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{{#Wiki_filter:ID:R01Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:NEWTheplantisoperatingwiththefollowingindications:B21-R612JetPumpTotalFlowRecorder87.4Mlbs/hrC51-R608ARxPowerAPRM1100%B31-R621A/BRRMGSETSPEEDCONTROLLERs73%(controllinginAUTO)Basedontheabovestartingconditionsandassumingnooperatoractioninresponsetothetransient,openingthefieldbreakerfor'A'ReactorRecircPumpwillcauseReactorPowertolower.Thepowerreductionisdueto_______.A.'A'ReactorRecircpumpcoastingdownONLY.B.'A'ReactorRecircPumpcoastingdownPLUSaspeedreductionin'B'ReactorRecircpumpbecauseof#4limiter.C.'A'ReactorRecircPumpcoastingdownPLUSaspeedreductionin'B'ReactorRecircpumpbecauseof#2and#3limiters.D.'A'ReactorRecircPumpcoastingdownPLUSaspeedreductionin'B'ReactorRecircpumpbecauseoflimiter#1limiter.Answer:AILO2015WrittenPage:1of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:Limiter4istheonlyrunbackthatwouldactuate.Atasettingof75%,itwouldhavenoeffectonthereductiononflow.ThereforethecoastdownofApumpistheonlythingloweringRxpower.DistractorExplanation:B.ThisanswerisincorrectbecausethesetpointofLimiter#4is75%,thisanswerisplausibleiftheexamineeincorrectlythought#4limiterasalowersetpoint.C.ThisanswerisincorrectandbecauseLimiters#2and#3arecutout.Thisanswerisplausibleiftheexamineeincorrectlybelieves#2limiterswillenforce.D.ThisanswerisincorrectbecauseLimiter#1isactuactedwhenRRpumpDischargeVlvisnotfullopenortotalFWflowislessthan20%.Thisanswerisplausibleiftheexamineeincorrectlybelievesflowwouldlowerduetolimiterenforcement.ReferenceInformation:23.138.01Section1.0Description(Limiter#2,#3,#4onpage8)-explainslimitersPlantProcedures23.138.01NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295001AK3.KnowledgeofthereasonsforthefollowingresponsesastheyapplytoPARTIALORCOMPLETELOSSOFFORCEDCOREFLOWCIRCULATION:295001AK3.02Reactorpowerresponse10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(10)Administrative,normal,abnormal,andemergencyoperatingproceduresforthefacility.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:2of22008September2015 ID:R02Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:NEWFollowingalossof120kVandareactorSCRAM,thefollowingindicationsexistonpanelH11-P809:BreakerPositionsBUS64BPOSB8CLOSEDBUS64BPOSB6TRIPPEDBUS11EAPOSEA3CLOSEDBUS12EBPOSEB3OPENBUS64CPOSC8CLOSEDBUS64CPOSC6TRIPPEDBasedontheseindications(1)whateventhasoccurred,and(2)whatactionsshouldtheoperatingcrewtakeinadditiontoenteringAOP20.300.120kV?A.(1)BuslockoutonBUS64B(2)Perform20.300.72B,LossOfBus72BONLY.B.(1)BuslockoutonBUS64C(2)Perform20.300.72C,LossOfBus72CONLY.C.(1)EDG12failureduetoafaultwithEDG12(2)Perform20.307.01,EmergencyDieselGeneratorFailureAND20.300.72C,LossOfBus72C.D.(1)EDG11failureduetoafaultwithEDG11(2)Perform20.307.01,EmergencyDieselGeneratorFailureAND20.300.72B,LossOfBus72B.Answer:CILO2015WrittenPage:3of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:20.300.120kVdirects20.307.01and20.300.72CiftheEDG12outputbreakerfailstoclose(ConditionK).Additionally,nobuslockoutisindicatedso20.307.01wouldbeeffectiveifthecauseoftheEDGfailureiscorrectable.DistracterExplanation:A.Isincorrectandplausiblebecausethereisnoindicationofa64BBUSLOCKOUT(indicatedbyBUSisolation).Iftherewasa64BBUSLOCKOUT,entering20.300.72Bwouldbecorrect.B.Isincorrectandplausiblebecausetherethereisnoindicationofa64CBUSLOCKOUT(indicatedbyBUSisolation).Iftherewasa64CBUSLOCKOUT,entering20.300.72Cwouldbecorrect.D.IsincorrectandplausiblebecausetheBUS11EAPOSEA3isCLOSEDsoEDG11hasstartedandloaded.IfEDG11hadfailedthen20.307.01and20.300.72Bwouldbecorrect.ReferenceInformation:20.300.120kv,page9,ConditionK.PlantProcedures20.300.120kvNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295003AA1.Abilitytooperateand/ormonitorthefollowingastheyapplytoPARTIALORCOMPLETELOSSOFA.C.POWER:295003AA1.02Emergencygenerators10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(10)Administrative,normal,abnormal,andemergencyoperatingproceduresforthefacility.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:4of22008September2015 ID:R03Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEW-CONTRACTAt1030,alossofoffsitepoweroccurred.AOP20.300.Offsite,LossofOffsitePower,isbeingimplementedtomitigatetheelectricalsystemevent.At1145(currenttime),electricalsystemindicationsandconditionsareasfollows:*AllEDGsarerunningloaded.*120kVand345kVswitchyardcomponentsaredamagedandarebeingevaluatedbypersonnelforrestoration.*10D72BOP260/130VBATTERY2PCTROUBLEisinalarm.*9D17DIVIESS130VBATTERY2PATROUBLEalarmedbutisnowclear.*10D68DIVIIESS130VBATTERY2PBTROUBLEalarmedbutisnowclear.Iftheelectricalsystemisoperatingwithinitsdesignbases,basedontheindications,(1)whatisthestatusofthestationbatteriesand(2)whatistheirabilitytosupplyloadsduringtheevent?A.(1)Battery2PCisbelowminimumcellvoltage,BOPloadsarede-energized.(2)Batteries2PAand2PBareaboveminimumcellvoltage,ESFloadsaresuppliedadequatepowertooperate.B.(1)Battery2PCisaboveminimumcellvoltage,BOPloadsaresuppliedadequatepowertooperate.(2)Batteries2PAand2PBareaboveminimumcellvoltage,ESFloadsaresuppliedadequatepowertooperate.C.(1)Battery2PCisaboveminimumcellvoltage,BOPloadsshouldbestrippedinordertosupplyadequatepowertoremainingloads.(2)Batteries2PAand2PBareaboveminimumcellvoltage,ESFloadsaresuppliedadequatepowertooperate.D.(1)Battery2PCisbelowminimumcellvoltage,BOPloadsshouldbestrippedinordertosupplyadequatepowertoremainingloads.(2)Batteries2PAand2PBarebelowminimumcellvoltage,ESFloadsshouldbestrippedinordertosupplyadequatepowertoremainingloads.Answer:CILO2015WrittenPage:5of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:BasedonthedesignoftheBOPbatteries,underloadedconditionsthebatteriescansupplyloadsforupto90minutesbeforefallingbelowminimumcellvoltagewithnochargeravailable.Basedontheconditionsofthe120kvswitchyard,currentlynoBOPchargerisavailable.TheprocedurerequiresstrippingtheDCBOPbussesafteronehouriftheDCBOPchargersremainunavailable.ThisistoretainthebatteriesavailableforDCcontrolpoweruseupto4hours.ESFbatteriesarefullyavailablewithchargersenergizedduetotheEDGpowerbeingavailable.AlarmsindicatebatterychargersareinservicefortheESFbatteriesasdirectedbytheprocedure.DistracterExplanation:A.IsincorrectandplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldincorrectlyinterprettheBOPbatterytroublealarmasalossofthebatteryvoltage.Thevoltagealarmisabovetheminimumcellvoltage.Thiswouldalsobesupportedbytheindicationthatoffsitepowercannotberestored.ESFchargersareenergizedasindicatedbythealarmstatuswhichalsoenhancestheplausibilityofthedistracter.B.IsincorrectandplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldincorrectlyinterpretthatsinceEDGpowerisavailableallavailablebatterychargersbothESFandBOPareenergized.ESFchargersareenergizedasindicatedbythealarmstatuswhichalsoenhancestheplausibilityofthedistracter.D.Isincorrectandplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldincorrectlyinterprettheindicationandapplicationoftheknowledgeofthedesignbasisof1.5hourstotheBOPbatteryandconcludethatsinceonehourhaspassedwithoutstrippingtheBOPbattery,thatthecellsarebelowminimumvoltage.ReferenceInformation:R32-00DCELECTRICALSYSTEMDBDpages26-27CriteriaforBOPbatteriesPlantProcedures20.300.OffsiteR32-00DESIGNBASISDOCUMENTFORDCELECTRICALSYSTEMNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295004AA2.Abilitytodetermineand/orinterpretthefollowingastheyapplytoPARTIALORCOMPLETELOSSOFD.C.POWER:295004AA2.03Batteryvoltage10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(10)Administrative,normal,abnormal,andemergencyoperatingproceduresforthefacility.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:6of22008September2015 ID:R04Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:BANK:802-2003-0006-008Withtheplantoperatingat90%power,aFeedwaterControllerFailure-MaximumDemandoccurs.Automaticprotectionfromthistransientisassuredbyascramgeneratedasaresultof________.A.OPRM-Upscaledirectscram,whichpreventsexceedingtheMCPRSafetyLimitB.ReactorWaterLevelHigh-Level8MainTurbineTripindirectscram,whichpreventsexceedingtheMCPRSafetyLimitC.ReactorVesselSteamDomePressure-Highdirectscram,whichpreventsexceedingtheReactorCoolantSystemPressureSafetyLimitD.APRMSimulatedThermalPowerUpscaledirectscram,whichpreventsexceedingtheReactorCoolantSystemPressureSafetyLimitAnswer:BILO2015WrittenPage:7of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:Thefeedwaterandmainturbinehighwaterleveltripinstrumentationisassumedtobecapableofprovidingaturbinetripinthedesignbasistransientanalysisforafeedwatercontrollerfailure,maximumdemandevent.TheLevel8tripindirectlyinitiatesareactorscram(above30%RTP)fromthemainturbinetripandtripsthefeedwaterpumps,therebyterminatingtheevent.ThereactorscrammitigatesthereductioninMCPR.DistracterExplanation:A.Thisisplausibleandincorrectbecausethisprotectsagainstthermalhydraulicpoweroscillations.C.Thisisplausibleandincorrectbecausethisprotectsagainstanyeventthatresultinareactorpressureincrease.D.ThisisplausibleandincorrectbecausethisprovidesprotectionagainstalossoffeedwaterheatingandensurestheMCPRSLisnotexceeded.ReferenceInformation:ForthisquestiontheT.S.B.isusedasareferenceforsysteminformationthatistaughtinthesystemscourseunderlessonplanLP-315-0127pertrainingobjectiveC013:C013.DescribetheReactorProtectionsystemtechnicalspecificationlimitingconditionsforoperation,theirbases,theassociatedsurveillancerequirement(s),andtheirrelationshiptooperability.T.S.B.3.3.2.2(pg3.3.2.2-2)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.2.38Knowledgeofconditionsandlimitationsinthefacilitylicense.295005AK1KnowledgeoftheoperationalimplicationsofthefollowingconceptsastheyapplytoMAINTURBINEGENERATORTRIP:295005AK1.02Corethermallimitconsiderations.TechnicalSpecifications3.3.2.2FeedwaterandMainTurbineHighWaterLevelTripInstrumentation10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(5)Facilityoperatingcharacteristicsduringsteadystateandtransientconditions,includingcoolantchemistry,causesandeffectsoftemperature,pressureandreactivitychanges,effectsofloadchanges,andoperatinglimitationsandreasonsfortheseoperatingcharacteristics.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:8of22008September2015 ID:R05Points:1.00Difficulty:3.50LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:BANK:315-0048-A018-001Theplantwasoperatingat15%powerduringastartup.Duetoanelectricalmalfunction,ALLTurbineControlValvesopenedresultinginaReactorScram.Nooperatoractionshavebeentaken.InadditiontoSafetyReliefValves,whichoneofthefollowingliststhesystemsavailableforDecayHeatRemovalIMMEDIATELYfollowingthescram?A.ReactorWaterCleanupONLY.B.TurbineBypassValvesandReactorWaterCleanupONLY.C.MainSteamLineDrainValvesandTurbineBypassValvesONLY.D.MainSteamLineDrainValves,TurbineBypassValvesandReactorWaterCleanup.Answer:AILO2015WrittenPage:9of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:Withpowerat15%,theModeSwitchisinRUN.TCVsopeninglowersRPVPressure.Whenpressurereaches756psigwithModeSwitchinRUN,aGP1PCISisolationoccursandaScram.WithMSIVsclosed,onlySRVsandRWCUareimmediatelyavailabletoremovedecayheat.DistracterExplanation:B.IsincorrectandplausiblebecauseTurbineBypassValvesarenotavailable.C.IsincorrectandplausiblebecauseTurbineBypassValvesandMSLDrainsarenotavailable.D.IsincorrectandplausiblebecauseTurbineBypassValvesandMSLDrainsarenotavailable.ReferenceInformation:23.601MainSteamLinePressure-Low23.601MainSteamLineIsolationValve-ClosureLimitSwitches20.000.21BasesModeSwitchinterlocksPlantProcedures20.000.2120.000.21BasesNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295006AK1.KnowledgeoftheoperationalimplicationsofthefollowingconceptsastheyapplytoSCRAM:295006AK1.01Decayheatgenerationandremoval10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(10)Administrative,normal,abnormal,andemergencyoperatingproceduresforthefacility.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:10of22008September2015 ID:R06Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEW-CONTRACTTheplantwasoperatingat100%powerwhenafireoccurredintheOwnerControlledArea.Thefireengulfedseveralbuildingsincludingtheonsitevehiclegarage.Thefollowingtimelineofeventssubsequentlyoccurred:10:30HeavyblacksmokeisdrawnintotheventilationintakemakingtheControlRoomuninhabitable.11:15Alloffsitepowerislost.Basedontheaboveplantconditions,at10:30controloftheplantwouldhaveshiftedtothe__________________.A.RemoteShutdownPanelandremainedthereforthedurationoftheeventB.DedicatedShutdownPanelandremainedthereforthedurationoftheeventC.RemoteShutdownPanelandsubsequentlytotheDedicatedShutdownPanelat11:15D.DedicatedShutdownPanelandsubsequentlytotheRemoteShutdownPanelat11:15Answer:CILO2015WrittenPage:11of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:Initiallyat10:30thecorrectlocationforremotecontroloftheplantduetoanuncomplicatedcontrolroomevacuationistheRemoteShutdownPanel.Attime11:15controloftheplantisrequiredtoshifttotheDedicatedShutdownPanelsincetheRemoteShutdownSystemisdesignedforanuncomplicatedcontrolroomevacuationeventandassuchdoesnotservetomitigatethefullrangeofdesignbasisevents.Therefore,transfertotheDedicatedShutdownPanelisrequiredsincethissystemprovidesameansofrestoringACpowertotheDiv1ESFandBOPbussesaswellasthenecessarysystemcontrolsandinstrumentationtomaintainthereactorcorecoveredintheeventofaControlRoomevacuationcoincidentwithalossofoffsitepower.DistracterExplanation:A.IsincorrectandplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldincorrectlyassumethattheRemoteShutdownPanelwasdesignedforthistypeofevent.ThecandidatecouldfailtorecognizethattheRemoteShutdownSystemisdesignedforacontrolroomevacuationevent(shorttermduration)andassuchdoesnotservetomitigatethefullrangeofdesignbasiseventsforwhichtheMainControlRoomwasdesigned.FurthermorethecandidatecouldalsofailtorecognizethattheDedicatedShutdownSystemprovidesameansofrestoringACpowertotheDiv1ESFandBOPbusses.Thepanelalsoprovidesnecessarysystemcontrolsandinstrumentationtomaintainthereactorcorecovered.Powerrestorationmaybecomenecessaryfollowingafireorlossofoffsitepower.B.IsincorrectandplausibleiftheexamineeincorrectlyassumedthatcontroloftheplantfromtheDedicatedShutdownPanelwasrequiredforallMainControlRoomevacuationeventsthatarearesultofanonsitefire.ThecandidatecouldfailtorecognizethatcontrolfromtheDedicatedShutdownPanelisonlyrequiredforfiresina3L"zoneofconcern"thathasthepotentialtoimpactsafeplantshutdowncapabilityduetomultiplehotshortsand/oropencircuitscausinglossofcontrolfromthecontrolroom.D.IsincorrectandplausibleiftheexamineeincorrectlyassumedthatcontroloftheplantfromtheDedicatedShutdownPanelwasrequiredforallMainControlRoomevacuationeventsthatarearesultofanonsitefire.Thecandidatecouldthenconcludethat,uponLossofOffsitePower,thecorrectresponsewouldbetoshiftcontroltotheRemoteShutdownPanel.ThecandidatecouldfailtorecognizethattheDedicatedShutdownSystemisdesignedtoallowforremotecontroloftheplantconcurrentwithalossofoffsitepowerevent.ReferenceInformation:20.000.19(pg2)Overide120.000.19BASES(pg2)Overide1Bases20.000.18BASES(pg2)-BASESSUMMARYILO2015WrittenPage:12of22008September2015 PlantProcedures20.000.1820.000.1920.000.18Bases20.000.19BasesNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295016AK2.KnowledgeoftheinterrelationsbetweenCONTROLROOMABANDONMENTandthefollowing:295016AK2.02Localcontrolstations:Plant-Specific10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:13of22008September2015 ID:R07Points:1.00Difficulty:2.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEW-CONTRACTTheplantisoperatingat100%powerwiththefollowingconditions:*#2GSWPumpsarerunning.*#3GSWPumpisOOSformotorreplacement.*#4GSWPumphasjusttripped.*#6GSWPumpisOOSfordischargestrainerleakrepair.*GSWHeaderPressuresteadyat70psigwiththeP4100-F841,GSWBypassLinePressureCtrlVlv,50%open.*RBCCWHeatExchangeroutlettemperatureis90°Fandrising.WhichONEofthefollowingactionsisrequiredtostabilizetheaboveconditions?A.DispatchanoperatortothrottleclosedP4100-F841,GSWBypassLinePressureCtrlVlv,inordertoraiseGSWheaderpressureandrestoreadequatecoolingwaterflow.B.DispatchanoperatortothrottleopenP4100-F840,GSWFlowTestPressureCtrlVlv,inordertoraiseGSWheaderpressureandrestoreadequatecoolingwaterflow.C.Scramthereactor,tripthemainturbineandinitiateDiv1and2EECWinordertoestablishcoolingtosafetyrelatedequipmentandrestoreGSWheaderpressuretonormalband.D.IncreasecoolingwaterflowusingP42-F400,RBCCWTempControlVlvinAUTO,orMANUALifnecessary,inordertorestoreRBCCWHeatExchangeroutlettemperatureandGSWheaderpressureinband.Answer:AILO2015WrittenPage:14of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:P4100-F841,GSWBypassLinePressureCtrlVlvisadump,orbackpressure,controlvalve.Priortothetransientandtripof#4GSWPump,thisvalvewasrequiredtobeopentomaintainGSWheaderpressuredueto3pumpsbeinginexcessoftheplantcoolingwaterrequirements.Withonly2GSWpumpsrunning,closingthisvalvewillraiseGSWheaderpressureandincreasecoolingwaterflowtotheCCWheatexchangerscooledbyGSWtherebyloweringCCWcoolingtemperatures,suchastheelevatedRBCCWHeatExchangeroutlet.DistracterExplanation:B.Isincorrectandplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldincorrectlydeterminethat,sincetheP4100-F841,GSWBypassLinePressureCtrlVlv,isatits50%openlimitthenpressurecontrolwouldlogicallytransfertotheP4100-F840,GSWFlowTestPressureCtrlVlv.Thiswouldbecorrectforahighpressurecondition.TheexamineecouldalsoincorrectlydeterminethatGSWpressurecontrolvalvesarethrottledOPENtoraiseGSWheaderpressure,however,thevalvesareactuallybackpressurecontrolvalvesandmustbethrottledCLOSEDtoraiseGSWheaderpressureandincreasecoolingwaterflowtosupportedCCWheatexchangers.C.Isincorrectandplausiblebecausethecandidatecouldincorrectlydeterminethat,sinceGSWheaderpressureisbelow65#,theplantandmainturbineshouldbetripped,andEECWinitiated,asdirectedbythelossofGSWAOP.However,thelossofGSWAOPoverridestatementonlyrequiresaplantscramifGSWheaderpressurecannotberestoredANDMAINTAINEDabove65psig.TheexamineeshoulddeterminethatthrottlingcapacityexiststorestoreGSWheaderpressurewithouttheneedforthesedrasticactions.D.IsincorrectandplausiblebecausethecandidatecouldincorrectlydeterminethatthrottlingopentheP42-F400,RBCCWTempControlVlvinAUTO,orMANUAL,wouldcorrecttheelevatedRBCCWHeatExchangeroutlettemperaturecondition.AlthoughthisactionisdirectedbyARP2D120,RBCCWHXDISCHTEMPERATUREHIGH/LOWforaHighTemperaturecondition,theactionisaccompaniedbyaconditionalstatementtomaketheadjustmentswhilemonitoringGSWheaderpressure.WithGSWheaderpressurealreadydegraded,thisactionwouldnotbeprudent.ReferenceInformation:ARP7D14(pg1)GSWpressurelowactions23.131(pg23-25)GSWpressurecontrolILO2015WrittenPage:15of22008September2015 PlantProcedures23.13107D1423.12702D120NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295018AK3.KnowledgeofthereasonsforthefollowingresponsesastheyapplytoPARTIALORCOMPLETELOSSOFCOMPONENTCOOLINGWATER:295018AK3.06Increasingcoolingwaterflowtoheatexchangers.10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(5)Facilityoperatingcharacteristicsduringsteadystateandtransientconditions,includingcoolantchemistry,causesandeffectsoftemperature,pressureandreactivitychanges,effectsofloadchanges,andoperatinglimitationsandreasonsfortheseoperatingcharacteristics.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:16of22008September2015 ID:R08Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:NEWTheplantisoperatingat100%powerwiththefollowingStationAirCompressorlineup:EastStationAirCompressorOffCenterStationAirCompressorRunningWestStationAirCompressorAutoFollowingaseismicevent,Bus72Ahasbeende-energized,andbothControlAirCompressorsautostartduetoloweringairpressure.At83psi,allairheaderpressuresbegintorecover.Assumingnooperatoraction,whatisthestatusofthefollowingStationAirvalves?P50-F401P50-F402P50-F440STATIONAIRTOTBHDRISOVLVSTATIONAIRTONIASISOVLVDIV1CONTROLAIRISOVLVA.B.C.D.Answer:BILO2015WrittenPage:17of22008September2015CLOSEDCLOSEDOPENOPENOPENCLOSEDCLOSEDOPENCLOSEDOPENOPENCLOSED AnswerExplanation:Basedonlogicprintslisted&AOP20.129.01,ControlAirCompressorsstartat85psithereforesystempresshastogotobelow85psiandthen,perthequestionsstempressurerecovers.Basedonthisthe401willgetaclosedsignal,andthe402and440willnotgetclosesignals.DistracterExplanation:Distracterareplausiblebasedonnotunderstandingsetpointsorpowersupplies/auto-startsofcompressorsA.Isincorrectbecause401willgetclosesignalat85#.Thisanswerisplausibleiftheexamineeincorrectlyassumesthesystempressuredidnotgolowenoughtocauseisolations.C.Isincorrectbecause402willnotgetclosesignaluntil75#andairheaderonlywentto83#.Thisanswerisplausibleiftheexamineeincorrectlyassumesthesystempressuredidgolowenoughtocauseisolations.D.Isincorrectbecause402&440willnotgetclosesignaluntil75#andairheaderonlywentto83#.Thisanswerisplausibleiftheexamineeincorrectlyassumesthesystempressuredidgolowenoughtocauseisolations.ReferenceInformation:I-2450-02,04,05arenotshownhere,howevertheyareincludedindevelopmentfolder,theAOPactionsmatchtheactuations.20.129.01(pg3)Systemactuationbasedonpressureperactionstatement.PlantProcedures20.129.0120.300.72ANUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295019AA1.Abilitytooperateand/ormonitorthefollowingastheyapplytoPARTIALORCOMPLETELOSSOFINSTRUMENTAIR:295019AA1.04Serviceairisolationsvalves:Plant-Specific10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:18of22008September2015 ID:R09Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:MODIFIEDBANK:ID26798TheplantisinHOTSHUTDOWNwiththefollowingconditions:*ReactorPressureis25psig.*RPVWaterLevelis250inchesandstable.*RHRPumpBisoperatinginShutdownCoolingMode.Whenthefollowingalarmoccurs:*2D26,DIVIIRHRSYSTEMLOWFLOWBYPASSINITIATED.Withoutoperatoractionwhichoneofthefollowingdescribes(1)theeffectonReactorWaterLeveland(2)reasonforthateffect?A.(1)ReactorWaterLevelwillremainthesame.(2)TheRHRpumpsminflowvalvehasopened;systemflowrateisreduced.B.(1)ReactorWaterLevelwillremainthesame.(2)TheRHRsystemflowislow,indicatingalowheatloadcondition.C.(1)ReactorWaterLevelwillrise.(2)TheRHRsystemflowfromthevesselislow,thisindicatesaflowimbalance.D.(1)ReactorWaterLevelwilllower.(2)TheRHRpumpsminflowvalvehasopened,rejectingRxwatertotheTorus.Answer:DILO2015WrittenPage:19of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:Thealarm2D26indicatestheRHRpumpsminflowvalvehasopenedresultinginincreasedpumpflow(twopaths).TheminflowvalvewillrejectRxwatertotheToruscausingleveltoloweruntilalowRxwaterlevelisolationisreached.OE:SOER87-002,InadvertentDrainingoftheReactorVesseltoSuppressionPoolatBWRsDistracterExplanation:A.ThisisplausibleandincorrectbecauseSDCisaclosedloopsystem,howeverwhentheminflowvalveisopenitbecomesarejectionpathcausingleveltolower.B.Thisisplausibleandincorrectbecausetheexamineecouldidentifythelowflowalarmtobelowflowinaclosedloopsystem,whichwouldhavenoeffectonlevel.C.ThisisplausibleandincorrectbecausetheexamineecouldidentifythelowflowalarmwithRHRoutputfromthevessel,andgivenafeedandbleedtypesystemthiscouldidentifyaconditionthatcausesleveltorise.ReferenceInformation:ARP2D26(pg1)Actionforthiscondition.FOSM-5706-1Greenhighlightofpathfordraintotorus(locatedinDevelopmentfolder)PlantProcedures03D07902D026IERs/SOERs/SERs/SENs/O&MRSOER87-2InadvertantDrainingofReactorVesseltoSuppressionPoolatBWRsNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295021AA2.Abilitytodetermineand/orinterpretthefollowingastheyapplytoLOSSOFSHUTDOWNCOOLING:295021AA2.03Reactorwaterlevel10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:20of22008September2015 ID:R10Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEW-CONTRACTCorealterationsareinprogresswiththeplantinMode5.'A'RHRpumpisoperatingintheshutdowncoolingmodeand'C'RHRpumpisavailableinstandby.'B'and'D'RHRpumpsareoutofservice.Thecontrolroomreceivesareportthatspentfuelpoollevelisslowlylowering.Anuclearoperatorisolatesthesourceoftheleakandthelevelreductionisstopped.*2D1FuelPoolLevelLowisalarmed.*2D13FuelPoolCoolingTroubleisalarmed.*FPCCUPumpshavetripped.*ThecontrolroomdeterminesthatRPVlevelis20.0ftabovetheRPVflangeusingB21-R605,RPVWaterLevelFloodUpRange.Whichoneofthefollowingactionsisrequired?A.SuspendmovementoffuelassemblieswithintheRPV.B.Verifyanalternatemethodofdecayheatremovalisavailable.C.Verifytwoalternatemethodsofdecayheatremovalareavailable.D.Initiateactiontorestoresecondarycontainmenttooperablestatus.Answer:AILO2015WrittenPage:21of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:TheexamineeshouldcorrectlydeterminethatTechnicalSpecification3.9.6(RefuelingOperations-RPVWaterLevel)requiressuspensionofmovementoffuelassemblieswithRPVlevel<20ft6inches.ThecompletiontimefortheactionisIMMEDIATELY.DistracterExplanation:B.IsincorrectandplausiblebecauseexamineemayincorrectlyidentifyTechnicalSpecification3.9.7actionsrequireoneverificationthatanalternatemethodofdecayheatremovalisavailablewithacompletiontimeofIMMEDIATELYifoneRHRSDCsubsystemisnotinoperation.Withlevel<20ft6inches,thisLCOisnotapplicable.C.IsincorrectandplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldincorrectlyidentifyTechnicalSpecification3.9.8requiresverificationofanalternatemethodofdecayheatisavailableforeachinoperablerequiredRHRSDCsubsystem.AlthoughBandDareinoperabletwostillremainandeventhoughRPVlevelislessthan20ft6incheswhichmakestheLCOapplicable,theconditionforentryisnotcurrentlymet.D.IsincorrectandplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldincorrectlyidentifyTechnicalSpecification3.9.7and3.9.8haveactionstoIMMEDIATELYrestoresecondarycontainmenttooperablestatusifthecompletiontimesofconditionAinbothLCOsarenotmet.ReferenceInformation:T.S.3.9.6(pg3.9-9)LCOandImmediateaction.NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.2.39Knowledgeoflessthanonehourtechnicalspecificationactionstatementsforsystems.295023RefuelingAccidentsTechnicalSpecifications3.9.6ReactorPressureVessel(RPV)WaterLevel10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamLOR2015Exam2SROLOR2015Exam2ROILO2015WrittenPage:22of22008September2015 ID:R11Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:NEW-CONTRACTWhichoftheresponsesbelowcompletesthefollowingregardingtheoperationalimplicationsofHighDrywellPressure?InMODES1,2and3,themaximumallowableDrywellPressureis__(1)__.Thislimitisbasedon__(2)__.A.(1)2.25psig(2)maintainingtheresultantdifferentialpressurebelowthemaximumprimarycontainmentdesigndifferentialpressureintheeventofinadvertentdrywellsprayactuation.B.(1)2.0psig(2)maintainingtheresultantdifferentialpressurebelowthemaximumprimarycontainmentdesigndifferentialpressureintheeventofinadvertentdrywellsprayactuation.C.(1)2.25psig(2)maintainingtheresultantpeakprimarycontainmentaccidentpressurebelowtheprimarycontainmentdesignpressureintheeventofaDesignBasisAccident(DBA).D.