ML19344D279: Difference between revisions
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (StriderTol Bot change) |
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (StriderTol Bot change) |
||
Line 443: | Line 443: | ||
, However, if weather and roadway conditions could hamper the evacuation process sheltering people within their own homes or public safety, could substantially reduce whole body exposures. To maximize the benefits of sheltering, windows and doors of homes should be closed and sealed, and ventilation systems turned off to minize the turnover rate of air within the building. | , However, if weather and roadway conditions could hamper the evacuation process sheltering people within their own homes or public safety, could substantially reduce whole body exposures. To maximize the benefits of sheltering, windows and doors of homes should be closed and sealed, and ventilation systems turned off to minize the turnover rate of air within the building. | ||
Calculations have shown that sheltering individuals can reduce the dose j from inhaled radionuclides by up to 35 percent.' Larger reductions can be achieved by the emergency sealing of openings in the structure such as | Calculations have shown that sheltering individuals can reduce the dose j from inhaled radionuclides by up to 35 percent.' Larger reductions can be achieved by the emergency sealing of openings in the structure such as | ||
, | ,(( taping windows or placing wet paper over cracks. . | ||
In the event of an atmospheric release of radioactive materials, doses to the public could occur by external radiation, by exposure to external radiation from radionuclides deposited on the ground and other surfaces, or by internal exposure due to inhalation of radienuclides. Levels in excess of accepted protective action quidelines would generally occur closer to the souroe so that the protective actions could be recommended on a two-phase approach. The first phase would be to evacuate indivduals close to the source (i.e., within 1-5 mile radius), while the second phase could be a recommendation to take shelter and institute food, water, and milk | In the event of an atmospheric release of radioactive materials, doses to the public could occur by external radiation, by exposure to external radiation from radionuclides deposited on the ground and other surfaces, or by internal exposure due to inhalation of radienuclides. Levels in excess of accepted protective action quidelines would generally occur closer to the souroe so that the protective actions could be recommended on a two-phase approach. The first phase would be to evacuate indivduals close to the source (i.e., within 1-5 mile radius), while the second phase could be a recommendation to take shelter and institute food, water, and milk | ||
~ control. Beyond 10 miles there is little distinction between the effectiveness of evacuation and sheltering in terms of minimizing projected health effects.' | ~ control. Beyond 10 miles there is little distinction between the effectiveness of evacuation and sheltering in terms of minimizing projected health effects.' |
Latest revision as of 20:14, 15 March 2020
ML19344D279 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Fort Saint Vrain ![]() |
Issue date: | 02/29/1980 |
From: | STONE & WEBSTER ENGINEERING CORP. |
To: | |
Shared Package | |
ML19344D271 | List: |
References | |
NUDOCS 8003110629 | |
Download: ML19344D279 (46) | |
Text
T O
PRELIMINARY EVACUATION TIME STUDY OF THE 10-MILE RADIUS EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE AT THE FORT ST. VRAIN STATION Prepared for:
Public Service Co:::pany of Colorado k
FEBRUARY 1980 o
e by Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation Denver, Colorado f and Boston, Massachusetts 8003110'{Q;
l TABLE OF COFTENTS Section Title Pagua 1
SUMMARY
2 INTRODUCTION .......................................
3 RESULTS ............................................
4 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...................................
APPENDIX A BACKGROUND DOCLHEIC APPENDIX B SPECIAL FACILITIES i
f m
i
.}
l r s. I e I
LIST OF TABLES Table Title g 3-1 ESTIMATED EVACUATION TIME - GENERAL POPULATI0!i..........
3-2 SPECIAL FACILITIES WITH ESTIMATED MOBILIIATION..........
TIME OF 60 MINUTES OR GREATER
+- A-1 SECTOR ANALYSIS.........................................
A-2 Z ONE CHA RACTE RISTI CS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
- A-3 ,
SPECIAL FACILITIES - ESTIMATED EVACUATION...............
TRAVEL TIME B-1 SPE CI AL FA CILITIES . . . . . . .'. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
r i
e h
J
m r
! - LIST OF FIGURES i-e Figure Title Pagg 2-1 GENERALIZED SECTOR / EVACUATION MAP AND SPECIAL 1 -
+ FACILITIES..............................................
, t 3-1 ESTIMATED SECTOR EVACUATION TIMES.......................
. T'-
s Y
t t
4 u t.
t ik
+ ,-
~
t d
4 {
e 1 e, 4
4 a
h b
l' 4
Y t t # = 1 --w --
er-- - - + e s -- m--me + e r- *--me>+v- - w-1%--r-W-+ee*m,-- e--*--e<*-+--r-- e- -==*v-w-n - ,rv.e---
SECTION 1 9
SUMMARY
4 Public Service Company of Colorado (PSCC), in response to a request from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)* has prepared this assessment of the time required to evacuate the area located within a 10 mile radius of the Fort St. Vrain Station, near Platteville, Colorado. This report is based on emergency planning data available at this time. Its findings are subject to revision af ter local emergency plans have been fully developed.
Findings developed in this assessment are currently under review by state and local emergency planners.
Based upon a 1979 resident population of approximately 13,000 people within 10 miles of the station and an employee population of 350 the best estimate of evacuation times and maximum special facilities mobilization times by zone are as shown on the table that follows:
I
( .
' Letter of November 29, 1979, from Brian K. Grimes, Director Emergency Preparedness Task Group, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, to all Power Reactor Licensees l
l
"~
l l
Best Estimated Estimate - Maximum General Special Population Facilities Evacuation Mobilization Zone' Description Time (Hours) Time (Hours)"
Sector I Area 0-2 miles from 4.0 N/A plant and west of the South Platte River Sector II Area 0-2 miles from 2.0 N/A plant and east of the South Platte River Sector I&V Area between 2-5 mile 7.0 N/A radius on the west side of the South Platte River and south of County Road 36 plus
{
Sector I f Sectors I&VI Area between 2-5 mile 8.0 N/A radius on the. west side of the South Platte River and north of County Road 36, plus Sector I
' Sectors are shown on Figure 2-1
- In no instance does the maximum evacuation time of a special facility exceed the best estimate of the general population time for a zone.
