ML19254E245: Difference between revisions
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NRC FORM 366 (7 77) | NRC FORM 366 (7 77) | ||
. LICENSEE EVENT REPORT | . LICENSEE EVENT REPORT CONT ROL BLOCK: l l l l l l l (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) 1 6 lo l1l l 0lH l Dl E Sl1l@lOl0]-l0l0lNlPlFl-l0l3l@l4l1IL 23 20 LICENSt l1 T YPE 1JJ@l51 CAl T 68l@ | ||
7 8 9 LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICkNSE NLNsLH CON'T 0 i SYR] l L j@l 0l 5 l 0 l - l 0 l 3 l 4bdl 6 63@l 0EVENT l 9DATE] 2 l 5 l 7 ] 9 l@l1l0l2l3l7l9 74 7S REPOHT D ATE 80 7 6 60 bl_ DOCKET NUf/ DER EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROB ABLE CONSEGUENCES h l o l 2 l l 0n September 25, 1974 at 0316 hours while performing ST 5071.04, " Auxiliary Feedwater I a 3 l System Channel Functional Test", the Auxiliary Feed Pump Turbine steam inlet valve MS196 o la l on system 1 lost its indication. The system was declared inoperable placing the unit i o s ! l in the Action. Statement of Technical Specification 3.7.1.2. On September 26, 1979 at l o c_j i 2030 hours wh!1e troubleshooting MS106, MS106A (cross-connect from system 1 to 2) was l 0 7 l found not operating. The unit remained in the action statement. There was no danger [ | |||
CONT ROL BLOCK: l l l l l l l (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) 1 6 lo l1l l 0lH l Dl E Sl1l@lOl0]-l0l0lNlPlFl-l0l3l@l4l1IL 23 20 LICENSt l1 T YPE 1JJ@l51 CAl T 68l@ | |||
7 8 9 LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICkNSE NLNsLH CON'T 0 i SYR] l L j@l 0l 5 l 0 l - l 0 l 3 l 4bdl 6 63@l 0EVENT l 9DATE] 2 l 5 l 7 ] 9 l@l1l0l2l3l7l9 74 7S REPOHT D ATE 80 | |||
7 6 60 bl_ DOCKET NUf/ DER EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROB ABLE CONSEGUENCES h l o l 2 l l 0n September 25, 1974 at 0316 hours while performing ST 5071.04, " Auxiliary Feedwater I a 3 l System Channel Functional Test", the Auxiliary Feed Pump Turbine steam inlet valve MS196 o la l on system 1 lost its indication. The system was declared inoperable placing the unit i o s ! l in the Action. Statement of Technical Specification 3.7.1.2. On September 26, 1979 at l o c_j i 2030 hours wh!1e troubleshooting MS106, MS106A (cross-connect from system 1 to 2) was l 0 7 l found not operating. The unit remained in the action statement. There was no danger [ | |||
o a l to the public or to station personnel. The redundant system was operable. (NP-33-79 11) 7 8 9 SYSTEY CAUSE CAUSE COMP. VALVE CCDE CODE SUBCODE CO?/PCNF NT CODE SUBCODE SUSCODE 7 | o a l to the public or to station personnel. The redundant system was operable. (NP-33-79 11) 7 8 9 SYSTEY CAUSE CAUSE COMP. VALVE CCDE CODE SUBCODE CO?/PCNF NT CODE SUBCODE SUSCODE 7 | ||
o el 8 | o el 8 | ||
Line 42: | Line 38: | ||
$1 S NPOWER OTHER STATUS DSCO RY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION i 5 U @ l1l0 0l@ NA l l B l@l Operator observation l ACTivt TY CO TENT OF RELE ASE A90UNT OF ACTIVITY LOCATION OF RELE ASE i o LZj ASE@D l Z l@l NA RELE l l NA 80 7 6 9 10 11 44 45 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES N U P.'8 E R TYPE D E SC RIP TION J l | $1 S NPOWER OTHER STATUS DSCO RY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION i 5 U @ l1l0 0l@ NA l l B l@l Operator observation l ACTivt TY CO TENT OF RELE ASE A90UNT OF ACTIVITY LOCATION OF RELE ASE i o LZj ASE@D l Z l@l NA RELE l l NA 80 7 6 9 10 11 44 45 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES N U P.'8 E R TYPE D E SC RIP TION J l | ||
