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(1 point) 1 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions: | |||
Time = 1200: | |||
Reactor power = 100% | |||
BOTH Main FDW Pumps trip | |||
PORV opens Time = 1205: | |||
Reactor power = 26% slowly lowering | |||
PORV has failed open | |||
: 1) In accordance with Rule 6 (HPI), the MAXIMUM power level at which HPI can be throttled is __(1)__. | |||
: 2) The reason power level is used to determine if throttling HPI is appropriate is that it ensures __(2)__. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
A. | |||
: 1. 5% | |||
: 2. maximum Boron addition continues until power is low enough to throttle HPI B. | |||
: 1. 1% | |||
: 2. maximum Boron addition continues until power is low enough to throttle HPI C. | |||
: 1. 5% | |||
: 2. sufficient core cooling exists until power level is low enough that HPI Forced cooling would become effective D. | |||
: 1. 1% | |||
: 2. sufficient core cooling exists until power level is low enough that HPI Forced cooling would become effective Page 1 of 100 ML20233A815 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 2 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following on Unit 1: | |||
Initial conditions: | |||
Reactor power = 100% | |||
Current conditions: | |||
SBLOCA occurs 1A and 1B SGs at the LOSCM setpoint | |||
: 1) In order for boiler-condenser mode of heat transfer to occur, the RCS primary side water level will be __(1)__ the SG secondary side water level. | |||
: 2) Based on the attached CETC trend, boiler-condenser heat transfer __(2)__ | |||
occurring. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
REFERENCE PROVIDED A. | |||
: 1. above | |||
: 2. is B. | |||
: 1. above | |||
: 2. is NOT C. | |||
: 1. below | |||
: 2. is D. | |||
: 1. below | |||
: 2. is NOT Page 2 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 3 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following conditions on U1: | |||
Reactor Power = 73% stable 1B1 RCP 1B2 RCP UPPER Cavity Pressure 710 psig stable 1420 psig stable LOWER Cavity Pressure 1070 psig stable 2140 psig stable Which ONE of the following describes the next required action(s) in accordance with AP/1/A/1700/016 (Abnormal Reactor Coolant Pump Operation)? | |||
A. | |||
Immediately trip 1B1 RCP B. | |||
Immediately trip 1B2 RCP C. | |||
Reduce reactor power to < 70% and then trip 1B1 RCP D. | |||
Reduce reactor power to < 70% and then trip 1B2 RCP Page 3 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 4 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following on Unit 2: | |||
Initial conditions: | |||
Reactor power = 100% | |||
Current conditions: | |||
Pressurizer level = 195 inches lowering LDST level = 78 inches lowering Which ONE of the following has occurred? | |||
A. | |||
Line break downstream of 2HP-7 B. | |||
Line break downstream of 2HP-120 C. | |||
2HP-14 has failed in the bleed position D. | |||
Loss of Instrument Air and Auxiliary Instrument Air to 2HP-5 Page 4 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 5 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions: | |||
Reactor power = 100% | |||
Inadvertent ES channel 6 actuation occurs Which ONE of the following will occur and why? | |||
A. | |||
The operating CC pump will stop to prevent deadheading the pump B. | |||
RCP seal return is isolated to eliminate a containment leakage path C. | |||
Letdown will isolate to prevent reaching the letdown high temperature interlock D. | |||
LPSW cooling to ALL RCPs is isolated to prevent a subsequent water hammer Page 5 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 6 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions: | |||
Initial conditions: | |||
Reactor power = 90% | |||
1B Main Feedwater pump trips Current conditions: | |||
Reactor power = 70% lowering RCS pressure = 2165 psig slowly lowering Pressurizer level = 228 inches slowly lowering Pressurizer temperature = 640°F slowly lowering Pressurizer heater bank 1 (Group A and K) is ON Pressurizer heater banks 2, 3, and 4 are in AUTO and are OFF The pressurizer is __(1)__ AND the pressurizer heater bank 2 __(2)__. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statement above? | |||
A. | |||
: 1. subcooled | |||
: 2. should be energized B. | |||
: 1. subcooled | |||
: 2. will energize at 2145 psig C. | |||
: 1. saturated | |||
: 2. should be energized D. | |||
: 1. saturated | |||
: 2. will energize at 2145 psig Page 6 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 7 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 3 conditions: | |||
Rule 1, (ATWS / Unanticipated Nuclear Power Production) has been initiated | |||
: 1) In accordance with Rule 1, an operator will be dispatched to open the Unit 3 CRD 600V normal power supply breaker at 3X9 and alternate 600V power supply breaker at __(1)__. | |||
: 2) DSS is interlocked to automatically de-energize Control Rod Groups 1 - 7 at a high RCS Pressure setpoint of __(2)__ psig. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
A. | |||
: 1. 2X2 | |||
: 2. 2450 B. | |||
: 1. 1X1 | |||
: 2. 2450 C. | |||
: 1. 2X2 | |||
: 2. 2500 D. | |||
: 1. 1X1 | |||
: 2. 2500 Page 7 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 8 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions: | |||
Reactor Power = 29% lowering Primary to secondary leakage in 1A SG Pzr level = 160 inches slowly lowering Only 1A HPI Pump operating 1HP-120 full open 1HP-5 closed The EOP SGTR tab | |||
: 1) __(1)__ direct operators to use 1RIA-59 and 1RIA-60 to determine the SG tube leak rate. | |||
: 2) __(2)__ direct manually tripping the Reactor at this time. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
A. | |||
: 1. will | |||
: 2. will B. | |||
: 1. will | |||
: 2. will NOT C. | |||
: 1. will NOT | |||
: 2. will D. | |||
: 1. will NOT | |||
: 2. will NOT Page 8 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 9 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 2 conditions: | |||
Loss of Heat Transfer has occurred Unit 2 TDEFWP is now available to feed the Steam Generators 2A SG level = 6 inches XSUR slowly lowering 2A SG pressure = 500 psig slowly lowering 2B SG level = 4 inches XSUR slowly lowering 2B SG pressure = 330 psig slowly lowering In accordance with Rule 7 (Steam Generator Feed Control), the MAXIMUM initial feed rate for the above conditions is __(1)__, in order to prevent __(2)__. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statement above? | |||
A. | |||
: 1. 100 gpm to EACH SG | |||
: 2. water hammer damage to voided feedwater lines B. | |||
: 1. 100 gpm to EACH SG | |||
: 2. damage to SG tubes C. | |||
: 1. 1000 gpm per header | |||
: 2. an RCS overcooling event D. | |||
: 1. 1000 gpm per header | |||
: 2. damage to TDEFDW pump (runout) | |||
Page 9 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 10 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions: | |||
Station Blackout occurred from 100% power SSF has been activated with SSF RC Makeup required U1 TDEFDWP is feeding both U1 SGs o 1FDW-315 manually throttled to 325 gpm o 1FDW-316 manually throttled to 330 gpm RCS NR Tc = 550°F slowly lowering MS Pressure = 1000 psig slowly lowering RCS Pressure = 1940 psig slowly lowering 1A SG XSUR level = 205 inches rising 1B SG XSUR level = 208 inches rising In accordance with Rule 7 (SG Feed Control), the reason EFDW Flow should INITIALLY be throttled is to ________. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statement above? | |||
A. | |||
maintain RCS NR Tc of 550 - 555°F B. | |||
raise RCS Pressure to 1950 - 2250 psig C. | |||
raise MS Pressure to approximately 1010 psig D. | |||
lower 1A and 1B SG XSUR levels to proper setpoint Page 10 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 11 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Time = 1200: | |||
Unit 1 reactor power = 100% | |||
EFPD = 400 Switchyard Isolation occurs Time = 1217: | |||
: 1) At Time = 1217, steady state natural circulation conditions __(1)__ been established. | |||
: 2) IF steady state natural circulation is established, the RCS loop transit time will be approximately __(2)__ minutes. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
REFERENCE PROVIDED (above) | |||
A. | |||
: 1. have | |||
: 2. 4 - 7 B. | |||
: 1. have | |||
: 2. 8 - 10 C. | |||
: 1. have NOT | |||
: 2. 4 - 7 D. | |||
: 1. have NOT | |||
: 2. 8 - 10 Page 11 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 12 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following on Unit 1: | |||
Initial conditions: | |||
1SA-06/A-2 (EL Inverter 1DIC System Trouble) actuates Current conditions: | |||
1SA-13/B-7 (Inverter 1DIC Output Voltage Low) actuated in the Equipment Room | |||
: 1) 1SA-13/B-7 actuated when voltage lowered below a MAXIMUM of __(1)__ volts. | |||
: 2) Manual transfer of the vital loads on 1KVIC to Regulated Power Panelboard (1KRA) will be performed using the __(2)__ on 1DIC Inverter. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
A. | |||
: 1. 72 | |||
: 2. Manual Bypass Switch B. | |||
: 1. 72 | |||
: 2. Alternate Source to Load Pushbutton C. | |||
: 1. 115 | |||
: 2. Manual Bypass Switch D. | |||
: 1. 115 | |||
: 2. Alternate Source to Load Pushbutton Page 12 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 13 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Plant conditions: | |||
1CA Battery Charger fails - output voltage = 0 VDC 1CA Battery voltage = 126 VDC 1DCB Bus voltage = 123 VDC Unit 2 DCA/DCB Bus voltage = 124 VDC Unit 3 DCA/DCB Bus voltage = 127 VDC Based on the above conditions, which ONE of the following will automatically supply power to 1DIA panelboard? | |||
A. | |||
1DCB Bus B. | |||
1CA Battery C. | |||
Unit 2 DC Bus D. | |||
Unit 3 DC Bus Page 13 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 14 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions: | |||
Initial conditions: | |||
Reactor power = 100% | |||
A and B LPSW pumps operating Current conditions: | |||
A LPSW pump trips due to breaker failure Standby LPSW pump will NOT start AP/1/A/1700/024 (Loss of LPSW) initiated | |||
: 1) 1LPSW-1121, 1122, 1123, and 1124 will close at a MAXIMUM LPSW header pressure of __(1)__ psig lowering. | |||
: 2) The reason the above valves automatically close is to __(2)__. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
A. | |||
: 1. 25 | |||
: 2. prevent LPSW pump run out B. | |||
: 1. 25 | |||
: 2. prevent water hammers in the LPSW system C. | |||
: 1. 18 | |||
: 2. prevent LPSW pump run out D. | |||
: 1. 18 | |||
: 2. prevent water hammers in the LPSW system Page 14 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 15 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions: | |||
Reactor power = 100% | |||
Instrument Air pressure = 85 psig lowering AP/1/A/1700/022 (Loss of Instrument Air) has been initiated | |||
: 1) AP/22 directs an immediate manual Reactor trip if instrument air header pressure lowers to a MAXIMUM value of __(1)__ psig. | |||
: 2) AP/22 directs tripping the Main FDW pumps immediately after tripping the Reactor because the controlling FDW valves fail __(2)__. | |||
A. | |||
: 1. 65 | |||
: 2. as is B. | |||
: 1. 70 | |||
: 2. as is C. | |||
: 1. 65 | |||
: 2. closed D. | |||
: 1. 70 | |||
: 2. closed Page 15 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 16 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions: | |||
Reactor power = 100% | |||
Grid disturbances affecting Voltage and Frequency are occurring Channel 1 AVR is ACTIVE Operator observes that the AVR Ready Light is OFF AVR = Auto Voltage Regulator FCR = Field Current Regulator | |||
: 1) The Ready Light being OFF indicates that __(1)__ are NOT matched. | |||
: 2) If the generator reaches the Underfrequency Maximum Allowable Time given in AP/1/A/1700/034 (Degraded Grid) the Main Turbine __(2)__ automatically trip. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
A. | |||
: 1. Channel 1 AVR and Channel 2 AVR | |||
: 2. will NOT B. | |||
: 1. Channel 1 AVR and Channel 2 AVR | |||
: 2. will C. | |||
: 1. Channel 1 AVR and Channel 1 FCR | |||
: 2. will NOT D. | |||
: 1. Channel 1 AVR and Channel 1 FCR | |||
: 2. will Page 16 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 17 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions: | |||
Initial conditions: | |||
Reactor power = 100% | |||
1A Main Steam Line Break occurs Current conditions: | |||
Reactor has tripped RCS Tave = 544°F slowly rising 1A SG Pressure = 0 psig 1B SG Pressure = 990 psig slowly rising Turbine bypass valves in Auto Reactor Building pressure = 0.2 psig stable | |||
: 1) The TDEFWP is __(1)__. | |||
: 2) The TDEFWP can be __(2)__. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
A. | |||
: 1. operating | |||
: 2. secured with TDEFWP control switch ONLY after AFIS is reset B. | |||
: 1. operating | |||
: 2. secured with TDEFWP control switch before AFIS is reset C. | |||
: 1. NOT operating | |||
: 2. started with TDEFWP control switch ONLY after AFIS is reset D. | |||
: 1. NOT operating | |||
: 2. started with TDEFWP control switch before AFIS is reset Page 17 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 18 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions: | |||
Reactor tripped from 100% power ALL Control Rods fully inserted 1MS-10 (Main Steam Relief Valve) is stuck open Main Steam pressure is being reduced in an attempt to reseat 1MS-10 In accordance with Subsequent Actions of the EOP | |||
: 1) Main Steam pressure will be reduced in __(1)__ psig increments. | |||
: 2) the MINIMUM RCS temperature allowed while reseating a MSRV is __(2)__ °F. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
A. | |||
: 1. 10 | |||
: 2. 525 B. | |||
: 1. 20 | |||
: 2. 525 C. | |||
: 1. 10 | |||
: 2. 532 D. | |||
: 1. 20 | |||
: 2. 532 Page 18 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 19 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions: | |||
Time = 0800: | |||
Reactor power = 100% | |||
1RIA-59 indicates 180 gpm stable CRS enters SGTR tab Time = 0810: | |||
: 1) The procedural guidance of AD-OP-ONS-0002 (Oconee Specific Abnormal Operations Guidance) __(1)__ allow operators to open 1HP-26 for the given conditions at Time = 0800. | |||
: 2) At Time = 0810, 1HP-24 and 1HP-25 are __(2)__. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
REFERENCE PROVIDED (above) | |||
A. | |||
: 1. does | |||
: 2. closed B. | |||
: 1. does | |||
: 2. open C. | |||
: 1. does NOT | |||
: 2. closed D. | |||
: 1. does NOT | |||
: 2. open Page 19 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 20 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 2 conditions: | |||
Initial conditions: | |||
Reactor power = 100% | |||
Pzr level Channel 3 is selected SASS in MANUAL Current conditions: | |||
Pzr level Channel 3 fails to 100 inches The CRS has not entered any abnormal procedure The RO has not yet referenced any alarm response guide The RO requests CRS concurrence to select a valid Pzr level indication | |||
: 1) Prior to any operator action, the operating HPI pump current (amps) will __(1)__. | |||
: 2) Based on the current conditions, AD-OP-ALL-1000 (Conduct of Operations) __(2)__ | |||
allow the RO to select a valid Pzr level indication with ONLY CRS verbal concurrence. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
A. | |||
: 1. rise | |||
: 2. does NOT B. | |||
: 1. rise | |||
: 2. does C. | |||
: 1. lower | |||
: 2. does NOT D. | |||
: 1. lower | |||
: 2. does Page 20 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 21 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions: | |||
Initial conditions: | |||
Reactor power = 100% | |||
Fire in Unit 1 Cable Room AP/1/A/1700/050, (Challenging Plant Fire) has been initiated Current conditions: | |||
AP/50 Section 4G, (Unit 1 Control Room Evacuation) directs the OATC to perform Encl 5.5, (OATC Actions for Control Room Evacuation) | |||
: 1) AP/50 Encl 5.5 will direct the OATC to take __(1)__. | |||
: 2) The reason the above action is taken is to __(2)__. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
A. | |||
: 1. 1FDW-315 and 1FDW-316 to MANUAL and close | |||
: 2. prevent spurious operation of 1FDW-315 and 1FDW-316 due to fire damage B. | |||
: 1. 1FDW-315 and 1FDW-316 to MANUAL and close | |||
: 2. ensure EFDW flow to the SGs can be controlled from the ASD Panel C. | |||
: 1. 1A and 1B TBVs to HAND and control SG pressure from the ADVs | |||
: 2. ensure natural circulation develops when the RCPs are secured D. | |||
: 1. 1A and 1B TBVs to HAND and control SG pressure from the ADVs | |||
: 2. maximize SG inventory prior to losing secondary pumps due to the fire Page 21 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 22 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following on Unit 1: | |||
Initial conditions: | |||
Reactor power = 100% stable Plant issue requires rapid shutdown AP/1/A/1700/029 (Rapid Unit Shutdown) initiated Current conditions: | |||
CRS directs RO to depress MAXIMUM RUNBACK | |||
: 1) In accordance with AP/29, __(1)__ Main FDW pump is the preferred pump to be shutdown first. | |||
: 2) The reason the above Main FDW pump is the preferred pump to be shutdown first is because its high discharge pressure trip setpoint is set __(2)__ than that of the remaining Main FDW pump. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statement above? | |||
A. | |||
: 1. 1A | |||
: 2. higher B. | |||
: 1. 1A | |||
: 2. lower C. | |||
: 1. 1B | |||
: 2. higher D. | |||
: 1. 1B | |||
: 2. lower Page 22 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 23 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions: | |||
Time = 1200:00: | |||
Reactor power = 40% | |||
PCB 20 and PCB 21, Generator Output Breakers OPEN Time = 1200:15: | |||
Main Turbine trips At Time = 1202:00 | |||
: 1) the SGs __(1)__ be fed from Main feedwater. | |||
: 2) reactor heat removal __(2)__ be from forced circulation. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
NO OPERATOR ACTIONS ARE TAKEN A. | |||
: 1. will | |||
: 2. will B. | |||
: 1. will | |||
: 2. will NOT C. | |||
: 1. will NOT | |||
: 2. will D. | |||
: 1. will NOT | |||
: 2. will NOT Page 23 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 24 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following on Unit 3 Auxiliary Shutdown Panel: | |||
3B HPI pump Remote/Local Selector in LOCAL position Unit 3 Turbine Bypass Valves in MANUAL controlling SG pressure | |||
: 1) The 3B HPI pump __(1)__ automatically start on low RCP seal injection flow. | |||
: 2) The Unit 3 TBVs __(2)__ automatically close on a loss of condenser vacuum condition. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
A. | |||
: 1. will | |||
: 2. will B. | |||
: 1. will | |||
: 2. will NOT C. | |||
: 1. will NOT | |||
: 2. will D. | |||
: 1. will NOT | |||
: 2. will NOT Page 24 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 25 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions: | |||
LOCA CD tab in progress ALL SCMs = 4ºF rising RCS pressure is controllable Statalarm 1SA-07/E-6 (ES LPI Bypass Permit) actuated | |||
: 1) The RCS pressure setpoint that caused Statalarm 1SA-07/E-6 to actuate is __(1)__ psig. | |||
: 2) In accordance with the LOCA CD tab, conditions are met such that operators | |||
__(2)__ be directed to manually bypass LPI. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
A. | |||
: 1. 890 | |||
: 2. will B. | |||
: 1. 890 | |||
: 2. will NOT C. | |||
: 1. 865 | |||
: 2. will D. | |||
: 1. 865 | |||
: 2. will NOT Page 25 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 26 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions: | |||
Time = 1200: | |||
Reactor power = 100% | |||
1TA and 1TB lockout occurs Time = 1300: | |||
Tcold = 550°F stable EOP Forced Cooldown (FCD) tab in progress Natural Circulation (NC) cooldown is initiated | |||
: 1) At Time = 1300, the EOP FCD tab will direct the crew to establish and maintain a cooldown rate of less than a MAXIMUM of __(1)__. | |||
: 2) A NOTE in the EOP FCD tab states that RCS pressure will NOT be reduced until the RCS is cooled to establish > __(2)__ SCM. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
A. | |||
: 1. 50°F/hr | |||
: 2. 150°F B. | |||
: 1. 50°F/hr | |||
: 2. 200°F C. | |||
: 1. 25°F/hr | |||
: 2. 150°F D. | |||
: 1. 25°F/hr | |||
: 2. 200°F Page 26 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 27 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions: | |||
Time = 0400: | |||
Reactor power = 100% | |||
PSW inoperable Time = 0430: | |||
ALL CBPs trip ALL Emergency FDW pumps fail to start in auto or manual Rule 3 in progress LOHT tab in progress RCS pressure = 2258 psig rising Pzr level = 381 inches rising 1A1 and 1B2 RCPs operating | |||
: 1) At Time = 0430, Rule 4 (Initiation of HPI Forced Cooling) __(1)__ required to be initiated. | |||
: 2) IF Rule 4 is initiated, it __(2)__ direct the crew to secure all but one RCP.. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
A. | |||
: 1. is | |||
: 2. will B. | |||
: 1. is | |||
: 2. will NOT C. | |||
: 1. is NOT | |||
: 2. will D. | |||
: 1. is NOT | |||
: 2. will NOT Page 27 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 28 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions: | |||
Reactor power = 68% | |||
1A1 RCP secured per AP/1/A/1700/016 Section 4D (Loss of RCP Seal Return) | |||
: 1) The EARLIEST time that AP/16 Section 4D directs closing the 1A1 RCP motor cooler inlet and outlet valves, 1LPSW-7&8, is __(1)__ after 1A1 RCP shutdown. | |||
: 2) Individual valve position indication __(2)__ available for 1LPSW-7&8 on the control board. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
A. | |||
: 1. 3 hours | |||
: 2. is B. | |||
: 1. 3 hours | |||
: 2. is NOT C. | |||
: 1. 30 minutes | |||
: 2. is D. | |||
: 1. 30 minutes | |||
: 2. is NOT Page 28 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 29 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 2 conditions: | |||
Time = 0800: | |||
Rx Power = 90% and stable Time = 1100: | |||
A group 2 rod drops fully into the core AP/2/A/1700/001 (Unit Runback) initiated | |||
: 1) At Time = 0800, available Shutdown Margin (SDM) will LOWER if letdown temperature __(1)__ by 5°F. | |||
: 2) At Time = 1100, the BOP determines that the regulating rods are positioned in the Unacceptable Region of the COLR. Per TS 3.2.1 (Regulating Rod Position Limits), | |||
the required action is to initiate boration to restore SDM to within the limits specified in the COLR within __(2)__. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
A. | |||
: 1. rises | |||
: 2. 15 minutes B. | |||
: 1. rises | |||
: 2. 1 hour C. | |||
: 1. lowers | |||
: 2. 15 minutes D. | |||
: 1. lowers | |||
: 2. 1 hour Page 29 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 30 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions: | |||
LOCA CD tab in progress Cooldown and de-pressurization in progress Core SCM = 6°F stable ECCS suction swap to the RBES is complete LPI pump rooms are accessible In accordance with the LOCA CD tab | |||
: 1) During the cooldown, LPI __(1)__ required to be aligned in a split flow arrangement with one train supplying HPI pump suction and the other train providing decay heat removal. | |||
: 2) IF LPI is aligned in the split flow arrangement described above, the LPI train supplying the HPI pumps will take suction from the __(2)__. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
A. | |||
: 1. is | |||
: 2. RBES B. | |||
: 1. is | |||
: 2. DHR drop line C. | |||
: 1. is NOT | |||
: 2. RBES D. | |||
: 1. is NOT | |||
: 2. DHR drop line Page 30 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 31 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 2 conditions: | |||
RCS cooldown in progress 2A LPI cooler isolated due to cooler leak | |||
: 1) The LPI Decay Heat Removal mode that will be used for the INITIAL transition to LPI cooling is __(1)__. | |||
: 2) The HIGHEST RCS pressure that will allow aligning LPI in the NORMAL Decay Heat Removal mode is __(2)__ psig. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
A. | |||
: 1. High Pressure | |||
: 2. 115 B. | |||
: 1. High Pressure | |||
: 2. 220 C. | |||
: 1. Switchover | |||
: 2. 115 D. | |||
: 1. Switchover | |||
: 2. 220 Page 31 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 32 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Which ONE of the following is the power supply for 3CF-2 (3B CFT Outlet)? | |||
A. | |||
3XC B. | |||
3XL C. | |||
3XN D. | |||
3XP Page 32 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 33 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions: | |||
Reactor power = 100% | |||
Leak through 1RC-66 (PORV) = 0.6 gpm Pzr level will __ (1) __ and initially Quench Tank __ (2) __ will rise. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statement above? | |||
A. | |||
: 1. rise | |||
: 2. level B. | |||
: 1. rise | |||
: 2. pressure C. | |||
: 1. remain constant | |||
: 2. level D. | |||
: 1. remain constant | |||
: 2. pressure Page 33 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 34 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Which ONE of the following will result in the Standby Component Cooling pump receiving an automatic start signal? | |||
A. | |||
CRD Outlet HDR Flow lowers to 136 gpm B. | |||
Component Cooling Total Flow lowers to 568 gpm C. | |||
Component Cooling Pump Discharge Pressure lowers to 95 psig D. | |||
Main Feeder Bus 1 (MFB1) locks out and de-energizes due to overcurrent Page 34 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 35 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions: | |||
Recovery from HPI Forced Cooling in progress Pzr level = 400 inches stable Lowest SCM = 33°F When the PORV is closed. | |||
: 1) a one degree rise in temperature can raise RCS pressure a MAXIMUM of approximately __(1)__ psig. | |||
: 2) EOP Encl. 5.40 (Recovery From HPI Forced Cooling) will direct the crew to initially control HPI by __(2)__. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
A. | |||
: 1. 100 | |||
: 2. lowering HPI flow to provide only for RCS leakage and seal injection B. | |||
: 1. 100 | |||
: 2. maintaining HPI flow approximately constant to maintain stable RCS temperature C. | |||
: 1. 50 | |||
: 2. lowering HPI flow to provide only for RCS leakage and seal injection D. | |||
: 1. 50 | |||
: 2. maintaining HPI flow approximately constant to maintain stable RCS temperature Page 35 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 36 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 2 conditions: | |||
Time = 0800: | |||
Reactor power = 100% | |||
Time = 0805: | |||
FDW transient occurs Controlling RCS Narrow Range pressure signal peaked at 2210 psig | |||
: 1) At Time = 0805, 2RC-1 __(1)__ open. | |||
: 2) The Controlling RCS Narrow Range pressure signal to 2RC-1 is determined by | |||
__(2)__ RCS pressure. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
A. | |||
: 1. is | |||
: 2. 2.MAX B. | |||
: 1. is | |||
: 2. median select C. | |||
: 1. is NOT | |||
: 2. 2.MAX D. | |||
: 1. is NOT | |||
: 2. median select Page 36 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 37 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following on Unit 1: | |||
Initial conditions: | |||
Reactor power = 100% | |||
BOTH Main Feedwater Pumps trip Current conditions: | |||
Reactor power = 57% slowly lowering | |||
: 1) The correct sequence of activities directed by Rule 1 (ATWS) is to __(1)__. | |||
: 2) The direction given to the operator opening the CRD breakers is to __(2)__ Arc Flash PPE. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
A. | |||
: 1. dispatch an operator to open the CRD breakers THEN align HPI injection from the BWST | |||
: 2. wear B. | |||
: 1. dispatch an operator to open the CRD breakers THEN align HPI injection from the BWST | |||
: 2. NOT wear C. | |||
: 1. align HPI injection from the BWST THEN dispatch an operator to open the CRD breakers | |||
: 2. wear D. | |||
: 1. align HPI injection from the BWST THEN dispatch an operator to open the CRD breakers | |||
: 2. NOT wear Page 37 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 38 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 3 conditions: | |||
Reactor power = 100% | |||
ES Analog Channel "C" WR RCS pressure signal fails LOW No FAULTED signals are present ES Channels __(1)__ are all now in a __(2)__ logic for automatic actuation. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statement above? | |||
A. | |||
: 1) 1 - 4 ONLY | |||
: 2) 2 out of 2 B. | |||
: 1) 1 - 6 | |||
: 2) 2 out of 2 C. | |||
: 1) 1 - 4 ONLY | |||
: 2) 1 out of 2 D. | |||
: 1) 1 - 6 | |||
: 2) 1 out of 2 Page 38 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 39 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 3 conditions: | |||
Time = 0800: | |||
Reactor Power = 100% | |||
RBCUs 3B and 3C running in LOW Speed Reactor Building average temperature = 120°F stable 3LPSW-18, 21, 24 have been FULL OPEN for the last 2 hours for testing Time = 0830: | |||
Inadvertent ES Channel 5 actuation | |||
: 1) With no operator action, once stabilized, RB pressure will be __(1)__ RB pressure at Time = 0800. | |||
: 2) LCO TS 3.6.4 (Containment Pressure) states that Containment pressure shall be | |||
< + __(2)__ psig. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements below? | |||
A. | |||
: 1. lower than | |||
: 2. 2.45 B. | |||
: 1. lower than | |||
: 2. 1.2 C. | |||
: 1. approximately the same as | |||
: 2. 2.45 D. | |||
: 1. approximately the same as | |||
: 2. 1.2 Page 39 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 40 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions: | |||
The Reactor trips from 100% power due to a LBLOCA | |||
: 1) EOP Encl. 5.1 (ES Actuation) directs initiation of Encl. 5.12 (ECCS Suction Swap to RBES) at a MAXIMUM level of __(1)__ feet in the BWST. | |||
: 2) TSP (Trisodium Phosphate Dodecahydrate) is added to the RB Emergency Sump to allow RBS to __(2)__. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
A. | |||
: 1. 15 | |||
: 2. aid in keeping Iodine in solution, ultimately reducing offsite dose B. | |||
: 1. 15 | |||
: 2. minimize hydrogen production from Radiolysis C. | |||
: 1. 19 | |||
: 2. aid in keeping Iodine in solution, ultimately reducing offsite dose D. | |||
: 1. 19 | |||
: 2. minimize hydrogen production from Radiolysis Page 40 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 41 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 3 conditions: | |||
Initial conditions: | |||
Reactor power = 100% | |||
3MS-112 & 3MS-173, (SSRH 3A/3B Controls) are OPEN in MANUAL 3MS-77, 78, 80, 81, (MS to SSRH's) control switches in OPEN Current conditions: | |||
Main Turbine trips With no operator actions | |||
: 1) 3MS-112 & 3MS-173 will __(1)__. | |||
: 2) 3MS-77, 78, 80, 81 will __(2)__. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
A. | |||
: 1. remain open | |||
: 2. remain open B. | |||
: 1. remain open | |||
: 2. close C. | |||
: 1. close | |||
: 2. remain open D. | |||
: 1. close | |||
: 2. close Page 41 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 42 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 3 conditions: | |||
Time = 04:00:00: | |||
Reactor power = 70% stable 3A Main FDW Pump suction pressure = 236 psig lowering Time = 04:01:25: | |||
3A Main FDW Pump suction pressure = 230 psig lowering With no operator actions, at Time = 04:01:25 | |||
: 1) 3A Main FDW pump __(1)__ tripped. | |||
: 2) U3 Reactor power is __(2)__. | |||
A. | |||
: 1. has | |||
: 2. stable at 65% | |||
B. | |||
: 1. has | |||
: 2. lowering at 20% per minute C. | |||
: 1. has NOT | |||
: 2. stable at 70% | |||
D. | |||
: 1. has NOT | |||
: 2. lowering at 20% per minute Page 42 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 43 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following on Unit 2: | |||
Initial conditions: | |||
Reactor power = 100% | |||
Current conditions: | |||
Both MFDW pumps trip Rule 3 in progress 2A EFDW flow = 95 gpm stable 2FDW-315 will NOT control in auto or manual In accordance with EOP Encl. 5.27 (Alternate Methods for Controlling EFDW Flow)... | |||
: 1) the first method to control 2A SG level will use __(1)__. | |||
: 2) the U2 TDEFDW Pump __(2)__ required to be placed in PULL TO LOCK. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
A. | |||
: 1. 2FDW-315 local operation | |||
: 2. is B. | |||
: 1. 2FDW-315 local operation | |||
: 2. is NOT C. | |||
: 1. 2FDW-35 from Control Room | |||
: 2. is D. | |||
: 1. 2FDW-35 from Control Room | |||
: 2. is NOT Page 43 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 44 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions: | |||
Time = 0400: | |||
Reactor power = 100% | |||
TDEFDW Pump OOS Switchyard Isolation occurs Time = 0403: | |||
1A and 1B MDEFDW Pumps operating Power is lost to the Moore Controller HAND/AUTO Station for 1FDW-316 1B SG level will stabilize at ______. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statement above? | |||
NO OPERATOR ACTIONS ARE TAKEN A. | |||
30 inches XSUR B. | |||
240 inches XSUR C. | |||
dryout conditions D. | |||
water in the steam lines Page 44 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 45 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 2 conditions: | |||
Reactor power = 100% | |||
2TD Switchgear de-energizes Which ONE of the following remains available? | |||
A. | |||
2C RBCU B. | |||
2B LPI pump C. | |||
2B HPI pump D. | |||
2A MD EFDW pump Page 45 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 46 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions: | |||
Initial conditions: | |||
Reactor power = 22% power CT-1 Amps = 2000 Central Switchyard is energizing the STBY Buses PCB 17 (OCONEE WH. STARTUP TRANS. CT1 TIE) is open for maintenance Current conditions: | |||
Yellow Bus lockout occurs Power to Unit 1 Main Feeder Buses will be supplied from ______ Transformer. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statement above? | |||
A. | |||
1T B. | |||
CT-4 C. | |||
CT-5 D. | |||
CT-1 Page 46 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 47 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions: | |||
Reactor in MODE 3 1KX Essential inverter DC Input breaker trips Power to 1KX Panelboard will be restored with the ________. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statement above? | |||
A. | |||
ASCO Switch B. | |||
Auctioneering Diodes C. | |||
Static Transfer Switch D. | |||
Inverter Bypass Switches Page 47 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 48 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following plant conditions: | |||
Time = 0800:00: | |||
KHU 1 generating to the grid KHU emergency start signal received Time = 0800:10: | |||
KHU 1 speed = 183 rpm rising Time = 0800:35: | |||
KHU 1 speed = 181 rpm lowering | |||
: 1) At Time = 0800:35, KHU 1 __(1)__ Emergency Locked out (ELO). | |||
: 2) KHU 2 __(2)__ shutdown when the KHU emergency start signal is RESET. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
A. | |||
: 1. has | |||
: 2. will B. | |||
: 1. has | |||
: 2. will NOT C. | |||
: 1. has NOT | |||
: 2. will D. | |||
: 1. has NOT | |||
: 2. will NOT Page 48 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 49 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following on Unit 1: | |||
Initial conditions: | |||
Reactor power = 100% | |||
1A GWD tank release in progress 1RIA-38 OOS Current conditions: | |||
Loss of power to 1RIA-37 RM-80 skid | |||
: 1) 1GWD-4 (A GWD TANK DISCHARGE) will __(1)__. | |||
: 2) Unit 1s Waste Gas Decay Tank discharge flow rate (scfm) is monitored on __(2)__. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
A. | |||
: 1. remain open | |||
: 2. 1VB1 (side board) | |||
B. | |||
: 1. remain open | |||
: 2. 1AB3 (back board) | |||
C. | |||
: 1. automatically close | |||
: 2. 1VB1 (side board) | |||
D. | |||
: 1. automatically close | |||
: 2. 1AB3 (back board) | |||
Page 49 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 50 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station | |||
: 1) The automatic runback of LPSW flow to the LPI system is based upon an interlock using __(1)__. | |||
: 2) The automatic runback described above will lower LPSW flow to the LPI Cooler(s) to a MAXIMUM of __(2)__ gpm. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
A. | |||
: 1. LPSW flow to a single LPI cooler | |||
: 2. 3000 B. | |||
: 1. LPSW flow to a single LPI cooler | |||
: 2. 5200 C. | |||
: 1. total LPSW flow to both LPI coolers | |||
: 2. 3000 D. | |||
: 1. total LPSW flow to both LPI coolers | |||
: 2. 5200 Page 50 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 51 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Which ONE of the following states all of the switchgear that can supply power to C LPSW pump? | |||
A. | |||
1TC ONLY B. | |||
2TC ONLY C. | |||
1TD ONLY D. | |||
1TD or 2TD Page 51 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 52 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 3 conditions: | |||
Time = 0800: | |||
3CC-8 fails closed due to loss of Instrument Air (IA) | |||
AP/3/A/1700/020 (Loss of Component Cooling) initiated Time = 0803: | |||
AO manually opened 3CC-8 (CC Return Outside Block) | |||
Time = 0900: | |||
IA restored to 3CC-8 AO has taken NO further action | |||
: 1) At Time = 0803, both Unit 3 CC pumps __(1)__ operating. | |||
: 2) At Time = 0900, 3CC-8 __(2)__ be operated from the Control Room. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
A. | |||
: 1. are | |||
: 2. can B. | |||
: 1. are | |||
: 2. can NOT C. | |||
: 1. are NOT | |||
: 2. can D. | |||
: 1. are NOT | |||
: 2. can NOT Page 52 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 53 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following plant conditions: | |||
Time = 0400: | |||
Backup IA Compressors in STBY1 Primary IA Compressor tripped Time = 0405: | |||
Instrument Air pressure = 91 psig lowering At Time = 0405 | |||
: 1) Auxiliary IA Compressors are __(1)__. | |||
: 2) Backup IA Compressors are __(2)__. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
ASSUME NO OPERATOR ACTIONS A. | |||
: 1. OFF | |||
: 2. operating B. | |||
: 1. OFF | |||
: 2. OFF C. | |||
: 1. operating | |||
: 2. operating D. | |||
: 1. operating | |||
: 2. OFF Page 53 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 54 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions: | |||
Time = 1300: | |||
Reactor power = 100% | |||
LBLOCA occurs RCS Pressure 40 psig and lowering RB Pressure 20 psig and rising Time = 1302:30: | |||
At Time = 1302:30: | |||
: 1) 1A, 1B, 1C RBCUs __(1)__. | |||
: 2) 1A and 1B RBS pumps __(2)__. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statement above? | |||
REFERENCE PROVIDED (above) | |||
A. | |||
: 1. are operating correctly | |||
: 2. should NOT be operating B. | |||
: 1. should ALL be operating in LOW speed | |||
: 2. should NOT be operating C. | |||
: 1. are operating correctly | |||
: 2. are operating correctly D. | |||
: 1. should ALL be operating in LOW speed | |||
: 2. are operating correctly Page 54 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 55 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following on Unit 2: | |||
Initial conditions: | |||
Reactor power = 100% | |||
Current conditions: | |||
RCS pressure = 1500 psig lowering RB pressure = 3.3 psig lowering | |||
: 1) Reactor Building essential isolation valves __(1)__ closed. | |||
: 2) In accordance with EOP Enclosure 5.1, (ES Actuation), a previously closed containment isolation valve will be opened by FIRST placing the associated | |||
__(2)__. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
A. | |||
: 1. are | |||
: 2. voter in OVERRIDE B. | |||
: 1. are | |||
: 2. ES Channel in MANUAL C. | |||
: 1. are NOT | |||
: 2. voter in OVERRIDE D. | |||
: 1. are NOT | |||
: 2. ES Channel in MANUAL Page 55 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 56 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions: | |||
OP/1/A/1105/019 (Control Rod Drive System) initiated Enclosure 4.15 (Recovery Of Dropped/Misaligned Safety Or Regulating Control Rod With Diamond in Automatic) in progress Step 2.4 states: IF affected rod is fully inserted, and Auto Latch and PI Alignment desired, perform the following: | |||
2.4.1 Select LATCH AUTO. | |||
: 1) When LATCH AUTO is performed, RPI __(1)__ automatically reset to match API. | |||
: 2) During this control rod recovery, the __(2)__. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
A. | |||
: 1. will | |||
: 2. Controlling CRD Group will maintain Rx power constant B. | |||
: 1. will | |||
: 2. Reactor Operator will be required to insert the regulating rods to stop the rise in power C. | |||
: 1. will NOT | |||
: 2. Controlling CRD Group will maintain Rx power constant D. | |||
: 1. will NOT | |||
: 2. Reactor Operator will be required to insert the regulating rods to stop the rise in power Page 56 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 57 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following on Unit 1: | |||
Initial conditions: | |||
Reactor power = 80% stable Diamond and FDW Masters in HAND CRS directs OATC to maintain Delta Tc 0°F +/- 2°F Current conditions: | |||
1B1 RCP trips Crew performs Plant Transient Response AP/1/A/1700/001 (Unit Runback) initiated Delta Tc = +2.2°F and becoming more positive | |||
: 1) The operator will be required to manually re-ratio feedwater such that feed to the | |||
__(1)__ SG is raised. | |||
: 2) In accordance with AP/01, the crew will be required to initiate a power reduction to a MAXIMUM of __(2)__ %. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
A. | |||
: 1. 1A | |||
: 2. 65 B. | |||
: 1. 1B | |||
: 2. 65 C. | |||
: 1. 1A | |||
: 2. 74 D. | |||
: 1. 1B | |||
: 2. 74 Page 57 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 58 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following on Unit 1: | |||
Initial conditions: | |||
Reactor power = 100% | |||
SBLOCA occurs Current conditions: | |||
LOCA CD tab in progress RCS pressure = 805 psig stable RCS temperature = 530°F RB pressure = 3.1 psig rising Pzr level = 25 inches rising | |||
: 1) Indicated Pzr level rising __(1)__ due to bubble formation in the reactor vessel head. | |||
: 2) In accordance with the LOCA CD tab, 1RC-159/1RC-160 are required to be opened when the Rx vessel head level lowers to a MAXIMUM of __(2)__ inches. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
A. | |||
: 1. is | |||
: 2. 154 B. | |||
: 1. is | |||
: 2. 180 C. | |||
: 1. is NOT | |||
: 2. 154 D. | |||
: 1. is NOT | |||
: 2. 180 Page 58 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 59 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 2 conditions: | |||
Reactor power = 80% | |||
0% light for Group 4 Rod 3 is lit AP/2/A/1700/001 (Unit Runback) initiated | |||
: 1) The GROUP IN LIMIT light for Control Rod Group 4 will be __(1)__. | |||
: 2) In accordance with AP/01, the operator __(2)__ change the rate of power reduction during the runback. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
A. | |||
: 1. ON | |||
: 2. can B. | |||
: 1. ON | |||
: 2. can NOT C. | |||
: 1. OFF | |||
: 2. can D. | |||
: 1. OFF | |||
: 2. can NOT Page 59 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 60 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station The power supply for 1NI-2 Wide Range detector is _______. | |||
A. | |||
KVIA B. | |||
KVIB C. | |||
KVIC D. | |||
KVID Page 60 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 61 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station RB Purge isolation valves 3PR-1, 3PR-2, 3PR-3, 3PR-4, 3PR-5, and 3PR-6 will ALL receive automatic close signals as a result of ______. | |||
A. | |||
3RIA-45 HIGH alarm B. | |||
3RIA-46 HIGH alarm C. | |||
actuation of ES channels 1 and 2 D. | |||
actuation of ES channels 5 and 6 Page 61 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 62 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions: | |||
Reactor in MODE 6 Fuel Transfer Canal is full B Spent Fuel Cooling Pump aligned to Refueling Cooling Mode in accordance with OP/1/A/1102/015 (Filling and Draining FTC) | |||
The B Spent Fuel Cooling Pump | |||
: 1) suction will be from the __(1)__. | |||
: 2) discharge will be to the __(2)__. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
A. | |||
: 1. Decay Heat Drop Line | |||
: 2. Spent Fuel Pool B. | |||
: 1. Decay Heat Drop Line | |||
: 2. Core Flood Nozzles C. | |||
: 1. Spent Fuel Transfer Tube | |||
: 2. Spent Fuel Pool D. | |||
: 1. Spent Fuel Transfer Tube | |||
: 2. Core Flood Nozzles Page 62 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 63 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following on Unit 1: | |||
Initial conditions: | |||
Reactor power = 100% | |||
Current conditions: | |||
Condenser vacuum = 21 inches Hg stable 1TA and 1TB de-energized With no operator actions, SG levels will be automatically controlled at ______. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statement above? | |||
A. | |||
25 inches SUR B. | |||
30 inches XSUR C. | |||
50% OR D. | |||
95% OR Page 63 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 64 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 2 conditions: | |||
Initial conditions: | |||
Reactor power = 100% | |||
Current conditions: | |||
Reactor trip Trip Confirm signal NOT generated by the Diamond | |||
: 1) The Turbine Load Status Flag is __(1)__. | |||
: 2) The Turbine Bypass valves will control at __(2)__. | |||
A. | |||
: 1. false | |||
: 2. setpoint B. | |||
: 1. false | |||
: 2. setpoint + 125 psig C. | |||
: 1. true | |||
: 2. setpoint D. | |||
: 1. true | |||
: 2. setpoint + 125 psig Page 64 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 65 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 2 conditions: | |||
Reactor shutdown from 100% in progress Main Turbine bearing oil leak occurs Reactor power = 28% stable | |||
: 1) Based on the graph above, the EARLIEST time the Main Turbine will automatically trip is __(1)__. | |||
: 2) After the Main Turbine has tripped, ICS will maintain Tave at approximately | |||
__(2)__ degrees F. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
REFERENCE PROVIDED (above) | |||
A. | |||
: 1. 12:01 | |||
: 2. 579 B. | |||
: 1. 12:01 | |||
: 2. 555 C. | |||
: 1. 12:03 | |||
: 2. 579 D. | |||
: 1. 12:03 | |||
: 2. 555 Page 65 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 66 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station In accordance with OP/1/A/1102/020 Encl. 4.4, Section 4 (Off-Going Plant Status Checklist) | |||
: 1) The EARLIEST time Section 4 (Off-Going Plant Status Checklist) is allowed to be completed is within the last __(1)__ of shift. | |||
: 2) if False is indicated for any status check performed, ensure specific condition is recorded on (in) the __(2)__. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
A. | |||
: 1. hour | |||
: 2. Turnover Sheet B. | |||
: 1. hour | |||
: 2. Narrative Log C. | |||
: 1. 30 minutes | |||
: 2. Turnover Sheet D. | |||
: 1. 30 minutes | |||
: 2. Narrative Log Page 66 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 67 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following on Unit 1. | |||
Initial conditions: | |||
Mode 6 Defueling in progress 1RIA-6 (Spent Fuel Pool Area Monitor) = 4 mr/hr stable Current conditions: | |||