~
Best Estimated Estimate - Maximum General Special Population Facilities Evacuation Mobilization Zone Description Time (Hours) Time (Hours)
Sectors II Area between 2-5 mile 5.0 N/A
& III radius on the east side of the South Platte River, and north of County Road 36, plus Sector II Sectors II & Area between 2-5 mile 8.0 0.3 IV radius on the east side of the South Platte River, and south of County Road 36 plus sector II Sectors I,V, Area between 5-10 m'le 9.0 0 3-1.0
& IX radius on the west side of the South Platte River, north from the Platte River '
to County Road 36, plus Sectors I&V l Sectors I,VI Area between 5-10 mile 90 0.3
&X radius on the west side of the South Platte River, and north of County Road 36, plus Sectors I&VI i
,, ,__ r --
Best Estimated Estimate - Maximum General Special Population Facilities Evacuation Mobilization Zone Description Time (Hours) Time (Hours)
- Sectors II, Area between 5-10 mile 90 03 III, & VII radtus on the east side of the South Platte River and north of County Road 36, plus Sectors II, III Sectors II, Area between 5-10 mile 10.0 0.3 IV & VIII radius on the east side of the South Platte River and south of County
< Road 36, plus Sector
, II and IV Inclement weather conditions, particularly during the winter season, have the potential for delaying evacuation. If evacuation routes cannot be kept open to ensure prompt and safe evacuation, consideration will be given to the implementation of alternate protective actions.
l
=
SECTION 2 INTRODUCTION This report presents an assessment, by sector, of estimated times to evacuate the general population and identified special facilities - such as hospitals, schools, nursing homes, - located within 10 miles of the Fort St. Vrain Station. The assessment has been prepared in compliance with the NRC's November 29, 1979, letter to all licensees authorized to operate a nuclear power reactor. This preliminary report is based on emergency planning data available at this time. Report contents are currently being reviewed by local emergency planning officials.
Evacuation routes were identified from the Colorado State Radiological Emergency Responnse Plan (RERP) for Fort St. Vrain as revised to Nov.,1979 and from information obtained in meetings with the Weld County Sheriff's Department and other state and local agencies. Notification time estimates were developed from available resources. Basic population estimates,
- distribution, and density data were obtained from the State RERP. Major employment centers were identified by survey. The only major employment center in the area is the Fort St. Vrain Station. Data so collected were used to assess estimated evacuation times on a sector basis.
Specifically, the following three methods of analysis were utilized to develop a range of estimated evacuation times by sector and to confirm the capacity of the local roadway network available to handle projected
, evacuation loads. A more detailed discussion of these methodologies and their results is contained in Appendix A of this report.
l
e q W
e e e t io u u c - ~ ,
. x
- e n
- D m v'o.., ,%.
I tN.L, g amLLmt n U I s uitt WM 9 e e/. 1 - -
/ / \ 3
- - A
/ . \,
e
- E 2 MILE 8 N w/ .,wo
- /
e { ( 1 ,2'r 1\ /\ ~
G / !
l QO =}
~ '
t \ w
,, e\", .
%('" ma s
it q
i 9
=
/
LittWG h COUNTY NCAO Q staff RCAO
@ U S EIGT417
$*E*A PActLetT h
0
- 2 3 4 3 SCALt - neiLE$
i In, ..
T j 'g g
FOR COMMENTS ONLY.
, FIGURE 2.1 SPECIAL FACILITIES AND EVACUATION ROUTES FORT ST. VRAIN, COLORADO PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO ame-
- 1. Calculations of evacuation time utilizing the Houston Evacuation Model, referenced in the prepared testimony of R.W. Houston on behalf of the NRC in the matter of Northern States Power, Tyrone Energy Park, Unit 1, Eau Claire, Wisconsin, October 7,1976, Docket No. 50-484;
- 2. Estimation of evacuation times utilizing the Population Density ve.-sus Evacuation Time Curve referenced in " Evacuation Risk - An Evaluation", USEPA Office of Radiation Programs, EPA-520/6-74-002; and
- 3. Estimation of a-" .able highway capacity and traffic volumes utilizing a modification of a method referenced in the prepared testimony of James A. Martin, Jr., on behalf of the NRC in the matter of Puget Sound Power and Light Company, Skagit Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2, Washington.
Estimates of mobilization times for special facilities are based upon contacts with the special facilities identified on Figure 2-1. These estimates are contained in Appendix B. Travel time required for personnel from the special facilities to evacuate the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone is presented in Table A-3 The following assumptions have been made in analyzing the data:
i
- 1. That evacuation of the outer NRC designated sectors and the inner
, adjacent sectors occur simultaneously (i.e., within the 5-mile radius, evacuation of Sector V require.= the simultaneous evacuation of Sector I; and within the 10-mile radius, evacuation of Section X requires the simultaneous evacuation of Sector VI and Sector I).
The sectors are aligned to coincide with geographic and highway boundaries familiar to the public.
- 2. That automobiles will be the predominant means of transportation, with the exception of buses for school children, hanoicapped, or otherwise nonambulatory persons. An average of one automobile per dwelling unit for residential evacuation and an average of 0.9 automobiles per person for employee evacuation is also assumed.
This assumption is based upon general experience for work related travel vehicle occupancy.
3 That school children will be evacuated directly from the area to ,
predesignated locations where their parents will be reunited with them. Emergency radio messages will confirm the evacuation actions of specific schools.
- 4. That population data used in the analysis represents the latest and most readily available data. Figures are based on data supplied by The State Division of Disaster Emergency Services (D0 DES) and include estimated total resident population, workers employed in the sector, as well as other identifiable concentrations of population. A conservative average of 2.2 persons per dwelling unit was assumed by D0 DES. This dwelling unit occupancy level was adopted in this report.
