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{{#Wiki_filter:s.': DRAFT WORKING PAPER - REPLACEMENT POWER COST Spared by: Sidney Feld Management Analysis Branch Division of Budget and Analysis Office of Resource Management S. Nuclear Regulatory mmission )S ~ l .....,1 O 0511210109 851022 PDR FOIA BELLB5-361 PDR
~ Q O WORKING PAPER - REPLACEMENT POWER COST The following discussion highlights three broad issues relevant to replacemen power cost's role in regulatory impact analyses. The first section explains why the capital investment in the facility is not a relevant cost consideration and shows the replacement power cost as fully capturing the total direct cost associated with losing a nuclear unit. The sec'ond section defines replacement power costs and discusses some key issues that should be explicitly considered by the NRC. The third and final section provides a recommended approach for NRC estimation of replacement power costs. 1. The Relationshio Between Caoital Investment and Replacement Power Costs It is well recognized that a typical nuclear unit represents a capital invest-ment of several billions of dollars. However, once the investment is in-place, it constitutes a sunk cost and cannot be included as a cost of an accident. This is because an element of cost attributable to an accident must represent an incremental adverse impact over and above what is expected if no accident The capital investment in question reflects real resources (e.g., occurs. labor, capital, materials, equipment, etc.) that have already been expended. Thus, regardless of the status of the nuclear unit, the resource commitment and need to recover that investmentE remains unaffected. Since the capital invest-ment stands as an element of equality between the accident and normal operation scenarios, the capital investment presents no incremental adverse impact and cannot contribute to the cost of an accident. Among skeptics, the logical response to this economic jargon may well be -- " Yeah but, in one case you are paying off a capital investment for a facility that is contributing to system reliability and is generating electricity, whereas in the second case you're paying and getting nothing back." M change in the status of the reactor may result in a shift in responsibility A for recovering the debt (i.e., from ratepayers to stockholders, pool of utili-ties,governmententities,etc.). This constitutes a transfer from one seg-ment of society to another with no incremental adverse impact to society as a whole. 1
The sunk-cost argument simply speaks to the fact that in both cases you paying off an identical capital investment and therefore that investment c6 be viewed as an element of cost attributable to an accident. The real dif-ference between the two scenarios is the output realized from that investment. That is, in one case the nuclear facility is generating electric.ty and \\ continues to represent a source of power to the system, whereas in the other instance the utility must rely on alternative sources of generation and may have to secure additional capacity to provide the energy and power that would have been available had the nuclear unit not experienced an accident. The incre-mental cost of satisfying these needs represents the replacement power cost and this then captures society's total direct cost of losing the nuclear unit.E 2. Issues Concerning Estimation of Replacement power Costs The terms replacement energy cost and replacement power cost are frequently used interchangeably, although technically they do represent different cost consi-derations. For NRC purposes, replacement energy cost captures the increased cost associated with generating the electrical energy foregone due to the loss of a nuclear unit. For temporary or short-term shutdowns of nuclear units, con-sideration of replacement energy costs is typically a sufficient accounting of the total incremental cost. However, with long-term and permanent shutdowns, the need to add new capacity to a system is more probable, and consequently, the cost of replacing both energy (MWh) and power (MW) are both contributors to the incremental cost. The replacement power cost is thi broader concept that encom-passes both these elements of cost. In this paper, the term replacement power cost is used with the understanding that if replacement capacity is not warranted, the analysis technically reduces to a replacement energy cost cal-culation. U ote, in certain instances the unexpected loss of nuclear capacity may have an N adverse impact on system reliability that cannot be immediately satisfied due to the long lead times typically required to add new capacity. Under such a scenario, in the short-run, a utility may be forced to operate with inadequate capacity resulting in unserved energy costs (based on the increased proba-bility of blackouts) and the need to impose load-curtailment measures. These system reliability related costs represent another direct cost of losing a nuclear facility. 2