1RIA-6 monitor power supply fuse blows 1RIA-6 local reading = 0 mr/hr 1RIA-6 View Node indication is magenta In accordance with OP/1/A/1502/007 (Operations Defueling/Refueling Responsibilities), Fuel Handling activities in the SFP can ______. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statement above? | |||
A. | |||
continue provided 1RIA-41 (SFP Gas) is operable B. | |||
continue because only the SFP Bridge area monitor is required C. | |||
NOT continue until a replacement portable area radiation monitor with alarm capability is in use D. | |||
NOT continue until SFP boron concentration re-sampled and SFP level re-verified and both parameters are within requirements Page 67 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 68 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions: | |||
Initial conditions: | |||
Reactor power = 100% | |||
Current conditions: | |||
Blackout in progress An RO has initiated AP/0/A/1700/025 (Standby Shutdown Facility Emergency Operating Procedure) | |||
Breaker transfer in the SSF is complete | |||
: 1) In accordance with AP/25, the SSF RO __(1)__ required to initiate feed with the SSF Aux Service Water pump. | |||
: 2) If required, 1RC-4 will be closed by __(2)__. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
A. | |||
: 1. is NOT | |||
: 2. directing the RO in the SSF control room B. | |||
: 1. is NOT | |||
: 2. using the switch in the Unit 1 control room C. | |||
: 1. is | |||
: 2. directing the RO in the SSF control room D. | |||
: 1. is | |||
: 2. using the switch in the Unit 1 control room Page 68 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 69 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station When establishing the Alternate Post-LOCA Boron Dilution flow alignment, the appropriate LOCA CD tab would direct opening | |||
: 1) valve LP-105 on __(1)__. | |||
: 2) valve LP-19 on __(2)__. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
A. | |||
: 1. Unit 1 ONLY | |||
: 2. Unit 1 ONLY B. | |||
: 1. Units 2 and 3 ONLY | |||
: 2. Unit 1 ONLY C. | |||
: 1. Unit 1 ONLY | |||
: 2. Units 2 and 3 ONLY D. | |||
: 1. Units 2 and 3 ONLY | |||
: 2. Units 2 and 3 ONLY Page 69 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 70 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions: | |||
Initial conditions: | |||
Reactor power = 100% | |||
1SA-15/A-2 (SU Source Volt Monitor Logic Test) actuated Current conditions: | |||
I&E determines the alarm actuated due to a defective alarm relay Repairs will take 3 - 4 days The CRS directs you to remove the nuisance alarm from service In accordance with OP/0/A/1108/001 Encl. 4.17 (Evaluation for Removal of Statalarms/Control Room Indications) | |||
: 1) Statalarm 1SA-15/A-2 is required to be added to the __(1)__ section of the Unit Turnover Sheet. | |||
: 2) A CBWO or __(2)__ label is required to be placed on the statalarm window. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
A. | |||
: 1. Out of Normal Alarms | |||
: 2. T/O Sheet B. | |||
: 1. Out of Normal Alarms | |||
: 2. OOS/I&E C. | |||
: 1. Equipment Deficiencies | |||
: 2. T/O Sheet D. | |||
: 1. Equipment Deficiencies | |||
: 2. OOS/I&E Page 70 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 71 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station | |||
: 1) In accordance with AD-OP-ALL-0112 (Operations Log Keeping and Chart Recorders), completion of Infrequently Performed Test or Evolution (IPTE) briefs and activities __(1)__ required to be recorded in the Narrative Log. | |||
: 2) In accordance with AD-OP-ALL-0106 (Conduct of Infrequently Performed Tests or Evolutions) (IPTE), lowered RCS inventory __(2)__ considered an Infrequently Performed Test or Evolution. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
A. | |||
: 1. are NOT | |||
: 2. is B. | |||
: 1. are | |||
: 2. is C. | |||
: 1. are NOT | |||
: 2. is NOT D. | |||
: 1. are | |||
: 2. is NOT Page 71 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 72 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station An RWP that you are preparing to work under states the highest dose rate in a particular area (at 30 cm) is 325 mR/hr. As you travel to the work site, a flashing blue light is noted in the entry path to the area. | |||
: 1) The RWP will designate the area as a __(1)__. | |||
: 2) The flashing blue light __(2)__ indicate a radiography boundary. | |||
A. | |||
: 1. High Radiation Area | |||
: 2. does B. | |||
: 1. Radiation Area | |||
: 2. does C. | |||
: 1. High Radiation Area | |||
: 2. does NOT D. | |||
: 1. Radiation Area | |||
: 2. does NOT Page 72 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 73 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions: | |||
Reactor power = 100% | |||
Which ONE of the following would require entry into the EOP? | |||
A. | |||
Reactor power rises to 102% | |||
B. | |||
One CRDM stator temperature rises to 185°F C. | |||
Reactor Coolant System pressure rises to 2360 psig D. | |||
Reactor Coolant System leakage in the RB of 55 gpm Page 73 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 74 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions: | |||
Reactor power = 100% | |||
1SA-3/B6 (FIRE ALARM) actuated Fire Alarm panel indication o point 0202071 (Unit 1 pipe trench room 348 North End) actuated o point 0202072 (Unit 1 pipe trench room 348 East Side) actuated AP/0/A/1700/043 (Fire Brigade Response Procedure) is in progress | |||
: 1) MERT will be dispatched to the area __(1)__. | |||
: 2) In accordance with AP/0/A/1700/043, if water is to be used for extinguishing the fire, a transformer mulsifyre is activated or a fire hydrant is opened to __(2)__. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
A. | |||
: 1. ONLY after the fire is confirmed | |||
: 2. ensure HPSW pump minimum flow requirements are met B. | |||
: 1. ONLY after the fire is confirmed | |||
: 2. mitigate the pressure surge from any water hammer event that occurs upon HPSW pump start C. | |||
: 1. at the same time as the fire brigade | |||
: 2. ensure HPSW pump minimum flow requirements are met D. | |||
: 1. at the same time as the fire brigade | |||
: 2. mitigate the pressure surge from any water hammer event that occurs upon HPSW pump start Page 74 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 75 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 2 conditions: | |||
Initial conditions: | |||
Reactor power = 100% | |||
Current conditions: | |||
Control Room being evacuated due to chemical spill The CRS has implemented AP/2/A/1700/008 (Loss of Control Room) | |||
In accordance with AP/08, | |||
: 1) The RO is dispatched to the __(1)__. | |||
: 2) RCS pressure will be controlled utilizing Pzr heater Bank 2 Groups __(2)__. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
A. | |||
: 1. Standby Shutdown Facility | |||
: 2. B and C B. | |||
: 1. Standby Shutdown Facility | |||
: 2. B and D C. | |||
: 1. Unit 2 Auxiliary Shutdown Panel | |||
: 2. B and C D. | |||
: 1. Unit 2 Auxiliary Shutdown Panel | |||
: 2. B and D Page 75 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 76 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions: | |||
Time = 0400: | |||
Reactor power = 80% | |||
1B HPI pump OOS Time = 0410: | |||
ES Channels 1 - 8 actuated Core SCM = 0ºF EOP Enclosure 5.1 (ES Actuation) in progress Seal Inlet HDR Flow = 25 gpm HPI Flow Train A flow = 456 gpm HPI Flow Train B flow = 482 gpm | |||
: 1) The 1A HPI header __(1)__ exceeding the HPI pump flow limits in accordance with Rule 6 (HPI Pump Throttling Limits). | |||
: 2) TS 3.5.2 (HPI) Bases states that a MINIMUM of __(2)__ HPI train(s) is/are required to mitigate cold leg breaks located on the discharge of the Reactor Coolant pumps. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
A. | |||
: 1. is | |||
: 2. two B. | |||
: 1. is | |||
: 2. one C. | |||
: 1. is NOT | |||
: 2. two D. | |||
: 1. is NOT | |||
: 2. one Page 76 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 77 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions: | |||
Time = 1000: | |||
Mode 6 LPI aligned in Normal Decay Heat Removal mode 1A and 1B SGs in wet layup Fuel Transfer Canal flooded 1B LPI pump OOS Time = 1030: | |||
The running LPI pump tripped and NO LPI pump can be started | |||
: 1) At Time = 1000, OP/1/A/1104/004 (Low Pressure Injection System) directs operation of the __(1)__ LPI pump. | |||
: 2) At Time = 1030, the CRS is required to initiate AP/1/A/1700/026 (Loss of Decay Heat Removal) Enclosure __(2)__ for heat removal. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
A. | |||
: 1. 1A | |||
: 2. 5.7 (DHR Using SF Cooling) | |||
B. | |||
: 1. 1A | |||
: 2. 5.18 (SSF Operation for Loss of DHR Events) | |||
C. | |||
: 1. 1C | |||
: 2. 5.7 (DHR Using SF Cooling) | |||
D. | |||
: 1. 1C | |||
: 2. 5.18 (SSF Operation for Loss of DHR Events) | |||
Page 77 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 78 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following on Unit 2: | |||
Initial conditions: | |||
Reactor power = 100% | |||
OAC ALARM, (2MS-93 Backup Nitrogen Press 1 LO-LO) is in alarm In-service Nitrogen bottle pressure for 2MS-93 (TD EFDWP STEAM SUPPLY TRIP VALVE) is 550 psig stable Current conditions: | |||
MSLB occurs on 2A SG inside containment | |||
: 1) The LCO for TS 3.3.13, (Automatic Feedwater Isolation System (AFIS)) Digital Channels __(1)__ being met. | |||
: 2) TS 3.3.13 Bases states that the AFIS circuitry provides protection against __(2)__ | |||
for MSLBs inside containment. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
A. | |||
: 1. is | |||
: 2. an inadvertent return to criticality B. | |||
: 1. is | |||
: 2. exceeding containment design pressure C. | |||
: 1. is NOT | |||
: 2. an inadvertent return to criticality D. | |||
: 1. is NOT | |||
: 2. exceeding containment design pressure Page 78 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 79 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions: | |||
Initial conditions: | |||
Both Main FDW pumps trip from 100% power Current conditions: | |||
Approximately 30 minutes after the above event, the STA informs the SM that the only reportable criteria for Non-Emergency 10 CFR 50.72 notification to the NRC is a 4-hour report. | |||
: 1) In accordance with the Emergency Feedwater (EFW) Design Basis Document (DBD), in order to mitigate the given event each motor driven emergency feedwater pump shall be capable of delivering at least __(1)__ gpm at or below 130°F to any single steam generator that is at a pressure of 1064 psia or below. | |||
: 2) In addition to the 4-hour reportable criteria, 8-hour Non-Emergency 10 CFR 50.72 criteria __(2)__ required to be reported to the NRC for this event. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
REFERENCE PROVIDED A. | |||
: 1. 375 | |||
: 2. is B. | |||
: 1. 375 | |||
: 2. is NOT C. | |||
: 1. 575 | |||
: 2. is D. | |||
: 1. 575 | |||
: 2. is NOT Page 79 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 80 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following plant conditions: | |||
Time = 0800:00: | |||
ACB-3 Closed A LOOP (Switchyard Isolation) occurs Unit 1 Reactor trips from 100% power Unit 2 Reactor power = 20% stable Unit 2 auxiliaries supplied from 2T Transformer | |||
: 1) At Time = 0800:10, __(1)__ volts will be indicated on CX Transformer voltmeter (TRANS NO. CX AC VOLTS) on CB3 in Keowee Control Room. | |||
: 2) In accordance with TS 3.8.1 (AC Sources - Operating) Bases, Keowee Hydro is required to be able to provide sufficient power within __(2)__ seconds after an emergency start initiate signal. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
A. | |||
: 1. 600 | |||
: 2. 23 B. | |||
: 1. 600 | |||
: 2. 33 C. | |||
: 1. 0 | |||
: 2. 23 D. | |||
: 1. 0 | |||
: 2. 33 Page 80 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 81 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions: | |||
Time = 0400: | |||
Reactor power = 100% | |||
2SA-18/A-11, (TURBINE BSMT WATER LEVEL EMERGENCY HIGH) actuated AP/1/A/1700/010, (Turbine Building flood) initiated Time = 0430: | |||
ALL CBPs, Main, and Emergency FDW pumps have tripped Protected Service Water (PSW) is NOT available | |||
: 1) At Time = 0430, the CRS __(1)__ required to transfer to the LOHT tab. | |||
: 2) The next method that is required to be used to remove decay heat is __(2)__. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
A. | |||
: 1. is NOT | |||
: 2. initiation of HPI Forced Cooling B. | |||
: 1. is NOT | |||
: 2. feeding with the SSF ASW pump C. | |||
: 1. is | |||
: 2. initiation of HPI Forced Cooling D. | |||
: 1. is | |||
: 2. feeding with the SSF ASW pump Page 81 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 82 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following on Unit 1: | |||
Reactor startup is in progress Reactor in MODE 3 1FDW-104 (1B SG Shell Drain Block) is declared INOPERABLE and is closed and deactivated to satisfy TS 3.6.3 (Containment Isolation Valves) Condition A | |||
: 1) The Unit 1 startup __(1)__ continue into MODE 2. | |||
: 2) If administrative controls are established to open 1FDW-104, the time that it is allowed to be open __(2)__ limited to 4 hours. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
REFERENCE PROVIDED A. | |||
: 1. can | |||
: 2. is B. | |||
: 1. can NOT | |||
: 2. is C. | |||
: 1. can | |||
: 2. is NOT D. | |||
: 1. can NOT | |||
: 2. is NOT Page 82 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 83 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions: | |||
Time = 1200: | |||
Reactor power = 100% | |||
Pressurizer temperature indicates as shown below Which ONE of the following describes ALL Tech Spec 3.3.8 (PAM Instrumentation) | |||
Condition(s) that apply (if any) at Time = 1200? | |||
REFERENCE PROVIDED A. | |||
NO Tech Spec 3.3.8 Condition applies B. | |||
Condition A ONLY C. | |||
Condition A, C, and H D. | |||
Condition A and C ONLY Page 83 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 84 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions: | |||
Time = 0800: | |||
Reactor trip from 100% power Excessive Heat Transfer on 1A SG Rule 5 (Main Steam Line Break) initiated ALL SCMs = 0°F RCPs secured in accordance with Rule 2 (Loss of SCM) | |||
Following initial entry into Subsequent Actions (SA), the procedural flowpath required for event mitigation is ______. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statement above? | |||
A. | |||
EHT, FCD, LOSCM B. | |||
LOSCM, EHT, SA C. | |||
LOSCM, EHT, FCD D. | |||
EHT, LOSCM, LOCA CD Page 84 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 85 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 3 conditions: | |||
Time = 0800: | |||
Reactor power = 100% | |||
SBLOCA occurs MANUAL Reactor Trip initiated Time = 0802: | |||
CRS enters the EOP LOSCM tab Time = 0814: | |||
The SM declares an ALERT based on plant conditions | |||
: 1) In accordance with AD-EP-ALL-0105 (Activation and Operation of the Technical Support Center), the LATEST time that TSC activation is required to be completed is __(1)__. | |||
: 2) The LATEST time allowed to notify the NRC per AD-EP-ALL-0111, (Control Room Activation of the ERO) is __(2)__. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
A. | |||
: 1. 0929 | |||
: 2. 0914 B. | |||
: 1. 0929 | |||
: 2. 0829 C. | |||
: 1. 0914 | |||
: 2. 0914 D. | |||
: 1. 0914 | |||
: 2. 0829 Page 85 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 86 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions: | |||
Time = 0800: | |||
Reactor in MODE 3 1A2 and 1B2 RCPs operating Time = 0805: | |||
All SCMs = 25°F stable 1A2 RCP Motor Upper Guide Bearing temperature = 195°F slowly rising 1B2 RCP Motor Stator Temperature = 255°F slowly rising Time = 0810: | |||
RCS leakage = 190 gpm stable The operating RCP trips | |||
: 1) At time = 0805, AP/1/A/1700/016 (Abnormal Reactor Coolant Pump Operation) will direct tripping the __(1)__ RCP. | |||
: 2) At time = 0810, the SRO is required to direct plant shutdown actions in accordance with the __(2)__ Cooldown tab of the EOP. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
A. | |||
: 1. 1B2 | |||
: 2. LOCA B. | |||
: 1. 1B2 | |||
: 2. Forced C. | |||
: 1. 1A2 | |||
: 2. LOCA D. | |||
: 1. 1A2 | |||
: 2. Forced Page 86 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 87 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions: | |||
Initial conditions: | |||
Reactor power = 100% | |||
Current conditions: | |||
Core SCM = 0°F Rule 2 (Loss of SCM) is in progress 1HP-24 and 1HP-25 fail closed RCS pressure = 890 psig lowering RB pressure = 2.1 psig rising | |||
: 1) In accordance with Rule 2, when the step to align LPI in piggyback is complete, there will be __(1)__ LPI pump(s) operating. | |||
: 2) In accordance with TS Bases, 1LP-15 and 1LP-16 __(2)__ subject to TS 3.5.2 High Pressure Injection (HPI). | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
A. | |||
: 1. one | |||
: 2. are B. | |||
: 1. one | |||
: 2. are NOT C. | |||
: 1. two | |||
: 2. are D. | |||
: 1. two | |||
: 2. are NOT Page 87 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 88 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions: | |||
Initial conditions: | |||
Reactor power = 100% | |||
I&E performing Reactor Protective System (RPS) calibration procedure Current conditions: | |||
The RCS Low Pressure trip setpoint is determined to be 1804 psig in 1A and 1B RPS Channels | |||
: 1) Per Alarm Response Guide 1SA-1/A-2 (1A LO PRESS TRIP), the actual RPS trip setpoint for RCS Low Pressure should be __(1)__ psig. | |||
: 2) In accordance with the bases of Tech Spec 3.3.1 (Reactor Protective System (RPS) Instrumentation), the 1A and 1B RCS Low Pressure Trip Functions are | |||
__(2)__. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
A. | |||
: 1. 1810 | |||
: 2. operable B. | |||
: 1. 1810 | |||
: 2. inoperable C. | |||
: 1. 1800 | |||
: 2. operable D. | |||
: 1. 1800 | |||
: 2. inoperable Page 88 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 89 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 3 plant conditions: | |||
Reactor power = 100% | |||
3XS3 de-energizes | |||
: 1) Which ONE of the following would require immediate entry into LCO 3.0.3? | |||
: 2) Upon entering LCO 3.0.3, the Bases states that the actual lowering of power | |||
__(2)__ required to begin within 1 hour of LCO 3.0.3 entry. | |||
A. | |||
: 1. 3A RBS Pump declared inoperable | |||
: 2. is B. | |||
: 1. 3A RBS Pump declared inoperable | |||
: 2. is NOT C. | |||
: 1. 3C RBCU declared inoperable | |||
: 2. is D. | |||
: 1. 3C RBCU declared inoperable | |||
: 2. is NOT Page 89 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 90 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following on Unit 1: | |||
Initial conditions: | |||
Reactor power = 100% | |||
Current conditions: | |||
LBLOCA occurs ES 1 - 8 actuated LOSCM tab in progress BOTH LPI trains in service | |||
: 1) Based on the given conditions, in accordance with the LOSCM tab the MINIMUM LPI flow that requires the CRS to transfer to the LOCA Cooldown tab is __(1)__ | |||
gpm. | |||
: 2) In accordance with TS 3.5.3 Low Pressure Injection (LPI) Bases, the safety grade flow indicator of an LPI Train __(2)__ required to support OPERABILITY of an RBS train. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
A. | |||
: 1. 2900 | |||
: 2. is NOT B. | |||
: 1. 2900 | |||
: 2. is C. | |||
: 1. 3400 | |||
: 2. is NOT D. | |||
: 1. 3400 | |||
: 2. is Page 90 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 91 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 2 conditions: | |||
Mode 6 Defueling in progress Main Fuel Bridge is withdrawing a fuel assembly that is binding | |||
: 1) In order to bypass the automatic stop in hoist upward movement, __(1)__ is required to be utilized on the Main Fuel Bridge. | |||
: 2) In accordance with MP/0/A/1500/029 Enclosure 9.7 (Bypassing Rx Bridge Interlocks), authorization is required to be obtained from __(2)__ prior to bypassing the above interlock. | |||
Options for (2) above: | |||
A. Refueling SRO B. Reactor Engineer C. Fuel Handling Supervisor D. Fuel Handling Equipment Engineer Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
A. | |||
: 1. Overload Bypass TS-1 | |||
: 2. A and C ONLY B. | |||
: 1. Overload Bypass TS-1 | |||
: 2. A, B, C, and D C. | |||
: 1. Hoist Interlock Bypass TS-2 | |||
: 2. A and C ONLY D. | |||
: 1. Hoist Interlock Bypass TS-2 | |||
: 2. A, B, C, and D Page 91 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 92 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station | |||
` | |||
Given the following Unit 1 conditions: | |||
Initial conditions: | |||
Unit 1 TDEFDW pump is out of service A lightning strike in the switchyard causes a reactor trip Incorrect wiring in 4160v relays causes a slow transfer of power to CT-1 Transformer Rule 3 (Loss of Main or Emergency FDW) is in progress Current conditions: | |||
Both MD EFDW pumps fail LOHT tab initiated ALL SCMs > 0°F | |||
: 1) Condensate Booster Pump feed __(1)__ required to be established. | |||
: 2) IF RCS temperature subsequently rises and results in core SCM = 0°F, the CRS is required to __(2)__. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
A. | |||
: 1. is | |||
: 2. remain in the LOHT tab B. | |||
: 1. is | |||
: 2. transfer to the LOSCM tab C. | |||
: 1. is NOT | |||
: 2. remain in the LOHT tab D. | |||
: 1. is NOT | |||
: 2. transfer to the LOSCM tab Page 92 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 93 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following on Unit 3: | |||
Initial conditions: | |||
Reactor power = 90% stable for fuel conditioning Routine liquid waste release in progress from Turbine Building Sump (TBS) | |||
Spurious electrical transient causes a 3RIA-54 (TBS) HIGH alarm SRO declares 3RIA-54 NON-FUNCTIONAL 3RIA-54 is removed from service and tagged out Instrument vendor notifies site that it will take 60 - 90 days to send repair parts due to instrument obsolescence Current conditions: | |||
It has been 45 days since 3RIA-54 was declared NON-FUNCTIONAL | |||
: 1) 3RIA-54 in HIGH alarm __(1)__ cause automatic actions. | |||
: 2) Based on the current conditions, if SLC 16.11.3 (Radioactive Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation) REQUIRED ACTION F.2 is satisfied, liquid waste releases from the Unit 3 TBS __(2)__ allowed. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
REFERENCE PROVIDED A. | |||
: 1. does | |||
: 2. are B. | |||
: 1. does | |||
: 2. are NOT C. | |||
: 1. does NOT | |||
: 2. are D. | |||
: 1. does NOT | |||
: 2. are NOT Page 93 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 94 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 3 conditions: | |||
Unit 3 Reactor power = 100% | |||
Main Turbine Bearing #7 temperature is suspect due to thermocouple failure Repair parts will be available in 30 days Engineering has provided Operations with guidance on additional monitoring for Bearing #7 In accordance with AD-OP-ALL-0111 (Operations Communications) | |||
: 1) the additional monitoring requirements for Bearing #7 will be contained in a/an | |||
__(1)__. | |||
: 2) The LOWEST level of management that can approve Standing Instructions and Operations Supplemental Information Packages (OSIP) is the __(2)__ Manager. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
A. | |||
: 1. Standing Instruction | |||
: 2. Shift B. | |||
: 1. Standing Instruction | |||
: 2. OPS C. | |||
: 1. Operations Supplemental Information Package (OSIP) | |||
: 2. Shift D. | |||
: 1. Operations Supplemental Information Package (OSIP) | |||
: 2. OPS Page 94 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 95 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station | |||
: 1) In accordance with TS 3.9.4 (DHR and Coolant Circulation-High Water Level), the required DHR loop may not be in operation for a MAXIMUM of 1 hour per __(1)__ | |||
hour period, provided no operations are permitted that would cause reduction of the Reactor Coolant System boron concentration. | |||
: 2) In accordance with TS 3.9.4 (DHR and Coolant Circulation-High Water Level) | |||
Bases, ECCW __(2)__ required to support the DHR train. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
A. | |||
: 1. 12 | |||
: 2. is NOT B. | |||
: 1. 12 | |||
: 2. is C. | |||
: 1. 8 | |||
: 2. is NOT D. | |||
: 1. 8 | |||
: 2. is Page 95 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 96 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 3 conditions: | |||
Reactor power = 100% | |||
Maintenance personnel preparing to perform EMERGENT work encounter a sign stating Single Point Vulnerability (Trip Sensitive Components). They stop and notify the WCC SRO. | |||
In accordance with AD-OP-ALL-0201 (Protected Equipment), EMERGENT work on or within 2 feet of SPVs is required to be approved by the ______. | |||
A. | |||
WCC SRO ONLY B. | |||
Shift Manager ONLY C. | |||
WCC SRO and Site Duty Manager D. | |||
Shift Manager and Site Duty Manager Page 96 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 97 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station In accordance with IP/0/A/0100/001 (Controlling Procedure for Troubleshooting and Maintenance Activities) | |||
: 1) the position designated to determine whether a Troubleshooting Plan is LOW or HIGH risk is __(1)__. | |||
: 2) the LOWEST level of operations approval for a High Risk Troubleshooting Action Plan is the __(2)__. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
A. | |||
: 1. Shift Manager | |||
: 2. Unit SRO B. | |||
: 1. Shift Manager | |||
: 2. Shift Manager C. | |||
: 1. Unit/WCC SRO | |||
: 2. Unit SRO D. | |||
: 1. Unit/WCC SRO | |||
: 2. Shift Manager Page 97 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 98 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 3 conditions: | |||
Fuel offload in progress A fuel cask has been dropped in the spent fuel pool causing fuel damage 3RIA-6 (Spent Fuel Pool Area Monitor) reaches the High Alarm setpoint | |||
: 1) 3RIA-6 __(1)__ sound a local alarm. | |||
: 2) The correct Emergency classification for this event is an __(2)__. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
DO NOT USE EMERGENCY COORDINATOR JUDGEMENT AS THE BASIS FOR EAL DETERMINATION REFERENCE PROVIDED A. | |||
: 1. does | |||
: 2. Alert B. | |||
: 1. does | |||
: 2. Unusual Event C. | |||
: 1. does NOT | |||
: 2. Alert D. | |||
: 1. does NOT | |||
: 2. Unusual Event Page 98 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 99 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions: | |||
The CRS enters an Abnormal Procedure (AP) | |||
In accordance with AD-OP-ONS-0002 (Oconee Specific Abnormal Operations Guidance) | |||
: 1) the Procedure Director (PD) __(1)__ allowed to announce plant conditions on the P.A. system if resources are not available and another SRO is observing the crew. | |||
: 2) All CAUTION statements for AP steps __(2)__ required to be read verbatim by the CRS with acknowledgement received from the Reactor Operators indicating the CAUTION statement is understood. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
A. | |||
: 1. is | |||
: 2. are B. | |||
: 1. is | |||
: 2. are NOT C. | |||
: 1. is NOT | |||
: 2. are D. | |||
: 1. is NOT | |||
: 2. are NOT Page 99 of 100 | |||
Question: | |||
(1 point) 100 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following conditions: | |||
Time = 1300: | |||
A General Emergency has been declared The first Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) is being issued The 15-minute average Wind Direction on 60M Tower (OAC) indicates 270 degrees (1) In accordance with AD-EP-ALL-0111 (Control Room Activation of the ERO), the SM/Emergency Coordinator's responsibility of approving Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) __(1)__ be delegated. | |||
(2) The general location of the sector(s) to be evacuated 2 - 5 miles downwind is | |||
__(2)__ of ONS. | |||
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? | |||
A. | |||
: 1. can | |||
: 2. West B. | |||
: 1. can | |||
: 2. East C. | |||
: 1. can NOT | |||
: 2. West D. | |||
: 1. can NOT | |||
: 2. East Page 100 of 100 | |||
Containment Isolation Valves 3.6.3 OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 3.6.3-1 Amendment Nos. 300, 300, & 300 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.3 Containment Isolation Valves LCO 3.6.3 Each containment isolation valve shall be OPERABLE. | |||
APPLICABILITY: | |||
MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. | |||
ACTIONS | |||
------------------------------------------------------------NOTES------------------------------------------------------ | |||
: 1. | |||
Penetration flow paths except for 48 inch purge valve penetration flow paths may be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls. | |||
: 2. | |||
Separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path. | |||
: 3. | |||
Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions for system(s) made inoperable by containment isolation valves. | |||
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. | |||
-----------NOTE------------ | |||
Only applicable to penetration flow paths with two containment isolation valves. | |||
One or more penetration flow paths with one containment isolation valve inoperable. | |||
A.1 Isolate the affected penetration flow path by use of at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve, one closed and de-activated non-automatic power operated valve, closed manual valve, blind flange, or check valve with flow through the valve secured. | |||
AND 4 hours (continued) | |||
Containment Isolation Valves 3.6.3 ACTIONS OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 3.6.3-2 Amendment Nos. 300, 300, & 300 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. | |||
(continued) | |||
A.2 | |||
-----------NOTE----------- | |||
Isolation devices in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means. | |||
Verify the affected penetration flow path is isolated. | |||
Once per 31 days for isolation devices outside containment AND Prior to entering MODE 4 from MODE 5 if not performed within the previous 92 days for isolation devices inside containment B. | |||
----------NOTE------------ | |||
Only applicable to penetration flow paths with two containment isolation valves. | |||
One or more penetration flow paths with two containment isolation valves inoperable. | |||
B.1 Isolate the affected penetration flow path by use of at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve, one closed and de-activated non-automatic power operated valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange. | |||
1 hour (continued) | |||
Containment Isolation Valves 3.6.3 ACTIONS (continued) | |||
OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 3.6.3-3 Amendment Nos. 300, 300, & 300 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. | |||
-----------NOTE----------- | |||
Only applicable to penetration flow paths with only one containment isolation valve and a closed system. | |||
One or more penetration flow paths with one containment isolation valve inoperable. | |||
C.1 Isolate the affected penetration flow path by use of at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve, one closed and de-activated non-automatic power operated valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange. | |||
AND C.2 | |||
----------NOTE------------ | |||
Isolation devices in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means. | |||
Verify the affected penetration flow path is isolated. | |||
4 hours Once per 31 days D. | |||
Required Action and associated Completion Time not met. | |||
D.1 Be in MODE 3. | |||
AND D.2 Be in MODE 5. | |||
12 hours 36 hours | |||
Containment Isolation Valves 3.6.3 OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 3.6.3-4 Amendment Nos. 372, 374, 373 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.3.1 Verify each 48 inch purge valve is sealed closed. | |||
In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.3.2 | |||
-------------------------NOTE-------------------------- | |||
Valves and blind flanges in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means. | |||
Verify each containment isolation manual and non-automatic power operated valve and blind flange that is located outside containment and not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured and required to be closed during accident conditions is closed, except for containment isolation valves that are open under administrative controls. | |||
In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.3.3 | |||
--------------------------NOTE-------------------------- | |||
Valves and blind flanges in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means. | |||
Verify each containment isolation manual and non-automatic power operated valve and blind flange that is located inside containment and not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured and required to be closed during accident conditions is closed, except for containment isolation valves that are open under administrative controls. | |||
Prior to entering MODE 4 from MODE 5 if not performed within the previous 92 days (continued) | |||
Containment Isolation Valves 3.6.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) | |||
OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 3.6.3-5 Amendment Nos. 409, 411 & 410 SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.3.4 Verify the isolation time of each automatic power operated containment isolation valve is within limits. | |||
In accordance with the INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAM SR 3.6.3.5 Verify each automatic containment isolation valve that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, actuates to the isolation position on an actual or simulated actuation signal. | |||
In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program | |||
PAM Instrumentation 3.3.8 OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 3.3.8-1 Amendment Nos. 350, 352, & 351 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.8 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation LCO 3.3.8 The PAM instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.8-1 shall be OPERABLE. | |||
APPLICABILITY: | |||
MODES 1, 2, and 3. | |||
ACTIONS | |||
----------------------------------------------------------------NOTES--------------------------------------------------- | |||
: 1. | |||
LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable. | |||
: 2. | |||
Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function. | |||
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. | |||
-----------NOTE----------- | |||
Not applicable to Functions 14, 18, 19, and 22. | |||
One or more Functions with one required channel inoperable. | |||
A.1 Restore required channel to OPERABLE status. | |||
30 days B. | |||
Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met. | |||
B.1 Initiate action in accordance with Specification 5.6.6. | |||
Immediately (continued) | |||
PAM Instrumentation 3.3.8 ACTIONS (continued) | |||
OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 3.3.8-2 Amendment Nos. 350, 352, & 351 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. | |||
-----------NOTE----------- | |||
Not applicable to Functions 14, 18, 19, and 22. | |||
One or more Functions with two required channels inoperable. | |||
C.1 Restore one channel to OPERABLE status. | |||
7 days D. | |||
Not Used D.1 Not Used Not Used E. | |||
-----------NOTE----------- | |||
Only applicable to Function 14. | |||
One required channel inoperable. | |||
E.1 Restore required channel to OPERABLE status. | |||
24 hours (continued) | |||
PAM Instrumentation 3.3.8 ACTIONS (continued) | |||
OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 3.3.8-3 Amendment Nos. 350, 352, & 351 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME F. | |||
-----------NOTE----------- | |||
Only applicable to Functions 18, 19, and | |||
: 22. | |||
One or more Functions with required channel inoperable. | |||
F.1 Declare the affected train inoperable. | |||
Immediately G. | |||
Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition C or E not met. | |||
G.1 Enter the Condition referenced in Table 3.3.8-1 for the channel. | |||
Immediately H. | |||
As required by Required Action G.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.8-1. | |||
H.1 Be in MODE 3. | |||
AND H.2 Be in MODE 4. | |||
12 hours 18 hours I. | |||
As required by Required Action G.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.8-1. | |||
I.1 Initiate action in accordance with Specification 5.6.6. | |||
Immediately | |||
PAM Instrumentation 3.3.8 OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 3.3.8-4 Amendment Nos. 372, 374, 373 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS | |||
-----------------------------------------------------------NOTE--------------------------------------------------------- | |||
These SRs apply to each PAM instrumentation Function in Table 3.3.8-1 except where indicated. | |||
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.8.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK for each required instrumentation channel that is normally energized. | |||
In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.8.2 | |||
--------------------------NOTE------------------------- | |||
Only applicable to PAM Functions 7 and 22. | |||
Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. | |||
In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.8.3 | |||
-------------------------NOTES------------------------ | |||
: 1. | |||
Neutron detectors are excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION. | |||
: 2. | |||
Not applicable to PAM Functions 7 and | |||
: 22. | |||
Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. | |||
In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program | |||
PAM Instrumentation 3.3.8 OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 3.3.8-5 Amendment Nos. 350, 352, & 351 Table 3.3.8-1 (page 1 of 1) | |||
Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation FUNCTION REQUIRED CHANNELS CONDITIONS REFERENCED FROM REQUIRED ACTION G.1 | |||
: 1. | |||
Wide Range Neutron Flux 2 | |||
H | |||
: 2. | |||
RCS Hot Leg Temperature 2 | |||
H | |||
: 3. | |||
RCS Hot Leg Level 2 | |||
I | |||
: 4. | |||
RCS Pressure (Wide Range) 2 H | |||
: 5. | |||
Reactor Vessel Head Level 2 | |||
I | |||
: 6. | |||
Containment Sump Water Level (Wide Range) 2 H | |||
: 7. | |||
Containment Pressure (Wide Range) 2 H | |||
: 8. | |||
Containment Isolation Valve Position 2 per penetration flow path(a)(b)(c) | |||
H | |||
: 9. | |||
Containment Area Radiation (High Range) 2 I | |||
: 10. | |||
Not Used | |||
: 11. | |||
Pressurizer Level 2 | |||
H | |||
: 12. | |||
Steam Generator Water Level 2 per SG H | |||
: 13. | |||
Steam Generator Pressure | |||
: 14. | |||
Borated Water Storage Tank Water Level | |||
: 15. | |||
Upper Surge Tank Level 2 per SG 2 | |||
2 H | |||
H H | |||
: 16. | |||
Core Exit Temperature 2 independent sets of 5(d) | |||
H | |||
: 17. | |||
Subcooling Monitor | |||
: 18. | |||
HPI System Flow | |||
: 19. | |||
LPI System Flow | |||
: 20. | |||
Not used | |||
: 21. | |||
Emergency Feedwater Flow | |||
: 22. | |||
Low Pressure Service Water Flow to LPI Coolers 2 | |||
1 per train 1 per train 2 per SG 1 per train H | |||
NA NA H | |||
NA (a) | |||
Not required for isolation valves whose associated penetration is isolated by at least one closed and deactivated automatic valve, closed manual valve, blind flange, or check valve with flow through the valve secured. | |||
(b) | |||
Only one position indication channel is required for penetration flow paths with only one installed control room indication channel. | |||
(c) | |||
Position indication requirements apply only to containment isolation valves that are electrically controlled. | |||
(d) | |||
The subcooling margin monitor takes the average of the five highest CETs for each of the ICCM trains. | |||
Prepared for Duke Energy by: Operations Support Services, Inc. - www.ossi-net.com (1/28/16) | |||
Modes: | |||
1 Power Operations No Mode NM 2 | |||
Startup 5 | |||
Cold Shutdown 3 | |||
Hot Standby 4 | |||
Hot Shutdown Oconee Nuclear Station Classification of Emergency CSD-EP-ONS-0101-02 Rev 000 Irradiated Fuel Event RU1.1 Sample analysis for a gaseous or liquid release indicates a concentration or release rate > 2 x SLC/TS limits for 60 min. (Notes 1, 2) | |||
RU1.2 Reading on any Table R-1 effluent radiation monitor | |||
> column UE for 60 min. (Notes 1, 2, 3) | |||
RA1.1 Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses | |||
> 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY (Note 4) | |||
RS1.1 Reading on any Table R-1 effluent radiation monitor > column SAE for 15 min. (Notes 1, 2, 3, 4) | |||
RS1.2 Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses | |||
> 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY (Note 4) | |||
RA1.2 Reading on any Table R-1 effluent radiation monitor | |||
> column ALERT for 15 min. (Notes 1, 2, 3, 4) | |||
RA1.3 Analysis of a liquid effluent sample indicates a concentration or release rate that would result in doses > 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY for 60 min. of exposure (Notes 1, 2) | |||
RU2.1 UNPLANNED water level drop in the REFUELING PATHWAY as indicated by low water level alarm or indication AND UNPLANNED rise in corresponding area radiation levels as indicated by any of the following radiation monitors: | |||
- RIA-3 RB Refueling Deck Shield Wall | |||
- RIA-6 Spent Fuel Building Wall | |||
- Portable area monitors on the main bridge or SFP bridge RA2.2 Damage to irradiated fuel resulting in a release of radioactivity AND HIGH alarm on any of the following radiation monitors: | |||
- RIA-3 RB Refueling Deck Shield Wall | |||
- RIA-6 Spent Fuel Building Wall | |||
- RIA-41 Spent Fuel Pool Gas | |||
- RIA-49 RB Gas | |||
- Portable area monitors on the main bridge or SFP bridge RA3.1 Dose rates > 15 mR/hr in EITHER of the following areas: | |||
- Control Room (RIA-1) | |||
- Central Alarm Station (by survey) | |||
Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity greater than 2 times the SLC/TS limits for 60 minutes or longer Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE Release of gaseous radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem thyroid CDE Release of gaseous radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 1,000 mrem TEDE or 5,000 mrem thyroid CDE Unplanned loss of water level above irradiated fuel Significant lowering of water level above, or damage to, irradiated fuel RA2.1 Uncovery of irradiated fuel in the REFUELING PATHWAY Radiation levels that IMPEDE access to equipment necessary for normal plant operations, cooldown or shutdown RS1.3 Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY: | |||
- Closed window dose rates > 100 mR/hr expected to continue for 60 min. | |||
- Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE | |||
> 500 mrem for 60 min. of inhalation. | |||
(Notes 1, 2) | |||
Abnorm. | |||
Rad Levels | |||
/ Rad Effluent R | |||
GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT 2 | |||
Rad Effluent 1 | |||
None None None None HS1.1 A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the PROTECTED AREA as reported by the Security Shift Supervision HA1.1 HU2.1 HU4.1 A FIRE is not extinguished within 15 min. of any of the following FIRE detection indications (Note 1): | |||
- Report from the field (i.e., visual observation) | |||
- Receipt of multiple (more than 1) fire alarms or indications | |||
- Field verification of a single fire alarm AND The FIRE is located within any Table H-1 area HA5.1 Release of a toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable gas into any Table H-2 rooms or areas AND Entry into the room or area is prohibited or IMPEDED (Note 5) | |||
Seismic event greater than OBE levels HU4.2 Receipt of a single fire alarm (i.e., no other indications of a FIRE) | |||
AND The fire alarm is indicating a FIRE within any Table H-1 area AND The existence of a FIRE is not verified within 30 min. of alarm receipt (Note 1) | |||
HU3.2 Internal room or area FLOODING of a magnitude sufficient to require manual or automatic electrical isolation of a SAFETY SYSTEM component needed for the current operating mode FIRE potentially degrading the level of safety of the plant Gaseous release IMPEDING access to equipment necessary for normal plant operations, cooldown or shutdown Confirmed SECURITY CONDITION or threat HOSTILE ACTION within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA or airborne attack threat within 30 minutes HOSTILE ACTION within the PROTECTED AREA HU7.1 Other conditions existing that in the judgment of the Site Emergency Coordinator warrant declaration of a UE Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant or indicate a security threat to facility protection has been initiated. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of SAFETY SYSTEMS occurs. | |||
An event has resulted in plant control being transferred from the Control Room to the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel or Standby Shutdown Facility HA6.1 Control Room evacuation resulting in transfer of plant control to alternate locations HS6.1 An event has resulted in plant control being transferred from the Control Room to the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel or Standby Shutdown Facility AND Control of any of the following key safety functions is not reestablished within 15 min. (Note 1): | |||
- Reactivity (Modes 1, 2, and 3 only) | |||
- Core Cooling | |||
- RCS heat removal Inability to control a key safety function from outside the Control Room Other conditions exist which, in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator, indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant or a security event that involves probable life threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment because of HOSTILE ACTION. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels. | |||
HA7.1 Other conditions exist that in the judgment of the Site Emergency Coordinator warrant declaration of an Alert HS7.1 Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public or HOSTILE ACTION that results in intentional damage or malicious acts, (1) toward site personnel or equipment that could lead to the likely failure of or, (2) that prevent effective access to equipment needed for the protection of the public. | |||
Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels beyond the SITE BOUNDARY. | |||
Other conditions existing that in the judgment of the Site Emergency Coordinator warrant declaration of a Site Area Emergency HG7.1 Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or IMMINENT substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity or HOSTILE ACTION that results in an actual loss of physical control of the facility. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Site Emergency Coordinator warrant declaration of a General Emergency None Hazards H | |||
Seismic Event Fire Control Room Evacuation Hazardous Gases Security EC Judgment 2 | |||
4 5 | |||
1 6 | |||
7 None HU3.3 Movement of personnel within the PROTECTED AREA is IMPEDED due to an offsite event involving hazardous materials (e.g., an offsite chemical spill or toxic gas release) | |||
