emergency response personnel should be
| |
| ' in view of the escort at all times unless so doing would constituta a danger to the escort.
| |
| For the purpose of this document, an escort is defin=d as a member of the sacurity organi::ation or other designated individual responsible for
| |
| * accompanying those personnel not allowed unescartad accass within a protactad area.
| |
| An escort is not required to possess a tachnical knowledge of the plant's procasses or equipment. >
| |
| s V.
| |
| PROTEC7 ION OF SECURITY EQUIPMENT i
| |
| Paragraph (e)(1) of 5 73.55 recuires, in part, that the licansee locata ensita secondary power supply systems for alarm annunciation ecufpment in vital 05/15/83 13 Attachment 2 to Snclosure C
| |
| ~
| |
| __ _ ._.._ _...... . . _ _ - - - . - . . ~ . _ - .. --a
| |
| +
| |
| r_* - ~v--- -- - - - - - - - - -- ,
| |
| | |
| ') . .
| |
| islands.
| |
| Protection of these itams of equipment is necassary to reduca vulner-
| |
| ):f ' abilities in the system because their sabotage c uld signf ficantly imcact the 1
| |
| ?
| |
| r safeguards of a plant. Therefore, licensees should include these piecas of .
| |
| equipment in vital islands.
| |
| T
| |
| --) VI. KEYS ANO LOCKS >
| |
| 11 1
| |
| lj .
| |
| Paragraph (d)(9) of 5 73.55 requires, in part, that keys, locxs,' c:moinations, d.
| |
| and relatad equipment must be controlled to reduca the probabfif ty of compromise.
| |
| } To accomplish this objective, the ifcansee should change all keys, locks, and
| |
| .i combinations at least annually or whenever there is evidence or suspicion that
| |
| )d any key, lock, c mbination; or relatad equipment have been c:mprcmised. Such j suspicion may be intarpretad as the reasonable belief that compromisa has
| |
| '1 .
| |
| occurred even though physical evidence has yet to be uncovered. Changes should
| |
| 'l: also be made whenever a person who had access to protacted areas or vital islands is tarminated for cause.
| |
| ]
| |
| g, 21 Keys, combinations and other access control devices should only be issued to those individuals possessing an unescorted access authorization in ac:fordance with 5 73.56.
| |
| .1 1
| |
| 1
| |
| * 4
| |
| _.k.
| |
| I i -
| |
| .1 1
| |
| i -
| |
| 4
| |
| ..g i
| |
| 1 .
| |
| 1
| |
| .j -
| |
| i 4 .,
| |
| s .
| |
| i 06/16/33 14 Attachment 2 to Enclosure C l
| |
| i*
| |
| -y__
| |
| -~. 7 ~ ,,
| |
| m
| |
| . . - . m.,,
| |
| ,e -
| |
| | |
| . :a
| |
| ~ -. ..
| |
| . s 2 e I
| |
| a
| |
| .i d
| |
| ' '. .!' 1 APPENDIX A" 8.3 a
| |
| .i i..
| |
| R Techniques 1 and 4 excerpted from NUREG/CR-1378, "Harcaning Existing strategic Special Nuclear Material Storage Facfif ties," June 1980.
| |
| 06/1S/83 ,a-At.acraent 2 to Enclosure C l e l
| |
| | |
| \
| |
| e . .
| |
| Technique No. 1 Hardenino Ocenino in Cafline or Wa11
| |
| ..i -
| |
| 1 EXISTING STRUCTURE - Opening in Cafling or Wall 1
| |
| ii i j
| |
| J TOOLS REQUIRED FOR POETRATION - Depends on existing opening )
| |
| i nj PENETRATION TIME - Depends on existing opening
| |
| .t
| |
| ; HAR0 GING ACTION
| |
| '.~;) 1. Add strong steel jamb to opentng I
| |
| 5 2.
| |
| j Fors 3 separata gratas by welding #4 or #5 rebar into 6" grids. *
| |
| 'j..
| |
| Weld gratas to inside cantar and outar ifps or jame. (Another .
| |
| method is to weld 6 separata layers of robar alternating vertical and horizontal and offset from each other.)
| |
| g INCREASED P SETRATION RESISTANCE TIME - Approximataly 15 ainutas
| |
| : j. ADDITIONAL PGETRATION TOOLS REQUIRED - Boltcutters .
| |
| ADVANTAGES OF TECiNIQUE -
| |
| ~
| |
| -j 1. Multiple layers to penetrata j 2. ,
| |
| Delay time can be increased by of ther increasing size of rebar or
| |
| -4
| |
| ' numbers of rebar.
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| ,1 l S l I 06/21/83 16 Attachment 2 to inclosure C I
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| Di AGR AM 1 - liasslaning Opening la Ceiling as Wall -
| |
| 1 1
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| t EXISTING SilillCIIAHE . IIAllDENED ETH4)CIljilE *
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| , SiOE VIEW -
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| SIDE VIEW END Oft TOP VIEW .