i 7 10101 Ol@l Zl@l NA | i 7 10101 Ol@l Zl@l NA | ||
' * | ' * | ||
* PE R SON d'imu'R, n 2 '' | * PE R SON d'imu'R, n 2 '' | ||
Line 51: | Line 46: | ||
*'"'''''* NRC USE ONLY 7 010 310 M 7 2 o issuyE l_ l @0EsCR,PTiON NA @ , I lll lll1IiIII; 10 68 63 dJ 6 7 8 9 DVR 79-141, 1%E Oc PREPARER Thomas P. Beeler PHONE. 419-259-5000, Ext. 253 { | *'"'''''* NRC USE ONLY 7 010 310 M 7 2 o issuyE l_ l @0EsCR,PTiON NA @ , I lll lll1IiIII; 10 68 63 dJ 6 7 8 9 DVR 79-141, 1%E Oc PREPARER Thomas P. Beeler PHONE. 419-259-5000, Ext. 253 { | ||
TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE SUPPLEE "TAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-79-111 DATE OF EVENT: September 25, 1979 FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURPERCE: Lost indication on MS106 and failuie of MS106A relay R2 Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 1, with Power (MD:) = 2770, and Load (Gross E4E) = 918. . | |||
TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE SUPPLEE "TAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-79-111 | |||
DATE OF EVENT: September 25, 1979 FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURPERCE: Lost indication on MS106 and failuie of MS106A relay R2 Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 1, with Power (MD:) = 2770, and Load (Gross E4E) = 918. . | |||
Description of Occurrence: Un September 25, 1979 at 0316 hours while performing Sur-veillance Test ST 5071.04, " Auxiliary Feedwater System Channel Functional Test", valve MS106, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine Steam Inlet Valve 1-1 from Steam Generator 1-1 lost its indication. Auxiliary Feedwater System 1-1 was declared inoperable placing the unit in the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.7.1.2. This requires two independent auxiliary feedwater systems available while in Modes 1, 2, and 3. With one system inoperabic, the inoperable system shall be restored to operable status within 72 hours or be in hot shutdown within the next 1.' hours. | Description of Occurrence: Un September 25, 1979 at 0316 hours while performing Sur-veillance Test ST 5071.04, " Auxiliary Feedwater System Channel Functional Test", valve MS106, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine Steam Inlet Valve 1-1 from Steam Generator 1-1 lost its indication. Auxiliary Feedwater System 1-1 was declared inoperable placing the unit in the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.7.1.2. This requires two independent auxiliary feedwater systems available while in Modes 1, 2, and 3. With one system inoperabic, the inoperable system shall be restored to operable status within 72 hours or be in hot shutdown within the next 1.' hours. | ||
On September 26, 1979 at 2030 hours while troubleshooting MS106, it was discovered that MS106A was not operating ',cause its closing relay R2 contacts were not closing. A .new relay was installed. While attempting to complete ST 5071.04 on September 27, 1979, at 1500 hours, MS106A was not operating because its closing relay R2 ccatacts were not closing. A second new retty was installed. These relay failures are being reported to document a component f ailure. | On September 26, 1979 at 2030 hours while troubleshooting MS106, it was discovered that MS106A was not operating ',cause its closing relay R2 contacts were not closing. A .new relay was installed. While attempting to complete ST 5071.04 on September 27, 1979, at 1500 hours, MS106A was not operating because its closing relay R2 ccatacts were not closing. A second new retty was installed. These relay failures are being reported to document a component f ailure. | ||
Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: MS106 was not operating properly because of a grounded control circuit which blew the control power fuse and ;aused its loss of all indication and control. MS106A was not opera:ing because closing relay R2 contacts were not closing. The problem was determined to be internal to the relay. The relay coil would pickup properly but its contacts would not close. The second failure on September 27, 1979 was corrected by installing a new relay. The new relay had to have its pins spread to make proper contact in the socket base. | Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: MS106 was not operating properly because of a grounded control circuit which blew the control power fuse and ;aused its loss of all indication and control. MS106A was not opera:ing because closing relay R2 contacts were not closing. The problem was determined to be internal to the relay. The relay coil would pickup properly but its contacts would not close. The second failure on September 27, 1979 was corrected by installing a new relay. The new relay had to have its pins spread to make proper contact in the socket base. | ||
Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or to station personnel. Auxiliary Feedwater System Train 2 was operable had it been required. | Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or to station personnel. Auxiliary Feedwater System Train 2 was operable had it been required. | ||
Corrective Action: Under Maintenance Work 3rder (MWO) 79-3033, the first occurrence was investigated. It was found that the ccatrol circuit was grounded at the local open indicating light circuit. The lamp retaining ring was tightened, wire re-terminated and control power fuse replaced. As a followup, MWO 79-3132 was issued LER #79-095 1245 349 | |||
Corrective Action: Under Maintenance Work 3rder (MWO) 79-3033, the first occurrence was investigated. It was found that the ccatrol circuit was grounded at the local open indicating light circuit. The lamp retaining ring was tightened, wire re-terminated and control power fuse replaced. As a followup, MWO 79-3132 was issued | |||
LER #79-095 1245 349 | |||
TOLEDO E'#ISON COMPANY DAVIS-BFSSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE PAGE 2 SUPPLE}' ENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-79-111 to inspect additionallocal indicating lights for excessive loose retaining rings, sockets, etc. There were no significant additional findings. The second occur-rence was investigated under MWO 79-3126. The defective R2 relay was replaced. | |||
TOLEDO E'#ISON COMPANY DAVIS-BFSSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE PAGE 2 SUPPLE}' ENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-79-111 | |||
to inspect additionallocal indicating lights for excessive loose retaining rings, sockets, etc. There were no significant additional findings. The second occur-rence was investigated under MWO 79-3126. The defective R2 relay was replaced. | |||
The pins on *he second relay were spread to assure proper contact. Facility Change Request 79-3t.1 was written to evaluate the use of Deutsch relays in the Auxiliary Feedwater System. Auxiliary Feedwater Systea 1 was declared operable by the succes-sful performance of ST 5071.04 at 1810 hours on September 26, 1979. | The pins on *he second relay were spread to assure proper contact. Facility Change Request 79-3t.1 was written to evaluate the use of Deutsch relays in the Auxiliary Feedwater System. Auxiliary Feedwater Systea 1 was declared operable by the succes-sful performance of ST 5071.04 at 1810 hours on September 26, 1979. | ||