A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA as reported by the Security Shift Supervision None ISFSI EU1.1 Damage to a loaded canister CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY as indicated by an on-contact radiation reading on the surface of a loaded spent fuel cask > any Table E-1 ISFSI dose limit Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY E | |||
Area Rad Levels 3 | |||
RA1.4 Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY: | |||
- Closed window dose rates > 10 mR/hr expected to continue for 60 min. | |||
- Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE | |||
> 50 mrem for 60 min. of inhalation. | |||
(Notes 1, 2) | |||
RG1.1 Reading on any Table R-1 effluent radiation monitor > column GE for 15 min. (Notes 1, 2, 3, 4) | |||
RG1.2 Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses | |||
> 1000 mrem TEDE or 5000 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY (Note 4) | |||
RG1.3 Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY: | |||
- Closed window dose rates > 1000 mR/hr expected to continue for 60 min. | |||
- Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE | |||
> 5000 mrem for 60 min. of inhalation (Notes 1, 2) | |||
RA3.2 An UNPLANNED event results in radiation levels that prohibit or IMPEDE access to any Table R-2 rooms or areas (Note 5) | |||
HU3.1 A tornado strike within the PROTECTED AREA Hazardous event HU3.4 A hazardous event that results in on-site conditions sufficient to prohibit the plant staff from accessing the site via personal vehicles (Note 7) 3 HU4.3 A FIRE within the PROTECTED AREA not extinguished within 60 min. of the initial report, alarm or indication (Note 1) | |||
HU4.4 A FIRE within the PROTECTED AREA that requires firefighting support by an offsite fire response agency to extinguish None None None None None None Table R-2 Safe Operation & Shutdown Rooms/Areas Room / Area Mode(s) | |||
- Turbine Building | |||
- Equipment and Cable Rooms | |||
- Auxiliary Building | |||
- Reactor Buildings 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 3, 4, 5 None RA2.3 Lowering of spent fuel pool level to -13.5 ft. | |||
RS2.1 Lowering of spent fuel pool level to -23.5 ft. | |||
RG2.1 Spent fuel pool level at the top of the fuel racks Spent fuel pool level cannot be restored to at least the top of the fuel racks for 60 minutes or longer Spent fuel pool level cannot be restored to at least -23.5 ft. | |||
for > 60 min. (Note 1) 5 6 | |||
1 2 | |||
3 4 | |||
NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 6 | |||
Refuel CA1.1 Loss of RCS inventory as indicated by RCS water level | |||
< 10" (LT-5) | |||
CU1.1 UNPLANNED loss of reactor coolant results in RCS water level less than a required lower limit for 15 min. (Note 1) | |||
RCS water level cannot be monitored AND EITHER UNPLANNED increase in any Table C-1 sump/tank level due to a loss of RCS inventory Visual observation of UNISOLABLE RCS leakage CU1.2 RCS water level cannot be monitored for 30 min. (Note 1) | |||
AND Core uncovery is indicated by any of the following: | |||
UNPLANNED increase in any Table C-1 Sump / Tank level due to a loss of RCS inventory Visual observation of UNISOLABLE RCS leakage High alarm on RIA-3 RB Refueling Deck Shield Wall Erratic Source Range Monitor Indication RCS water level cannot be monitored for 30 min. (Note 1) | |||
AND Core uncovery is indicated by any of the following: | |||
UNPLANNED increase in any Table C-1 Sump / | |||
Tank level due to a loss of RCS inventory Visual observation of UNISOLABLE RCS leakage High alarm on RIA-3 RB Refueling Deck Shield Wall Erratic Source Range Monitor Indication AND Any Containment Challenge indication, Table C-2 RCS water level cannot be monitored for 15 min. (Note 1) | |||
AND EITHER UNPLANNED increase in any Table C-1 Sump / Tank level due to a loss of RCS inventory Visual observation of UNISOLABLE RCS leakage CA1.2 Unit 1/2/3 Plant Vent Unit 1/2/3 Plant Vent Gaseous Liquid 3.00E+5 cpm RIA-45 RIA-46 Table R-1 Effluent Monitor Classification Thresholds Release Point Monitor GE SAE Alert UE 3.00E+4 cpm 3.00E+3 cpm 1.41E+5 cpm Liquid Radwaste Discharge RIA-33 4.79E+5 cpm Note 1: The Emergency Coordinator should declare the event promptly upon determining that time limit has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. | |||
Note 2: If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded the specified time limit. | |||
Note 3: If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped, indicating that the release path is isolated, the effluent monitor reading is no longer VALID for classification purposes. | |||
Note 4: The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EALs RA1.1, RS1.1 and RG1.1 should be used for emergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment using actual meteorology are available. | |||
Note 5: If the equipment in the listed room or area was already inoperable or out-of-service before the event occurred, then no emergency classification is warranted. | |||
Note 6: If CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is re-established prior to exceeding the 30-minute time limit, declaration of a General Emergency is not required. | |||
Note 7: This EAL does not apply to routine traffic impediments such as fog, snow, ice, or vehicle breakdowns or accidents. | |||
Note 8: A manual trip action is any Control Room operator action, or set of actions, which causes the control rods to be rapidly inserted into the core, and does not include manually driving in control rods or implementation of boron injection strategies. | |||
Note 9: RVLS is not valid if EITHER of the following exists: | |||
One or more RCPs are running OR | |||
- LPI pump(s) are running Note 10: In the absence of reliable RCS temperature indication caused by the loss of decay heat removal capability, classification should be based on time to boil data. | |||
Note 11: If the affected SAFETY SYSTEM train was already inoperable or out of service before the hazardous event occurred, then this emergency classification is not warranted. | |||
Note 12: If the hazardous event only resulted in VISIBLE DAMAGE, with noi indications of degraded performance to at least one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM, then this emergency classification is not warranted. | |||
NOTES Seismic event > OBE as indicated by EITHER of the following: | |||
- 1SA-9/E-1 (SEISMIC TRIGGER) alarm | |||
- 3SA-9/E-1 (SEISMIC TRIGGER) alarm Natural or Tech. | |||
Hazard Table C-1 Sumps / Tanks RB Normal Sumps RB Emergency Sumps Core Flood Tank Quench Tank Low Activity Waste Tank High Activity Waste Tank Miscellaneous Waste Holdup Tank LPI Room Sumps | |||
[Refer to EAL CA6.1 OR SA9.1 for escalation due to seismic event] | |||
[Refer to EAL CA6.1 OR SA9.1 for escalation due to natural or technological hazard] | |||
[Refer to EAL CA6.1 OR SA9.1 for escalation due to FIRE] | |||
None Table H-1 Fire Areas | |||
- Reactor Building | |||
- Auxiliary Building | |||
- Turbine Building | |||
- Standby Shutdown Facility | |||
- Intake Structure | |||
- Electrical Blockhouse | |||
- Keowee Hydro & associated transformers | |||
- Transformer Yard | |||
- Protected Service Water Building | |||
- Essential Siphon Vacuum Building Table H-2 Safe Operation & Shutdown Rooms/Areas Room / Area Mode(s) | |||
- Turbine Building | |||
- Equipment and Cable Rooms | |||
- Auxiliary Building | |||
- Reactor Buildings 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 3, 4, 5 EC Judgment 7 | |||
Onsite Offsite System Commercial phone service ONS site phone system EOF phone system Public address system Onsite radio system DEMNET Offsite radio system NRC Emergency Telephone System Satellite Phone NRC X | |||
X X | |||
X X | |||
X X | |||
X X | |||
X Table C-5 Communication Methods X | |||
X X | |||
X Table C-3 AC Power Sources Offsite | |||
- Unit Normal Transformer (backcharged) | |||
- Unit Startup Transformer (SWYD) | |||
- Another Unit Startup Transformer (aligned) | |||
(SWYD) | |||
- CT5 (Central/energizing Standby Bus) | |||
Emergency | |||
- Unit Startup Transformer (Keowee) | |||
- Another Unit Startup Transformer (aligned) | |||
(Keowee) | |||
- CT4 | |||
- CT5 (dedicated line/energizing Standby Bus) | |||
HA1.2 A validated notification from NRC of an aircraft attack threat within 30 min. of the site 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 HU1.1 A SECURITY CONDITION that does not involve a HOSTILE ACTION as reported by the Security Shift Supervision HU1.2 Notification of a credible security threat directed at the site HU1.3 A validated notification from the NRC providing information of an aircraft threat Note 1: The Emergency Coordinator should declare the event promptly upon determining that time limit has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. | |||
Note 2: If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded the specified time limit. | |||
Note 3: If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped, indicating that the release path is isolated, the effluent monitor reading is no longer VALID for classification purposes. | |||
Note 4: The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EALs RA1.1, RS1.1 and RG1.1 should be used for emergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment using actual meteorology are available. | |||
Note 5: If the equipment in the listed room or area was already inoperable or out-of-service before the event occurred, then no emergency classification is warranted. | |||
Note 6: If CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is re-established prior to exceeding the 30-minute time limit, declaration of a General Emergency is not required. | |||
Note 7: This EAL does not apply to routine traffic impediments such as fog, snow, ice, or vehicle breakdowns or accidents. | |||
Note 8: A manual trip action is any Control Room operator action, or set of actions, which causes the control rods to be rapidly inserted into the core, and does not include manually driving in control rods or implementation of boron injection strategies. | |||
Note 9: RVLS is not valid if EITHER of the following exists: | |||
One or more RCPs are running OR | |||
- LPI pump(s) are running Note 10: In the absence of reliable RCS temperature indication caused by the loss of decay heat removal capability, classification should be based on time to boil data. | |||
Note 11: If the affected SAFETY SYSTEM train was already inoperable or out of service before the hazardous event occurred, then this emergency classification is not warranted. | |||
Note 12: If the hazardous event only resulted in VISIBLE DAMAGE, with no indications of degraded performance to at least one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM, then this emergency classification is not warranted. | |||
NOTES ONS ONS Date & Time of Shutdown Date Time None Table E-1 ISFSI Dose Limits 24P** | |||
400 mrem/hr Location HSM front surface HSM front bird screen Outside HSM door End shield wall exterior 24PHB 1050 mrem/hr 40 mrem/hr 550 mrem/hr 24PTH 1200 mrem/hr 160 mrem/hr 800 mrem/hr HSM Module 24P* | |||
1050 mrem/hr 140 mrem/hr 600 mrem/hr E1-E20, W1-W20 E21-E42, W21-W42 E43-E67, W43-W67 E81-E92, W81-W92 400 mrem/hr 200 mrem/hr 40 mrem/hr 1000 mrem/hr 40 mrem/hr 600 mrem/hr E68-E74, W68-W74 24PHB 24PTH E75-E80, W75-W80 | |||
*HSM E1-E20 and W1-W20 were loaded with 24P canisters under the Site Specific License SNM-2503 and only have Technical Specification dose rate limit for HSM surface. | |||
**HSM E21-E42 and W21-W42 were loaded with 24P canisters under the General License CoC 1004. | |||
Table E-1 ISFSI Dose Limits - Notes 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 60 min.* | |||
20 min.* | |||
If a RCS heat removal system is in operation within this time frame and RCS temperature is being reduced, the EAL is not applicable 0 min. | |||
Table C-4 RCS Heat-up Duration Thresholds Not intact OR at REDUCED INVENTORY Intact (but not REDUCED INVENTORY) | |||
RCS Status CONTAINMENT CLOSURE Status Heat-up Duration N/A established not established None Cold SD/ | |||
Refuel System Malfunct. | |||
Loss of Essential AC Power Loss of all but one AC power source to essential buses for 15 minutes or longer CU2.1 AC power capability, Table C-3, to essential 4160V buses MFB-1 and MFB-2 reduced to a single power source for 15 min. (Note 1) | |||
AND Any additional single power source failure will result in loss of all AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS Indicated voltage is < 105 VDC on vital DC buses required by Technical Specifications for 15 min. (Note 1) | |||
CU4.1 CG1.1 Loss of RCS inventory Loss of RCS inventory affecting core decay heat removal capability Loss of RCS inventory affecting fuel clad integrity with containment challenged RCS Level Loss of Comm. | |||
Loss of all onsite or offsite communications capabilities CU5.1 UNPLANNED loss of RCS inventory for 15 minutes or longer Loss of Vital DC power for 15 minutes or longer CA2.1 Loss of all offsite and all emergency AC power capability to essential 4160V buses MFB-1 and MFB-2 for 15 min. | |||
(Note 1) | |||
Loss of all offsite and all emergency AC power to essential buses for 15 minutes or longer CS1.1 RCS Temp. | |||
UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature to > 200°F due to loss of decay heat removal capability (Note 10) | |||
CU3.1 UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature Loss of all RCS temperature and RCS level indication for 15 min. (Note 1) | |||
CU3.2 CA3.1 UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature to > 200°F for | |||
> Table C-4 duration (Notes 1, 10) | |||
OR UNPLANNED RCS pressure increase > 10 psig due to a loss of RCS cooling (this EAL does not apply during water-solid plant conditions) | |||
Inability to maintain plant in cold shutdown None None Hazardous Event Affecting Safety Systems C | |||
1 3 | |||
5 6 | |||
The occurrence of any Table C-6 hazardous event AND Event damage has caused indications of degraded performance on one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode AND EITHER of the following: | |||
Event damage has caused indications of degraded performance to a second train of the SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode. | |||
Event damage has resulted in VISIBLE DAMAGE to the second train of the SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode (Note 11, 12) 2 GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT Loss of all Table C-5 onsite communication methods OR Loss of all Table C-5 offsite communication methods OR Loss of all Table C-5 NRC communication methods Hazardous event affecting a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode CA6.1 EAL - COLD MODES 5, 6 & No Mode None None None None None None None Loss of Vital DC Power 4 | |||
None None None 5 | |||
6 5 | |||
6 NM 5 | |||
6 5 | |||
6 5 | |||
6 5 | |||
6 NM 5 | |||
6 5 | |||
6 5 | |||
6 5 | |||
6 NM 5 | |||
6 Table C-6 Hazardous Events Seismic event (earthquake) | |||
Internal or external FLOODING event High winds or tornado strike FIRE EXPLOSION Other events with similar hazard characteristics as determined by the Shift Manager Table C-2 Containment Challenge Indications CONTAINMENT CLOSURE not established (Note 6) | |||
Containment hydrogen concentration > 4% | |||
Unplanned rise in containment pressure | |||
GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT Table F-1 Fission Product Barrier Threshold Matrix Containment (CMT) Barrier Fuel Clad (FC) Barrier Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Barrier Loss Potential Loss Loss Loss Potential Loss Potential Loss A. RCS or SG Tube Leakage B. Inadequate Heat Removal C. CMT Radiation / | |||
RCS Activity D. CMT Integrity or Bypass None None None 1. | |||
RVLS < 0" (Note 9) | |||
None | |||
: 1. Any condition in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator that indicates loss of the Fuel Clad barrier | |||
: 1. Any condition in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator that indicates potential loss of the Fuel Clad barrier | |||
: 1. An automatic or manual ES actuation required by EITHER: | |||
* UNISOLABLE RCS leakage | |||
* SG tube RUPTURE | |||
: 1. Any condition in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator that indicates loss of the RCS barrier | |||
: 1. Any condition in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator that indicates potential loss of the RCS barrier | |||
: 1. Any condition in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator that indicates loss of the Containment barrier | |||
: 1. Any condition in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator that indicates potential loss of the Containment barrier None None None E. EC Judgment | |||
: 1. RCS leakage > normal makeup capacity due to EITHER: | |||
* UNISOLABLE RCS leakage | |||
* SG tube leakage | |||
: 2. RCS cooldown to < 400°F at | |||
> 100°F/hr OR HPI has operated in the injection mode with no RCPs operating | |||
: 1. A leaking SG is FAULTED outside of containment | |||
: 1. CETCs > 1200°F | |||
: 1. CETCs > 700°F | |||
: 2. RCS heat removal cannot be established AND RCS subcooling < 0ºF None | |||
: 1. RCS heat removal cannot be established AND RCS subcooling < 0ºF | |||
: 1. CETCs >1200°F AND Restoration procedures not effective within 15 min. (Note 1) | |||
: 1. 1/2/3RIA 57/58 > Table F-2 column FC Loss | |||
: 2. Coolant activity > 300 µCi/ml DEI | |||
: 1. Containment radiation: | |||
- 1,3 RIA 57/58 > 1.0 R/hr | |||
- 2 RIA 57 > 1.6 R/hr | |||
- 2 RIA 58 > 1.0 R/hr | |||
: 1. 1/2/3RIA 57/58 > Table F-2 column CMT Potential Loss None None None | |||
: 1. Containment isolation is required AND EITHER | |||
- Containment integrity has been lost based on Emergency Coordinator judgment | |||
- UNISOLABLE pathway from Containment to the environment exists | |||
: 2. Indications of RCS leakage outside of containment | |||
: 1. Containment pressure > 59 psig | |||
: 2. Containment hydrogen concentration > 4% | |||
: 3. Containment pressure > 10 psig with < one full train of containment heat removal system (1 RBS with > 700 gpm spray flow AND 2 RBCUs) operating per design for 15 min. (Note 1) | |||
: 2. HPI forced cooling initiated System Malfunct. | |||
SA1.1 AC power capability, Table S-1, to essential 4160V buses MFB-1 and MFB-2 reduced to a single power source for 15 min. (Note 1) | |||
AND Any additional single power source failure will result in loss of all AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS SG1.1 None None Fission Product Barriers FS1.1 Loss of any two barriers AND Loss or potential loss of third barrier (Table F-1) | |||
Loss or potential loss of any two barriers (Table F-1) | |||
FA1.1 Any loss or any potential loss of either Fuel Clad or RCS barrier (Table F-1) | |||
FG1.1 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 SS1.1 Loss of Essential AC Power Loss of all offsite AC power capability to essential buses for 15 minutes or longer SU1.1 Loss of all offsite AC power capability, Table S-1, to essential 4160V buses MFB-1 and MFB-2 for 15 min. | |||
(Note 1) | |||
Loss of all but one AC power source to essential buses for 15 minutes or longer Loss of all offsite and all emergency AC power to essential buses for 15 minutes or longer Prolonged loss of all offsite and all emergency AC power to essential buses Loss of 125 VDC power based on battery bus voltage indications < 105 VDC on both vital DC Distribution Centers DCA and DCB for 15 min. (Note 1) | |||
SS2.1 Loss of all vital DC power for 15 minutes or longer SA6.1 An automatic or manual trip fails to shut down the reactor as indicated by reactor power 5% | |||
AND Manual trip pushbutton is not successful in shutting down the reactor as indicated by reactor power 5% (Note 8) | |||
An automatic or manual trip fails to shut down the reactor as indicated by reactor power 5% | |||
AND All actions to shut down the reactor are not successful as indicated by reactor power 5% | |||
AND EITHER: | |||
- CETCs >1200°F on ICCM | |||
- RCS subcooling < 0ºF SS6.1 Automatic or manual trip fails to shut down the reactor and subsequent manual actions taken at the reactor control consoles are not successful in shutting down the reactor Inability to shut down the reactor causing a challenge to core cooling or RCS heat removal Loss of all onsite or offsite communications capabilities SU7.1 Loss of CR Indications UNPLANNED loss of Control Room indications for 15 minutes or longer SU3.1 An UNPLANNED event results in the inability to monitor one or more Table S-2 parameters from within the Control Room for 15 min. (Note 1) | |||
SA3.1 An UNPLANNED event results in the inability to monitor one or more Table S-2 parameters from within the Control Room for 15 min. (Note 1) | |||
AND Any significant transient is in progress, Table S-3 UNPLANNED loss of Control Room indications for 15 minutes or longer with a significant transient in progress Hazardous event affecting a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode SA9.1 RCS activity greater than Technical Specification allowable limits SU4.1 RCS activity > 50 µCi/gm Dose Equivalent I-131 for > 48 hr continuous period OR RCS activity > 280 µCi/gm Dose Equivalent Xe-133 for > 48 hr continuous period RCS leakage for 15 minutes or longer SU5.1 RCS unidentified or pressure boundary leakage | |||
> 10 gpm for 15 min. | |||
OR RCS identified leakage > 25 gpm for 15 min. | |||
OR Leakage from the RCS to a location outside containment | |||
> 25 gpm for 15 min. | |||
(Note 1) | |||
Automatic or manual trip fails to shut down the reactor SU6.1 None Loss of all offsite and all emergency AC power capability to essential 4160V buses MFB-1 and MFB-2 for 15 min. (Note 1) | |||
Loss of all offsite and all emergency AC power capability to essential 4160V buses MFB-1 and MFB-2 AND Failure to power SSF equipment and PSW unavailable AND EITHER: | |||
- Restoration of at least one essential bus in < 4 hours is not likely (Note 1) | |||
- CETC reading > 1200°F F | |||
S 1 | |||
3 9 | |||
Loss of Comm. | |||
7 An automatic trip did not shut down the reactor as indicated by reactor power 5% after any RPS setpoint is exceeded AND A subsequent automatic trip or the manual trip pushbutton is successful in shutting down the reactor as indicated by reactor power < 5% (Note 8) | |||
None None None None None Loss of Vital DC Power 2 | |||
EAL-HOT MODES 1, 2, 3 & 4 SG1.2 Loss of all offsite and all emergency AC power capability to essential 4160V buses MFB-1 and MFB-2 for 15 min. | |||
AND Failure to power SSF equipment and PSW unavailable AND Loss of 125 VDC power based on battery bus voltage indications < 105 VDC on both vital DC Distribution Centers DCA and DCB for 15 min. | |||
(Note 1) | |||
None RCS Activity 4 | |||
RPS Failure 6 | |||
RCS Leakage 5 | |||
None None None SU6.2 A manual trip did not shut down the reactor as indicated by reactor power 5% after any manual trip action was initiated AND A subsequent automatic trip or the manual trip pushbutton is successful in shutting down the reactor as indicated by reactor power < 5% (Note 8) | |||
Loss of all Table S-4 onsite communication methods OR Loss of all Table S-4 offsite communication methods OR Loss of all Table S-4 NRC communication methods Hazardous Event Affecting Safety Systems None Table S-2 Safety System Parameters | |||
- Reactor power | |||
- RCS level | |||
- RCS pressure | |||
- CETC temperature | |||
- Level in at least one S/G | |||
- EFW flow to at least one S/G 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 1 | |||
1 2 | |||
3 4 | |||
1 2 | |||
3 4 | |||
1 2 | |||
3 4 | |||
1 2 | |||
3 4 | |||
1 2 | |||
3 4 | |||
1 2 | |||
3 4 | |||
1 2 | |||
3 4 | |||
1 2 | |||
3 4 | |||
1 1 | |||
1 2 | |||
3 4 | |||
None Failure to isolate containment or loss of containment pressure control SU8.1 Any penetration is not closed within 15 min. of a VALID ES actuation signal OR Containment pressure > 10 psig with < one full train of containment heat removal system (1 RBS with > 700 gpm spray flow AND 2 RBCUs) operating per design for 15 min. | |||
(Note 1) 1 2 | |||
3 4 | |||
1 2 | |||
3 4 | |||
Table S-5 Hazardous Events Seismic event (earthquake) | |||
Internal or external FLOODING event High winds or tornado strike FIRE EXPLOSION Other events with similar hazard characteristics as determined by the Shift Manager CMT Failure 8 | |||
None Loss of all essential AC and vital DC power sources for 15 minutes or longer 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 None Prepared for Duke Energy by: Operations Support Services, Inc. - www.ossi-net.com (1/28/16) | |||
Modes: | |||
1 Power Operations No Mode NM 2 | |||
Startup 5 | |||
Cold Shutdown 3 | |||
Hot Standby 4 | |||
Hot Shutdown Oconee Nuclear Station Classification of Emergency CSD-EP-ONS-0101-02 Rev 000 Irradiated Fuel Event RU1.1 Sample analysis for a gaseous or liquid release indicates a concentration or release rate > 2 x SLC/TS limits for 60 min. (Notes 1, 2) | |||
RU1.2 Reading on any Table R-1 effluent radiation monitor | |||
> column UE for 60 min. (Notes 1, 2, 3) | |||
RA1.1 Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses | |||
> 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY (Note 4) | |||
RS1.1 Reading on any Table R-1 effluent radiation monitor > column SAE for 15 min. (Notes 1, 2, 3, 4) | |||
RS1.2 Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses | |||
> 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY (Note 4) | |||
RA1.2 Reading on any Table R-1 effluent radiation monitor | |||
> column ALERT for 15 min. (Notes 1, 2, 3, 4) | |||
RA1.3 Analysis of a liquid effluent sample indicates a concentration or release rate that would result in doses > 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY for 60 min. of exposure (Notes 1, 2) | |||
RU2.1 UNPLANNED water level drop in the REFUELING PATHWAY as indicated by low water level alarm or indication AND UNPLANNED rise in corresponding area radiation levels as indicated by any of the following radiation monitors: | |||
- RIA-3 RB Refueling Deck Shield Wall | |||
- RIA-6 Spent Fuel Building Wall | |||
- Portable area monitors on the main bridge or SFP bridge RA2.2 Damage to irradiated fuel resulting in a release of radioactivity AND HIGH alarm on any of the following radiation monitors: | |||
- RIA-3 RB Refueling Deck Shield Wall | |||
- RIA-6 Spent Fuel Building Wall | |||
- RIA-41 Spent Fuel Pool Gas | |||
- RIA-49 RB Gas | |||
- Portable area monitors on the main bridge or SFP bridge RA3.1 Dose rates > 15 mR/hr in EITHER of the following areas: | |||
- Control Room (RIA-1) | |||
- Central Alarm Station (by survey) | |||
Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity greater than 2 times the SLC/TS limits for 60 minutes or longer Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE Release of gaseous radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem thyroid CDE Release of gaseous radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 1,000 mrem TEDE or 5,000 mrem thyroid CDE Unplanned loss of water level above irradiated fuel Significant lowering of water level above, or damage to, irradiated fuel RA2.1 Uncovery of irradiated fuel in the REFUELING PATHWAY Radiation levels that IMPEDE access to equipment necessary for normal plant operations, cooldown or shutdown RS1.3 Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY: | |||
- Closed window dose rates > 100 mR/hr expected to continue for 60 min. | |||
- Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE | |||
> 500 mrem for 60 min. of inhalation (Notes 1, 2) | |||
Abnorm. | |||
Rad Levels | |||
/ Rad Effluent R | |||
GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT 2 | |||
Rad Effluent 1 | |||
None None None None HS1.1 A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the PROTECTED AREA as reported by the Security Shift Supervision HU2.1 HU4.1 A FIRE is not extinguished within 15 min. of any of the following FIRE detection indications (Note 1): | |||
- Report from the field (i.e., visual observation) | |||
- Receipt of multiple (more than 1) fire alarms or indications | |||
- Field verification of a single fire alarm AND The FIRE is located within any Table H-1 area HA5.1 Release of a toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable gas into any Table H-2 rooms or areas AND Entry into the room or area is prohibited or IMPEDED (Note 5) | |||
Seismic event greater than OBE levels HU4.2 Receipt of a single fire alarm (i.e., no other indications of a FIRE) | |||
AND The fire alarm is indicating a FIRE within any Table H-1 area AND The existence of a FIRE is not verified within 30 min. of alarm receipt (Note 1) | |||
HU3.2 Internal room or area FLOODING of a magnitude sufficient to require manual or automatic electrical isolation of a SAFETY SYSTEM component needed for the current operating mode FIRE potentially degrading the level of safety of the plant Gaseous release IMPEDING access to equipment necessary for normal plant operations, cooldown or shutdown HU7.1 Other conditions existing that in the judgment of the Site Emergency Coordinator warrant declaration of a UE Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant or indicate a security threat to facility protection has been initiated. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of SAFETY SYSTEMS occurs. | |||
An event has resulted in plant control being transferred from the Control Room to the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel or Standby Shutdown Facility HA6.1 Control Room evacuation resulting in transfer of plant control to alternate locations HS6.1 An event has resulted in plant control being transferred from the Control Room to the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel or Standby Shutdown Facility AND Control of any of the following key safety functions is not reestablished within 15 min. (Note 1): | |||
- Reactivity (Modes 1, 2, and 3 only) | |||
- Core Cooling | |||
- RCS heat removal Inability to control a key safety function from outside the Control Room Other conditions exist which, in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator, indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant or a security event that involves probable life threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment because of HOSTILE ACTION. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels. | |||
HA7.1 Other conditions exist that in the judgment of the Site Emergency Coordinator warrant declaration of an Alert HS7.1 Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public or HOSTILE ACTION that results in intentional damage or malicious acts, (1) toward site personnel or equipment that could lead to the likely failure of or, (2) that prevent effective access to equipment needed for the protection of the public. | |||
Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels beyond the SITE BOUNDARY. | |||
Other conditions existing that in the judgment of the Site Emergency Coordinator warrant declaration of a Site Area Emergency HG7.1 Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or IMMINENT substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity or HOSTILE ACTION that results in an actual loss of physical control of the facility. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Site Emergency Coordinator warrant declaration of a General Emergency None Hazards H | |||
Seismic Event Fire Control Room Evacuation Hazardous Gases Security EC Judgment 2 | |||
4 5 | |||
1 6 | |||
7 None HU3.3 Movement of personnel within the PROTECTED AREA is IMPEDED due to an offsite event involving hazardous materials (e.g., an offsite chemical spill or toxic gas release) | |||
None ISFSI EU1.1 Damage to a loaded canister CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY as indicated by an on-contact radiation reading on the surface of a loaded spent fuel cask > any Table E-1 ISFSI dose limit Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY E | |||
Area Rad Levels 3 | |||
RA1.4 Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY: | |||
- Closed window dose rates > 10 mR/hr expected to continue for 60 min. | |||
- Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE | |||
> 50 mrem for 60 min. of inhalation (Notes 1, 2) | |||
RG1.1 Reading on any Table R-1 effluent radiation monitor > column GE for 15 min. (Notes 1, 2, 3, 4) | |||
RG1.2 Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses | |||
> 1000 mrem TEDE or 5000 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY (Note 4) | |||
RG1.3 Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY: | |||
- Closed window dose rates > 1000 mR/hr expected to continue for 60 min. | |||
- Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE | |||
> 5000 mrem for 60 min. of inhalation (Notes 1, 2) | |||
RA3.2 An UNPLANNED event results in radiation levels that prohibit or IMPEDE access to any Table R-2 rooms or areas (Note 5) | |||
HU3.1 A tornado strike within the PROTECTED AREA Hazardous event HU3.4 A hazardous event that results in on-site conditions sufficient to prohibit the plant staff from accessing the site via personal vehicles (Note 7) | |||
Natural or Tech. | |||
Hazard 3 | |||
HU4.3 A FIRE within the PROTECTED AREA not extinguished within 60 min. of the initial report, alarm or indication (Note 1) | |||
HU4.4 A FIRE within the PROTECTED AREA that requires firefighting support by an offsite fire response agency to extinguish None None None None None None None None RA2.3 Lowering of spent fuel pool level to -13.5 ft. | |||
RS2.1 Lowering of spent fuel pool level to -23.5 ft. | |||
RG2.1 Spent fuel pool level at the top of the fuel racks Spent fuel pool level cannot be restored to at least the top of the fuel racks for 60 minutes or longer Spent fuel pool level cannot be restored to at least -23.5 ft. | |||
for > 60 min. (Note 1) 5 6 | |||
1 2 | |||
3 4 | |||
NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 6 | |||
Refuel Unit 1/2/3 Plant Vent Unit 1/2/3 Plant Vent Gaseous Liquid 3.00E+5 cpm RIA-45 RIA-46 Table R-1 Effluent Monitor Classification Thresholds Release Point Monitor GE SAE Alert UE 3.00E+4 cpm 3.00E+3 cpm 1.41E+5 cpm Liquid Radwaste Discharge RIA-33 4.79E+5 cpm Seismic event > OBE as indicated by EITHER of the following: | |||
- 1SA-9/E-1 (SEISMIC TRIGGER) alarm | |||
- 3SA-9/E-1 (SEISMIC TRIGGER) alarm Onsite Offsite System Commercial phone service ONS site phone system EOF phone system Public address system Onsite radio system DEMNET Offsite radio system NRC Emergency Telephone System Satellite Phone NRC X | |||
X X | |||
X X | |||
X X | |||
X X | |||
X Table S-4 Communication Methods X | |||
X X | |||
X Table S-3 Significant Transients | |||
- Reactor trip | |||
- Runback > 25% thermal power | |||
- Electrical load rejection > 25% electrical load | |||
- ECCS actuation None | |||
[Refer to EAL CA6.1 OR SA9.1 for escalation due to seismic event] | |||
[Refer to EAL CA6.1 OR SA9.1 for escalation due to natural or technological hazard] | |||
[Refer to EAL CA6.1 OR SA9.1 for escalation due to FIRE] | |||
Table F-2 Containment Radiation - R/hr (1/2/3RIA 57/58) | |||
Time After S/D (Hrs) 0 - < 0.5 0.5 - < 2.0 2.0 - < 8.0 | |||
> 8.0 140 40 15 5 | |||
FC Loss 300 80 32 10 CMT Potential Loss RIA 57 RIA 58 700 195 75 25 1500 400 160 50 RIA 57 RIA 58 None Table H-2 Safe Operation & Shutdown Rooms/Areas Room / Area Mode(s) | |||
- Turbine Building | |||
- Equipment and Cable Rooms | |||
- Auxiliary Building | |||
- Reactor Buildings 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 3, 4, 5 Table R-2 Safe Operation & Shutdown Rooms/Areas Room / Area Mode(s) | |||
- Turbine Building | |||
- Equipment and Cable Rooms | |||
- Auxiliary Building | |||
- Reactor Buildings 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 3, 4, 5 Table S-1 AC Power Sources Offsite | |||
- Unit Normal Transformer (backcharged) | |||
- Unit Startup Transformer (SWYD) | |||
- Another Unit Startup Transformer (aligned) | |||
(SWYD) | |||
- CT5 (Central/energizing Standby Bus) | |||
Emergency | |||
- Unit Startup Transformer (Keowee) | |||
- Another Unit Startup Transformer (aligned) | |||
(Keowee) | |||
- CT4 | |||
- CT5 (dedicated line/energizing Standby Bus) | |||
Table H-1 Fire Areas | |||
- Reactor Building | |||
- Auxiliary Building | |||
- Turbine Building | |||
- Standby Shutdown Facility | |||
- Intake Structure | |||
- Electrical Blockhouse | |||
- Keowee Hydro & associated transformers | |||
- Transformer Yard | |||
- Protected Service Water Building | |||
- Essential Siphon Vacuum Building HU1.1 A SECURITY CONDITION that does not involve a HOSTILE ACTION as reported by the Security Shift Supervision HA1.1 Confirmed SECURITY CONDITION or threat HOSTILE ACTION within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA or airborne attack threat within 30 minutes HOSTILE ACTION within the PROTECTED AREA A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA as reported by the Security Shift Supervision HU1.2 Notification of a credible security threat directed at the site HU1.3 A validated notification from the NRC providing information of an aircraft threat HA1.2 A validated notification from NRC of an aircraft attack threat within 30 min. of the site 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 ONS Note 1: The Emergency Coordinator should declare the event promptly upon determining that time limit has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. | |||
Note 2: If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded the specified time limit. | |||
Note 3: If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped, indicating that the release path is isolated, the effluent monitor reading is no longer VALID for classification purposes. | |||
Note 4: The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EALs RA1.1, RS1.1 and RG1.1 should be used for emergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment using actual meteorology are available. | |||
Note 5: If the equipment in the listed room or area was already inoperable or out-of-service before the event occurred, then no emergency classification is warranted. | |||
Note 6: If CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is re-established prior to exceeding the 30-minute time limit, declaration of a General Emergency is not required. | |||
Note 7: This EAL does not apply to routine traffic impediments such as fog, snow, ice, or vehicle breakdowns or accidents. | |||
Note 8: A manual trip action is any Control Room operator action, or set of actions, which causes the control rods to be rapidly inserted into the core, and does not include manually driving in control rods or implementation of boron injection strategies. | |||
Note 9: RVLS is not valid if EITHER of the following exists: | |||
One or more RCPs are running OR | |||
- LPI pump(s) are running Note 10: In the absence of reliable RCS temperature indication caused by the loss of decay heat removal capability, classification should be based on time to boil data. | |||
Note 11: If the affected SAFETY SYSTEM train was already inoperable or out of service before the hazardous event occurred, then this emergency classification is not warranted. | |||
Note 12: If the hazardous event only resulted in VISIBLE DAMAGE, with no indications of degraded performance to at least one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM, then this emergency classification is not warranted. | |||
NOTES The occurrence of any Table S-5 hazardous event AND Event damage has caused indications of degraded performance on one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode AND EITHER of the following: | |||
Event damage has caused indications of degraded performance to a second train of the SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode. | |||
Event damage has resulted in VISIBLE DAMAGE to the second train of the SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode (Note 11, 12) | |||
Note 1: The Emergency Coordinator should declare the event promptly upon determining that time limit has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. | |||
Note 2: If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded the specified time limit. | |||
Note 3: If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped, indicating that the release path is isolated, the effluent monitor reading is no longer VALID for classification purposes. | |||
Note 4: The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EALs RA1.1, RS1.1 and RG1.1 should be used for emergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment using actual meteorology are available. | |||
Note 5: If the equipment in the listed room or area was already inoperable or out-of-service before the event occurred, then no emergency classification is warranted. | |||
Note 6: If CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is re-established prior to exceeding the 30-minute time limit, declaration of a General Emergency is not required. | |||
Note 7: This EAL does not apply to routine traffic impediments such as fog, snow, ice, or vehicle breakdowns or accidents. | |||
Note 8: A manual trip action is any Control Room operator action, or set of actions, which causes the control rods to be rapidly inserted into the core, and does not include manually driving in control rods or implementation of boron injection strategies. | |||
Note 9: RVLS is not valid if EITHER of the following exists: | |||
One or more RCPs are running OR | |||
- LPI pump(s) are running Note 10: In the absence of reliable RCS temperature indication caused by the loss of decay heat removal capability, classification should be based on time to boil data. | |||
Note 11: If the affected SAFETY SYSTEM train was already inoperable or out of service before the hazardous event occurred, then this emergency classification is not warranted. | |||
Note 12: If the hazardous event only resulted in VISIBLE DAMAGE, with no indications of degraded performance to at least one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM, then this emergency classification is not warranted. | |||
NOTES ONS None None Table E-1 ISFSI Dose Limits 24P** | |||
400 mrem/hr Location HSM front surface HSM front bird screen Outside HSM door End shield wall exterior 24PHB 1050 mrem/hr 40 mrem/hr 550 mrem/hr 24PTH 1200 mrem/hr 160 mrem/hr 800 mrem/hr HSM Module 24P* | |||
1050 mrem/hr 140 mrem/hr 600 mrem/hr E1-E20, W1-W20 E21-E42, W21-W42 E43-E67, W43-W67 E81-E92, W81-W92 400 mrem/hr 200 mrem/hr 40 mrem/hr 1000 mrem/hr 40 mrem/hr 600 mrem/hr E68-E74, W68-W74 24PHB 24PTH E75-E80, W75-W80 | |||
*HSM E1-E20 and W1-W20 were loaded with 24P canisters under the Site Specific License SNM-2503 and only have Technical Specification dose rate limit for HSM surface. | |||
**HSM E21-E42 and W21-W42 were loaded with 24P canisters under the General License CoC 1004. | |||
Table E-1 ISFSI Dose Limits - Notes 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM | |||
Prepared for Duke Energy by: Operations Support Services, Inc. - www.ossi-net.com (1/28/16) | |||
Modes: | |||
1 Power Operations No Mode NM 2 | |||
Startup 5 | |||
Cold Shutdown 3 | |||
Hot Standby 4 | |||
Hot Shutdown Oconee Nuclear Station Classification of Emergency CSD-EP-ONS-0101-02 Rev 000 Irradiated Fuel Event RU1.1 Sample analysis for a gaseous or liquid release indicates a concentration or release rate > 2 x SLC/TS limits for 60 min. (Notes 1, 2) | |||
RU1.2 Reading on any Table R-1 effluent radiation monitor | |||
> column UE for 60 min. (Notes 1, 2, 3) | |||
RA1.1 Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses | |||
> 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY (Note 4) | |||
RS1.1 Reading on any Table R-1 effluent radiation monitor > column SAE for 15 min. (Notes 1, 2, 3, 4) | |||
RS1.2 Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses | |||
> 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY (Note 4) | |||
RA1.2 Reading on any Table R-1 effluent radiation monitor | |||
> column ALERT for 15 min. (Notes 1, 2, 3, 4) | |||
RA1.3 Analysis of a liquid effluent sample indicates a concentration or release rate that would result in doses > 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY for 60 min. of exposure (Notes 1, 2) | |||
RU2.1 UNPLANNED water level drop in the REFUELING PATHWAY as indicated by low water level alarm or indication AND UNPLANNED rise in corresponding area radiation levels as indicated by any of the following radiation monitors: | |||
- RIA-3 RB Refueling Deck Shield Wall | |||
- RIA-6 Spent Fuel Building Wall | |||
- Portable area monitors on the main bridge or SFP bridge RA2.2 Damage to irradiated fuel resulting in a release of radioactivity AND HIGH alarm on any of the following radiation monitors: | |||
- RIA-3 RB Refueling Deck Shield Wall | |||
- RIA-6 Spent Fuel Building Wall | |||
- RIA-41 Spent Fuel Pool Gas | |||
- RIA-49 RB Gas | |||
- Portable area monitors on the main bridge or SFP bridge RA3.1 Dose rates > 15 mR/hr in EITHER of the following areas: | |||
- Control Room (RIA-1) | |||
- Central Alarm Station (by survey) | |||
Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity greater than 2 times the SLC/TS limits for 60 minutes or longer Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE Release of gaseous radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem thyroid CDE Release of gaseous radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 1,000 mrem TEDE or 5,000 mrem thyroid CDE Unplanned loss of water level above irradiated fuel Significant lowering of water level above, or damage to, irradiated fuel RA2.1 Uncovery of irradiated fuel in the REFUELING PATHWAY Radiation levels that IMPEDE access to equipment necessary for normal plant operations, cooldown or shutdown RS1.3 Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY: | |||
- Closed window dose rates > 100 mR/hr expected to continue for 60 min. | |||
- Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE | |||
> 500 mrem for 60 min. of inhalation. | |||
(Notes 1, 2) | |||
Abnorm. | |||
Rad Levels | |||
/ Rad Effluent R | |||
GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT 2 | |||
Rad Effluent 1 | |||
None None None None HS1.1 A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the PROTECTED AREA as reported by the Security Shift Supervision HA1.1 HU2.1 HU4.1 A FIRE is not extinguished within 15 min. of any of the following FIRE detection indications (Note 1): | |||
- Report from the field (i.e., visual observation) | |||
- Receipt of multiple (more than 1) fire alarms or indications | |||
- Field verification of a single fire alarm AND The FIRE is located within any Table H-1 area HA5.1 Release of a toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable gas into any Table H-2 rooms or areas AND Entry into the room or area is prohibited or IMPEDED (Note 5) | |||
Seismic event greater than OBE levels HU4.2 Receipt of a single fire alarm (i.e., no other indications of a FIRE) | |||
AND The fire alarm is indicating a FIRE within any Table H-1 area AND The existence of a FIRE is not verified within 30 min. of alarm receipt (Note 1) | |||
HU3.2 Internal room or area FLOODING of a magnitude sufficient to require manual or automatic electrical isolation of a SAFETY SYSTEM component needed for the current operating mode FIRE potentially degrading the level of safety of the plant Gaseous release IMPEDING access to equipment necessary for normal plant operations, cooldown or shutdown Confirmed SECURITY CONDITION or threat HOSTILE ACTION within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA or airborne attack threat within 30 minutes HOSTILE ACTION within the PROTECTED AREA HU7.1 Other conditions existing that in the judgment of the Site Emergency Coordinator warrant declaration of a UE Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant or indicate a security threat to facility protection has been initiated. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of SAFETY SYSTEMS occurs. | |||