= ~. o 1 i The replacement power cost represents the incremental cost of generating elec-i tricity and providing additional capacity due to the temporary or permanent i shutdown of a nuclear unit. This incremental cost should capture the total 1 difference in system cost between a system with and without the generating unit in question available for operation. The principal cost elements involved in l this cost penalty are the incremental costs of the alternative energy source (s) and the variable costs associated with the nuclear unit that has been shut down. I i j The nuclear unit's* variable costs consist of fuel and variable operation and maintenance (0&M) expenses: items for which current and projected values are readily attainable. The relevant costs of the alternative energy source are not as apparent because their selection is not something one can readily predict. Logically, the utility will rely upon the least expensive alternative available. However, what is available will depend on the system-capacity mix, transmission I capabilities, and the demands existing on the system at any point in time during j the nuclear shutdown. Depending on these factors, replacement power may be sup-plied by some combination of capacity already available to the utility system, or through outside purchases, or from an investment in new capacity. For an 2 extended shutdown, which can encompass 40 years when a new facility experiences i a pemanent debilitating accident, one. can expect all of the above to contribute to replacement power. Cost estimation is further complicated because each of these alternatives has different incremental costs associated with it. For-tunately, computer models are available that can systematically _ deal with the complexities of the data and the countless micro-decisions that ultimately lead } to a final cost estimate. In fact, in my opinion, once a computer model is I in-place and approved for NRC reviews, there are really only a few key issues that the NRC must address before cost estimates can be provided. These issues concern our ability to define the problem such that the scope of the computer i analysis will be relevant to NRC needs and produce meaningful results. Issues { requiring NRC input are: j-A. NRC must explicitly define the expected chain of events if a nuclear unit experiences an accident. Will other units at that site be shut i down, or will other units of the same manufacturer be shut down, and i j in each case, for how long? Replacement pcwer costs are not linear j as successive nuclear units are taken out of service. If not 1, but 10 or 70 units are shut down, the utilities must seek out increasingly
a._ more expensive alternatives to make up the energy that has been lost. Further, if an accident results in multiple shutdowns, the need to replace capacity and the likelihood of adverse system rel,iability impacts resulting will increase. B. Cost to whom? Is the NRC interested in the cost of replacement power to' society, to the impacted utility, or to both? Depending'on the response, the consideration of certain cost elements is affected. For example, if a utility that has lost a nuclear unit is assumed to rely on purchased power to replace the nuclear generation, the pur-chasing utility will be charged the production costs associated with that energy plus a demand charge to cover the return on the capital investment. The demand charge represents a sh1ft in responsibility from the seller to the purchaser of the replacement power. From society's perspective there is no incremental-cost associated with this demand charge as the additional cost to one group of ratepayers is exactly counterbalanced by the savings by the other group. How-ever, if one is concerned about the increased costs to the utility that has lost the unit, the demand charge is an important real cost to be included. C. A number of key input assumptions embedded in replacement power cost calculations are the subject of much uncertainty and controversy. These include, for example, the capacity factor, cost escalation rates and the discount rate. The NRC should develop a uniform set of assumptions to be used in all replacement power cost estimates with the understanding that these assumptions should be defensible. There is general agreement that replacement power costs are an important factor in a cost benefit analysis directed at safety modifications. The possibility of avoiding replacement power costs typically looms as a principal benefit of a proposed safety change, whereas, the replacement power cost accompanying a tem-parary shutdown (to perform a retrofi,t) may be.the' principal contributor to the cost of the proposed action. Thus, replacement power costs are an important operative force on both sides of the cost benefit equation. 4 ~