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| i EMAMPIE flEPHESENIS A i 22** a 24" OPENING CLOSEll 18P WIIll NO. 4 IIEllAll NO. 4 014 NO. 6 HEHAH P
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| Pflafill A110N inESISl ANCE IlME PENE Til ATION HESIS TANCE IIME k
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| '; ' Technique No. 2 Hardenine a Duct in Caflinc or Wall Where Air Flew is Aecu1 rec EXISTING STRUCTURE - Duct cpening in cailing or wall where air flew is required j
| |
| a TCOLS REQUIRED FOR POETRATION - Depends on existing epening
| |
| ;ij PS ETRATION TIME - Depends on existing opening
| |
| ?; -
| |
| HARD BING ACTION
| |
| .> Y d 1.
| |
| ; Construct duct to desired size by welding together several ducts j .
| |
| with open areas of less than 96 square inches and not exceeding 6 inches one way.
| |
| I i.i t c; INCREASED PENETRATION RESISTANCE TIME - A substantially imoroved barrier
| |
| :. ADDITICNAL PENETRATICN TCOLS REQUIRED - None that have proved effective ADVANTAGES CF TECHNIQUE .
| |
| i ;t 1.
| |
| ; i Prevides many variations in matarials and dimensions.
| |
| j 2. Offers many possibiltties for custos upgrades.
| |
| , 3. Provides substantially improved resistance.
| |
| I ~
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| 4 Does not affect air flow.
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| 06/21/83 la Attachment 2 to Enclosure C 9
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| Technique No. 3 ,
| |
| f' Hardenino is Recuireca Ouct in a Cei1ino or Wali Where Afe Flew t
| |
| DISTING STRUCTURE - Ouct opening in ceiling or wall where air ficw is required l TOOLS REQUIRED FOR PENETRATION - Depends on existing cpaning
| |
| ~!;
| |
| a PGETRATION TIME - Approximately 1 minuta for a 24" x 24" duct (horizontal) 4 HARD SING ACTION 1
| |
| ti
| |
| ., 1.
| |
| Line duct with coils of ;aneral purpose barned tape obstacle (GPSTO) or concertina. If coils cannot be used, bands or ribbons of barted
| |
| 'l?
| |
| tape can be riveted to walls.
| |
| i j 2. Attach diffusers with 16 quartar-inch bolts.
| |
| "4 INCREASED PSETRATION RESISTANCE TIME - Approximately 10 minutes
| |
| ; A00ITIONAL PEETRATION TOOLS REQUIRED - Depends o.1 installation method of -
| |
| barned tape
| |
| . l ' ADVANTAGES OF TECHNIQUE
| |
| .} 1.
| |
| . .j Greatly hampers crawl.through.
| |
| :; 2.
| |
| Various installation methods allow upgrading with minimal effects on duct performance. -
| |
| 1.. . -
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| 06/21/83 20 Attac.iment 2 to Enclosure 0 l
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| 1 Technique No. 4 Hardeninc Ocenino in Caflino or Wall Where Air Flow
| |
| , is Recuirso i
| |
| EXISTING STRUCTURE - Opening any si::e
| |
| ,l;
| |
| :1 TOOLS REQUIRED FOR PENETRATION - Depends on existing opening t-] PENETRATION TIME - Depends on existing opening
| |
| ; \j HARDENING ACTION
| |
| , e
| |
| : 1. Add strong' steel famo te opening.
| |
| i .
| |
| "". ..'u 2. Weld steel pipes of 3" diameter or less together and then weld to
| |
| ]
| |
| y steel jamb.
| |
| : INCREASED PENETRATION RESISTANCE TIME - More.than 15 minutas
| |
| ; ADDITIONAL PENETRATION TOOLS REQUIRED - Cutting torch v .
| |
| .-1,
| |
| :. 1 ADVANTAGES OF TEC@tIQUE 1
| |
| t
| |
| : 1. Allows air flow.
| |
| l 3. Reduces bodily' access.
| |
| j
| |
| * 3
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| t 06/21/83 22 At.act. ment 2 to Enclosure C e
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| |
| ~
| |
| OI AGN AM 4- Ilardening Ogia.dag in Calling or Wall Wisere Alt flow is Haapairad . ,
| |
| f l
| |
| EXISilNG OPENING .
| |
| SIDE VIEW ilAflOENED GPENING SIDE VgEw TOP VIEW
| |
| * e WALL E t WALL AI '
| |
| r--- __ _ _ _ _ _ SNSIDE OllISIDE
| |
| ' ~
| |
| {4['E4
| |
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| STEEL /
| |
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| PAPE j N 4.s W AI.8 OPE N' ' Allt WALA- WALL t WALL
| |
| ' Flow l
| |
| ' J WE 4 il J04NTS M .$; _ STEEL WAI.t. JAMG 'l I Watt ,
| |
| ! i WALL l. g j j MAX. 3 figg, yp,{igs ,,y l- a~-.)