(1)2.0psig(2)maintainingtheresultantpeakprimarycontainmentaccidentpressurebelowtheprimarycontainmentdesignpressureintheeventofaDesignBasisAccident(DBA).Answer:DILO2015WrittenPage:23of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:Theexamineeshouldcorrectlyconcludethat,inaccordancewithLCO3.6.1.4,themaximumDrywellPressureinthespecifiedMODEsis2.0psig.TheexamineeshouldalsoconcludethatthebasesforthislimitistopreservetheinitialconditionsassumedintheaccidentanalysisfortheDesignBasisAccident(DBA)thusensuringthatthepeakprimarycontainmentpressuredoesnotexceedthedesignpressureoftheprimarycontainmentpressure.DistracterExplanation:A.IsincorrectandplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldfailtorecognizetheLCO3.6.1.4maximumallowableDrywellPressureof2.0psig.Also,theexamineecouldfailtorecognizethatthebasisgiveninthesecondpartofthedistractorisfortheminimumallowableDrywellPressurespecifiedbyLCO3.6.1.4inMODES1,2and3,whichprotectscontainmentintegritybykeepingexternaltointernaldrywelldifferentialpressurebelowthemaximumallowabledesignD/P.B.IsincorrectandplausiblebecausethefirstpartofthedistractordoesprovidethecorrectmaximumDrywellPressureallowedbyLCO3.6.1.4intheMODEsspecified.However,theexamineecouldfailtorecognizethatthebasisgiveninthesecondpartofthedistractorisfortheminimumallowableDrywellPressurespecifiedbyLCO3.6.1.4inMODES1,2and3,whichprotectscontainmentintegritybykeepingexternaltointernaldrywelldifferentialpressurebelowthemaximumallowabledesignD/P.C.IsincorrectandplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldfailtorecognizetheLCO3.6.1.4maximumallowableDrywellPressureof2.0psig.ReferenceInformation:ForthisquestiontheT.S.B.isusedasareferenceforsysteminformationthatistaughtinthesystemscourseunderlessonplanLP-315-0127pertrainingobjectiveC013:C013.DescribetheReactorProtectionsystemtechnicalspecificationlimitingconditionsforoperation,theirbases,theassociatedsurveillancerequirement(s),andtheirrelationshiptooperability.T.S.3.6.1.4(pg3.6-18)LCOstatementT.S.3.6.1.4BASES(pgB3.3.1.4-1to2)Basesforlimit.ILO2015WrittenPage:24of22008September2015 PlantProcedures03D081NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295024EK1.KnowledgeoftheoperationalimplicationsofthefollowingconceptsastheyapplytoHIGHDRYWELLPRESSURE:295024EK1.01Drywellintegrity:Plant-SpecificTechnicalSpecifications3.6.1.4PrimaryContainmentPressure10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(8)Components,capacity,andfunctionsofemergencysystems.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:25of22008September2015 ID:R12Points:1.00Difficulty:2.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:NEW-CONTRACTThereactorisneartheendofanoperatingcyclewithPowerandRecirculationFlowat100%.IftheplantrespondsasassumedintheFermi2over-pressurizationprotectionanalysis,whenatleasttwoAveragePowerRangeMonitorsreach________,thereactorwillscraminordertoterminateaMainSteamIsolationValve(MSIV)closureevent.A.107.2%NeutronFluxB.113.5%SimulatedThermalPowerC.118%NeutronFluxD.122.2%SimulatedThermalPowerAnswer:CILO2015WrittenPage:26of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:AstheMSIVclosureeventisoccurring,reactorpressurewillbeincreasing.TheincreaseinRPVpressureduringreactoroperationwillcompressthesteamvoidsandresultinapositivereactivityinsertion,whichthencausesneutronfluxandThermalPowertoincrease.TheFermi2over-pressurizationprotectionanalysisconservativelyassumesscramontheAveragePowerRangeMonitorNeutronFlux-Upscaletripof118%which,alongwiththeSRVs,limitsthepeakRPVpressuretolessthantheASMECodelimits.DistracterExplanation:A.Isincorrectandplausibleifthecandidateassumedthatthe107.2%wastheAPRMsetpoint.The107.2%istheRBMHTSPat>82%reactorpowerwhichwillonlycauseaRodWithdrawlBlock.B.IsincorrectandplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldfailtorecognizethattheAPRMSTP-UpscaletripprovidesprotectionagainsttransientswhereThermalPowerincreasesslowlyandnotforrapidlychangingpowereventssuchastheMSIVclosureand,therefore,assumesthatsincetheAPRMSTP-Upscaletripisclampedatanupperlimitof113.5%,whichislowerthantheAPRMNeutronFlux-UpscaleFunctionAllowableValueat100%recirculationflow,thatthisfunctionwillterminatetheMSIVclosureeventbeforetheAPRMUpscaleFunction.D.IsincorrectandplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldfailtorecognizethattheAPRMSTP-UpscaletripprovidesprotectionagainsttransientswhereThermalPowerincreasesslowlyandnotforrapidlychangingpowereventssuchastheMSIVclosureandthencalculatestheSTPupscaletripfor100%ReferenceInformation:ForthisquestiontheT.S.B.isusedasareferenceforsysteminformationthatistaughtinthesystemscourseunderlessonplanLP-315-0105pertrainingobjectiveC013:C013.DescribetheNuclearBoilersystemtechnicalspecificationlimitingcon¬ditionsforoperation,theirbases,theassociatedsurveillancerequirement(s),andtheirrelationshiptooperability.T.S.B.3.3.1.1(pgB3.3.1.1-14to15)BasesforMSICClosureILO2015WrittenPage:27of22008September2015 PlantProcedures03D09303D073NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295025EK2.KnowledgeoftheinterrelationsbetweenHIGHREACTORPRESSUREandthefollowing:295025EK2.09ReactorpowerTechnicalSpecifications3.3.1.1ReactorProtectionSystem(RPS)Instrumentation10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:28of22008September2015 ID:R13Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:NEW-CONTRACTWhichoftheresponsesbelowbestcompletesthefollowingstatementregardingthecriticalparameterfortheHeatCapacityLimit(HCL)curveandthebasisbehindwhythereactormustbeEmergencyDepressurizedwhenthecurveisexceeded?ThereactorisEmergencyDepressurizedwhen__(1)__exceedstheHCLtoensurethatthe__(2)__isnotexceededbeforethedepressurizationoftheRPViscomplete.A.(1)DrywellTemperature(2)DrywellDesignTemperatureB.(1)DrywellTemperature(2)PressureSuppressionPressureC.(1)TorusWaterTemperature(2)TorusDesignTemperatureD.(1)TorusWaterTemperature(2)PressureSuppressionPressureAnswer:CILO2015WrittenPage:29of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:ThecriticalparameterontheHCLcurveisTorusWaterTemperature.EmergencyDepressurizingduetoexceedingtheHCLcurveisbasedonnotexceedingeitherthetorusdesigntemperatureorthePCPLbeforethedepressurizationoftheRPViscomplete.DistracterExplanation:A.IsincorrectandplausiblebecausetheexamineecoulddeterminethatthecriticalparameterontheHCLcurveisDrywellTemperatureandthereforeconcludethatEmergencyDepressurizingduetoexceedingtheHCLcurveisbasedonnotexceedingthedrywelldesigntemperaturebeforethedepressurizationoftheRPViscomplete.B.IsincorrectandplausiblebecausetheexamineecoulddeterminethatthecriticalparameterontheHCLcurveisDrywellTemperature.ThecandidatecouldincorrectlyconcludethatEmergencyDepressurizingduetoexceedingtheHCLcurveisbasedonnotexceedingthePressureSuppressionPressureofcontainmentratherthanthePCPLlimitbeforethedepressurizationoftheRPViscomplete.D.IsincorrectandplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldcorrectlyrecognizethatthecriticalparameterontheHCLcurveisTorusWaterTemperature.However,thecandidatecouldincorrectlyconcludethatEmergencyDepressurizingduetoexceedingtheHCLcurveisbasedonnotexceedingthePressureSuppressionPressureofcontainmentratherthanthePCPLlimitbeforethedepressurizationoftheRPViscomplete.ReferenceInformation:BWROGEPGs/SAGs,AppendixB(pgB-7-24&B-17-16to17)BasesofHCL&EmergencyDepressurization.PlantProcedures29.100.01SH2BWROGEPGAppBNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295026EK3.KnowledgeofthereasonsforthefollowingresponsesastheyapplytoSUPPRESSIONPOOLHIGHWATERTEMPERATURE:295026EK3.01Emergency/normaldepressurization10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(8)Components,capacity,andfunctionsofemergencysystems.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamLOR2015QuestionPoolILO2015WrittenPage:30of22008September2015 ID:R14Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEW-CONTRACTAtwhichofthefollowingDrywellTemperatureandRPVpressuremayPRVWaterlevelindicationbecomeunreliableduetoboilingintheinstrumentrun?DrywellTemperatureRPVpressureA.250°F25PSIGB.325°F50PSIGC.350°F150PSIGD.375°F250PSIGAnswer:BILO2015WrittenPage:31of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:UsingtheRPVSaturationTemperaturecurve,at50psigintheReactor,theDrywellTemperaturelistedatwhichtheinstrumentmaybecomereliableduetoboilingintherunisaboove300°F.DistracterExplanation:DistractersaincorrectandplausiblebasedinplottingthedataintheRPVSaturationTemperaturecurve.ReferenceInformation:29.100.01SH6notincludehere,acopyisinthehandoutfolder.PlantProcedures29.100.01SH6NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295028EA2.Abilitytodetermineand/orinterpretthefollowingastheyapplytoHIGHDRYWELLTEMPERATURE:295028EA2.02Reactorpressure10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(10)Administrative,normal,abnormal,andemergencyoperatingproceduresforthefacility.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:32of22008September2015 ID:R15Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEWAplanteventhasdamagedtheReactorBuilding.TheOperatingShiftisexecutingtheEOPs.*Thereactorhasscrammedhowever12rodsarestuckat04*RWLis176inches.*ReactorPressureis900psig.*TheMSIVsareopen.TheSTAhasplottedthreepointsonthePSPbasedonvaliddatafromMCRindication.Basedonthisdata,theOperatingshiftshouldpreparefor(1)whichofthefollowingcoursesofactionand(2)why?A.(1)DepressurizeusingBypassValvesignoringcooldownrates.(2)Becausesuppressionpoolwaterlevelwillbelowenoughthatsteamdischargedfromthedrywellintothesuppressionpoolmaynotbecondensed.B.(1)DepressurizeusingBypassValvesignoringcooldownrates.(2)BecausesuppressionpoolwaterlevelwillcorrespondtotheMinimumPressureSuppressionPrimaryContainmentWaterLevel.Belowthislevel,thepressuresuppressioncapabilityoftheprimarycontainmentmaybeinsufficienttoaccommodateanRPVbreachbycoredebris.C.(1)EmergencyDepressurize(2)Becausesuppressionpoolwaterlevelwillbelowenoughthatsteamdischargedfromthedrywellintothesuppressionpoolmaynotbecondensed.D.(1)EmergencyDepressurize(2)BecausesuppressionpoolwaterlevelwillcorrespondtotheMinimumPressureSuppressionPrimaryContainmentWaterLevel.Belowthislevel,thepressuresuppressioncapabilityoftheprimarycontainmentmaybeinsufficienttoaccommodateanRPVbreachbycoredebris.ILO2015WrittenPage:33of22008September2015 Answer:CILO2015WrittenPage:34of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:SuppressionpoolwaterlevelmustbemaintainedabovetheelevationoftheMarkI/IIdowncomerventopeningsorleast2feetabovethetopoftheMarkIIIhorizontalventstoensurethatsteamdischargedfromthedrywellintothesuppressionpoolfollowingaprimarysystembreakwillbeadequatelycondensed.(ResultsoftheBodegaBayMarkIcontainmenttestsindicate95%steamcondensationmaybeachievedfromaverticaldowncomerventthatdischargesatalevelsixinchesabovethesuppressionpoolsurface.)Ifsuppressionpoolwaterlevelcannotbemaintainedabovethespecifiedminimumvalue,steammaynotbeadequatelycondensedandprimarycontainmentpressurecouldexceedallowablelimits.SincetheRPVmaynotbekeptatpressurewhenpressuresuppressioncapabilityisunavailable,EmergencyRPVDepressurizationisrequired.[Leftmostline]isthesuppressionpoolwaterlevelcorrespondingtotheelevationofthedowncomerventopeningsortwofeetabovethehorizontalvents,asappropriate.Ifsuppressionpoolwaterlevelisbelowthiselevation,theRPVmaynotbekeptinapressurizedstatesincesteamdischargedthroughtheventsmaynotbecondensed.[rightmostline]isthesuppressionpoolwaterlevelcorrespondingtotheMaximumPressureSuppressionPrimaryContainmentWaterLevel.Abovethiselevation,thepressuresuppressioncapabilityoftheprimarycontainmentmaybeinsufficienttoaccommodateanRPVbreachbycoredebris.DistractersExplanation:"(1)DepressurizeusingBypassValvesignoringcooldownrates."-Thisanswerisplausibleandincorrect.Theexamineewouldchoosethisanswerbecauseitisavalidmethodtoreduceprimarypressureanditwouldputallthatenergyofthethedepressurizationinthecondenser.HoweverthisisnotthemethodallowedbytheEOPsforthiscondition."(2)BecausesuppressionpoolwaterlevelwillcorrespondtotheMinimumPressureSuppressionPrimaryContainmentWaterLevel.Belowthislevel,thepressuresuppressioncapabilityoftheprimarycontainmentmaybeinsufficienttoaccommodateanRPVbreachbycoredebris."-Thisanswerisplausibleandincorrect.TheexamineewouldchoosethisanswerbasedonrememberingtheupperlimitforTWL.IEtheMaximumPressureSuppressionPrimaryContainmentWaterLevel.ReferenceInformation:BWREPGAppendixB(pgB-7-49)and(pgB-17-64)PlantProceduresBWROGEPGAppBNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.4.18KnowledgeofthespecificbasesforEOPs295030LowSuppressionPoolWaterLevel10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(10)Administrative,normal,abnormal,andemergencyoperatingproceduresforthefacility.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:35of22008September2015 ILO2015WrittenPage:36of22008September2015 ID:R16Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:NEW-CONTRACTWhichoneofthefollowingrepresentstheminimumRPVlevelwhere(1)adequatecorecoolingexists,and(2)themaximumexpectedcladtemperatureifSBFWpumpsaretheonlysourceinjecting?A.(1)-25"(2)1500°FB.(1)-48"(2)1500°FC.(1)-25"(2)1800°FD.(1)-48"(2)1800°FAnswer:AILO2015WrittenPage:37of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:TheMinimumSteamCoolingRPVWaterLevel(MSCRWL)isdefinedasthelowestRPVwaterlevelatwhichthecoveredportionofthereactorcorewillgeneratesufficientsteamtoprecludeanycladtemperatureintheuncoveredportionofthecorefromexceeding1500°F.AtFermi2itiscalculatedtobe-25.DistracterExplanation:AlldistractersareincorrectandplausibleiftheexamineedoesnotunderstandtheMSCRWLrequirements.TheMinimumZero-InjectionRPVWaterLevelisdefinedtobethelowestRPVwaterlevelatwhichthecoveredportionofthereactorcorewillgeneratesufficientsteamtoprecludeanycladtemperatureintheuncoveredportionofthecorefromexceeding1800oF.AdequateCoreCoolingisensuredaslongasCoreSprayrequirements(5725gpm)aresatisfiedandRPVwaterlevelcanberestoredandmaintainedatorabovetheelevationofthejetpumpsuctions(-48in).ReferenceInformation:BWROGEPG(pgB-17-58)MCSRWLMSCRWLDesignCalc(pg1)PlantProceduresBWROGEPGAppBNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295031EK1.KnowledgeoftheoperationalimplicationsofthefollowingconceptsastheyapplytoREACTORLOWWATERLEVEL:295031EK1.01AdequatecorecoolingNRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:38of22008September2015 ID:R17Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEW-CONTRACTTheplanthasexperiencedatransientthatresultedinareactorscramwithreactorpowerabove5%.Thecrewisusing29.ESP.03foralternatecontrolrodinsertion.WhichONEofthefollowingalternatecontrolrodinsertionmethodsin29.ESP.03couldbemademoreeffectivebyCLOSINGC1100-F034,CRDChargingWaterHeaderIsolationValve?A.IncreaseCRDCoolingWaterDifferentialPressureB.ScramResetAndManualScramReinitiationC.VentCRDOverPistonVolumesD.ManualControlRodInsertionAnswer:DILO2015WrittenPage:39of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:ClosingC1100-F034isaneffectivemeansofraisingdrivewaterD/P.ThisisanoptiongiveninSection3.0,ManualControlRodInsertion,fortheoperatortouseifunabletomaintainsufficientdrivewaterD/PwithC1152-F003,CRDDrive/ClgWaterPCV,andC11-K612,CRDFlowController.DistracterExplanation:A.IsincorrectandplausiblebecauseclosingC1100-F034wouldbeaneffectivemeansofraisingcoolingwaterdifferentialpressure,butifascramsignalispresentandtheCRDscramvalvesopen,havingC1100-F034openwouldactuallyincreasepressureontheundersideofthedrivepistonthesameasincreasingcoolingwaterpressure.Additionally,noproceduralguidanceisgivenforclosingC1100-F034inthissectionforthatreason.B.IsincorrectandplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldincorrectlyinterprettheconditionsunderwhichoperationofC1100-F034isdirectedtobeoperatedforthismethodandfailtorecognizethat,ifreactorpressureisnotavailabletoscramcontrolrods,thenOPENINGC1100-F034wouldbeeffectiveinprovidingtheunderpistonpressurenecessaryforcontrolrodinsertionwhenthescramsignalisre-initiated.C.IsincorrectandplausiblebecauseclosingC1100-F034wouldbeaneffectivemeansofincreasingthedifferentialpressurenecessarytoaccomplishcontrolrodinsertionwhileventingtheCRDoverpistonvolumeandfurthermore,theexamineecouldincorrectlyinterpretthestepattheendofthesectionthatdirectsopeningtheC1100-F034foranyventedcontrolrodsnotfullyinsertedasmeaningthatC11-F034shouldbeclosedwhenperformingthisevolution.ReferenceInformation:29.ESP.03Section3.0(pg.5)PlantProcedures29.ESP.03NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295037EK2.KnowledgeoftheinterrelationsbetweenSCRAMCONDITIONPRESENTANDREACTORPOWERABOVEAPRMDOWNSCALEORUNKNOWNandthefollowing:295037EK2.05CRDhydraulicsystem10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:40of22008September2015 ID:R18Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:BANK:EQOP3150001004Theplantisoperatingatfullpower.Subsequentlythefollowingconditionsoccur:*MainSteamlineRadiationMonitorsA,B,C,andDallindicate3,700mr/hr*OffGasRadiationMonitorindicates800mr/hrincreasing*RBHVACRadiationMonitorindicates11,000cpmWhatistheexpectedplantresponse?A.ReactorScramandaGroup1Isolation.B.RBHVACSystemIsolationandSGTSInitiation.C.MSIVIsolation,ReactorScramandOffGasIsolation.D.ReactorScram,RBHVACSystemIsolation,andSGTSInitiation.Answer:AILO2015WrittenPage:41of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:ReactorScramandaGroup1IsolationbasedonARP3D82DistracterExplanation:Distactersareincorrectandplausiblebasedonknowsetpointslistin3D32,3D82,&3D12ReferenceInformation:3D82(pg1&2)AutoactionsandsetpointsPlantProcedures03D08203D01203D032NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295038EK3KnowledgeofthereasonsforthefollowingresponsesastheyapplytoHIGHOFF-SITERELEASERATE:295038EK3.02Systemisolations10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(5)Facilityoperatingcharacteristicsduringsteadystateandtransientconditions,includingcoolantchemistry,causesandeffectsoftemperature,pressureandreactivitychanges,effectsofloadchanges,andoperatinglimitationsandreasonsfortheseoperatingcharacteristics.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:42of22008September2015 ID:R19Points:1.00Difficulty:2.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:NEWEDG11isrunningafteralossofpowerevent.AfiresubsequentlyoccursintheEDG11EngineRoom,andtheCO2Systemhasautomaticallyactuated.EDG11is(1)andtheventilationsystem(2).A.(1)running(2)fansanddampersarealignedtoventtheEDG11EngineroomB.(1)tripped(2)fanswillshutdown,anddamperswillisolatetheEngineroomC.(1)tripped(2)fansanddampersarealignedtoventtheEDG11EngineroomD.(1)running(2)fanswillshutdown,anddamperswillisolatetheEngineroomAnswer:DILO2015WrittenPage:43of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:TheCO2acutationisnotanessentialtripfortherunningEDG.TheRHRComplexisprotectedwithWet-pipeSprinkler,StandpipeHoseStation,andCO2FireSuppressionSystems.AfterCO2dischargesintoanEDGroom,theassociatedventilationsystemfanswillshutdown,anddamperswillisolatetheaffectedroom.DistracterExplanation:Alldistractersareplausibleiftheexamineedoesnotcompletelyunderstandtheinterlocksassociatedwithfanoperation.A.IsincorrectbecausethefansanddamperswillnotaligntoventtheEngineroomB.IsincorrectbecausetheEDGwillnottrip.C.IsincorrectbecausetheEDGwilnottriporfansanddampersalign.ReferenceInformation:23.30723.501.02PlantProcedures23.501.0223.307NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2600000AA1.Abilitytooperateand/ormonitorthefollowingastheyapplytoPLANTFIREONSITE:600000AA1.05Plantandcontrolroomventilationsystems.10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(10)Administrative,normal,abnormal,andemergencyoperatingproceduresforthefacility.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:44of22008September2015 ID:R20Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:BANK:315-0028-A020-001FollowingaGridDisturbance,conditionsareasfollows:GeneratorPower1200MweReactivePower360MVAR(LAG)GeneratorHydrogenPressure75psigTheSystemDispatcherhasrequestedadditionalreactiveloadsupporttomaintaingridvoltage.ConsideringtheattachedCapabliltyCurve,whichONEofthefollwingactionsisrequired?A.RAISERecirculationFlowtoincreasetheReactiveLoadontheGenerator.B.LOWERRecirculationFlow,becauseGeneratorLoadlimitshavebeenexceeded.C.MANUALLYRAISEtheVoltageRegulatorsettingtoincreasetheReactiveLoadontheGenerator.D.MANUALLYLOWERtheVoltageRegulatorsetting,becauseReactiveLoadlimitshaveBeenexceeded.Answer:CILO2015WrittenPage:45of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:RAISINGtheVoltageRegulatorsettinginMANUALwillincreasetheReactiveLoadontheGenerator.Isplausible;willraiseGeneratorPower.A.B.Isplausible;possiblemisconceptionregarding60psigHydrogenCurve.LoadLimitsareexceededat60psig.D.Isplausible;possiblemisconceptionregarding60psigHydrogenCurve.LoadLimitsareexceededat60psig.PlantProcedures23.118NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2700000AA2.013.5/3.6Operatingpointonthegeneratorcapabilitycurve700000AA2.Abilitytodetermineand/orinterpretthefollowingastheyapplytoGENERATORVOLTAGEANDELECTRICGRIDDISTURBANCES:NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2012AuditExamILO2015WrittenPage:46of22008September2015 ID:R21Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:NEW-CONTRACTWithReactorPowerstartingat100%,atwhichofthefollowingpointswillthefirstDIRECTEDpowerreductionoccurduringaLossofMainCondenserVacuumevent?A.CondenserVacuuminitiallystartslowering.B.InitialcrewactionsfailtostabilizeCondenserVacuumbetween0.7-2.5psia.C.CondenserVacuumreaches2.8psia.D.CondenserVacuumreaches3.68psia.Answer:BILO2015WrittenPage:47of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:Thefirstpowerreductionoccurs,duetothecrewperformingaRapidPowerReductiontotrytostabilizeCondenserVacuum,whenthecrew'sinitialactionswereunabletostabilizeCondenserVacuumbetween0.7to2.5psia.DistracterExplanation:A.AnswerisincorrectandplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldincorrectlyinterprettheAOPsymptomof'MainGeneratorMWdecreasing'asmeaningReactorPowerwouldbedecreasing.TheexamineecouldalsoincorrectlychoosethisresponseifitisassumedthataRapidPowerReductionisrequiredimmediatelyuponthestartofaloweringCondenserVacuumevent.C.AnswerisincorrectandplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldfailtorecognizetheneedtoperformaRapidPowerReductionandinsteadassumethatthefirstpowerreductionwouldoccurwhentheAOPOverrideconditionof2.8psiawasmetrequiringthecrewtoplacetheModeSwitchinShutdown.D.AnswerisincorrectandplausiblebecausetheexamineebecausetheexamineecouldfailtorecognizetheneedtoperformaRapidPowerReductionandinsteadassumethatthefirstpowerreductionwouldoccurwhentheMainTurbineTripsetpointof3.68psiawasreached,whichwouldcauseaReactorScramduetopowerbeingabove30%.ReferenceInformation:20.125.01(pg3)CONDITIONBPlantProcedures20.125.01NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295002AA2.Abilitytodetermineand/orinterpretthefollowingastheyapplytoLOSSOFMAINCONDENSERVACUUM:295002AA2.01Condenservacuum/absolutepressure.10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(10)Administrative,normal,abnormal,andemergencyoperatingproceduresforthefacility.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:48of22008September2015 ID:R22Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEW-CONTRACTConsidereachofthetransientslistedbelow:*A-ReactorPressurerises90psiabovethenormalpressureregulatorsetpoint,thenlowers.*B-ReactorPressurerisestotheReactorPressureScramsetpoint,thenlowers.*C-ReactorPressurerises100psiabovethehighestSRVsafetysetpoint,thenlowers.*D-ReactorPressurerises175psiabovethehighestSRVsafetysetpoint,thenlowers.*E-ReactorPressurerises225psiabovethehighestSRVsafetysetpoint,thenlowers.BasedontheHIGHESTReactorPressureencounteredduringeachevent,whichofthesetransientswouldhaveresultedintheplantNOTbeingincompliancewith(1)LCO3.4.1.1,ReactorSteamDomePressure,and/or(2)SL2.1.2,ReactorCoolantSystemPressureSafetyLimit?A.(1)ALLofthelistedtransients(2)TransientsDandEonlyB.(1)TransientsBthroughEonly(2)TransientsDandEonlyC.(1)ALLofthelistedtransients(2)TransientsCthroughEonlyD.(1)TransientsBthroughEonly(2)TransientsCthroughEonlyAnswer:BILO2015WrittenPage:49of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:Bycalculation,themaximumpressuresencounteredforeachofthetransientsisasfollows:*A-90psiabovethenormalpressureregulatorsetpoint(944-949psig)is1034-1039psig.*B-TheReactorPressureScramsetpointis1093psig.*C-100psiabovethehighestSRVsafetysetpoint(1155psig)is1255psig.*D-175psiabovethehighestSRVsafetysetpointis1330psig.*E-225psiabovethehighestSRVsafetysetpointis1380psig.(1)LCO3.4.1.1pressureis1045psig,and(2)SL2.1.2pressureis1325psig.OnlytransientAresultsinpressure<(1),andalloftheothertransientsare>(1).TransientsDandEwouldresultinexceeding(2).DistracterExplanation:A.Answerisplausibleandincorrectbecausetheexamineecouldincorrectlydeterminethat100#abovethepressureregulatorsetpointwouldresultinexceeding1045psig.C.Answerisplausibleandincorrectbecausetheexamineecouldincorrectlydeterminethat100#abovethepressureregulatorsetpointwouldresultinexceeding1045psigand/ortheexamineecouldincorrectlydeterminethat,sincetransientCresultedinexceeding1250psig,whichisthedesignpressureoftheRPVsuctionpiping,thattheReactorPressureSafetyLimitwasexceededwhichisacommonmisconception.However,theSLisbasedonnotexceeding110%ofthispressure.D.Answerisplausibleandincorrectbecausetheexamineecouldincorrectlydeterminethat,sincetransientCresultedinexceeding1250psig,whichisthedesignpressureoftheRPVsuctionpiping,thattheReactorPressureSafetyLimitwasexceededwhichisacommonmisconception.However,theSLisbasedonnotexceeding110%ofthispressure.ReferenceInformation:S.L.2.1T.S.3.4.11NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.2.22Knowledgeoflimitingconditionsforoperationsandsafetylimits295007HighReactorPressureTechnicalSpecifications2.1SAFETYLIMITS(SLs)3.4.11ReactorSteamDomePressure10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(5)Facilityoperatingcharacteristicsduringsteadystateandtransientconditions,includingcoolantchemistry,causesandeffectsoftemperature,pressureandreactivitychanges,effectsofloadchanges,andoperatinglimitationsandreasonsfortheseoperatingcharacteristics.