~ 3. Recommended Approach Rigorous replacement power cost estimates are produced with computer models that optimize system production costs and system expansion plans assuming the subject nuclear unit is and is not available for operation. The difference in system costs between these two cases constitutes the cost of replacement power. In general, these models are not controversial and are viewed as producing meaning-ful results. The major disadvantages of this approach are the exhaustive data requirements and long lead times needed to complete the analysis. These practical considerations oftentimes completely negate the usefulness of this procedure to real-world regulatory cecisions for which time and resources are important constraints. Research currently sponsored by the NRC's Office of Research, Division of Risk Analysis, is involved in streamlining this cost estimating procedure. Essen-tially, this effort involves the use of a number of hypothetical representative service areas for which input data are already available and fully operational. The modelling capability has been modified to enable these data sets to produce results reasonably close to those from actual service area data. The procedure is capable of estimating the fuel use, cost, and reliability effects of accident-induced and regulatory-forced shutdowns of nuclear generating units in a quick and cost effective manner. Furthermore, a major advantage of this approach is its ability to estimate the integrated effect on cost and reliability of multiple-unit shutdowns. This work effort is being performed at the Argonne National Laboratory under FIN Number A2223 Formalized Risk Decisionmaking Processes. 5
s- <4. L 5 Y.AR 0 11983 l l s MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert A. Purple, Deputy Director l Divisio6 of Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation FROM: Edwin G. Triner, Director Division of Budget and Analysis Office of Resource Management
SUBJECT:
COST ANALYSIS GROUP'S REVIEW OF BACXFITTING IMPACT COSTS l By memo of February 16, 1983, you requested our assistance on an g industry study on backfitting impact costs. The specific request was to provide a response to Question 7 of the James Tourtellotte memo to Dircks of January 17, 1983. The attached report is in response to that i request. /S/ t Edwin G. Triner, Director Division of Budget and Analysis Office of Resource Management
Attachment:
bec: E. Triner, RM/B w-e J"F a au As stated RM/B R/F * /c et re J. Clark, RM/BMA w/o a rF * *4 - cc: L. Barry, RM S. Feld, RM/BMA T. Murley, EDO RM/BMA R/F t nn. nBn Feld :,js b.... Clark. ' Tri t/#/83 ..;.,,./.. /83 .[y / r //sa h.3 ^ " " ,. = _-- - ~ O
.y February 28, 1983 l A Review of " Nuclear Power Plant Sackfitting and Regulatory Impact Costs" f i e 1 - = p red by: . Cost Analysis Group office of Resource Management
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s A Review of " Nuclear Power Plant Backfitting and Regulatory Impact Costs" In response to a February lii,1983 request for assistanca from NRR, the Cost Analysis Group (CAG) within the Office of Resource Management, has reviewed " Nuclear Power Plant Backfitting and Regulatory Impact Costs."* Fo11cwing is aur response to Question 7 posed by James Tourtellotte. 7. Provide any coments the staff may have regarding the accuracy or characterization of the enclosed information. In particu-lar, does the staff agree with the statements on pages 7 (re: Catawba) and 9 (re: Byron) asserting that 40 percent of the total costs of these NTOL's is due to regulatory impact? If not, why not? What evidence can the staff present refuting these claims? Essentially the industry analysis ccmpares construction costs of nuclear units that were completed in the 1973-74 timeframe with similar units currently under construction by the came utilities. Adjustments were made for inflation and number of reactors at the site (the latter variable accounting for, economies of scale) in an attempt to bring.the units to an equal footing. The residual cost difference is,then totally attributed to new regulatory and backfitting requirements of which 60 percent are viewed as NRC initiated. These assumptions result in a conclusion that approximately 40 percent of the total construction cost.of the NTOL's results from new (post 1973-74) NRC requirements. It is somewhat difficult to speak to the correctness of this approach because it is presented in such generalities. For example, although we are told that adjustments were made for inflation and number of reactors, no real detail is provided on how these adjustments were made and the actual scaling factors and inflation rates assumed. Nevertheless, on the face of it, it appears that the industry's estimate of regulatory and backfit costs is overstated simply because other factors, completely ignored in the industry report, have contributed to the cost increase between 1973-74 vintage plants and NTOL's. The following factors should be separately accounted for before a residual value is derived and identified as the contribution of new regulatory and backfitting requirements. Included as Attachment A.