- 5. That designated evacuation routes will remain open to evacuation traffic through such measures as removal of snow and disabled vehicles, sanding, and special traffic suidance control measures.
l l
- 6. That sufficient manpower and resources will be available to j i, activate and enforce evacuation routing. It is also assumed that
! at least one traffic lane on each evacuation route will be available for buses and other emergency vehicles. Use of a single lane results in a conservative estimate for evacuation times.
lL 1
i 4
d
- 7. That unavoidable time delays will be incurred between the time of initial notification and accomplishment of evacuation, but that these delays will be minimized by advance planning which will include periocic mailers to area residents identifying sector evacuation routes, evacuation centers and other evacuation 4 instructions. Based upon results of similar evacuation studies, an average of 20 minutes for public preparation time (i.e.,
mobilization time) has been allowed for the public to react to evacuation notification.
e
- 8. That inclement weather conditions, particularly during the winter season, have the potential for delaying evacuation. In this connection, it is assumed that the practice of plowing early and often in a snow storm, together with the application of sand to icy roads, will allow continued mobility during a snow storm i evacuation. It is also assumed that existing practices dealing with other severe storms, including the clearance of fallen trees and wires and the provision of alternate routing around washouts, a will be adequate to ensure mobility during severe weather. If assurances are not provided that evacuation routes can be kept open for prompt and safe evacuation, consideration will be given to implementation of alternate protective actions.
(
- 9. That principal evacuation directions are north and south, although selected east and west roads will also be used. Only those s roadways which provide a sector direct access beyond the 10-mile
, radius have been considered as evacuation routes. All evacuation lf routes have an assumed capacity of 1000 vehicles an hour, except for U.S. 85 which is assumed to have a capacity of 1500 vehicles an j, hour. Evacuation routes and plans are discussed in more detail in
('.
Appendix A.
!i 10. That in timea of immediate peril, a farm community can be mobilized in about the same time as a urban residential community.
i l
l .
9 SECTION 3 l
RESULTS Ranges of estimated notification and evacuation times for the general public during good weather conditions are shown, by sector, on Figure 3-1 and in Table 3-1. These results are subject to change af ter final revisions to local emergency response plans. These estimates range from 1 to 11 hours1.273148e-4 days <br />0.00306 hours <br />1.818783e-5 weeks <br />4.1855e-6 months <br /> for evacuating the 2-mile radius; 3.5 to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> to evacuate the O to 5 mile radius; and 5.25 to 11.0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> to evacuate each of the O-to 10-mile radius.
It was found that of the three methodologies applied in this study, the graph method number 2 usually produced the highest evacuation times while the method based on modification of the James A. Martin Jr. approach, consistently produced the lowest evacuation times. The middle value of the three evacuation-time estimates, rounded to the nearest hour, is shown in Table 3-1 as the best estimate.
i No specific quantification of the impact of inclement weather conditions on evacuation-time estimates is indicated because current emergency practices should allow sufficient continued mobility on the area's highways during adverse weather conditions. If evacuation routes cannot be kept open,
- consideration will be given to the implementation of alternate protective actions.
t k
4 d
l I ,
e,-
e e e I
to uitt b e 3e i 3
- e 1 a %: %-
L... m 6
- 5 witt 'Nd 9 g /- .1 / .! /\g
/
g .? A \ _o ee E t untt f N w' ....oos/ n
~
74 ' /
s g l ll [ I (' r hs~/ d ~
g %l i V'(\~ f*
-i s y
) i
< \ r--
g
\ %( y! ,
x / ,
3 e .
~ - 9 n,A $f uG
- h g/._*
e _ . ....
s ..... .. i I s . . ... . g e 0;;"?,.'n:2., . .,,
scat met.s ESTD'.ATD Ev101!!:N ZONE TDE(EU.2) 02 m 1 2.5 - 9.0 t H 1.0 -n.0 0-5 1C".I.3 Iav 6.0 -10. 5 I a VI 35-9.5 - - -.J nan: 3.: -ic.5 n a IV 3.o - 2.o FIGURE 3.1 c ie x:2.xs z. v. a n j j5 ,j;b' ESTIMATED SECTOR I.
5:75:c.c EVACUATION TIMES 5'Ih6,2,g.,
Ba n 5 25-u.o FORT ST. VRAIN. COLOR ADO .-
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO j .
, 4
The time required for confirmation of evacuation is not specified because methods to accomplish confirmation have not yet been determined. Further, the consequences of the use of visible verification methods (i.e. occupants
, tying readily visible tags to doors as they leave, have not, to this point been evaluated by local officials. Discussion of appropriate verfication methods will be recommended fcr inclusion in State and local Radiological Emergency Response Plans.
Estimated mobilization times, as well as the names, addresses, and capacities of those special facilities identified on Figure 2-1 which have estimated mobilization times of 60 minutes or greater, are shown in Table 3-2. Evacuation of special facilities located inside the 10-mile area can be accomplished within a maximum of 0.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />, once the facility is 4
mobilized sif sufficient vehicles are available and priority egress is allowed to minimize conflict with other vehicular traffic.
1 y
m I
l
, y _. , ._ ... , , , . ,
6 TABLE 3-1 FORT ST. VRAIN STATION ESTINATED EVACUATION TIME OF Tile CENERAL POPULATION WITHIN 10 HILES OF Tile STATION Estimated Good Weather Evacuation Time Range of Estimated Estimated Total 1979 Estimated Estimated Evacuation Best Resident Not t f! cation Hobillzation Time Jone Population Estimate (Hours )e Time (Hinutess e) (Hours ***)
(Hours ****)
0-2 Hiles I 490 2.1 20 2.0-9.0 4.0 II 76 0.6 20 1.0-11.0 2.0 0-5 H11es I&V 904 6.0 20 1 & VI 6.0-10.25 7.0 1094 30 20 II & III 3 5-9.75 8.0 374 25 20 II & IV 1802 3.00-10.50 5.0 2.4 *
,3 3.00-12.00 8.0 E10 Hines I,V.IX 4449 5.6 20 5.2-9.5 9.0 I.VI.11 5471 4.1 20 5.5-10.25 II,III,8VII 1703 9.0 4.7 20 5.75-9.75 9.0 II,IV,VIII 2244 4.1 20 5.25-11.0 10
- Based on " Testimony of R.W. Houston, Matter of Northern States Power, Tyrone Energy Park, Unit I, EAU claire, Wisconstn*,3 October 7,1976; Docket No. 50-484.
seEstimated 20 minutes mobilization time based on " Evacuation Analysis: Indian Point Site," New York State Office of Disaster Preparedness, New York State Department of Health Hay 1978.
eseRange determined from lowest and highest of the three evacuation time estimates.