| |
| I (1!!U!!M10NMS!Ha!!C4l!ME f!!!U!!al!9t!EES! HANCE TIME i
| |
| del' ENDS ON EXISilNG DPENING -
| |
| i:
| |
| Mill 4E IllAN IS MINilTES t
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| * i d BT 3 TO THE ATTAC*M
| |
| ., MISCZLLANEGUS AM BOMENTS ENCLOSURE (ENCL. C)
| |
| VALUE/ IMPACT STATBENT
| |
| : 1. .
| |
| 6 9
| |
| O O
| |
| O O
| |
| O We w I
| |
| | |
| . ~
| |
| 1 I .
| |
| j VALUE/ IMPACT STAT B ST MISCELLANECUS AMEN 0MENTS CONCERNING PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR POWER' PLANT 3 I
| |
| ; 1. THE PROPOSED ACTION l -
| |
| 1.1 Descriotion The Commission proposes to amend 10 CFR Part 73 in order to: -
| |
| r >
| |
| (i) Clarify policy on vital area designations (vital island approach);
| |
| ^ (ii) Revise vital island access control requirements; (i11) Permit the suscension of safeguards measures curing safety emergencies; ,
| |
| ; (iv) Requ' ire protection of certain physical security equipment; and '
| |
| (v) Revise requirements for key and lock controls.
| |
| l
| |
| : 1. 2 Need for Procosed Action
| |
| * The subject actions are being pursued in order to clarify and/or modify
| |
| * certain existing physical protection requirements for nuclear power plants.
| |
| - The amendments have been designed to fostar plant safety while caintaining adequata safeguards. A detailed discussion of the need for each amendment is providea in the accompanying Commission paper.
| |
| e.
| |
| : 1. 3 Value/Imoact of Procosed Actions i
| |
| ; 1. Vital Area Desianation Policy Industry and Public - Benefits and Costs If industr/ protects vital islands by using existing barriers and accass control points, the following benefits would be derived: '
| |
| o Hinimized sabotage possibilities by protacting at least one area within each set of vital areas wherein radiological '
| |
| sabotage could be accomplished. -
| |
| ! 06/15/83 1 Attacament 3 to inclosurs C e geye ie mpq, _ ens ,
| |
| N#*
| |
| , e - - - , , , ,.-+-n,,-,- , , . -- --
| |
| -r-, - .+-, ,e---e, - -
| |
| | |
| 1 e e
| |
| :.1 1
| |
| ~. !
| |
| . ,8 o Increased plant safety by allowing fewer intarior barriers ft '
| |
| .'; and accass control points which could hinder safety response personnel.
| |
| ]
| |
| o Licensee flexibility in designing a physical security program, E.]i
| |
| [ 1.e., provides a high degree of latitude in the protection of selected areas thereby per: sitting the licensee to minimize g costs without significantly reducing safeguards effectiveness.
| |
| ~
| |
| j 2. Vital Island Access Control Amendment
| |
| . 3, ,
| |
| Industry and Puelic - Senefits and Costs If indust:/ controls vital island access in accordanca with the proposed amendments to S 73.55(d)(7), the following benefits would
| |
| , ; be derived:
| |
| * l o
| |
| Laproved emergency ingress or egress thereby festaring plant j safety.
| |
| .i
| |
| : .o Better assurance that approved up-to-data nonemergency accass lists are used. This reduces the number of persons with access to reactor areas vulnerable to sabotage.
| |
| t a Reduced risk of sabotage connaittad by a person who received a
| |
| .j termination notica.
| |
| .; o Improved physical security intagrity of. vital f slands by 1ccking
| |
| ] and alarming extariar doors, not otherwise controlled, whica 4
| |
| lead to vital islands.
| |
| , Because the proposed requirements set forth in the amenements in q
| |
| 5 73.55(d)(7) are largely modifications of existing procedures, the. costs to the industry are considered negligible. -
| |
| The proposed amendments on vital area designations will permit ifcansees
| |
| ; to protect groups of such areas as vital islands. The cost to reconfigure i
| |
| 06/15/83 2 Attachment 3 to Enclosure C 4
| |
| | |
| ~
| |
| r
| |
| ' existing vital areas into vital islands is approximately equal to the cost of enclosing two typical vital islands. Sased on a survey of nine licansees, the i cost to do so would be $1.2M.
| |
| ?,
| |
| ; Initial Cost Imoact (Cost in sX or M)
| |
| , 1 Acolicable to Power Reactor Licensees (1) Cost to reconffgure vital fstands based on industry survey................... 1.2M -
| |
| 'j (a) 30% deduction (assumes ifcensees will use existing barriers and equipment in reconfiguring vital 1
| |
| islands).............................. 360K (b) Sub-Tota 1............................. 840K -
| |
| 1 (2) To relocate and/or purchase door t control and alarm systems.................. 10K 4
| |
| ' Total projected cost per unit.............. 850K
| |
| : 3. Protection of Physical Security Ecufoment j Industry and Puh11c - Seneffts and Costs i
| |
| If industry protects from sabotage certain security equipment 1 not now appearing to qualf fy for designation as vital equipment under 5 73.2(1) but which significantly impacts upon the security of the i
| |
| plant, the following beneffts would be derived:
| |
| o Protection of security equipment which would better assure its
| |
| 'i availability during a safeguards emergency, thereby reducing the chance of. successful radiological sanotage.