Failure Data: Previous failures of auxiliar) feedwater system relays have been reportcd in Licensee Event Report NP-33-79-94. | Failure Data: Previous failures of auxiliar) feedwater system relays have been reportcd in Licensee Event Report NP-33-79-94. | ||
LER #79-095 1245 350}} | LER #79-095 1245 350}} |
Latest revision as of 01:07, 2 February 2020
ML19254E245 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Davis Besse ![]() |
Issue date: | 10/23/1979 |
From: | Beeler T TOLEDO EDISON CO. |
To: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
Shared Package | |
ML19254E242 | List: |
References | |
LER-79-095-03L, LER-79-95-3L, NUDOCS 7910310369 | |
Download: ML19254E245 (3) | |
Text
. . , , # ,,,,...u ,
NRC FORM 366 (7 77)
. LICENSEE EVENT REPORT CONT ROL BLOCK: l l l l l l l (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) 1 6 lo l1l l 0lH l Dl E Sl1l@lOl0]-l0l0lNlPlFl-l0l3l@l4l1IL 23 20 LICENSt l1 T YPE 1JJ@l51 CAl T 68l@
7 8 9 LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICkNSE NLNsLH CON'T 0 i SYR] l L j@l 0l 5 l 0 l - l 0 l 3 l 4bdl 6 63@l 0EVENT l 9DATE] 2 l 5 l 7 ] 9 l@l1l0l2l3l7l9 74 7S REPOHT D ATE 80 7 6 60 bl_ DOCKET NUf/ DER EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROB ABLE CONSEGUENCES h l o l 2 l l 0n September 25, 1974 at 0316 hours0.00366 days <br />0.0878 hours <br />5.224868e-4 weeks <br />1.20238e-4 months <br /> while performing ST 5071.04, " Auxiliary Feedwater I a 3 l System Channel Functional Test", the Auxiliary Feed Pump Turbine steam inlet valve MS196 o la l on system 1 lost its indication. The system was declared inoperable placing the unit i o s ! l in the Action. Statement of Technical Specification 3.7.1.2. On September 26, 1979 at l o c_j i 2030 hours0.0235 days <br />0.564 hours <br />0.00336 weeks <br />7.72415e-4 months <br /> wh!1e troubleshooting MS106, MS106A (cross-connect from system 1 to 2) was l 0 7 l found not operating. The unit remained in the action statement. There was no danger [
o a l to the public or to station personnel. The redundant system was operable. (NP-33-79 11) 7 8 9 SYSTEY CAUSE CAUSE COMP. VALVE CCDE CODE SUBCODE CO?/PCNF NT CODE SUBCODE SUSCODE 7
o el 8
] cl a @ l xi@ l a@ lx lx lx Ix lx lx l@ W@ LZJ @
9 10 11 12 13 18 13 20 REPORT REVISION SEQUENTIAL O CCU R R E F.CE E REPORT NO. CODE TYPE f 4 0.
LEA RO
@ aeg l 7VENT l9 l YEl-j AR l0 l9 5l l/l 0l 3] lLl l-32 0l
?? 23 24 26 21 28 29 30 31
_ 21 HOURS 22 5 8 IT FO EU S. S DL E P.* A P A RER TA E ACT CN O PL NT .ETH l33B lgl34Blg 25 Zlg 30 Z
@ l 0 l0 l9 lU l 31 40
[Y [g Jg 41 42 l3Z jg lZ [9 l9 l9 [g 4 44 41 CAUSE DESCR;PTION ANL CORRECTIVE ACTIONS h
[ i Lo j l Under Maintenance Work Order (SMO) 79-3033, the loss of ind4;ation of MS106 was deter-l
[ilij mined to have been caused by a looje lamp retainer ring which grounded and blew the I
, 7 l control power fuse. The ring was tig'itened and fuse replaced. Under BM0 79-3126, the
[ij3) l f aulty R2 relay (Deutsch) for MS106A was replaced. Auxiliary Feedwater System I was l i 4 l declared operable by the successful performance of ST 5071.04 at 1810 hours0.0209 days <br />0.503 hours <br />0.00299 weeks <br />6.88705e-4 months <br /> on 9/27/79).