- This represents the olddle value of the three evacuation time estimates recorded to the nearest hour.
e ~
~ . ,, ..., , . ,
4 TADt.E 3-2 FORT St. VRAIN STATION SPECIAL FACILit!ES WITH ESTIMATED HOBILIZATION TIME OF 60 MINUTES OR GREATER Hap Total Estisunted Identification capacity Facility N bilization Sector Comununity Number Name/ Address (Persons) Time (liours)e II Frederick 19 Frederick Elem School 735 0 3-1.0 I
e Time required to clear facility and have transportation available, but not to move out of the 10 mile area.
i t ,
d 1
SECTION 4 i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT i
Public Service Company of Colorado wishes to thank state, city, county, e
school officials, representatives and management of special facilities and
, state and local government emergency planners for their assistance in the 4
- preparation and review of this report.
4 4
f
(
t f
1 9
J
- ,e- ,. - -,--,-,n- -
e f
Y" r
Appendix A BACKGROUND DOCUME!C t
4 i
f
?
APPENDIX A a
BACKGROUND DOCUMENT
- Basis of Analysis On November 29, 1979, the Nuclear Regulatory commission requested all power reactor licensees to provide information regarding estimates for evacuation of selected areas around operating nuclear reactors. This information is required to permit the NRC to identify those areas where unusual evacuation constraints exist that could require the consideration of special planning measures or facility modifications. The information will enable the NRC to respond to a recent recommendation from the Environment, Energy, and y Natural Resources Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations.
The area for which the evacuation estimate is required includes the entire area situated within a 10-mile radius about the Fort St. Vrain Station.
Estimates are discussed by sectors including two approximately 180o sectors in the O- to 2-mile radius, four approximately 900 sectors in the O- to 5-mile radius, and four approximatly 900 sectors in the 0-to 10-mile radius. The estimated evacuation times for the outer 5- and 10-mile sectors assume simultaneous evacuation of adjacent inner sectors. l l
l The following information is required for response to the NRC letter: .l l
- 1. Two estimates for each of the areas defined above for evacuation of the general population (not including special facilities). Both a best-weather estimate and an adverse-weather estimate are requested.
w --ir v
- 2. The total time required to evacuate special facilities (e.g.,
hospitals) within each area (best-weather and adverse-weather estimate).
3 The time required for confirmation of evacuation. Confirmation methods may consider special instructions to the public (e.g.,
tying a handkerchief to a door or gate to indicate the occupant has left the premises).
4 Where plans and prompt notification systems are not in place for areas out to 10 miles, estimates of the times required to evacuate j the plume-exposure emergency planning zone (EPZ) until such measures are in place. Notification times greater than 15 minutes are to be included in the evacuation times and footnoted to 4
indicate the notification time.
- 5. Where special evacuation problems are identified (e.g.,
, high-population-density areas), alternative protection actions, such as sheltering which would reduce exposure, and the effectiveness of these measures are to be specified.
- 6. A short background document giving the methods used and the assumptions made to develop estimates, including the identification l* of evacuation routes and methods of transportation used. This document is to note agreement, or areas of disagreement, by 1 i principal local officials.
Based upon the above, the objectives of the study are to determine the characterisitics of the area's roadway system and its capability to
( evacuate the population within a 10-mile radius of the Fort St. Vrain i-Station, to determine limiting factors for evacuating each sector via the
, designated evacuation routes and to estimate evacuation times for each sector.
m W
The study does not address the means to notify the populace to evacuate.
State and local Radiological Emergency Respose Plans will designate predetermined evacuation procedures and responsibilities, including means of public notification and identification of evacuation centers. State and local emergency plans will also include the basis for notification, responsible agencies, methods of 24-hour communication and a general description of the information to be communicated.
In addition, state and local plans will give consideration to methods of verifying public sector notification. Methods to be considered may include f
the use of readily visible evacuation tags previously distributed to a household, and the use of identifying tags or notices on a street or areas basis. In this connection, State and local plans should give consideration to the consequences of visible verification methods (i.e., identification
'{'
of empty homes susceptive to looting).
Evacuation of General Population There is no single recognized methodology to assess an area's evacuation capability. Three approaches have been used to establish a range of evacuation-time estimates.
! The basic information which must be collected to assess an area's evacuability using these methodologies, includes:
- a. The capacity of principal evacuation routes,
! b. Population and its density and distribution on a town, township or sector basis, i c. Estimated notification times for the general population (including employees), as well as mobilization times for special facilities such as schools, hospitals and nursing homes.
i l
d
Most of the information in this report was gathered from the State of Colorado RERP for the Fort St. Vrain Station and by contacting local officials. In addition, special facilities were contacted to determine the maximum number of persons who would have to be evacuated during any given
- period and to obtain estimates of the time required to evacuate the individual site.
Numerous streets and highways within the 10-mile radius were identifed in the existing State Emergency Plan as evacuation routes. For the purposes of this analysis, only those routes which provide direct sector access beyond tha 10-mile radius are considered for evacution routes. This assumption allows the designation of consistent routes of evacuation for any emergency regardless of the number, or location, of the sectors
~{ involved. Taking these considerations into account, the street and highway facilities shown in Table A-1 are designated as evacuation routes.
Population distribution for the area surrounding the Fort St. Vrain Station is based upon data provided by D0 DES. Population data collected from these sources was then distributed within the sectors identified in the November
- 29, 1979, NRC letter.
The major employment center in the area is the Fort St. Vrain Station where a maximum of 350 people are employed. There are no other major employers
' within 10 miles of the plant. No deductions were taken for residents who leave the area for their jobs, schools, or for other reasons. Use of this methodology will result in conservative traffic volumes and evacuation times.
i i
l l
Data were then evaluated using each of the following methodologies:
- 1. An evacuation model developed by Dr. R.W. Houston (1) designed to
. estimate vehicular evacuation times as a function of azimuth and distance about a potential source and based, in part, en information contained in " Evacuation Risks - An Evaluation".(2) The model relates evacuation time in hours (te ) to the population initially in the impact area (N o), the area of impact in square miles ( A), and the number of roads leaving the area (L). The formula developed for this model is te = 1.05 Ao.27N o.23/Lo.5 I
1 For the purposes of the analysis, time is measured from the initial
'{ warning to the population at large since activities to this point are subject to a substantial measure of control and because it is consistent with historical evacuation-time information. Since historical evacuation-time information includes warning times as
, well as evacuation times, initial warning is defined as the f beginning of the notification process and, by definition, coincides with the implementation of evacuation. Thus, the results of this analysis include the time to notify the genera public as well as the time to evacuate the general population from the impacted
[ area. Parameters are inserted into the model to represent the i
effect of time-delay factors which act to prevent instantaneous realization of full evacuation route capacities. These parameters reflect delays due to the spread of warnings, preparation for evacuation, waiting times vacate parking lots and side streets, distances between vehicles, vehicle speeds, variations in speed and driving habits, etc.