t 2 o 1. The cost of money (and therefore interest payments) has increased by between a factor of five and ten as between NT0L's and 1973-74 vintage plants.* This difference has been further exacerbated by the lengthening of the construction period for NTOL's. Generally, these higher interest payments are not a result of new regulatory requirements. It can be argued that the longer construction period and therefore that portion of the higher interest payments is attributable to increased regulatory requirements, but a case can be made that much of the delays are utility imposed due to financial strains and recognition of lower demand growth. Adjusting for interest during construction can significantly alter the industry's conclusion concerning the cost impact of new NRC-imposed requirements. The table on the following page contrasts the industry estimate for Catawba with staff estimates. All industry assumptions are maintained except in the second column the staff assumes interest during construction is totally independent of new NRC requirements, and in the third column it is assumed that only 50 percent of the interest during construction is impacted by regulatory requirements. Based on the results in Table 1, it can be seen that new NRC require-ments represent betwee* about 29 and 35 percent of Catawba's total construction cost instead of the 41.8 percent reported by the Duke Power Company. Further, in 1982 dollars, the dollar impact is between $970 million and $1,190 million.vs. Duke's estimate of $1,407 million. J 2. Escalation also looms as an important contributor to the total construction cost of a nuclear facility. For example, for the Catawba units, escalation constitutes about 5.6 percent of Catawba's current cost estimate.** NTOL's have experienced far lengthier construction periods than those plants of 1973-74 vintage *** and, consequently, typically have a far greater escalation compon it than the earlier units. To the extent the longer construction period is non-regulatory induced (i.e., delayed due to internal financial constraints and slower demand growth), this increase in cost should not be included as a part of the cost of new requirements as it is in the industry estimate. "A Review of the Economics of Coal and Nuclear Power," Draft, U.S. Dept. of Energy, Sept. 24, 1981 Fig. 111-2, p. 111-4. Source - Quarterly Progress Repcrt on Status of Reactor Construction, Dept. of Energy, Fonn E1A-254(9-81), June 30,1982. The Catawba Units have a projected average construction period of about 14 years vs. an average construction period of about 7.5 years for the Oconee" units with which they are compared. The construction period used here extends from CP application to commercial operation. ~
3 i Table 1.. Effect of Interest During Construction on the Regulatory Impact of j Catawba's Construction Cost k l Industry Est. NRC Staff Est. NRC Staff Est. t i. (includes interest (includesno (includes 50% i during construc-interest dur-of interest tion) ing construc-during construc t tion) tion) i j Catawba [1982 3 cost per kW) $1469 $1008 $1238 4 Oconee [1982 $ cost per kWJ $445 $305'* $375 l ( 1982 3 increase.in cost for Catawba $2,345,000,000 $1,610,000,000 $1,976,000,000 j [4 $/kW x 2,290,000 kW] Cost of new NRC-imposed require- $1,407.000,000 $966,000,000 $1,186,000,000 j ments[60%ofincreaseincost] Cost of new NRC-imnased require-41.8% 28.7% 35.2% 3 ments as % of Catawba /s total t cost I i b 4 o Adjustment for interest during construction for the Catawba plant is from Quarterly Progress Report on Status of Reactor Construction, Dept. of Energy Form EIA-254(9-81), June 30, 1982. 4 Adjustment for interest during construction for the Oconee plant conservatively assumes that interest during construction represents the same percentage of Oconee's total capital cost (31.4%) as it does for Catawba. t i j I 1 t
.~. _ _ _ _. 4 i 3. The industry estimates are adjusted to 1982 dollars to permit a fair comparison between NTOL's and 1973-74 vintage plants. It appears that i this adjustment accounts for general inflation which only reflects j changes in the value of the dollar. Over time, many cost elements i have also experienced real increases in price above and beyond the general inflation rate. To the extent this has occurred in the nuclear construction area, the industry estimate overstates j the cost increase attributable to new regulatory requirements. l' Finally, it is worth noting that the NRC could develop its own estimates of t these retrofit costs. The CONCEPT computer model estimates the construction cost of nuclear units based on equipment, material and labor requirements con-i l tained in the United Engineer's Energy Economic Data Base. In theory, this data .l base is updated every year to