| |
| a Increased assurance of comnif ance with the general performance requirements specified in 5 73.55(a). . .
| |
| +
| |
| 'Suca equipment would include secondary power supply systams for intrusion.
| |
| . alarms and nonportanle communications equipment.
| |
| 06/16/83 3 Attachment 3 to inclosure C
| |
| | |
| . - . .. .[- $ - - - -
| |
| 1 _ ._
| |
| a . ...
| |
| a -
| |
| 1
| |
| .f l .,
| |
| In order to protect security-related squipment such as secondary power j
| |
| suoply systems for intrusion alaras and non portanie communications equipment, the typical reactor site would incur the following estimated costs:
| |
| ~
| |
| d
| |
| ] Initial Cort Imoact (Cost in sx)
| |
| ::a f Applicable to Power Reactor Licensees
| |
| ~1 (1) To enclose (cage or fence) secondary
| |
| { power supply systems and nonportable j communications equipment (assumes the *
| |
| '] installation of 100 ifnear feet of cage
| |
| -.; or fence materials at 3.030K per foot). . . . . . . . . . 3.CX J,9 I (2) To alars seccndary power supply and non portable consunications equipment locations (assumes three locations, two area alarms per location, hardware and labor per -
| |
| -! alarm 4
| |
| $1.2K).................................... 7. 2X Total Projected Cost............................
| |
| . 'l 10.2X
| |
| : 4. Revised Key and t.eck Controls
| |
| * Industry and Public - Benefits and Costs
| |
| * If industry revises its procedures in accordance with the proposed j
| |
| 1 amendments to 5 73.55(d)(9)', the following benefit woule'be derived:
| |
| * o Reduction in the expense and administrative burden of
| |
| ' 5 implementing a key and lock control program without t ,
| |
| 1 1 significantly reducing the safeguards benefits of such a program.
| |
| l-2 Because the proposed revisions to 5 73.55(d)(9) represent reducing the
| |
| ' requirements concerning implementation of an effective key and lock control I
| |
| program, the following savings are profectad:
| |
| t 1
| |
| 4 l
| |
| 06/15/83 4 Attacnment 3 to Enclosure C 1
| |
| I I
| |
| , . - - - , .r,. .,m w , _.- _ _. . _ _ . . , , , . = , , - c. 3 y. m 9 , , ,y
| |
| | |
| I i
| |
| t
| |
| .. I
| |
| ~
| |
| 4 Aco1feable to Power Reactor t.icensees Annual Costs (or Savines) '
| |
| - (1) The labor cost to change the key and lock system under present requirements. . . . . . . . . . . $21.0K '
| |
| (assumes a sita average of 1500 persons, i
| |
| 24 people issued keys, 30% annual
| |
| ~
| |
| turnover rate or 7 persons with keys terminata annually, or one person i leaves every 51 days thereby requiring key / lock changas 7 times per year
| |
| $3K per change.)
| |
| e
| |
| : (2) The labor cost to change the key and
| |
| . lock system under proposed requirements. . . . . . . . . . l ess $6. 0K (assumes a site average of 1500 persons, 24 people issued keys, 30% annual turnover rata or 7 persons with keys -
| |
| tarainate annually. As the proposed requirements cause lock / key changes annually and when persons are terminated .
| |
| ' for lack of trustworthiness or inadequata I work performance (projectad 1 of 7 persons),
| |
| 3 lock /kay changes would average once every 180 cays or 2 times per year 33K per change Net 8
| |
| i savinos...................................... $15.0K
| |
| ! 5.
| |
| NRC Ocorations - 3enefits and Costs *
| |
| ! If the decision is made to adopt the vital island protection
| |
| ," approach, the impact of these amendments on NRC operations will fall
| |
| ! in the areas of licansing negotiation and the conduct of field inspec-4 tions to assure compliance.
| |
| Additional NRC actions will be necassary to assure compliance with i
| |
| (1) proposed amendments to 10 CFR 73.55(d)(7) concerning v hal
| |
| - island accass control, (2) protection requirements for certain physical security equipment,2 and (3) revised key and lock control requirements.
| |
| '5ucn equipment would include secondary power supply systems for intrusion i alams and non portable communication equipment.
| |
| '1 .
| |
| )
| |
| :l l
| |
| 06/15/83 .
| |
| l Attachment 3 to Saclosure C i
| |
| _ geg.geo M _ 98 89 *e. _ - - - - ~ ~
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| I
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| , -e swww b a
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| T
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| ..I S The initial cost 3 to the NRC is estimated to be:
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| i i
| |
| t
| |
| - (1) Licensing negotiation and review of amended
| |
| . security plans (assuming 8 staff-cays / plan x 48 plans 4 x 3480/ staff-day)....................... $184.3K (2) Inspection and Enforcement Staff support time j for the negotiation process on per site basis (assuming 5 staff-days /sita x 48 sitas j $480/ staff-day)........................x.... . . .... .