An event has resulted in plant control being transferred from the Control Room to the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel or Standby Shutdown Facility HA6.1 Control Room evacuation resulting in transfer of plant control to alternate locations HS6.1 An event has resulted in plant control being transferred from the Control Room to the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel or Standby Shutdown Facility AND Control of any of the following key safety functions is not reestablished within 15 min. (Note 1): | |||
- Reactivity (Modes 1, 2, and 3 only) | |||
- Core Cooling | |||
- RCS heat removal Inability to control a key safety function from outside the Control Room Other conditions exist which, in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator, indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant or a security event that involves probable life threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment because of HOSTILE ACTION. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels. | |||
HA7.1 Other conditions exist that in the judgment of the Site Emergency Coordinator warrant declaration of an Alert HS7.1 Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public or HOSTILE ACTION that results in intentional damage or malicious acts, (1) toward site personnel or equipment that could lead to the likely failure of or, (2) that prevent effective access to equipment needed for the protection of the public. | |||
Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels beyond the SITE BOUNDARY. | |||
Other conditions existing that in the judgment of the Site Emergency Coordinator warrant declaration of a Site Area Emergency HG7.1 Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or IMMINENT substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity or HOSTILE ACTION that results in an actual loss of physical control of the facility. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Site Emergency Coordinator warrant declaration of a General Emergency None Hazards H | |||
Seismic Event Fire Control Room Evacuation Hazardous Gases Security EC Judgment 2 | |||
4 5 | |||
1 6 | |||
7 None HU3.3 Movement of personnel within the PROTECTED AREA is IMPEDED due to an offsite event involving hazardous materials (e.g., an offsite chemical spill or toxic gas release) | |||
A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA as reported by the Security Shift Supervision None ISFSI EU1.1 Damage to a loaded canister CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY as indicated by an on-contact radiation reading on the surface of a loaded spent fuel cask > any Table E-1 ISFSI dose limit Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY E | |||
Area Rad Levels 3 | |||
RA1.4 Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY: | |||
- Closed window dose rates > 10 mR/hr expected to continue for 60 min. | |||
- Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE | |||
> 50 mrem for 60 min. of inhalation. | |||
(Notes 1, 2) | |||
RG1.1 Reading on any Table R-1 effluent radiation monitor > column GE for 15 min. (Notes 1, 2, 3, 4) | |||
RG1.2 Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses | |||
> 1000 mrem TEDE or 5000 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY (Note 4) | |||
RG1.3 Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY: | |||
- Closed window dose rates > 1000 mR/hr expected to continue for 60 min. | |||
- Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE | |||
> 5000 mrem for 60 min. of inhalation (Notes 1, 2) | |||
RA3.2 An UNPLANNED event results in radiation levels that prohibit or IMPEDE access to any Table R-2 rooms or areas (Note 5) | |||
HU3.1 A tornado strike within the PROTECTED AREA Hazardous event HU3.4 A hazardous event that results in on-site conditions sufficient to prohibit the plant staff from accessing the site via personal vehicles (Note 7) 3 HU4.3 A FIRE within the PROTECTED AREA not extinguished within 60 min. of the initial report, alarm or indication (Note 1) | |||
HU4.4 A FIRE within the PROTECTED AREA that requires firefighting support by an offsite fire response agency to extinguish None None None None None None Table R-2 Safe Operation & Shutdown Rooms/Areas Room / Area Mode(s) | |||
- Turbine Building | |||
- Equipment and Cable Rooms | |||
- Auxiliary Building | |||
- Reactor Buildings 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 3, 4, 5 None RA2.3 Lowering of spent fuel pool level to -13.5 ft. | |||
RS2.1 Lowering of spent fuel pool level to -23.5 ft. | |||
RG2.1 Spent fuel pool level at the top of the fuel racks Spent fuel pool level cannot be restored to at least the top of the fuel racks for 60 minutes or longer Spent fuel pool level cannot be restored to at least -23.5 ft. | |||
for > 60 min. (Note 1) 5 6 | |||
1 2 | |||
3 4 | |||
NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 6 | |||
Refuel CA1.1 Loss of RCS inventory as indicated by RCS water level | |||
< 10" (LT-5) | |||
CU1.1 UNPLANNED loss of reactor coolant results in RCS water level less than a required lower limit for 15 min. (Note 1) | |||
RCS water level cannot be monitored AND EITHER UNPLANNED increase in any Table C-1 sump/tank level due to a loss of RCS inventory Visual observation of UNISOLABLE RCS leakage CU1.2 RCS water level cannot be monitored for 30 min. (Note 1) | |||
AND Core uncovery is indicated by any of the following: | |||
UNPLANNED increase in any Table C-1 Sump / Tank level due to a loss of RCS inventory Visual observation of UNISOLABLE RCS leakage High alarm on RIA-3 RB Refueling Deck Shield Wall Erratic Source Range Monitor Indication RCS water level cannot be monitored for 30 min. (Note 1) | |||
AND Core uncovery is indicated by any of the following: | |||
UNPLANNED increase in any Table C-1 Sump / | |||
Tank level due to a loss of RCS inventory Visual observation of UNISOLABLE RCS leakage High alarm on RIA-3 RB Refueling Deck Shield Wall Erratic Source Range Monitor Indication AND Any Containment Challenge indication, Table C-2 RCS water level cannot be monitored for 15 min. (Note 1) | |||
AND EITHER UNPLANNED increase in any Table C-1 Sump / Tank level due to a loss of RCS inventory Visual observation of UNISOLABLE RCS leakage CA1.2 Unit 1/2/3 Plant Vent Unit 1/2/3 Plant Vent Gaseous Liquid 3.00E+5 cpm RIA-45 RIA-46 Table R-1 Effluent Monitor Classification Thresholds Release Point Monitor GE SAE Alert UE 3.00E+4 cpm 3.00E+3 cpm 1.41E+5 cpm Liquid Radwaste Discharge RIA-33 4.79E+5 cpm Note 1: The Emergency Coordinator should declare the event promptly upon determining that time limit has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. | |||
Note 2: If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded the specified time limit. | |||
Note 3: If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped, indicating that the release path is isolated, the effluent monitor reading is no longer VALID for classification purposes. | |||
Note 4: The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EALs RA1.1, RS1.1 and RG1.1 should be used for emergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment using actual meteorology are available. | |||
Note 5: If the equipment in the listed room or area was already inoperable or out-of-service before the event occurred, then no emergency classification is warranted. | |||
Note 6: If CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is re-established prior to exceeding the 30-minute time limit, declaration of a General Emergency is not required. | |||
Note 7: This EAL does not apply to routine traffic impediments such as fog, snow, ice, or vehicle breakdowns or accidents. | |||
Note 8: A manual trip action is any Control Room operator action, or set of actions, which causes the control rods to be rapidly inserted into the core, and does not include manually driving in control rods or implementation of boron injection strategies. | |||
Note 9: RVLS is not valid if EITHER of the following exists: | |||
One or more RCPs are running OR | |||
- LPI pump(s) are running Note 10: In the absence of reliable RCS temperature indication caused by the loss of decay heat removal capability, classification should be based on time to boil data. | |||
Note 11: If the affected SAFETY SYSTEM train was already inoperable or out of service before the hazardous event occurred, then this emergency classification is not warranted. | |||
Note 12: If the hazardous event only resulted in VISIBLE DAMAGE, with noi indications of degraded performance to at least one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM, then this emergency classification is not warranted. | |||
NOTES Seismic event > OBE as indicated by EITHER of the following: | |||
- 1SA-9/E-1 (SEISMIC TRIGGER) alarm | |||
- 3SA-9/E-1 (SEISMIC TRIGGER) alarm Natural or Tech. | |||
Hazard Table C-1 Sumps / Tanks RB Normal Sumps RB Emergency Sumps Core Flood Tank Quench Tank Low Activity Waste Tank High Activity Waste Tank Miscellaneous Waste Holdup Tank LPI Room Sumps | |||
[Refer to EAL CA6.1 OR SA9.1 for escalation due to seismic event] | |||
[Refer to EAL CA6.1 OR SA9.1 for escalation due to natural or technological hazard] | |||
[Refer to EAL CA6.1 OR SA9.1 for escalation due to FIRE] | |||
None Table H-1 Fire Areas | |||
- Reactor Building | |||
- Auxiliary Building | |||
- Turbine Building | |||
- Standby Shutdown Facility | |||
- Intake Structure | |||
- Electrical Blockhouse | |||
- Keowee Hydro & associated transformers | |||
- Transformer Yard | |||
- Protected Service Water Building | |||
- Essential Siphon Vacuum Building Table H-2 Safe Operation & Shutdown Rooms/Areas Room / Area Mode(s) | |||
- Turbine Building | |||
- Equipment and Cable Rooms | |||
- Auxiliary Building | |||
- Reactor Buildings 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 3, 4, 5 EC Judgment 7 | |||
Onsite Offsite System Commercial phone service ONS site phone system EOF phone system Public address system Onsite radio system DEMNET Offsite radio system NRC Emergency Telephone System Satellite Phone NRC X | |||
X X | |||
X X | |||
X X | |||
X X | |||
X Table C-5 Communication Methods X | |||
X X | |||
X Table C-3 AC Power Sources Offsite | |||
- Unit Normal Transformer (backcharged) | |||
- Unit Startup Transformer (SWYD) | |||
- Another Unit Startup Transformer (aligned) | |||
(SWYD) | |||
- CT5 (Central/energizing Standby Bus) | |||
Emergency | |||
- Unit Startup Transformer (Keowee) | |||
- Another Unit Startup Transformer (aligned) | |||
(Keowee) | |||
- CT4 | |||
- CT5 (dedicated line/energizing Standby Bus) | |||
HA1.2 A validated notification from NRC of an aircraft attack threat within 30 min. of the site 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 HU1.1 A SECURITY CONDITION that does not involve a HOSTILE ACTION as reported by the Security Shift Supervision HU1.2 Notification of a credible security threat directed at the site HU1.3 A validated notification from the NRC providing information of an aircraft threat Note 1: The Emergency Coordinator should declare the event promptly upon determining that time limit has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. | |||
Note 2: If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded the specified time limit. | |||
Note 3: If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped, indicating that the release path is isolated, the effluent monitor reading is no longer VALID for classification purposes. | |||
Note 4: The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EALs RA1.1, RS1.1 and RG1.1 should be used for emergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment using actual meteorology are available. | |||
Note 5: If the equipment in the listed room or area was already inoperable or out-of-service before the event occurred, then no emergency classification is warranted. | |||
Note 6: If CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is re-established prior to exceeding the 30-minute time limit, declaration of a General Emergency is not required. | |||
Note 7: This EAL does not apply to routine traffic impediments such as fog, snow, ice, or vehicle breakdowns or accidents. | |||
Note 8: A manual trip action is any Control Room operator action, or set of actions, which causes the control rods to be rapidly inserted into the core, and does not include manually driving in control rods or implementation of boron injection strategies. | |||
Note 9: RVLS is not valid if EITHER of the following exists: | |||
One or more RCPs are running OR | |||
- LPI pump(s) are running Note 10: In the absence of reliable RCS temperature indication caused by the loss of decay heat removal capability, classification should be based on time to boil data. | |||
Note 11: If the affected SAFETY SYSTEM train was already inoperable or out of service before the hazardous event occurred, then this emergency classification is not warranted. | |||
Note 12: If the hazardous event only resulted in VISIBLE DAMAGE, with no indications of degraded performance to at least one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM, then this emergency classification is not warranted. | |||
NOTES ONS ONS Date & Time of Shutdown Date Time None Table E-1 ISFSI Dose Limits 24P** | |||
400 mrem/hr Location HSM front surface HSM front bird screen Outside HSM door End shield wall exterior 24PHB 1050 mrem/hr 40 mrem/hr 550 mrem/hr 24PTH 1200 mrem/hr 160 mrem/hr 800 mrem/hr HSM Module 24P* | |||
1050 mrem/hr 140 mrem/hr 600 mrem/hr E1-E20, W1-W20 E21-E42, W21-W42 E43-E67, W43-W67 E81-E92, W81-W92 400 mrem/hr 200 mrem/hr 40 mrem/hr 1000 mrem/hr 40 mrem/hr 600 mrem/hr E68-E74, W68-W74 24PHB 24PTH E75-E80, W75-W80 | |||
*HSM E1-E20 and W1-W20 were loaded with 24P canisters under the Site Specific License SNM-2503 and only have Technical Specification dose rate limit for HSM surface. | |||
**HSM E21-E42 and W21-W42 were loaded with 24P canisters under the General License CoC 1004. | |||
Table E-1 ISFSI Dose Limits - Notes 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 60 min.* | |||
20 min.* | |||
If a RCS heat removal system is in operation within this time frame and RCS temperature is being reduced, the EAL is not applicable 0 min. | |||
Table C-4 RCS Heat-up Duration Thresholds Not intact OR at REDUCED INVENTORY Intact (but not REDUCED INVENTORY) | |||
RCS Status CONTAINMENT CLOSURE Status Heat-up Duration N/A established not established None Cold SD/ | |||
Refuel System Malfunct. | |||
Loss of Essential AC Power Loss of all but one AC power source to essential buses for 15 minutes or longer CU2.1 AC power capability, Table C-3, to essential 4160V buses MFB-1 and MFB-2 reduced to a single power source for 15 min. (Note 1) | |||
AND Any additional single power source failure will result in loss of all AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS Indicated voltage is < 105 VDC on vital DC buses required by Technical Specifications for 15 min. (Note 1) | |||
CU4.1 CG1.1 Loss of RCS inventory Loss of RCS inventory affecting core decay heat removal capability Loss of RCS inventory affecting fuel clad integrity with containment challenged RCS Level Loss of Comm. | |||
Loss of all onsite or offsite communications capabilities CU5.1 UNPLANNED loss of RCS inventory for 15 minutes or longer Loss of Vital DC power for 15 minutes or longer CA2.1 Loss of all offsite and all emergency AC power capability to essential 4160V buses MFB-1 and MFB-2 for 15 min. | |||
(Note 1) | |||
Loss of all offsite and all emergency AC power to essential buses for 15 minutes or longer CS1.1 RCS Temp. | |||
UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature to > 200°F due to loss of decay heat removal capability (Note 10) | |||
CU3.1 UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature Loss of all RCS temperature and RCS level indication for 15 min. (Note 1) | |||
CU3.2 CA3.1 UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature to > 200°F for | |||
> Table C-4 duration (Notes 1, 10) | |||
OR UNPLANNED RCS pressure increase > 10 psig due to a loss of RCS cooling (this EAL does not apply during water-solid plant conditions) | |||
Inability to maintain plant in cold shutdown None None Hazardous Event Affecting Safety Systems C | |||
1 3 | |||
5 6 | |||
The occurrence of any Table C-6 hazardous event AND Event damage has caused indications of degraded performance on one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode AND EITHER of the following: | |||
Event damage has caused indications of degraded performance to a second train of the SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode. | |||
Event damage has resulted in VISIBLE DAMAGE to the second train of the SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode (Note 11, 12) 2 GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT Loss of all Table C-5 onsite communication methods OR Loss of all Table C-5 offsite communication methods OR Loss of all Table C-5 NRC communication methods Hazardous event affecting a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode CA6.1 EAL - COLD MODES 5, 6 & No Mode None None None None None None None Loss of Vital DC Power 4 | |||
None None None 5 | |||
6 5 | |||
6 NM 5 | |||
6 5 | |||
6 5 | |||
6 5 | |||
6 NM 5 | |||
6 5 | |||
6 5 | |||
6 5 | |||
6 NM 5 | |||
6 Table C-6 Hazardous Events Seismic event (earthquake) | |||
Internal or external FLOODING event High winds or tornado strike FIRE EXPLOSION Other events with similar hazard characteristics as determined by the Shift Manager Table C-2 Containment Challenge Indications CONTAINMENT CLOSURE not established (Note 6) | |||
Containment hydrogen concentration > 4% | |||
Unplanned rise in containment pressure | |||
GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT Table F-1 Fission Product Barrier Threshold Matrix Containment (CMT) Barrier Fuel Clad (FC) Barrier Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Barrier Loss Potential Loss Loss Loss Potential Loss Potential Loss A. RCS or SG Tube Leakage B. Inadequate Heat Removal C. CMT Radiation / | |||
RCS Activity D. CMT Integrity or Bypass None None None 1. | |||
RVLS < 0" (Note 9) | |||
None | |||
: 1. Any condition in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator that indicates loss of the Fuel Clad barrier | |||
: 1. Any condition in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator that indicates potential loss of the Fuel Clad barrier | |||
: 1. An automatic or manual ES actuation required by EITHER: | |||
* UNISOLABLE RCS leakage | |||
* SG tube RUPTURE | |||
: 1. Any condition in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator that indicates loss of the RCS barrier | |||
: 1. Any condition in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator that indicates potential loss of the RCS barrier | |||
: 1. Any condition in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator that indicates loss of the Containment barrier | |||
: 1. Any condition in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator that indicates potential loss of the Containment barrier None None None E. EC Judgment | |||
: 1. RCS leakage > normal makeup capacity due to EITHER: | |||
* UNISOLABLE RCS leakage | |||
* SG tube leakage | |||
: 2. RCS cooldown to < 400°F at | |||
> 100°F/hr OR HPI has operated in the injection mode with no RCPs operating | |||
: 1. A leaking SG is FAULTED outside of containment | |||
: 1. CETCs > 1200°F | |||
: 1. CETCs > 700°F | |||
: 2. RCS heat removal cannot be established AND RCS subcooling < 0ºF None | |||
: 1. RCS heat removal cannot be established AND RCS subcooling < 0ºF | |||
: 1. CETCs >1200°F AND Restoration procedures not effective within 15 min. (Note 1) | |||
: 1. 1/2/3RIA 57/58 > Table F-2 column FC Loss | |||
: 2. Coolant activity > 300 µCi/ml DEI | |||
: 1. Containment radiation: | |||
- 1,3 RIA 57/58 > 1.0 R/hr | |||
- 2 RIA 57 > 1.6 R/hr | |||
- 2 RIA 58 > 1.0 R/hr | |||
: 1. 1/2/3RIA 57/58 > Table F-2 column CMT Potential Loss None None None | |||
: 1. Containment isolation is required AND EITHER | |||
- Containment integrity has been lost based on Emergency Coordinator judgment | |||
- UNISOLABLE pathway from Containment to the environment exists | |||
: 2. Indications of RCS leakage outside of containment | |||
: 1. Containment pressure > 59 psig | |||
: 2. Containment hydrogen concentration > 4% | |||
: 3. Containment pressure > 10 psig with < one full train of containment heat removal system (1 RBS with > 700 gpm spray flow AND 2 RBCUs) operating per design for 15 min. (Note 1) | |||
: 2. HPI forced cooling initiated System Malfunct. | |||
SA1.1 AC power capability, Table S-1, to essential 4160V buses MFB-1 and MFB-2 reduced to a single power source for 15 min. (Note 1) | |||
AND Any additional single power source failure will result in loss of all AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS SG1.1 None None Fission Product Barriers FS1.1 Loss of any two barriers AND Loss or potential loss of third barrier (Table F-1) | |||
Loss or potential loss of any two barriers (Table F-1) | |||
FA1.1 Any loss or any potential loss of either Fuel Clad or RCS barrier (Table F-1) | |||
FG1.1 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 SS1.1 Loss of Essential AC Power Loss of all offsite AC power capability to essential buses for 15 minutes or longer SU1.1 Loss of all offsite AC power capability, Table S-1, to essential 4160V buses MFB-1 and MFB-2 for 15 min. | |||
(Note 1) | |||
Loss of all but one AC power source to essential buses for 15 minutes or longer Loss of all offsite and all emergency AC power to essential buses for 15 minutes or longer Prolonged loss of all offsite and all emergency AC power to essential buses Loss of 125 VDC power based on battery bus voltage indications < 105 VDC on both vital DC Distribution Centers DCA and DCB for 15 min. (Note 1) | |||
SS2.1 Loss of all vital DC power for 15 minutes or longer SA6.1 An automatic or manual trip fails to shut down the reactor as indicated by reactor power 5% | |||
AND Manual trip pushbutton is not successful in shutting down the reactor as indicated by reactor power 5% (Note 8) | |||
An automatic or manual trip fails to shut down the reactor as indicated by reactor power 5% | |||
AND All actions to shut down the reactor are not successful as indicated by reactor power 5% | |||
AND EITHER: | |||
- CETCs >1200°F on ICCM | |||
- RCS subcooling < 0ºF SS6.1 Automatic or manual trip fails to shut down the reactor and subsequent manual actions taken at the reactor control consoles are not successful in shutting down the reactor Inability to shut down the reactor causing a challenge to core cooling or RCS heat removal Loss of all onsite or offsite communications capabilities SU7.1 Loss of CR Indications UNPLANNED loss of Control Room indications for 15 minutes or longer SU3.1 An UNPLANNED event results in the inability to monitor one or more Table S-2 parameters from within the Control Room for 15 min. (Note 1) | |||
SA3.1 An UNPLANNED event results in the inability to monitor one or more Table S-2 parameters from within the Control Room for 15 min. (Note 1) | |||
AND Any significant transient is in progress, Table S-3 UNPLANNED loss of Control Room indications for 15 minutes or longer with a significant transient in progress Hazardous event affecting a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode SA9.1 RCS activity greater than Technical Specification allowable limits SU4.1 RCS activity > 50 µCi/gm Dose Equivalent I-131 for > 48 hr continuous period OR RCS activity > 280 µCi/gm Dose Equivalent Xe-133 for > 48 hr continuous period RCS leakage for 15 minutes or longer SU5.1 RCS unidentified or pressure boundary leakage | |||
> 10 gpm for 15 min. | |||
OR RCS identified leakage > 25 gpm for 15 min. | |||
OR Leakage from the RCS to a location outside containment | |||
> 25 gpm for 15 min. | |||
(Note 1) | |||
Automatic or manual trip fails to shut down the reactor SU6.1 None Loss of all offsite and all emergency AC power capability to essential 4160V buses MFB-1 and MFB-2 for 15 min. (Note 1) | |||
Loss of all offsite and all emergency AC power capability to essential 4160V buses MFB-1 and MFB-2 AND Failure to power SSF equipment and PSW unavailable AND EITHER: | |||
- Restoration of at least one essential bus in < 4 hours is not likely (Note 1) | |||
- CETC reading > 1200°F F | |||
S 1 | |||
3 9 | |||
Loss of Comm. | |||
7 An automatic trip did not shut down the reactor as indicated by reactor power 5% after any RPS setpoint is exceeded AND A subsequent automatic trip or the manual trip pushbutton is successful in shutting down the reactor as indicated by reactor power < 5% (Note 8) | |||
None None None None None Loss of Vital DC Power 2 | |||
EAL-HOT MODES 1, 2, 3 & 4 SG1.2 Loss of all offsite and all emergency AC power capability to essential 4160V buses MFB-1 and MFB-2 for 15 min. | |||
AND Failure to power SSF equipment and PSW unavailable AND Loss of 125 VDC power based on battery bus voltage indications < 105 VDC on both vital DC Distribution Centers DCA and DCB for 15 min. | |||
(Note 1) | |||
None RCS Activity 4 | |||
RPS Failure 6 | |||
RCS Leakage 5 | |||
None None None SU6.2 A manual trip did not shut down the reactor as indicated by reactor power 5% after any manual trip action was initiated AND A subsequent automatic trip or the manual trip pushbutton is successful in shutting down the reactor as indicated by reactor power < 5% (Note 8) | |||
Loss of all Table S-4 onsite communication methods OR Loss of all Table S-4 offsite communication methods OR Loss of all Table S-4 NRC communication methods Hazardous Event Affecting Safety Systems None Table S-2 Safety System Parameters | |||
- Reactor power | |||
- RCS level | |||
- RCS pressure | |||
- CETC temperature | |||
- Level in at least one S/G | |||
- EFW flow to at least one S/G 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 1 | |||
1 2 | |||
3 4 | |||
1 2 | |||
3 4 | |||
1 2 | |||
3 4 | |||
1 2 | |||
3 4 | |||
1 2 | |||
3 4 | |||
1 2 | |||
3 4 | |||
1 2 | |||
3 4 | |||
1 2 | |||
3 4 | |||
1 1 | |||
1 2 | |||
3 4 | |||
None Failure to isolate containment or loss of containment pressure control SU8.1 Any penetration is not closed within 15 min. of a VALID ES actuation signal OR Containment pressure > 10 psig with < one full train of containment heat removal system (1 RBS with > 700 gpm spray flow AND 2 RBCUs) operating per design for 15 min. | |||
(Note 1) 1 2 | |||
3 4 | |||
1 2 | |||
3 4 | |||
Table S-5 Hazardous Events Seismic event (earthquake) | |||
Internal or external FLOODING event High winds or tornado strike FIRE EXPLOSION Other events with similar hazard characteristics as determined by the Shift Manager CMT Failure 8 | |||
None Loss of all essential AC and vital DC power sources for 15 minutes or longer 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 None Prepared for Duke Energy by: Operations Support Services, Inc. - www.ossi-net.com (1/28/16) | |||
Modes: | |||
1 Power Operations No Mode NM 2 | |||
Startup 5 | |||
Cold Shutdown 3 | |||
Hot Standby 4 | |||
Hot Shutdown Oconee Nuclear Station Classification of Emergency CSD-EP-ONS-0101-02 Rev 000 Irradiated Fuel Event RU1.1 Sample analysis for a gaseous or liquid release indicates a concentration or release rate > 2 x SLC/TS limits for 60 min. (Notes 1, 2) | |||
RU1.2 Reading on any Table R-1 effluent radiation monitor | |||
> column UE for 60 min. (Notes 1, 2, 3) | |||
RA1.1 Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses | |||
> 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY (Note 4) | |||
RS1.1 Reading on any Table R-1 effluent radiation monitor > column SAE for 15 min. (Notes 1, 2, 3, 4) | |||
RS1.2 Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses | |||
> 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY (Note 4) | |||
RA1.2 Reading on any Table R-1 effluent radiation monitor | |||
> column ALERT for 15 min. (Notes 1, 2, 3, 4) | |||
RA1.3 Analysis of a liquid effluent sample indicates a concentration or release rate that would result in doses > 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY for 60 min. of exposure (Notes 1, 2) | |||
RU2.1 UNPLANNED water level drop in the REFUELING PATHWAY as indicated by low water level alarm or indication AND UNPLANNED rise in corresponding area radiation levels as indicated by any of the following radiation monitors: | |||
- RIA-3 RB Refueling Deck Shield Wall | |||
- RIA-6 Spent Fuel Building Wall | |||
- Portable area monitors on the main bridge or SFP bridge RA2.2 Damage to irradiated fuel resulting in a release of radioactivity AND HIGH alarm on any of the following radiation monitors: | |||
- RIA-3 RB Refueling Deck Shield Wall | |||
- RIA-6 Spent Fuel Building Wall | |||
- RIA-41 Spent Fuel Pool Gas | |||
- RIA-49 RB Gas | |||
- Portable area monitors on the main bridge or SFP bridge RA3.1 Dose rates > 15 mR/hr in EITHER of the following areas: | |||
- Control Room (RIA-1) | |||
- Central Alarm Station (by survey) | |||
Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity greater than 2 times the SLC/TS limits for 60 minutes or longer Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE Release of gaseous radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem thyroid CDE Release of gaseous radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 1,000 mrem TEDE or 5,000 mrem thyroid CDE Unplanned loss of water level above irradiated fuel Significant lowering of water level above, or damage to, irradiated fuel RA2.1 Uncovery of irradiated fuel in the REFUELING PATHWAY Radiation levels that IMPEDE access to equipment necessary for normal plant operations, cooldown or shutdown RS1.3 Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY: | |||
- Closed window dose rates > 100 mR/hr expected to continue for 60 min. | |||
- Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE | |||
> 500 mrem for 60 min. of inhalation (Notes 1, 2) | |||
Abnorm. | |||
Rad Levels | |||
/ Rad Effluent R | |||
GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT 2 | |||
Rad Effluent 1 | |||
None None None None HS1.1 A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the PROTECTED AREA as reported by the Security Shift Supervision HU2.1 HU4.1 A FIRE is not extinguished within 15 min. of any of the following FIRE detection indications (Note 1): | |||
- Report from the field (i.e., visual observation) | |||
- Receipt of multiple (more than 1) fire alarms or indications | |||
- Field verification of a single fire alarm AND The FIRE is located within any Table H-1 area HA5.1 Release of a toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable gas into any Table H-2 rooms or areas AND Entry into the room or area is prohibited or IMPEDED (Note 5) | |||
Seismic event greater than OBE levels HU4.2 Receipt of a single fire alarm (i.e., no other indications of a FIRE) | |||
AND The fire alarm is indicating a FIRE within any Table H-1 area AND The existence of a FIRE is not verified within 30 min. of alarm receipt (Note 1) | |||
HU3.2 Internal room or area FLOODING of a magnitude sufficient to require manual or automatic electrical isolation of a SAFETY SYSTEM component needed for the current operating mode FIRE potentially degrading the level of safety of the plant Gaseous release IMPEDING access to equipment necessary for normal plant operations, cooldown or shutdown HU7.1 Other conditions existing that in the judgment of the Site Emergency Coordinator warrant declaration of a UE Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant or indicate a security threat to facility protection has been initiated. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of SAFETY SYSTEMS occurs. | |||
An event has resulted in plant control being transferred from the Control Room to the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel or Standby Shutdown Facility HA6.1 Control Room evacuation resulting in transfer of plant control to alternate locations HS6.1 An event has resulted in plant control being transferred from the Control Room to the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel or Standby Shutdown Facility AND Control of any of the following key safety functions is not reestablished within 15 min. (Note 1): | |||
- Reactivity (Modes 1, 2, and 3 only) | |||
- Core Cooling | |||
- RCS heat removal Inability to control a key safety function from outside the Control Room Other conditions exist which, in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator, indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant or a security event that involves probable life threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment because of HOSTILE ACTION. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels. | |||
HA7.1 Other conditions exist that in the judgment of the Site Emergency Coordinator warrant declaration of an Alert HS7.1 Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public or HOSTILE ACTION that results in intentional damage or malicious acts, (1) toward site personnel or equipment that could lead to the likely failure of or, (2) that prevent effective access to equipment needed for the protection of the public. | |||
Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels beyond the SITE BOUNDARY. | |||
Other conditions existing that in the judgment of the Site Emergency Coordinator warrant declaration of a Site Area Emergency HG7.1 Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or IMMINENT substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity or HOSTILE ACTION that results in an actual loss of physical control of the facility. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Site Emergency Coordinator warrant declaration of a General Emergency None Hazards H | |||
Seismic Event Fire Control Room Evacuation Hazardous Gases Security EC Judgment 2 | |||
4 5 | |||
1 6 | |||
7 None HU3.3 Movement of personnel within the PROTECTED AREA is IMPEDED due to an offsite event involving hazardous materials (e.g., an offsite chemical spill or toxic gas release) | |||
None ISFSI EU1.1 Damage to a loaded canister CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY as indicated by an on-contact radiation reading on the surface of a loaded spent fuel cask > any Table E-1 ISFSI dose limit Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY E | |||
Area Rad Levels 3 | |||
RA1.4 Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY: | |||
- Closed window dose rates > 10 mR/hr expected to continue for 60 min. | |||
- Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE | |||
> 50 mrem for 60 min. of inhalation (Notes 1, 2) | |||
RG1.1 Reading on any Table R-1 effluent radiation monitor > column GE for 15 min. (Notes 1, 2, 3, 4) | |||
RG1.2 Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses | |||
> 1000 mrem TEDE or 5000 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY (Note 4) | |||
RG1.3 Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY: | |||
- Closed window dose rates > 1000 mR/hr expected to continue for 60 min. | |||
- Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE | |||
> 5000 mrem for 60 min. of inhalation (Notes 1, 2) | |||
RA3.2 An UNPLANNED event results in radiation levels that prohibit or IMPEDE access to any Table R-2 rooms or areas (Note 5) | |||
HU3.1 A tornado strike within the PROTECTED AREA Hazardous event HU3.4 A hazardous event that results in on-site conditions sufficient to prohibit the plant staff from accessing the site via personal vehicles (Note 7) | |||
Natural or Tech. | |||
Hazard 3 | |||
HU4.3 A FIRE within the PROTECTED AREA not extinguished within 60 min. of the initial report, alarm or indication (Note 1) | |||
HU4.4 A FIRE within the PROTECTED AREA that requires firefighting support by an offsite fire response agency to extinguish None None None None None None None None RA2.3 Lowering of spent fuel pool level to -13.5 ft. | |||
RS2.1 Lowering of spent fuel pool level to -23.5 ft. | |||
RG2.1 Spent fuel pool level at the top of the fuel racks Spent fuel pool level cannot be restored to at least the top of the fuel racks for 60 minutes or longer Spent fuel pool level cannot be restored to at least -23.5 ft. | |||
for > 60 min. (Note 1) 5 6 | |||
1 2 | |||
3 4 | |||
NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM 6 | |||
Refuel Unit 1/2/3 Plant Vent Unit 1/2/3 Plant Vent Gaseous Liquid 3.00E+5 cpm RIA-45 RIA-46 Table R-1 Effluent Monitor Classification Thresholds Release Point Monitor GE SAE Alert UE 3.00E+4 cpm 3.00E+3 cpm 1.41E+5 cpm Liquid Radwaste Discharge RIA-33 4.79E+5 cpm Seismic event > OBE as indicated by EITHER of the following: | |||
- 1SA-9/E-1 (SEISMIC TRIGGER) alarm | |||
- 3SA-9/E-1 (SEISMIC TRIGGER) alarm Onsite Offsite System Commercial phone service ONS site phone system EOF phone system Public address system Onsite radio system DEMNET Offsite radio system NRC Emergency Telephone System Satellite Phone NRC X | |||
X X | |||
X X | |||
X X | |||
X X | |||
X Table S-4 Communication Methods X | |||
X X | |||
X Table S-3 Significant Transients | |||
- Reactor trip | |||
- Runback > 25% thermal power | |||
- Electrical load rejection > 25% electrical load | |||
- ECCS actuation None | |||
[Refer to EAL CA6.1 OR SA9.1 for escalation due to seismic event] | |||
[Refer to EAL CA6.1 OR SA9.1 for escalation due to natural or technological hazard] | |||
[Refer to EAL CA6.1 OR SA9.1 for escalation due to FIRE] | |||
Table F-2 Containment Radiation - R/hr (1/2/3RIA 57/58) | |||
Time After S/D (Hrs) 0 - < 0.5 0.5 - < 2.0 2.0 - < 8.0 | |||
> 8.0 140 40 15 5 | |||
FC Loss 300 80 32 10 CMT Potential Loss RIA 57 RIA 58 700 195 75 25 1500 400 160 50 RIA 57 RIA 58 None Table H-2 Safe Operation & Shutdown Rooms/Areas Room / Area Mode(s) | |||
- Turbine Building | |||
- Equipment and Cable Rooms | |||
- Auxiliary Building | |||
- Reactor Buildings 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 3, 4, 5 Table R-2 Safe Operation & Shutdown Rooms/Areas Room / Area Mode(s) | |||
- Turbine Building | |||
- Equipment and Cable Rooms | |||
- Auxiliary Building | |||
- Reactor Buildings 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 3, 4, 5 Table S-1 AC Power Sources Offsite | |||
- Unit Normal Transformer (backcharged) | |||
- Unit Startup Transformer (SWYD) | |||
- Another Unit Startup Transformer (aligned) | |||
(SWYD) | |||
- CT5 (Central/energizing Standby Bus) | |||
Emergency | |||
- Unit Startup Transformer (Keowee) | |||
- Another Unit Startup Transformer (aligned) | |||
(Keowee) | |||
- CT4 | |||
- CT5 (dedicated line/energizing Standby Bus) | |||
Table H-1 Fire Areas | |||
- Reactor Building | |||
- Auxiliary Building | |||
- Turbine Building | |||
- Standby Shutdown Facility | |||
- Intake Structure | |||
- Electrical Blockhouse | |||
- Keowee Hydro & associated transformers | |||
- Transformer Yard | |||
- Protected Service Water Building | |||
- Essential Siphon Vacuum Building HU1.1 A SECURITY CONDITION that does not involve a HOSTILE ACTION as reported by the Security Shift Supervision HA1.1 Confirmed SECURITY CONDITION or threat HOSTILE ACTION within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA or airborne attack threat within 30 minutes HOSTILE ACTION within the PROTECTED AREA A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA as reported by the Security Shift Supervision HU1.2 Notification of a credible security threat directed at the site HU1.3 A validated notification from the NRC providing information of an aircraft threat HA1.2 A validated notification from NRC of an aircraft attack threat within 30 min. of the site 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 ONS Note 1: The Emergency Coordinator should declare the event promptly upon determining that time limit has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. | |||
Note 2: If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded the specified time limit. | |||
Note 3: If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped, indicating that the release path is isolated, the effluent monitor reading is no longer VALID for classification purposes. | |||
Note 4: The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EALs RA1.1, RS1.1 and RG1.1 should be used for emergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment using actual meteorology are available. | |||
Note 5: If the equipment in the listed room or area was already inoperable or out-of-service before the event occurred, then no emergency classification is warranted. | |||
Note 6: If CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is re-established prior to exceeding the 30-minute time limit, declaration of a General Emergency is not required. | |||
Note 7: This EAL does not apply to routine traffic impediments such as fog, snow, ice, or vehicle breakdowns or accidents. | |||
Note 8: A manual trip action is any Control Room operator action, or set of actions, which causes the control rods to be rapidly inserted into the core, and does not include manually driving in control rods or implementation of boron injection strategies. | |||
Note 9: RVLS is not valid if EITHER of the following exists: | |||
One or more RCPs are running OR | |||
- LPI pump(s) are running Note 10: In the absence of reliable RCS temperature indication caused by the loss of decay heat removal capability, classification should be based on time to boil data. | |||
Note 11: If the affected SAFETY SYSTEM train was already inoperable or out of service before the hazardous event occurred, then this emergency classification is not warranted. | |||
Note 12: If the hazardous event only resulted in VISIBLE DAMAGE, with no indications of degraded performance to at least one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM, then this emergency classification is not warranted. | |||
NOTES The occurrence of any Table S-5 hazardous event AND Event damage has caused indications of degraded performance on one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode AND EITHER of the following: | |||
Event damage has caused indications of degraded performance to a second train of the SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode. | |||
Event damage has resulted in VISIBLE DAMAGE to the second train of the SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode (Note 11, 12) | |||
Note 1: The Emergency Coordinator should declare the event promptly upon determining that time limit has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. | |||
Note 2: If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded the specified time limit. | |||
Note 3: If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped, indicating that the release path is isolated, the effluent monitor reading is no longer VALID for classification purposes. | |||
Note 4: The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EALs RA1.1, RS1.1 and RG1.1 should be used for emergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment using actual meteorology are available. | |||
Note 5: If the equipment in the listed room or area was already inoperable or out-of-service before the event occurred, then no emergency classification is warranted. | |||
Note 6: If CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is re-established prior to exceeding the 30-minute time limit, declaration of a General Emergency is not required. | |||
Note 7: This EAL does not apply to routine traffic impediments such as fog, snow, ice, or vehicle breakdowns or accidents. | |||
Note 8: A manual trip action is any Control Room operator action, or set of actions, which causes the control rods to be rapidly inserted into the core, and does not include manually driving in control rods or implementation of boron injection strategies. | |||
Note 9: RVLS is not valid if EITHER of the following exists: | |||
One or more RCPs are running OR | |||
- LPI pump(s) are running Note 10: In the absence of reliable RCS temperature indication caused by the loss of decay heat removal capability, classification should be based on time to boil data. | |||
Note 11: If the affected SAFETY SYSTEM train was already inoperable or out of service before the hazardous event occurred, then this emergency classification is not warranted. | |||
Note 12: If the hazardous event only resulted in VISIBLE DAMAGE, with no indications of degraded performance to at least one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM, then this emergency classification is not warranted. | |||
NOTES ONS None None Table E-1 ISFSI Dose Limits 24P** | |||
400 mrem/hr Location HSM front surface HSM front bird screen Outside HSM door End shield wall exterior 24PHB 1050 mrem/hr 40 mrem/hr 550 mrem/hr 24PTH 1200 mrem/hr 160 mrem/hr 800 mrem/hr HSM Module 24P* | |||
1050 mrem/hr 140 mrem/hr 600 mrem/hr E1-E20, W1-W20 E21-E42, W21-W42 E43-E67, W43-W67 E81-E92, W81-W92 400 mrem/hr 200 mrem/hr 40 mrem/hr 1000 mrem/hr 40 mrem/hr 600 mrem/hr E68-E74, W68-W74 24PHB 24PTH E75-E80, W75-W80 | |||
*HSM E1-E20 and W1-W20 were loaded with 24P canisters under the Site Specific License SNM-2503 and only have Technical Specification dose rate limit for HSM surface. | |||
**HSM E21-E42 and W21-W42 were loaded with 24P canisters under the General License CoC 1004. | |||
Table E-1 ISFSI Dose Limits - Notes 5 | |||
6 1 | |||
2 3 | |||
4 NM | |||
Examination KEY ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Q A Q A Q A Q A 1 | |||
B 26 A | |||
51 B | |||
76 A | |||
2 C | |||
27 A | |||
52 B | |||
77 A | |||
3 D | |||
28 B | |||
53 A | |||
78 D | |||
4 B | |||
29 C | |||
54 C | |||
79 A | |||
5 A | |||
30 A | |||
55 B | |||
80 C | |||
6 A | |||
31 C | |||
56 A | |||
81 B | |||
7 A | |||
32 D | |||
57 C | |||
82 C | |||
8 D | |||
33 C | |||
58 A | |||
83 D | |||
9 B | |||
34 B | |||
59 A | |||
84 C | |||
10 B | |||
35 A | |||
60 C | |||
85 A | |||
11 A | |||
36 B | |||
61 C | |||
86 C | |||
12 C | |||
37 D | |||
62 A | |||
87 A | |||
13 B | |||
38 C | |||
63 C | |||
88 A | |||
14 D | |||
39 D | |||
64 A | |||
89 D | |||
15 A | |||
40 C | |||
65 B | |||
90 D | |||
16 D | |||
41 C | |||
66 A | |||
91 B | |||
17 D | |||
42 D | |||
67 C | |||
92 C | |||
18 C | |||
43 C | |||
68 A | |||
93 A | |||
19 B | |||
44 B | |||
69 C | |||
94 A | |||
20 B | |||
45 C | |||
70 A | |||
95 D | |||
21 A | |||
46 C | |||
71 B | |||
96 D | |||
22 D | |||
47 C | |||
72 A | |||
97 D | |||
23 C | |||
48 B | |||
73 C | |||
98 A | |||
24 D | |||
49 C | |||
74 C | |||
99 B | |||
25 C | |||
50 B | |||
75 D | |||
100 D | |||
Printed 6/22/2020 9:08:52 AM Page 1 of 1}} | |||
Latest revision as of 03:17, 23 May 2025
| ML20233A815 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee |
| Issue date: | 08/20/2020 |
| From: | NRC/RGN-II |
| To: | |
| References | |
| Download: ML20233A815 (136) | |
Text
Question:
(1 point) 1 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions:
Time = 1200:
Reactor power = 100%
BOTH Main FDW Pumps trip
PORV opens Time = 1205:
Reactor power = 26% slowly lowering
PORV has failed open
- 1) In accordance with Rule 6 (HPI), the MAXIMUM power level at which HPI can be throttled is __(1)__.