! U The time-delay parameter used in the model is based upon an analysis which shows a correlation between road miles per square mile of land area (r) and population density (p). This analysis resulted in a formula (r=0.281 po.403) which, given the population density of an area, yields an estimate of the number of road miles per square mile of land area.
l l' i
i e
Given the area of the evacuation sone, the number of road miles in the area can be estimated.
A second formula (Lg37=r o /2) can then be used to determine the number of evacuation routes in the area if they are not known.
This second formula assumes that the average length of a road within the Area A is on the order of the square root of A; so the average number of roads within the area is approximately rA /A, and one-half of the average nu=ber of roads is available for use as evacuation routes. It should be noted that roads counted as leaving an area do not return to an area and roads internal to an area are not counted as evacuation routes.
i A plot of the resuts of this analysis for selected historical events (Evacuation Risks - An Elevation, USEPA, Office of Radiation Programs, EPA-500/6-74-002) shows that, in high population density regions of about 15,000 persons per square mile or greater, delays appear to be relatively brief and evacuation times are more controlled by roadway capacities. For areas of lower population density, such as around the Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Power Station, 4
evacuation times depend more on parameters other than roadway
! capacities. Taking these considerations into account yields the t
formula intiailly identifed and used in this analysis.
(t e=1.05A0.27No o 23fto,5)
(1) Houston Evacuation Model referenced in the prepared testimony of Mr.
R.W. Houston on behalf of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in the matter of Northern States Power, Tyrone Energy Park, Unit 1, Eau Claire,
! Wisconsin, October 7,1976, Docket No. 50-484.
i
- 2. Method No. 2 (2) utilizes Figure 2, Population Density versus
. Evacuation Time, contained in " EPA-500/6-74-002 as the basis of calculations. This graph is based upon questionnaires completed a
following actual evacuation incidents. It shows a correlation between population density and the time required to evacuate the impacted area using predominantly private vehicles. Population densities surveyed by EPA during development of the graph ranged from approximately 15 persons /per square mile to 20,000 persons / square mile. Evacuation times ranged from 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> to 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> and include warning times as well as the time required to evacuate the population. It is theorized that the greater evacuation times required to evacuate less densely populated areas were largely due to the longer warning times required because of l[' increased distances between persons and the need for the more individual contact; to the longer times required to prepare farms for a " shutdown" than theose required for urban residences, and to limited choice and direction of roads in less dense areas.
{ This second methed requires that the population density by square mile be determined. These data are then entered in the graph and the estimated time and hours to evacuate the area are read directly from the graph.
(2)" Evacuation Risk - An Evaluation, "USEPA Office Radiation Programs, EPA-520/6-74-002; and) 4 3 The third method (3) estimates the ability to evacuate impacted t
areas based on the capacity of local evacuation routes, distance between vehicles, flow rates of vehicles, and vehicle occupancy.
This method determines whether the roads can accommodate the
'l*
evacuating population.
. 4 m
The number of egress routes in each area is first determined. The average capacity for each highway (one lane or more if available) is then derived to define the total average capacity for each area. One lane of each road is maintained open for emergency vehicle traffic. The results represent the number of vehicles which can be accommodated. The maximum time required to accomplish evacuation of each area is then estimated by assigning traffic flows to the various highway links and estimating the times.
i In determining capacities, a value of 1,000 vehicles per lane per
,- hour was assumed.(4) At least one lane of each roadway was assumed l to be kept open for special and emergency vehicles. U.S. Route 85 was assigned a capacity of 1,500 vehicles per lane per hour.
(3)(Modification of a method referenced in the prepared testimony of Jamea A. Martin, Jr., on behalf of the NRC in the matter of Puget Sound Power and Light Company, Skagit Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 Washington.)
(4) Transportation and Traffic Engineering Handbook, The Institute of Traffic Engineers,1976 e
f These three methods of analysis provide a range of estimated evacuation times by sector. The middle value of the three evacuation-time estimates, rounded to the nearest hour, is assume to represent the best estimate.
l . Special Facilities i
The evacuation times for special facilities are based upon direct contacts with the facilities, rather than any of the above methodologies. The special facilities identified included:
- 1. Nursing homes;
- 2. Schools (including voaational, technical, training, and handicapped),
3 Senior citizen activity centers;
- 4. Recreation areas;
- 5. Day care centers
- O The following questions were asked of special facilities located within 10 miles of the Fort St. Vrain Station. The information is for weekday / daytime occurence.
, Nursing Homes
- 1. Number of in-patients?
- 2. Percent of in-patients that would be moved short of imminent disaster to facility?
3 Percent of in-patients identified in Question 2 requiring special
, transportation (e.g. , ambulance, wheelchair)?
I
- 4. Previous experience or time estimates for in-patient evacuation of building (e.g., firedrills)?
t
- 5. Available transportation (quantified) to take patiencs away from facility (e.g., staff autos, ambulances)?
- 6. Where would patients be taken?
Schools i
- 1. Number of students?
- 2. Number of staff and student autos and buses available?
3 Special transportation needs of students?
- 4. Availability of special transportation?
- 5. Previous evacuations or planning (e.g., fire drills, time to laod buses after school)?
Senior Citizen Centers i
- 1. Number of members present at a particular time?
- 2. Available transportation?
3 Special transportation nesds?
I Recreation Areas
- 1. Number of persons at peak use periods?
- 2. Estimated time for evacuation (based on estimated or weather related conditions)?
Day Care i See Schools l Individual Sector Analysis
'I The evacuation analysis of the sectors identified in the November 29, 1979, NRC letter is discussed below on the basis of the O to 2 mile radius, the O to 5 mile radius, and the o to 10 mile radius. The characteristics of the individual sectors are contained in Table A-2.
t j The range of results using the three methodologies previously descirbed were in Table A-1 and are described below.