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:50of22008September2015 ID:R23Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEW-CONTRACTTheplanthasexperiencedasteamleakintheDrywellduringoperationatratedpower.Thefollowingconditionscurrentlyexist:RPVwaterlevel197inchesRPVpressure800psigandloweringReactorpowerloweringontheSRMsTorusWaterTemperature98°FDrywellTemperature240°FDrywellPressure8.7psigTorusWaterLevel0.8inchesWhatisthebasisforplacingTorusSpraysinservicefortheseplantconditions?A.Toincreasethescrubbingactionofthesuppressionpoolwhileactionstoventprimarycontainmentaretakingplace.B.Tocooltheenclosedtorusairspacebyabsorbingheatenergythroughtheprocessofevaporativeandconvectivecooling.C.TolowerDrywellPressurebacktowithinthelimitsoftheDrywellSprayInitiationLimitcurvesothatactionscanbetakentospraytheDrywell.D.Toeffectthedesiredcontainmentpressurereductionnecessarytodrawnon-condensablegassesintotheTorusairspaceasameansofpreventingchugging.Answer:BILO2015WrittenPage:51of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:Thebasisfortheactiontospraythetorusistoeffectthedesiredpressuredropthroughcoolingofthetorusairspacebyabsorbingheatenergyfromtheenclosedatmospherethroughtheprocessofevaporativeandconvectivecooling.TorusspraysareinitiatedforthepurposeofreducingPrimaryContainmentPressureandTemperaturethusincreasingdrywellcooling.ThisisthebasisfortheactionsofEOPStepsPCP-4andPCP-5.A.IsplausibleandincorrectbecausethecandidatecouldcorrectlyrecallthatthePrimaryContainmentispreferentiallyventedfromthetorustotakeadvantageofsuppressionpoolscrubbingforminimizingtheamountofradioactivityreleased.ThecandidatecouldincorrectlyconcludethattheactiontospraythetorusistoincreasethisscrubbingactionforcontainmentventingwhichoccurslaterinthesameEOPparametercontrollegatstepPCP-13.C.IsplausibleandincorrectbecausetheexamineecouldcorrectlyrecallthatDrywellPressuremustbewithinthelimitsoftheDWSILinordertospraytheDrywellasdirectedfurtherdownthesameEOPparametercontrollegatstepPCP-8.TheexamineecouldincorrectlydeterminethatsprayingoftheTorusatstepPCP-5isperformedinordertoensurethatDrywellPressureiswithinthelimitsoftheDWSILwhenstepPCP-8isreached.D.Isplausibleandincorrectbecausethecandidatecouldincorrectlydeterminethatmaintainingnon-condensablegassesintheTorusairspaceiswhatpreventsthephenomenonofchuggingintheMarkIcontainment.ThecandidatecouldincorrectlyconcludethattheBeforestatementofstepPCP-4(BeforeToruspressurereaches9psig)ismeanttolowerToruspressureandthereforedrawnon-condensablegassesbackintotheTorustopreventchuggingfromoccurring,whichisacommonareaofconfusionforlicensedoperatorcandidates.ReferenceInformation:BWROGEPGAPPB(pgB-7-35TO37)PCP-4andPCP-5PlantProcedures29.100.01SH2BWROGEPGAppBNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295010AK3KnowledgeofthereasonsforthefollowingresponsesastheyapplytoHIGHDRYWELLPRESSURE:295010AK3.02Increaseddrywellcooling.10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(5)Facilityoperatingcharacteristicsduringsteadystateandtransientconditions,includingcoolantchemistry,causesandeffectsoftemperature,pressureandreactivitychanges,effectsofloadchanges,andoperatinglimitationsandreasonsfortheseoperatingcharacteristics.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:52of22008September2015 ID:R24Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:BANK:ID:41788Operationsisperformingareactorstartupfromcoldshutdown.Thereactoriscriticalwitha120secondperiod.TheOperatorwithdrawlsthenextcontrolrodfromposition08to10whichresultsinasustained20secondperiod.WhichoneofthefollowingdescribesthenextOperatoractionrequiredtobetaken?A.MonitoroverlapdatabetweenSRMsandIRMsandrangeIRMsasnecessary.B.PositionSRMdetectorsasnecessarytomaintaincountratebetween102and105cps.C.InformtheReactorEngineerofthepowerrise,andinserttheControlRodasfarasnecessarytoturnpower.D.InserttheControlRodbacktoposition08toobtainareactorperiodof>50secondsandnotifySMandStationNuclearEngineer.Answer:DILO2015WrittenPage:53of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:Therodwithdrawalhascausedasustained20secondperiodthatwouldresultin3D51SRMPERIODSHORTalarm.Thealarmresponseprocedurerequirestheoperatortoinsertcontrolrodstoturnpowerascension,andnotifytheSMandSNE.DistracterInformation:A.ThisanswerisplausibleandincorrectiftheexamineeweretoincorrectlyassumethattheSRM/IRMoverlapverificationisrequiredpriortoremovingSRMs.B.ThisanswerisplausibleandincorrectiftheexamineeincorrectlyassumestheperiodshortalarmiscausedbythepositionoftheSRMsdetectors.ThisactioniswarrantedbytheperiodshortalarmARPbutpriortyisgiventorodinsertion.C.ThisanswerisplausibleandincorrectbecausethefirstoperatoractionwouldbetoinsertthecontrolrodasopposedtoinformtheReactorEngineer.TheoperatorwouldalsonotbeabletoinsertthecontrolrodasfarasnecessarybecauseoftheRWMpreventingtherodfrominsertingpastposition8.ReferenceInformation:ARP3D51(pg1)SRMPERIODSHORTPilgrimReactivityEventPlantProcedures03D051NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295014AA1.Abilitytooperateand/ormonitorthefollowingastheyapplytoINADVERTENTREACTIVITYADDITION:295014AA1.03RMCS:Plant-Specific.10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:54of22008September2015 ID:R25Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEW-CONTRACTForwhichofthefollowingconditionswouldusingtheEmergencyInmodeofcontrolrodinsertionbeauthorizedwithoutadditionalShiftManagerconcurrence?A.ToinsertaControlRodinanattempttorecoupletherodafterbecominguncoupled.B.FollowingascramwheremultiplerodsfailedtofullyinsertandReactorPowerwas10%ontheAPRMsandsteady.C.FollowingascramwhereseveralrodsfailedtofullyinsertandReactorPowerwasonRange5oftheIRMsandlowering.D.Whenrestoringoperationoutsideofthe"Exit"RegionofthePowertoFlowmapfollowingatripofaReactorRecirculationPumpwiththeOPRMInoperable.Answer:BILO2015WrittenPage:55of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:TheindicationsprovidedareindicativeofaFailuretoScramconditionwherethereactorwasstillintheheatingrange,withpowerabovetheAPRMdownscalesetpointof3%,whichrequiresperformanceofactionspertheQlegof29.100.01,Sheet1A,RPVControl-ATWS.Theconditionsgivenwouldauthorizeuseof29.ESP.03,AlternateControlRodInsertionMethods,whichwouldthenauthorizeinsertingthecontrolrodsusingtheEmergencyInmodeofrodinsertion.DistracterExplanation:A.IsplausibleandincorrectbecausethecandidatecouldrecognizethatattemptingtorecoupleacontrolrodtoitsmechanismrequiresinsertingthecontrolrodandincorrectlydeterminethatthemethodusedtoperformthisrodinsertionrequirestheuseoftheEmergencyInMode.C.IsplausibleandincorrectbecausetheexamineecouldincorrectlydeterminethattheEmergencyInModeofRodInsertionisexplicitlyallowedforthisconditionwithoutrecognizingthattherodinsertionwouldNOTbeinaccordancewiththeQlegoftheEOPsandinsteadwouldbedirectedbytheScramAOP(duetopowerbeing<3%).ThecandidatecouldfailtorecognizethatrodinsertionpertheScramAOPisconductedusingthenormalmethodof23.623andonlyperESP29.ESP.03withconcurrenceoftheShiftManager.D.IsplausibleandincorrectbecausethecandidatecouldrecognizethatoperatingintheExitregionofthepowertoflowmap,withtheOPRMInoperable,requirescontrolrodinsertiontorestoreoperationoutsideoftheExitregion.ThecandidatecouldincorrectlyconcludethatthemethodofcontrolrodinsertionwouldrequireuseofEmergencyIninaccordancewiththeEmergencyPowerReductionsectionof23.623withoutrealizingthatthecorrectsectiontousewouldbeforaRapidPowerReductionthatonlyauthorizesuseoftheNormalInmodeofrodinsertion.ReferenceInformation:29.100.01SH129.100.01SH1A29.ESP.03PlantProcedures23.62329.100.01SH1A29.ESP.0320.106.02NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295015AK2.KnowledgeoftheinterrelationsbetweenINCOMPLETESCRAMandthefollowing:295015AK2.02RMCS:Plant-Specific10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:56of22008September2015 ILO2015WrittenPage:57of22008September2015 ID:R26Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEWAconditionhasresultedintheSpentFuelStoragePoolWaterLevelbeing1footlowoutofband.TherearenofuelmovementsoractivtiesongoingintheFuelPool.AnLCOentryisrequired,andthere__(1)__animmediateconcernforpersonnelonthe5thflooroftheReactorBuildingbecausethelevelrequirementisbasedon__(2)__.A.(1)IS(2)shieldinggammathatisproducedfromdecayinanirradiatedfuelassembly,whiletheassemblyisbeingmovedabovetheReactorCoreB.(1)ISNOT(2)absorbingiodinegasesbeforetheyarereleasedtothesecondarycontainmentduetoafuelhandlingaccidentabovetheReactorCoreC.(1)IS(2)shieldingneutronsthatareproducedfromdecayinanirradiatedfuelassembly,whiletheassemblyisbeingmovedabovethefuelracksinSpentFuelStoragePoolD.(1)ISNOT(2)absorbingkryptongasesbeforetheyarereleasedtothesecondarycontainmentduetoafuelhandlingaccidentabovetheSpentFuelStoragePoolAnswer:BILO2015WrittenPage:58of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:LCO3.7.7StatesthatThespentfuelstoragepoolwaterlevelshallbe>22ftoverthetopofirradiatedfuelassembliesseatedinthespentfuelstoragepoolracks.thisrequireperCONDITIONASpentfuelstoragepoolwaterlevelnotwithinlimit,immediatelysuspendmovementofirradiatedfuelassembliesinthespentfuelstoragepool.ThebasesstatthatthisisbasedonabsorbingiodinegasesbeforetheyarereleasedtothesecondarycontainmentduetoafuelhandlingaccidentabovetheReactorCore.DistracterExplanation:A.Thisanswerisplausibleandincorrect.TheexamineewouldchoosethisansweriftheythoughttheSpentfuelpoolwaterwasmeanttoshieldgamma.C.Thisanswerisplausibleandincorrect.TheexamineewouldchoosethisansweriftheythoughttheSpentfuelpoolwaterwasmeanttoshieldneutrons.D.Thisanswerisplausibleandincorrect.TheexamineewouldchoosethisansweriftheythoughttheaccidentsanalyzedforweredoneovertheSFPratherthanthecoreandthegasofconcernwaskrypton.ReferenceInformation:ForthisquestiontheT.S.B.isusedasareferenceforsysteminformationthatistaughtinthesystemscourseunderlessonplanLP-315-0115pertrainingobjectiveC013:C013.DescribetheFuelPoolCoolingandCleanupsystemtechnicalspecificationlimitingconditionsforoperation,theirbases,theassociatedsurveillancerequirement(s),andtheirrelationshiptooperability.T.S.3.7.7andBASESILO2015WrittenPage:59of22008September2015 NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295033EK1.KnowledgeoftheoperationalimplicationsofthefollowingconceptsastheyapplytoHIGHSECONDARYCONTAINMENTAREARADIATIONLEVELS:295033EK1.02PersonnelprotectionTechnicalSpecifications3.7.7SpentFuelStoragePoolWaterLevel10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(9)Shielding,isolation,andcontainmentdesignfeatures,includingaccesslimitations.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:60of22008September2015 ID:R27Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEWAnRHRPumpisoperatinginShutdownCoolingandthePrimaryContainmentisdeinertedwhenanexplosionseverelydamagesequipmentinthePrimaryContainment.Severalhourslater,theplanthasbeenstabilized.*CHRRMShasbeenslowingincreasingandiscurrentlyreading1041R/hr.*PrimaryContainmentH2concentrationhasbeenslowlyincreasingandiscurrentlyreading2%.*RBHVACisshutdown,andDiv1SGTSisinservice.*Aradioactivereleaseisinprogress,butthereiscurrentlynodetectablechangeindoseatthesiteboundary.WhichofthefollowingprocedureswouldbeusedtopreservePrimaryContainmentIntegrity?A.29.100.01Sheet2,PrimaryContainmentControlB.20.000.02,AbnormalReleaseOfRadioactiveMaterialC.23.406,PrimaryContainmentNitrogenInertingAndPurgeSystemD.29.ESP.06,PrimaryContainmentVentingAndPurgeForHydrogenAndOxygenControlAnswer:AILO2015WrittenPage:61of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:EntryConditionfor29.100.01Sheet2isH2>1%.DistracterExplanation:B.IsplausibleandincorrectbecausetheexamineethinksthatanAOPdealingwiththereleaseistheonlywaytodealwiththedegradationofprimarycontainment.C.IsplausibleandincorrectbecausetheexamineethinkstheSOPcanbeusetopurgeH2andthereforehelppreservePrimaryContainment.D.IsplausibleandincorrectbecausethisistheESPthattheEOPswoulddirectifventingwereallowed,butforthiscondition,ventingforH2controlisnotallowed.ReferenceInformation:29.100.01Sheet2-EntryconditionsPlantProcedures29.100.01SH2NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2500000EK1.KnowledgeoftheoperationalimplicationsofthefollowingconceptsastheyapplytoHIGHCONTAINMENTHYDROGENCONCENTRATIONS:500000EK1.01Containmentintegrity10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(8)Components,capacity,andfunctionsofemergencysystems.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:62of22008September2015 ID:R28Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEW-CONTRACTTheplantwasoperatingat100%powerwhenasmallprimarycoolantleakraiseddrywellpressureto2.2psig.Allsystemsoperatedasdesigned.Thefollowingconditionsexistwhentheplantisinitiallystabilized:*RPVlevelis195inchesbeingmaintainedusingRCIC.*RPVpressureis900psig.*Division1RHRisinTorusCoolingModeusing'A'RHRpump;'A'RHRCMCswitchisinRUN.*A'RHRPumpMANUALOVERRIDEwhitelightisilluminated.*AllotherRHRPumpsarerunningwithCMCswitchesinAUTO.Alossofoffsitepowerthenoccurs.SelecttheresponsethatdescribestheoperationoftheRHRpumpsastheEDGsautomaticallyloadwithNOoperatoraction.A.AllRHRpumpsstartimmediatelywhentheirrespectiveEDG'soutputbreakercloses.B.AllRHRpumpsstart5secondsaftertheirrespectiveEDG'soutputbreakercloses.C.RHRpumps'B','C',and'D'startimmediatelywhentheirrespectiveEDG'soutputbreakercloses.'A'RHRpumpisstopped.D.RHRpumps'B','C',and'D'start5secondsaftertheirrespectiveEDG'soutputbreakercloses.'A'RHRpumpisstopped.Answer:AILO2015WrittenPage:63of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:ThedesignoftheEDGloadsequencerstartsRHRpumpsimmediatelywithnotimedelay.Also,theARHRpumpCMCinRUNwillnotpreventthepumpfromrestartingafterhavingbeentakenoutofAUTOduringandECCSinitiation.IftheCMCwasreturnedtoAUTOafterbeingtakenoutofAUTOaftertheECCSinitiationsignalwaspresentthepumpwouldremainOFF.DistracterExplanation:B.Isincorrectandplausible.TheexamineecouldincorrectlyidentifythattheRHRpumpshaveatimeddelayforstartingasmanycomponentsinitiatedbytheEDGloadsequencerhaveassociatedtimedelays.C.Isincorrectandplausible.TheexamineecouldconfusetheMANUALOVERRIDEcircuitasbeingapplicableintheAUTOandRUNpositionsoftheCMCswitchsincethelightisilluminatedwiththeCMCinRUNwithanECCSinitiationsignalpresent.IftheCMCwasreturnedtoAUTOafterbeingtakenoutofAUTOaftertheECCSinitiationsignalwaspresentthepumpwouldremainOFF.D.Isincorrectandplausible.TheexamineecouldincorrectlyidentifythattheRHRpumpshaveatimeddelayforstartingasmanycomponentsinitiatedbytheEDGloadsequencerhaveassociatedtimedelays.TheexamineecouldconfusetheMANUALOVERRIDEcircuitasbeingapplicableintheAUTOandRUNpositionsoftheCMCswitchsincethelightisilluminatedwiththeCMCinRUNwithanECCSinitiationsignalpresent.IftheCMCwasreturnedtoAUTOafterbeingtakenoutofAUTOaftertheECCSinitiationsignalwaspresentthepumpwouldremainOFF.ReferenceInformation:I-2714-24EDGAUTOLOADSEQ(H-2)RHRisbeforestep1SOstartattime0.(drawingindevelopmentfolder)I-2201-01RHRPUMPAELECTRICALSCHEMATIC(E-3thruH-3)52XXandK9AandXK-33(drawingindevelopmentfolder)PlantProcedures23.205NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2203000RHR/LPCI:InjectionMode203000K4.KnowledgeofRHR/LPCI:INJECTIONMODE(PLANTSPECIFIC)designfeature(s)and/orinterlockswhichprovideforthefollowing:203000K4.07EmergencygeneratorloadsequencingNRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:64of22008September2015 ID:R29Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:BANK315-0141-A021-029Theplantisshutdownandthefollowingconditionsexist:*BOTHRecircPumpsaresecured.*ShutdownCoolingisbeingprovidedbyRHRLoopA.*ReactorCoolantSystemTemperatureis170°F,withacooldowninprogress.*RPVWaterLevelLOWEREDto190inchesontheNarrowRangeLevelindicators.RPVWaterLevelisaconcernbecauseitis__________________________.A.toolowtopreventRHRPumpcavitation.B.toolowtopreventRPVthermalstratification.C.lowenoughtogenerateaLowRPVLevelscramsignal.D.lowenoughtogenerateaRHRShutdownCoolingIsolationsignal.Answer:BILO2015WrittenPage:65of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:Per23.2053.2.2DuringNon-ATWS,RHRSDCModeoperation,reactorwaterlevelmustbemaintainedabove220inchestopreventtemperaturestratification.DuringATWS,RPVleveliscontrolledperEOPs.DistracterInformation:A.IsplausibleandincorrectbecauseRWLinthiscaseprovidesheadtotheRHRpump.C.IsplausibleandincorrectbecausethereisalowRPVlevelscramD.IsplausibleandincorrectbecausethereisalowRPVlevelIsolationforSDC.ReferenceInformation:23.205(pg10)P&L3.2.2PlantProcedures23.205NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2205000K5.KnowledgeoftheoperationalimplicationsofthefollowingconceptsastheyapplytoSHUTDOWNCOOLINGSYSTEM(RHRSHUTDOWNCOOLINGMODE):205000K5.03Heatremovalmechanisms10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(10)Administrative,normal,abnormal,andemergencyoperatingproceduresforthefacility.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:66of22008September2015 ID:R30Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:NEW-CONTRACTWiththeplantoperatingatfullpower,afailureoftheCSTlevelinstrumentationhascausedHPCIsuctiontoswaptotheTorus.HPCIshouldbeconsideredINOPERABLEif___________________________________.A.thisconditionismaintainedformorethan12hoursB.thisconditionismaintainedformorethan24hoursC.KeepFillisalsolostinthisconditionformorethan12hoursD.KeepFillisalsolostinthisconditionformorethan24hoursAnswer:CILO2015WrittenPage:67of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:TheSOPhasaP&LthatrequiresthatffalignedtotheTorusinstandbyformorethantwelveconsecutivehourswithoutHPCIKeepFillSysteminoperation,HPCIshouldbeconsideredINOPERABLE,duetopotentialdraindownofsystempiping.DistracterExplanation:A.IsplausiblesinceHPCIisnotalignedtoitsnormalsuctionsource,theCST.Theexamineecouldfailtorecognizethatthetransientandaccidentanalyses,whichtakecreditforHPCI,assumethattheHPCIsuctionsourceisthesuppressionpool.B.IsincorrectbutplausiblebecausetheHPCIsystempipingcouldbecomedrainedifitremainedalignedtotheTorusformorethan24hours,requiringittobedeclaredINOPERABLE.D.IsplausiblebecausethecombinationofHPCIsuctionbeingalignedtotheToruswithalossofKeepFillformorethan24hourswouldcauseHPCItobeINOPERABLE,butHPCIisINOPERABLEatmorethan12hours.ReferenceInformation:23.202(pg7)P&L3.19PlantProcedures23.202NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2206000K6.KnowledgeoftheeffectthatalossormalfunctionofthefollowingwillhaveontheHIGHPRESSURECOOLANTINJECTIONSYSTEM:206000K6.09Condensatestorageandtransfersystem:BWR-2,3,4TechnicalSpecifications3.3.5.1EmergencyCoreCoolingSystem(ECCS)Instrumentation10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:68of22008September2015 ID:R31Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:BANK:315-0140-B003-001ALOCAsignalfromDiv1CSLogicisreceivedwhileDIV1CoreSprayisoperatinginTESTMode.HowwilltheCoreSpraySystemrespond?A.Div1CoreSpraywilltrip.Div2CoreSpraywilllineuptoinject.B.Div1and2CoreSpraywilllineuptoinject.Thetestvalvewillclose.C.Div1CoreSpraywillremainrunningintheTESTmode.Div2CoreSpraywilllineuptoinject.D.Div1CoreSpraywillremainrunningintheTESTmode.Div2CoreSpraywillremaininStandby.Answer:BILO2015WrittenPage:69of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:ALOCAsignalfromeitherCSLogicwillautostartbothdivisionsofCoreSpray.Per23.203,Section5.5,AutoInitiationDiv1,"IfDiv1CoreSprayisintheTestModewhenanautomaticinitiationsignalisreceived,E2150-F015A,Div1CSTestLineIsoVlv,willcloseasthesystemalignsforinjectiontotheReactorVessel."DistracterExplanation:A.Isincorrectandplausibleifexamineeincorrectlyassumesthatsystemlineupwouldcauseatripconditionwhenaninjectionsignaloccurs.C.Isincorrectandplausibleifexamineedidnotknowabouttheautoclosure.D.IsincorectandplausibleiftheexamineefeltthataLOCAsignalfromonlyDiv1CSLogicdoesnotprovideasystemstartsignal.ReferenceInformation:23.203Section5.5(pg22)NOTEPlantProcedures23.203NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2209001A1.Abilitytopredictand/ormonitorchangesinparametersassociatedwithoperatingtheLOWPRESSURECORESPRAYSYSTEMcontrolsincluding:209001A1.08Systemlineup10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(5)Facilityoperatingcharacteristicsduringsteadystateandtransientconditions,includingcoolantchemistry,causesandeffectsoftemperature,pressureandreactivitychanges,effectsofloadchanges,andoperatinglimitationsandreasonsfortheseoperatingcharacteristics.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:70of22008September2015 ID:R32Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:BANK:315-0114-C010-006TheSLCInitiationKeylockSwitch,C4100-M004,hasbeenplacedinthePMPARUNposition.Thefollowingindicationsarenoted30secondslater:*ReactorPressureis1000psig.*C41-R601,SLCTankLevelIndicator,issteady.*SLCContinuityLightsAandBareON.*SLCPumpACMCSwitchredlightisON,andgreenlightisOFF.*C41-R600,SLCPumpDischargePressureIndicator,isoscillatingbetween1320and1370psig.Theseareindicationsof(1)whatcondition,and(2)whatactionshouldtheoperatorperform?A.(1)SLCExplosiveValvesfailedtofire.(2)StartSLCPumpB.B.(1)NormaloperationfortheSLCSystem.(2)MonitorSLCTanklevel.C.(1)C41-F001,SLCStorageTankOutletValveisclosed.(2)DispatchanoperatortoopenC41-F001.D.(1)C41-F029A,SLCPumpADischargeReliefValvefailedopen.(2)DispatchanoperatortogagshutC41-F029A.Answer:AILO2015WrittenPage:71of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:IftheC41-F004A&B,failedtofire,positivedisplacementSLCPumpAwillOPENC41-F029A,SLCPumpADischargeReliefValve,whichcausespressureoscillationsbetween1320and1370psig.ThesearetheliftandreseatpressuresforC41-F029A.StartingSLCPumpBwillfiretheotherprimerinbothvalves.DistracterExplanation:B.Isincorrectandplausible,normalIndicationwouldbedischargepressureslightlyhigherthanReactorPressureANDloweringSLCTankLevel.C.Isincorrectandplausible,theTankLevelwouldremainsteadyiftheStorageTankOutletwereshut,butdischargepressurewouldbelow.D.Isincorrectandplausible,ReliefValvehasopened,buthasnotfailed.ReferenceInformation:SOP23.139(Pg11&12)SLCinjectionPlantProcedures23.139NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2211000A2.Abilityto(a)predicttheimpactsofthefollowingontheSTANDBYLIQUIDCONTROLSYSTEM;and(b)basedonthosepredictions,useprocedurestocorrect,control,ormitigatetheconsequencesofthoseabnormalconditionsoroperations:211000A2.06Valveopenings10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(5)Facilityoperatingcharacteristicsduringsteadystateandtransientconditions,includingcoolantchemistry,causesandeffectsoftemperature,pressureandreactivitychanges,effectsofloadchanges,andoperatinglimitationsandreasonsfortheseoperatingcharacteristics.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:72of22008September2015 ID:R33Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:MODIFIED:315-0127-C010-001TheplantisshutdowninarefuelingoutagewithundervesselworkinprogressonSRMBdetector.Therestorationsequenceofthe"ModeSwitchinRefuelandOneRod-OutInterlockVerification"surveillanceisinprogress.TheReactorModeSwitchisplacedinSHUTDOWN.TheScramResetSwitchisthenturnedtotheGP1/4ANDGP2/3positions,andreleased.Aboutoneminutelater,anautomaticscramsignalisreceived.AllRPVandContainmentparametersremainconstantthroughouttheevent.Assumingnootheroperatoractionswereperformed,whichofthefollowingexplainsthecauseoftheSECONDscram?A.Alarm3D51,SRMPERIODSHORT,wasreceivedduetomovingtheSRMdetector.B.Alarm3D56,TESTABILITYLOGICA/BRPS/PWRFAILURE,wasreceivedduetoablownfuseinRPSCabinetH21-P085.C.Alarm3D86,MNSTMLINEISOVALVECLOSURECHANNELTRIP,wasreceivedduetoanupscalefailureofaMainSteamLineFlowinstrument.D.Alarm3D94,DISCHWATERVOLHILEVELCHANNELTRIP,wasreceivedduetotheSDVHighLevelChannelTripnotbeingbypassedbeforethefirstscramwasreset.Answer:DILO2015WrittenPage:73of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:SDVHighLevelwillinitiateasecondautomaticreactorscramunderthegivenconditions.ThisquestionisbasedonOEatFermi(LER96-021-00)involvingfailuretobypasstheSDVHighLevelchanneltrippriortoresetingascram.DistacterExplanation:A.Isplausibleandincorrect;thisalarmcouldbeexpectedduringSRMinsertion,butisONLYanalarm.B.Isplausibleandincorrect;RPSpowerfaillureinanRPScabinetcouldcauseanalarm,butnotascram.C.Isplausibleandincorrect;buttheMSIVClosureTripisbypassedwiththeReactorModeSwitchinSHUTDOWN.ReferenceInformation:ARP3D94SOP23.610pg10&11LER96-021PlantProcedures23.61003D094OperatingExperienceLER96-021FermiAutoScramonSDVduringShutdownNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2212000A3.AbilitytomonitorautomaticoperationsoftheREACTORPROTECTIONSYSTEMincluding:212000A3.05SCRAMinstrumentvolumelevel10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:74of22008September2015 ID:R34Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEW-CONTRACTAreactorstartupisinprogressinaccordancewith22.000.02,PlantStartupto25%Power.Reactorpoweris7%asindicatedontheAveragePowerRangeMonitors(APRMs).Sourcerangedetectorshavebeenwithdrawn.Intermediaterangedetectorsarebeingwithdrawn.Intermediaterangemonitors(IRM)A,B,C,andDindicate20onrange9.IRMsE,F,G,andHindicate30onrange10.DuringwithdrawalofIRMF,theretractpermitlogicmalfunctionsandtheRETRACTPERMITlightextinguishes.Basedontheseconditions,whichofthefollowingdescribestheIRMsystemandrelatedsystemresponse?A.IRMFstopsretracting,and3D113,CONTROLRODWITHDRAWALBLOCK,alarms.B.IRMFstopsretracting,and3D60,IRMCHB/F/D/HUPSCALETRIP/INOP,alarmscausingahalfscram.C.IRMFcontinuestoretract,and3D113,CONTROLRODWITHDRAWALBLOCK,alarms.D.IRMFcontinuestoretract,and3D60,IRMCHB/F/D/HUPSCALETRIP/INOP,alarmscausingahalfscram.Answer:CILO2015WrittenPage:75of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:TheIRMRETRACTPERMITlightshouldbeonwhentheModeSwitchisplacedinRUN.Inaccordancewithprocedure22.000.02,PlantStartupto25%Power,IRMsarenotwithdrawnuntiltheModeSwitchisplacedinRUNwhichisdirectedat5%-10%power.TheIRMRETRACTPERMITinterlockcausesarodblockiftheIRMiswithdrawnandtheinterlockisnotsatisfied(lightextinguished).Theinterlockdoesnotpreventcontinuedwithdrawalofthedetector.DistracterInformation:A.Isincorrectandplausible.MisapplyingormisunderstandingtheIRMRETRACTPERMITlogicwouldallowtheexamineetoselectthisanswer,alsoitisplausiblethatamalfunctionoftheIRMsystemduringastartupwouldcausearodblockB.Isincorrectandplausible.MisapplyingormisunderstandingtheIRMRETRACTPERMITlogicwouldallowtheexamineetoselectthisanswer,alsoitisplausibleamalfunctionoftheIRMsystemwouldcauseanIRMINOPtrip.TheINOPtripdoescauseahalfscram.D.Isincorrectandplausible.TheIRMdoescontinuetoretract,severalmalfunctionscauseanIRMINOPtripwhichdoescauseahalfscramifalarmed.MisapplyingtheIRMINOPforamalfunctionintheRETRACTPERMITlogicwouldallowtheexamineetoselectthisanswer.TheINOPtripdoescauseahalfscram.ReferenceInformation:I-2115-6ShowshowmodeswitcheffectsrodblocksfromSRM/IRMI-2145-56ShowIRMretactpermitlogicI-2145-59ShowsallrodblocksfromIRMsPlantProcedures23.60322.000.02NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2215003IRMSystem215003K1.Knowledgeofthephysicalconnectionsand/orcauseeffectrelationshipsbetweenINTERMEDIATERANGEMONITOR(IRM)SYSTEMandthefollowing:215003K1.02ReactormanualcontrolNRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:76of22008September2015 ID:R35Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:NEWWiththeReactorModeSwitchinSTARTUPHOTSTANDBY,theIntermediateRangeMonitorsareonRANGE4withthefollowingreadings:IRMChannelReadingA103B101C102D102E108F95G103H98TheP603operatorplacesIRMChannelERangeSelectorSwitchinRANGE3.WhichofthefollowingconditionsaretheresultoftheP603operator'saction?A.IRMDownscaleAlarmONLYB.IRMUpscaleTripONLYC.IRMUpscaleTripANDControlRodWithdrawalBlockONLYD.IRMUpscaleTripANDControlRodWithdrawalBlockANDHalf-ScramAnswer:DILO2015WrittenPage:77of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:IRMEisjustbelowtheUPSCALETRIP.RangingDOWNwillresultinIRMEcausinganUPSCALETRIP,RODBLOCK,andaHalfScram.DistracterExplanation:A.Isplausibleandincorrectanincorrectassumptionthatdown-rangingcausesadownscalecondition.B.Isplausibleandincorrectanincorrectassumptionthatdown-rangingcausesanupscaletriponly.C.Isplausibleandincorrectanincorrectassumptionthatdown-rangingcausesanupscaletripandrodblockwithnohalf-scram.ReferenceInformation:ARP3D113,3D59and3D60PlantProcedures03D05903D06003D113NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2215003A4.Abilitytomanuallyoperateand/ormonitorinthecontrolroom:215003A4.03IRMrangeswitches10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:78of22008September2015 ID:R36Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:MODIFIEDBANK:3150122A013005Duringareactorstartup,reactorpowerisonRange3oftheIntermediateRangeMonitors,andSourceRangeMonitor(SRM)detectorsarebeingwithdrawnfromthecore.DIV248/24VDCDistributionlosespower.Assumingnooperatoractionistaken,aControlRodBlockiscausedbypowerlossto_____.A.SRMAandSRMDONLY.B.SRMBandSRMCONLY.C.SRMA,CandIRMsA,C,E,G,I.D.SRMsB,DandIRMsB,D,F,H.Answer:DILO2015WrittenPage:79of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:PowertoIRMChannelsB,D,F,HandSRMChannelsBandDarefrom48/24VDCDistributionCabinet2IB1-3,CircuitBreaker1,DistracterExplanation:DistractersareplausibleasSRMdrivesarepoweredfrom120/208VDistributionCabinet72E-2B-1vice48/24VandknowingtheRODBLOCKsetpoint.ReferencesInformation:ARP3D113,RODBLOCK300VDCdecreasing(pg.2),SOP23.602,ENERGIZINGSRM(Pg9).PlantProcedures03D11323.602NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2215004K2.Knowledgeofelectricalpowersuppliestothefollowing:215004K2.01SRMchannels/detectors10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:80of22008September2015 ID:R37Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEW-CONTRACTWhichofthefollowingstatementsisanaccuratedescriptionoftheoperationoftheSourceRangeMonitoringSystemregardingsimultaneousmovementofallfourSRMdetectors?A.ItisNOTpossibletodosoatanytimeduetolimitationsimposedbythecontrolcircuitry.B.ItisNOTpermissibletodosoatanytimeasthiswillresultinunreliableindicationsasthedetectortravelsthroughfluxinthecore.C.ItisONLYpossibletodosointheinwarddirectionduringaReactorShutdownduetolimitationsimposedbythecontrolcircuitry.D.ItisNOTpermissibletodosoduringaReactorStartupasthiswillresultinunreliableindicationsasthedetectortravelsthroughfluxinthecore.Answer:DILO2015WrittenPage:81of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:Theexamineeshouldcorrectlydeterminethatsimultaneousdetectormovementisalwaysallowedbythedetectorcontrolcircuitry;however,23.602P&L3.11prohibitssimultaneousdetectormovementduringaReactorStartupasthiswillresultinanindicatedchangeinlogcountrateandperiodasthedetectortravelsthroughfluxinthecore.DistracterExplanation:A.Isincorrectandplausiblebecausethecandidatecouldincorrectlydeterminethatsimultaneousdetectormovementisneverallowedandenforcedbyprogrammingwithinthedetectorcontrolcircuitry.ThisisalsomadeplausiblebythefactthatmostoftheP&Lsin23.602coversystemlimitations,response,etc.,imposedbytheSRMcontrolcircuits.B.IsincorrectbutplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldincorrectlydeterminethatsimultaneousmovementofSRMdetectorsisneverpermissibleduetounreliableindications,wheninfacttheP&LonlyprohibitssimultaneousmovementduringReactorStartup.C.IsplausiblebecausethecandidatecouldrememberthatitisonlypermissibletosimultaneouslyinsertSRMdetectorsfollowingaReactorScramandincorrectlydeterminethatthislimitationmustbeimposedbythecontrolcircuitry.ThisisalsomadeplausiblebythefactthatmostoftheP&Lsin23.602coversystemlimitations,response,etc.,imposedbytheSRMcontrolcircuits.ReferenceInformation:23.602(pg8)P&L3.11PlantProcedures23.602NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.1.32Abilitytoexplainandapplysystemlimitsandprecautions215004SRMSystem10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(10)Administrative,normal,abnormal,andemergencyoperatingproceduresforthefacility.