- 2) The reason power level is used to determine if throttling HPI is appropriate is that it ensures __(2)__.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
A.
- 1. 5%
- 1. 1%
- 1. 5%
- 2. sufficient core cooling exists until power level is low enough that HPI Forced cooling would become effective D.
- 1. 1%
- 2. sufficient core cooling exists until power level is low enough that HPI Forced cooling would become effective Page 1 of 100 ML20233A815
Question:
(1 point) 2 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following on Unit 1:
Initial conditions:
Reactor power = 100%
Current conditions:
SBLOCA occurs 1A and 1B SGs at the LOSCM setpoint
- 1) In order for boiler-condenser mode of heat transfer to occur, the RCS primary side water level will be __(1)__ the SG secondary side water level.
- 2) Based on the attached CETC trend, boiler-condenser heat transfer __(2)__
occurring.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
REFERENCE PROVIDED A.
- 1. above
- 2. is B.
- 1. above
- 2. is NOT C.
- 1. below
- 2. is D.
- 1. below
- 2. is NOT Page 2 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 3 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following conditions on U1:
Reactor Power = 73% stable 1B1 RCP 1B2 RCP UPPER Cavity Pressure 710 psig stable 1420 psig stable LOWER Cavity Pressure 1070 psig stable 2140 psig stable Which ONE of the following describes the next required action(s) in accordance with AP/1/A/1700/016 (Abnormal Reactor Coolant Pump Operation)?
A.
Immediately trip 1B1 RCP B.
Immediately trip 1B2 RCP C.
Reduce reactor power to < 70% and then trip 1B1 RCP D.
Reduce reactor power to < 70% and then trip 1B2 RCP Page 3 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 4 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following on Unit 2:
Initial conditions:
Reactor power = 100%
Current conditions:
Pressurizer level = 195 inches lowering LDST level = 78 inches lowering Which ONE of the following has occurred?
A.
Line break downstream of 2HP-7 B.
Line break downstream of 2HP-120 C.
2HP-14 has failed in the bleed position D.
Loss of Instrument Air and Auxiliary Instrument Air to 2HP-5 Page 4 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 5 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions:
Reactor power = 100%
Inadvertent ES channel 6 actuation occurs Which ONE of the following will occur and why?
A.
The operating CC pump will stop to prevent deadheading the pump B.
RCP seal return is isolated to eliminate a containment leakage path C.
Letdown will isolate to prevent reaching the letdown high temperature interlock D.
LPSW cooling to ALL RCPs is isolated to prevent a subsequent water hammer Page 5 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 6 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions:
Initial conditions:
Reactor power = 90%
1B Main Feedwater pump trips Current conditions:
Reactor power = 70% lowering RCS pressure = 2165 psig slowly lowering Pressurizer level = 228 inches slowly lowering Pressurizer temperature = 640°F slowly lowering Pressurizer heater bank 1 (Group A and K) is ON Pressurizer heater banks 2, 3, and 4 are in AUTO and are OFF The pressurizer is __(1)__ AND the pressurizer heater bank 2 __(2)__.
Which ONE of the following completes the statement above?
A.
- 1. subcooled
- 2. should be energized B.
- 1. subcooled
- 2. will energize at 2145 psig C.
- 1. saturated
- 2. should be energized D.
- 1. saturated
- 2. will energize at 2145 psig Page 6 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 7 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 3 conditions:
Rule 1, (ATWS / Unanticipated Nuclear Power Production) has been initiated
- 1) In accordance with Rule 1, an operator will be dispatched to open the Unit 3 CRD 600V normal power supply breaker at 3X9 and alternate 600V power supply breaker at __(1)__.
- 2) DSS is interlocked to automatically de-energize Control Rod Groups 1 - 7 at a high RCS Pressure setpoint of __(2)__ psig.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
A.
- 1. 2X2
- 2. 2450 B.
- 1. 1X1
- 2. 2450 C.
- 1. 2X2
- 2. 2500 D.
- 1. 1X1
- 2. 2500 Page 7 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 8 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions:
Reactor Power = 29% lowering Primary to secondary leakage in 1A SG Pzr level = 160 inches slowly lowering Only 1A HPI Pump operating 1HP-120 full open 1HP-5 closed The EOP SGTR tab
- 2) __(2)__ direct manually tripping the Reactor at this time.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
A.
- 1. will
- 2. will B.
- 1. will
- 2. will NOT C.
- 1. will NOT
- 2. will D.
- 1. will NOT
- 2. will NOT Page 8 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 9 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 2 conditions:
Loss of Heat Transfer has occurred Unit 2 TDEFWP is now available to feed the Steam Generators 2A SG level = 6 inches XSUR slowly lowering 2A SG pressure = 500 psig slowly lowering 2B SG level = 4 inches XSUR slowly lowering 2B SG pressure = 330 psig slowly lowering In accordance with Rule 7 (Steam Generator Feed Control), the MAXIMUM initial feed rate for the above conditions is __(1)__, in order to prevent __(2)__.
Which ONE of the following completes the statement above?
A.
- 1. 100 gpm to EACH SG
- 2. water hammer damage to voided feedwater lines B.
- 1. 100 gpm to EACH SG
- 2. damage to SG tubes C.
- 1. 1000 gpm per header
- 2. an RCS overcooling event D.
- 1. 1000 gpm per header
- 2. damage to TDEFDW pump (runout)
Page 9 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 10 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions:
Station Blackout occurred from 100% power SSF has been activated with SSF RC Makeup required U1 TDEFDWP is feeding both U1 SGs o 1FDW-315 manually throttled to 325 gpm o 1FDW-316 manually throttled to 330 gpm RCS NR Tc = 550°F slowly lowering MS Pressure = 1000 psig slowly lowering RCS Pressure = 1940 psig slowly lowering 1A SG XSUR level = 205 inches rising 1B SG XSUR level = 208 inches rising In accordance with Rule 7 (SG Feed Control), the reason EFDW Flow should INITIALLY be throttled is to ________.
Which ONE of the following completes the statement above?
A.
maintain RCS NR Tc of 550 - 555°F B.
raise RCS Pressure to 1950 - 2250 psig C.
raise MS Pressure to approximately 1010 psig D.
lower 1A and 1B SG XSUR levels to proper setpoint Page 10 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 11 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Time = 1200:
Unit 1 reactor power = 100%
EFPD = 400 Switchyard Isolation occurs Time = 1217:
- 1) At Time = 1217, steady state natural circulation conditions __(1)__ been established.
- 2) IF steady state natural circulation is established, the RCS loop transit time will be approximately __(2)__ minutes.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
REFERENCE PROVIDED (above)
A.
- 1. have
- 2. 4 - 7 B.
- 1. have
- 2. 8 - 10 C.
- 1. have NOT
- 2. 4 - 7 D.
- 1. have NOT
- 2. 8 - 10 Page 11 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 12 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following on Unit 1:
Initial conditions:
1SA-06/A-2 (EL Inverter 1DIC System Trouble) actuates Current conditions:
1SA-13/B-7 (Inverter 1DIC Output Voltage Low) actuated in the Equipment Room
- 1) 1SA-13/B-7 actuated when voltage lowered below a MAXIMUM of __(1)__ volts.
- 2) Manual transfer of the vital loads on 1KVIC to Regulated Power Panelboard (1KRA) will be performed using the __(2)__ on 1DIC Inverter.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
A.
- 1. 72
- 2. Manual Bypass Switch B.
- 1. 72
- 2. Alternate Source to Load Pushbutton C.
- 1. 115
- 2. Manual Bypass Switch D.
- 1. 115
- 2. Alternate Source to Load Pushbutton Page 12 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 13 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Plant conditions:
1CA Battery Charger fails - output voltage = 0 VDC 1CA Battery voltage = 126 VDC 1DCB Bus voltage = 123 VDC Unit 2 DCA/DCB Bus voltage = 124 VDC Unit 3 DCA/DCB Bus voltage = 127 VDC Based on the above conditions, which ONE of the following will automatically supply power to 1DIA panelboard?
A.
1DCB Bus B.
1CA Battery C.
Unit 2 DC Bus D.
Unit 3 DC Bus Page 13 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 14 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions:
Initial conditions:
Reactor power = 100%
A and B LPSW pumps operating Current conditions:
A LPSW pump trips due to breaker failure Standby LPSW pump will NOT start AP/1/A/1700/024 (Loss of LPSW) initiated
- 1) 1LPSW-1121, 1122, 1123, and 1124 will close at a MAXIMUM LPSW header pressure of __(1)__ psig lowering.
- 2) The reason the above valves automatically close is to __(2)__.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
A.
- 1. 25
- 2. prevent LPSW pump run out B.
- 1. 25
- 2. prevent water hammers in the LPSW system C.
- 1. 18
- 2. prevent LPSW pump run out D.
- 1. 18
- 2. prevent water hammers in the LPSW system Page 14 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 15 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions:
Reactor power = 100%
Instrument Air pressure = 85 psig lowering AP/1/A/1700/022 (Loss of Instrument Air) has been initiated
- 1) AP/22 directs an immediate manual Reactor trip if instrument air header pressure lowers to a MAXIMUM value of __(1)__ psig.
- 2) AP/22 directs tripping the Main FDW pumps immediately after tripping the Reactor because the controlling FDW valves fail __(2)__.
A.
- 1. 65
- 2. as is B.
- 1. 70
- 2. as is C.
- 1. 65
- 2. closed D.
- 1. 70
- 2. closed Page 15 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 16 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions:
Reactor power = 100%
Grid disturbances affecting Voltage and Frequency are occurring Channel 1 AVR is ACTIVE Operator observes that the AVR Ready Light is OFF AVR = Auto Voltage Regulator FCR = Field Current Regulator
- 1) The Ready Light being OFF indicates that __(1)__ are NOT matched.
- 2) If the generator reaches the Underfrequency Maximum Allowable Time given in AP/1/A/1700/034 (Degraded Grid) the Main Turbine __(2)__ automatically trip.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
A.
- 2. will NOT B.
- 2. will C.
- 1. Channel 1 AVR and Channel 1 FCR
- 2. will NOT D.
- 1. Channel 1 AVR and Channel 1 FCR
- 2. will Page 16 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 17 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions:
Initial conditions:
Reactor power = 100%
1A Main Steam Line Break occurs Current conditions:
Reactor has tripped RCS Tave = 544°F slowly rising 1A SG Pressure = 0 psig 1B SG Pressure = 990 psig slowly rising Turbine bypass valves in Auto Reactor Building pressure = 0.2 psig stable
- 1) The TDEFWP is __(1)__.
- 2) The TDEFWP can be __(2)__.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
A.
- 1. operating
- 2. secured with TDEFWP control switch ONLY after AFIS is reset B.
- 1. operating
- 2. secured with TDEFWP control switch before AFIS is reset C.
- 1. NOT operating
- 2. started with TDEFWP control switch ONLY after AFIS is reset D.
- 1. NOT operating
- 2. started with TDEFWP control switch before AFIS is reset Page 17 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 18 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions:
Reactor tripped from 100% power ALL Control Rods fully inserted 1MS-10 (Main Steam Relief Valve) is stuck open Main Steam pressure is being reduced in an attempt to reseat 1MS-10 In accordance with Subsequent Actions of the EOP
- 1) Main Steam pressure will be reduced in __(1)__ psig increments.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
A.
- 1. 10
- 2. 525 B.
- 1. 20
- 2. 525 C.
- 1. 10
- 2. 532 D.
- 1. 20
- 2. 532 Page 18 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 19 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions:
Time = 0800:
Reactor power = 100%
1RIA-59 indicates 180 gpm stable CRS enters SGTR tab Time = 0810:
- 1) The procedural guidance of AD-OP-ONS-0002 (Oconee Specific Abnormal Operations Guidance) __(1)__ allow operators to open 1HP-26 for the given conditions at Time = 0800.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
REFERENCE PROVIDED (above)
A.
- 1. does
- 2. closed B.
- 1. does
- 2. open C.
- 1. does NOT
- 2. closed D.
- 1. does NOT
- 2. open Page 19 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 20 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 2 conditions:
Initial conditions:
Reactor power = 100%
Pzr level Channel 3 is selected SASS in MANUAL Current conditions:
Pzr level Channel 3 fails to 100 inches The CRS has not entered any abnormal procedure The RO has not yet referenced any alarm response guide The RO requests CRS concurrence to select a valid Pzr level indication
- 1) Prior to any operator action, the operating HPI pump current (amps) will __(1)__.
- 2) Based on the current conditions, AD-OP-ALL-1000 (Conduct of Operations) __(2)__
allow the RO to select a valid Pzr level indication with ONLY CRS verbal concurrence.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
A.
- 1. rise
- 2. does NOT B.
- 1. rise
- 2. does C.
- 1. lower
- 2. does NOT D.
- 1. lower
- 2. does Page 20 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 21 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions:
Initial conditions:
Reactor power = 100%
Fire in Unit 1 Cable Room AP/1/A/1700/050, (Challenging Plant Fire) has been initiated Current conditions:
AP/50 Section 4G, (Unit 1 Control Room Evacuation) directs the OATC to perform Encl 5.5, (OATC Actions for Control Room Evacuation)
- 1) AP/50 Encl 5.5 will direct the OATC to take __(1)__.
- 2) The reason the above action is taken is to __(2)__.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
A.
- 2. ensure natural circulation develops when the RCPs are secured D.
- 2. maximize SG inventory prior to losing secondary pumps due to the fire Page 21 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 22 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following on Unit 1:
Initial conditions:
Reactor power = 100% stable Plant issue requires rapid shutdown AP/1/A/1700/029 (Rapid Unit Shutdown) initiated Current conditions:
CRS directs RO to depress MAXIMUM RUNBACK
- 1) In accordance with AP/29, __(1)__ Main FDW pump is the preferred pump to be shutdown first.
- 2) The reason the above Main FDW pump is the preferred pump to be shutdown first is because its high discharge pressure trip setpoint is set __(2)__ than that of the remaining Main FDW pump.
Which ONE of the following completes the statement above?
A.
- 1. 1A
- 2. higher B.
- 1. 1A
- 2. lower C.
- 1. 1B
- 2. higher D.
- 1. 1B
- 2. lower Page 22 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 23 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions:
Time = 1200:00:
Reactor power = 40%
PCB 20 and PCB 21, Generator Output Breakers OPEN Time = 1200:15:
Main Turbine trips At Time = 1202:00
- 2) reactor heat removal __(2)__ be from forced circulation.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
NO OPERATOR ACTIONS ARE TAKEN A.
- 1. will
- 2. will B.
- 1. will
- 2. will NOT C.
- 1. will NOT
- 2. will D.
- 1. will NOT
- 2. will NOT Page 23 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 24 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following on Unit 3 Auxiliary Shutdown Panel:
3B HPI pump Remote/Local Selector in LOCAL position Unit 3 Turbine Bypass Valves in MANUAL controlling SG pressure
- 2) The Unit 3 TBVs __(2)__ automatically close on a loss of condenser vacuum condition.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
A.
- 1. will
- 2. will B.
- 1. will
- 2. will NOT C.
- 1. will NOT
- 2. will D.
- 1. will NOT
- 2. will NOT Page 24 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 25 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions:
LOCA CD tab in progress ALL SCMs = 4ºF rising RCS pressure is controllable Statalarm 1SA-07/E-6 (ES LPI Bypass Permit) actuated
- 2) In accordance with the LOCA CD tab, conditions are met such that operators
__(2)__ be directed to manually bypass LPI.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
A.
- 1. 890
- 2. will B.
- 1. 890
- 2. will NOT C.
- 1. 865
- 2. will D.
- 1. 865
- 2. will NOT Page 25 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 26 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions:
Time = 1200:
Reactor power = 100%
1TA and 1TB lockout occurs Time = 1300:
Tcold = 550°F stable EOP Forced Cooldown (FCD) tab in progress Natural Circulation (NC) cooldown is initiated
- 1) At Time = 1300, the EOP FCD tab will direct the crew to establish and maintain a cooldown rate of less than a MAXIMUM of __(1)__.
- 2) A NOTE in the EOP FCD tab states that RCS pressure will NOT be reduced until the RCS is cooled to establish > __(2)__ SCM.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
A.
- 1. 50°F/hr
- 2. 150°F B.
- 1. 50°F/hr
- 2. 200°F C.
- 1. 25°F/hr
- 2. 150°F D.
- 1. 25°F/hr
- 2. 200°F Page 26 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 27 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions:
Time = 0400:
Reactor power = 100%
PSW inoperable Time = 0430:
ALL CBPs trip ALL Emergency FDW pumps fail to start in auto or manual Rule 3 in progress LOHT tab in progress RCS pressure = 2258 psig rising Pzr level = 381 inches rising 1A1 and 1B2 RCPs operating
- 1) At Time = 0430, Rule 4 (Initiation of HPI Forced Cooling) __(1)__ required to be initiated.
- 2) IF Rule 4 is initiated, it __(2)__ direct the crew to secure all but one RCP..
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
A.
- 1. is
- 2. will B.
- 1. is
- 2. will NOT C.
- 1. is NOT
- 2. will D.
- 1. is NOT
- 2. will NOT Page 27 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 28 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions:
Reactor power = 68%
1A1 RCP secured per AP/1/A/1700/016 Section 4D (Loss of RCP Seal Return)
- 1) The EARLIEST time that AP/16 Section 4D directs closing the 1A1 RCP motor cooler inlet and outlet valves, 1LPSW-7&8, is __(1)__ after 1A1 RCP shutdown.
- 2) Individual valve position indication __(2)__ available for 1LPSW-7&8 on the control board.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
A.
- 1. 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />
- 2. is B.
- 1. 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />
- 2. is NOT C.
- 1. 30 minutes
- 2. is D.
- 1. 30 minutes
- 2. is NOT Page 28 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 29 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 2 conditions:
Time = 0800:
Rx Power = 90% and stable Time = 1100:
A group 2 rod drops fully into the core AP/2/A/1700/001 (Unit Runback) initiated
- 1) At Time = 0800, available Shutdown Margin (SDM) will LOWER if letdown temperature __(1)__ by 5°F.
- 2) At Time = 1100, the BOP determines that the regulating rods are positioned in the Unacceptable Region of the COLR. Per TS 3.2.1 (Regulating Rod Position Limits),
the required action is to initiate boration to restore SDM to within the limits specified in the COLR within __(2)__.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
A.
- 1. rises
- 2. 15 minutes B.
- 1. rises
- 2. 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> C.
- 1. lowers
- 2. 15 minutes D.
- 1. lowers
- 2. 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Page 29 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 30 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions:
LOCA CD tab in progress Cooldown and de-pressurization in progress Core SCM = 6°F stable ECCS suction swap to the RBES is complete LPI pump rooms are accessible In accordance with the LOCA CD tab
- 1) During the cooldown, LPI __(1)__ required to be aligned in a split flow arrangement with one train supplying HPI pump suction and the other train providing decay heat removal.
- 2) IF LPI is aligned in the split flow arrangement described above, the LPI train supplying the HPI pumps will take suction from the __(2)__.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
A.
- 1. is
- 2. RBES B.
- 1. is
- 2. DHR drop line C.
- 1. is NOT
- 2. RBES D.
- 1. is NOT
- 2. DHR drop line Page 30 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 31 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 2 conditions:
RCS cooldown in progress 2A LPI cooler isolated due to cooler leak
- 1) The LPI Decay Heat Removal mode that will be used for the INITIAL transition to LPI cooling is __(1)__.
- 2) The HIGHEST RCS pressure that will allow aligning LPI in the NORMAL Decay Heat Removal mode is __(2)__ psig.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
A.
- 1. High Pressure
- 2. 115 B.
- 1. High Pressure
- 2. 220 C.
- 1. Switchover
- 2. 115 D.
- 1. Switchover
- 2. 220 Page 31 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 32 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Which ONE of the following is the power supply for 3CF-2 (3B CFT Outlet)?
A.
3XC B.
3XL C.
3XN D.
3XP Page 32 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 33 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions:
Reactor power = 100%
Leak through 1RC-66 (PORV) = 0.6 gpm Pzr level will __ (1) __ and initially Quench Tank __ (2) __ will rise.
Which ONE of the following completes the statement above?
A.
- 1. rise
- 2. level B.
- 1. rise
- 2. pressure C.
- 1. remain constant
- 2. level D.
- 1. remain constant
- 2. pressure Page 33 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 34 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Which ONE of the following will result in the Standby Component Cooling pump receiving an automatic start signal?
A.
CRD Outlet HDR Flow lowers to 136 gpm B.
Component Cooling Total Flow lowers to 568 gpm C.
Component Cooling Pump Discharge Pressure lowers to 95 psig D.
Main Feeder Bus 1 (MFB1) locks out and de-energizes due to overcurrent Page 34 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 35 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions:
Recovery from HPI Forced Cooling in progress Pzr level = 400 inches stable Lowest SCM = 33°F When the PORV is closed.
- 1) a one degree rise in temperature can raise RCS pressure a MAXIMUM of approximately __(1)__ psig.
- 2) EOP Encl. 5.40 (Recovery From HPI Forced Cooling) will direct the crew to initially control HPI by __(2)__.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
A.
- 1. 100
- 1. 100
- 1. 50
- 1. 50
Question:
(1 point) 36 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 2 conditions:
Time = 0800:
Reactor power = 100%
Time = 0805:
FDW transient occurs Controlling RCS Narrow Range pressure signal peaked at 2210 psig
- 1) At Time = 0805, 2RC-1 __(1)__ open.
__(2)__ RCS pressure.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
A.
- 1. is
- 2. 2.MAX B.
- 1. is
- 2. median select C.
- 1. is NOT
- 2. 2.MAX D.
- 1. is NOT
- 2. median select Page 36 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 37 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following on Unit 1:
Initial conditions:
Reactor power = 100%
BOTH Main Feedwater Pumps trip Current conditions:
Reactor power = 57% slowly lowering
- 1) The correct sequence of activities directed by Rule 1 (ATWS) is to __(1)__.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
A.
- 2. wear B.
- 2. NOT wear C.
- 2. wear D.
- 2. NOT wear Page 37 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 38 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 3 conditions:
Reactor power = 100%
ES Analog Channel "C" WR RCS pressure signal fails LOW No FAULTED signals are present ES Channels __(1)__ are all now in a __(2)__ logic for automatic actuation.
Which ONE of the following completes the statement above?
A.
- 1) 1 - 4 ONLY
- 2) 2 out of 2 B.
- 1) 1 - 6
- 2) 2 out of 2 C.
- 1) 1 - 4 ONLY
- 2) 1 out of 2 D.
- 1) 1 - 6
- 2) 1 out of 2 Page 38 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 39 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 3 conditions:
Time = 0800:
Reactor Power = 100%
RBCUs 3B and 3C running in LOW Speed Reactor Building average temperature = 120°F stable 3LPSW-18, 21, 24 have been FULL OPEN for the last 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for testing Time = 0830:
Inadvertent ES Channel 5 actuation
- 1) With no operator action, once stabilized, RB pressure will be __(1)__ RB pressure at Time = 0800.
- 2) LCO TS 3.6.4 (Containment Pressure) states that Containment pressure shall be
< + __(2)__ psig.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements below?
A.
- 1. lower than
- 2. 2.45 B.
- 1. lower than
- 2. 1.2 C.
- 1. approximately the same as
- 2. 2.45 D.
- 1. approximately the same as
- 2. 1.2 Page 39 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 40 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions:
The Reactor trips from 100% power due to a LBLOCA
- 1) EOP Encl. 5.1 (ES Actuation) directs initiation of Encl. 5.12 (ECCS Suction Swap to RBES) at a MAXIMUM level of __(1)__ feet in the BWST.
- 2) TSP (Trisodium Phosphate Dodecahydrate) is added to the RB Emergency Sump to allow RBS to __(2)__.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
A.
- 1. 15
- 2. aid in keeping Iodine in solution, ultimately reducing offsite dose B.
- 1. 15
- 2. minimize hydrogen production from Radiolysis C.
- 1. 19
- 2. aid in keeping Iodine in solution, ultimately reducing offsite dose D.
- 1. 19
- 2. minimize hydrogen production from Radiolysis Page 40 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 41 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 3 conditions:
Initial conditions:
Reactor power = 100%
3MS-112 & 3MS-173, (SSRH 3A/3B Controls) are OPEN in MANUAL 3MS-77, 78, 80, 81, (MS to SSRH's) control switches in OPEN Current conditions:
Main Turbine trips With no operator actions
- 2) 3MS-77, 78, 80, 81 will __(2)__.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
A.
- 1. remain open
- 2. remain open B.
- 1. remain open
- 2. close C.
- 1. close
- 2. remain open D.
- 1. close
- 2. close Page 41 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 42 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 3 conditions:
Time = 04:00:00:
Reactor power = 70% stable 3A Main FDW Pump suction pressure = 236 psig lowering Time = 04:01:25:
3A Main FDW Pump suction pressure = 230 psig lowering With no operator actions, at Time = 04:01:25
- 1) 3A Main FDW pump __(1)__ tripped.
- 2) U3 Reactor power is __(2)__.
A.
- 1. has
- 2. stable at 65%
B.
- 1. has
- 2. lowering at 20% per minute C.
- 1. has NOT
- 2. stable at 70%
D.
- 1. has NOT
- 2. lowering at 20% per minute Page 42 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 43 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following on Unit 2:
Initial conditions:
Reactor power = 100%
Current conditions:
Both MFDW pumps trip Rule 3 in progress 2A EFDW flow = 95 gpm stable 2FDW-315 will NOT control in auto or manual In accordance with EOP Encl. 5.27 (Alternate Methods for Controlling EFDW Flow)...
- 1) the first method to control 2A SG level will use __(1)__.
- 2) the U2 TDEFDW Pump __(2)__ required to be placed in PULL TO LOCK.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
A.
- 1. 2FDW-315 local operation
- 2. is B.
- 1. 2FDW-315 local operation
- 2. is NOT C.
- 1. 2FDW-35 from Control Room
- 2. is D.
- 1. 2FDW-35 from Control Room
- 2. is NOT Page 43 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 44 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions:
Time = 0400:
Reactor power = 100%
TDEFDW Pump OOS Switchyard Isolation occurs Time = 0403:
1A and 1B MDEFDW Pumps operating Power is lost to the Moore Controller HAND/AUTO Station for 1FDW-316 1B SG level will stabilize at ______.
Which ONE of the following completes the statement above?
NO OPERATOR ACTIONS ARE TAKEN A.
30 inches XSUR B.
240 inches XSUR C.
dryout conditions D.
water in the steam lines Page 44 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 45 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 2 conditions:
Reactor power = 100%
2TD Switchgear de-energizes Which ONE of the following remains available?
A.
2C RBCU B.
2B LPI pump C.
2B HPI pump D.
2A MD EFDW pump Page 45 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 46 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions:
Initial conditions:
Reactor power = 22% power CT-1 Amps = 2000 Central Switchyard is energizing the STBY Buses PCB 17 (OCONEE WH. STARTUP TRANS. CT1 TIE) is open for maintenance Current conditions:
Yellow Bus lockout occurs Power to Unit 1 Main Feeder Buses will be supplied from ______ Transformer.
Which ONE of the following completes the statement above?
A.
1T B.
CT-4 C.
CT-5 D.
CT-1 Page 46 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 47 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions:
Reactor in MODE 3 1KX Essential inverter DC Input breaker trips Power to 1KX Panelboard will be restored with the ________.
Which ONE of the following completes the statement above?
A.
ASCO Switch B.
Auctioneering Diodes C.
Static Transfer Switch D.
Inverter Bypass Switches Page 47 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 48 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following plant conditions:
Time = 0800:00:
KHU 1 generating to the grid KHU emergency start signal received Time = 0800:10:
KHU 1 speed = 183 rpm rising Time = 0800:35:
KHU 1 speed = 181 rpm lowering
- 1) At Time = 0800:35, KHU 1 __(1)__ Emergency Locked out (ELO).
- 2) KHU 2 __(2)__ shutdown when the KHU emergency start signal is RESET.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
A.
- 1. has
- 2. will B.
- 1. has
- 2. will NOT C.
- 1. has NOT
- 2. will D.
- 1. has NOT
- 2. will NOT Page 48 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 49 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following on Unit 1:
Initial conditions:
Reactor power = 100%
1A GWD tank release in progress 1RIA-38 OOS Current conditions:
Loss of power to 1RIA-37 RM-80 skid
- 1) 1GWD-4 (A GWD TANK DISCHARGE) will __(1)__.
- 2) Unit 1s Waste Gas Decay Tank discharge flow rate (scfm) is monitored on __(2)__.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
A.
- 1. remain open
- 2. 1VB1 (side board)
B.
- 1. remain open
- 2. 1AB3 (back board)
C.
- 1. automatically close
- 2. 1VB1 (side board)
D.
- 1. automatically close
- 2. 1AB3 (back board)
Page 49 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 50 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station
- 2) The automatic runback described above will lower LPSW flow to the LPI Cooler(s) to a MAXIMUM of __(2)__ gpm.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
A.
- 2. 3000 B.
- 2. 5200 C.
- 2. 3000 D.
- 2. 5200 Page 50 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 51 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Which ONE of the following states all of the switchgear that can supply power to C LPSW pump?
A.
1TC ONLY B.
2TC ONLY C.
1TD ONLY D.
1TD or 2TD Page 51 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 52 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 3 conditions:
Time = 0800:
3CC-8 fails closed due to loss of Instrument Air (IA)
AP/3/A/1700/020 (Loss of Component Cooling) initiated Time = 0803:
AO manually opened 3CC-8 (CC Return Outside Block)
Time = 0900:
IA restored to 3CC-8 AO has taken NO further action
- 1) At Time = 0803, both Unit 3 CC pumps __(1)__ operating.
- 2) At Time = 0900, 3CC-8 __(2)__ be operated from the Control Room.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
A.
- 1. are
- 2. can B.
- 1. are
- 2. can NOT C.
- 1. are NOT
- 2. can D.
- 1. are NOT
- 2. can NOT Page 52 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 53 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following plant conditions:
Time = 0400:
Backup IA Compressors in STBY1 Primary IA Compressor tripped Time = 0405:
Instrument Air pressure = 91 psig lowering At Time = 0405
- 1) Auxiliary IA Compressors are __(1)__.
- 2) Backup IA Compressors are __(2)__.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
ASSUME NO OPERATOR ACTIONS A.
- 1. OFF
- 2. operating B.