Analysis of the O to 2 Mile Radius The O to 2 mile radius includes the two approximately 1800 sectors east l
- and west of the South Platte River. The approximately 9 square mile Sector I area is west of the South Platte River and contains about 140 residents and about 350 workers employed at the Fort St. Vrain Station. It I is estimated that approximatley 380 privately-owned vehicles are available to evacuate the total resident and employed population of 490 persons. i i
l i l I-The designated north / south evacuation routes from Sector I are County Road (CR) 17, CR 21, and CR 19 The designated west evacuation routes are CR 34 and CR 36. All routes are two lane roadways. During an emergency, one lane will be maintained free from all but cmergency vehicle traffic and evacuation buses. It is estimated that a-Jh road will carry an average of
1,000 vehicles per hour. As a result, evacuation of Sector I is estimated to require 2.5 to 9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br />. This estimate includes the time necessary to notify and mobilize the population. The best estimate of time is 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
The approximately 3 5 sq mile Sector II area contains 76 residents and no employees. It is estimated that 35 privately owned vehicles are available to evacuate the population.
The designated evacuaton routes from Sector II are CR 36, 38, and 23 All are two lane roadways with an estimated capacity of 1,000 vehicles per hour. It is estimated that Sector II can be evacuated in 1.0 to 11.0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br />, including notification and mobilization time. The best estimate of evacuation time if 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
There were no special facilities identified in either Sector I or Section II.
Anlavsis of the O to 5 Mile Radius The O to 5 mile radius contains four sectors, Sectors III, IV, V and VI, ,
plus the 0-2 mile radius sectors. See?';s 'TI and IV are east of the South Platte River, while Sectors V and VI r>.re west of tne River. Sector III consists of that area within the 2 to 5 mile radius, southeast of the South Platte River and porth of CR 36 and is 11.0 square miles in area.
The analysis assumes that Sector III will be evacuated with Sector II via CR 40, CR 27 .tnd U.S. Bt. The esticited capacity of U.S. 85 is 1,500 vehicles per lane per hour and the tio County Roads are 1,000 vehicles per lane per hour. The 374 residents within this approximately 14.5 sq mile zone can be evacuated in 3 0 to 10.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />, including the time to notify and mobilize residents. The best eptimate of time is 5.0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br />.
Sector IV includes that area within the 2 to 5 mile radius that is south of CR 36 and east of the South Platte River. The approximately 10.5 sq mile sector includes the town of Platteville.
I
The analysis assumes that Sector IV will be evacuated with Sector II by way of U.S. 85. The evacution of the 1,000 residents within the cone containing Sectors II and IV via this facility would require 3.0 to 12.0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br />. including notification and mebilization time. The best estimate of time is 8.0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br />.
The greatest concentration of resident population in Sector IV is near the town of Plattevi'le with a popluation of about 1,500 residents. Special considerations include two schools in Platteville with an enrollment of 635 students.
Sector V encompasses the almost 23 sq mile area witnin the 2 to 5 mile radius situated west of the South Platte River and south of CR 36.
The 904 residents in Sectors I and V will be evacuated by way of CR 19,13, 30, and 34. Evacuation of the approximately 32 sq mile area of Sectors I and V would require 6.0 to 10.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br />, including time to notify and mobilize the population. The best estimate of time is 7.0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br />.
Sector VI is that portion of the 2 to 5 mile radius located west of the South Platte River and north of CR 36. It encompasses approximately 21 square miles of area. This analysis assumes that Sector VI will be evacuated with Sector I.
i
- Sectors I and VI will be evacuated by way of four two-lane roadways, CR 36,
[. 13, 17, and 21. About 3 5 to 9 75 hours8.680556e-4 days <br />0.0208 hours <br />1.240079e-4 weeks <br />2.85375e-5 months <br /> would be required to notify, mobilize and evacuate the 29 sq mile area of Sectors I and VI in which about 1,094 people reside and work. The best estimate of time for the process is 8.0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br />.
4 1
r Analysis of the O to 10 Mile Radius 4
The 0 to 10 mile radius contains four sectors, i.e., Sectors VII, VIII, IX and X, in addition to the sectors within the 0-5 mile radius. Sectors VII and VIII are east of the South Platte River. Sectors IX and X are west of the South Platte River.
Sector VII is located east of the South Platte River and north of CR 36.
The approximately 34 square mile area includes the town of Gilerest. The analysis assumes that Sector VII will be evacuated in conjunction with Sectors II and III. U.S. 85, CR 44, and CR 42 will be used in the evacuation. Approximately 1,703 persons live within the 48 square mile area of Sectors II, III and VII and can be evacuated in 5 75 to 9 75 hours8.680556e-4 days <br />0.0208 hours <br />1.240079e-4 weeks <br />2.85375e-5 months <br /> (including notification and mobilization time). The best estimate of required time is 9 0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br />.
Special concerns for evacuation in the Sectors II, III and VII area include the two schools in Gilcrest with approximately 675 students.
Sector VIII which will be evacuated in conjunction with Sectors II and IV, encompasses approximately 48 square miles of area situated south of CR 36 and east of the South Platte River. Population density in the sector is i low. U.S. 85 will be used to evacuate the majority of the 2,244 residents from the zone CR 32 and CR 39 will also be used to evacuate people near the perimeter of. the zone. About 5.25 to 11.0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> will be required to
, notify, mobilize and evacuate the total population. The best estimate of time is 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />. There are no special facilities for evacuation other
- i than those in.Platteville.
, e-f I The 73 square mile Sector IX situated west of 'the South Platte River and CR j" 36 will be evacuated in conjunction with Sectors I and V by way of CR 7, 13, 19,18, 24, 28, 30, and 34. The notification, mobilization, and
. evacuation of the 4,449 residents and 350 employees in the zone could occur in 5.25 to 9.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />. The best estimate of time is 9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br />. Special concerns for evacuation in the area are schools in Mead and Firestone and the Barbour Ponds State Recreation Area.
l I l
Sector X is located west of the South Platte River and north of CR 36.
Populstion within the sector's 80 square mile area is concentrated in the communities of Milliken and Johnstown. Sector X will be evacuted in conjunction with Sectors I and VI. The estimated 5,471 residents and employees from these sectors will utilize the two lane CR 36, CR 44, CR 46, CR 50, CR 17, CR 21 and CR 54 during the evacuation. Notification, mobilization and evacuation time is estimated to be 5.5 to 10.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br />.