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:82of22008September2015 ID:R38Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:BANK:315-124-0008-005Whichofthefollowingdescribesasetofconditionsthatwouldgenerateafullreactorscramsignal?A.APRMs1&4faileddownscaleduringnormaloperations.B.APRM4becomesinopduringrefuelingwiththeshortinglinksinstalled.C.APRMs2&3failedupscaleduringastartupwiththemodeswitchinRUN.D.APRM1failedupscalewithIRMAfailedupscaleduringastartupwiththemodeswitchinSTARTUP/HOTSTANDBY.Answer:CILO2015WrittenPage:83of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:Per23.601INSTRUMENTTRIPSHEETSAny2APRMsinatrippedstatewillcausethe2of4voterstoinitiateafullRxScram&NeutronFlux-Upscale(Setdown)<15%RTPDistracterInformation:A.Isplausibleandincorrect,because2APRMshaveinputtovoterswhichwouldnormallybeenoughvotestocauseascram,howeverdownscalewillnotcauseavote.B.Isplausibleandincorrect,becauseanAPRMhasinputtovoterswhichcancauseascramandshortinglinksnormallyreducecoincidence,howeveronly1APRMINOPwillnotvoteascramevenwithshortinglinksinstalled.D.Isplausibleandincorrect,because2votescausesascram,howevertheIRMdoesnotinputintothevoters.ReferenceInformation:23.601(pg41)AveragePowerRangeMonitor(Scramsetpoints,inputto2of4voter)PlantProcedures23.601NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2215005K1.Knowledgeofthephysicalconnectionsand/orcauseeffectrelationshipsbetweenAVERAGEPOWERRANGEMONITOR/LOCALPOWERRANGEMONITORSYSTEMandthefollowing:215005K1.01RPS10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(6)Design,components,andfunctionofreactivitycontrolmechanismsandinstrumentation.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:84of22008September2015 ID:R39Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEW-CONTRACTAplantstartupisinprogress.Reactorpoweris30%andbeingincreasedbycontrolrodwithdrawal.APRM2malfunctionsandisindicating0%power.WhichoneofthefollowingdescribestheeffectonRodBlockMonitorsasaresultoftheAPRMfailure?A.RBMAandBareOPERABLE.OutwardControlrodmotioncancontinue.B.RBMAandBareINOPERABLE.OutwardControlrodmotionisblocked.C.RBMAisbypassedandINOPERABLE.BypassingAPRM2willallowoutwardcontrolrodmotion.D.RBMBisbypassedandINOPERABLE.BypassingAPRM2willallowoutwardcontrolrodmotion.Answer:DILO2015WrittenPage:85of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:TheexamineeshouldcorrectlyrecognizethatAPRM#2istheprimaryAPRMforRBMBanddeterminethat,underthecurrentconditionof30%power,theRBMisbypassedduetoAPRM2powerinputof0%.TheRBMisbypasseduntilpowerexceedsthesetpointof27%powerfromtheprimaryAPRM.ThesecondaryARPM(APRM4inthiscase)willbeautomaticallyselectedaftertheARPM2bypassjoystickisoperated.ThisquestionismademorechallengingbythefactthatTechSpecsrequirestheRBMtobeOPERABLEAPRM.DistracterExplanation:A.IsincorrectandplausiblebecausetheexamineemayincorrectlyrecallthattechnicalspecificationAdditionallyRBMAisassociatedwithAPRMs#1and3,andsinceitismayseemmorelogicaltoassociateAPRMs1&2withRBMA,ratherthanAPRMs2&4beingassociatedwithRBMB.AlsowiththeAPRMdownscalewiththemodeswitchinrun,outwardrodmotioncouldnotoccurduetoaAPRMdownscalecontrolrodwithdrawlblock.B.IsincorrectbutplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldincorrectlydeterminethattheARPMdownscaleeffectsbothRBMs.(RecircflowtransmitterfailurescouldaffectbothRBMsflowcomparator).OutwardcontrolrodmotionisblockedbytheAPRMdownscalefailure.C.IsincorrectbutplausiblebecausetheexamineemayincorrectlyrecallthatRBMAisassociatedwithAPRM#2sinceitismayseemmorelogicaltoassociateAPRMs1&2withRBMA,ratherthanAPRMs2&4beingassociatedwithRBMB.ReferenceInformation:23.607(pg3)1.1SystemDescriptionILO2015WrittenPage:86of22008September2015 PlantProcedures23.60503D09903D10323.607NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2215005K3.KnowledgeoftheeffectthatalossormalfunctionoftheAVERAGEPOWERRANGEMONITOR/LOCALPOWERRANGEMONITORSYSTEMwillhaveonfollowing:215005K3.07Rodblockmonitor:Plant-SpecificTechnicalSpecifications3.3.2.1ControlRodBlockInstrumentation10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:87of22008September2015 ID:R40Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:NEW-CONTRACTWhichofthefollowingRCICSystemTrips/IsolationparametersisdesignedwiththepurposeofprovidingprotectionfortheRCICTurbine?A.SteamLineFlowB.PumpSuctionPressureC.ExhaustDiaphragmPressureD.EquipmentRoomTemperatureAnswer:CILO2015WrittenPage:88of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:TheexamineeshouldcorrectlydeterminethatHighturbineexhaustdiaphragmpressureindicatesthatthepressuremaybetoohightocontinueoperationoftheRCICsystem'sturbine.Thecandidateshouldrecognizethat,whenthisisolationsetpointisreached,oneoftwoexhaustdiaphragmshasrupturedandpressureisreachingturbinecasingpressurelimits.Furthermore,thecandidateshouldunderstandthattheseisolationsareforequipmentprotectionandarenotassumedinanytransientoraccidentanalysisintheUFSAR.DistracterExplanation:A.IsplausiblebecausetheSteamLineFlowHighfunctionisprovidedtodetectabreakoftheRCICsteamlinesandinitiateclosureofthesteamlineisolationvalvesoftheRCICsystem.ThecandidatecouldincorrectlyconcludethattheSteamLineFlowHighfunctionprotectstheRCICTurbinefromeitherhighsteamflowinduceddamage,suchasoverspeed.Thisispossibleifthecandidatefailedtorecognizethat,ifthesteamisallowedtocontinueflowingoutofthebreak,thereactorwilldepressurizeandthecorecanuncover,therefore,theisolationsareinitiatedonhighflowtopreventorminimizecoredamage.B.IsplausiblebecausethePumpSuctionPressureisprovidedtoprotectthepumpagainstpossiblecavitationandlackofcooling.ThecandidatecouldincorrectlyconcludethatthePumpSuctionTripprotectstheturbinebytrippingthepump.D.IsplausiblebecauseareatemperaturesareprovidedtodetectaleakfromtheassociatedsystemsteampipingandanisolationoftheRCICsteamsupplyvalvesoccursonasensedhightemperaturecondition.ThecandidatecouldincorrectlyconcludethattheHighEquipmentRoomTemperaturefunctionprotectsequipmentintheRCICroom.Thecandidatecouldalsoincorrectlyconcludethatthischoiceispossibleifthecandidaterememberedthatthisfunctionisdiversetothehighflowinstrumentation,asdescribedintheTechnicalSpecificationBases,butfailedtorecognizethattheisolationoccurswhenaverysmallleakhasoccurredbecause,ifthesmallleakwereallowedtocontinuewithoutisolation,offsitedoselimitsmaybereached.ReferenceInformation:ForthisquestiontheT.S.B.isusedasareferenceforsysteminformationthatistaughtinthesystemscourseunderlessonplanLP-315-0143pertrainingobjectiveC013:C013.DescribetheRectorCoreIsolationCoolingsystemtechnicalspecificationlimitingconditionsforoperation,theirbases,theassociatedsurveillancerequirement(s),andtheirrelationshiptooperability.T.S.B3.3.6.1(pg3.3.6.1-16&17)RCICTurbineExhaustDiaphragmPressure-HighILO2015WrittenPage:89of22008September2015 NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2217000K4.KnowledgeofREACTORCOREISOLATIONCOOLINGSYSTEM(RCIC)designfeature(s)and/orinterlockswhichprovideforthefollowing:217000K4.04Preventsturbinedamage:Plant-SpecificTechnicalSpecifications3.3.6.1PrimaryContainmentIsolationInstrumentation10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:90of22008September2015 ID:R41Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:BANK:315-0162-0005-001WhatistheeffectontheADSSystemifUPSpowerislost?A.ADSLevel1Logicdeenergized.B.ADSLevel3Logicdeenergized.C.ADSLogicAandBdeenergized.D.ADSControlRoomTimerdeenergized.Answer:DILO2015WrittenPage:91of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:Per3D22LossofUPSAforADSTimersDistracterExplanation:A.IsincorrectandplausableLevel1isaninputtoADSB.IsincorrectandplausableLevel3isaninputtoADSC.IsincorrectandplausableA/BlogictriggersADS.ReferenceInformation:ARP3D22(pg1)ILO2015WrittenPage:92of22008September2015 ILO2015WrittenPage:93of22008September2015 PlantProcedures03D022NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2218000K2.Knowledgeofelectricalpowersuppliestothefollowing:218000K2.01ADSlogic10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:94of22008September2015 ID:R42Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEW-CONTRACTAtransienthasoccurredresultinginthefollowingconditions:*ALLMSIVsareclosed.*Nooperatoractionshavebeentaken.*RCICisoperatingandinjectingintothevessel.*RPVWaterLevelis35inches,loweringoneinchperminute.*Reactorpressureis900psigandslowlylowering5psigperminute.*Drywellpressureis1.0psigandtrendingupat0.05psigperminute.*1D57,ADS/SRV/EECWTCVPOWERSUPPLYFAILURE,isinalarm.*2PA2-5Circuit1isde-energized.WhateffectwilltheaboveconditionshaveonADSifNOoperatoractionsaretakenwithinthenext15minutes?A.TheADSvalveswillNOThavebeenopenedwhenrequiredbytheEOPstherebychallengingfueldesignlimitsduetolossofadequatecorecooling.B.TheADSvalveswillhaveautomaticallyopenedbeforebeingrequiredtodosobytheEOPstherebycomplicatingeffortstorestoreandmaintainRPVwaterlevel.C.OnlythreeoftheADSvalveswillhaveopenedautomaticallyandthereforetheRPVisNOTensuredtoremaindepressurizedunderallconditionsasrequiredbytheEOPs.D.PowertotheADSvalveswillnothavebeenrestored,therebyrenderingthemincapableofopeningautomaticallyorremotelybytheoperatorandremovingtheblowdownfunctionoftheADSvalves.Answer:BILO2015WrittenPage:95of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:Theexamineeshouldcorrectlydeterminethatin3minutes,Level1(31.8")willbereached,and7minutesafterthatthe105secondtimerwillcountdownafterwhichtheADSvalveswillopen.Theexamineeshouldconcludethat,withinthe15minuteswithnooperatoractiontaken,theADSvalveswillbeopen.TheexamineeshouldalsodeterminethatADSLogicStringAhaslostpower;however,ADSLogicStringBstillhaspowerfromanalternatesource(2PA2-6,Circuit1)andthatthepowersourcesupplyingthislogicstringalsopowersthepilotvalve'ssolenoids.TheexamineeshoulddeterminethattheEOPsrequireADStobeinhibitedatLevel1,andfailuretodowillresultinanuncontrolledADSinitiationat20"RPVlevel,whichisbeforetheEOPrequiredpointofWHENRPVlevelis=0".DistracterExplanation:A.IsplausiblebecausethecandidatecouldcalculatethattheADSvalvesshouldopenautomaticallyin10minutesandarepreventedfromdoingsoduetothelogicpowerfailureandthereforeincorrectlyconcludethat,withnoactionstakenatthatpointandtheADSvalvesnotbeingopened,thatthecrewisinviolationoftheEOPsandtheirbases.C.IsplausiblebecausetheADSvalveswillopenin10minutesandwillbeopenatthe15minutepointandthecandidatecouldincorrectlydeterminethatthetwoADSlogicpowersuppliesgotodifferentADSvalves/valvelogicstringstherebyresultinginlessthantheEPGdefinedMinimumNumberofSRVsRequiredforEmergencyDepressurization(MNSRED)tobeopen,thedefinitionofwhichisthesecondhalfofthisdistractor.D.Isincorrectbutplausiblebecause2PA2-5Circuit1isthenormalpowersupplytotheADSpilotvalvesolenoidsandtheexamineecouldincorrectlydeterminethat,sincethispowersourcewaslostandnosubsequentactiontaken,thattheADSvalveswouldbeincapableofperformingtheirrequiredfunctioneitherautomaticallyormanuallyasrequiredbytheEOPs.ReferenceInformation:ARP1D31indicatesthatADSwilltimedownfor7minutesbeforeinitiatingthetimerwithonlyaL1(31.8").Thehighdrywellpressuresignalisnotpresent,andwillnotbeduetotherateofpressureriseasgiveninthestemofthequestion.ARP1D44indicatesthatafterinitiationADSwilltimedownfor105seconds.ARP1D36indicatesthatADSvalveswillopenafterthetimeriscomplete.ARP1D57validatesthatsomeADScomponentsarede-energizeddueto2PA2-5Ckt1offasindicatedinthestemThelogicprintsforADSpowersupplies(I-2095-01)andBADSlogicpower(I-2095-07)indicatehowthelogicremainsautomaticallypoweredonalossofthepowerfrom2PA2-5Ckt1.(locatedindrawings.pdf)ThelogicprintsforADSvalvesP,J,R(I-2095-02)indicatehowthevalvesremainsautomaticallypoweredonalossofthepowerfrom2PA2-5Ckt1.ValvesHandEarethesame.(locatedindrawings.pdf)TheBWROGbasesforstepRC/L-2describesthatADSshouldbepreventedasfollows:ReferenceDiscussion:IfithasbeendeterminedthatRPVwaterlevelcanberestoredandmaintainedabovethetopoftheactivefuelwithavailableinjectionsources,emergencyRPVdepressurizationisunnecessary.AutomaticinitiationofADSisthereforeprevented.SubsequentstepsprovideexplicitanddetailedinstructionsforcontrollingRPVwaterlevelandpressureandspecifywhenemergencydepressurizationisappropriate.PermittingautomaticADSinitiationmaybeundesirableforthefollowingreasons:ILO2015WrittenPage:96of22008September2015 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*ADSactuationcanimposeaseverethermaltransientontheRPVandmaycomplicateeffortstocontrolRPVwaterlevel.*Ifonlysteam-drivensystemsareavailableforinjection,ADSactuationmaydirectlyleadtolossofadequatecorecoolingandsubsequentcoredamage.*TheconditionsassumedinthedesignoftheADSactuationlogic(e.g.,nooperatoractionfor10minutesaftereventinitiation)maynotexistwhentheactionsspecifiedinthissteparebeingperformed.*TheoperatingcrewcandrawonmuchmoreinformationthanisavailabletotheADSlogic(e.g.,equipmentoutofserviceformaintenance,operatingexperiencewithcertainsystems,probabilityofrestorationofoff-sitepower,etc.)andcanbetterjudge,basedoninstructionscontainedintheEPGs/SAGs,whenandhowtodepressurizetheRPV.ADSinitiationispreventedinthisstep,however,onlyifRPVwaterlevelcanberestoredandmaintainedabovethetopoftheactivefuelandtheADStimerinitiates.IfRPVwaterlevelcannotberestoredandmaintainedabovethetopoftheactivefuel,theinstructionisnotapplicable,sincelevelcontroltransferstoContingency#1inaccordancewiththebranchattheendofStepRC/L-2.Ifthetimerdoesnotinitiate,theADSlogicisnotdefeatedsothatthesystemwillstillprovideanautomaticbackupforhighpressureinjectioninsmallbreaklossofcoolantaccidents.PlantProcedures01D3101D3601D4401D57BWROGEPGAppBNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2218000K5.KnowledgeoftheoperationalimplicationsofthefollowingconceptsastheyapplytoAUTOMATICDEPRESSURIZATIONSYSTEM:218000K5.01ADSlogicoperation10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(5)Facilityoperatingcharacteristicsduringsteadystateandtransientconditions,includingcoolantchemistry,causesandeffectsoftemperature,pressureandreactivitychanges,effectsofloadchanges,andoperatinglimitationsandreasonsfortheseoperatingcharacteristics.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:97of22008September2015 ID:R43Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:BANK:EQOP3150165A016002Followingatransientinitiatedbyalossofthe345kVand120kVswitchyards,thefollowingEmergencyDieselGeneratorconditionsexist:*EDG11JacketCoolantTemperatureHighisalarming.*EDG12CrankcasePressureHighisalarming.*EDG13OilTemperatureHighisalarming.*EDG14FuelOilPressureLowisalarming.WhichoneoftheCoreSprayPumpsisaffected?A.CoreSprayPumpAB.CoreSprayPumpBC.CoreSprayPumpCD.CoreSprayPumpDAnswer:CILO2015WrittenPage:98of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:WithaLossofOffsitePower,UndervoltageconditionshavecausedEDGstostartwithbypassednonessentialtrips.CrankcasePressureHighisanEssentialTripandEDG12isTRIPPED,thisisthepowersourcetoCoreSprayPumpC.DistracterExplanation:A.Isplausible;wouldbetrueifJacketCoolantTemperatureHighwereanEssentialTripandCrankcasePressureHighwasaNonEssentialTrip.B.Isplausible;wouldbetrueifOilTemperatureHighwereanEssentialTripandCrankcasePressureHighwasaNonEssentialTrip.D.Isplausible;wouldbetrueifFuelOilPressureLowwereanEssentialTripandCrankcasePressureHighwasaNonEssentialTrip.ReferenceInformation:SOP23.307Section1.1page5behavoirofEDGwithstartsignal&EnclBfortripsPlantProcedures23.307NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2264000K3.KnowledgeoftheeffectthatalossormalfunctionoftheEMERGENCYGENERATORS(DIESEL/JET)willhaveonfollowing:264000K3.01Emergencycorecoolingsystems10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:99of22008September2015 ID:R44Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:BANK:315-0148-0005-007Theplantisoperatingnormallyat95%power.AsignificantleakdevelopsontheH21-P004rack,andtheexcessflowcheckvalveontheVARIABLElegoftheWIDERangeinstrumentsclosesinresponsetotheleak.WhatwouldDIRECTLYbetheeffectontheplantfromthischangeinsensedlevel?A.RWCUisolates.B.TIPsretractandisolate.C.ReactorlowwaterLevel3scram.D.Level8tripofbothRFPsandMainTurbine.Answer:AILO2015WrittenPage:100of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:Widerangeinstrumentsonarackmeansthattheleakaffects2instruments,andbecausethecheckvalveisclosed,thevariablelegofthetwoinstrumentwillbelow,sothattheinstrumentswillindicatefailedlow.BecausetheracknumberisevenP004,andthelogicisNSSSA=ChannelsA,BandB=ChannelsC,D.ThereforeNSSSgroupisolationsforthewiderangeinstrumentswouldoccuronNSSSlogicA.InthiscaseGroup10forRWCUisoneisolationsthatwouldoccurDistracterExplanation:B.Isplausibleandifstudentthinksgroup15isoffofwiderangeorconnectsthisleaktoanarrowlevelinstruments.C.IsplausibleifstudentsthinksthereisaRPSTripassociatedwiththewiderangeinstrumentsorconnectstheleakanarrowrangeinstrument,D.isplausibleiftheexamineebelievesthisleakaffectsnarrowrangeorassociatestheLevel8tripwithwiderange.ReferenceInformation:SOP23.601(Pg11-12)InstrumenttripsheetsFOSM-5701-2Instrumentlocation.PlantProcedures23.601NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2223002K6.KnowledgeoftheeffectthatalossormalfunctionofthefollowingwillhaveonthePRIMARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONSYSTEM/NUCLEARSTEAMSUPPLYSHUT-OFF:223002K6.04Nuclearboilerinstrumentation10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:101of22008September2015 ID:R45Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:NEW-CONTRACTWhichofthefollowingdesignfeaturesassociatedwiththeplant'sSafetyReliefValves(SRVs)functionstomitigatecontainmentloadscausedbyreopeningsofanSRVbyreducingthefrequencyofsubsequentSRVactuationsfollowingtheinitialSRVopening.A.Two-StageTargetRockValvesB.SRVdischargelineT-quenchersC.Low-LowSetrelieffeatureoftwoSRVsD.Vacuum-reliefvalveslocatedineachSRVdischargelineAnswer:CILO2015WrittenPage:102of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:TheexamineeshouldcorrectlydeterminethatitistheLLSrelieffeatureoftwooftheplant'sSRVsthatservetoallowtimeforthewaterlegthatformsintheSRVdischargepipingfollowingSRVclosure(fromdischargepipingresidualsteamcondensation)toclear.TheexamineeshouldconcludethateliminatingthewaterlegreducestheloadingfromsubsequentSRVactuationstoacceptablelevels.DistracterExplanation:A.Isincorrectbutplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldincorrectlydeterminethatuseoftwo-stageTargetRockvalvesatFermi2wasdonetoallowproperblowdowntimeinordertoallowthewaterlegtodrainfromtheSRVdischargepipingpriortoasubsequentdischarge.TheexamineecouldincorrectlyassumethattheLLSRelieffunctionanduseofTwo-stageTargetRockvalvesworkinconjunctiontoperformthisfunctionwhen,infact,theyworktogethertomeettherequirementsofNUREG-0737toreducethefrequencyofstuckopensafetyreliefvalveeventsatFermi2.B.IsplausiblebecausetheSRVdischargelineT-quenchersarepartoftheoverallSRVdesignthatlimitsloadingforcesoncontainmentandtheexamineecouldincorrectlydeterminethattheholesintheT-quencherarewhatlimitsthelegofwaterintheSRVtailpipeandforgetthatthepurposeoftheSRVT-quenchersistolimitvalveoutletpressureto40percentofmaximumvalveinletpressurethroughtheuseoftheholesdrilledintheterminationpipe.D.Isplausiblebecausethevacuumrelieffeature(vacuumbreakers)oftheSRVdischargelinesarepartoftheoverallSRVdesignthatlimitsforcesoncontainmentandtheexamineecouldincorrectlyconcludethatthevacuumbreakersallowtimeforthelegofwatertoclearwithoutrecallingthatthevacuumreliefvalvesprovidedoneachSRVdischargelinepreventdrawinganexcessiveamountofwaterupintothelineasaresultofsteamcondensationfollowingterminationofreliefoperation.ReferenceInformation:ForthisquestiontheT.S.B.isusedasareferenceforsysteminformationthatistaughtinthesystemscourseunderlessonplanLP-315-0143pertrainingobjectiveC013:C013.DescribetheRectorCoreIsolationCoolingsystemtechnicalspecificationlimitingconditionsforoperation,theirbases,theassociatedsurveillancerequirement(s),andtheirrelationshiptooperability.T.S.B3.6.1.6Low-LowSet(LLS)Valves(pgB3.6.1.6-1to2)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESILO2015WrittenPage:103of22008September2015 NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2239002K4.KnowledgeofRELIEF/SAFETYVALVESdesignfeature(s)and/orinterlockswhichprovideforthefollowing:239002K4.03PreventssiphoningofwaterintoSRVdischargepipingandlimitsloadsonsubsequentactuationofSRV'sTechnicalSpecifications3.6.1.6Low-LowSet(LLS)Valves10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:104of22008September2015 ID:R46Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:MODIFIEDBANK:20201420011001WhichofthefollowingindicationsarecorrectforSRVoperation?A.A&CB.B&CC.A&DD.B&DAnswer:BILO2015WrittenPage:105of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:GraphforopeningandthenclosingofaSRVDistracterExplanation:DistractersareplausiblebasedonReactorresponsetoSRVopen.ReferenceInformation:AOP20.000.25(pg7)ILO2015WrittenPage:106of22008September2015 NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2239002A1.Abilitytopredictand/ormonitorchangesinparametersassociatedwithoperatingtheRELIEF/SAFETYVALVEScontrolsincluding:239002A1.05Reactorwaterlevel10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(5)Facilityoperatingcharacteristicsduringsteadystateandtransientconditions,includingcoolantchemistry,causesandeffectsoftemperature,pressureandreactivitychanges,effectsofloadchanges,andoperatinglimitationsandreasonsfortheseoperatingcharacteristics.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:107of22008September2015 ID:R47Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:MODIFIEDBANK:3150146C002003Theplantisoperatingat50%power.DigitalFeedwaterLevelControlisin3-ElementcontrolwiththeReactorLevelSelectSwitchinA.3D164,FEEDWATERCONTROLDCSTROUBLE,hasalarmed,andbothReactorFeedwaterPumpControllershaveswitchedtoEmergencyBypass.(1)WhatistheresultingimpacttoFeedwaterLevelControl(DCS),and(2)whatactionisrequiredbyprocedure?A.(1)DCSwillshifttoForcedSingleElementControl.(2)ContinuepoweroperationinSingleElementControlperSOP23.107.B.(1)DCSremainsin3ElementControl.(2)ManuallyadjustReactorFeedwaterPumpControllerstomatchFeedPumpspeedsperSOP23.107.C.(1)DCSwillshifttoForcedSingleElementControl.(2)SinceAdequatePumpingCapacityisNOTavailable,shutdownthereactorperAOP20.107.01.D.(1)DCSremainsin3ElementControl.(2)ManuallyadjustReactorFeedwaterPumpControllerstomatchFeedFlowwithSteamFlowperAOP20.107.01.Answer:DILO2015WrittenPage:108of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:WithbothReactorFeedPumpControllersinEMERGENCYBYPASS,manualfeedwatercontrolisrequiredbytheAOPtomaintainlevel.DistracterExplanation:A.Isplausible;wouldbetrueforalossofonefeedflowortwosteamflowinputs,ifNOTinEmergencyBypass.B.IsaplausiblemisconceptioninthatmatchingRFPspeedswouldbeeffectivevicematchingsteamflowandfeedflow.C.Isplausiblemisconception;testingknowledgeofpumpingcapacitywithcontrollersinEmergencyBypassReferenceInformation:ARP3D164(pg2)AOP20.107.01(pg9)PlantProcedures20.107.0103D164NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2259002A2.Abilityto(a)predicttheimpactsofthefollowingontheREACTORWATERLEVELCONTROLSYSTEM;and(b)basedonthosepredictions,useprocedurestocorrect,control,ormitigatetheconsequencesofthoseabnormalconditionsoroperations:259002A2.06Lossofcontrollersignaloutput10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(5)Facilityoperatingcharacteristicsduringsteadystateandtransientconditions,includingcoolantchemistry,causesandeffectsoftemperature,pressureandreactivitychanges,effectsofloadchanges,andoperatinglimitationsandreasonsfortheseoperatingcharacteristics.