account for changing physical requirements. If a CONCEPT run based on the 1974 data base were made with a given set of parameters i . identified (i.e., cost of money, length of construction period, size of plant, j same geographic region, etc.) and a similar run (i.e., same general parameters) were made using the current data base (both in constant 1982 dollars), the dif-I forence between the two estimates should reflect solely the change in physical requirements imposed over the years. Adopting industry's view that 60 percent j is attributed to new NRC-imposed requirements should produce a defensible L estimate to contrast with the results of the industry report. NRC currently has i a technical assistance contract in place with the ORNL to perform specific I CONCEPT runs such as this. The task could take approximately two weeks and I would require a reordering of ORNL's workload priorities to allow them to address the issue immediately. t l f i i I I i 1
--....o. .ATTACHffENT A r m p, e e. ; d / cv NUCLEAR PCWER PLANT 3ACXIITTING AND RIGULATORY IMPACT CCSTS Data was obtained frem Duke Power Ccmpany and Cc=monwealth l Edi'sonCompanyonthea'ctualbackfittingcost[. experienced,after q operating licenses had' been received, on four nuclear power stations. i Also, cost data was obtained on three nuc ear power s at tions l' that arm necrly completed and a' compa=ison made between the costs of the these stations and similar, stations that were ecmpleted in i i .c 1973 and rS74. l This information is provided as an attempt to illustrate l the. magnitude of' the cost experienced in the backfitting of operating plants and, separately,, to provida a perspective.of the magnit*ade of the changed regulatory' environment as it has impacted nuclear units nearing cc=pletion at this time. No attempt was made to, determ,ine the value of any backfit er. regulatcry change in terms of safe'ty enhancement. Each back:Iit or regulatory chinge was intended to, provide some additional margin of safety in the i plan,cperation. However, since,no measurable basis of safsty 4 has been established or cos't-benefit analysis providad'for the changes, the actual safety value of the many changes is not ) ~ definable. I e b e I ,9 O 0 9 e e .,.-,,_,-.._.,---_-,-,.-._,..~,,.,_,.--.,,_nn,_.,..-.,
? j BACKFI**ING COST EXPERIINCZ CN FCUR OPERATING NUCLEAR ( l PCWER STATIONS i [ Oconee Pcwer Station - 3 Units l Cuke Pcwer Com any j t i . The econee Power Station censists of three PWR nuclear units ) ^ j . wd.h a combined capacity of'2661.MWo. Commercial operatien of the -l r j first unit was February 6,1971, tha 'second unit was October 6, 1973, and the thiri unit was July l'9,1974. Total cost of the t i units was $493 million, equivalent to $185 per KW. t ) Backfitting costs for the three Oconee units through June 30, l 1 1 1982 has been 5179 million. ~These costs can be allocated as j $142.4 million for NRC imposed backfitting other than TMI lessons 10arned; 5.21.4 million for TMI lessons learned backfitting; and I l $15.2. million for utility initiated backfitting.' An add'itional ( 4 backfitting cost of $121 million is anticipated for the oconee l l I l units to satisfy the existing and, projected projects required by i the NRC. A detailed listing of the previous and projected i backfitting costs in provided as Attachment A. 4 'Dresden Power-Station '3 Units Commonwealth Edison Company. i I The Dresden station consists of three 3WR nuclear units with a j ecmbi:'.ed capacity of' 1735 MWe Commercial operation of the first unit was in dugust 1960, the's,ecorui uniti in August 1970, and the 3 third unit in october.1971. Total cost of the thr'ee units was 5219 mi1Ilon. Backfit 6 g costs for the Dresden units through July 1982 hcs been $159 million.. These costs can.be allocated as $106 millien ] for NRC imposed.backfitting other than TMI lessons learned; 518 mil-lien'for.TMI lessens learned backfitting; and 535 million for
3 cuility initiated backfitting. An additional 572 million is antici-pated fer near-term future hackfitting costs to satisfy NRC require-I A detailed listing of the previous and projected backfitting ments. i costs for the Dresden station is provided as-Attachment 3. l Quad Cities Power Station - 2 Units j c - nwealth Edison comoany i o l The Quad cities station consists of two BWR nuclear units with I a combined capacity of 1578 MWe. Commercial cperation of the first ) unit was in August 1972 and the second unit in October 1972. The 1 total cost of the two units was $262 million. l 3ackfitting costs for the Quad cities units through July 1982 hoc heen $135 million.' These.. costs carrhe allocated as 595 miilion i j for NRC imposed,backfitting other than TMI lessons learned; $16 million for.TMr lessons learned backfitting; and $24 million for 1 utility initiated backfitting. An additional 573 million is 1 j anticipated for near-term future backfitting costs to. satisfy NRC f rcquirements. .A detailed listing of the previous and projecteN \\ hnckfitting cosits for the Quad. Cities stations is provided as A'ttachment C. Il f.icn Nuclear Power Station - 1 Units Cor==.onweelsh Edison Comoany l The Zion station consists of two PWR nuclear units with a combined capacity of-2080 MWe. Commercial operation of the first unit was in cetober 1973 and the second unit in September i 1974.. The total cost of the two units was $557 million. 3 1 ~ t