The best estimate of time is 9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br />. Special concerns during the j evacuation include four public schools and a senior citizen's center.
Traffic Control For the most part the evacuation estimates were based on the following assumptions:
[{i
- 1. That the most direst route will be used to evacuate the area,
- 2. That traffic will travel in only one direction on evacuation routes,
,1 3 That traffic will not cross at intersections, and
- 4. That traffic will not be sent from one evacuation zone throu6h another, i.e. traffic from the zone made up of Sector IV & II should not be sent north along U.S. Route 85 into the zone consisting of Sector III, & II during an evacuation.
These traffic patterns will require traffic control points along evacuation routes. The number and location of these control points will be determined by local available resources and by the emergency. The following general recommendations are made.
l-Employees leaving the Fort St. Vrain Station should be sent north along CR
- 19. People leaving Johnstown should be sent west on CR 50. Sending Johnstown residents north along CR 17 could result in delays at the bridge over the Big Thompson River. People leaving Milliken should be sent north along CR 21. This is the most direct route even though there is a river crossing. Platteville should be evacuated south along U.S. Route 85.
l Beyond these general recommendations the only traffic control needed is maintenance of one way tra ffic and the elimination of traffic crossings. '
This plan does not address radiological monitoring of evacuees or their vehicles.
Evacuation of Special Facilities Special facilities identified within 10 miles of the Fort St. Vrain Station are shown on Figure 2-1. An effort was made to identify and contact all special facilities within the 10-mile area.
I The facilities' names, addresses, type of facility, maximum number of residents /studets, number of staff / student automobiles available, and
'; esttmated mobilization time are contained in Appendix B. Estimated evacuation-travel times for special facilities are shown in Table A-3 for a given type of facility. Generally, personnel from school facilities would be evacuated by high capacity vehicles which would receive priority treatment during evacuation. The emergency lane provided on each evacuation route would be used by vehicles transporting special facility personnel. Thus, relatively high, speeds (assumed at 20 mph) could be attained. As a result, maximum travel time for evacuating personnel from special facilities beyond the 10-mile area should not exceed one-half hour.
Alternative Actions
! Evacuation of the population to minimize public exposure to a passing radioactive material cloud is the protective action most discussed. There are, however, other protective measures available which may be more appropriate L
9
Generally, the type of accident is the first consideration.' If a low probability, " core degredation" accident occurs, a relatively long release duration would generally result in a recommendation for evacuation.
, However, if weather and roadway conditions could hamper the evacuation process sheltering people within their own homes or public safety, could substantially reduce whole body exposures. To maximize the benefits of sheltering, windows and doors of homes should be closed and sealed, and ventilation systems turned off to minize the turnover rate of air within the building.
Calculations have shown that sheltering individuals can reduce the dose j from inhaled radionuclides by up to 35 percent.' Larger reductions can be achieved by the emergency sealing of openings in the structure such as
,(( taping windows or placing wet paper over cracks. .
In the event of an atmospheric release of radioactive materials, doses to the public could occur by external radiation, by exposure to external radiation from radionuclides deposited on the ground and other surfaces, or by internal exposure due to inhalation of radienuclides. Levels in excess of accepted protective action quidelines would generally occur closer to the souroe so that the protective actions could be recommended on a two-phase approach. The first phase would be to evacuate indivduals close to the source (i.e., within 1-5 mile radius), while the second phase could be a recommendation to take shelter and institute food, water, and milk
~ control. Beyond 10 miles there is little distinction between the effectiveness of evacuation and sheltering in terms of minimizing projected health effects.'
Other actions which may be used include removal of grazing animals from
'. pasture; div raion of raw milk to milk products such as cheese and butter;
-i closing wate intake valves from a contaminated water source; importation of uncontaminated food and water supplies; decontamination of contaminated materials and foodstuffs; and, use of potassium iodide as a prophlylaxis to reduce the dose to the thyroid.
These represent o.117 a few of the alternate courses which could be taken in a radiological emergency. The particular actions chosen will, of course, depend upon the type and severity of the accident as well as such other parameters as meteorological conditions, time of day and so forth.
f
-}
eExamination of Offsite Emergency Protective Measures for Core Melt Accidents. Aldrich, D.C. , McGrath, P.E. , Ericson, D.M. , Jr. , and Jones, R.B., of Sandia Laboratories, Alburquerque, New Mexico, and Rasmussen, N.C., Department of Nuclear Engineering, M.I.T., Cambridge, Massachusetts,
- as presented at the American Nuclear Society Topical Meeting of 4 Probabalistic Analysis of Nuclear Reactor Safety, May 8-10, 1978.
1 1
l 4
4 l
i 1
4
e TABt.E A-1 FORT ST. VRAIK JTATION SECTOR ANALTSIS Fraeuation Routes Estimated Good Weather Evacuation flee Range of Estteated Estimated Notification Estteated Average Time in
?otal Popu. Ilo. of Mobiliza- Total lation To be Vehicles Facility Excess or tion Evacuation Zone Evacuated llo. of Capacity 15 Min' timees Times Available Facility Lanes (Veh/hr) (Minutes) (Minutes) (Hours)ese 0-2 Miles I 490 180 CR17 2 1000 110 20 CR19 2 1000 2.5-9.0 CR21 2 1000 CR34 2 1000 CR36 2 1000 II 16 35 CR23 2 1000 20 20 1.0-11.0 CR36 2 1000 CR 1R 2 1000 0-5 Miles
! e' 904 567 Cat) 2 1000 345 20 CRI9 2 6-10.25 1000 CR30 2 1000 CR34 2 1000 I & VI 1994 653 Cal 3 2 1000 16 5 20 CR17 2 1000 3.5-9.75 CR21 2 1000 CR36 2 1000 II & III 374 170 CR77 2 1000 135 20 CR40 2 1000 3.0-10.5 U.S. 85 4 1000 II & IV 1802 slg U.S. 85 4 1500 130 20 3.0 12.00 0-10 Miles I.Y II 4449 217R CR 7 2 1000 320 20 CR 13 2 1000 5.25-9.5 CR19 2 1000 Cal 8 2 1000 CR24 2 1000 CR28 2 1000 CR30 2 1000 CR34
, ,, . . . . . - , ^~ -' ' '
e i
TADLE A-1 FORT ST. TRAIN STAfl0N SECTOR ANALYSIS Evacuation Routes Estiested Good Weather Evacuation Tlee Range of Estimated Estimated Nott rication Estimated Average flee in Mobilita.