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:109of22008September2015 ID:R48Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:BANK:EQOP3150120B003005DuringcooldownoperationofDiv1SGTS,8D48,DIVISGTSCO2DISCHVLVOPEN,alarms.WhichofthefollowingistheLOWESTSGTSCharcoalBedTemperatureconsistentwiththisindication?A.150°FB.255°FC.310°FD.355°FAnswer:CILO2015WrittenPage:110of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:310°FisthesetpointatwhichtheCO2dischargevalve(F413A/B)willopen.OncethevalveisopentheCO2pressurewillbesensedandbringinthealarm8D48.DistracterExplanation:A.Isplausibleandincorrectbecause150°FisnormalCharcoalAdsorberBlanketHeatersetpointB.Isplausibleandincorrectbecause255°FisCoolingFanAutoOperationsetpointD.Isplausibleandincorrectbecause355°FisinexcessofCO2InitiationsetpointReferenceInformation:T46K002ASetpointsfromCECOI-2642-05(F413A/Bactuationlogic)PlantProcedures08D48NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2261000A3.AbilitytomonitorautomaticoperationsoftheSTANDBYGASTREATMENTSYSTEMincluding:261000A3.03Valveoperation261000A3.04Systemtemperature.10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:111of22008September2015 ID:R49Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEWTheplantisoperatingat100%reactorpowerwithEDG12currentlysyncedtotheGRIDandbeingcontrolledfromtheMainControlRoom.Alossofthe345KvmatandaReactorScramthenoccurs.Basedontheseconditions,whichofthefollowingstatementscorrectlydescribesEDGoperationandparameterresponsewhencontrolledfromtheMainControlRoom?A.WhenEDG12GovernorControlswitchistakentoraise,EDG12Generatorfrequencywillincrease.B.WhenEDG12EDGVoltageControlswitchistakentoraise,EDG12GeneratorVoltagewillincrease.C.WhenEDG13EDGVoltageControlswitchistakentoraise,EDG13GeneratorKVARSwillincrease.D.WhenEDG13GovernorControlswitchistakentoraise,EDG13Generatorfrequencywillincrease.Answer:DILO2015WrittenPage:112of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:ToanswerthisquestiontheexamineemustdeterminethatEDG12wouldbeinDroopmodeandEDG13wouldbeinisochronous.UnderstandingthisiscriticalincontrollingtheEDGandbeingabletokeepit'sparameterinbandasanoperator.BasedonthistheGovernorcontrolswitchandtheVoltagecontrolswitcheffecttheEDGdifferently.ForDROOP,GovernorControlcontrolsLOADinKWandVoltageControlcontrolsreactiveloadinVARS.ForISOCHRONOUSGovernorControlcontrolsfrequencyinHzandVoltageControlcontrolsoutputvoltage.DistracterExplanation:A.isplausibleandincorrectbecauseitwouldbetrueifEDG12wasinisochronous.B.isplausibleandincorrectbecauseitwouldbetrueifEDG12wasinisochronous.C.isplausibleandincorrectbecauseitwouldbetrueifEDG13wasindroop.ReferenceInformation:ST-OP-315-0065-001(pg26)PlantProcedures23.307NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2262001A4.Abilitytomanuallyoperateand/ormonitorinthecontrolroom:262001A4.05Voltage,current,power,andfrequencyonA.C.buses10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:113of22008September2015 ID:R50Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEW-CONTRACTAfireintheBOPswitchgearroomhascausedseveralBOPbussestobede-energizedandresultedinthefollowingindicationsbeingobservedintheControlRoom:*3D22,UPSUNITA/BTROUBLE,alarmed.*11D42,SWYDDCSTROUBLE,alarmed.*AllC32,ReactorFeedwaterDCS,indicationsonpanelH11-P603havebeenlost.*RPISindicationsontheFullCoreDisplayarede-energized.*TheRodWorthMinimizerisde-energized.WhatisthestatusoftheUPSsystem,andwhatactionsarenecessarytorestorecontrolofthe120kVmatandCTGsfromtheFermi2ControlRoomandtheH21-P623DedicatedShutdownPanel?A.UPSAandBarede-energized;temporarypowerneedstobeprovidedtoBOPBUS72L.B.UPSAandBarede-energized;temporarypowerneedstobeprovidedto120Kv/SBODCS.C.UPSAisde-energized;UPSAneedstobemanuallytransferredtoitsAlternatePowerSupplyusingtheBypasstoAltLineswitch.D.UPSBisde-energized;UPSBneedstobemanuallytransferredtoitsAlternatePowerSupplyusingtheBypasstoAltLineswitch.Answer:BILO2015WrittenPage:114of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:BasedonthealarmconditionsandindicationsprovidedintheMainControlRoom,UPSAandBisde-energized.Also,powerhasbeenlosttoUPSC,the120Kv/SBODCSunit,andtemporarypowerwillneedtobeprovidedinordertorestorecontroltotheaffectedcomponents.DistracterExplanation:A.IsplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldevaluatethecontrolroomindicationsandrecognizethatUPSAandBarede-energizedanddetermineincorrectlythatthecourseofactionwouldbetosupplytemporarypowertoUPShowever,72LwillnotprovidepowertotheUPSsystem,thenormalpowerandalternateis72Mand72R,powertoeitherofwhichcouldpowerUPSAandB.C.Isincorrectbutplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldincorrectlydetermine,fromtheindicationsgiven,thatonlyUPSAwasde-energized.IfonlyUPSAwasde-energized,thenmanuallytransferringUPSAtoitsalternatesourceusingtheBypasstoAltLineswitchcouldbeaviableoptionsincetheUPSBsourcewouldstillbeavailableasthealternatetoUPSA.D.Isincorrectbutplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldincorrectlydetermine,fromtheindicationsgiven,thatonlyUPSBwasde-energized.IfonlyUPSBwasde-energized,thenmanuallytransferringUPSBtoitsalternatesourceusingtheBypasstoAltLineswitchcouldbeaviableoptionsincetheUPSAsourcewouldstillbeavailableasthealternatetoUPSB.ReferenceInformation:ARP3D22AutoactionshowUPSA->ADSTimer.SOP23.308.01P&L3.10onpg6PlantProcedures03D02223.308.01NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.2.44Abilitytointerpretcontrolroomindicationstoverifythestatusandoperationofsystem,andunderstandhowoperatoractionsanddirectivesaffectplantandsystemconditions262002UPS(AC/DC)10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(5)Facilityoperatingcharacteristicsduringsteadystateandtransientconditions,includingcoolantchemistry,causesandeffectsoftemperature,pressureandreactivitychanges,effectsofloadchanges,andoperatinglimitationsandreasonsfortheseoperatingcharacteristics.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:115of22008September2015 ID:R51Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEWTheBOPD.C.GroundDetectionPanelhasthefollowingindicationswhentheleftpushbuttonisdepressed.Basedontheseindications,use23.309EnclosureA,toidentifythefault.A.NoneB.FaultonpositivewiringC.FaultonneutralwiringD.FaultonnegativewiringAnswer:CILO2015WrittenPage:116of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:Answerisbasedon23.309EnclA.Thelightbrightnessthatisdisplayedforthisquestionis(1)Dim(2)Dim(3)Out(4)VeryDim(5)VeryDim(6)VeryDimWithPB#1beingin"B"andPB#2beingin"A"DistracterExplanation:DistractersareplausiblebasedonunderstandingtheindicationsandcorrectlyusingEnclA.ReferenceInformation:23.309EnclAPlantProcedures23.309NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2263000K1.Knowledgeofthephysicalconnectionsand/orcauseeffectrelationshipsbetweenD.C.ELECTRICALDISTRIBUTIONandthefollowing:263000K1.04Grounddetection10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:117of22008September2015 ID:R52Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:BANK:315-0171-A014-001(M)Theplantisoperatingat100%powerwiththefollowingauxiliaryequipmentlineup:*EastStationAirCompressorrunning;CenterinAuto*SouthH2SealOilPumprunning;NorthinAuto*NorthRFPTWestLubeOilPumprunning;EastinAuto*NorthandCenterTBCCWpumpsrunning.Bus72Nislostduetoaninternalelectricalfault.Whatistheappropriateoperatorresponsetothisevent?A.Performarapidpowerreduction.B.StartbothSBFWpumpsandinjectat1200gpm.C.VerifytheSouthTBCCWpumphasautomaticallystarted.D.VerifytheCenterStationAirCompressorhasautomaticallystarted.Answer:DILO2015WrittenPage:118of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:TheEastStationAirCompressorispoweredfrom72N.TheoperatormustverifytheCenterstandbyequipmentautostartsper20.300.72AConditionC.DistracterExplanation:A.isincorrectbutplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldincorrectlydeterminethatthisactionisrequiredbasedononlyasingleTBCCWpumpbeingavailable.B.isincorrectbutplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldincorrectlydeterminethelossoftheNorthRFPTLubeoilpumpandpossibleNorthRFPTtrip.C.isincorrectbecausetheSouthandCenterTBCCWpumppowerisfrom72NandTBCCWpumpsdonotautostart.ReferenceInformation:AOP20.300.72A(pg3)ConditionCPlantProcedures20.300.72NNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2300000K2.Knowledgeofelectricalpowersuppliestothefollowing:300000K2.01Instrumentaircompressor10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(10)Administrative,normal,abnormal,andemergencyoperatingproceduresforthefacility.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2012AuditExamILO2015WrittenPage:119of22008September2015 ID:R53Points:1.00Difficulty:2.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:BANK:315-0067-C005-001Withtheplantoperatingatfullpower,ALLReactorBuildingClosedCoolingWater(RBCCW)ANDEmergencyEquipmentCoolingWater(EECW)flowisLOST.WhichONEofthefollowingcomponentsrequiresactiontobetakenwithinTWOminutes,withoutregardtotemperaturechange?A.HPCIPumpRoomCoolerB.ReactorRecirculationPumpsC.ControlRodDriveHydraulicPumpD.ReactorBuildingSteamTunnelSpaceCoolersAnswer:BILO2015WrittenPage:120of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:ReactorrecirculationpumpoperationislimitedtoTWOminuteswithoutRBCCW/EECWflow,Overidestatementfor20.127.01DistracterExplanation:DistractorsarevalidbasedonbeingloadsonthesystemaddressedbytheAOP.ReferenceInformation:AOP20.127.01(pg2)PlantProcedures20.127.01NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2400000K3.KnowledgeoftheeffectthatalossormalfunctionoftheCCWSwillhaveonthefollowing:400000K3.01LoadscooledbyCCWS10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(5)Facilityoperatingcharacteristicsduringsteadystateandtransientconditions,includingcoolantchemistry,causesandeffectsoftemperature,pressureandreactivitychanges,effectsofloadchanges,andoperatinglimitationsandreasonsfortheseoperatingcharacteristics.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:121of22008September2015 ID:R54Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEWForanormalNOTCHINofaselectedcontrolrodusingRMCS,whichofthefollowingplotsshowhowthesystemparameterswillrespond?NOTE-FortheseplotstheRODMOVEMENTCONTROLSWistakentoNOTCHIN,thenreleased.A.A&CB.A&DC.B&CD.B&DAnswer:AILO2015WrittenPage:122of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:ThisquestionaskstheexamineetopredicttheresponseofDriveWaterFlowanditsmostrelatedparameterDriveWaterDiffPressure.AandCplotsaretheNormalsystemresponse.DistracterExplanation:BPlotisplausibleandincorrectbecauseaNOTCHOUTwouldprovideaflowof2gpmDPlotisplausibleandincorrectbecauseitshowsthenormalcycleofDriveWaterDiffpressure,howeveritisforaNOTCHOUT.ReferenceInformation:SOP23.623referenceprovidedforunderstandingofnormalsystemoperations.GraphsareplotdatabasedonsystemoperationsforNOTCHINandOUT.PlantProcedures23.623NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2201002A1.Abilitytopredictand/ormonitorchangesinparametersassociatedwithoperatingtheREACTORMANUALCONTROLSYSTEMcontrolsincluding:201002A1.01CRDdrivewaterflow10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(5)Facilityoperatingcharacteristicsduringsteadystateandtransientconditions,includingcoolantchemistry,causesandeffectsoftemperature,pressureandreactivitychanges,effectsofloadchanges,andoperatinglimitationsandreasonsfortheseoperatingcharacteristics.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:123of22008September2015 ID:R55Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEW-CONTRACTTheplantwasoperatingat100%powerwithControlRod14-47atNotchPosition20whenthefollowingseriesofeventsoccurred:*At10:00ControlRod14-47starteddriftingduetoastuckcolletassembly.*At10:02ControlRod14-47wasverifiedtobefullyinserted.*At10:05ControlRod14-47washydraulicallydisarmed.*At10:15ControlRod14-47wasindividuallyscrammed.Assumingtheseweretheonlyoperatoractionsperformed,whichofthefollowingdescribeshowreactorpowerwasaffectedduringtheaboveseriesofevents?A.Powerwasincreasingat10:00andagainat10:05.B.Powerwasdecreasingat10:00andthenincreasingat10:05.C.Powerwasdecreasingat10:00andremainedsteadyafter10:02.D.Powerwasincreasingat10:00andremainedsteadyafter10:02.Answer:AILO2015WrittenPage:124of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:Astuckcolletassemblywouldcausepowertoincreaseastheroddriftedoutofthecore.TherodwasinsertedbyoperatorImmediateActionat10:02and,afterbeingdisarmedat10:05woulddriftbackoutofthecoreagaincausingpowertoincrease.Theexamineeshouldverifythisbythefactthattherodwasindividuallyscrammedat10:15,whichisonlynecessaryiftherodcontinuedtodriftoutafterbeingdisarmed,whichisanothersymptomofastuckcolletassembly.DistracterExplanation:B.Isplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldincorrectlydeterminethatastuckcolletassemblywouldcausecontrolrod14-47todriftintothecore,whichwouldrequiretheoperatortoverifythecontrolrodfullyinsertedandthentakeactiontodisarmthecontrolrod.Theoperatorcouldthenincorrectlydeterminethatthestuckcolletwouldthencausetherodtodriftout,oncehydraulicallydisarmed,whichwouldrequirefurtheractiontoindividuallyscramthecontrolrod.C.Isincorrectbutplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldincorrectlydeterminethatastuckcolletassemblywouldcausecontrolrod14-47todriftintothecore,whichwouldrequiretheoperatortoverifythecontrolrodfullyinsertedandthentakeactiontodisarmthecontrolrod,whichwouldpreventanyfurtherpowerchanges.D.Isplausiblebecausetheexamineeshouldcorrectlydeterminethatastuckcolletassemblywouldcausepowertoincreaseastheroddriftedoutofthecore.However,thecandidatecouldincorrectlyconcludethat,oncethecontrolrodwasinsertedat10:02andsubsequentlydisarmedat10:05,theseactionswouldholdcontrolrod14-47fullyinsertedandthatindividuallyscrammingtherodwasonlynecessaryforproceduralcompliance.ReferenceInformation:AOP20.106.07+BASESCaution1&ActionsD.1-D.6PlantProcedures20.106.0720.106.07BasesNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2201003K3.KnowledgeoftheeffectthatalossormalfunctionoftheCONTROLRODANDDRIVEMECHANISMwillhaveonfollowing:201003K3.01Reactorpower10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:125of22008September2015 ID:R56Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEW-CONTRACTAreactorstartupisinprogresswithpowerintheSourceRange.Duringturnover,theoncomingROreviewedthecurrentandfollowingstepsoftheRodWithdrawalSequenceandassociatedrodpositionsandidentifiedthefollowing:StepRodMoveFrom/ToCurrentPosition2714-3908to121238-1508to121238-3908to121214-1508to12102830-3108to120822-3108to120830-2308to120822-2308to1208AllotherControlRodsareattheirtargetpositionsandtheRodWorthMinimizerdoesnotindicateanyerrorsorblocks.Afterturnover,theROturnsonRodSelectPowerandselectsControlRod30-31formovement.WhichofthefollowinglistsALLoftheerrorsorblocksthatwillbedisplayedontheRodWorthMinimizer?Key:SE=SelectError;IB=InsertBlock;WB=WithdrawalBlock;IE=InsertError;WE=WithdrawalErrorA.ONLYSEB.ONLYIBandWBC.ONLYSE,IBandWBD.SE,IB,WB,IEandWEAnswer:CILO2015WrittenPage:126of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:ControlRod30-31isnotthenextrodinthesequenceandaSEwillbedisplayed.TheSEgeneratesbothaWBandanIBandwillnotpermitanyrodmotion.Withallrodsstillintheirtargetpositions,neitheranIEnoraWEwillbedisplayed.DistracterExplanation:A.IsplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldrecognizethatControlRod30-31isnotthenextrodinthesequence,soaSEwillbedisplayed;howevertheexamineecouldincorrectlydeterminethattheSEisallthatisgeneratedandfailtorecognizethataSEalsogeneratesbothaWBandanIB.B.IsincorrectbutplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldcorrectlyrecognizethatControlRod30-31isnotthenextrodinthesequenceanddeterminethatbothanIBandWBaregeneratedwithoutrecognizingthattheIBandWBaregeneratedasaresultoftheSE,whichwillalsobedisplayed.D.IsplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldrecognizethatControlRod30-31isnotthenextrodinthesequence,soaSEwillbedisplayed.TheexamineecouldalsodeterminethattheSEgeneratesbothaWBandanIBandwillnotpermitanyrodmotion.However,theexamineecouldincorrectlyconcludethatbothanIEandWEarealsogenerated,andwillbedisplayed.ReferenceInformation:ST-OP-315-0013(pg11)explansRodBlockandErrorFunctionsPlantProcedures23.608NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2201006K4.KnowledgeofRODWORTHMINIMIZERSYSTEM(RWM)(PLANTSPECIFIC)designfeature(s)and/orinterlockswhichprovideforthefollowing:201006K4.03Selectblocks/errors:P-Spec(Not-BWR6)10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:127of22008September2015 ID:R57Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:NEW-CONTRACTTheplanthasexperiencedalossofbus72B.Whilethecrewisperformingactionsinaccordancewith20.300.72Btostabilizetheplant,afailureofBOTHsealsforBReactorRecirculationpumpoccurs.WhichofthefollowingvalveswillthecrewNOTbeabletoclosetoisolateBRRPump?A.B3105-F023B,SouthRRPumpSuctionValveB.B3105-F031B,SouthRRPumpDischargeValveC.G3352-F106,RWCURRLoopBSuctionIsolationValveD.B3100-F008B,SouthRRPumpSealWaterIsolationValveAnswer:AILO2015WrittenPage:128of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:B3105-F023BneedstobeclosedinordertoisolateBRRpump,butispoweredbybus72B,andwillNOTbeabletobeclosed.ThisquestionischallengingbecauseBOTHoftheRRPumps'suctionisolationvalves(F023A&B)arepoweredbythesamebus,72B,whichisaDiv1bus,andRRPumpBhasprimarilyDiv2poweredcomponents.DistracterExplanation:B.IsplausiblebecauseB3105-F031BneedstobeclosedinordertoisolateBRRpump,andtheexamineecouldfailtorecognizethatthisvalveisstillpoweredfrombus72CFsoitISabletobeclosedtoisolateBRRPump.C.IsplausiblebecauseG3352-F106needstobeclosedinordertoisolateBRRpump,andtheexamineecouldfailtorecognizethatthisvalveisstillpoweredfromMCC72EsoitISabletobeclosedtoisolateBRRPump.D.IsplausiblebecauseB3100-F008BneedstobeclosedinordertoisolateBRRpump,andtheexamineecouldfailtorecognizethatthisvalveisnormallydirectedtobeclosedlocally,soitISabletobeclosedtoisolateBRRPump.ReferenceInformation:20.300.72NEnclApg3of4LISTOFAFFECTEDLOADSPlantProcedures23.138.0120.300.72BNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2202001K2.Knowledgeofelectricalpowersuppliestothefollowing:202001K2.03Recirculationsystemvalves10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:129of22008September2015 ID:R58Points:1.00Difficulty:5.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:MODIFIEDBANK:20204010203009TheplantisinMode2withreactorheatupinprogress.TheReactorWaterCleanupSystem(RWCU)islineduptoblowdownfromRWCUtotheMainCondenser.Thefollowingeventsthenoccur:2D119,RBCCWPUMPSDIFFPRESSHIGH/LOW,alarms.2D46,MOTORTRIPPED,alarms.BothoperatingRBCCWpumpsindicateTRIPPED.NOoperatoractionshavebeentaken.(1)ForRWCUwhatautomaticactuationswilloccur?(2)HowwillRWCUrespondtotheseactuations?A.(1)G3352-F119,RWCUInletIsolationValve,closes.(2)RWCUpumpstriponlowflow.B.(1)G3352-F044,Filter/DemineralizerBypassValve,opens.(2)RWCUFilter/Demineralizersoutlettemperaturewillstablizeandbegintolower.C.(1)G3352-F220,G3352-F004,andG3352-F001,RWCUContainmentIsolationValves,close.(2)RWCUpumpstriponlowflow.D.(1)G3300-F033,BlowdownFlowControlValve,throttlescloses.(2)RWCUFilter/Demineralizersoutlettemperaturewillstablizeandbegintolower.Answer:AILO2015WrittenPage:130of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:LossofRBCCWcoolingtoNRHXRcausesahightemperaturewhichleadstothiseffect.RWCUNRHXsNRHXOutletTempat140°F:G3352-F119closes.RWCUPumpstrip.RWCUDeminsintoHold.DistracterExplanation:Alldistractorsareplausibleandarebasedontheexamineesabilitytoproperlyinterpretindicationsandunderstandsystemoperations.ReferenceInformation:ARP2D110(pg1)AUTOACTIONPlantProcedures20.127.0102D110NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2204000A3.AbilitytomonitorautomaticoperationsoftheREACTORWATERCLEANUPSYSTEMincluding:204000A3.03Responsetosystemisolations10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:131of22008September2015 ID:R59Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEW-CONTRACTTheplantisoperatingat100%power.AfireintheReactorBuildingisreportedaffectingbothReactorPressureVessel(RPV)LevelInstrumentracks.IfonlytheWideRangeRPVlevelinstruments'referencelegtemperaturesbecomeelevatedduetothefire,whichoneofthefollowingcorrectlycompletesthefollowingstatementindicatingtheeffectontheRPVlevelactuationsascomparedtotheRPVleveltripsetpointundernormaltemperatureconditions?Duetotheelevatedtemperatureinthelevelinstrumentreferencelegs,actualRPVlevelfora__(1)__wouldbe__(2)__whentheactuationoccurred.A.(1)reactorscram(2)higherB.(1)reactorscram(2)lowerC.(1)corespraylogicactuation(2)higherD.(1)corespraylogicactuation(2)lowerAnswer:DILO2015WrittenPage:132of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:HeatingofthereferencelegsofanyRPVlevelinstrumentwouldcausetheindicatedleveltoincreaseduetothedensitychangeofthewaterinthereferenceleg.Basedontheloweringdensityinthereferenceleg,thereferencelegwouldhavelessmassascomparedtothevariableleg(actuallevel)thusmakingactualRPVlevellowerforanysetpointinitiatedactuationortrip.Thewiderangeinstrumentsalsoprovidecorespray(ECCS)actuations.DistracterExplanation:A.Isincorrectbutplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldincorrectlydeterminethatwiderangeinstrumentsprovidereactorscramfunctions.Thereactorscramfunctionsareprovidedbynarrowinstruments.Theinstrumentmalfunctionduetotheelevatedtemperaturesisindicatedonlyifthevariablelegtemperatureswereaffectedandnotthereferencelegwhichwouldbeanincorrectassessment.B.Isincorrectbutplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldincorrectlydeterminethatwiderangeinstrumentsprovidereactorscramfunctions.Theinstrumentmalfunctionduetotheelevatedtemperaturesiscommensuratewiththeelevatedreferencelegtemperatureandwouldbeanaccurateassessmentoftheeffect.C.Isincorrectbutplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldincorrectlydeterminetheinstrumentmalfunctionduetotheelevatedtemperaturesisindicatedonlyifthevariablelegtemperatureswereaffectedandnotthereferencelegwhichwouldbeanincorrectassessment.ReferenceInformation:BC07Sr4_SensorsMay2011Explainstemperatevariationsoninstruments.23.601(pg16)CoreSprayactuationfromtheseinstruments/logicI2rprod-CECO-Identifiestheinstrumentslistedin23.601asthewiderangeinstruments.PlantProcedures23.60129.ESP.01NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2216000K5.KnowledgeoftheoperationalimplicationsofthefollowingconceptsastheyapplytoNUCLEARBOILERINSTRUMENTATION:216000K5.14Density10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(5)Facilityoperatingcharacteristicsduringsteadystateandtransientconditions,includingcoolantchemistry,causesandeffectsoftemperature,pressureandreactivitychanges,effectsofloadchanges,andoperatinglimitationsandreasonsfortheseoperatingcharacteristics.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:133of22008September2015 ID:R60Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEWTheplantisshutdown.Acoolantleakresultedinanautomaticscramandanemergencydepressurization.Currentconditionsareasfollows:*Drywellpressureis19.5psig.*Toruspressureis19psig.*RPVlevelis198inchesandsteady.*Division1&2CSareinjectingandbeingusedtocontrolRWL.*AllRHRpumpsareoff.TheCRSdirectsE1150-F010closedandTorusCoolingandSprayplacedinserviceusingDivision1RHR.DrywellSprayisthenplacedinserviceusingDivision1RHRaddinganadditional12,500gpm.AleakfromtheTorusthenoccurs.InitialToruslevelis-14inchesandloweringat2inchesperminute.HowlongbeforetheRHRpump(s)providingTorusCoolingandSprayandDrywellSpraywouldhavetobeshutofforflowreduced?A.13minutesB.18minutesC.28minutesD.37minutesAnswer:BILO2015WrittenPage:134of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:Div1RHRflowfortheaboveconditionis~22859gpm(2pumpconfigurationrequiredperSOP)-14inchesstartinglevelwith-2inchesperminuteDistracterExplanation:DistractorsarevalidbasedonunderstandingsystemconfigurationsandexpectedflowsforRHR12500gpm~-40inches-1pumps(-14to-40)26inches=13minutes23000gpm~-50inches-2pumps(-14to-50)36inches=18minutes-CORRECTANSWER18500gpm~-70inches-2pumps(-14to-70)56inches=28minutes12500gpm~-88inches-2pumps(-14to-88)74inches=37minutesReferenceInformation:SOP23.205EnclA-ProcedureforRHRCONTAINMENTCOOLINGMODESOPERATION(Shows2RHRpumpswouldbeused)EOP29.100.01SH6-RHR(LPCI)VortexlimitPlantProcedures23.20529.100.01SH6NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2230000K1.Knowledgeofthephysicalconnectionsand/orcauseeffectrelationshipsbetweenRHR/LPCI:TORUS/SUPPRESSIONPOOLSPRAYMODEandthefollowing:230000K1.01Suppressionpool10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(5)Facilityoperatingcharacteristicsduringsteadystateandtransientconditions,includingcoolantchemistry,causesandeffectsoftemperature,pressureandreactivitychanges,effectsofloadchanges,andoperatinglimitationsandreasonsfortheseoperatingcharacteristics.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:135of22008September2015 ID:R61Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEW-CONTRACTAplantshutdownisinprogresswithreactorpowercurrentlystableat65%.TheTurbineFlowLimitersetpointisthenslowlyloweredto60%.WhichoneofthefollowingdescribestheGovernor/PressureRegulatorsystemvalveresponse?A.TurbineControlValveandTurbineBypassValvepositionsremainthesame.B.TurbineControlValvesthrottleclose,andTurbineBypassValvesthrottleopen.C.TurbineControlValvepositionsremainthesame,andTurbineBypassValvesthrottleopen.D.TurbineControlValvesthrottleclose,andTurbineBypassValvepositionsremainthesame.Answer:BILO2015WrittenPage:136of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:ThesetpointadjustmentshouldhavebeentomaintaintheTurbineFlowLimiter5%abovereactorpowerandnot5%belowreactorpower.LoweringtheturbineflowlimitersetpointbelowthereactorpowersetpointwillcausetheTurbineControlValvestoclose.TheTurbineBypassvalveswillopeninresponsetoareactorpressureincrease.DistracterExplanation:A.Isincorrectbutplausible.Theexamineecouldincorrectlydeterminethatsetpointwasproperlyadjusted,whichwouldcausenovalvemovementsincethesetpointdifferencefromreactorpoweris5%inthestem.Inaccordancewith22.000.03,PowerOperation25%to100%to25%,thesetpointismaintained5%above(vicebelow)reactorpowerduringtheshutdown.C.Isincorrectbutplausible.TheexamineecouldincorrectlydeterminethatthesystemresponseisacombinationofresponsesfromdistractorsAandCwhichwouldeachbepartlycorrectfortheadjustmentoftheTurbineFlowLimiterandReactorFlowLimiter.D.Isincorrectbutplausible.TheexamineecouldincorrectlydeterminethatthesystemresponsewouldbeasstatedindistractorAsincethiswouldbeacorrectresponseiftheReactorFlowLimitsetpointhadbeenadjustedto60%insteadoftheTurbineFlowLimitsetpoint.ReferenceInformation:22.000.02pg5022.000.03pg823.109pg38PlantProcedures23.10922.000.0222.000.03NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2241000K6KnowledgeoftheeffectthatalossormalfunctionofthefollowingwillhaveontheREACTOR/TURBINEPRESSUREREGULATINGSYSTEM:241000K6.12Control/governorvalvesNRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:137of22008September2015 ID:R62Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEWAreactoroperatorisperforming24.000.02Attachment1EightHour--MODE1,2,3--ControlRoom.TheDrywellFloorDrainandEquipmentDrainSumpPumpswereplacedinRUN,allowedtotrip,andreturnedtoAUTO.ThefollowingdataisrecordedonDataSheet1:TIME*CurrentTime(hr:min)0000*PreviousTime(hr:min)1600SUMPLEVEL*FloorDrainSumpLevel(in.)26.3DRYWELLFLOORDRAIN*PreviousIntegrator(gal)119043DRYWELLEQUIPMENTDRAIN*PreviousIntegrator(gal)715937CURRENTINTEGRATORREADINGS:Assuminganycalculatedleakagewouldremainconstantforthenext24hours,wouldanLCOentryberequiredandwhy?A.Yes,duetototalleakage.B.Yes,duetounidentifiedleakage.C.Yes,duetounidentifiedleakageandtotalleakage.D.No,leakageiswithinTechSpeclimits.Answer:BILO2015WrittenPage:138of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:LCO3.4.4RCSoperationalLEAKAGEshallbelimitedto:a.NopressureboundaryLEAKAGE:b.<5gpmunidentifiedLEAKAGE:c.<25gpmtotalLEAKAGEaveragedovertheprevious24hourperiod;andd.