80 7 8 9
$1 S NPOWER OTHER STATUS DSCO RY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION i 5 U @ l1l0 0l@ NA l l B l@l Operator observation l ACTivt TY CO TENT OF RELE ASE A90UNT OF ACTIVITY LOCATION OF RELE ASE i o LZj ASE@D l Z l@l NA RELE l l NA 80 7 6 9 10 11 44 45 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES N U P.'8 E R TYPE D E SC RIP TION J l
i 7 10101 Ol@l Zl@l NA
' *
- PE R SON d'imu'R, n 2
NuveER DEsCmPnON@
lilai1010101@l 7 3 9 11 12 NA 80 g
LOSS OF OR D AUAGE TO FACll.1TY TYPE DESCRIPTION b I
7 i 9i8 LZJ@l 9 10 NA 80
- '"* NRC USE ONLY 7 010 310 M 7 2 o issuyE l_ l @0EsCR,PTiON NA @ , I lll lll1IiIII; 10 68 63 dJ 6 7 8 9 DVR 79-141, 1%E Oc PREPARER Thomas P. Beeler PHONE. 419-259-5000, Ext. 253 {
TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE SUPPLEE "TAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-79-111 DATE OF EVENT: September 25, 1979 FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURPERCE: Lost indication on MS106 and failuie of MS106A relay R2 Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 1, with Power (MD:) = 2770, and Load (Gross E4E) = 918. .
Description of Occurrence: Un September 25, 1979 at 0316 hours0.00366 days <br />0.0878 hours <br />5.224868e-4 weeks <br />1.20238e-4 months <br /> while performing Sur-veillance Test ST 5071.04, " Auxiliary Feedwater System Channel Functional Test", valve MS106, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine Steam Inlet Valve 1-1 from Steam Generator 1-1 lost its indication. Auxiliary Feedwater System 1-1 was declared inoperable placing the unit in the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.7.1.2. This requires two independent auxiliary feedwater systems available while in Modes 1, 2, and 3. With one system inoperabic, the inoperable system shall be restored to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in hot shutdown within the next 1.' hours.
On September 26, 1979 at 2030 hours0.0235 days <br />0.564 hours <br />0.00336 weeks <br />7.72415e-4 months <br /> while troubleshooting MS106, it was discovered that MS106A was not operating ',cause its closing relay R2 contacts were not closing. A .new relay was installed. While attempting to complete ST 5071.04 on September 27, 1979, at 1500 hours0.0174 days <br />0.417 hours <br />0.00248 weeks <br />5.7075e-4 months <br />, MS106A was not operating because its closing relay R2 ccatacts were not closing. A second new retty was installed. These relay failures are being reported to document a component f ailure.
Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: MS106 was not operating properly because of a grounded control circuit which blew the control power fuse and ;aused its loss of all indication and control. MS106A was not opera:ing because closing relay R2 contacts were not closing. The problem was determined to be internal to the relay. The relay coil would pickup properly but its contacts would not close. The second failure on September 27, 1979 was corrected by installing a new relay. The new relay had to have its pins spread to make proper contact in the socket base.
Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or to station personnel. Auxiliary Feedwater System Train 2 was operable had it been required.
Corrective Action: Under Maintenance Work 3rder (MWO) 79-3033, the first occurrence was investigated. It was found that the ccatrol circuit was grounded at the local open indicating light circuit. The lamp retaining ring was tightened, wire re-terminated and control power fuse replaced. As a followup, MWO 79-3132 was issued LER #79-095 1245 349
TOLEDO E'#ISON COMPANY DAVIS-BFSSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE PAGE 2 SUPPLE}' ENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-79-111 to inspect additionallocal indicating lights for excessive loose retaining rings, sockets, etc. There were no significant additional findings. The second occur-rence was investigated under MWO 79-3126. The defective R2 relay was replaced.
The pins on *he second relay were spread to assure proper contact. Facility Change Request 79-3t.1 was written to evaluate the use of Deutsch relays in the Auxiliary Feedwater System. Auxiliary Feedwater Systea 1 was declared operable by the succes-sful performance of ST 5071.04 at 1810 hours0.0209 days <br />0.503 hours <br />0.00299 weeks <br />6.88705e-4 months <br /> on September 26, 1979.
Failure Data: Previous failures of auxiliar) feedwater system relays have been reportcd in Licensee Event Report NP-33-79-94.
LER #79-095 1245 350