Totta Popu No. of Facility Total la tion To be Vehtolas Excess of tion Evacuation Evacuated No. of Capaatty 15 Min' time Times
. Zone Available Facility lanes (Veh/hr) (Minutes) (Minutes) (flours)' "
I VI , & I 5471 2643 CR 17 2 1000 230 20 5.5-9.5 CR 21 2 1000 CR 36 2 1000 CR 44 2 1000 CR 46 2 1000 CR So 2 1000 CR 54 2 1000 II,III EVII 1703 774 U.S. 85 4 1500 265 20 CR 42 2 5.15-9 15 1000 CR 44 2 1000 II,IV,VIII 2244 in20 CR 32 2 1000 230 20 CR 39 2 5.25-11.0 1000 U.S. 85 4 1500
- Based on "Testtaony of R.W. Houston, Matter of Northern States Power, Tyrone Energy Park, Unit 1 . EAU Clair, Wisconsin:3 October 7,1976; Docket No. 50-484
- Estimated 20 minutes unbilization time based on
- Evacuation Analysist Indian Point Site, "New Yort State Orrice of Disaster Preparedness, New York State Department of Health, May 1978.
8888arge deterstned from lowest and hiahest of the three evacuation time estimates .
il.- . _, - . _ _ , - ..
TABLE A-2 FORT ST. VRAIN STATION ZONE CHARACTERISTICS Population Evacuation Vehicles Area Total To Be Resident Employee Zone' (So M1) Residents Employees Evacuated Owned Owned Total 0-2 Miles I 9.2 140 350 490 64 315 379 II 3.4 76 -
76 35 -
35 0-5 Miles I&V 33.8 554 350 904 252 315 567 I & VI 29.2 744 350 1094 338 315 653 II & III 14.7 374 -
374 170 -
170 II & IV 14.9 1802 -
1802 819 -
819 0-10 Miles I,V, IX 106.8 4099 350 4449 1863 315 2178 I, VI, x 109.6 5121 350 5471 2328 315 2643 II,III,VII 47.7 1736 -
1736 774 -
774 II,IV,VIII 62.8 2244 -
2244 1020 -
1020
. i o e r m e i n v T
i o an d e
n t dt e t o a naD u0 ?
i e ad p2 t
a r
c nno m roor m
oy t
r u te oiif cl o c I - - - - - ftt - - -
n F a aad ei
,, v gzce mm f E n!i r i u o
__ s d i!fi t s s s Et e s nt iu rbt q t a e
u i t n a oe i T a n
re oz Wmnr ve at d
a s L i t
1 i ra t u r
E a nt e 8 8 c e i V E
ei n d a A SC - - - - - o 0 0 - nv l
R ae i
T m l
e
,o 0 O et 1 I m 01 T il e 0 A t e d 1 U v i T C l a s A A t
u er t T V r vt u S E t a o 3
s r
ro tt d N D 0 A I E u 7, e A T N - - - - o es t E R A 1 - - - t a a L
V M uh c B
A I n y o T T
. T S imt l e
S E i r
0l T - 2i a R e c O S r .a s F E a ef r I C m e T ia t I y 0 s t n L a s nd s e I D - - - - 1 O - - - C C oa A i o n F t r e a z L cf i A i o t I f i C i s C E s t e P l ol r S o ni. m o
o e i
h 0 7 8 8 d n c tf e e S - - - - 1 0 0 0 -
uoe n p S
irs d me n bl an 5me 1 uv o
ei I
I I n na rt r aa
)
V I V, I oet Ct s
r 1 e 4, I V, dt h.. y S
I V 4, c I V u e I I e sm H. an o n V I S i
f I
I, I, Di h o V. V, aoP a
( Z I I
I 6
1 I
I I I f
O I I
I I
I B r
" fE
- r
- V
, se ~
4 Appendix B SPECIAL FACILITIES (Later) 4 t
e
~
o 9
TABLE B-1 FORT ST. VRAIN STATION SPECIAL FACILITIES WITHIN 10 MILES OF TIIE STATION Est.
No. of Fao1111ty Map Haalaus Starr/ Student Mob 111:stion ID Des 1 dents Vehicles Time Greater Than Cosaun it y No.e Sector Name of Facility Address Students Available 20 Min.**
Gilcrest 1 VII C11 crest Sr. High School 504 40 Buses 125 Students 2 VII C11 crest Eles. School 167 40 Starr 3 VII C11erest Sr. Citizens Center 35 Platteville 4 IV Platteville Eles. School 293 6 Buses 25 Starr 5 IV Platteville Middle School 342 6 IV Snoopy's Day Care 13 4 7 IV Platteville Nursing Home 3 Fredertok 8 II Frederick Elee. School 735 to Buses 45 80 Staff 100 Student 9 II Frederick Sr. High School 512 Mead 10 II Head Eles. School 336 7 Buses 36 Starr 11 II Mead Jr. H!sh School 197 1 Bus, 1 Van, 12 Cars 12 II Countef View Carte Nursing 85 Home Milliken 13 I Milliken Eless. School 256 14 I Milliken Middle School 242 15 I Milliken Sr. Citizens Center 20 Johnstom 16 I Johnsto m Eles. School 321 For Milliken &
' Johnstown Schools, 6 Buses each 17 I Johnstown High School 299 65 Start 60 Students 18 I Johnstom Sr. Cittsens Center 35 19 II Barbour Ponds State 575 No Transportation Recreation Area Ave 11able
~ '~ ' ' ' - - ~- , _._._ _.. , ,
= !
f
- =,
Firestone 20 II Tri City Sr. Citizen Center 30 20 Cars Dracono 21 II Carbon Yalley Day Cam Center 40 -
- Refers *o Figure 2-1 seMobilisation of 20 minutes is based on " Evacuation Analysis Indian Point Site": New York State Office of Diaster Preparedness, New York State Department of Health, May 1976. The time to mobilise also assumes buses or automobiles are readily available for evaluation.
.I e
e l
,..o Table B-2 SPECIAL FACILITIES
, Names and Locations (later)
?
l t !
1 l
i l
l I
I l
l l