<2gpmincreaseinunidentifiedLEAKAGEprevious24hourperiodinMODE1.unidentifiedLEAKAGE-->DRYWELLFLOORDRAIN.121539-119043=2496gal/480min=5.2gal/min==>LCOENTRYidentifiedLEAKAGE-->DRYWELLEQUIPMENTDRAIN.176701-715937=764gal/480min=1.59gal/min+5.2gal/min=6.79==>NOTLCOENTRYDistracterExplanation:DistractersareplausiblebasedonknowledgeofT.S.operationleakageandcorrectmonitoringofintegratorsReferenceInformation:ARP2D75DRYWELLSUMPRATEHIGH24.000.02Enclfilledout1-31-14(historical-fordata)24.000.02Attachment1(pg3-6)thesurveillanceT.S.3.4.4(pg3..4-9to10)LCOrequirementsPlantProcedures24.000.02NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2268000A4.Abilitytomanuallyoperateand/ormonitorinthecontrolroom:268000A4.01SumpintegratorsTechnicalSpecifications3.4.4RCSOperationalLEAKAGE10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:139of22008September2015 ID:R63Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:BANK:315-0135-A021-003Withtheplantoperatingatfullpower,thefollowingalarmsandindicationsexist:*6D21,E/WOFFGASRECOMBINERTEMPERATUREHIGH/LOW,alarms.*TheWestOffGasRecombinerisinserviceandisindicating700°FonN62-R815,OffGasComponentsTemperatureRecorder.*TheEastOffGasRecombinerisinstandbyandisindicating270°FonN62-R815,OffGasComponentsTemperatureRecorder.WhichONEofthefollowingoperatoractionsshouldbeperformedtocontrolOffGasRecombinerTemperature?A.VERIFYN62-F400,18"ManifoldSteamSupplyTCV,isOPEN.B.VERIFYN62-F400,18"ManifoldSteamSupplyTCV,isSHUT.C.VERIFYN62-N013A,C(WestRecombinerThermostaticControlledElectricHeaters)at600°F.D.VERIFYN62-N013DE,F(EastRecombinerThermostaticControlledElectricHeaters)at600°F.Answer:DILO2015WrittenPage:140of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:Basedonunderstandtheautomaticoperationoftheoffgassystemtheexamineeshouldrecognizethatthetemperatureofthestandby(East)offgasrecombinertemperatureislow(setpointof276°F)BasedontheARP,thefirstactionafterverifiyingthetemperature(providedbythequestionstem)istoverifytheheatersetpointat600°F.DistracterExplanation:A.IsincorrectandplausiblebecausetheN62-F400controlssteamflowtotherecombinerandbythis,temperature.Howeverthisisonlytruefortherecombinerinserviceandtheinservicerecombinertemperatureisinband.Theexamineewouldchoosethisansweriftheyincorreclyidentifiedtheproblemtobeintheinservicerecombinerandwantedtolowertemperture.B.IsincorrectandplausiblebecausetheN62-F400controlssteamflowtotherecombinerandbythis,temperature.Howeverthisisonlytruefortherecombinerinserviceandtheinservicerecombinertemperatureisinband.Theexamineewouldchoosethisansweriftheyincorreclyidentifiedtheproblemtobeintheinservicerecombinerandwantedtoraisetemperture.D.IsincorrectandplausiblebecausethisistheThermostaticControlledElectricHeatersfortheinservicerecombine.Theexamineewouldchoosethisansweriftheyincorreclyidentifiedtheproblemtobeintheinservicerecombinerandthoughttheheaterscouldcorrecttheproblem.ReferenceInformation:ARP6D21(pg1-3)actionsandsetpointsPlantProcedures06D21NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2271000A3AbilitytomonitorautomaticoperationsoftheOFFGASSYSTEMincluding:271000A3.03Systemtemperatures10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:141of22008September2015 ID:R64Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:NEWTheCREFSystemisdesignedtomaintainahabitableenvironmentintheControlRoomEnvelopefor____day(s)continuousoccupancyafteraDBAwithoutexceedingTotalEffectiveDoseEquivalent(TEDE)limits.A.1B.7C.14D.30Answer:DILO2015WrittenPage:142of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:TheCREFSystemisdesignedtomaintainahabitableenvironmentintheCREfora30daycontinuousoccupancyafteraDBAwithoutexceeding5remTotalEffectiveDoseEquivalent(TEDE).-fromT.S.BasisB3.7.3-2.DistracterExplanation:1,7,and14daylimitsareplausiblebasedonthereuseintechspecs.ReferenceInformation:T41-02CONTROLCENTERHEATING,VENTILATING,ANDAIR-CONDITIONING(CCHVAC)SYSTEMDBD.(4.1.12)PlantProceduresT41-02CONTROLCENTERHEATING,VENTILATING,ANDAIR-CONDITIONING(CCHVAC)SYSTEMNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.1.27Knowledgeofsystempurposeandorfunction.288000PlantVentilationSystems.TechnicalSpecifications3.7.3ControlRoomEmergencyFiltration(CREF)SystemNRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:143of22008September2015 ID:R65Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEW-CONTRACTDuetoradiationmonitoralarms,reactorpowerwasloweredinaccordancewith20.000.07,FuelCladdingFailure.Theplantiscurrentlyoperatingat95%power.Thefollowingannunciatorsandindicationsareobserved:*3D32,DIVI/IIRBVENTEXHRADNMONITORUPSCALE*3D36,DIVI/IIRBVENTEXHRADNMONITORUPSCALETRIP*WhiteDivision1ReactorBuildingIsolateTRIPPEDlight-ON*WhiteDivision2ReactorBuildingIsolateTRIPPEDlight-OFFBasedontheseindications,whichONEofthefollowingdescribes(1)thestatusofSecondaryContainmentand(2)theactions,ifany,requiredbyplantproceduresassumingallequipmentoperatesasexpected.A.(1)SecondaryContainmentisfullyisolatedandpressureisbeingmaintainednegative.(2)Noadditionalactionsarenecessarytoalignrequiredequipment.B.(1)SecondaryContainmentisNOTfullyisolatedandpressureisbeingmaintainednegative.(2)ClosetheopenSecondaryContainmentisolationvalves.C.(1)SecondaryContainmentisfullyisolatedandpressureisbeingmaintainedpositive.(2)Startthenon-runningdivisionofSGTStoensurebuildingpressureisloweredtoanegativevalue.D.(1)SecondaryContainmentisNOTfullyisolatedandpressureisbeingmaintainedpositive.(2)ClosetheopenSecondaryContainmentisolationvalves,andstartthenon-runningdivisionofSGTStoensurebuildingpressureisloweredtoanegativevalue.Answer:AILO2015WrittenPage:144of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:SecondaryContainmentisolationvalveswillallbeclosedevenwithonlyonedivision'stripisolationcircuitytripped.Whenonedivisiontrips,isolationvalvescloseineachlineforthesupplyandexhaust.Theotherisolationvalveswillgetaclosesignalwhenthefanstriponlowflow.ThealarmproceduresandAOP20.000.02,AbnormalReleaseofRadioactiveMaterial,directverificationofactions;however,basedononedivision'stripcircuitrytripping,onedivisionofSGTSwouldstartandisenoughtomaintainpressureasdescribedinAOP20.000.02bases.DistracterExplanation:B.IsincorrectbutplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldincorrectlydeterminethatallcontainmentisolationvalvesarenotclosedbasedononlyDivision1secondarycontainmentisolationcircuitytripping.C.IsincorrectbutplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldincorrectlydeterminethatallisolationvalvesclosedandthatanadditionaltrainofSGTSisrequiredtofullymaintainpressuresincethesystemtripcircuitswouldnormallystartbothdivisions.D.IsincorrectbutplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldincorrectlydeterminethatallcontainmentisolationvalvesarenotclosedbasedononlyDivision1secondarycontainmentisolationcircuitytrippingandanadditionaltrainofSGTSisrequiredtofullymaintainpressuresincethesystemtripcircuitswouldnormallystartbothdivisions.ReferenceInformation:AOP20.000.02B.1-B.5+BASESPlantProcedures20.000.0223.40423.42620.000.0720.000.02BasesNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2290001A2.Abilityto(a)predicttheimpactsofthefollowingontheSECONDARYCONTAINMENT;and(b)basedonthosepredictions,useprocedurestocorrect,control,ormitigatetheconsequencesofthoseabnormalconditionsoroperations:290001A2.04Highairborneradiation10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(5)Facilityoperatingcharacteristicsduringsteadystateandtransientconditions,includingcoolantchemistry,causesandeffectsoftemperature,pressureandreactivitychanges,effectsofloadchanges,andoperatinglimitationsandreasonsfortheseoperatingcharacteristics.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:145of22008September2015 ID:R66Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:NEW10CFR55.25states"If,duringthetermofthelicense,thelicenseedevelopsapermanentphysicalormentalconditionthatcausesthelicenseetofailtomeettherequirementsof§55.21ofthispart,thefacilitylicenseeshallnotifytheCommission..."ToensurethatFermi2meetstheserequirements,MGA13,FermiMedicalRequirements,requiresthatlicensedindividualsshallberesponsibletoimmediatelynotify_______________ofanychangeinmedicalstatus.A.MedicalonlyB.theirimmediatesupervisoronlyC.MedicalandtheirimmediatesupervisoronlyD.Medical,theirimmediatesupervisor,andtheSupervisor,OperationsTrainingAnswer:DILO2015WrittenPage:146of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:MGA13Section2.10.1states"LicensedindividualsshallberesponsibletoimmediatelynotifyMedical,theirimmediatesupervisor,andtheSupervisor,OperationsTrainingofanychangeinmedicalstatus."DistracterExplanation:A,B,C.Medical,theirimmediatesupervisor,andSupervisor,OperationsTrainingmustbenotifedbytheLicensedindividualimmediately.ReferenceInformation:MGA13pg13PlantProceduresMGA13NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.1.4Knowledgeofindividuallicensedoperatorresponsibilitiesrelatedtoshiftstaffing,suchasmedicalrequirements,no-solooperation,maintenanceofactivelicensestatus,10CFR55,etc.10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(10)Administrative,normal,abnormal,andemergencyoperatingproceduresforthefacility.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:147of22008September2015 ID:R67Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:BANK:315-0128-A013-001FollowingaMANUALReactorScramfrom50%power,thefollowingconditionsareobservedinIPCS:PIDQUALVALUEUNITSDESCRIPTIONN30DX3017GOOD0.00PCTHPTurbinecontrolvalve#1positionN30DX3018GOOD0.00PCTHPTurbinecontrolvalve#2positionN30DX3019GOOD0.00PCTHPTurbinecontrolvalve#3positionN30DX3020GOOD0.00PCTHPTurbinecontrolvalve#4positionS20DC0315GOODCLOSEDGeneratorBreakerCMS20DC0315GOODCLOSEDGeneratorBreakerCFS13DJ1212LOW0.0MWEGeneratorGrossGenerationTheMainGeneratorExciterFieldBreakerindicatesCLOSED.Basedontheseconditions,whichoneofthefollowingTurbineGeneratorTripsignalswillinitiate?A.LossofFieldB.ReversePowerC.GeneratorDifferentialD.NegativePhaseSequenceAnswer:BILO2015WrittenPage:148of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:WithTCVsSHUT,nosteamisbeingsuppliedtotheTurbineGenerator.TheGeneratorisstillconnectedtothegridandwillbeginmotoring.ReversePowerwillbesensedbythisconditionandwillgenerateaTurbineGeneratorTripwhenthe67relayisenergized.BreakerpositionmustbelookedupinSOER.DistracterExplanation:A.IsincorrectandplausiblebecauseitwouldbetrueiftheMainGeneratorFieldBreakerOPENED,orexcitationwaslost.C.IsincorrectandplausiblewouldbetrueifanelectricalfaultconditionoccurredresultinginDifferentialCurrentcondition.D.IsincorrectandplausiblewouldbetrueifaphaseopenoccurredintheGeneratorStator.LiketheReversePowertrip,theNegativePhaseSequencetripistimedependent,whichisacommonmisconception.ReferenceInformation:AOP20.000.21Bases,page5PlantProcedures20.000.21BasesNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.1.19Abilitytouseplantcomputertoevaluatesystemorcomponentstatus295005AA1.Abilitytooperateand/ormonitorthefollowingastheyapplytoMAINTURBINEGENERATORTRIP:295005AA1.04Maingeneratorcontrols10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2013AuditExam/ILO2012ExamILO2015WrittenPage:149of22008September2015 ID:R68Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEWTheplantwasoperatingat100%powerwithJetPumpTotalFlowof87.4Mlbs/hrwhenreactorpowerlowered.Thefollowingflowindicationswereobserved:BasedONLYontheindicationsabove,whateventhasoccurred?A.JetPumpFailureonLoopAB.JetPumpFailureonLoopBC.UncontrolledRecircFlowchangeof5%onAReactorRecircPump(lowering)D.UncontrolledRecircFlowchangeof5%onBReactorRecircPump(rising)Answer:BILO2015WrittenPage:150of22008September2015 ILO2015WrittenPage:151of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:20.138.02JetPumpFailureSymptoms:UnexplainedchangeinindicatedCoreFlowUnexplainedchangeinRecircLoopFlowUnexplaineddecreaseinCoreD/PJetPumpPercentDifferentialPressuredeviatesexcessivelyfromtheaverageoftheremainingJetPumpPercentDifferentialPressuresAdditionallythedifferencebetweenB21-R609BandB21-R609DshowsthatBloophasaimbalanceshowingthatthejetpumpinBloophaveafailure.DistracterExplanation:A.ThisanswerisincorrectbecausethedifferencebetweenB21-R609BandB21-R609DshowsthatBloophasaimbalanceshowingthatthejetpumpinBloop.C.ThechangeinJetPumptotalflowdoesnotmatcha5%loweringinARecircpumpanddifferencebetweenB21-R609BandB21-R609DshowsthatBloophasaimbalanceshowingthatthejetpumpinBloophasfailed.HowevertheflowindicationsforAlooparelowerthanBimplying(incorrectly)aloweringofArecircflow.D.ThechangeinJetPumptotalflowdoesnotmatcha5%increaseinBRecircpumpanddifferencebetweenB21-R609BandB21-R609DshowsthatBloophasaimbalanceshowingthatthejetpumpinBloophasfailed.HowevertheflowindicationsforBlooparehigherthanAimplying(incorrectly)aincreaseofBrecircflow.ReferenceInformation:AOP20.138.02JetPumpFailure(pg5)JetPumpFailureSymptomsPlantProcedures23.138.02NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.1.7Abilitytoevaluateplantperformanceandmakeoperationaljudgmentsbasedonoperatingcharacteristics,reactorbehavior,andinstrumentinterpretation10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(5)Facilityoperatingcharacteristicsduringsteadystateandtransientconditions,includingcoolantchemistry,causesandeffectsoftemperature,pressureandreactivitychanges,effectsofloadchanges,andoperatinglimitationsandreasonsfortheseoperatingcharacteristics.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:152of22008September2015 ID:R69Points:1.00Difficulty:4.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:BANK:804-0001-0007-009Withtheplantoperatingat80%power,at0800onAugust28,EDG11isdiscoveredINOPERABLE.WhichONEofthefollowingdescribesLATESTTIMEthatSR3.8.1.1"Verifycorrectbreakeralignmentandindicatedpoweravailabilityforeachoffsitecircuit"canbecompletedWITHOUTenteringintoaconditionwhichrequiresaunitshutdown?A.0815onAugust28B.0850onAugust28C.0905onAugust28D.0915onAugust29Answer:BILO2015WrittenPage:153of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:SR3.8.1.1isdueWITHINONEHOUR,0850August28isthelatesttimewhichcomplies.DistracterExplanation:A.Isincorrectandplausible,butNOTthelatesttime(15minutesforeventclassification)B.Isincorrectandplausible,SR3.8.1.1expiredat0900-NO1.25extensionsarepermittedoninitialperiodD.Isincorrectandplausible,SR3.8.1.1expiredat0900-NO1.25extensionsarepermittedoninitialperiodReferenceInformation:T.S.3.8.1(pg3.8-1to3.8-9)NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.2.36Abilitytoanalyzetheeffectofmaintenanceactivitiessuchasdegradedpowersources,onthestatusoflimitingconditionsforoperationsTechnicalSpecifications3.8.1ACSourcesOperating10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(10)Administrative,normal,abnormal,andemergencyoperatingproceduresforthefacility.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:154of22008September2015 ID:R70Points:1.00Difficulty:2.50LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:NEWPerMOP05,ControlofEquipment,"AccesstoProtectedAreasmaybegrantedtoallowactivitiesdeemednecessarybytheShiftManager."WhichofthefollowingpersonnelareNOTexemptfromProtectedEquipmentrestrictions?A.SecurityB.PlantManagerC.NRCinspectorsD.NuclearOperatorsAnswer:BILO2015WrittenPage:155of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:PerMOP5,ControlofEquipment,Security,Operations,andNRCinspectorsareexemptfromProtectedEquipmentrestrictions.DistracterExplanation:A/C/Dareallexempt;soincorrectandplausible.ReferenceInformation:MOP05,pages30&31PlantProceduresMOP05-ControlOfEquipmentNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.2.14KnowledgeoftheprocessforcontrollingequipmentconfigurationorstatusNRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2013AuditExam/ILO2012ExamILO2015WrittenPage:156of22008September2015 ID:R71Points:1.00Difficulty:2.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:BANK:508-0001-A013-003WhichONEofthefollowingdescribestheannuallimitsforTotalEffectiveDoseEquivalent(TEDE)assetforthin(1)10CFR20and(2)Fermi2AdministrativeGuidelinesforpersonswithRadiationTrainingandcompletecurrentyearrecords?A.(1)3rem/year(2)0.5rem/yearB.(1)3rem/year(2)1rem/yearC.(1)5rem/year(2)0.5rem/yearD.(1)5rem/year(2)1rem/yearAnswer:DILO2015WrittenPage:157of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:10CFR20limitsTEDEto5rems/yr,andAdministrativelimitsMRP03are1rem/yrforpersonswithcurrentrecords.DistracterExplanation:A.Isincorrectandplausiblebecause0.5remisfortheincompleterecords.B.Isincorrectandplausiblebecause3rem/yearisnotthefederalTEDElimit.C.Isincorrectandplausiblebecause0.5rem/yearisthelimitwithincompletecurrentyearrecords.ReferenceInformation:MRP03EnclA(pg1)PlantProceduresMRP02NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.3.43.2/3.7KnowledgeofradiationexposurelimitsundernormalandemergencyconditionsNRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2001ExamILO2015WrittenPage:158of22008September2015 ID:R72Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEW-CONTRACTTheplantisoperatingat100%powerwhenaLOCAoccurs.Whichofthefollowingsetsofalarms,ifactuatedduringtheseplantconditions,wouldindicateafuelcladdingfailurerequiringuseofStandbyLiquidControlforToruspHcontrol?A.3D8-DIVI/IIOFFGASRADNMONITORUPSCALE3D24-2MINUTEHOLDUPPIPERADNMONITORUPSCALETRIPB.3D43-DIVI/IICONTMAREARADNMONITORTROUBLE3D83-MNSTMLINECHA/B/C/DRADNMONITORUPSCALEC.8D1-TORUSHARDVENTRADIATIONHIGH/FAIL16D8-TURBINEBUILDINGHIGHRADND.3D44-EFFLUENTPROCESSRADNMONITORTROUBLE3D48-TURBINEBLDGVENTEXHAUSTRADNMONITORUPSCALE/INOPAnswer:BILO2015WrittenPage:159of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:20.000.07,FuelCladdingFailure,and3D43,DIVI/IICONTMAREARADNMONITORTROUBLE,statethatthesealarmsareindicativeofagrossfuelcladdingfailureandrequireuseofSLCfortoruspHcontrolasdirectedbybothoftheseprocedures.DistracterExplanation:A.Isincorrectandplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldincorrectlydeterminethattheradiationmonitoralarmsareindicativeofafuelcladdingfailure.TheproceduresindicatethesealarmswouldbeindicativeofasmallcladdingfailureandnotagrossfailurerequiringuseofSLCfortoruspHcontrol.C.Isincorrectandplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldincorrectlydeterminethatafuelcladdingfailurewouldresultinatorushardventradiationalarm,howeverinthecurrentplantconditionstheventpathwouldnotbealignedandtherewouldbenoflowpasttheradiationmonitor.Turbinebuildinghighradiationcouldalsobeindicativeofafuelcladfailure,howeverproceduredirectionforthisalarmdoesnotdirectuseofSLCfortoruspHcontrol.D.Isincorrectandplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldincorrectlydeterminethat3D44mayalarmforafuelelementfailuresince3D44monitors9processradmonitorsetpointsanalarmsifanyareaboverequiredtrippoints.3D44doesnotdirectactionsfortheuseofSLCfortoruspHcontrol.Similarly3D48wouldbeplausibleforacladdingfailureifradiationwastransportingthroughtheturbinebuilding.ReferenceInformation:ARP3D43(pg1&2)SubsequentactionsandInitiatingDevicesAOP20.000.07&BASES(all)grossfuelactionsandindications.PlantProcedures03D08303D04403D04816D0820.000.0203D00803D02403D04308D0120.000.07NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.3.15Knowledgeofradiationmonitoringsystems,suchasfixedradiationmonitorsandalarms,portablesurveyinstruments,personnelmonitoringequipment,etc.10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(10)Administrative,normal,abnormal,andemergencyoperatingproceduresforthefacility.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:160of22008September2015 ILO2015WrittenPage:161of22008September2015 ID:R73Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:BANK315-0141-0003-011Theplantisshutdownforarefuelingoutage.*RPVtemperatureis140°F.*Division2RHRisoperatingintheShutdownCoolingmode.*RHRPumpBisrunning.Thefollowingalarmsandindicationsarethennoted:*3D156,REACTORWATERLEVELLOW*3D79,REACVESSELWATERLEVELL3CHANNELTRIP*RPVwaterlevelis160"andsteadyonNarrowRangelevelindicators.*RPVwaterlevelis135"andloweringslowlyonWideRangelevelindicators.Basedontheseconditions,whichONEofthefollowingactionsistakenfirstinaccordancewithplantprocedures?A.Enter29.100.01Sheet1,RPVControl,andrestorelevelusingRPVFlooding.B.Enter29.100.01Sheet1,RPVControl,andrestorelevelusingTable1systems.C.Enter20.205.01,LossofShutdownCooling,andrestoreshutdowncoolingusingBRHRpump.D.Enter20.205.01,LossofShutdownCooling,andrestoreshutdowncoolingusingDivision1RHR.Answer:BILO2015WrittenPage:162of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:RPVLevel3conditionrequiresentryintotheEOPs.ItalsoresultsinalossofShutdownCooling,butsinceEOPentrytakespriority,actionsintheAOParetakenaftertheEOPactions.EOPSh1statestorestorelevelusingTable1systems.SinceRPVlevelCANbedetermined,entryintoRPVFloodingisnotrequired.DistracterExplanation:A.IsincorrectsinceRPVlevelCANbedetermined,andentryintoRPVFloodingisnotrequired.ItisplausibleiftheexamineeincorrectlyassumestheindicationdiscrepanciesasalossofRPVlevelindication.C.IsincorrectbecauseAOPentryisnotapriorityduringEOPactions.ItisplausiblebecausetheAOPactionsincluderestoringSDCusingthesameRHRlooppreviouslyinservice.D.IsincorrectbecauseAOPentryisnotapriorityduringEOPactions.ItisplausibleiftheexamineeincorrectlyassumesDiv2RHRisisolated,andDiv1RHRmustbeusedtorestoreSDC.ReferenceInformation:29.100.01Sheet1(entryconditionsandactions)QuestionCognitiveLevelAnalysis/SynthesisPlantProcedures20.205.0129.100.01SH1NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.4.1KnowledgeofEOPentryconditionsandimmediateactionsteps.10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(10)Administrative,normal,abnormal,andemergencyoperatingproceduresforthefacility.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2001ExamILO2015WrittenPage:163of22008September2015 ID:R74Points:1.00Difficulty:2.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:NEWAnALERTEmergencyActionLevelhasbeendeclaredandisNOTsecurityrelated.TheTechnicalSupportCenterandEmergencyOperationsFacilityareNOTactivated.PerRERPProcedures,the__(1)__telephoneshouldbeusedtomakeanINITIALnotificationtotheUSNuclearRegulatoryCommissionwhichmustbecompletednolaterthan__(2)__aftertheemergencydeclaration.A.(1)ENS(EmergencyNotificationSystem)(2)15minutesB.(1)ENS(EmergencyNotificationSystem)(2)60minutesC.(1)HPN(HealthPhysicsNetwork)(2)15minutesD.(1)HPN(HealthPhysicsNetwork)(2)60minutesAnswer:BILO2015WrittenPage:164of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:PerEP-290,theNRCmustbenotifiedusingtheENStelephone60minutesafterclassifyinganevent.DistracterExplanation:A.isplausiblebecause15minutesistherequirementforlocalandstateauthorizesANDtheNRCforsecurityevents.C.isplausiblebecausetheHPNisanothercommunicationsystemusedforcommunicationsdirectedfromEP-290and15minutesistherequirementforlocalandstateauthorizesANDtheNRCforsecurityevents.D.isplausiblebecausetheHPNisanothercommunicationsystemusedforcommunicationsdirectedfromEP-290ReferenceInformation:EP-290Page7(NRCNotificationrequirements)PlantProceduresEP-290NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.4.43Knowledgeofemergencycommunicationssystemsandtechniques.10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(10)Administrative,normal,abnormal,andemergencyoperatingproceduresforthefacility.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:165of22008September2015 ID:R75Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:BANK:EQOP3150032C001001DuringaLossofCondenserVacuum,thefollowingalarmstatusexists:4D108,CONDENSERPRESSUREHIGHALARMING4D46,MAINTURBINETRIPPEDALARMING3D86,MNSTMLINEISOVALVECLOSURECHANNELTRIPALARMING5D46,N/SRFPTEXHAUSTPRESSHIGHTRIP/FAULTCLEARThesealarmsareCONSISTENTwithwhichONEofthefollowingMainCondenserBackpressurevalues?A.2.5psiaB.5.0psiaC.9.5psiaD.12.5psiaAnswer:CILO2015WrittenPage:166of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:Giventhesealarms,MainCondenserBackpressureisbetween6.8and12.2psia.DistacterExplanation:A.Isplausible;wouldbetruewithONLY4D108(2.21psia)B.Isplausible;wouldbetruewith4D108and4D46(3.68psia)D.Isplausible;wouldbetruewith4D108,4D46,3D86,and5D46alarms.(12.2psia)ReferenceInformation:AOP20.125.01,LossofCondenserVacuum,pg2PlantProcedures20.125.0105D04604D04604D108NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.4.46Abilitytoverifythatthealarmsareconsistentwiththeplantconditions10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(10)Administrative,normal,abnormal,andemergencyoperatingproceduresforthefacility.