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| : + S115.2K Tota 1............................................. 3299.5K
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| .I I The estimated annual cost to the NRC is estimated to be:
| |
| 1 (1) Licensing review and approval of security plans (assuming 8 staff-days / plan x 6 revised per year x $480/ staff-day. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. p. .ians .. . . .. . $23.0K
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| 'I (2) Inspection and Enforcement staff support time for .
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| M the negotiation process on per sits basis (assuming 5 staff-days /sita x 6 sitas 5480/ staff-day. . . . . . . . . . . . . . per year x
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| +
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| : ...................... 314.4K Tota 4 1............................................. 337.4K
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| : 6. Other Government Acencies i .
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| It is not expected that these rulemaking actions will have any impact on other government agencies.
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| 4
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| : 7. The public The public's protection from radiological release will be maintained
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| 'l by assurance of adequate safeguards of vital areas and equipment j -
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| from sabotage within nuclear facilities. -
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| .] . There would be negligible impact on the public or effect on customer
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| .} electric bills.
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| 1 4
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| i
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| .l 4The manpower resourcas required to amend the ifcanses to reflect vital
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| * jj . Islands have been included in budget projections for the period involved.
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| * No budgetary changes will be required as a result of this rulemaking.
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| /d
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| *All presently licensed power reactor units (71) are located on 48 sitas, j represented by 48 security plans.
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| 2 -
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| !' 06/21/33 6 Attachment 3 to b elosure C 4
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| i -
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| i 4
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| _, _.r- --.
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| e - -
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| e
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| .- , , , 9m, . , , . - - - - - , - - , - . -w..2 ..,,,,,-_m. - . . , , . , . . .7 _ ---e, _. - - -
| |
| --a ,*--e. , - -
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| | |
| _ . . . _ . . . . . - . - - . - ~
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| a -
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| , s." -
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| 1 . .
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| l
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| .4
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| ~
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| 1.4. 3ecision on the Pmoosed Ac+ .-. .'
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| i The benefit to be derivec (rom these amendments would be lower costs to fully implement NRC regulations regarding reactor safeguards while continuing
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| ,j to provide adequate protection of the pubife health and safety.
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| : 2. STATUTORY CONSIDERATIONS i
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| 2.1 NRC Authority ''
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| The Atomic Energy Act cf 1954, as 1 mended, Section 151(3) provides authority for the Commission to prescribe regulations designed to protect the public health and minimize danger to If fe or property. '
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| : 2. 2 Need for National Environmental Protection Act Assessment i
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| The proposed action is*not a major action, as defined by 10 CFR
| |
| , 51.5(a)(10), and does not require an environmental impact statement.
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| : 2. 3 Relationshio to Other histine or Procosed Reculations or Polfeies i
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| There are no apparent potantial confifets or overlaos with other NRC proposed regulations or policies nor with other agencies' regulaticns or poli.:ies.
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| I .
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| I i i
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| C6/15/83 7- Attachment 3 to helosure C I
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| l l
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| . . , . . ~ . - - . - . . . . . - - - - - - - . - - -
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| ,- **~*v"***
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| J,
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| 'l' f
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| . '{
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| I
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| { ATTACHMENT 4 TO THE i
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| 1
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| -t MISCELLANECUS AMENOMENTS ENCLOSURE (ENCL. C) s I ORAFT PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMEhT e
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| 4
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| ?
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| I
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| * 1 4
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| 0 i
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| i 5
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| 6
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| t e
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| ;u._.....,., - m m. . - - - - - - ~ ~ - - - - . -
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| rc-- -- - -
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| v- s
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| | |
| _ . _ . . . _ . . . _ ~ , _ . . _ . . . _ . _ . . _ . - .
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| ' NRC PRCPosts TO C1.ARIFY PHYSICAL SECURITf REQUIREMENTS
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| ; FOR NUC1. EAR POWER Pt. ANTS The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is proposing to amend its requiations to j
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| clarify some of its requirements governing the physical security of nuclear j power plants.
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| 9 As proposed, the amendments would:
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| 1.
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| Requirethatvitalareas(areasinwhichradfologicalsabotagecab
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| [
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| be accomplished) be protected only to the extant necessary to prevent l
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| sabotage. At present, all vital ar%as aust be protactad; however, in 8
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| many cases, a saboteur would have to entar t:wo or more vital areas to carn out a succassful radiological sabotage, and it is not necessary '
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| to protect all vital areas to fntarrupt sanotage.
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| 2.
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| Define requirements ,for access to vital areas to assure adequate '
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| i accesa for safety purposes while providing necessa n physical security protection.
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| 3.
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| - Provide the protection of speciff ed physical security equipment which, if sabotaged, could impact significantly the security of the plant.
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| An example would be a requirement for secondary power suppifes for intrusion alarms and non portable communications equipment.
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| +
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| 4.