- 1. OFF
- 2. OFF C.
- 1. operating
- 2. operating D.
- 1. operating
- 2. OFF Page 53 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 54 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions:
Time = 1300:
Reactor power = 100%
LBLOCA occurs RCS Pressure 40 psig and lowering RB Pressure 20 psig and rising Time = 1302:30:
At Time = 1302:30:
- 1) 1A, 1B, 1C RBCUs __(1)__.
- 2) 1A and 1B RBS pumps __(2)__.
Which ONE of the following completes the statement above?
REFERENCE PROVIDED (above)
A.
- 1. are operating correctly
- 2. should NOT be operating B.
- 1. should ALL be operating in LOW speed
- 2. should NOT be operating C.
- 1. are operating correctly
- 2. are operating correctly D.
- 1. should ALL be operating in LOW speed
- 2. are operating correctly Page 54 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 55 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following on Unit 2:
Initial conditions:
Reactor power = 100%
Current conditions:
RCS pressure = 1500 psig lowering RB pressure = 3.3 psig lowering
- 1) Reactor Building essential isolation valves __(1)__ closed.
- 2) In accordance with EOP Enclosure 5.1, (ES Actuation), a previously closed containment isolation valve will be opened by FIRST placing the associated
__(2)__.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
A.
- 1. are
- 2. voter in OVERRIDE B.
- 1. are
- 2. ES Channel in MANUAL C.
- 1. are NOT
- 2. voter in OVERRIDE D.
- 1. are NOT
- 2. ES Channel in MANUAL Page 55 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 56 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions:
OP/1/A/1105/019 (Control Rod Drive System) initiated Enclosure 4.15 (Recovery Of Dropped/Misaligned Safety Or Regulating Control Rod With Diamond in Automatic) in progress Step 2.4 states: IF affected rod is fully inserted, and Auto Latch and PI Alignment desired, perform the following:
2.4.1 Select LATCH AUTO.
- 2) During this control rod recovery, the __(2)__.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
A.
- 1. will
- 2. Controlling CRD Group will maintain Rx power constant B.
- 1. will
- 2. Reactor Operator will be required to insert the regulating rods to stop the rise in power C.
- 1. will NOT
- 2. Controlling CRD Group will maintain Rx power constant D.
- 1. will NOT
- 2. Reactor Operator will be required to insert the regulating rods to stop the rise in power Page 56 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 57 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following on Unit 1:
Initial conditions:
Reactor power = 80% stable Diamond and FDW Masters in HAND CRS directs OATC to maintain Delta Tc 0°F +/- 2°F Current conditions:
1B1 RCP trips Crew performs Plant Transient Response AP/1/A/1700/001 (Unit Runback) initiated Delta Tc = +2.2°F and becoming more positive
- 1) The operator will be required to manually re-ratio feedwater such that feed to the
__(1)__ SG is raised.
- 2) In accordance with AP/01, the crew will be required to initiate a power reduction to a MAXIMUM of __(2)__ %.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
A.
- 1. 1A
- 2. 65 B.
- 1. 1B
- 2. 65 C.
- 1. 1A
- 2. 74 D.
- 1. 1B
- 2. 74 Page 57 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 58 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following on Unit 1:
Initial conditions:
Reactor power = 100%
SBLOCA occurs Current conditions:
LOCA CD tab in progress RCS pressure = 805 psig stable RCS temperature = 530°F RB pressure = 3.1 psig rising Pzr level = 25 inches rising
- 1) Indicated Pzr level rising __(1)__ due to bubble formation in the reactor vessel head.
- 2) In accordance with the LOCA CD tab, 1RC-159/1RC-160 are required to be opened when the Rx vessel head level lowers to a MAXIMUM of __(2)__ inches.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
A.
- 1. is
- 2. 154 B.
- 1. is
- 2. 180 C.
- 1. is NOT
- 2. 154 D.
- 1. is NOT
- 2. 180 Page 58 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 59 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 2 conditions:
Reactor power = 80%
0% light for Group 4 Rod 3 is lit AP/2/A/1700/001 (Unit Runback) initiated
- 1) The GROUP IN LIMIT light for Control Rod Group 4 will be __(1)__.
- 2) In accordance with AP/01, the operator __(2)__ change the rate of power reduction during the runback.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
A.
- 1. ON
- 2. can B.
- 1. ON
- 2. can NOT C.
- 1. OFF
- 2. can D.
- 1. OFF
- 2. can NOT Page 59 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 60 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station The power supply for 1NI-2 Wide Range detector is _______.
A.
KVIA B.
KVIB C.
KVIC D.
KVID Page 60 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 61 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station RB Purge isolation valves 3PR-1, 3PR-2, 3PR-3, 3PR-4, 3PR-5, and 3PR-6 will ALL receive automatic close signals as a result of ______.
A.
3RIA-45 HIGH alarm B.
3RIA-46 HIGH alarm C.
actuation of ES channels 1 and 2 D.
actuation of ES channels 5 and 6 Page 61 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 62 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions:
Reactor in MODE 6 Fuel Transfer Canal is full B Spent Fuel Cooling Pump aligned to Refueling Cooling Mode in accordance with OP/1/A/1102/015 (Filling and Draining FTC)
The B Spent Fuel Cooling Pump
- 1) suction will be from the __(1)__.
- 2) discharge will be to the __(2)__.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
A.
- 1. Decay Heat Drop Line
- 2. Spent Fuel Pool B.
- 1. Decay Heat Drop Line
- 2. Core Flood Nozzles C.
- 1. Spent Fuel Transfer Tube
- 2. Spent Fuel Pool D.
- 1. Spent Fuel Transfer Tube
- 2. Core Flood Nozzles Page 62 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 63 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following on Unit 1:
Initial conditions:
Reactor power = 100%
Current conditions:
Condenser vacuum = 21 inches Hg stable 1TA and 1TB de-energized With no operator actions, SG levels will be automatically controlled at ______.
Which ONE of the following completes the statement above?
A.
25 inches SUR B.
30 inches XSUR C.
50% OR D.
95% OR Page 63 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 64 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 2 conditions:
Initial conditions:
Reactor power = 100%
Current conditions:
Reactor trip Trip Confirm signal NOT generated by the Diamond
- 1) The Turbine Load Status Flag is __(1)__.
- 2) The Turbine Bypass valves will control at __(2)__.
A.
- 1. false
- 2. setpoint B.
- 1. false
- 2. setpoint + 125 psig C.
- 1. true
- 2. setpoint D.
- 1. true
- 2. setpoint + 125 psig Page 64 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 65 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 2 conditions:
Reactor shutdown from 100% in progress Main Turbine bearing oil leak occurs Reactor power = 28% stable
- 1) Based on the graph above, the EARLIEST time the Main Turbine will automatically trip is __(1)__.
- 2) After the Main Turbine has tripped, ICS will maintain Tave at approximately
__(2)__ degrees F.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
REFERENCE PROVIDED (above)
A.
- 1. 12:01
- 2. 579 B.
- 1. 12:01
- 2. 555 C.
- 1. 12:03
- 2. 579 D.
- 1. 12:03
- 2. 555 Page 65 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 66 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station In accordance with OP/1/A/1102/020 Encl. 4.4, Section 4 (Off-Going Plant Status Checklist)
- 1) The EARLIEST time Section 4 (Off-Going Plant Status Checklist) is allowed to be completed is within the last __(1)__ of shift.
- 2) if False is indicated for any status check performed, ensure specific condition is recorded on (in) the __(2)__.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
A.
- 1. hour
- 2. Turnover Sheet B.
- 1. hour
- 2. Narrative Log C.
- 1. 30 minutes
- 2. Turnover Sheet D.
- 1. 30 minutes
- 2. Narrative Log Page 66 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 67 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following on Unit 1.
Initial conditions:
Mode 6 Defueling in progress 1RIA-6 (Spent Fuel Pool Area Monitor) = 4 mr/hr stable Current conditions:
1RIA-6 monitor power supply fuse blows 1RIA-6 local reading = 0 mr/hr 1RIA-6 View Node indication is magenta In accordance with OP/1/A/1502/007 (Operations Defueling/Refueling Responsibilities), Fuel Handling activities in the SFP can ______.
Which ONE of the following completes the statement above?
A.
continue provided 1RIA-41 (SFP Gas) is operable B.
continue because only the SFP Bridge area monitor is required C.
NOT continue until a replacement portable area radiation monitor with alarm capability is in use D.
NOT continue until SFP boron concentration re-sampled and SFP level re-verified and both parameters are within requirements Page 67 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 68 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions:
Initial conditions:
Reactor power = 100%
Current conditions:
Blackout in progress An RO has initiated AP/0/A/1700/025 (Standby Shutdown Facility Emergency Operating Procedure)
Breaker transfer in the SSF is complete
- 1) In accordance with AP/25, the SSF RO __(1)__ required to initiate feed with the SSF Aux Service Water pump.
- 2) If required, 1RC-4 will be closed by __(2)__.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
A.
- 1. is NOT
- 2. directing the RO in the SSF control room B.
- 1. is NOT
- 2. using the switch in the Unit 1 control room C.
- 1. is
- 2. directing the RO in the SSF control room D.
- 1. is
- 2. using the switch in the Unit 1 control room Page 68 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 69 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station When establishing the Alternate Post-LOCA Boron Dilution flow alignment, the appropriate LOCA CD tab would direct opening
- 1) valve LP-105 on __(1)__.
- 2) valve LP-19 on __(2)__.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
A.
- 1. Unit 1 ONLY
- 2. Unit 1 ONLY B.
- 1. Units 2 and 3 ONLY
- 2. Unit 1 ONLY C.
- 1. Unit 1 ONLY
- 2. Units 2 and 3 ONLY D.
- 1. Units 2 and 3 ONLY
- 2. Units 2 and 3 ONLY Page 69 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 70 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions:
Initial conditions:
Reactor power = 100%
1SA-15/A-2 (SU Source Volt Monitor Logic Test) actuated Current conditions:
I&E determines the alarm actuated due to a defective alarm relay Repairs will take 3 - 4 days The CRS directs you to remove the nuisance alarm from service In accordance with OP/0/A/1108/001 Encl. 4.17 (Evaluation for Removal of Statalarms/Control Room Indications)
- 1) Statalarm 1SA-15/A-2 is required to be added to the __(1)__ section of the Unit Turnover Sheet.
- 2) A CBWO or __(2)__ label is required to be placed on the statalarm window.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
A.
- 1. Out of Normal Alarms
- 2. T/O Sheet B.
- 1. Out of Normal Alarms
- 2. OOS/I&E C.
- 1. Equipment Deficiencies
- 2. T/O Sheet D.
- 1. Equipment Deficiencies
- 2. OOS/I&E Page 70 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 71 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station
- 1) In accordance with AD-OP-ALL-0112 (Operations Log Keeping and Chart Recorders), completion of Infrequently Performed Test or Evolution (IPTE) briefs and activities __(1)__ required to be recorded in the Narrative Log.
- 2) In accordance with AD-OP-ALL-0106 (Conduct of Infrequently Performed Tests or Evolutions) (IPTE), lowered RCS inventory __(2)__ considered an Infrequently Performed Test or Evolution.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
A.
- 1. are NOT
- 2. is B.
- 1. are
- 2. is C.
- 1. are NOT
- 2. is NOT D.
- 1. are
- 2. is NOT Page 71 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 72 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station An RWP that you are preparing to work under states the highest dose rate in a particular area (at 30 cm) is 325 mR/hr. As you travel to the work site, a flashing blue light is noted in the entry path to the area.
- 1) The RWP will designate the area as a __(1)__.
- 2) The flashing blue light __(2)__ indicate a radiography boundary.
A.
- 2. does B.
- 1. Radiation Area
- 2. does C.
- 2. does NOT D.
- 1. Radiation Area
- 2. does NOT Page 72 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 73 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions:
Reactor power = 100%
Which ONE of the following would require entry into the EOP?
A.
Reactor power rises to 102%
B.
One CRDM stator temperature rises to 185°F C.
Reactor Coolant System pressure rises to 2360 psig D.
Reactor Coolant System leakage in the RB of 55 gpm Page 73 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 74 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions:
Reactor power = 100%
1SA-3/B6 (FIRE ALARM) actuated Fire Alarm panel indication o point 0202071 (Unit 1 pipe trench room 348 North End) actuated o point 0202072 (Unit 1 pipe trench room 348 East Side) actuated AP/0/A/1700/043 (Fire Brigade Response Procedure) is in progress
- 1) MERT will be dispatched to the area __(1)__.
- 2) In accordance with AP/0/A/1700/043, if water is to be used for extinguishing the fire, a transformer mulsifyre is activated or a fire hydrant is opened to __(2)__.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
A.
- 1. ONLY after the fire is confirmed
- 2. ensure HPSW pump minimum flow requirements are met B.
- 1. ONLY after the fire is confirmed
- 2. mitigate the pressure surge from any water hammer event that occurs upon HPSW pump start C.
- 1. at the same time as the fire brigade
- 2. ensure HPSW pump minimum flow requirements are met D.
- 1. at the same time as the fire brigade
- 2. mitigate the pressure surge from any water hammer event that occurs upon HPSW pump start Page 74 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 75 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 2 conditions:
Initial conditions:
Reactor power = 100%
Current conditions:
Control Room being evacuated due to chemical spill The CRS has implemented AP/2/A/1700/008 (Loss of Control Room)
In accordance with AP/08,
- 1) The RO is dispatched to the __(1)__.
- 2) RCS pressure will be controlled utilizing Pzr heater Bank 2 Groups __(2)__.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
A.
- 1. Standby Shutdown Facility
- 2. B and C B.
- 1. Standby Shutdown Facility
- 2. B and D C.
- 1. Unit 2 Auxiliary Shutdown Panel
- 2. B and C D.
- 1. Unit 2 Auxiliary Shutdown Panel
- 2. B and D Page 75 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 76 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions:
Time = 0400:
Reactor power = 80%
ES Channels 1 - 8 actuated Core SCM = 0ºF EOP Enclosure 5.1 (ES Actuation) in progress Seal Inlet HDR Flow = 25 gpm HPI Flow Train A flow = 456 gpm HPI Flow Train B flow = 482 gpm
- 1) The 1A HPI header __(1)__ exceeding the HPI pump flow limits in accordance with Rule 6 (HPI Pump Throttling Limits).
- 2) TS 3.5.2 (HPI) Bases states that a MINIMUM of __(2)__ HPI train(s) is/are required to mitigate cold leg breaks located on the discharge of the Reactor Coolant pumps.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
A.
- 1. is
- 2. two B.
- 1. is
- 2. one C.
- 1. is NOT
- 2. two D.
- 1. is NOT
- 2. one Page 76 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 77 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions:
Time = 1000:
Mode 6 LPI aligned in Normal Decay Heat Removal mode 1A and 1B SGs in wet layup Fuel Transfer Canal flooded 1B LPI pump OOS Time = 1030:
The running LPI pump tripped and NO LPI pump can be started
- 1) At Time = 1000, OP/1/A/1104/004 (Low Pressure Injection System) directs operation of the __(1)__ LPI pump.
- 2) At Time = 1030, the CRS is required to initiate AP/1/A/1700/026 (Loss of Decay Heat Removal) Enclosure __(2)__ for heat removal.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
A.
- 1. 1A
- 2. 5.7 (DHR Using SF Cooling)
B.
- 1. 1A
- 2. 5.18 (SSF Operation for Loss of DHR Events)
C.
- 1. 1C
- 2. 5.7 (DHR Using SF Cooling)
D.
- 1. 1C
- 2. 5.18 (SSF Operation for Loss of DHR Events)
Page 77 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 78 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following on Unit 2:
Initial conditions:
Reactor power = 100%
OAC ALARM, (2MS-93 Backup Nitrogen Press 1 LO-LO) is in alarm In-service Nitrogen bottle pressure for 2MS-93 (TD EFDWP STEAM SUPPLY TRIP VALVE) is 550 psig stable Current conditions:
MSLB occurs on 2A SG inside containment
- 1) The LCO for TS 3.3.13, (Automatic Feedwater Isolation System (AFIS)) Digital Channels __(1)__ being met.
for MSLBs inside containment.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
A.
- 1. is
- 2. an inadvertent return to criticality B.
- 1. is
- 2. exceeding containment design pressure C.
- 1. is NOT
- 2. an inadvertent return to criticality D.
- 1. is NOT
- 2. exceeding containment design pressure Page 78 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 79 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions:
Initial conditions:
Both Main FDW pumps trip from 100% power Current conditions:
Approximately 30 minutes after the above event, the STA informs the SM that the only reportable criteria for Non-Emergency 10 CFR 50.72 notification to the NRC is a 4-hour report.
- 1) In accordance with the Emergency Feedwater (EFW) Design Basis Document (DBD), in order to mitigate the given event each motor driven emergency feedwater pump shall be capable of delivering at least __(1)__ gpm at or below 130°F to any single steam generator that is at a pressure of 1064 psia or below.
- 2) In addition to the 4-hour reportable criteria, 8-hour Non-Emergency 10 CFR 50.72 criteria __(2)__ required to be reported to the NRC for this event.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
REFERENCE PROVIDED A.
- 1. 375
- 2. is B.
- 1. 375
- 2. is NOT C.
- 1. 575
- 2. is D.
- 1. 575
- 2. is NOT Page 79 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 80 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following plant conditions:
Time = 0800:00:
ACB-3 Closed A LOOP (Switchyard Isolation) occurs Unit 1 Reactor trips from 100% power Unit 2 Reactor power = 20% stable Unit 2 auxiliaries supplied from 2T Transformer
- 1) At Time = 0800:10, __(1)__ volts will be indicated on CX Transformer voltmeter (TRANS NO. CX AC VOLTS) on CB3 in Keowee Control Room.
- 2) In accordance with TS 3.8.1 (AC Sources - Operating) Bases, Keowee Hydro is required to be able to provide sufficient power within __(2)__ seconds after an emergency start initiate signal.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
A.
- 1. 600
- 2. 23 B.
- 1. 600
- 2. 33 C.
- 1. 0
- 2. 23 D.
- 1. 0
- 2. 33 Page 80 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 81 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions:
Time = 0400:
Reactor power = 100%
2SA-18/A-11, (TURBINE BSMT WATER LEVEL EMERGENCY HIGH) actuated AP/1/A/1700/010, (Turbine Building flood) initiated Time = 0430:
ALL CBPs, Main, and Emergency FDW pumps have tripped Protected Service Water (PSW) is NOT available
- 1) At Time = 0430, the CRS __(1)__ required to transfer to the LOHT tab.
- 2) The next method that is required to be used to remove decay heat is __(2)__.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
A.
- 1. is NOT
- 2. initiation of HPI Forced Cooling B.
- 1. is NOT
- 2. feeding with the SSF ASW pump C.
- 1. is
- 2. initiation of HPI Forced Cooling D.
- 1. is
- 2. feeding with the SSF ASW pump Page 81 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 82 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following on Unit 1:
Reactor startup is in progress Reactor in MODE 3 1FDW-104 (1B SG Shell Drain Block) is declared INOPERABLE and is closed and deactivated to satisfy TS 3.6.3 (Containment Isolation Valves) Condition A
- 1) The Unit 1 startup __(1)__ continue into MODE 2.
- 2) If administrative controls are established to open 1FDW-104, the time that it is allowed to be open __(2)__ limited to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
REFERENCE PROVIDED A.
- 1. can
- 2. is B.
- 1. can NOT
- 2. is C.
- 1. can
- 2. is NOT D.
- 1. can NOT
- 2. is NOT Page 82 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 83 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions:
Time = 1200:
Reactor power = 100%
Pressurizer temperature indicates as shown below Which ONE of the following describes ALL Tech Spec 3.3.8 (PAM Instrumentation)
Condition(s) that apply (if any) at Time = 1200?
REFERENCE PROVIDED A.
NO Tech Spec 3.3.8 Condition applies B.
Condition A ONLY C.
Condition A, C, and H D.
Condition A and C ONLY Page 83 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 84 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions:
Time = 0800:
Reactor trip from 100% power Excessive Heat Transfer on 1A SG Rule 5 (Main Steam Line Break) initiated ALL SCMs = 0°F RCPs secured in accordance with Rule 2 (Loss of SCM)
Following initial entry into Subsequent Actions (SA), the procedural flowpath required for event mitigation is ______.
Which ONE of the following completes the statement above?
A.
EHT, FCD, LOSCM B.
LOSCM, EHT, SA C.
LOSCM, EHT, FCD D.
EHT, LOSCM, LOCA CD Page 84 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 85 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 3 conditions:
Time = 0800:
Reactor power = 100%
SBLOCA occurs MANUAL Reactor Trip initiated Time = 0802:
CRS enters the EOP LOSCM tab Time = 0814:
The SM declares an ALERT based on plant conditions
- 1) In accordance with AD-EP-ALL-0105 (Activation and Operation of the Technical Support Center), the LATEST time that TSC activation is required to be completed is __(1)__.
- 2) The LATEST time allowed to notify the NRC per AD-EP-ALL-0111, (Control Room Activation of the ERO) is __(2)__.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
A.
- 1. 0929
- 2. 0914 B.
- 1. 0929
- 2. 0829 C.
- 1. 0914
- 2. 0914 D.
- 1. 0914
- 2. 0829 Page 85 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 86 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions:
Time = 0800:
Reactor in MODE 3 1A2 and 1B2 RCPs operating Time = 0805:
All SCMs = 25°F stable 1A2 RCP Motor Upper Guide Bearing temperature = 195°F slowly rising 1B2 RCP Motor Stator Temperature = 255°F slowly rising Time = 0810:
RCS leakage = 190 gpm stable The operating RCP trips
- 1) At time = 0805, AP/1/A/1700/016 (Abnormal Reactor Coolant Pump Operation) will direct tripping the __(1)__ RCP.
- 2) At time = 0810, the SRO is required to direct plant shutdown actions in accordance with the __(2)__ Cooldown tab of the EOP.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
A.
- 1. 1B2
- 2. LOCA B.
- 1. 1B2
- 2. Forced C.
- 1. 1A2
- 2. LOCA D.
- 1. 1A2
- 2. Forced Page 86 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 87 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions:
Initial conditions:
Reactor power = 100%
Current conditions:
Core SCM = 0°F Rule 2 (Loss of SCM) is in progress 1HP-24 and 1HP-25 fail closed RCS pressure = 890 psig lowering RB pressure = 2.1 psig rising
- 1) In accordance with Rule 2, when the step to align LPI in piggyback is complete, there will be __(1)__ LPI pump(s) operating.
- 2) In accordance with TS Bases, 1LP-15 and 1LP-16 __(2)__ subject to TS 3.5.2 High Pressure Injection (HPI).
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
A.
- 1. one
- 2. are B.
- 1. one
- 2. are NOT C.
- 1. two
- 2. are D.
- 1. two
- 2. are NOT Page 87 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 88 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions:
Initial conditions:
Reactor power = 100%
I&E performing Reactor Protective System (RPS) calibration procedure Current conditions:
The RCS Low Pressure trip setpoint is determined to be 1804 psig in 1A and 1B RPS Channels
- 1) Per Alarm Response Guide 1SA-1/A-2 (1A LO PRESS TRIP), the actual RPS trip setpoint for RCS Low Pressure should be __(1)__ psig.
- 2) In accordance with the bases of Tech Spec 3.3.1 (Reactor Protective System (RPS) Instrumentation), the 1A and 1B RCS Low Pressure Trip Functions are
__(2)__.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
A.
- 1. 1810
- 2. operable B.
- 1. 1810
- 2. inoperable C.
- 1. 1800
- 2. operable D.
- 1. 1800
- 2. inoperable Page 88 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 89 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 3 plant conditions:
Reactor power = 100%
3XS3 de-energizes
- 1) Which ONE of the following would require immediate entry into LCO 3.0.3?
- 2) Upon entering LCO 3.0.3, the Bases states that the actual lowering of power
__(2)__ required to begin within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of LCO 3.0.3 entry.
A.
- 1. 3A RBS Pump declared inoperable
- 2. is B.
- 1. 3A RBS Pump declared inoperable
- 2. is NOT C.
- 1. 3C RBCU declared inoperable
- 2. is D.
- 1. 3C RBCU declared inoperable
- 2. is NOT Page 89 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 90 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following on Unit 1:
Initial conditions:
Reactor power = 100%
Current conditions:
LBLOCA occurs ES 1 - 8 actuated LOSCM tab in progress BOTH LPI trains in service
- 1) Based on the given conditions, in accordance with the LOSCM tab the MINIMUM LPI flow that requires the CRS to transfer to the LOCA Cooldown tab is __(1)__
gpm.
- 2) In accordance with TS 3.5.3 Low Pressure Injection (LPI) Bases, the safety grade flow indicator of an LPI Train __(2)__ required to support OPERABILITY of an RBS train.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
A.
- 1. 2900
- 2. is NOT B.
- 1. 2900
- 2. is C.
- 1. 3400
- 2. is NOT D.
- 1. 3400
- 2. is Page 90 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 91 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 2 conditions:
Mode 6 Defueling in progress Main Fuel Bridge is withdrawing a fuel assembly that is binding
- 1) In order to bypass the automatic stop in hoist upward movement, __(1)__ is required to be utilized on the Main Fuel Bridge.
- 2) In accordance with MP/0/A/1500/029 Enclosure 9.7 (Bypassing Rx Bridge Interlocks), authorization is required to be obtained from __(2)__ prior to bypassing the above interlock.
Options for (2) above:
A. Refueling SRO B. Reactor Engineer C. Fuel Handling Supervisor D. Fuel Handling Equipment Engineer Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
A.
- 1. Overload Bypass TS-1
- 2. A and C ONLY B.
- 1. Overload Bypass TS-1
- 2. A, B, C, and D C.
- 1. Hoist Interlock Bypass TS-2
- 2. A and C ONLY D.
- 1. Hoist Interlock Bypass TS-2
- 2. A, B, C, and D Page 91 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 92 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station
`
Given the following Unit 1 conditions:
Initial conditions:
Unit 1 TDEFDW pump is out of service A lightning strike in the switchyard causes a reactor trip Incorrect wiring in 4160v relays causes a slow transfer of power to CT-1 Transformer Rule 3 (Loss of Main or Emergency FDW) is in progress Current conditions:
Both MD EFDW pumps fail LOHT tab initiated ALL SCMs > 0°F
- 1) Condensate Booster Pump feed __(1)__ required to be established.
- 2) IF RCS temperature subsequently rises and results in core SCM = 0°F, the CRS is required to __(2)__.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
A.
- 1. is
- 2. remain in the LOHT tab B.
- 1. is
- 2. transfer to the LOSCM tab C.
- 1. is NOT
- 2. remain in the LOHT tab D.
- 1. is NOT
- 2. transfer to the LOSCM tab Page 92 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 93 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following on Unit 3:
Initial conditions:
Reactor power = 90% stable for fuel conditioning Routine liquid waste release in progress from Turbine Building Sump (TBS)
Spurious electrical transient causes a 3RIA-54 (TBS) HIGH alarm SRO declares 3RIA-54 NON-FUNCTIONAL 3RIA-54 is removed from service and tagged out Instrument vendor notifies site that it will take 60 - 90 days to send repair parts due to instrument obsolescence Current conditions:
It has been 45 days since 3RIA-54 was declared NON-FUNCTIONAL
- 1) 3RIA-54 in HIGH alarm __(1)__ cause automatic actions.
- 2) Based on the current conditions, if SLC 16.11.3 (Radioactive Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation) REQUIRED ACTION F.2 is satisfied, liquid waste releases from the Unit 3 TBS __(2)__ allowed.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
REFERENCE PROVIDED A.
- 1. does
- 2. are B.
- 1. does
- 2. are NOT C.
- 1. does NOT
- 2. are D.
- 1. does NOT
- 2. are NOT Page 93 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 94 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 3 conditions:
Unit 3 Reactor power = 100%
Main Turbine Bearing #7 temperature is suspect due to thermocouple failure Repair parts will be available in 30 days Engineering has provided Operations with guidance on additional monitoring for Bearing #7 In accordance with AD-OP-ALL-0111 (Operations Communications)
- 1) the additional monitoring requirements for Bearing #7 will be contained in a/an
__(1)__.
- 2) The LOWEST level of management that can approve Standing Instructions and Operations Supplemental Information Packages (OSIP) is the __(2)__ Manager.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
A.
- 1. Standing Instruction
- 2. Shift B.
- 1. Standing Instruction
- 2. OPS C.
- 1. Operations Supplemental Information Package (OSIP)
- 2. Shift D.
- 1. Operations Supplemental Information Package (OSIP)
- 2. OPS Page 94 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 95 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station
- 1) In accordance with TS 3.9.4 (DHR and Coolant Circulation-High Water Level), the required DHR loop may not be in operation for a MAXIMUM of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> per __(1)__
hour period, provided no operations are permitted that would cause reduction of the Reactor Coolant System boron concentration.
Bases, ECCW __(2)__ required to support the DHR train.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
A.
- 1. 12
- 2. is NOT B.
- 1. 12
- 2. is C.
- 1. 8
- 2. is NOT D.
- 1. 8
- 2. is Page 95 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 96 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 3 conditions:
Reactor power = 100%
Maintenance personnel preparing to perform EMERGENT work encounter a sign stating Single Point Vulnerability (Trip Sensitive Components). They stop and notify the WCC SRO.
In accordance with AD-OP-ALL-0201 (Protected Equipment), EMERGENT work on or within 2 feet of SPVs is required to be approved by the ______.
A.
Shift Manager ONLY C.
WCC SRO and Site Duty Manager D.
Shift Manager and Site Duty Manager Page 96 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 97 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station In accordance with IP/0/A/0100/001 (Controlling Procedure for Troubleshooting and Maintenance Activities)
- 1) the position designated to determine whether a Troubleshooting Plan is LOW or HIGH risk is __(1)__.
- 2) the LOWEST level of operations approval for a High Risk Troubleshooting Action Plan is the __(2)__.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
A.
- 1. Shift Manager
- 2. Unit SRO B.
- 1. Shift Manager
- 2. Shift Manager C.
- 1. Unit/WCC SRO
- 2. Unit SRO D.
- 1. Unit/WCC SRO
- 2. Shift Manager Page 97 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 98 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 3 conditions:
Fuel offload in progress A fuel cask has been dropped in the spent fuel pool causing fuel damage 3RIA-6 (Spent Fuel Pool Area Monitor) reaches the High Alarm setpoint
- 1) 3RIA-6 __(1)__ sound a local alarm.
- 2) The correct Emergency classification for this event is an __(2)__.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
DO NOT USE EMERGENCY COORDINATOR JUDGEMENT AS THE BASIS FOR EAL DETERMINATION REFERENCE PROVIDED A.
- 1. does
- 2. Alert B.
- 1. does
- 2. Unusual Event C.
- 1. does NOT
- 2. Alert D.
- 1. does NOT
- 2. Unusual Event Page 98 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 99 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following Unit 1 conditions:
The CRS enters an Abnormal Procedure (AP)
In accordance with AD-OP-ONS-0002 (Oconee Specific Abnormal Operations Guidance)
- 1) the Procedure Director (PD) __(1)__ allowed to announce plant conditions on the P.A. system if resources are not available and another SRO is observing the crew.
- 2) All CAUTION statements for AP steps __(2)__ required to be read verbatim by the CRS with acknowledgement received from the Reactor Operators indicating the CAUTION statement is understood.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
A.
- 1. is
- 2. are B.
- 1. is
- 2. are NOT C.
- 1. is NOT
- 2. are D.
- 1. is NOT
- 2. are NOT Page 99 of 100
Question:
(1 point) 100 ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Oconee Nuclear Station Given the following conditions:
Time = 1300:
A General Emergency has been declared The first Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) is being issued The 15-minute average Wind Direction on 60M Tower (OAC) indicates 270 degrees (1) In accordance with AD-EP-ALL-0111 (Control Room Activation of the ERO), the SM/Emergency Coordinator's responsibility of approving Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) __(1)__ be delegated.
(2) The general location of the sector(s) to be evacuated 2 - 5 miles downwind is
__(2)__ of ONS.
Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?
A.
- 1. can
- 2. West B.
- 1. can
- 2. East C.
- 1. can NOT
- 2. West D.
- 1. can NOT
- 2. East Page 100 of 100
Containment Isolation Valves 3.6.3 OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 3.6.3-1 Amendment Nos. 300, 300, & 300 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.3 Containment Isolation Valves LCO 3.6.3 Each containment isolation valve shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
ACTIONS
NOTES------------------------------------------------------
- 1.
Penetration flow paths except for 48 inch purge valve penetration flow paths may be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls.
- 2.
Separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path.
- 3.
Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions for system(s) made inoperable by containment isolation valves.
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.
NOTE------------
Only applicable to penetration flow paths with two containment isolation valves.
One or more penetration flow paths with one containment isolation valve inoperable.
A.1 Isolate the affected penetration flow path by use of at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve, one closed and de-activated non-automatic power operated valve, closed manual valve, blind flange, or check valve with flow through the valve secured.
AND 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> (continued)
Containment Isolation Valves 3.6.3 ACTIONS OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 3.6.3-2 Amendment Nos. 300, 300, & 300 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.
(continued)
A.2
NOTE-----------
Isolation devices in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means.
Verify the affected penetration flow path is isolated.
Once per 31 days for isolation devices outside containment AND Prior to entering MODE 4 from MODE 5 if not performed within the previous 92 days for isolation devices inside containment B.
NOTE------------
Only applicable to penetration flow paths with two containment isolation valves.
One or more penetration flow paths with two containment isolation valves inoperable.
B.1 Isolate the affected penetration flow path by use of at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve, one closed and de-activated non-automatic power operated valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange.
1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> (continued)
Containment Isolation Valves 3.6.3 ACTIONS (continued)
OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 3.6.3-3 Amendment Nos. 300, 300, & 300 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C.
NOTE-----------
Only applicable to penetration flow paths with only one containment isolation valve and a closed system.
One or more penetration flow paths with one containment isolation valve inoperable.
C.1 Isolate the affected penetration flow path by use of at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve, one closed and de-activated non-automatic power operated valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange.
AND C.2
NOTE------------
Isolation devices in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means.
Verify the affected penetration flow path is isolated.
4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Once per 31 days D.
Required Action and associated Completion Time not met.
D.1 Be in MODE 3.
AND D.2 Be in MODE 5.
12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> 36 hours
Containment Isolation Valves 3.6.3 OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 3.6.3-4 Amendment Nos. 372, 374, 373 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.3.1 Verify each 48 inch purge valve is sealed closed.
In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.3.2
NOTE--------------------------
Valves and blind flanges in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means.
Verify each containment isolation manual and non-automatic power operated valve and blind flange that is located outside containment and not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured and required to be closed during accident conditions is closed, except for containment isolation valves that are open under administrative controls.
In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.3.3
NOTE--------------------------
Valves and blind flanges in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means.
Verify each containment isolation manual and non-automatic power operated valve and blind flange that is located inside containment and not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured and required to be closed during accident conditions is closed, except for containment isolation valves that are open under administrative controls.
Prior to entering MODE 4 from MODE 5 if not performed within the previous 92 days (continued)
Containment Isolation Valves 3.6.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 3.6.3-5 Amendment Nos. 409, 411 & 410 SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.3.4 Verify the isolation time of each automatic power operated containment isolation valve is within limits.
In accordance with the INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAM SR 3.6.3.5 Verify each automatic containment isolation valve that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, actuates to the isolation position on an actual or simulated actuation signal.
In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program
PAM Instrumentation 3.3.8 OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 3.3.8-1 Amendment Nos. 350, 352, & 351 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.8 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation LCO 3.3.8 The PAM instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.8-1 shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2, and 3.
ACTIONS
NOTES---------------------------------------------------
- 1.
LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable.
- 2.
Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.
NOTE-----------
Not applicable to Functions 14, 18, 19, and 22.
One or more Functions with one required channel inoperable.
A.1 Restore required channel to OPERABLE status.
30 days B.
Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met.
B.1 Initiate action in accordance with Specification 5.6.6.
Immediately (continued)
PAM Instrumentation 3.3.8 ACTIONS (continued)
OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 3.3.8-2 Amendment Nos. 350, 352, & 351 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C.
NOTE-----------
Not applicable to Functions 14, 18, 19, and 22.
One or more Functions with two required channels inoperable.
C.1 Restore one channel to OPERABLE status.
7 days D.
Not Used D.1 Not Used Not Used E.
NOTE-----------
Only applicable to Function 14.
One required channel inoperable.
E.1 Restore required channel to OPERABLE status.
24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> (continued)
PAM Instrumentation 3.3.8 ACTIONS (continued)
OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 3.3.8-3 Amendment Nos. 350, 352, & 351 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME F.
NOTE-----------
Only applicable to Functions 18, 19, and
- 22.
One or more Functions with required channel inoperable.
F.1 Declare the affected train inoperable.
Immediately G.
Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition C or E not met.
G.1 Enter the Condition referenced in Table 3.3.8-1 for the channel.
Immediately H.
As required by Required Action G.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.8-1.
H.1 Be in MODE 3.
AND H.2 Be in MODE 4.
12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> 18 hours I.
As required by Required Action G.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.8-1.
I.1 Initiate action in accordance with Specification 5.6.6.
Immediately
PAM Instrumentation 3.3.8 OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 3.3.8-4 Amendment Nos. 372, 374, 373 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
NOTE---------------------------------------------------------
These SRs apply to each PAM instrumentation Function in Table 3.3.8-1 except where indicated.
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.8.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK for each required instrumentation channel that is normally energized.
In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.8.2
NOTE-------------------------
Only applicable to PAM Functions 7 and 22.
Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.8.3
NOTES------------------------
- 1.
Neutron detectors are excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
- 2.
Not applicable to PAM Functions 7 and
- 22.
Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program
PAM Instrumentation 3.3.8 OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 3.3.8-5 Amendment Nos. 350, 352, & 351 Table 3.3.8-1 (page 1 of 1)
Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation FUNCTION REQUIRED CHANNELS CONDITIONS REFERENCED FROM REQUIRED ACTION G.1
- 1.
Wide Range Neutron Flux 2
H
- 2.
RCS Hot Leg Temperature 2
H
- 3.
RCS Hot Leg Level 2
I
- 4.
RCS Pressure (Wide Range) 2 H
- 5.
Reactor Vessel Head Level 2
I
- 6.
Containment Sump Water Level (Wide Range) 2 H
- 7.
Containment Pressure (Wide Range) 2 H
- 8.
Containment Isolation Valve Position 2 per penetration flow path(a)(b)(c)
H
- 9.
Containment Area Radiation (High Range) 2 I
- 10.
Not Used
- 11.
Pressurizer Level 2
H
- 12.
Steam Generator Water Level 2 per SG H
- 13.
Steam Generator Pressure
- 14.
Borated Water Storage Tank Water Level
- 15.
Upper Surge Tank Level 2 per SG 2
2 H
H H
- 16.
Core Exit Temperature 2 independent sets of 5(d)
H
- 17.
Subcooling Monitor
- 18.
HPI System Flow
- 19.
LPI System Flow
- 20.
Not used
- 21.
Emergency Feedwater Flow
- 22.
Low Pressure Service Water Flow to LPI Coolers 2
1 per train 1 per train 2 per SG 1 per train H
NA NA H
NA (a)
Not required for isolation valves whose associated penetration is isolated by at least one closed and deactivated automatic valve, closed manual valve, blind flange, or check valve with flow through the valve secured.
(b)
Only one position indication channel is required for penetration flow paths with only one installed control room indication channel.
(c)
Position indication requirements apply only to containment isolation valves that are electrically controlled.
(d)
The subcooling margin monitor takes the average of the five highest CETs for each of the ICCM trains.
Prepared for Duke Energy by: Operations Support Services, Inc. - www.ossi-net.com (1/28/16)
Modes:
1 Power Operations No Mode NM 2
Startup 5
Cold Shutdown 3
Hot Standby 4
Hot Shutdown Oconee Nuclear Station Classification of Emergency CSD-EP-ONS-0101-02 Rev 000 Irradiated Fuel Event RU1.1 Sample analysis for a gaseous or liquid release indicates a concentration or release rate > 2 x SLC/TS limits for 60 min. (Notes 1, 2)
RU1.2 Reading on any Table R-1 effluent radiation monitor
> column UE for 60 min. (Notes 1, 2, 3)
RA1.1 Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses
> 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY (Note 4)
RS1.1 Reading on any Table R-1 effluent radiation monitor > column SAE for 15 min. (Notes 1, 2, 3, 4)
RS1.2 Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses
> 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY (Note 4)
RA1.2 Reading on any Table R-1 effluent radiation monitor
> column ALERT for 15 min. (Notes 1, 2, 3, 4)
RA1.3 Analysis of a liquid effluent sample indicates a concentration or release rate that would result in doses > 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY for 60 min. of exposure (Notes 1, 2)
RU2.1 UNPLANNED water level drop in the REFUELING PATHWAY as indicated by low water level alarm or indication AND UNPLANNED rise in corresponding area radiation levels as indicated by any of the following radiation monitors:
- RIA-3 RB Refueling Deck Shield Wall
- RIA-6 Spent Fuel Building Wall
- Portable area monitors on the main bridge or SFP bridge RA2.2 Damage to irradiated fuel resulting in a release of radioactivity AND HIGH alarm on any of the following radiation monitors:
- RIA-3 RB Refueling Deck Shield Wall
- RIA-6 Spent Fuel Building Wall
- RIA-41 Spent Fuel Pool Gas
- RIA-49 RB Gas
- Portable area monitors on the main bridge or SFP bridge RA3.1 Dose rates > 15 mR/hr in EITHER of the following areas:
- Control Room (RIA-1)
- Central Alarm Station (by survey)
Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity greater than 2 times the SLC/TS limits for 60 minutes or longer Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE Release of gaseous radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem thyroid CDE Release of gaseous radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 1,000 mrem TEDE or 5,000 mrem thyroid CDE Unplanned loss of water level above irradiated fuel Significant lowering of water level above, or damage to, irradiated fuel RA2.1 Uncovery of irradiated fuel in the REFUELING PATHWAY Radiation levels that IMPEDE access to equipment necessary for normal plant operations, cooldown or shutdown RS1.3 Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY:
- Closed window dose rates > 100 mR/hr expected to continue for 60 min.
- Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE
> 500 mrem for 60 min. of inhalation.
(Notes 1, 2)
Abnorm.
Rad Levels
/ Rad Effluent R
GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT 2
Rad Effluent 1
None None None None HS1.1 A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the PROTECTED AREA as reported by the Security Shift Supervision HA1.1 HU2.1 HU4.1 A FIRE is not extinguished within 15 min. of any of the following FIRE detection indications (Note 1):
- Report from the field (i.e., visual observation)
- Receipt of multiple (more than 1) fire alarms or indications
- Field verification of a single fire alarm AND The FIRE is located within any Table H-1 area HA5.1 Release of a toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable gas into any Table H-2 rooms or areas AND Entry into the room or area is prohibited or IMPEDED (Note 5)
Seismic event greater than OBE levels HU4.2 Receipt of a single fire alarm (i.e., no other indications of a FIRE)
AND The fire alarm is indicating a FIRE within any Table H-1 area AND The existence of a FIRE is not verified within 30 min. of alarm receipt (Note 1)
HU3.2 Internal room or area FLOODING of a magnitude sufficient to require manual or automatic electrical isolation of a SAFETY SYSTEM component needed for the current operating mode FIRE potentially degrading the level of safety of the plant Gaseous release IMPEDING access to equipment necessary for normal plant operations, cooldown or shutdown Confirmed SECURITY CONDITION or threat HOSTILE ACTION within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA or airborne attack threat within 30 minutes HOSTILE ACTION within the PROTECTED AREA HU7.1 Other conditions existing that in the judgment of the Site Emergency Coordinator warrant declaration of a UE Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant or indicate a security threat to facility protection has been initiated. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of SAFETY SYSTEMS occurs.
An event has resulted in plant control being transferred from the Control Room to the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel or Standby Shutdown Facility HA6.1 Control Room evacuation resulting in transfer of plant control to alternate locations HS6.1 An event has resulted in plant control being transferred from the Control Room to the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel or Standby Shutdown Facility AND Control of any of the following key safety functions is not reestablished within 15 min. (Note 1):
- Reactivity (Modes 1, 2, and 3 only)
- Core Cooling
- RCS heat removal Inability to control a key safety function from outside the Control Room Other conditions exist which, in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator, indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant or a security event that involves probable life threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment because of HOSTILE ACTION. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.
HA7.1 Other conditions exist that in the judgment of the Site Emergency Coordinator warrant declaration of an Alert HS7.1 Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public or HOSTILE ACTION that results in intentional damage or malicious acts, (1) toward site personnel or equipment that could lead to the likely failure of or, (2) that prevent effective access to equipment needed for the protection of the public.
Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels beyond the SITE BOUNDARY.
Other conditions existing that in the judgment of the Site Emergency Coordinator warrant declaration of a Site Area Emergency HG7.1 Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or IMMINENT substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity or HOSTILE ACTION that results in an actual loss of physical control of the facility. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Site Emergency Coordinator warrant declaration of a General Emergency None Hazards H
Seismic Event Fire Control Room Evacuation Hazardous Gases Security EC Judgment 2
4 5
1 6
7 None HU3.3 Movement of personnel within the PROTECTED AREA is IMPEDED due to an offsite event involving hazardous materials (e.g., an offsite chemical spill or toxic gas release)
A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA as reported by the Security Shift Supervision None ISFSI EU1.1 Damage to a loaded canister CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY as indicated by an on-contact radiation reading on the surface of a loaded spent fuel cask > any Table E-1 ISFSI dose limit Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY E
Area Rad Levels 3
RA1.4 Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY:
- Closed window dose rates > 10 mR/hr expected to continue for 60 min.
- Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE
> 50 mrem for 60 min. of inhalation.
(Notes 1, 2)
RG1.1 Reading on any Table R-1 effluent radiation monitor > column GE for 15 min. (Notes 1, 2, 3, 4)
RG1.2 Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses
> 1000 mrem TEDE or 5000 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY (Note 4)
RG1.3 Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY:
- Closed window dose rates > 1000 mR/hr expected to continue for 60 min.
- Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE
> 5000 mrem for 60 min. of inhalation (Notes 1, 2)
RA3.2 An UNPLANNED event results in radiation levels that prohibit or IMPEDE access to any Table R-2 rooms or areas (Note 5)
HU3.1 A tornado strike within the PROTECTED AREA Hazardous event HU3.4 A hazardous event that results in on-site conditions sufficient to prohibit the plant staff from accessing the site via personal vehicles (Note 7) 3 HU4.3 A FIRE within the PROTECTED AREA not extinguished within 60 min. of the initial report, alarm or indication (Note 1)
HU4.4 A FIRE within the PROTECTED AREA that requires firefighting support by an offsite fire response agency to extinguish None None None None None None Table R-2 Safe Operation & Shutdown Rooms/Areas Room / Area Mode(s)
- Turbine Building
- Equipment and Cable Rooms
- Auxiliary Building
- Reactor Buildings 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 3, 4, 5 None RA2.3 Lowering of spent fuel pool level to -13.5 ft.
RS2.1 Lowering of spent fuel pool level to -23.5 ft.
RG2.1 Spent fuel pool level at the top of the fuel racks Spent fuel pool level cannot be restored to at least the top of the fuel racks for 60 minutes or longer Spent fuel pool level cannot be restored to at least -23.5 ft.
for > 60 min. (Note 1) 5 6
1 2
3 4
NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 6
Refuel CA1.1 Loss of RCS inventory as indicated by RCS water level
< 10" (LT-5)
CU1.1 UNPLANNED loss of reactor coolant results in RCS water level less than a required lower limit for 15 min. (Note 1)
RCS water level cannot be monitored AND EITHER UNPLANNED increase in any Table C-1 sump/tank level due to a loss of RCS inventory Visual observation of UNISOLABLE RCS leakage CU1.2 RCS water level cannot be monitored for 30 min. (Note 1)
AND Core uncovery is indicated by any of the following:
UNPLANNED increase in any Table C-1 Sump / Tank level due to a loss of RCS inventory Visual observation of UNISOLABLE RCS leakage High alarm on RIA-3 RB Refueling Deck Shield Wall Erratic Source Range Monitor Indication RCS water level cannot be monitored for 30 min. (Note 1)
AND Core uncovery is indicated by any of the following:
UNPLANNED increase in any Table C-1 Sump /
Tank level due to a loss of RCS inventory Visual observation of UNISOLABLE RCS leakage High alarm on RIA-3 RB Refueling Deck Shield Wall Erratic Source Range Monitor Indication AND Any Containment Challenge indication, Table C-2 RCS water level cannot be monitored for 15 min. (Note 1)
AND EITHER UNPLANNED increase in any Table C-1 Sump / Tank level due to a loss of RCS inventory Visual observation of UNISOLABLE RCS leakage CA1.2 Unit 1/2/3 Plant Vent Unit 1/2/3 Plant Vent Gaseous Liquid 3.00E+5 cpm RIA-45 RIA-46 Table R-1 Effluent Monitor Classification Thresholds Release Point Monitor GE SAE Alert UE 3.00E+4 cpm 3.00E+3 cpm 1.41E+5 cpm Liquid Radwaste Discharge RIA-33 4.79E+5 cpm Note 1: The Emergency Coordinator should declare the event promptly upon determining that time limit has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.
Note 2: If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded the specified time limit.
Note 3: If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped, indicating that the release path is isolated, the effluent monitor reading is no longer VALID for classification purposes.
Note 4: The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EALs RA1.1, RS1.1 and RG1.1 should be used for emergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment using actual meteorology are available.
Note 5: If the equipment in the listed room or area was already inoperable or out-of-service before the event occurred, then no emergency classification is warranted.
Note 6: If CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is re-established prior to exceeding the 30-minute time limit, declaration of a General Emergency is not required.
Note 7: This EAL does not apply to routine traffic impediments such as fog, snow, ice, or vehicle breakdowns or accidents.
Note 8: A manual trip action is any Control Room operator action, or set of actions, which causes the control rods to be rapidly inserted into the core, and does not include manually driving in control rods or implementation of boron injection strategies.
Note 9: RVLS is not valid if EITHER of the following exists:
One or more RCPs are running OR
- LPI pump(s) are running Note 10: In the absence of reliable RCS temperature indication caused by the loss of decay heat removal capability, classification should be based on time to boil data.
Note 11: If the affected SAFETY SYSTEM train was already inoperable or out of service before the hazardous event occurred, then this emergency classification is not warranted.
Note 12: If the hazardous event only resulted in VISIBLE DAMAGE, with noi indications of degraded performance to at least one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM, then this emergency classification is not warranted.
NOTES Seismic event > OBE as indicated by EITHER of the following:
- 1SA-9/E-1 (SEISMIC TRIGGER) alarm
- 3SA-9/E-1 (SEISMIC TRIGGER) alarm Natural or Tech.
Hazard Table C-1 Sumps / Tanks RB Normal Sumps RB Emergency Sumps Core Flood Tank Quench Tank Low Activity Waste Tank High Activity Waste Tank Miscellaneous Waste Holdup Tank LPI Room Sumps
[Refer to EAL CA6.1 OR SA9.1 for escalation due to seismic event]
[Refer to EAL CA6.1 OR SA9.1 for escalation due to natural or technological hazard]
[Refer to EAL CA6.1 OR SA9.1 for escalation due to FIRE]
None Table H-1 Fire Areas
- Reactor Building
- Auxiliary Building
- Turbine Building
- Standby Shutdown Facility
- Intake Structure
- Electrical Blockhouse
- Keowee Hydro & associated transformers
- Transformer Yard
- Protected Service Water Building
- Essential Siphon Vacuum Building Table H-2 Safe Operation & Shutdown Rooms/Areas Room / Area Mode(s)
- Turbine Building
- Equipment and Cable Rooms
- Auxiliary Building
- Reactor Buildings 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 3, 4, 5 EC Judgment 7
Onsite Offsite System Commercial phone service ONS site phone system EOF phone system Public address system Onsite radio system DEMNET Offsite radio system NRC Emergency Telephone System Satellite Phone NRC X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X Table C-5 Communication Methods X
X X
X Table C-3 AC Power Sources Offsite
- Unit Normal Transformer (backcharged)
- Unit Startup Transformer (SWYD)
- Another Unit Startup Transformer (aligned)
(SWYD)
- CT5 (Central/energizing Standby Bus)
Emergency
- Unit Startup Transformer (Keowee)
- Another Unit Startup Transformer (aligned)
(Keowee)
- CT4
- CT5 (dedicated line/energizing Standby Bus)
HA1.2 A validated notification from NRC of an aircraft attack threat within 30 min. of the site 5
6 1
2 3
4 HU1.1 A SECURITY CONDITION that does not involve a HOSTILE ACTION as reported by the Security Shift Supervision HU1.2 Notification of a credible security threat directed at the site HU1.3 A validated notification from the NRC providing information of an aircraft threat Note 1: The Emergency Coordinator should declare the event promptly upon determining that time limit has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.
Note 2: If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded the specified time limit.
Note 3: If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped, indicating that the release path is isolated, the effluent monitor reading is no longer VALID for classification purposes.
Note 4: The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EALs RA1.1, RS1.1 and RG1.1 should be used for emergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment using actual meteorology are available.
Note 5: If the equipment in the listed room or area was already inoperable or out-of-service before the event occurred, then no emergency classification is warranted.
Note 6: If CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is re-established prior to exceeding the 30-minute time limit, declaration of a General Emergency is not required.
Note 7: This EAL does not apply to routine traffic impediments such as fog, snow, ice, or vehicle breakdowns or accidents.
Note 8: A manual trip action is any Control Room operator action, or set of actions, which causes the control rods to be rapidly inserted into the core, and does not include manually driving in control rods or implementation of boron injection strategies.
Note 9: RVLS is not valid if EITHER of the following exists:
One or more RCPs are running OR
- LPI pump(s) are running Note 10: In the absence of reliable RCS temperature indication caused by the loss of decay heat removal capability, classification should be based on time to boil data.
Note 11: If the affected SAFETY SYSTEM train was already inoperable or out of service before the hazardous event occurred, then this emergency classification is not warranted.
Note 12: If the hazardous event only resulted in VISIBLE DAMAGE, with no indications of degraded performance to at least one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM, then this emergency classification is not warranted.
NOTES ONS ONS Date & Time of Shutdown Date Time None Table E-1 ISFSI Dose Limits 24P**
400 mrem/hr Location HSM front surface HSM front bird screen Outside HSM door End shield wall exterior 24PHB 1050 mrem/hr 40 mrem/hr 550 mrem/hr 24PTH 1200 mrem/hr 160 mrem/hr 800 mrem/hr HSM Module 24P*
1050 mrem/hr 140 mrem/hr 600 mrem/hr E1-E20, W1-W20 E21-E42, W21-W42 E43-E67, W43-W67 E81-E92, W81-W92 400 mrem/hr 200 mrem/hr 40 mrem/hr 1000 mrem/hr 40 mrem/hr 600 mrem/hr E68-E74, W68-W74 24PHB 24PTH E75-E80, W75-W80
- HSM E1-E20 and W1-W20 were loaded with 24P canisters under the Site Specific License SNM-2503 and only have Technical Specification dose rate limit for HSM surface.
- HSM E21-E42 and W21-W42 were loaded with 24P canisters under the General License CoC 1004.
Table E-1 ISFSI Dose Limits - Notes 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 60 min.*
20 min.*
If a RCS heat removal system is in operation within this time frame and RCS temperature is being reduced, the EAL is not applicable 0 min.
Table C-4 RCS Heat-up Duration Thresholds Not intact OR at REDUCED INVENTORY Intact (but not REDUCED INVENTORY)
RCS Status CONTAINMENT CLOSURE Status Heat-up Duration N/A established not established None Cold SD/
Refuel System Malfunct.
Loss of Essential AC Power Loss of all but one AC power source to essential buses for 15 minutes or longer CU2.1 AC power capability, Table C-3, to essential 4160V buses MFB-1 and MFB-2 reduced to a single power source for 15 min. (Note 1)
AND Any additional single power source failure will result in loss of all AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS Indicated voltage is < 105 VDC on vital DC buses required by Technical Specifications for 15 min. (Note 1)
CU4.1 CG1.1 Loss of RCS inventory Loss of RCS inventory affecting core decay heat removal capability Loss of RCS inventory affecting fuel clad integrity with containment challenged RCS Level Loss of Comm.
Loss of all onsite or offsite communications capabilities CU5.1 UNPLANNED loss of RCS inventory for 15 minutes or longer Loss of Vital DC power for 15 minutes or longer CA2.1 Loss of all offsite and all emergency AC power capability to essential 4160V buses MFB-1 and MFB-2 for 15 min.
(Note 1)
Loss of all offsite and all emergency AC power to essential buses for 15 minutes or longer CS1.1 RCS Temp.
UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature to > 200°F due to loss of decay heat removal capability (Note 10)
CU3.1 UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature Loss of all RCS temperature and RCS level indication for 15 min. (Note 1)
CU3.2 CA3.1 UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature to > 200°F for
> Table C-4 duration (Notes 1, 10)
OR UNPLANNED RCS pressure increase > 10 psig due to a loss of RCS cooling (this EAL does not apply during water-solid plant conditions)
Inability to maintain plant in cold shutdown None None Hazardous Event Affecting Safety Systems C
1 3
5 6
The occurrence of any Table C-6 hazardous event AND Event damage has caused indications of degraded performance on one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode AND EITHER of the following:
Event damage has caused indications of degraded performance to a second train of the SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode.
Event damage has resulted in VISIBLE DAMAGE to the second train of the SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode (Note 11, 12) 2 GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT Loss of all Table C-5 onsite communication methods OR Loss of all Table C-5 offsite communication methods OR Loss of all Table C-5 NRC communication methods Hazardous event affecting a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode CA6.1 EAL - COLD MODES 5, 6 & No Mode None None None None None None None Loss of Vital DC Power 4
None None None 5
6 5
6 NM 5
6 5
6 5
6 5
6 NM 5
6 5
6 5
6 5
6 NM 5
6 Table C-6 Hazardous Events Seismic event (earthquake)
Internal or external FLOODING event High winds or tornado strike FIRE EXPLOSION Other events with similar hazard characteristics as determined by the Shift Manager Table C-2 Containment Challenge Indications CONTAINMENT CLOSURE not established (Note 6)
Containment hydrogen concentration > 4%
Unplanned rise in containment pressure
GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT Table F-1 Fission Product Barrier Threshold Matrix Containment (CMT) Barrier Fuel Clad (FC) Barrier Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Barrier Loss Potential Loss Loss Loss Potential Loss Potential Loss A. RCS or SG Tube Leakage B. Inadequate Heat Removal C. CMT Radiation /
RCS Activity D. CMT Integrity or Bypass None None None 1.
RVLS < 0" (Note 9)
None
- 1. Any condition in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator that indicates loss of the Fuel Clad barrier
- 1. Any condition in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator that indicates potential loss of the Fuel Clad barrier
- 1. An automatic or manual ES actuation required by EITHER:
- UNISOLABLE RCS leakage
- SG tube RUPTURE
- 1. Any condition in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator that indicates loss of the RCS barrier
- 1. Any condition in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator that indicates potential loss of the RCS barrier
- 1. Any condition in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator that indicates loss of the Containment barrier
- 1. Any condition in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator that indicates potential loss of the Containment barrier None None None E. EC Judgment
- 1. RCS leakage > normal makeup capacity due to EITHER:
- UNISOLABLE RCS leakage
- SG tube leakage
- 2. RCS cooldown to < 400°F at
> 100°F/hr OR HPI has operated in the injection mode with no RCPs operating
- 1. A leaking SG is FAULTED outside of containment
- 1. CETCs > 1200°F
- 1. CETCs > 700°F
- 1. CETCs >1200°F AND Restoration procedures not effective within 15 min. (Note 1)
- 1. 1/2/3RIA 57/58 > Table F-2 column FC Loss
- 2. Coolant activity > 300 µCi/ml DEI
- 1. Containment radiation:
- 1,3 RIA 57/58 > 1.0 R/hr
- 2 RIA 57 > 1.6 R/hr
- 2 RIA 58 > 1.0 R/hr
- 1. 1/2/3RIA 57/58 > Table F-2 column CMT Potential Loss None None None
- 1. Containment isolation is required AND EITHER
- Containment integrity has been lost based on Emergency Coordinator judgment
- UNISOLABLE pathway from Containment to the environment exists
- 2. Indications of RCS leakage outside of containment
- 1. Containment pressure > 59 psig
- 2. Containment hydrogen concentration > 4%
- 3. Containment pressure > 10 psig with < one full train of containment heat removal system (1 RBS with > 700 gpm spray flow AND 2 RBCUs) operating per design for 15 min. (Note 1)
- 2. HPI forced cooling initiated System Malfunct.
SA1.1 AC power capability, Table S-1, to essential 4160V buses MFB-1 and MFB-2 reduced to a single power source for 15 min. (Note 1)
AND Any additional single power source failure will result in loss of all AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS SG1.1 None None Fission Product Barriers FS1.1 Loss of any two barriers AND Loss or potential loss of third barrier (Table F-1)
Loss or potential loss of any two barriers (Table F-1)
FA1.1 Any loss or any potential loss of either Fuel Clad or RCS barrier (Table F-1)
FG1.1 1
2 3
4 1
2 3
4 1
2 3
4 SS1.1 Loss of Essential AC Power Loss of all offsite AC power capability to essential buses for 15 minutes or longer SU1.1 Loss of all offsite AC power capability, Table S-1, to essential 4160V buses MFB-1 and MFB-2 for 15 min.
(Note 1)
Loss of all but one AC power source to essential buses for 15 minutes or longer Loss of all offsite and all emergency AC power to essential buses for 15 minutes or longer Prolonged loss of all offsite and all emergency AC power to essential buses Loss of 125 VDC power based on battery bus voltage indications < 105 VDC on both vital DC Distribution Centers DCA and DCB for 15 min. (Note 1)
SS2.1 Loss of all vital DC power for 15 minutes or longer SA6.1 An automatic or manual trip fails to shut down the reactor as indicated by reactor power 5%
AND Manual trip pushbutton is not successful in shutting down the reactor as indicated by reactor power 5% (Note 8)
An automatic or manual trip fails to shut down the reactor as indicated by reactor power 5%
AND All actions to shut down the reactor are not successful as indicated by reactor power 5%
AND EITHER:
- CETCs >1200°F on ICCM
- RCS subcooling < 0ºF SS6.1 Automatic or manual trip fails to shut down the reactor and subsequent manual actions taken at the reactor control consoles are not successful in shutting down the reactor Inability to shut down the reactor causing a challenge to core cooling or RCS heat removal Loss of all onsite or offsite communications capabilities SU7.1 Loss of CR Indications UNPLANNED loss of Control Room indications for 15 minutes or longer SU3.1 An UNPLANNED event results in the inability to monitor one or more Table S-2 parameters from within the Control Room for 15 min. (Note 1)
SA3.1 An UNPLANNED event results in the inability to monitor one or more Table S-2 parameters from within the Control Room for 15 min. (Note 1)
AND Any significant transient is in progress, Table S-3 UNPLANNED loss of Control Room indications for 15 minutes or longer with a significant transient in progress Hazardous event affecting a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode SA9.1 RCS activity greater than Technical Specification allowable limits SU4.1 RCS activity > 50 µCi/gm Dose Equivalent I-131 for > 48 hr continuous period OR RCS activity > 280 µCi/gm Dose Equivalent Xe-133 for > 48 hr continuous period RCS leakage for 15 minutes or longer SU5.1 RCS unidentified or pressure boundary leakage
> 10 gpm for 15 min.
OR RCS identified leakage > 25 gpm for 15 min.
OR Leakage from the RCS to a location outside containment
> 25 gpm for 15 min.
(Note 1)
Automatic or manual trip fails to shut down the reactor SU6.1 None Loss of all offsite and all emergency AC power capability to essential 4160V buses MFB-1 and MFB-2 for 15 min. (Note 1)
Loss of all offsite and all emergency AC power capability to essential 4160V buses MFB-1 and MFB-2 AND Failure to power SSF equipment and PSW unavailable AND EITHER:
- Restoration of at least one essential bus in < 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is not likely (Note 1)
- CETC reading > 1200°F F
S 1
3 9
Loss of Comm.
7 An automatic trip did not shut down the reactor as indicated by reactor power 5% after any RPS setpoint is exceeded AND A subsequent automatic trip or the manual trip pushbutton is successful in shutting down the reactor as indicated by reactor power < 5% (Note 8)
None None None None None Loss of Vital DC Power 2
EAL-HOT MODES 1, 2, 3 & 4 SG1.2 Loss of all offsite and all emergency AC power capability to essential 4160V buses MFB-1 and MFB-2 for 15 min.
AND Failure to power SSF equipment and PSW unavailable AND Loss of 125 VDC power based on battery bus voltage indications < 105 VDC on both vital DC Distribution Centers DCA and DCB for 15 min.
(Note 1)
None RCS Activity 4
RPS Failure 6
RCS Leakage 5
None None None SU6.2 A manual trip did not shut down the reactor as indicated by reactor power 5% after any manual trip action was initiated AND A subsequent automatic trip or the manual trip pushbutton is successful in shutting down the reactor as indicated by reactor power < 5% (Note 8)
Loss of all Table S-4 onsite communication methods OR Loss of all Table S-4 offsite communication methods OR Loss of all Table S-4 NRC communication methods Hazardous Event Affecting Safety Systems None Table S-2 Safety System Parameters
- Reactor power
- RCS level
- RCS pressure
- CETC temperature
- Level in at least one S/G
- EFW flow to at least one S/G 1
2 3
4 1
1 2
3 4
1 2
3 4
1 2
3 4
1 2
3 4
1 2
3 4
1 2
3 4
1 2
3 4
1 2
3 4
1 1
1 2
3 4
None Failure to isolate containment or loss of containment pressure control SU8.1 Any penetration is not closed within 15 min. of a VALID ES actuation signal OR Containment pressure > 10 psig with < one full train of containment heat removal system (1 RBS with > 700 gpm spray flow AND 2 RBCUs) operating per design for 15 min.
(Note 1) 1 2
3 4
1 2
3 4
Table S-5 Hazardous Events Seismic event (earthquake)
Internal or external FLOODING event High winds or tornado strike FIRE EXPLOSION Other events with similar hazard characteristics as determined by the Shift Manager CMT Failure 8
None Loss of all essential AC and vital DC power sources for 15 minutes or longer 1
2 3
4 None Prepared for Duke Energy by: Operations Support Services, Inc. - www.ossi-net.com (1/28/16)
Modes:
1 Power Operations No Mode NM 2
Startup 5
Cold Shutdown 3
Hot Standby 4
Hot Shutdown Oconee Nuclear Station Classification of Emergency CSD-EP-ONS-0101-02 Rev 000 Irradiated Fuel Event RU1.1 Sample analysis for a gaseous or liquid release indicates a concentration or release rate > 2 x SLC/TS limits for 60 min. (Notes 1, 2)
RU1.2 Reading on any Table R-1 effluent radiation monitor
> column UE for 60 min. (Notes 1, 2, 3)
RA1.1 Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses
> 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY (Note 4)
RS1.1 Reading on any Table R-1 effluent radiation monitor > column SAE for 15 min. (Notes 1, 2, 3, 4)
RS1.2 Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses
> 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY (Note 4)
RA1.2 Reading on any Table R-1 effluent radiation monitor
> column ALERT for 15 min. (Notes 1, 2, 3, 4)
RA1.3 Analysis of a liquid effluent sample indicates a concentration or release rate that would result in doses > 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY for 60 min. of exposure (Notes 1, 2)
RU2.1 UNPLANNED water level drop in the REFUELING PATHWAY as indicated by low water level alarm or indication AND UNPLANNED rise in corresponding area radiation levels as indicated by any of the following radiation monitors:
- RIA-3 RB Refueling Deck Shield Wall
- RIA-6 Spent Fuel Building Wall
- Portable area monitors on the main bridge or SFP bridge RA2.2 Damage to irradiated fuel resulting in a release of radioactivity AND HIGH alarm on any of the following radiation monitors:
- RIA-3 RB Refueling Deck Shield Wall
- RIA-6 Spent Fuel Building Wall
- RIA-41 Spent Fuel Pool Gas
- RIA-49 RB Gas
- Portable area monitors on the main bridge or SFP bridge RA3.1 Dose rates > 15 mR/hr in EITHER of the following areas:
- Control Room (RIA-1)
- Central Alarm Station (by survey)
Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity greater than 2 times the SLC/TS limits for 60 minutes or longer Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE Release of gaseous radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem thyroid CDE Release of gaseous radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 1,000 mrem TEDE or 5,000 mrem thyroid CDE Unplanned loss of water level above irradiated fuel Significant lowering of water level above, or damage to, irradiated fuel RA2.1 Uncovery of irradiated fuel in the REFUELING PATHWAY Radiation levels that IMPEDE access to equipment necessary for normal plant operations, cooldown or shutdown RS1.3 Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY:
- Closed window dose rates > 100 mR/hr expected to continue for 60 min.
- Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE
> 500 mrem for 60 min. of inhalation (Notes 1, 2)
Abnorm.
Rad Levels
/ Rad Effluent R
GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT 2
Rad Effluent 1
None None None None HS1.1 A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the PROTECTED AREA as reported by the Security Shift Supervision HU2.1 HU4.1 A FIRE is not extinguished within 15 min. of any of the following FIRE detection indications (Note 1):
- Report from the field (i.e., visual observation)
- Receipt of multiple (more than 1) fire alarms or indications
- Field verification of a single fire alarm AND The FIRE is located within any Table H-1 area HA5.1 Release of a toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable gas into any Table H-2 rooms or areas AND Entry into the room or area is prohibited or IMPEDED (Note 5)
Seismic event greater than OBE levels HU4.2 Receipt of a single fire alarm (i.e., no other indications of a FIRE)
AND The fire alarm is indicating a FIRE within any Table H-1 area AND The existence of a FIRE is not verified within 30 min. of alarm receipt (Note 1)
HU3.2 Internal room or area FLOODING of a magnitude sufficient to require manual or automatic electrical isolation of a SAFETY SYSTEM component needed for the current operating mode FIRE potentially degrading the level of safety of the plant Gaseous release IMPEDING access to equipment necessary for normal plant operations, cooldown or shutdown HU7.1 Other conditions existing that in the judgment of the Site Emergency Coordinator warrant declaration of a UE Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant or indicate a security threat to facility protection has been initiated. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of SAFETY SYSTEMS occurs.
An event has resulted in plant control being transferred from the Control Room to the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel or Standby Shutdown Facility HA6.1 Control Room evacuation resulting in transfer of plant control to alternate locations HS6.1 An event has resulted in plant control being transferred from the Control Room to the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel or Standby Shutdown Facility AND Control of any of the following key safety functions is not reestablished within 15 min. (Note 1):
- Reactivity (Modes 1, 2, and 3 only)
- Core Cooling
- RCS heat removal Inability to control a key safety function from outside the Control Room Other conditions exist which, in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator, indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant or a security event that involves probable life threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment because of HOSTILE ACTION. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.
HA7.1 Other conditions exist that in the judgment of the Site Emergency Coordinator warrant declaration of an Alert HS7.1 Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public or HOSTILE ACTION that results in intentional damage or malicious acts, (1) toward site personnel or equipment that could lead to the likely failure of or, (2) that prevent effective access to equipment needed for the protection of the public.
Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels beyond the SITE BOUNDARY.
Other conditions existing that in the judgment of the Site Emergency Coordinator warrant declaration of a Site Area Emergency HG7.1 Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or IMMINENT substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity or HOSTILE ACTION that results in an actual loss of physical control of the facility. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Site Emergency Coordinator warrant declaration of a General Emergency None Hazards H
Seismic Event Fire Control Room Evacuation Hazardous Gases Security EC Judgment 2
4 5
1 6
7 None HU3.3 Movement of personnel within the PROTECTED AREA is IMPEDED due to an offsite event involving hazardous materials (e.g., an offsite chemical spill or toxic gas release)
None ISFSI EU1.1 Damage to a loaded canister CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY as indicated by an on-contact radiation reading on the surface of a loaded spent fuel cask > any Table E-1 ISFSI dose limit Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY E
Area Rad Levels 3
RA1.4 Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY:
- Closed window dose rates > 10 mR/hr expected to continue for 60 min.
- Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE
> 50 mrem for 60 min. of inhalation (Notes 1, 2)
RG1.1 Reading on any Table R-1 effluent radiation monitor > column GE for 15 min. (Notes 1, 2, 3, 4)
RG1.2 Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses
> 1000 mrem TEDE or 5000 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY (Note 4)
RG1.3 Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY:
- Closed window dose rates > 1000 mR/hr expected to continue for 60 min.
- Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE
> 5000 mrem for 60 min. of inhalation (Notes 1, 2)
RA3.2 An UNPLANNED event results in radiation levels that prohibit or IMPEDE access to any Table R-2 rooms or areas (Note 5)
HU3.1 A tornado strike within the PROTECTED AREA Hazardous event HU3.4 A hazardous event that results in on-site conditions sufficient to prohibit the plant staff from accessing the site via personal vehicles (Note 7)
Natural or Tech.
Hazard 3
HU4.3 A FIRE within the PROTECTED AREA not extinguished within 60 min. of the initial report, alarm or indication (Note 1)
HU4.4 A FIRE within the PROTECTED AREA that requires firefighting support by an offsite fire response agency to extinguish None None None None None None None None RA2.3 Lowering of spent fuel pool level to -13.5 ft.
RS2.1 Lowering of spent fuel pool level to -23.5 ft.
RG2.1 Spent fuel pool level at the top of the fuel racks Spent fuel pool level cannot be restored to at least the top of the fuel racks for 60 minutes or longer Spent fuel pool level cannot be restored to at least -23.5 ft.
for > 60 min. (Note 1) 5 6
1 2
3 4
NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 6
Refuel Unit 1/2/3 Plant Vent Unit 1/2/3 Plant Vent Gaseous Liquid 3.00E+5 cpm RIA-45 RIA-46 Table R-1 Effluent Monitor Classification Thresholds Release Point Monitor GE SAE Alert UE 3.00E+4 cpm 3.00E+3 cpm 1.41E+5 cpm Liquid Radwaste Discharge RIA-33 4.79E+5 cpm Seismic event > OBE as indicated by EITHER of the following:
- 1SA-9/E-1 (SEISMIC TRIGGER) alarm
- 3SA-9/E-1 (SEISMIC TRIGGER) alarm Onsite Offsite System Commercial phone service ONS site phone system EOF phone system Public address system Onsite radio system DEMNET Offsite radio system NRC Emergency Telephone System Satellite Phone NRC X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X Table S-4 Communication Methods X
X X
X Table S-3 Significant Transients
- Runback > 25% thermal power
- Electrical load rejection > 25% electrical load
- ECCS actuation None
[Refer to EAL CA6.1 OR SA9.1 for escalation due to seismic event]
[Refer to EAL CA6.1 OR SA9.1 for escalation due to natural or technological hazard]
[Refer to EAL CA6.1 OR SA9.1 for escalation due to FIRE]
Table F-2 Containment Radiation - R/hr (1/2/3RIA 57/58)
Time After S/D (Hrs) 0 - < 0.5 0.5 - < 2.0 2.0 - < 8.0
> 8.0 140 40 15 5
FC Loss 300 80 32 10 CMT Potential Loss RIA 57 RIA 58 700 195 75 25 1500 400 160 50 RIA 57 RIA 58 None Table H-2 Safe Operation & Shutdown Rooms/Areas Room / Area Mode(s)
- Turbine Building
- Equipment and Cable Rooms
- Auxiliary Building
- Reactor Buildings 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 3, 4, 5 Table R-2 Safe Operation & Shutdown Rooms/Areas Room / Area Mode(s)
- Turbine Building
- Equipment and Cable Rooms
- Auxiliary Building
- Reactor Buildings 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 3, 4, 5 Table S-1 AC Power Sources Offsite
- Unit Normal Transformer (backcharged)
- Unit Startup Transformer (SWYD)
- Another Unit Startup Transformer (aligned)
(SWYD)
- CT5 (Central/energizing Standby Bus)
Emergency
- Unit Startup Transformer (Keowee)
- Another Unit Startup Transformer (aligned)
(Keowee)
- CT4
- CT5 (dedicated line/energizing Standby Bus)
Table H-1 Fire Areas
- Reactor Building
- Auxiliary Building
- Turbine Building
- Standby Shutdown Facility
- Intake Structure
- Electrical Blockhouse
- Keowee Hydro & associated transformers
- Transformer Yard
- Protected Service Water Building
- Essential Siphon Vacuum Building HU1.1 A SECURITY CONDITION that does not involve a HOSTILE ACTION as reported by the Security Shift Supervision HA1.1 Confirmed SECURITY CONDITION or threat HOSTILE ACTION within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA or airborne attack threat within 30 minutes HOSTILE ACTION within the PROTECTED AREA A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA as reported by the Security Shift Supervision HU1.2 Notification of a credible security threat directed at the site HU1.3 A validated notification from the NRC providing information of an aircraft threat HA1.2 A validated notification from NRC of an aircraft attack threat within 30 min. of the site 5
6 1
2 3
4 ONS Note 1: The Emergency Coordinator should declare the event promptly upon determining that time limit has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.
Note 2: If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded the specified time limit.
Note 3: If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped, indicating that the release path is isolated, the effluent monitor reading is no longer VALID for classification purposes.
Note 4: The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EALs RA1.1, RS1.1 and RG1.1 should be used for emergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment using actual meteorology are available.
Note 5: If the equipment in the listed room or area was already inoperable or out-of-service before the event occurred, then no emergency classification is warranted.
Note 6: If CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is re-established prior to exceeding the 30-minute time limit, declaration of a General Emergency is not required.
Note 7: This EAL does not apply to routine traffic impediments such as fog, snow, ice, or vehicle breakdowns or accidents.
Note 8: A manual trip action is any Control Room operator action, or set of actions, which causes the control rods to be rapidly inserted into the core, and does not include manually driving in control rods or implementation of boron injection strategies.
Note 9: RVLS is not valid if EITHER of the following exists:
One or more RCPs are running OR
- LPI pump(s) are running Note 10: In the absence of reliable RCS temperature indication caused by the loss of decay heat removal capability, classification should be based on time to boil data.
Note 11: If the affected SAFETY SYSTEM train was already inoperable or out of service before the hazardous event occurred, then this emergency classification is not warranted.
Note 12: If the hazardous event only resulted in VISIBLE DAMAGE, with no indications of degraded performance to at least one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM, then this emergency classification is not warranted.
NOTES The occurrence of any Table S-5 hazardous event AND Event damage has caused indications of degraded performance on one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode AND EITHER of the following:
Event damage has caused indications of degraded performance to a second train of the SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode.
Event damage has resulted in VISIBLE DAMAGE to the second train of the SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode (Note 11, 12)
Note 1: The Emergency Coordinator should declare the event promptly upon determining that time limit has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.
Note 2: If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded the specified time limit.
Note 3: If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped, indicating that the release path is isolated, the effluent monitor reading is no longer VALID for classification purposes.
Note 4: The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EALs RA1.1, RS1.1 and RG1.1 should be used for emergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment using actual meteorology are available.
Note 5: If the equipment in the listed room or area was already inoperable or out-of-service before the event occurred, then no emergency classification is warranted.
Note 6: If CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is re-established prior to exceeding the 30-minute time limit, declaration of a General Emergency is not required.
Note 7: This EAL does not apply to routine traffic impediments such as fog, snow, ice, or vehicle breakdowns or accidents.
Note 8: A manual trip action is any Control Room operator action, or set of actions, which causes the control rods to be rapidly inserted into the core, and does not include manually driving in control rods or implementation of boron injection strategies.
Note 9: RVLS is not valid if EITHER of the following exists:
One or more RCPs are running OR
- LPI pump(s) are running Note 10: In the absence of reliable RCS temperature indication caused by the loss of decay heat removal capability, classification should be based on time to boil data.
Note 11: If the affected SAFETY SYSTEM train was already inoperable or out of service before the hazardous event occurred, then this emergency classification is not warranted.
Note 12: If the hazardous event only resulted in VISIBLE DAMAGE, with no indications of degraded performance to at least one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM, then this emergency classification is not warranted.
NOTES ONS None None Table E-1 ISFSI Dose Limits 24P**
400 mrem/hr Location HSM front surface HSM front bird screen Outside HSM door End shield wall exterior 24PHB 1050 mrem/hr 40 mrem/hr 550 mrem/hr 24PTH 1200 mrem/hr 160 mrem/hr 800 mrem/hr HSM Module 24P*
1050 mrem/hr 140 mrem/hr 600 mrem/hr E1-E20, W1-W20 E21-E42, W21-W42 E43-E67, W43-W67 E81-E92, W81-W92 400 mrem/hr 200 mrem/hr 40 mrem/hr 1000 mrem/hr 40 mrem/hr 600 mrem/hr E68-E74, W68-W74 24PHB 24PTH E75-E80, W75-W80
- HSM E1-E20 and W1-W20 were loaded with 24P canisters under the Site Specific License SNM-2503 and only have Technical Specification dose rate limit for HSM surface.
- HSM E21-E42 and W21-W42 were loaded with 24P canisters under the General License CoC 1004.
Table E-1 ISFSI Dose Limits - Notes 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM
Prepared for Duke Energy by: Operations Support Services, Inc. - www.ossi-net.com (1/28/16)
Modes:
1 Power Operations No Mode NM 2
Startup 5
Cold Shutdown 3
Hot Standby 4
Hot Shutdown Oconee Nuclear Station Classification of Emergency CSD-EP-ONS-0101-02 Rev 000 Irradiated Fuel Event RU1.1 Sample analysis for a gaseous or liquid release indicates a concentration or release rate > 2 x SLC/TS limits for 60 min. (Notes 1, 2)
RU1.2 Reading on any Table R-1 effluent radiation monitor
> column UE for 60 min. (Notes 1, 2, 3)
RA1.1 Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses
> 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY (Note 4)
RS1.1 Reading on any Table R-1 effluent radiation monitor > column SAE for 15 min. (Notes 1, 2, 3, 4)
RS1.2 Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses
> 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY (Note 4)
RA1.2 Reading on any Table R-1 effluent radiation monitor
> column ALERT for 15 min. (Notes 1, 2, 3, 4)
RA1.3 Analysis of a liquid effluent sample indicates a concentration or release rate that would result in doses > 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY for 60 min. of exposure (Notes 1, 2)
RU2.1 UNPLANNED water level drop in the REFUELING PATHWAY as indicated by low water level alarm or indication AND UNPLANNED rise in corresponding area radiation levels as indicated by any of the following radiation monitors:
- RIA-3 RB Refueling Deck Shield Wall
- RIA-6 Spent Fuel Building Wall
- Portable area monitors on the main bridge or SFP bridge RA2.2 Damage to irradiated fuel resulting in a release of radioactivity AND HIGH alarm on any of the following radiation monitors:
- RIA-3 RB Refueling Deck Shield Wall
- RIA-6 Spent Fuel Building Wall
- RIA-41 Spent Fuel Pool Gas
- RIA-49 RB Gas
- Portable area monitors on the main bridge or SFP bridge RA3.1 Dose rates > 15 mR/hr in EITHER of the following areas:
- Control Room (RIA-1)
- Central Alarm Station (by survey)
Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity greater than 2 times the SLC/TS limits for 60 minutes or longer Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE Release of gaseous radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem thyroid CDE Release of gaseous radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 1,000 mrem TEDE or 5,000 mrem thyroid CDE Unplanned loss of water level above irradiated fuel Significant lowering of water level above, or damage to, irradiated fuel RA2.1 Uncovery of irradiated fuel in the REFUELING PATHWAY Radiation levels that IMPEDE access to equipment necessary for normal plant operations, cooldown or shutdown RS1.3 Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY:
- Closed window dose rates > 100 mR/hr expected to continue for 60 min.
- Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE
> 500 mrem for 60 min. of inhalation.
(Notes 1, 2)
Abnorm.
Rad Levels
/ Rad Effluent R
GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT 2
Rad Effluent 1
None None None None HS1.1 A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the PROTECTED AREA as reported by the Security Shift Supervision HA1.1 HU2.1 HU4.1 A FIRE is not extinguished within 15 min. of any of the following FIRE detection indications (Note 1):
- Report from the field (i.e., visual observation)
- Receipt of multiple (more than 1) fire alarms or indications
- Field verification of a single fire alarm AND The FIRE is located within any Table H-1 area HA5.1 Release of a toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable gas into any Table H-2 rooms or areas AND Entry into the room or area is prohibited or IMPEDED (Note 5)
Seismic event greater than OBE levels HU4.2 Receipt of a single fire alarm (i.e., no other indications of a FIRE)
AND The fire alarm is indicating a FIRE within any Table H-1 area AND The existence of a FIRE is not verified within 30 min. of alarm receipt (Note 1)
HU3.2 Internal room or area FLOODING of a magnitude sufficient to require manual or automatic electrical isolation of a SAFETY SYSTEM component needed for the current operating mode FIRE potentially degrading the level of safety of the plant Gaseous release IMPEDING access to equipment necessary for normal plant operations, cooldown or shutdown Confirmed SECURITY CONDITION or threat HOSTILE ACTION within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA or airborne attack threat within 30 minutes HOSTILE ACTION within the PROTECTED AREA HU7.1 Other conditions existing that in the judgment of the Site Emergency Coordinator warrant declaration of a UE Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant or indicate a security threat to facility protection has been initiated. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of SAFETY SYSTEMS occurs.
An event has resulted in plant control being transferred from the Control Room to the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel or Standby Shutdown Facility HA6.1 Control Room evacuation resulting in transfer of plant control to alternate locations HS6.1 An event has resulted in plant control being transferred from the Control Room to the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel or Standby Shutdown Facility AND Control of any of the following key safety functions is not reestablished within 15 min. (Note 1):
- Reactivity (Modes 1, 2, and 3 only)
- Core Cooling
- RCS heat removal Inability to control a key safety function from outside the Control Room Other conditions exist which, in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator, indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant or a security event that involves probable life threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment because of HOSTILE ACTION. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.
HA7.1 Other conditions exist that in the judgment of the Site Emergency Coordinator warrant declaration of an Alert HS7.1 Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public or HOSTILE ACTION that results in intentional damage or malicious acts, (1) toward site personnel or equipment that could lead to the likely failure of or, (2) that prevent effective access to equipment needed for the protection of the public.
Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels beyond the SITE BOUNDARY.
Other conditions existing that in the judgment of the Site Emergency Coordinator warrant declaration of a Site Area Emergency HG7.1 Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or IMMINENT substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity or HOSTILE ACTION that results in an actual loss of physical control of the facility. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Site Emergency Coordinator warrant declaration of a General Emergency None Hazards H
Seismic Event Fire Control Room Evacuation Hazardous Gases Security EC Judgment 2
4 5
1 6
7 None HU3.3 Movement of personnel within the PROTECTED AREA is IMPEDED due to an offsite event involving hazardous materials (e.g., an offsite chemical spill or toxic gas release)
A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA as reported by the Security Shift Supervision None ISFSI EU1.1 Damage to a loaded canister CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY as indicated by an on-contact radiation reading on the surface of a loaded spent fuel cask > any Table E-1 ISFSI dose limit Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY E
Area Rad Levels 3
RA1.4 Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY:
- Closed window dose rates > 10 mR/hr expected to continue for 60 min.
- Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE
> 50 mrem for 60 min. of inhalation.
(Notes 1, 2)
RG1.1 Reading on any Table R-1 effluent radiation monitor > column GE for 15 min. (Notes 1, 2, 3, 4)
RG1.2 Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses
> 1000 mrem TEDE or 5000 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY (Note 4)
RG1.3 Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY:
- Closed window dose rates > 1000 mR/hr expected to continue for 60 min.
- Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE
> 5000 mrem for 60 min. of inhalation (Notes 1, 2)
RA3.2 An UNPLANNED event results in radiation levels that prohibit or IMPEDE access to any Table R-2 rooms or areas (Note 5)
HU3.1 A tornado strike within the PROTECTED AREA Hazardous event HU3.4 A hazardous event that results in on-site conditions sufficient to prohibit the plant staff from accessing the site via personal vehicles (Note 7) 3 HU4.3 A FIRE within the PROTECTED AREA not extinguished within 60 min. of the initial report, alarm or indication (Note 1)
HU4.4 A FIRE within the PROTECTED AREA that requires firefighting support by an offsite fire response agency to extinguish None None None None None None Table R-2 Safe Operation & Shutdown Rooms/Areas Room / Area Mode(s)
- Turbine Building
- Equipment and Cable Rooms
- Auxiliary Building
- Reactor Buildings 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 3, 4, 5 None RA2.3 Lowering of spent fuel pool level to -13.5 ft.
RS2.1 Lowering of spent fuel pool level to -23.5 ft.
RG2.1 Spent fuel pool level at the top of the fuel racks Spent fuel pool level cannot be restored to at least the top of the fuel racks for 60 minutes or longer Spent fuel pool level cannot be restored to at least -23.5 ft.
for > 60 min. (Note 1) 5 6
1 2
3 4
NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 6
Refuel CA1.1 Loss of RCS inventory as indicated by RCS water level
< 10" (LT-5)
CU1.1 UNPLANNED loss of reactor coolant results in RCS water level less than a required lower limit for 15 min. (Note 1)
RCS water level cannot be monitored AND EITHER UNPLANNED increase in any Table C-1 sump/tank level due to a loss of RCS inventory Visual observation of UNISOLABLE RCS leakage CU1.2 RCS water level cannot be monitored for 30 min. (Note 1)
AND Core uncovery is indicated by any of the following:
UNPLANNED increase in any Table C-1 Sump / Tank level due to a loss of RCS inventory Visual observation of UNISOLABLE RCS leakage High alarm on RIA-3 RB Refueling Deck Shield Wall Erratic Source Range Monitor Indication RCS water level cannot be monitored for 30 min. (Note 1)
AND Core uncovery is indicated by any of the following:
UNPLANNED increase in any Table C-1 Sump /
Tank level due to a loss of RCS inventory Visual observation of UNISOLABLE RCS leakage High alarm on RIA-3 RB Refueling Deck Shield Wall Erratic Source Range Monitor Indication AND Any Containment Challenge indication, Table C-2 RCS water level cannot be monitored for 15 min. (Note 1)
AND EITHER UNPLANNED increase in any Table C-1 Sump / Tank level due to a loss of RCS inventory Visual observation of UNISOLABLE RCS leakage CA1.2 Unit 1/2/3 Plant Vent Unit 1/2/3 Plant Vent Gaseous Liquid 3.00E+5 cpm RIA-45 RIA-46 Table R-1 Effluent Monitor Classification Thresholds Release Point Monitor GE SAE Alert UE 3.00E+4 cpm 3.00E+3 cpm 1.41E+5 cpm Liquid Radwaste Discharge RIA-33 4.79E+5 cpm Note 1: The Emergency Coordinator should declare the event promptly upon determining that time limit has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.
Note 2: If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded the specified time limit.
Note 3: If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped, indicating that the release path is isolated, the effluent monitor reading is no longer VALID for classification purposes.
Note 4: The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EALs RA1.1, RS1.1 and RG1.1 should be used for emergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment using actual meteorology are available.
Note 5: If the equipment in the listed room or area was already inoperable or out-of-service before the event occurred, then no emergency classification is warranted.
Note 6: If CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is re-established prior to exceeding the 30-minute time limit, declaration of a General Emergency is not required.
Note 7: This EAL does not apply to routine traffic impediments such as fog, snow, ice, or vehicle breakdowns or accidents.
Note 8: A manual trip action is any Control Room operator action, or set of actions, which causes the control rods to be rapidly inserted into the core, and does not include manually driving in control rods or implementation of boron injection strategies.
Note 9: RVLS is not valid if EITHER of the following exists:
One or more RCPs are running OR
- LPI pump(s) are running Note 10: In the absence of reliable RCS temperature indication caused by the loss of decay heat removal capability, classification should be based on time to boil data.
Note 11: If the affected SAFETY SYSTEM train was already inoperable or out of service before the hazardous event occurred, then this emergency classification is not warranted.
Note 12: If the hazardous event only resulted in VISIBLE DAMAGE, with noi indications of degraded performance to at least one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM, then this emergency classification is not warranted.
NOTES Seismic event > OBE as indicated by EITHER of the following:
- 1SA-9/E-1 (SEISMIC TRIGGER) alarm
- 3SA-9/E-1 (SEISMIC TRIGGER) alarm Natural or Tech.
Hazard Table C-1 Sumps / Tanks RB Normal Sumps RB Emergency Sumps Core Flood Tank Quench Tank Low Activity Waste Tank High Activity Waste Tank Miscellaneous Waste Holdup Tank LPI Room Sumps
[Refer to EAL CA6.1 OR SA9.1 for escalation due to seismic event]
[Refer to EAL CA6.1 OR SA9.1 for escalation due to natural or technological hazard]
[Refer to EAL CA6.1 OR SA9.1 for escalation due to FIRE]
None Table H-1 Fire Areas
- Reactor Building
- Auxiliary Building
- Turbine Building
- Standby Shutdown Facility
- Intake Structure
- Electrical Blockhouse
- Keowee Hydro & associated transformers
- Transformer Yard
- Protected Service Water Building
- Essential Siphon Vacuum Building Table H-2 Safe Operation & Shutdown Rooms/Areas Room / Area Mode(s)
- Turbine Building
- Equipment and Cable Rooms
- Auxiliary Building
- Reactor Buildings 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 3, 4, 5 EC Judgment 7
Onsite Offsite System Commercial phone service ONS site phone system EOF phone system Public address system Onsite radio system DEMNET Offsite radio system NRC Emergency Telephone System Satellite Phone NRC X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X Table C-5 Communication Methods X
X X
X Table C-3 AC Power Sources Offsite
- Unit Normal Transformer (backcharged)
- Unit Startup Transformer (SWYD)
- Another Unit Startup Transformer (aligned)
(SWYD)
- CT5 (Central/energizing Standby Bus)
Emergency
- Unit Startup Transformer (Keowee)
- Another Unit Startup Transformer (aligned)
(Keowee)
- CT4
- CT5 (dedicated line/energizing Standby Bus)
HA1.2 A validated notification from NRC of an aircraft attack threat within 30 min. of the site 5
6 1
2 3
4 HU1.1 A SECURITY CONDITION that does not involve a HOSTILE ACTION as reported by the Security Shift Supervision HU1.2 Notification of a credible security threat directed at the site HU1.3 A validated notification from the NRC providing information of an aircraft threat Note 1: The Emergency Coordinator should declare the event promptly upon determining that time limit has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.
Note 2: If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded the specified time limit.
Note 3: If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped, indicating that the release path is isolated, the effluent monitor reading is no longer VALID for classification purposes.
Note 4: The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EALs RA1.1, RS1.1 and RG1.1 should be used for emergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment using actual meteorology are available.
Note 5: If the equipment in the listed room or area was already inoperable or out-of-service before the event occurred, then no emergency classification is warranted.
Note 6: If CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is re-established prior to exceeding the 30-minute time limit, declaration of a General Emergency is not required.
Note 7: This EAL does not apply to routine traffic impediments such as fog, snow, ice, or vehicle breakdowns or accidents.
Note 8: A manual trip action is any Control Room operator action, or set of actions, which causes the control rods to be rapidly inserted into the core, and does not include manually driving in control rods or implementation of boron injection strategies.
Note 9: RVLS is not valid if EITHER of the following exists:
One or more RCPs are running OR
- LPI pump(s) are running Note 10: In the absence of reliable RCS temperature indication caused by the loss of decay heat removal capability, classification should be based on time to boil data.
Note 11: If the affected SAFETY SYSTEM train was already inoperable or out of service before the hazardous event occurred, then this emergency classification is not warranted.
Note 12: If the hazardous event only resulted in VISIBLE DAMAGE, with no indications of degraded performance to at least one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM, then this emergency classification is not warranted.
NOTES ONS ONS Date & Time of Shutdown Date Time None Table E-1 ISFSI Dose Limits 24P**
400 mrem/hr Location HSM front surface HSM front bird screen Outside HSM door End shield wall exterior 24PHB 1050 mrem/hr 40 mrem/hr 550 mrem/hr 24PTH 1200 mrem/hr 160 mrem/hr 800 mrem/hr HSM Module 24P*
1050 mrem/hr 140 mrem/hr 600 mrem/hr E1-E20, W1-W20 E21-E42, W21-W42 E43-E67, W43-W67 E81-E92, W81-W92 400 mrem/hr 200 mrem/hr 40 mrem/hr 1000 mrem/hr 40 mrem/hr 600 mrem/hr E68-E74, W68-W74 24PHB 24PTH E75-E80, W75-W80
- HSM E1-E20 and W1-W20 were loaded with 24P canisters under the Site Specific License SNM-2503 and only have Technical Specification dose rate limit for HSM surface.
- HSM E21-E42 and W21-W42 were loaded with 24P canisters under the General License CoC 1004.
Table E-1 ISFSI Dose Limits - Notes 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 60 min.*
20 min.*
If a RCS heat removal system is in operation within this time frame and RCS temperature is being reduced, the EAL is not applicable 0 min.
Table C-4 RCS Heat-up Duration Thresholds Not intact OR at REDUCED INVENTORY Intact (but not REDUCED INVENTORY)
RCS Status CONTAINMENT CLOSURE Status Heat-up Duration N/A established not established None Cold SD/
Refuel System Malfunct.
Loss of Essential AC Power Loss of all but one AC power source to essential buses for 15 minutes or longer CU2.1 AC power capability, Table C-3, to essential 4160V buses MFB-1 and MFB-2 reduced to a single power source for 15 min. (Note 1)
AND Any additional single power source failure will result in loss of all AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS Indicated voltage is < 105 VDC on vital DC buses required by Technical Specifications for 15 min. (Note 1)
CU4.1 CG1.1 Loss of RCS inventory Loss of RCS inventory affecting core decay heat removal capability Loss of RCS inventory affecting fuel clad integrity with containment challenged RCS Level Loss of Comm.
Loss of all onsite or offsite communications capabilities CU5.1 UNPLANNED loss of RCS inventory for 15 minutes or longer Loss of Vital DC power for 15 minutes or longer CA2.1 Loss of all offsite and all emergency AC power capability to essential 4160V buses MFB-1 and MFB-2 for 15 min.
(Note 1)
Loss of all offsite and all emergency AC power to essential buses for 15 minutes or longer CS1.1 RCS Temp.
UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature to > 200°F due to loss of decay heat removal capability (Note 10)
CU3.1 UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature Loss of all RCS temperature and RCS level indication for 15 min. (Note 1)
CU3.2 CA3.1 UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature to > 200°F for
> Table C-4 duration (Notes 1, 10)
OR UNPLANNED RCS pressure increase > 10 psig due to a loss of RCS cooling (this EAL does not apply during water-solid plant conditions)
Inability to maintain plant in cold shutdown None None Hazardous Event Affecting Safety Systems C
1 3
5 6
The occurrence of any Table C-6 hazardous event AND Event damage has caused indications of degraded performance on one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode AND EITHER of the following:
Event damage has caused indications of degraded performance to a second train of the SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode.
Event damage has resulted in VISIBLE DAMAGE to the second train of the SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode (Note 11, 12) 2 GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT Loss of all Table C-5 onsite communication methods OR Loss of all Table C-5 offsite communication methods OR Loss of all Table C-5 NRC communication methods Hazardous event affecting a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode CA6.1 EAL - COLD MODES 5, 6 & No Mode None None None None None None None Loss of Vital DC Power 4
None None None 5
6 5
6 NM 5
6 5
6 5
6 5
6 NM 5
6 5
6 5
6 5
6 NM 5
6 Table C-6 Hazardous Events Seismic event (earthquake)
Internal or external FLOODING event High winds or tornado strike FIRE EXPLOSION Other events with similar hazard characteristics as determined by the Shift Manager Table C-2 Containment Challenge Indications CONTAINMENT CLOSURE not established (Note 6)
Containment hydrogen concentration > 4%
Unplanned rise in containment pressure
GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT Table F-1 Fission Product Barrier Threshold Matrix Containment (CMT) Barrier Fuel Clad (FC) Barrier Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Barrier Loss Potential Loss Loss Loss Potential Loss Potential Loss A. RCS or SG Tube Leakage B. Inadequate Heat Removal C. CMT Radiation /
RCS Activity D. CMT Integrity or Bypass None None None 1.
RVLS < 0" (Note 9)
None
- 1. Any condition in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator that indicates loss of the Fuel Clad barrier
- 1. Any condition in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator that indicates potential loss of the Fuel Clad barrier
- 1. An automatic or manual ES actuation required by EITHER:
- UNISOLABLE RCS leakage
- SG tube RUPTURE
- 1. Any condition in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator that indicates loss of the RCS barrier
- 1. Any condition in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator that indicates potential loss of the RCS barrier
- 1. Any condition in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator that indicates loss of the Containment barrier
- 1. Any condition in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator that indicates potential loss of the Containment barrier None None None E. EC Judgment
- 1. RCS leakage > normal makeup capacity due to EITHER:
- UNISOLABLE RCS leakage
- SG tube leakage
- 2. RCS cooldown to < 400°F at
> 100°F/hr OR HPI has operated in the injection mode with no RCPs operating
- 1. A leaking SG is FAULTED outside of containment
- 1. CETCs > 1200°F
- 1. CETCs > 700°F
- 1. CETCs >1200°F AND Restoration procedures not effective within 15 min. (Note 1)
- 1. 1/2/3RIA 57/58 > Table F-2 column FC Loss
- 2. Coolant activity > 300 µCi/ml DEI
- 1. Containment radiation:
- 1,3 RIA 57/58 > 1.0 R/hr
- 2 RIA 57 > 1.6 R/hr
- 2 RIA 58 > 1.0 R/hr
- 1. 1/2/3RIA 57/58 > Table F-2 column CMT Potential Loss None None None
- 1. Containment isolation is required AND EITHER
- Containment integrity has been lost based on Emergency Coordinator judgment
- UNISOLABLE pathway from Containment to the environment exists
- 2. Indications of RCS leakage outside of containment
- 1. Containment pressure > 59 psig
- 2. Containment hydrogen concentration > 4%
- 3. Containment pressure > 10 psig with < one full train of containment heat removal system (1 RBS with > 700 gpm spray flow AND 2 RBCUs) operating per design for 15 min. (Note 1)
- 2. HPI forced cooling initiated System Malfunct.
SA1.1 AC power capability, Table S-1, to essential 4160V buses MFB-1 and MFB-2 reduced to a single power source for 15 min. (Note 1)
AND Any additional single power source failure will result in loss of all AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS SG1.1 None None Fission Product Barriers FS1.1 Loss of any two barriers AND Loss or potential loss of third barrier (Table F-1)
Loss or potential loss of any two barriers (Table F-1)
FA1.1 Any loss or any potential loss of either Fuel Clad or RCS barrier (Table F-1)
FG1.1 1
2 3
4 1
2 3
4 1
2 3
4 SS1.1 Loss of Essential AC Power Loss of all offsite AC power capability to essential buses for 15 minutes or longer SU1.1 Loss of all offsite AC power capability, Table S-1, to essential 4160V buses MFB-1 and MFB-2 for 15 min.
(Note 1)
Loss of all but one AC power source to essential buses for 15 minutes or longer Loss of all offsite and all emergency AC power to essential buses for 15 minutes or longer Prolonged loss of all offsite and all emergency AC power to essential buses Loss of 125 VDC power based on battery bus voltage indications < 105 VDC on both vital DC Distribution Centers DCA and DCB for 15 min. (Note 1)
SS2.1 Loss of all vital DC power for 15 minutes or longer SA6.1 An automatic or manual trip fails to shut down the reactor as indicated by reactor power 5%
AND Manual trip pushbutton is not successful in shutting down the reactor as indicated by reactor power 5% (Note 8)
An automatic or manual trip fails to shut down the reactor as indicated by reactor power 5%
AND All actions to shut down the reactor are not successful as indicated by reactor power 5%
AND EITHER:
- CETCs >1200°F on ICCM
- RCS subcooling < 0ºF SS6.1 Automatic or manual trip fails to shut down the reactor and subsequent manual actions taken at the reactor control consoles are not successful in shutting down the reactor Inability to shut down the reactor causing a challenge to core cooling or RCS heat removal Loss of all onsite or offsite communications capabilities SU7.1 Loss of CR Indications UNPLANNED loss of Control Room indications for 15 minutes or longer SU3.1 An UNPLANNED event results in the inability to monitor one or more Table S-2 parameters from within the Control Room for 15 min. (Note 1)
SA3.1 An UNPLANNED event results in the inability to monitor one or more Table S-2 parameters from within the Control Room for 15 min. (Note 1)
AND Any significant transient is in progress, Table S-3 UNPLANNED loss of Control Room indications for 15 minutes or longer with a significant transient in progress Hazardous event affecting a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode SA9.1 RCS activity greater than Technical Specification allowable limits SU4.1 RCS activity > 50 µCi/gm Dose Equivalent I-131 for > 48 hr continuous period OR RCS activity > 280 µCi/gm Dose Equivalent Xe-133 for > 48 hr continuous period RCS leakage for 15 minutes or longer SU5.1 RCS unidentified or pressure boundary leakage
> 10 gpm for 15 min.
OR RCS identified leakage > 25 gpm for 15 min.
OR Leakage from the RCS to a location outside containment
> 25 gpm for 15 min.
(Note 1)
Automatic or manual trip fails to shut down the reactor SU6.1 None Loss of all offsite and all emergency AC power capability to essential 4160V buses MFB-1 and MFB-2 for 15 min. (Note 1)
Loss of all offsite and all emergency AC power capability to essential 4160V buses MFB-1 and MFB-2 AND Failure to power SSF equipment and PSW unavailable AND EITHER:
- Restoration of at least one essential bus in < 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is not likely (Note 1)
- CETC reading > 1200°F F
S 1
3 9
Loss of Comm.
7 An automatic trip did not shut down the reactor as indicated by reactor power 5% after any RPS setpoint is exceeded AND A subsequent automatic trip or the manual trip pushbutton is successful in shutting down the reactor as indicated by reactor power < 5% (Note 8)
None None None None None Loss of Vital DC Power 2
EAL-HOT MODES 1, 2, 3 & 4 SG1.2 Loss of all offsite and all emergency AC power capability to essential 4160V buses MFB-1 and MFB-2 for 15 min.
AND Failure to power SSF equipment and PSW unavailable AND Loss of 125 VDC power based on battery bus voltage indications < 105 VDC on both vital DC Distribution Centers DCA and DCB for 15 min.
(Note 1)
None RCS Activity 4
RPS Failure 6
RCS Leakage 5
None None None SU6.2 A manual trip did not shut down the reactor as indicated by reactor power 5% after any manual trip action was initiated AND A subsequent automatic trip or the manual trip pushbutton is successful in shutting down the reactor as indicated by reactor power < 5% (Note 8)
Loss of all Table S-4 onsite communication methods OR Loss of all Table S-4 offsite communication methods OR Loss of all Table S-4 NRC communication methods Hazardous Event Affecting Safety Systems None Table S-2 Safety System Parameters
- Reactor power
- RCS level
- RCS pressure
- CETC temperature
- Level in at least one S/G
- EFW flow to at least one S/G 1
2 3
4 1
1 2
3 4
1 2
3 4
1 2
3 4
1 2
3 4
1 2
3 4
1 2
3 4
1 2
3 4
1 2
3 4
1 1
1 2
3 4
None Failure to isolate containment or loss of containment pressure control SU8.1 Any penetration is not closed within 15 min. of a VALID ES actuation signal OR Containment pressure > 10 psig with < one full train of containment heat removal system (1 RBS with > 700 gpm spray flow AND 2 RBCUs) operating per design for 15 min.
(Note 1) 1 2
3 4
1 2
3 4
Table S-5 Hazardous Events Seismic event (earthquake)
Internal or external FLOODING event High winds or tornado strike FIRE EXPLOSION Other events with similar hazard characteristics as determined by the Shift Manager CMT Failure 8
None Loss of all essential AC and vital DC power sources for 15 minutes or longer 1
2 3
4 None Prepared for Duke Energy by: Operations Support Services, Inc. - www.ossi-net.com (1/28/16)
Modes:
1 Power Operations No Mode NM 2
Startup 5
Cold Shutdown 3
Hot Standby 4
Hot Shutdown Oconee Nuclear Station Classification of Emergency CSD-EP-ONS-0101-02 Rev 000 Irradiated Fuel Event RU1.1 Sample analysis for a gaseous or liquid release indicates a concentration or release rate > 2 x SLC/TS limits for 60 min. (Notes 1, 2)
RU1.2 Reading on any Table R-1 effluent radiation monitor
> column UE for 60 min. (Notes 1, 2, 3)
RA1.1 Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses
> 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY (Note 4)
RS1.1 Reading on any Table R-1 effluent radiation monitor > column SAE for 15 min. (Notes 1, 2, 3, 4)
RS1.2 Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses
> 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY (Note 4)
RA1.2 Reading on any Table R-1 effluent radiation monitor
> column ALERT for 15 min. (Notes 1, 2, 3, 4)
RA1.3 Analysis of a liquid effluent sample indicates a concentration or release rate that would result in doses > 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY for 60 min. of exposure (Notes 1, 2)
RU2.1 UNPLANNED water level drop in the REFUELING PATHWAY as indicated by low water level alarm or indication AND UNPLANNED rise in corresponding area radiation levels as indicated by any of the following radiation monitors:
- RIA-3 RB Refueling Deck Shield Wall
- RIA-6 Spent Fuel Building Wall
- Portable area monitors on the main bridge or SFP bridge RA2.2 Damage to irradiated fuel resulting in a release of radioactivity AND HIGH alarm on any of the following radiation monitors:
- RIA-3 RB Refueling Deck Shield Wall
- RIA-6 Spent Fuel Building Wall
- RIA-41 Spent Fuel Pool Gas
- RIA-49 RB Gas
- Portable area monitors on the main bridge or SFP bridge RA3.1 Dose rates > 15 mR/hr in EITHER of the following areas:
- Control Room (RIA-1)
- Central Alarm Station (by survey)
Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity greater than 2 times the SLC/TS limits for 60 minutes or longer Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE Release of gaseous radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem thyroid CDE Release of gaseous radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 1,000 mrem TEDE or 5,000 mrem thyroid CDE Unplanned loss of water level above irradiated fuel Significant lowering of water level above, or damage to, irradiated fuel RA2.1 Uncovery of irradiated fuel in the REFUELING PATHWAY Radiation levels that IMPEDE access to equipment necessary for normal plant operations, cooldown or shutdown RS1.3 Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY:
- Closed window dose rates > 100 mR/hr expected to continue for 60 min.
- Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE
> 500 mrem for 60 min. of inhalation (Notes 1, 2)
Abnorm.
Rad Levels
/ Rad Effluent R
GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT 2
Rad Effluent 1
None None None None HS1.1 A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the PROTECTED AREA as reported by the Security Shift Supervision HU2.1 HU4.1 A FIRE is not extinguished within 15 min. of any of the following FIRE detection indications (Note 1):
- Report from the field (i.e., visual observation)
- Receipt of multiple (more than 1) fire alarms or indications
- Field verification of a single fire alarm AND The FIRE is located within any Table H-1 area HA5.1 Release of a toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable gas into any Table H-2 rooms or areas AND Entry into the room or area is prohibited or IMPEDED (Note 5)
Seismic event greater than OBE levels HU4.2 Receipt of a single fire alarm (i.e., no other indications of a FIRE)
AND The fire alarm is indicating a FIRE within any Table H-1 area AND The existence of a FIRE is not verified within 30 min. of alarm receipt (Note 1)
HU3.2 Internal room or area FLOODING of a magnitude sufficient to require manual or automatic electrical isolation of a SAFETY SYSTEM component needed for the current operating mode FIRE potentially degrading the level of safety of the plant Gaseous release IMPEDING access to equipment necessary for normal plant operations, cooldown or shutdown HU7.1 Other conditions existing that in the judgment of the Site Emergency Coordinator warrant declaration of a UE Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant or indicate a security threat to facility protection has been initiated. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of SAFETY SYSTEMS occurs.
An event has resulted in plant control being transferred from the Control Room to the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel or Standby Shutdown Facility HA6.1 Control Room evacuation resulting in transfer of plant control to alternate locations HS6.1 An event has resulted in plant control being transferred from the Control Room to the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel or Standby Shutdown Facility AND Control of any of the following key safety functions is not reestablished within 15 min. (Note 1):
- Reactivity (Modes 1, 2, and 3 only)
- Core Cooling
- RCS heat removal Inability to control a key safety function from outside the Control Room Other conditions exist which, in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator, indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant or a security event that involves probable life threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment because of HOSTILE ACTION. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.
HA7.1 Other conditions exist that in the judgment of the Site Emergency Coordinator warrant declaration of an Alert HS7.1 Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public or HOSTILE ACTION that results in intentional damage or malicious acts, (1) toward site personnel or equipment that could lead to the likely failure of or, (2) that prevent effective access to equipment needed for the protection of the public.
Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels beyond the SITE BOUNDARY.
Other conditions existing that in the judgment of the Site Emergency Coordinator warrant declaration of a Site Area Emergency HG7.1 Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or IMMINENT substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity or HOSTILE ACTION that results in an actual loss of physical control of the facility. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Site Emergency Coordinator warrant declaration of a General Emergency None Hazards H
Seismic Event Fire Control Room Evacuation Hazardous Gases Security EC Judgment 2
4 5
1 6
7 None HU3.3 Movement of personnel within the PROTECTED AREA is IMPEDED due to an offsite event involving hazardous materials (e.g., an offsite chemical spill or toxic gas release)
None ISFSI EU1.1 Damage to a loaded canister CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY as indicated by an on-contact radiation reading on the surface of a loaded spent fuel cask > any Table E-1 ISFSI dose limit Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY E
Area Rad Levels 3
RA1.4 Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY:
- Closed window dose rates > 10 mR/hr expected to continue for 60 min.
- Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE
> 50 mrem for 60 min. of inhalation (Notes 1, 2)
RG1.1 Reading on any Table R-1 effluent radiation monitor > column GE for 15 min. (Notes 1, 2, 3, 4)
RG1.2 Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses
> 1000 mrem TEDE or 5000 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY (Note 4)
RG1.3 Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY:
- Closed window dose rates > 1000 mR/hr expected to continue for 60 min.
- Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE
> 5000 mrem for 60 min. of inhalation (Notes 1, 2)
RA3.2 An UNPLANNED event results in radiation levels that prohibit or IMPEDE access to any Table R-2 rooms or areas (Note 5)
HU3.1 A tornado strike within the PROTECTED AREA Hazardous event HU3.4 A hazardous event that results in on-site conditions sufficient to prohibit the plant staff from accessing the site via personal vehicles (Note 7)
Natural or Tech.
Hazard 3
HU4.3 A FIRE within the PROTECTED AREA not extinguished within 60 min. of the initial report, alarm or indication (Note 1)
HU4.4 A FIRE within the PROTECTED AREA that requires firefighting support by an offsite fire response agency to extinguish None None None None None None None None RA2.3 Lowering of spent fuel pool level to -13.5 ft.
RS2.1 Lowering of spent fuel pool level to -23.5 ft.
RG2.1 Spent fuel pool level at the top of the fuel racks Spent fuel pool level cannot be restored to at least the top of the fuel racks for 60 minutes or longer Spent fuel pool level cannot be restored to at least -23.5 ft.
for > 60 min. (Note 1) 5 6
1 2
3 4
NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM 6
Refuel Unit 1/2/3 Plant Vent Unit 1/2/3 Plant Vent Gaseous Liquid 3.00E+5 cpm RIA-45 RIA-46 Table R-1 Effluent Monitor Classification Thresholds Release Point Monitor GE SAE Alert UE 3.00E+4 cpm 3.00E+3 cpm 1.41E+5 cpm Liquid Radwaste Discharge RIA-33 4.79E+5 cpm Seismic event > OBE as indicated by EITHER of the following:
- 1SA-9/E-1 (SEISMIC TRIGGER) alarm
- 3SA-9/E-1 (SEISMIC TRIGGER) alarm Onsite Offsite System Commercial phone service ONS site phone system EOF phone system Public address system Onsite radio system DEMNET Offsite radio system NRC Emergency Telephone System Satellite Phone NRC X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X Table S-4 Communication Methods X
X X
X Table S-3 Significant Transients
- Runback > 25% thermal power
- Electrical load rejection > 25% electrical load
- ECCS actuation None
[Refer to EAL CA6.1 OR SA9.1 for escalation due to seismic event]
[Refer to EAL CA6.1 OR SA9.1 for escalation due to natural or technological hazard]
[Refer to EAL CA6.1 OR SA9.1 for escalation due to FIRE]
Table F-2 Containment Radiation - R/hr (1/2/3RIA 57/58)
Time After S/D (Hrs) 0 - < 0.5 0.5 - < 2.0 2.0 - < 8.0
> 8.0 140 40 15 5
FC Loss 300 80 32 10 CMT Potential Loss RIA 57 RIA 58 700 195 75 25 1500 400 160 50 RIA 57 RIA 58 None Table H-2 Safe Operation & Shutdown Rooms/Areas Room / Area Mode(s)
- Turbine Building
- Equipment and Cable Rooms
- Auxiliary Building
- Reactor Buildings 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 3, 4, 5 Table R-2 Safe Operation & Shutdown Rooms/Areas Room / Area Mode(s)
- Turbine Building
- Equipment and Cable Rooms
- Auxiliary Building
- Reactor Buildings 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 3, 4, 5 Table S-1 AC Power Sources Offsite
- Unit Normal Transformer (backcharged)
- Unit Startup Transformer (SWYD)
- Another Unit Startup Transformer (aligned)
(SWYD)
- CT5 (Central/energizing Standby Bus)
Emergency
- Unit Startup Transformer (Keowee)
- Another Unit Startup Transformer (aligned)
(Keowee)
- CT4
- CT5 (dedicated line/energizing Standby Bus)
Table H-1 Fire Areas
- Reactor Building
- Auxiliary Building
- Turbine Building
- Standby Shutdown Facility
- Intake Structure
- Electrical Blockhouse
- Keowee Hydro & associated transformers
- Transformer Yard
- Protected Service Water Building
- Essential Siphon Vacuum Building HU1.1 A SECURITY CONDITION that does not involve a HOSTILE ACTION as reported by the Security Shift Supervision HA1.1 Confirmed SECURITY CONDITION or threat HOSTILE ACTION within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA or airborne attack threat within 30 minutes HOSTILE ACTION within the PROTECTED AREA A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA as reported by the Security Shift Supervision HU1.2 Notification of a credible security threat directed at the site HU1.3 A validated notification from the NRC providing information of an aircraft threat HA1.2 A validated notification from NRC of an aircraft attack threat within 30 min. of the site 5
6 1
2 3
4 ONS Note 1: The Emergency Coordinator should declare the event promptly upon determining that time limit has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.
Note 2: If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded the specified time limit.
Note 3: If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped, indicating that the release path is isolated, the effluent monitor reading is no longer VALID for classification purposes.
Note 4: The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EALs RA1.1, RS1.1 and RG1.1 should be used for emergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment using actual meteorology are available.
Note 5: If the equipment in the listed room or area was already inoperable or out-of-service before the event occurred, then no emergency classification is warranted.
Note 6: If CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is re-established prior to exceeding the 30-minute time limit, declaration of a General Emergency is not required.
Note 7: This EAL does not apply to routine traffic impediments such as fog, snow, ice, or vehicle breakdowns or accidents.
Note 8: A manual trip action is any Control Room operator action, or set of actions, which causes the control rods to be rapidly inserted into the core, and does not include manually driving in control rods or implementation of boron injection strategies.
Note 9: RVLS is not valid if EITHER of the following exists:
One or more RCPs are running OR
- LPI pump(s) are running Note 10: In the absence of reliable RCS temperature indication caused by the loss of decay heat removal capability, classification should be based on time to boil data.
Note 11: If the affected SAFETY SYSTEM train was already inoperable or out of service before the hazardous event occurred, then this emergency classification is not warranted.
Note 12: If the hazardous event only resulted in VISIBLE DAMAGE, with no indications of degraded performance to at least one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM, then this emergency classification is not warranted.
NOTES The occurrence of any Table S-5 hazardous event AND Event damage has caused indications of degraded performance on one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode AND EITHER of the following:
Event damage has caused indications of degraded performance to a second train of the SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode.
Event damage has resulted in VISIBLE DAMAGE to the second train of the SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode (Note 11, 12)
Note 1: The Emergency Coordinator should declare the event promptly upon determining that time limit has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.
Note 2: If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded the specified time limit.
Note 3: If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped, indicating that the release path is isolated, the effluent monitor reading is no longer VALID for classification purposes.
Note 4: The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EALs RA1.1, RS1.1 and RG1.1 should be used for emergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment using actual meteorology are available.
Note 5: If the equipment in the listed room or area was already inoperable or out-of-service before the event occurred, then no emergency classification is warranted.
Note 6: If CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is re-established prior to exceeding the 30-minute time limit, declaration of a General Emergency is not required.
Note 7: This EAL does not apply to routine traffic impediments such as fog, snow, ice, or vehicle breakdowns or accidents.
Note 8: A manual trip action is any Control Room operator action, or set of actions, which causes the control rods to be rapidly inserted into the core, and does not include manually driving in control rods or implementation of boron injection strategies.
Note 9: RVLS is not valid if EITHER of the following exists:
One or more RCPs are running OR
- LPI pump(s) are running Note 10: In the absence of reliable RCS temperature indication caused by the loss of decay heat removal capability, classification should be based on time to boil data.
Note 11: If the affected SAFETY SYSTEM train was already inoperable or out of service before the hazardous event occurred, then this emergency classification is not warranted.
Note 12: If the hazardous event only resulted in VISIBLE DAMAGE, with no indications of degraded performance to at least one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM, then this emergency classification is not warranted.
NOTES ONS None None Table E-1 ISFSI Dose Limits 24P**
400 mrem/hr Location HSM front surface HSM front bird screen Outside HSM door End shield wall exterior 24PHB 1050 mrem/hr 40 mrem/hr 550 mrem/hr 24PTH 1200 mrem/hr 160 mrem/hr 800 mrem/hr HSM Module 24P*
1050 mrem/hr 140 mrem/hr 600 mrem/hr E1-E20, W1-W20 E21-E42, W21-W42 E43-E67, W43-W67 E81-E92, W81-W92 400 mrem/hr 200 mrem/hr 40 mrem/hr 1000 mrem/hr 40 mrem/hr 600 mrem/hr E68-E74, W68-W74 24PHB 24PTH E75-E80, W75-W80
- HSM E1-E20 and W1-W20 were loaded with 24P canisters under the Site Specific License SNM-2503 and only have Technical Specification dose rate limit for HSM surface.
- HSM E21-E42 and W21-W42 were loaded with 24P canisters under the General License CoC 1004.
Table E-1 ISFSI Dose Limits - Notes 5
6 1
2 3
4 NM
Examination KEY ILT20-1 ONS SRO NRC Examination Q A Q A Q A Q A 1
B 26 A
51 B
76 A
2 C
27 A
52 B
77 A
3 D
28 B
53 A
78 D
4 B
29 C
54 C
79 A
5 A
30 A
55 B
80 C
6 A
31 C
56 A
81 B
7 A
32 D
57 C
82 C
8 D
33 C
58 A
83 D
9 B
34 B
59 A
84 C
10 B
35 A
60 C
85 A
11 A
36 B
61 C
86 C
12 C
37 D
62 A
87 A
13 B
38 C
63 C
88 A
14 D
39 D
64 A
89 D
15 A
40 C
65 B
90 D
16 D
41 C
66 A
91 B
17 D
42 D
67 C
92 C
18 C
43 C
68 A
93 A
19 B
44 B
69 C
94 A
20 B
45 C
70 A
95 D
21 A
46 C
71 B
96 D
22 D
47 C
72 A
97 D
23 C
48 B
73 C
98 A
24 D
49 C
74 C
99 B
25 C
50 B
75 D
100 D
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