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2008AuditExamILO2015WrittenPage:167of22008September2015 ID:S76Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEW-CONTRACTTheplantisoperatingat100%power.Anearthquakeoccursandthefollowingindicationsareobserved:120KvBUS101Voltageindicates0ACvolts.120kvbreakerpositionsGM,GKindicateOPEN.120kvbreakerpositionsGHandGDindicateCLOSED.345kvbreakerpositionsBMandDMindicateCLOSED.345kvbreakerpositionsBT,DF,CM,andCFindicateOPEN.3D73,TripActuatorsA1/A2Trippedalarms3D74,TripActuatorsB1/B2Trippedalarms.3D85,PrimaryContainmentHighPressChannelTripalarms.OperatorsplacethemodeswitchinShutdown,andenter29.000.01Sheet1RPVcontrol.RPVlevelisbeingmaintainedinthenormalbandusing'B'SBFWPump.Electricalindicationsarereportedbyacontrolroomoperatorasfollows:EDG11-Runningwithanofoutput1000KWEDG12-Runningwithanofoutput990KWEDG13-Runningwithanofoutput0KWEDG14-Runningwithanofoutput0KWNodamageisreportedon345kvor120kvmats.Basedontheseindications,whatproceduralactionswouldbedirectedtorestorepowertode-energizedbuses?A.StartCTG11-1,OPENdisconnectGL,andrestorepowerthroughtheAlternateFeed13.2kvPeakerBus1-2BPosA6.B.Closebreaker13.2kvPeakerBus1-2BPosA6,andrestorepowerusingTrans64AlternateFeed.C.StartCTG11-1,OPENbreakerGD,andrestorepowerthroughTrans1.D.ManuallyloadEDG13andEDG14.Answer:CILO2015WrittenPage:168of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:TheSROexamineemustknowthatthehighdrywellpressurechanneltripwouldhavealsoinitiatedanautomaticstartofallfouremergencydieselgenerators.Withanautomaticstartonhighdrywellpressure,theEDGswillremainrunninguntilthehighdrywellconditionisreset.TheEDGswillnotloadautomaticallyloadontotheirrespectivebusseswithoutanexistingundervoltagesignal.TheSROexamineemustevaluatetheKWloadingindicationsgiveninthequestionstemandidentifythatSST64hasbeende-energizedfromoffsitepower.ThenormalpowertotheEDG13and14bussesisfromSST65.BecauseEDG13and14arerunningunloaded,thisisanadditionalindicationthatSST65isstillenergizedandthelossofpowerisisolatedtoSST64.TheSROexamineewouldthenevaluatethe20seriesAbnormalOperatingProcedurestoselectthecorrectprocedurebasedonSYMPTOMs(lossof120kv)andaselectionenclosureincludedintherelatedelectricalAOPs.20.300.kvwouldbeacorrectchoiceforalossofpowertoEDGbuses11and12.TheSROexamineemustknowthatthepreferredrestorationpathasdirectedby20.300.120kvisthroughTrans1.Therearemultiplerestorationoptionsbasedonthemechanismforthelossofpower.DistracterExplanation:A.Isnotcorrectandplausible.TheSROexamineecouldincorrectlydeterminethatpowershouldberestoredusingCTG-11-1usingtheAlternatepath.IfdisconnectGLisclosed(normalposition)theproceduredoesnotdirectopeningitunlessthereisdamagetothemat.B.Isnotcorrectandplausible.TheSROexamineecouldincorrectlydeterminethattheBus11alternatesourcecouldbeenergizedbasedonthe120kvbreakerlineupandchoosetorestorethispowersourcewhichwouldbepreferredifavailable.Theexamineewouldhavetohavecorrectknowledgeofthe120kvsystemflowpathfornormalandalternatesources.D.Isnotcorrectandplausible.TheSROexamineecouldapplytheinformationfor4D32generatorfrequencytoselect20.300.GRIDastheproceduretorestorepowerwhichwouldplaceEDG13and14inserviceonrespectivebusses.Alsoincorrectlyidentifyingthatdivision2powerislostbasedontheindicationsmayleadtheSROexamineetowhattopreferentiallyrestorethevitalbusses,therebyselectingthisdistractor.ReferenceInformation:AOP20.300.120(actionsfor120loss)SD-2500-01BUSlineupforcondition.PlantProcedures20.300.OffsiteNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295003PartialorCompleteLossofA.C.Power295003AA2.Abilitytodetermineand/orinterpretthefollowingastheyapplytoPARTIALORCOMPLETELOSSOFA.C.POWER:295003AA2.01CauseofpartialorcompletelossofA.C.powerNRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:169of22008September2015 ILO2015WrittenPage:170of22008September2015 ID:S77Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEWTheplantisoperatingat100%reactorpowerwhentheMainControlRoomreceivesareportofaconfirmedfireinDiv1BatteryRoom.Thecrewenters20.000.22,PlantFires,musterstheFireBrigade,andtakesactionIAW20.000.22andtheappropriatefireplan.WhenthefireisouttheFireBrigadeleaderreportsthatare-flashwatchissetandexplainsthattheDivision1Batteryhasbeenseverelydamaged.WhichofthefollowingoutlinestheMINIMUMactionsrequiredtobeincompliancewithTechnicalSpecifications?A.Completeaplantshutdownwithin14hours.B.Within2hoursrestoreDIV1DCtooperablewithonlytheDIV1BatteryChargerinservice.C.PlacetheReactorModeSwitchinShutdown,andbelessthan200°FAverageReactorCoolantTemperaturewithin12hours.D.PlacetheReactorModeSwitchinStartup/HotStandbywithin7hours,andplacetheReactorModeSwitchinShutdownwithin13hours,andbelessthan200°FAverageReactorCoolantTemperaturein37hours.Answer:AILO2015WrittenPage:171of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:ToanswerthisquestiontheexamineemustfirstidentifyarequiredT.Saction,byapplingaT.Sforasystem(G2.2.40)andthenidentifywhichplantconditionsmeettherequiredMODEofoperation(G2.2.35).TodetermineTSactionrequired(G2.2.40):3.8.4LCOTheDivisionIandDivisionIIDCelectricalpowersubsystemsshallbeOPERABLE.TheBasisstatesthebatteryisrequiredforthesubsystemtobeOPERABLE.CONDITIONB.OneDCelectricalpowersubsysteminoperableforreasonsotherthanConditionA.REQUIREDACTIONRestoreDCelectricalsubsystemtoOPERABLEstatuswithin2hours.CONDITIONC.RequiredActionandAssociatedCompletionTimenotmet.REQUIREDACTION:BeinMODE3in12hours.Todetermineactionsrequiredtoplacetheplantintherequiredmode(G2.2.35):OncetheexamineedeterminestherequirementtobeinMODE3,thenbasedonTable1.1-1,theexamineewillchoosetheconditionsthatcorrespondtoMODE3.AnswerAistheonlychoicethatplacestheplantinMODE3.DistracterExplanation:B.Thisanswerassumesyoucanbeoperablewithoutthebatterywhichisincorrect.IfthebatterywasnotrequiredthisanswerwouldbeplausiblebasedonCONDITIONB.CondtionsthatdonotchangeMODEC.IstheconditionsforMODE4,whichisincorrect(seeabove).Ifthecandidatewasonlyconsideringthe12hourrequiredactionofCONDITIONC.thisistheonlydistracterthatmeetsthattimerequirement.D.ThisanswerisLCO3.0.3,howeverisdoesnotapplybecauseT.S.3.8.4canbecompliedwith.ThisanswerisseveralMODESovertime.ReferenceInformation:TS&TSBASIS3.8.4LCO,CONDB&CNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.2.403.4/4.7AbilitytoapplytechnicalspecificationsforasystemG2.2.353.6/4.5AbilitytodetermineTechnicalSpecificationModeofOperation295004PartialorCompleteLossofD.C.PowerTechnicalSpecifications3.8.4DCSourcesOperating10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.43(b)(1)Conditionsandlimitationsinthefacilitylicense.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:172of22008September2015 ILO2015WrittenPage:173of22008September2015 ID:S78Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:BANK:802-2001-0001-007Afireisinprogress.TurbineBuildingAreaTemperaturehasexceeded200°F,andanautomaticReactorScramhasoccurred.Allcontrolrodsarefullyinserted,andtheReactorModeSwitchisinSHUTDOWN.WithsmokeaccumulatingintheMainControlRoom,evacuationtotheRemoteShutdownPanelhasbeendirected.AttheRemoteShutdownPanel,thefollowingconditionsarenoted:*RPVPressureis950psig.*RPVWaterLevelis175inches.AssumingthatCOLDShutdownisdesired,whichoneofthefollowingis(1)theprocedurallydirectedmethodforconductingacooldown,and(2)whatistheLOWESTRPVPressureallowablewithinONEhour?A.(1)LOWERthepressuresettingonpressurecontrollersinTurbineControlRelayPanel.(2)TheLOWESTRPVPressureallowablewithinONEhouris400psig.B.(1)OPENSafetyReliefValvesAorBattheRemoteShutdownPanel.(2)TheLOWESTRPVPressureallowablewithinONEhouris400psig.C.(1)LOWERthepressuresettingonpressurecontrollersinTurbineControlRelayPanel.(2)TheLOWESTRPVPressureallowablewithinONEhouris450psig.D.(1)OPENSafetyReliefValvesAorBattheRemoteShutdownPanel.(2)TheLOWESTRPVPressureallowablewithinONEhouris450psig.Answer:DILO2015WrittenPage:174of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:RISINGTurbineBuildingAreaTemperaturescausingaReactorScramindicateMSIVsareCLOSED.SRVswillbeoperated.20.000.19limitscooldownto90°F/hr.TheLOWESTRPVPressureallowablewithinONEhouris450psig.DistracterExplanation:A.isplausableiftheexamineethoughtthecauseofthescramwasnotclosedMSIVsandthoughttheywereOPENandthecooldownlimitis100°F/hr.B.isplausableiftheexamineethoughtthecooldownlimitis100°F/hr.C.isplausableiftheexamineethoughtthecauseofthescramwasnotclosedMSIVsandthoughttheywereOPEN.ReferenceInformation:AOP20.000.19CondKpg13andAttachment1,pg1PlantProcedures20.000.19NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295016AA2.Abilitytodetermineand/orinterpretthefollowingastheyapplytoCONTROLROOMABANDONMENT:295016AA2.06Cooldownrate10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.43(b)(5)Assessmentoffacilityconditionsandselectionofappropriateproceduresduringnormal,abnormal,andemergencysituations.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2008AuditExamILO2015WrittenPage:175of22008September2015 ID:S79Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:NEWYouaretheCRSandtheplantisoperatingat100%reactorpowerwhen3D85,PRIMARYCONTAINMENTHIGHPRESSCHANNELTRIP,alarms.Div1&2PCPressureRecordersindicate1.7psigandslowlyincreasing.One(1)minutehaspassedsincethescram,andnooperatoractionshavebeentaken.1D80,DIV1/2EECW/EESWSYSINMANUALOVERRIDE,isinalarm.P4400-F601A,Div1EECWRETURNISOVLV,indicatesOPEN.P4400-F601B,Div2EECWRETURNISOVLV,indicatesCLOSED.P4400-F603A,Div1EECWSUPPLYISOVLV,indicatesOPEN.P4400-F603B,Div2EECWSUPPLYISOVLV,indicatesCLOSED.Basedontheseindications,whichONEofthefollowingactionswilltheCRSdirectfortheEECWsystem?A.PlaceP4400-M001,DIV1EECWISOOVERRIDESW,inNORMAL.B.PlaceP4400-M001,DIV1EECWISOOVERRIDESW,inNORMAL,andDepressP4400-M042,DIV1EECWISORESETSW.C.PlaceP4400-M004,DIV2EECWISOOVERRIDESW,inNORMAL.D.PlaceP4400-M004,DIV2EECWISOOVERRIDESW,inNORMAL,andDepressP4400-M049,DIV2EECWISORESETSW.Answer:AILO2015WrittenPage:176of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:1D80indicatesthattheDIV1ORDIV2EECWISOOVERRIDESWisinOverride.WiththisswitchinoverrideEECWwillnotinitiateonhighdrywellpressure.SothecorrectactionistoplaceP4400-M001DIV1EECWISOOVERRIDESWinNORMALtoallowdivision1EECWtoactuateasrequired.DistactorExplanation:B.Isincorrectandplausiblebecausetheresetisolationpushbuttonisnotrequiredtoallowthesystemtostartautomaticity,howeverthepushbuttonisusedintheSOPinrelationtotheOVERRIDESWtoresetEECW.C.Isincorrectbecausedivision2EECWisalreadyrunning,thisanswerisplausiblebecausetheexaminecouldinterpreted2D14and2D17asindicationofaproblemwithDivision2EECWratherthannormalstartingalarms.D.Isincorrectbecausedivision2EECWisalreadyrunning,thisanswerisplausiblebecausetheexaminecouldinterpreted2D14and2D17asindicationofaproblemwithDivision2EECWratherthannormalstartingalarms.ReferenceInformation:ARP1D80DIVI/IIEECW/EESWSYSINMANUALOVERRIDE(cautiondescibeseffectofswitchanddirectiontoreturntonormal)NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.4.16KnowledgeofEOPimplementationhierarchyandcoordinationwithothersupportproceduresorguidelinessuchasoperatingprocedures,abnormaloperatingprocedures,andsevereaccidentmanagementguidelines295018PartialorCompleteLossofComponentCoolingWater10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.43(b)(5)Assessmentoffacilityconditionsandselectionofappropriateproceduresduringnormal,abnormal,andemergencysituations.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:177of22008September2015 ID:S80Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEW-CONTRACTTheplantisoperatingat100%powerwithrefuelflooractivitiesinprogresstocompletefuelbundlesippinginaccordancewithMOP16,ConductofRefuelFloorActivities(Non-Outage).PermissionhasbeengrantedtousetheINTERLOCKOVERRIDEkeyfortherefuelingplatforminaccordancewith23.710,FuelHandlingSystem,forsippingoperations.Ashorttimelaterthefollowingoccurs:*16D1,RBREFUELINGAREAFIFTHFLOORHIGHRADN,alarms.*PanelH11-P816ARMrecorderindicateschannels15and17inalarm(peakedat10mr/hr).*3D31,DIV1/2FPVENTEXHRADNMONITORUPSCALE,alarms.*RBHVACsupplyandexhaustfansarerunning.Thelicensedoperatorassignedtotherefuelingactivitiesreportsthatafuelbundlehadbeenwithdrawntoapproximately3feetofthespentfuelpoolsurface,howeverithasbeensubsequentlyloweredintoastoragelocation.Whatproceduralactionsarerequiredtobedirectedtoaddresstheseindicationsandreports?A.AlertpersonnelusingtheplantareaalarmandHi-com,evacuatetheRefuelFloor,andmonitorSFPlevel.B.VerifyisolationofRBHVAC,andverifysecondarycontainmentintegrity.C.ConfirmisolationofRBHVACandinitiationofSGTS.D.IsolateallsystemsdischargingintotheareaexceptsystemsrequiredbyEOPsanddamagecontrol.Answer:AILO2015WrittenPage:178of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:Theindicationsidentifythatahighradiationhasoccurredonthefifthfloorduetoareductioninshieldingfromraisingabundletoonearthesurfaceofthespentfuelpool.16D1RBREFUELINGAREAFIFTHFLOORHIGHRADNalarmsdirectevacuatingtheareaandentering20.710.01REFUELINGFLOORHIGHRADIATION.ARM15and17inalarmat10mr/hrwithasetpointof9mr/hrvalidatethealarmingcondition.20.710.01REFUELINGFLOORHIGHRADIATIONAlsodirectsalertingpersonnelusingtheplantareaalarmandHi-com,evacuatingtherefuelfloor,monitoringSFPlevelDistracterExplanation:B.IsincorrectandplausiblebecausetheSROexamineemayinterprettheARMalarmsetpointsincorrectlyalongwiththe3D31DIV1/2FPVENTEXHRADNMONITORUPSCALEalarmsanddecidethatRBHVACisolationandinitiationofSGTSisappropriateasdirectedby20.710.01REFUELINGFLOORHIGHRADIATION.3D31DIV1/2FPVENTEXHRADNMONITORUPSCALEalarmsat2mr/hrandtheTRIPoccursat3mr/hrandisindicatedbyanothersetofalarmswhichisnotinbasedonthestemconditionsgiven.IfthisincorrectassumptionisdeterminedtheproceduredirectsverifyingisolationofRBHVAC,verifyingsecondarycontainmentintegrityC.IsincorrectandplausiblebecausetheSROexamineemayinterprettheARMalarmsetpointsand3D31DIV1/2FPVENTEXHRADNMONITORUPSCALEalarmsincorrectlyandmisapplythe29.100.01Sheet5SecondaryContainmententryconditions.ARMs15and17arenotlistedinthetableforradlevelentryconditionsforsecondarycontainmentandFPVENTEXHRADNMONITORentrysetpointsare5mr/hr.Thealarmsonlyindicate2mr/hr.EscalationintotheEOPwithouttheentryconditionswouldnotbeappropriate.IfthisincorrectassumptionisdeterminedtheproceduredirectsconfirmingisolationofRBHVACandinitiationofSGTSintheoverrideD.IsincorrectandplausiblebecausetheSROexamineemayinterprettheARMalarmsetpointsand3D31DIV1/2FPVENTEXHRADNMONITORUPSCALEalarmsincorrectlyandmisapplythe29.100.01Sheet5SecondaryContainmententryconditions.ARMs15and17arenotlistedinthetableforradlevelentryconditionsforsecondarycontainmentandFPVENTEXHRADNMONITORentrysetpointsare5mr/hr.Thealarmsonlyindicate2mr/hr.EscalationintotheEOPwithouttheentryconditionswouldnotbeappropriate.IfincorrectlydeterminedtobeabovemaxnormaltheactiontoisolateallsystemsdischargingintotheareaexceptsystemsrequiredbyEOPsanddamagecontrolwouldbeappropriate.ReferenceInformation:ARP16D1(pg1)INITIALRESPONSEARP20.710.01(pg4)CONDITIONAILO2015WrittenPage:179of22008September2015 PlantProcedures16D0103D03120.710.0129.100.01SH5NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295023AA2Abilitytodetermineand/orinterpretthefollowingastheyapplytoREFUELINGACCIDENTS:295023AA2.01Arearadiationlevels.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:180of22008September2015 ID:S81Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:BANK:EQOP2020121A002007DuringanaccidentconditionAFTEREmergencyRPVDepressurization,thefollowingconditionsexist:*RPVPressureis50psig.*DrywellTemperatureis250°F,RISING.*DrywellPressureis42psig,RISING.*TorusPressureis42.5psig,RISING.*PrimaryContainmentWaterLevelis580ft,RISING.WhichONEofthefollowingactionsisREQUIRED?A.INITIATEDrywellSpraysper29.100.01Sheet2,PRIMARYCONTAINMENTCONTROL.B.VENTtheDrywellIRRESPECTIVEofoffsiteradioactivityreleaselimitsper29.ESP.07Section3.0.C.VENTtheTorusREMAININGWITHINoffsiteradioactivityreleaselimitsper29.ESP.07Section2.0.D.VENTtheTorusIRRESPECTIVEofoffsiteradioactivityreleaselimitsper29.ESP.07Section2.0.Answer:BILO2015WrittenPage:181of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:WithDrywellPressureabovePCPL,itisrequiredtoventtheDrywellIRRESPECTIVEofoffsitereleaseratelimitsper29.ESP.07Section3.0.29.100.01SH2PCP-11DistracterExplanation:A.isplausible;wouldbetrueforTorusWaterLevel<+45inches,whichis<560feet.C.isplausible;wouldbetrueforTorusWaterLevel<570feet.D.isplausible;wouldbetrueforTorusWaterLevel<570feet..ReferenceInformation:EOP29.100.01SH2PCP-11&CurvePlantProcedures29.100.01SH629.100.01SH229.ESP.07NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295024EA2.Abilitytodetermineand/orinterpretthefollowingastheyapplytoHIGHDRYWELLPRESSURE:295024EA2.01Drywellpressure.10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.43(b)(5)Assessmentoffacilityconditionsandselectionofappropriateproceduresduringnormal,abnormal,andemergencysituations.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:182of22008September2015 ID:S82Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEWAnATWShasoccurredandtheOperatingShiftisexecutingtheEOPs.SLCPumpAwasstartedat12:15withaSLCtanklevelof72inches.TheP603operatorobservesthatRWCUIsolatesasrequiredandSLCTanklevelistrendingdownnormally.AssumingthattheSLCsystemcontinuesoperatingnormallyattime12:45whichofthefollowingEOPactionswouldbedirected?A.ShutdownSLCpumpsB.DepressurizetheRPVat<90°F/hrC.KeepRPVwaterlevelbetween-25inchesand114inchesD.RestoreandkeepRPVwaterlevelbetween173inchesand214inchesAnswer:DILO2015WrittenPage:183of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:SLCTANKisa9feetI.D.x12feethighverticalcylindertank.PerDBD(4.2.1pg16)1ft³=7.48052USgalTheminimumdesignflowrateoccursat1,215psigandis41.2gpmforaSLCpumpPertheDBD(4.2.3onpg17)<45inchesSLCTANKLEVELisHOTSHUTDOWNBORONWEIGHTpertheEOP29.100.01SH1ATable1572INCHESSTARTINGLEVELfortheSLCTANK30Minutesat42.2gpm=1236galAt40Galperinchtheleveldropis30.9Inches41.1INCHES<--CurrentLevelEOPFSL-OR2directsrestoringnormalwaterlevel173-214inchesonHOTSHUTDOWNBORONWEIGHTDistracterExplanation:A.EOP29.100.01SH1ASTEPFSQ-19directsthiswhenSLCTankisempty,iftheexamineecalculatesthetankasemptytheywouldchoosethisanswerB.EOP29.100.01SH1ASTEPFSP-5directscooldown,howeverthisisonlywithnoboroninjectionorCOLDS/Dbornweight,thisanswerisplausibleiftheexamineebelievescoldS/Dbornweighthasbeeninjected.C.EOP29.100.01SH1ASTEPFSQ-OR1providesforthishowever,theconditionsarenotmet.TheexamineewouldchoosethisansweriftheyassumedthatHotShutdownBoronWeightorthatRxpower<3%withboroninjectionallowsfortheexitofthepowerlegofSH1A.ReferenceInformation:EOP29.100.01SH1A(yellowbox-TABLE15)DBDC41-00-SLC(pg16&17)PlantProcedures29.100.01SH1ANUREG1123KACatalogRev.2211000K5.063/3.2Tanklevelmeasurement295037EA2.034.3*/4.4*SBLCtanklevel10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.43(b)(5)Assessmentoffacilityconditionsandselectionofappropriateproceduresduringnormal,abnormal,andemergencysituations.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:184of22008September2015 ID:S83Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:BANK:EQOP8023002A003001WhilemitigatinganATWSper29.100.01Sheet1A,whatisthesignificanceofTorusWaterTemperaturereaching115°FwhileReactorPoweris10%?A.IfEmergencyDepressurizationisconductedatthispoint,theHeatCapacityLimitwillNOTbeexceeded.B.IfTorusWaterTemperaturecontinuestoincreaseANDisbeingusedastheinjectionsource,ReactorPowerwillLOWER.C.IfStandbyLiquidControlisinjectedatthispoint,HotShutdownBoronWeightwillbeinjectedbeforetheHeatCapacityLimitisreached.D.IfALLinjectiontotheRPVisTerminatedandPreventedatthispoint,RPVWaterLevelwillremainABOVETAFwhenReactorPowerreaches3%.Answer:CILO2015WrittenPage:185of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:BIITCurveisshown-TheslopedpartisbasedoninjectingHSBWpriortoexceedingtheHCL.TheflatpartisbasedonTechnicalSpecificationsscramrequirement.DistracterExplanation:Aisplausible;exceedingHCLrequiresEmergencyDepressurization.Bisplausible;graphshowsLOWERvaluesofpowerwithHIGHERvaluesofTorusTemperature.Displausible;ReactorPowerandTorusTemperatureareconsideredwithRPVWaterLevelby29.100.01Sheet1AATWSRPVControlFSL-8,andundertheseconditionswillrequireTerminatingandPreventingInjection.ReferenceInformation:BWROGEPG/SAGsAppendixBBasesC5pageB-14-15PlantProceduresBWROGEPGAppBNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.1.25Abilitytointerpretstationreferencematerialssuchasgraphs,curves,tables,etc.295013HighSuppressionPoolWaterTemperature295037SCRAMConditionPresentandReactorPowerAboveAPRMDownscaleorunknown.10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.43(b)(5)Assessmentoffacilityconditionsandselectionofappropriateproceduresduringnormal,abnormal,andemergencysituations.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2008ExamILO2015WrittenPage:186of22008September2015 ID:S84Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:MODIFIED:EQOP3150148A018003Theplantisshutdownwiththefollowingconditions:*ReactorPressureis85psig.*MainSteamIsolationValvesareOPEN.*RHRLoopAisoperatinginShutdownCoolingModewithcooldowninprogress.*ReactorWaterCleanupisinservice.PowertoRPSBusAissubsequentlylostduetoatripofRPSMGSetA.Whichofthestatedactionswillrestoretheplanttonormal?A.EnterSOP23.205,RHRSystem.RestoreShutdownCoolingbystartinganRHRLoopBPumpandopeningE1150-F015B,Div2LPCIInboardIsolationValve.B.EnterSOP23.205,RHRSystem.RestoreShutdownCoolingbyplacingRPSBusAonAlternatePower,resettingtheisolation,andrealigningRHRLoopA.C.EnterAOP20.205.01,LossofShutdownCooling.RestoreShutdownCoolingbystartinganRHRLoopBPumpandopeningE1150-F015B,Div2LPCIInboardIsolationValve.D.EnterAOP20.205.01,LossofShutdownCooling.RestoreShutdownCoolingbyplacingRPSBusAonAlternatePower,resettingtheisolation,andrealigningRHRLoopA.Answer:DILO2015WrittenPage:187of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:RHRLoopAwillexperienceE1150-F015A,Div1LPCIInboardIsolationValveANDE1150-F009,RHRSDCInboardSuctionIsolationValveISOLATION.WithRPSonAlternatePower,theisolationmayberesetandthesystemrestarted.DistracterExplanation:A.Isincorrectandplausible;AOPentryisrequiredandE1150outboardswereaffectedviceinboardisolations.B.Isincorrectandplausible;AOPentryisrequired.C.Isincorrectandplausible;wouldbetrueifE1150outboardswereaffectedviceinboardisolations.ReferenceInformation:SOP23.601Pg11forE1150-F009ANDE1150-F015AISOLATIONGPAOP20.205.01LossofShutdowncoolingactions.SOP23.205.01Shutdowncoolingprocedure.SOP23.316RestoringRPSSection7.3PlantProcedures20.205.01NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295020AA2Abilitytodetermineand/orinterpretthefollowingastheyapplytoINADVERTENTCONTAINMENTISOLATION:295020AA2.06Causeofisolation.10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.43(b)(5)Assessmentoffacilityconditionsandselectionofappropriateproceduresduringnormal,abnormal,andemergencysituations.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:188of22008September2015 ID:S85Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEWPlantwasoperatingat100%reactorpowerwhentheReactorBuildingVentExhaustRadMonitortrippedupscale(3D36).*TheCRNSOhasreviewed3D36andreportsthatthealarmisvalid.*Thesourceofthereleaseisdischargingintosecondarycontainmentandhasnotbeenidentifiedorisolated.*RBSBNESecondaryContainmentRadLevelhasreachedMaxNormandisstable.*NOOTHERAREASareatorapproachingMaxSafe.Assumingtheplantrespondedasexpectedtothisalarm,theCRSisrequiredtohaveentered__(1)__.Alongwithproceduralactionsthatverifytheplantrespondedasexpected,theCRSwilldirect__(2)__.A.(1)20.000.02,ABNORMALRELEASEOFRADIOACTIVEMATERIAL,and29.100.01SH5,SECONDARYCONTAINMENTANDRADRELEASEONLY.(2)IsolateHPCI.B.(1)20.000.02,ABNORMALRELEASEOFRADIOACTIVEMATERIAL,and29.100.01SH5,SECONDARYCONTAINMENTANDRADRELEASEONLY.(2)IsolateRCIC.C.(1)20.000.02,ABNORMALRELEASEOFRADIOACTIVEMATERIAL,and29.100.01SH5,SECONDARYCONTAINMENTANDRADRELEASE,and29.100.01SH1,RPVCONTROL.(2)IsolateHPCI.D.(1)20.000.02,ABNORMALRELEASEOFRADIOACTIVEMATERIAL,and29.100.01SH5,SECONDARYCONTAINMENTANDRADRELEASE,and29.100.01SH1,RPVCONTROL.(2)IsolateRCIC.Answer:BILO2015WrittenPage:189of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:3D36inalarmmeansthatRBVentExhaustRadiationMonitoris16,000cpmincreasing.Thereforeentryconditionsexistfor20.000.02and29.100.01SH5.Thestemofthequestionsprovidesformostoftherequiredactions,withoutthesourcebeingknown.With1maxnormtheEOPflowchartsrequireisolatingallsystemdischargingintotheareathereforetheRCICwouldneedisolated.DistracterExplanation:A.isplausibleandincorrectbecausetheAOPentryisrequiredandtheactionisanactiontheCRSwoulddirectinthiscase,thisanswerisincorrectbecausetheCRSisREQUIREDtoalsoenterEOP,additionallytheHPCIisnotinRBSBNE.C.isplausibleandincorrectiftheexamineebelievestheconditionsinthestemwillleadtoaSCRAM,thenentryintotheRPVlevelEOPchartwouldberequiredandthelistedactionwouldbeconsistentwiththeRPVlevelEOPentry,additionallytheHPCIisnotinRBSBNE.D.isplausibleandincorrectiftheexamineebelievestheconditionsinthestemwillleadtoaSCRAM,thenentryintotheRPVlevelEOPchartwouldberequiredandthelistedactionwouldbeconsistentwiththeRPVlevelEOPentryandtheEOPchartwoulddirectentryintotheSCRAMAOP.ReferenceInformation:AOP20.000.02PlantProcedures20.000.02NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.4.4Abilitytorecognizeabnormalindicationsforsystemoperatingparameterswhichareentry-levelconditionsforemergencyandabnormaloperatingprocedures295034SecondaryContainmentVentilationHighRadiation10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.43(b)(4)Radiationhazardsthatmayariseduringnormalandabnormalsituations,includingmaintenanceactivitiesandvariouscontaminationconditions.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:190of22008September2015 ID:S86Points:1.00Difficulty:3.50LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:MODIFIED:315-0141-0008-001Theplantisoperatingnormallyat100%power.Maintenancehasreportedthatduetoaninstrumentfailure,theReactorSteamDomePressure-LowinputtotheLPCILOOPSelectlogichasfailedHIGH.Shortlyafteridentifyingtheinstrumentfailure,anearthquakeoccurs.BothRecircPumpstrip,andDrywellpressurerisescausingareactorscram.Currentplantconditionsareasfollows:-RPVLevelis164inches-RPVpressureis450psig-Drywellpressureis22.3psigWhichofthefollowingidentifiesboth(1)thecurrentRHRSystemvalvelineupand(2)theCRSdirectiontotheCRNSOconcerningRHRSystemoperation?A.(1)E1150-F017A&B,LPCILoopOutboardInjectionIsoValves,areopen,andE1150-F015A&B,LPCILoopInboardIsolationValves,areclosed.(2)ManuallyopenE1150-F015ontheloopdesiredforinjectionper23.205,RHRSystem.B.(1)E1150-F017A&B,LPCILoopOutboardInjectionIsoValves,areopen,andE1150-F015A&B,LPCILoopInboardIsolationValves,areopen.(2)MaintainRPVWaterLevel173to214inchesusingLPCIperEOP29.100.01,Sheet1.C.(1)E1150-F017A&B,LPCILoopOutboardInjectionIsoValves,areopen,andE1150-F015A&B,LPCILoopInboardIsolationValves,areclosed.(2)PerformForcedLPCILoopSelectLogicOperationonthedesiredloopper23.205,RHRSystem.D.(1)E1150-F017A&B,LPCILoopOutboardInjectionIsoValves,areopen,andE1150-F015A&B,LPCILoopInboardIsolationValves,areopen.(2)ManuallycloseE1150-F015ontheloopdesiredforContainmentCoolingper23.205,RHRSystem.Answer:AILO2015WrittenPage:191of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:ReactorSteamDomePressure-LowisaninputintotheLPCILoopSelectLogic.Ifpressureis<906psig,LPCIwillalignforinjection.E1150-F015A/BgetsanopensignalfromLPCILoopSelect,butwillnotopenuntilreactorpressureis<461psig(permissive).Inthiscase,thelogicwillnever"see"reactorpressure<906psig,sothelogicwillnotinitiate.SinceE1150-F015A/Bwillnotgetanopensignalfromthelogic,itremainsclosedafterthe461psigpermissiveismetandmustbereopenedper23.205.DistracterExplanation:B.isincorrectbecauseE1150-F015A&Bareclosed.Iftheexamineeassumesthisisthecorrectlineup,actionsfromtheEOParelogical.C.isincorrectbecauseforcedLPCIloopselectisnotrequired.Bothloopsareoperable,andE1150-f015canbemanuallyopened.IfexamineeassumesE1150-F015A&Bcannotbeopened,forcedlogicoperationwouldbelogical.D.isincorrectbecauseE1150-F015A&Bareclosed.Iftheexamineeassumesthisisthecorrectlineup,actionspreventinjectionfromtheoppositeloopandsetupfortoruscoolingarelogical.ReferenceInformation:23.601pg24-ReactorSteamDomePressure-LowisaninputintotheLPCILoopSelectLogic.Itinitiatesifreactorpressureis<906psigandoneorbothRRPumpsarenotrunning.ST-OP-315-0041-001(Fig18)showstheLPCILoopSelectionLogic-if<2RRPumpsarenotrunning,andrxpressureis>906psig,theselectionlogicwillnotactuate.23.205-listssectionsforManualLPCIInitiation(whichrequiresopeningE1150-F015A/B)andForcedLPCIloopSelectionLogicoperation(plantconditionsdonotmeetrequiredprerequisites).PlantProcedures23.205NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.4.21Knowledgeoftheparametersandlogicusedtoassessthestatusofsafetyfunctionssuchasreactivitycontrol,corecoolingandheatremoval,reactorcoolantsystemintegrity,containmentconditions,radioactivityreleasecontrol,etc.203000A2.Abilityto(a)predicttheimpactsofthefollowingontheRHR/LPCI:INJECTIONMODE(PLANTSPECIFIC);and(b)basedonthosepredictions,useprocedurestocorrect,control,ormitigatetheconsequencesofthoseabnormalconditionsoroperations:203000A2.10Nuclearboilerinstrumentfailures10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.43(b)(5)Assessmentoffacilityconditionsandselectionofappropriateproceduresduringnormal,abnormal,andemergencysituations.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:192of22008September2015 ID:S87Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEW-CONTRACTTheplantwasoperatingat75%powerwhenatripoftheSouthRFPoccurred.Currentconditionsareasfollows:Recircpumpspeedslower37%Reactorpower63%SBFWinjectingat600gpmRPVlevel196"andstableHPCIlogicthenmalfunctionscausinganautomaticinitiationofHPCI.WhichofthefollowingactionswouldtheCRSdirectinaccordancewith20.107.01,LossofFeedwaterorFeedwaterControl?A.PerformaRapidPowerReduction.B.RaiseNorthRFPspeedC.InjectwithSBFWat1200gpm.D.PlacetheModeSwitchinShutdown.Answer:DILO2015WrittenPage:193of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:HPCIinitiationisnotwithintheboundoftheanalysisforincreasedcoreinletsubcoolingasdescribedintheAOPbases.ActionistotaketheMODESwitchtoShutdown.A.IsincorrectbecauseofaboveandisplausiblebecauseitisanActionfrom20.107.01ifrecircrunbackoccurs.B.IsincorrectbecauseofaboveandisplausiblebecauseitisanActionfrom20.107.01ifinadequatepumpingpowerexists.However,levelisstableandmanualcontroloftheNRFPisnotdesired.C.IsincorrectbecauseofaboveandisplausiblebecauseitisanActionfrom20.107.01;however,theoverridetakesprecedence.PlantProcedures20.107.01NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.4.49Abilitytoperformwithoutreferencetoproceduresthoseactionsthatrequireimmediateoperationofsystemcomponentsandcontrols.206000HPCISystem.