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| Change the present requirement for key, lock, and coseination changes
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| ' when any employee with access to them leaves to: (1) change routinely.
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| everj year; (2) change whenever a person's access authorization is revoked for cause; and (3) change when the compromise of locks is suspected.
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| Interestad persons are invitad to submit written comments on the proposed amendments to Part 73 of the Commission's regulations to the Secretary, U.S.
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| i Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, OC 20555, Attantion: Occketing -
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| and Services 3ranen, by (90 days after FR publication).
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| 06/15/83 1 Attac :mont 4 to Enclosure C
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| _, -n. --
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| ^- --
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| O M
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| DC
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| l 5
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| 4 f
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| i ATTACHMENT 5 TO THE MISCELLANEQUS AMetCMENTS ENCLOSURE (ENCL. C)
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| VITAL ISLANO ILLUSTRATION ,
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| 4 e
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| O O
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| 9 0
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| . . . - . - . , .-- . . ~ * ~
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| ,, M /
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| -l 1
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| Vital Island Illustration
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| ]'
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| 3, Hvoothetical Conficuration 1
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| i 1
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| :: J mr Nx l 1.
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| i ,
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| z 1 y t 1 ..
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| ,)
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| Vital Island A i
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| - ~
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| y y s
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| a V+ s .
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| y y .
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| v.7
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| /
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| Vital Island 3 y -
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| v -
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| y t i 18 i
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| ; Aeolication '
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| The illustration demonstrates the proposed vital island concept. This hypothetical facility has 10 vital areas, Vs through Vso. Vt and V are Type I vital areas (single vital area wherein radiological sabotage can be accomplished). Vs through Vgo are Type II vital areas (vital areas wherein rudiological sabotage can be accomolished only in conjunction with additional- .
| |
| sabotage activity in at least one other separata vital area.) (Vs, V , and Vs3 l
| |
| constituta a complete grouo of Type II vital areas (sabotage can be accomplished only by carrying out acts in all three locations). Likewise (V 3
| |
| and Ve], CV2 and V;], and CVs. Ve, and V.o] represent completa groups of
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| * Type II vital areas.
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| I 06/15/83 i Attacnment 5 ts inclosure C i
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| ~~
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| 1
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| - , _ - , +, - + . , , , -
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| - - , - - ~ , - . - , , - . . . , - - - - - , . - , - , . - - . ,
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| | |
| -d--
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| _ _ _ . . . :.. u . . -- = - - - - -
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| .l -
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| * e
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| .1 i
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| 4' The proposed vital island concapt involves locating each Type I vital area and
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| ' " one vital area of each completa group of Type II vital areas in one or more protected vital islands.
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| This permits the licensee to use, where possible, I
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| } existing barriers / access contro1 points and to take advantage of recurring
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| [j appearances of cartain vital areas in many completa groups of Type II vital
| |
| -i
| |
| ^3 areas (as is the case with Vs in this illustration). Under this approach, j adequate safeguards for this example facility could be accomplished by j
| |
| ' protecting Vs, Vse Vs, and Va, as one or more vital islands. These four areas could be structured in one to four vital islands. In the example, two vital;
| |
| , .) islands are shown.
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| .)i I
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| 'j
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| * This approach also permits the ifcanses flexibility in selecting and grouping '
| |
| 3 r
| |
| 'i the vital areas to be protected into vital islands. For e'x ample, the ifcansee 4
| |
| .I could choose to include V, or Vt a instead of Vs since they are all in the same
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| ! j complete group of Type II vital areas, and still maintain adequate protection.
| |
| Thus, the proposed vital island designation approach permits the licansee to
| |
| ( (1) reduca the nuncer of areas to be protected by corcentrating on vital areas
| |
| ; } which appear in a large number of Type II vital area groups, (2) select from j each completa group of Type II vital areas the vital area that is most cost-
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| }
| |
| effective to protact, and (3),take advantage of existing barriers and access [
| |
| control points in grouning vital trees into vital islands.
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| i I d (
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| (i s.
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| ' l.
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| ; . I 06/15/83 2 t
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| At.achment 5 to inclosure C t
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| o
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| . . . . . n--.
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| 7
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| .... . . . . . . . . z : - - - .. .... .. . . .. . . . . . - ,
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| : a. v
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| -~*
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| +- m.