_=. Backfitting cost for the Zica units through July 1982 has been $34 million. These costs ca=,ha allocated as $41 million for l NRC imposed backfitting other than M lessens learned; $25 millien i 1 for m lessons learned backfitting; and 517 m'illion for utility ~ \\ ~ initiated backfitting. An additional 517 million is anticipated i i for near-term future backfitting costs to satisfy NRC requirements. t A detailed' listing of the previous and projected backfitting costs i for the tien station is provided as Attachment D. i i i seeciffe Examcles of Reculatorv I.wact Examples of the major,cest impact of regulation in two areas, security and fire protection, are provided as Attachment E. 1 I j !l q 1 .l ] 1 l j l a i a 4 g l t 3 e e 0 e g 8 ,r.,,,.,. n,..- ..g.-.,,-,..-~,m,--- ,-.s -.n..,--.n__..,.. ,.m,
_s_ RIGULAMRY IMPACT CN THRIZ NUCLEAR PCWY."R STATICNS Duke Power Company McGuire Nuclear Power Station - 2 Units. The McGuire station consists of two PWR nuclear units with a cinnbined. capacity of 2360 MWe The construction permits were 'psued by.the NRC for these units is February 1973. At the' time, ~ i Cf receiving the CP's, the cost esti:nats for the two units was $493 million with anticipated commercial operation dates of March', 1976 and March 1977,. The. current cost estimate for the two McGuire units in as bookeddolb. arsis $1,955million,equalto$828perKW. Commer-cial operation of the f,irst uni,t was Dec' ember 1981 and tha 'second*
- unit.is scheduled for October 1983.
A 1982 equivalent
- cost of the McGuire, station can be determined by escalating the ' dollars spent in es p year during construction,to equivalent 1982 dollars.
Such a calculation provides a total cost in equivalent.1982 dollars of $2,943 million, equal to $1,247 per KW. Catawba Pcwer Station - 2 Units The Catawha Power Station consists of two PWR nuclear units with a combined capacity of 2290 MWe. Construction permits were issued by the NRC for these units. in August 1975. At the time .of recei.ving the d's, the cost. estimate for the two units was. $1,054 million with. anticipated commarcial' operation dates of January 1981 and January 1982. a pq a
. _ ~ - Th3 cur =ent coot estimata for tho two catawbc. unita in ca. ' committed dollars is $'2,928 million, equal.to $1,279 per XW, based i en ec=mercial operation dates fer the two units of March 1984 and i september.1985. A revised increased cost estimate has not yet bee-completed for the new commercial operation dates of June 1985 for \\ the first unit'and. June 1987 for the second unit. A 1982 equiva-1$nt value of Catawba,. determined kr escalating prior spent funds l i t to.1982 dollars, is $3,3tj million equal to $1,469 per,KW. t Comnarative Regulatorv Cost Imtact of Ocones, McGuire and Catawba Nuclear Power stations I An approxima len cf the cost impact of. regulatory changes can be illustrated by comparing the costs of the Oconee, McGuire and l Catawba stations. All of the stations have pressurized wa.ter j reactors an'd all. three 'were designed and. constructed by the Duke Power company.' The costs of the Oconee units may be used as a benchmark for ccmparison of the regulatory cost impact on the 'ater units.' . Practically all of the materials were purchased and I l most of the labor performed for ocories be$cre 1974. Thus, conser-e vatively,.the actual.'oconee cost of $135 per KW can be taken to l represent 1973 dollars. By using the Atlanta, Georgia, Bureau of j rabor Statistics inflation factors and ' adjusting the' number to cecount for three units at the station, the 1982 value of the equivalent Cconee' plant cost would be about $445 per KW for a two unit plant. This assumes'that the regulatory environment remains constant between 1973 and 1982. Since a' primary difference between,1973 and 1982 other than inflation is the regulatory environment,'a majority of the additional costs for McGuire and Catawba stations may be assigned as a regulatory impact. While O portion of the added cost;s 'are the results of changes desired ~
- by tho utility,. it la c:nservatively estimated that at locct 60 percent of the increase is the result of NRC regulatory changes.