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| t i
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| l i
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| * ATTACHMENT 6 TO THE MISCELLANEOUS AMEN 0MENTS
| |
| * I (ENCLOSURE C)
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| SUPPORTING STATEMENT FOR RECORDXEEPING
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| : ANO t'-
| |
| :, REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
| |
| . FOR 1
| |
| 10 CFR PART 73 "
| |
| h I
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| t f
| |
| 6 .
| |
| 1 . .g l
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| |
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| |
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| | |
| , .--. , ,. >. . " w -~ - --- ~ ~"~~ ~' ' ~ ~
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| paa s
| |
| . ~
| |
| l
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| , SUPPORTING STATBENT FOR REPORTING REQUIROENTS FOR 1
| |
| ; 1. Justiff eation 4
| |
| a
| |
| , J (f) The Commission proposes to amend 10 CFR 73.55, " Requirements for
| |
| {
| |
| Physical Protection of Licensed Activities in Nuclear Power Reactors Against Radiological Sabotage," to claHfy and refine the policy for l l (1) the designation and protaction of vital areas containing safety-4 related equipment, (2) vital area accass controls, (3) authoMty to suspend safeguards measures during safety emergencies, (4) protec-i tion of certain ftans of security equipment which significantly t
| |
| impact nuclear plant security, and (5) key and lock ca. .rols.
| |
| The requirements have been designed to accommodata recommendations -
| |
| of the Safety / Safeguards Review Committee established in response to the Chairman's request of August 16, 1982. Thfs Committee had the overall task of studying power reactor safeguards requirements and
| |
| ; practices to detarmine whether actual or potential confifets exist i
| |
| with plant safety objectives. ~
| |
| +
| |
| * Section 73.55 now requires that all vital areas (areas in which radfo- .
| |
| logical sabotage can be accomoffsned) be protected. Security plans which designata these vital areas were originally accepted by the
| |
| [
| |
| Commission on an interim basis pending sita~ specific reviews to verify such designations. Many site-specific reviews have been '
| |
| completed. . .
| |
| ; j The results indicata that present S 73.55 requirements may be unneces. sadly stM et in mandating protectfon of all vital areas.
| |
| i The Commission is considering adoption of a clarified vital area designation policy which would require protection only to the extent necessary to interrupt sabotage. Licensees would be given c:nsider-
| |
| * able latitude to take advantage of existing barHers and access
| |
| * i control points. Cartain components, however, would be deemed vital in all cases. These include: onsite diesel generators and batteries (excluding electrical df stribution systems), reactor ,
| |
| 4 e
| |
| eB 4 9 i
| |
| i
| |
| .,w m. .. , , , .- n~w , --
| |
| s ' A
| |
| ,4.---.
| |
| ,_,5_m.y~. , , - - . _ _ - , - . - _ . , , , , . - - , _ , . _ . _ . , - . - + , - - - . , - _ . , . , . . . _ _ . . - _ _ _ , . . ~ , . , , , , . .,..y-,
| |
| | |
| s -
| |
| 4 o -
| |
| ]-
| |
| containment, control reams, central 11 arm station, and onsite water
| |
| .c supplies (excluding piping) required for Jafe snutdown.
| |
| t 1
| |
| .c I# The staff is proposing amendments to 10 CFR 73.55(d)(7) that address
| |
| * both nonemergency and emergency access contrels to vital islands.
| |
| Although the initial proposed amendment to 5 73.55(d)(7) was subject
| |
| };
| |
| to a round of public <:omment in 1980 (see 45 FR 15937), the staff j
| |
| d believes that the revised proposed requirements should also be published for pubife comment due to significant rewording based or k- the new concept for vital area designation described above. These Ei
| |
| .i revisions assure adequate access for safety purposes while maintain-i ing safeguards requirements.
| |
| i 9,.
| |
| -}
| |
| The staff fs also proposing a revision to 5 73.55(a) to provide authority for licensees to suspend safeguards measures if required j
| |
| to e - date emergency response. These changes are based upon 4 4 i j recommendations made ty the Safety / Safeguards Comeittaa that power reactor ifcensees. be given improved flexibility to facilitate *
| |
| ! ], response to site emergencies or " unusual events.''
| |
| The Commission is considering requiring protection of scacified 3 i
| |
| , t onsite physical security equipment (includes secondary power sucplies for intrusion alarms and non-portable communications equipment) which 3
| |
| l is required for the proper functioning of the security system.
| |
| Usually this equipment does not qualify as vital equipment, but the sanotage of this equfpment could seriously impair the security of j
| |
| * the plant. Such protection is necessarf to achieve the general performanca requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(a).
| |
| In a matter associated with access control, the Commission is con ' -
| |
| j sidering amendment 9 73.55(d)(9) to reduce unnecessary costs associated j with key and lock controls. The present recuirements call for key, l
| |
| .: lock, and connination changes when any emolayee who had access to y these devices is terminated. ,
| |
| t 8
| |
| l 06/16/83 2 Attacament i to inclosure C E
| |
| _ . , - ,e *
| |
| *[ g I TI ' " ' ~
| |
| | |
| _ . . . _ . _ _ , ~ - - - . - - - -- ' - ^ ~ '' "
| |
| #!^ .. s
| |
| , ,i - -
| |
| l
| |
| { .. l i
| |
| Staff experienca indicatas that adequata protaction could be obtaine_d by changing keys, locks, and concinations: (1) routinely on an
| |
| : 3. ,
| |
| annual basis, (2) whenever a person's access authorf:stion is revoked for reasons of lack of trustworthiness, reif acility, or inadequata i
| |
| {
| |
| j performance, and (3) when compronise of locks is suspected.
| |
| i l l (fi) The attached draft " Vital Island Designation and Protection Guide,"
| |
| i provides guidance to the'11censee for determining site-ruecific vital island designation and protection. This guide wfil be '
| |
| provided to each licensee as a guide for use in developing their respective ,,1als.
| |
| t The licensee is equired to prepare and submit a revised security plan to the Commission for review and approval. Paragraph (d)(f) .
| |
| ! of 5.73.55 requires that each ifcansee establish authorized access lists for each vital island which are to be updated and reaoproved at least every 31 days. The accass Ifsts need to be maintained by the licensee in order to assure ifconsee como11ance with the require-
| |
| ! aent of the rule.
| |
| (iii)
| |
| There are no sfailar data available in the field which can be used for these purposes.
| |
| : 2. Descriotion of Survey Plan 1
| |
| There are presently 48 nuclear power reactor sitas which will be subject to this rule. It,is assumed that the program will be organized and i .
| |
| I
| |
| * administared on a sita rather than a reactor unit basis. The mailing l
| |
| address for these affectad sites may be obtained from the Ofrector of '
| |
| I Safeguarcs, Offica of Nuclear Material Safety ud Safeguards, U.S.
| |
| Nuclear Regulatory Ccamission, Washington, QC 20555.
| |
| t.
| |
| 06/1S/83 3 Attacament 5 to Enclosurs C e-- -
| |
| o I.
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| ~ _. __
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| | |
| - 2 0 u .
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| ~
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| s
| |
| : 3. Tabulation and Publication Plans
| |
| ;t
| |
| ;- sj t Revised security plans submitted to the Commission will be reviewed, 1 approved, and filed by the Commission. Specific licenses revised secu-2d rity plans will not be published for pubife review or comment in accarc-a sj ancu with 10 CFR 2.790(d). The NRC anticipatas full compliance with the regulations.
| |
| ]>
| |
| .:t 3
| |
| ; 4
| |
| .; Time Schedule for Data Collection and Publication
| |
| 'i The ifcansee will be required to submit to the Commission his Access I
| |
| 1 ,
| |
| 't Authorization Plan for approval within 120 days of the effective data of j j the rule. Within 360 days after the rule becomes effective or 120 days J.j after approval by the Casumission, whichever is fatar, the ifcansee is required to implement the requirements of his approved plan.
| |
| 6 It is estimated that it will take about la Commission staff-days to
| |
| -] review and approve each plan submitted and that initially all p,lans will -
| |
| l i
| |
| be reviewed and approved within 260 days after receipt of the plans.
| |
| l 5. Consultations outsido the Acency The Safety / Safeguards Review Committee, during their task of studying l
| |
| power reactor safeguards requirements and practices in order to datar*
| |
| 4 mine whether actual or potential conflicts existad with plant safety
| |
| * I objectives, visited several ifcensee sitas and oeserved plant operating l ,
| |
| conditions. The suggestions and reconumendations of the Consmittee's
| |
| -i findings have been taken into consideration in the proposed revision of the rule.
| |
| I i .
| |
| t l
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| ! }
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| i ,
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| I l :
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| l
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| [
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| I .
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| 06/15/33 4 Attacnment 6 to Enclosure C l
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| I _._ __ .- . . . . .
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| .m~q- * = * - ****#**
| |
| *******1
| |
| | |
| . - . ~ . . . - - - -- - - ~ ~ ~ ' ~ ~ ~ ~ ' ~ ~ ~ ^^~ '' ~ ' ~ ~ ~
| |
| r* , e g -
| |
| ; )o >0 'o i t .
| |
| 1 1
| |
| , 6.
| |
| Estimation of Rescondent Recortine Burden Nuncer of Respondents J.,
| |
| Regulatory After Effective Annual Reports Annual
| |
| ; Section Oate of Rule Total Time Staff Filed /Resconcents Recufred/Resconse Hours L 10 CFR 73.55(a) 48 initially 1 plan / licensee 24 man-hours / plan j 2. 10 CFR 73.55(d)(7) 48 initially 1 plan / licensee 1152
| |
| ! 32 man-hours / plan 1536
| |
| 'i 3. 10 CFR 73.55(d)(9) 48 initially 1 plan / licensee 8 man-hours / plan 384
| |
| .! 7.
| |
| Estimate of Cost to Federal Governments 1
| |
| ~i .
| |
| +
| |
| It is estimated that it will cost the NRC 5184.3X (8 staff-days / plan x 48 plans x $480/ staff-days) to review and approve all submittad revised
| |
| .j security plans.
| |
| i It is estimated that six new plants will submit plans for review and I
| |
| i approval each year which will cost the NRC about $23.0K to precess (8 staff-days / plan x 6 plans x $440/ staff-day). .
| |
| t i
| |
| i l'.
| |
| 4 i
| |
| t 06/15/83 5 Attacament 5 to Enclosure C l
| |
| l e
| |
| ,mee=o- e . t' ~+. -
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| eew ,
| |
| e
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| *9
| |
| , - - . , . - , , - , - + .-.- , ~ - , , . , - . -}}
| |