The additienal cost in 1982 dellars for the McGuire Station is - s1,893 millien and for,the Catawba Station is 32,345 million. l A 60 percent regulate =y impact is $1,136 millien for McGuire and
- 1,407 million for catawba.
,This added regulatory impact on McGuire,and Catawba, when ecmpared to Oconee, is about 40 percent of' tha total station 1981 equivalent value. Nuclear Capacity Actual c: Antic:. pated 1982 Equivalent Value Station (MWe) Dolla: Value Total Scataen value /:G Total Sea. Value/KW Oconee 2661 $ 493,000,000 ~$135 $1,134,000,000 445 l McGuire 2360 1,955,000,000 - 828 2,942,000,000 51,247 Catawba 2200 2,923,000,000 $1, 279 3,364,000,.000 51,469 Cc=carisen in 1982 Ecu1 valent Collars $1247 pe': KW McGuire' Unit Cost Ocense Unit, Cost. 445 per KW Difference 3 802 per KW Additional McGuire Station Cost: 5802 x 2,360,000 KW =. $1,892,000,000 Utility Improvements - 40 pe= cent. $757,000,000 =- Regulatory I= pact - 60 percent. = $1,135,000,000 Catawba Unit cost 51469 per KW 0;cnee Unit. Cost 445 per KW ,' Difference-1024 per KW Additional Catawba: Station Costs - $1024 x 2,290,000 KW $2,345,000,000 = Utility Improvements 40 percent =- $938,000,000 ) Regulatory Impact l 60 percent = S1,407,000,000 b t 9
_g. i i 4 j Cemmonwealth Edison Company j~ Evron Nuclear Power Station - 2 Units l The Eyron station consists of two PWR nuclear units wi'.h a combined capacity of 2240.We. Construction permits were issued I by the NRC for these units in December 1975.* At the time of - l recal.ving the CP's, the cost estimate for the two units was i j
- $1,164 million, with anticipated commercial operation dates of May 1980' and May,1982.
i The current cost estimate for the two Byron units is $2,764 l million. The fuel load dates for the two units are August 1982 i l and August 1984. I, c'e m e a r a t i v e Reesulaterv 't'e st Tatsmet of Tien and Evren Muelear Power Stations ~ i l An approximation of the cost impact of regulatory changes can ' he illustrated by comparing the costs and time of construction of j the Zion'and Byron power stations. Each station has two pressurized 1 water reactors of. about the saine. size, from the same manuf acturer, ,. ware designed by the sue A-E and constructed by the same i contractor. Th.e actual cost of the Zion station was $582 million, with 'a. 52-month construction' period and commercial ' service in October 1973. Th's estimated cost.for the Eyron station is $2;T64 million,. j j with a 92-month construction period and commercial service of l 1 rehruary 1984'. When Zion ecsts are escalated to correspond with i the Byron.' cost. estimate., tha result is a comparative : ion ecst o't i 59,54 million. The difference between the " Escalated Zion Cost" ) 4 j and the " Estimated Eyron. Cost" is $1,310 million. While'seme of j 1 .s..... ..a . s .. i, 4 --....... a....,,.,,- -..,,, 4., 4 4...,a
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