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:194of22008September2015 ID:S88Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEW-CONTRACTThefollowingplantconditionsexistafteraLOCAevent:*RPVlevel-5inches*TorusWaterTemperature180°Fandstable*TorusWaterlevel-90inchesandstable*TorusPressure4psigandstable*ReactorPressure0psigandstable*CoreSprayPumpsA&Cinjectingat6000gpm*CoreSprayPumpsB&Dinjectingat3000gpmWhichofthefollowingCSSystemflowswouldtheCRSdirecttomaximizeCSflowwhileremainingwithinoperatinglimits?A.LowerDiv1to5400gpm.RaiseDiv2to8150gpm.B.LowerDiv1to5400gpm.RaiseDiv2to5400gpm.C.RaiseDiv1to8150gpm.RaiseDiv2to8150gpm.D.RaiseDiv1to7000gpm.RaiseDiv2to7000gpm.Answer:BILO2015WrittenPage:195of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:29.100.01SH6Caution4statesthatCShastobeoperatedwithinNPSHandVortexlimits.TheselimitsaredefinedbythegraphsonSH6.ForaTWLof-90,theMAXflowallowedis5400gpmandisthemostlimiting.7000gpmisincorrectbecauseofVortexLimitandplausibleifonlyCSNPSHLIMITisusedwitha:TorusOverpressure=(4psig)+3.5psig+(-90/30)=4.5,howeverSH6saysdonotinterpolate,thereforeuse0psigcurveforTorusOverpressure.Therefore180°FTWT=7000gpmfor0psigcurve.8150gpmisincorrectbecauseofVortexLimitandplausibleifonlyCSNPSHLMITisusedwithabovetorusoverpressureandtheexamineechoosestointerpolate,thisgivesavalueof8150.PlantProcedures29.100.01SH6NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.4.20KnowledgeofoperationalimplicationsofEOPwarnings,cautions,andnotes.209001LowPressureCoreSpraySystem.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:196of22008September2015 ID:S89Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEW-CONTRACTTheplantisinMode5withrefuelingoperationsinprogress.Therefuelfloorcoordinatorreportsthatafuelbundlecontactedtheedgeofastoragerackandwasdamaged.Momentslaterthefollowingindicationsareobserved.*3D31,DIVI/IIFPVENTEXHRADNMONITORUPSCALE,alarmsforallchannels.*3D35,DIVI/IIFPVENTEXHRADNMONITORUPSCALETRIP,alarmsforallchannels.*T46-R800A,Div1SGTSFlowRecorder,indicates4950scfm.*T46-R800B,Div2SGTSFlowRecorder,indicates3950scfm.*8D46,DIV1REACTORBLDGPRESSUREHIGH/LOW,alarms.*17D46,DIV2REACTORBLDGPRESSUREHIGH/LOW,alarms.*T41-R800A,Div1RBDiffPress,indicates-0.6incheswc.*T41-R800B,Div2RBDiffPress,indicates-0.6incheswc.Basedontheseindications,(1)determinetheimpactsforSGTS,and(2)determinewhatactionsarenecessarytoaddresstheconditions.A.(1)Secondarycontainmentpressureisslightlytoonegative.TheincreasedflowinDiv1SGTSincreasesthecharcoalbedadsorptionrate.(2)MaintainDiv1SGTSinservice,andshutdownDiv2SGTS.B.(1)Secondarycontainmentpressureisslightlytoonegative.TheincreasedflowinDiv1SGTSreducesthecharcoalbedadsorptionrate.(2)MaintainDiv2SGTSinservice,andshutdownDiv1SGTS.C.(1)Secondarycontainmentpressureisnotnegativeenough.ThedecreasedflowinDiv2SGTSincreasesthecharcoalbedadsorptionrate.(2)MaintainDiv2SGTSinservice,andshutdownDiv1SGTS.D.(1)Secondarycontainmentpressureisnotnegativeenough.ThedecreasedflowinDiv2SGTSreducesthecharcoalbedadsorptionrate.(2)MaintainDiv1SGTSinservice,andshutdownDiv2SGTS.Answer:BILO2015WrittenPage:197of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:DivisiononeSGTSisoperatingoutsideofthenormalflowrangeasdescribedinSOP23.404as3879-4180scfm.TheSOP23.404willdirectstoppingonedivisionofSGTSasdoesARPs8D46and17D46basedonthesecondarycontainmentpressurebeingslightlytoonegativebelowthealarmsetpointof-0.5incheswc.ToohighofaflowreducesthecharcoalbedadsorptionasdescribedinST-OP-315-0020page19.AnswerAisincorrectandplausible.TheSROexamineecouldincorrectlyidentifythatDivision1SGTSincreasedflowwouldincreasetheadsorptionratebasedonmoreairflowpastthebed.AnswerCisincorrectandplausible.TheSROexamineecouldidentifythatDivision2SGTSflowlowercomparedwouldincreasetheadsorptionratewiththegasremainingnearthebedlonger.Althoughthisisthenormalflowforthesystemdesignanddoesnotincreasetheadsorptionrate.Alsotheanswerinincorrectsincesecondarycontainmentpressureisnegativeenough.AnswerDisincorrectandplausible.TheSROexamineecouldincorrectlyidentifythatDivision2SGTSflowlowercomparedwoulddecreasetheadsorptionratewiththegasremainingnearthebedlonger.Thisisthenormalflowrangeandwouldnotdecreasetheadsorptionrate.Alsotheanswerinincorrectsincesecondarycontainmentpressureisnegativeenough.PlantProcedures17D4608D4623.404NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2261000StandbyGasTreatmentSystem261000A2Abilityto(a)predicttheimpactsofthefollowingontheSTANDBYGASTREATMENTSYSTEM;and(b)basedonthosepredictions,useprocedurestocorrect,control,ormitigatetheconsequencesofthoseabnormalconditionsoroperations:261000A2.02HighsystemflowNRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:198of22008September2015 ID:S90Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEWTheplantisoperatingat100%reactorpowerwiththeCenterstationaircompressorinserviceandtheEaststationaircompressorinstandby.IASEastDRYERUNIThasbeenremovedfromserviceper23.129andtaggedout.AmalfunctionoftheIASWestDRYERUNITstartsloweringIASairpressure.IsolationandbypassingoftheIASdryerunitisbeingattemptedbyfieldpersonnel.Thiseventcausesthefollowingplanttransient:*IASHEADERPRESSUREindicates70psigandslowlylowering*STATIONAIRHEADERPRESSUREindicates105psigandsteady*NIASHEADERPRESSUREindicates97psigoneachdivisionandiscyclingwithinnormalband.Thefollowingvalveshaveclosed:*P5000-F440,DIV1CONTROLAIRISOVLV*P5000-F441,DIV2CONTROLAIRISOVLVAdditionallythefollowingalarmsarein:*7D50DIVI/DIV2CONTROLAIRCOMPRESSORAUTOSTART*7D54INTERRUPTIBLECONTROLAIRHEADERPRESSURELOW*7D56INTERRUPTIBLECONTROLAIRDRYERTROUBLE*7D60RHRCOMPLEXCONTROLAIRPRESSURELOW*3D80CONTROLRODDRIFTWhichofthefollowingmusttheCRSdirect?A.PlaceReactorModeswitchinSHUTDOWNB.StartanyavailableStationAirCompressor.C.SupplyNIASfromStationAirD.CrosstieDiv2NIASwithIASAnswer:AILO2015WrittenPage:199of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:IASpressureisloweringand3D80indicatescontrolroddrift.ThereforetheCRSwillhavetodirectthemodeswitchtoshutdown.B.IsplausibleandincorrectbecauseitisanactionintheAOPforStationAirPressure<95.HowevertheIASairdryerisalreadypassingthemaximumcubicfeetofairthatitcan.TheexamineewillchoosethisansweriftheybelievemoreaircanbepassedtoIASfromStationairorthatStationAirPressurewilllowerasIASlowerssothattheymeetthe<95psigtostartaStationAirCompressor.C.IsplausibleandincorrectbecauseNIASisnormallyaloadonIAS,howeveritisnotcurrentlyaloadbecausethecontrolaircompressorsaresupplyingNIAS.TheexaminewillchoosethisansweriftheybelieveNIASisstillaloadforIASandbelievetheloadreductioncanhelp.D.IsplausibleandincorrectbecausethisconnectionexistsinthesystemviatheP500F403,howeverthisconnectionisonlyusedtosupplyNIASfromIAS.ThereisnoproceduralthatsupportsforsupplyingIASfromDIV2NIASbecausetheconnectionisnotdesignedtosupportsupplingIASbecausethedemandofIASismuchgreaterthanDIV2NIAScanprovide.Ref20.129.01Basis(pg2)and20.129.01(overridestatement)PlantProcedures20.129.01NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2300000A2.Abilityto(a)predicttheimpactsofthefollowingontheINSTRUMENTAIRSYSTEMand(b)basedonthosepredictions,useprocedurestocorrect,control,ormitigatetheconsequencesofthoseabnormaloperation:300000A2.01Airdryerandfiltermalfunctions10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.43(b)(5)Assessmentoffacilityconditionsandselectionofappropriateproceduresduringnormal,abnormal,andemergencysituations.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:200of22008September2015 ID:S91Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEWTheplantisoperatingat100%power.AnIASleakaffectingbothCRDflowcontrolvalveshasoccurred.Systemflowhasbeenrestoredinaccordancewith20.106.03CRDFlowControlFailure.TheIASleakworsensandrod02-19beginsdriftingintothecore.Whatisthe(1)expectedimpactand(2)whatactionswilltheCRSdirect?A.(1)Additionalcontrolrodswillbegindriftingintothecore.(2)PlacethemodeswitchinS/DandCLOSEtheflowcontrolvalvelocally.B.(1)Asinglecontrolrodisdriftingintothecore.(2)Manuallyinsertrod02-19usingEMERRODIN.C.(1)Additionalcontrolrodswillbegindriftingintothecore.(2)PlacethemodeswitchinS/Dwhen2ormorerodsbegindrifting.D.(1)Asinglecontrolrodisdriftingintothecore.(2)Disarmthedriftingcontrolrod.Answer:AILO2015WrittenPage:201of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:ThecandidatemustrealizethattheIASleakwillaffecttheremainderofthecontrolrodsinthesamemannerandcontinuetodriftadditionalrods.Procedureforlossofair20.129.01onlyrequiresoneroddrifttoplacethemodeswitchinshutdown.Alsoprocedure20.106.03FCVfailurehasacautionstatingthatisareactorscramoccurs,aFCVinmanualmustbefullyclosedlocally.DistracterExplanation:B.Althoughthefirsthalfiscorrectthatasinglecontrolrodisdrifting,morewilldriftbasedontheIASleakandtheactiontomanuallyinsertitwouldbegivenif20.106.07ControlRodDriftwasapplicable.20.129.01requiresascramifasinglecontrolrodisdrifting.C.Additionalrodswillbedrifting,andmonitoringforanotherroddriftingwouldbeappropriateif20.106.07wasapplicableinthecurrentconditions,howeveritisnot.D.Althoughthefirsthalfiscorrectthatasinglecontrolrodisdrifting,morewilldriftbasedontheIASleakandtheactiontodisarmtherodwouldbegivenif20.106.07ControlRodDriftwasapplicable,aftertherodwasinserted.Ref(20.129.01)PlantProcedures20.129.01NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2201001A2.Abilityto(a)predicttheimpactsofthefollowingontheCRDHYDRAULICSYSTEM;and(b)basedonthosepredictions,useprocedurestocorrect,control,ormitigatetheconsequencesofthoseabnormalconditionsoroperations:201001A2.09Lossofapplicableplantairsystems.10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.43(b)(5)Assessmentoffacilityconditionsandselectionofappropriateproceduresduringnormal,abnormal,andemergencysituations.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:202of22008September2015 ID:S92Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:MODIFIEDBANKID:31046AnATWSisinprogresswiththefollowingconditions:*RPVlevelisbeingcontrolledat-15to0inches.*ALLMSIVsareclosed.*AllControlRodsareNOTinserted.*TorusCooling,TorusSpraysandDrywellSpraysarebeingsuppliedfromRHR.*ContainmentVentingisbeingperformedtomaintainTorusPressurebelowthePrimaryContainmentPressureLimit.*TheSLCSystemhasfailed,andAlternateBoronInjection(29.ESP.02)isbeingimplemented.*ContainmentHighRangeRadiationMonitorsindicate3000R/hr(40minutesafterthescram).InaccordancewithEP-101,whichONEofthefollowingEmergencyActionLevelsisappropriatebasedsolelyonFissionProductBarrierDegradation?A.UnusualEventFU1-AnyLossORAnyPotentialLossofPrimaryContainment.B.AlertFA1-AnyLossORAnyPotentialLossofEITHERFuelCladORReactorCoolantSystem.C.SiteAreaEmergencyFS1-LossORPotentialLossofAnyTwoBarriers.D.GeneralEmergencyFG1-LossofAnyTwoBarriersANDPotentialLossofThirdBarrierAnswer:DILO2015WrittenPage:203of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:CHRRMSisanindicationofFuelCladbreach,andVentingduetoapproachingPCPL(duetoinadequateTorusCooling)isRCSandCTBarrierbreach.ThisquestionisconceptualonFPBarriers.DistracterExplanation:A.IsplausibleifcandidatecannotassociateventingirrespectiveofreleaserateswithCTfailure.B.IsplausibleifcandidatecannotassociateCHRRMindicationwithfuelfailureORContainmentPressurewithRCSfailureORassociateventingirrespectiveofreleaserateswithCTfailure.C.IsplausibleifcandidatecannotassociateCHRRMindicationwithfuelfailureandContainmentPressurewithRCSfailure.ReferenceInformation:EP-101TABF-ProvidedinHandoutfolder.PlantProceduresEP-101NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.4.41Knowledgeoftheemergencyactionlevelthresholdsandclassifications219000RHR/LPCI:Torus/SuppressionPoolCoolingModeNRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:204of22008September2015 ID:S93Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEWTheplantisoperatingat100%powerwithDiv1CCHVACinservicewhenthefollowingoccurs:*3D36DIVI/IIRBVENTEXHRADNMONITORUPSCALETRIPalarms.*DivI/IIRBVentExhaustRadiationMonitorreads16,500cpmonbothdivisions.*Allautomaticactionsoccurasexpected.BasedontheaboveconditionswhichofthefollowingactionswouldbeincludedintheactionstheCRSdirect?A.Per22.000.03and22.000.04,GENERALOPERATINGPROCEDURE,ShutdowntheReactor.B.Per23.427,PRIMARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONSYSTEM,VerifyGroup18isolationsC.Per20.000.02,ABNORMALRELEASEOFRADIOACTIVEMATERIAL,ShutdownDiv1CCHVACEmergMakeupFan.D.Per20.000.02,ABNORMALRELEASEOFRADIOACTIVEMATERIAL,ShutdownDiv2CCHVACEmergMakeupFan.Answer:DILO2015WrittenPage:205of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:20.000.02ConditionCdirectstheshutdownCCHVACEmergMakeupFanofthenon-operatingdivisionifbothmakeupfansarerunning.A.IsincorrectandplausablebecausethisactionislistedintheEOPshowevertheGOPshutdownisonlyusedifNOTHINGisdischargingfromaprimarysystemintosecondarycontainment.Thisanswerisplausibleiftheexamineefeelsthattheconditionsabovemeritsshutdown,butascramisundesirable.B.Isincorrectandplausablebecausegroup18isPrimaryContainmentPneumaticSupplySystem,iftheexaminedoesnotknowthegroupisolationrequirements,thisanswerisplausibleasapenetrationofprimarycontainmentthatcouldneedisolation.AdditionallyGroup14&16isolationsdooccur.C.Isincorrectandplausablebecauseamakeupfandoesneedshutdown,howeverbecauseDiv1wasinservice,Div2isthecorrectanswer.Ref:20.000.02pg3,4,&5PlantProcedures20.000.0229.100.01SH5NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2290003A2.Abilityto(a)predicttheimpactsofthefollowingontheCONTROLROOMHVAC;and(b)basedonthosepredictions,useprocedurestocorrect,control,ormitigatetheconsequencesofthoseabnormalconditionsoroperations:290003A2.01Initiation/reconfiguration10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.43(b)(5)Assessmentoffacilityconditionsandselectionofappropriateproceduresduringnormal,abnormal,andemergencysituations.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:206of22008September2015 ID:S94Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:NEWYouaretheRefuelFloorSupervisor.TheplantisshutdownandplantisinMODE5.Whichofthefollowingactionsmustbecompletedpriortocommencingcorealterations?A.Verify50hourshaveelapsedsinceReactorShutdown.B.ObtainpermissiontocommencecorealterationsfromOperationsEngineer.C.RestrictaccesstotheupperelevationsoftheDrywellabovethe627ft.elevation.D.ConfirmtheSupervisor,ReactorEngineeringshallestablishoversightofcorealterationsfromthecontrolroom.Answer:CILO2015WrittenPage:207of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:MOP13requiresthatpriortoCoreAlterationsthatAccesstotheupperelevationsoftheDrywellduringmovementofirradiatedcorecomponentsorfuelwillberestrictedabovethe627ft.elevation.Accessabovethe627ft.elevationbutbelowthe633ft.elevationwillbeallowedonacasebycasebasis.Accessisprohibitedabovethe633ft.elevation.A.IsincorrectandplauseablebecauseMOP13requires60hourstoelaspesinceRxShutdownbeforecoreAlterations.50hoursisincorrect.B.IsincorrectandplauseablebecauseMOP13requirestheShiftManagergivepermissionforcorealterations.TheOperationsEngineeristheSupervisorfortheShiftManagers.D.Isincorrectandplauseablebecausethemaincontrolroomdoesmaintainoversight,howeverthisisnotwhattheSupervisor,ReactorEngineeringdoesforcorealterationsRef:MOP13Section4.1andSection4.2PlantProceduresMOP13NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.1.41Knowledgeoftherefuelingprocess10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.43(b)(7)Fuelhandlingfacilitiesandprocedures.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:208of22008September2015 ID:S95Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:BANKID:27039Duringcorealterationswithfuelmovements,inadditiontominimumshiftcomplementsperMOP03,PoliciesandPractices,whatistheminimumshiftcomplementrequiredperMOP13?1RefuelFloorSupervisor,1FuelHandler,_____________A.andnoothersrequiredB.and1FuelMovementVerifieronlyC.1FuelMovementVerifier,and1ReactorEngineeronlyD.1FuelMovementVerifier,1ReactorEngineer,and1RefuelFloorCoordinatorAnswer:BILO2015WrittenPage:209of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:TheminimumshiftcomplementforcorealterationsshallconsistofthosepositionslistedinMOP03,"PoliciesandPractices,"plusoneRefuelFloorSupervisor;andduringfuelmovements,additionalpositionsrequirementofone(1)fuelhandler,andone(1)FuelMovementVerifier.AisincorrectbecausethereisnoFuelMovementVerifierC.isincorrectbecauseReactorEngineerisnotrequiredD.isincorrectbecauseReactorEngineerandRefuelFloorCoordinatorarenotrequired | |||
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MOP13,page2PlantProceduresMOP13NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.1.42KnowledgeofnewandspentfuelmovementproceduresNRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2013AuditExam/ILO2012ExamILO2015WrittenPage:210of22008September2015 ID:S96Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:BANK:ILO2010NRCEXAMDuetoanerrorinthecalibrationprocedurefortheRPSDrywellPressureinstruments,thehighpressuretripsetpointforallfourchannelswereadjustedsuchthatthechannelswouldnottripuntilDrywellPressurereaches2.2psig.InordertosatisfytherequiredTechnicalSpecifications,readjustthetripsetpointforchannels__________________________.A.AandDtobelowTechnicalSpecificationlimitswithin1hour.B.AandCtobelowTechnicalSpecificationlimitswithin6hours.C.BandDtobelowTechnicalSpecificationlimitswithin1hour.D.BandCtobelowTechnicalSpecificationlimitswithin6hours.Answer:AILO2015WrittenPage:211of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:TorestoretripcapabilityforDrywellPressure,atleastoneofthetripsystemsmustberestored(tripsetpointlessthan1.88psig)within1hour.Torestoreatripsystemthetwochannelsforthattripsystem[(AorC)and(BorD)]mustberestored.DistracterExplanation:Distractersareplausibleandincorrectbasedonunderstandingtripsetpointandlogiclistedabove.ReferenceInformation:23.601Pg20(LogicforDrywellPressure-High)T.S.3.3.1.1(setpointandrequirement)NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.2.23AbilitytotrackTechnicalSpecificationlimitingconditionsforoperations.295024HighDrywellPressure.TechnicalSpecifications3.3.1.1ReactorProtectionSystem(RPS)Instrumentation10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.43(b)(2)Facilityoperatinglimitationsinthetechnicalspecificationsandtheirbases.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2010ExamILO2015WrittenPage:212of22008September2015 ID:S97Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:MODIFIEDBANKID:32686TheRHRSWSystemisdesignedtoprovidecoolingwaterfortheResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)Systemheatexchangers,requiredforasafereactorshutdownfollowingaDesignBasisAccident(DBA).WhichONEofthefollowingwillensurethisdesigncapacity?A.DivIRHRReservoirat26feet,DivIIReservoirat25.5feetRHRReservoiraveragetemperatureof64°FB.DivIRHRReservoirat25.5feet,DivIIReservoirat25.2feetRHRReservoiraveragetemperatureof81°FC.DivIRHRReservoirat25.4feet,DivIIReservoirat25.6feetRHRReservoiraveragetemperatureof82°FD.DivIRHRReservoirat24feet,DivIIReservoirat25feetRHRReservoiraveragetemperatureof77°FAnswer:AILO2015WrittenPage:213of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:RHRServiceWaterrequiresanadequatesuctionsource(UltimateHeatSink)boundedbyaminimumindependentandaveragelevelof25ftandtemperature<80°Fwithbothtowersandfansoperable.DistracterExplainationB.IsincorrectandplausiblebecauseRHRReservoiraveragetemperatureistoohigh.TheexamineeincorrectlyfocusontheReservoirlevelonly.C.IsincorrectandplausiblebecauseRHRReservoiraveragetemperatureistoohigh.TheexamineeincorrectlyfocusontheReservoirlevelonly.D.IsincorrectandplausiblebecauseAverageofbothlevelsislessthantherequired25ft.TheexamineeincorrectlyfocusontheRHRReservoiraveragetemperatureonly.NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.2.25KnowledgeofbasesinTechnicalSpecificationsforlimitingconditionsforoperationsandsafetylimits.TechnicalSpecifications3.7.1ResidualHeatRemovalServiceWater(RHRSW)System3.7.2EmergencyEquipmentCoolingWater(EECW)/EmergencyEquipmentServiceWater(EESW)SystemandUltimateHeatSink(UHS)10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.43(b)(2)Facilityoperatinglimitationsinthetechnicalspecificationsandtheirbases.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:214of22008September2015 ID:S98Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:BANK:EQOP8320001A002001EmergencyOperationsFacilitiesareNOTmanned.Followinganaccident,itisrequiredtoestimateCore/FuelDamageusingthefollowingContainmentHighRangeRadiationMonitor(CHRRM)readingsandconditions:*ReactorwasSHUTDOWNat1200.*CHRRMReadingsweretakenat1300.*DIV1CHRRMindicates2.0x104R/hr.*DIV2CHRRMindicates1.5x104R/hr.WhichONEofthefollowingisthecorrectCore/FuelDamagecalculation,basedonthesereadings?%GapRelease(H)%ofFermi-2UpperBoundLOCA(J)%ofRegulatoryGuide1.3LOCA(K)A.B.C.D.Answer:BILO2015WrittenPage:215of22008September201540.011.821.45.01.9115.430.08.828.66.72.511.8 AnswerExplanation:AnswercalculatedusingEnl.B1hourvaluesfor(E)7E+4,(F)3E+5,and(G)8E+5PlantProceduresEP-547NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.3.5Abilitytouseradiationmonitoringsystems,suchasfixedradiationmonitorsandalarms,portablesurveyinstruments,personnelmonitoringequipment,etc.10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.43(b)(4)Radiationhazardsthatmayariseduringnormalandabnormalsituations,includingmaintenanceactivitiesandvariouscontaminationconditions.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2008ExamILO2015WrittenPage:216of22008September2015 ID:S99Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEWTheplantwasoperatingat100%power.TheNorthRFPtripped.Thefollowingactionsareinprogress:*SBFWhasbeenstartedandisinjectingat1200gpm.*TheP603operatorisinsertingtheCRAMarraytolowerReactorPower.*Reactorwaterlevelis185inchesandrisingslowly.Assumingnootherplanteventsandthatreactorpowerisloweredtobelow65%byfullyinsertingtheCRAMarraywhichONEofthefollowingdescribesarequiredfollowupactionthatwillbedirectedbyCRSbasedontheactionstakensofar?A.PlaceRecircA&BFlowLimiter2/3DefeatswitchinDEFEAT.B.PlacetheReactorModeswitchinSHUTDOWNC.PerformaReactorshutdownusingtheGOP.D.ShutdownSBFW.Answer:DILO2015WrittenPage:217of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:20.107.01LOSSOFFEEDWATERORFEEDWATERCONTROLdirectsactionsforatrippedRFPandRWLisloworloweringbecausealackofAdequatepumpingcapacity.CONDITIOND.ReactorPower>65%ANDRFPtripped.(pg5)ACTION:D.1VerifyRRrunsbackto2/3Limiter.D.2PlaceRecircA&BFlowLimiter2/3DefeatswitchinNORMAL.D.3InjectwithSBFWat1200gpm.D.4InsertCRAMarraytolowerReactorPower<65%.AdditionallywhenCONDITIONE.CRAMarrayinserted.(pg5)ACTION:E.1VerifyReactorPower<65%.E.2ShutdownSBFW.E.3MonitorCoreThermalLimits.E.4NotifySNE.A.IsplausibleandincorrectbecauseitrequiredactionforthisswitchtobeplaceinNORMALfortheconditionslisted.B.IsplausibleandincorrectbecauseloweringpowerandflowcanputthecoreinaSCRAMregion,howevertheseconditionswillnot.C.Isplausibleandincorrectbecausetheexamineemayincorrectlyassumeconditiontonotallowcontinuedpoweroperations.Ref(20.107.01pg3,5)PlantProcedures20.107.01NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.4.11Knowledgeofabnormalconditionprocedures.295031ReactorLowWaterLevel.10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.43(b)(5)Assessmentoffacilityconditionsandselectionofappropriateproceduresduringnormal,abnormal,andemergencysituations.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:218of22008September2015 ID:S100Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEWTheplantisoperatingat100%powerwhen,duetoalossoffeedwaterareactorSCRAMoccurs.TheShiftenterstheEOPsonRPVwaterlevel3,andtakesappropriateactions.20minuteslater,theplantisstablewithRPVwaterlevelbeingmaintained173-214inches,when16D27FIREALARMoccurs.FireDetectionZone14/FireZone11ABW:Div2BatteryChargerRoomisalarming.ThefieldoperatorreportsthatthefiredoortoDiv2BatteryChargerRoomishottothetouchandthereisastrongodorofsmokeinthearea.TheCRSEnters20.000.22PlantFiresandbeginsdirectingtheshifttorespondtothefire.IfthefireweretospreadthroughtheDiv2BatteryChargerRoomfiredoorstotheadjacentareas,whichofthefollowingactionswouldtheCRSdirectandwhy?A.PERFORM20.000.18,ControlOfThePlantFromTheDedicatedShutdownPanel,becauseofafireina3Lzone.B.DIRECTtheCRNSOtouseHPCIandSBFWaspreferredmakeupsources,becausethefirehasorcouldimpactRCIC.C.DIRECTtheCRNSOtouseRCICandSBFWaspreferredmakeupsources,becausethefirehasorcouldimpactHPCI.D.PERFORM20.000.19ShutdownFromOutsideTheControlRoom,becauseofafirehasdamagedtheabilityofMCRtocontrolsafeshutdownequipment.Answer:AILO2015WrittenPage:219of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:TheDCMCCAreaisoneoftheimmediatelyadjacentareas.Therefore:Per20.000.22CONDITIONCFirein3LZone(8,9A,11,12,12A,14(DCMCCArea)or16(AB4only).ACTION:C.1PERFORM20.000.18,ControlOfThePlantFromTheDedicatedShutdownPanelB&C.BothHPCIandRCICarecompromisedbythefirewithspreadtoadjacentareas,BothoftheseareplausibleiftheexamineefailstounderstandtherelationshipsbetweenHPCI,RCICandESFDivisionalDCpower.Additionallythesedistractersarequotedfromthefirestrategieslistedin20.000.22Plantfires.D.ThisanswerisplausibleiftheexaminedoesnotunderstandthepurposeoftheAOPorconfusesthepurposeofthisAOPwith20.000.18ControlOfThePlantFromTheDedicatedShutdownPanel.BothAOPsdocontroltheplantfromoutsidetheMCR.B&CMORE:AllRCICpumpandvalvemotors(exceptF084andF007)receive260VDCmotorpowerand130VDCcontrolpowerfrom260VDCMCC2PA-1.PowertoF084issuppliedfrom260VDCMCC2PB-1.PowertoF007issuppliedvia480VACMCC72F-4A.AllHPCIpumpandvalvemotors,exceptF075andF002,receive260VDCmotorpowerand130VDCcontrolpowerfrom260VDCMCC2PB-1.PowertoF075issuppliedfrom260VDCMCC2PA-1.PowertoF002issuppliedvia480VACMCC72C-3A(120/24VACcontrolpowerissuppliedby2transformersfromthesameMCCposition).260VDCMCC2PA(B)-1islocatedAB2-H11(Zone14)PlantProcedures20.000.22NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.4.273.4/3.9Knowledgeof"fireintheplant"procedure10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.43(b)(5)Assessmentoffacilityconditionsandselectionofappropriateproceduresduringnormal,abnormal,andemergencysituations.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:220of22008September2015}} 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Revision as of 07:51, 6 June 2018
| ML15268A038 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 08/31/2015 |
| From: | Bielby M E NRC/RGN-III/DRS/OLB |
| To: | Detroit Edison, Co |
| References | |
| Download: ML15268A038 (220) | |
Text
ID:R01Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:NEWTheplantisoperatingwiththefollowingindications:B21-R612JetPumpTotalFlowRecorder87.4Mlbs/hrC51-R608ARxPowerAPRM1100%B31-R621A/BRRMGSETSPEEDCONTROLLERs73%(controllinginAUTO)Basedontheabovestartingconditionsandassumingnooperatoractioninresponsetothetransient,openingthefieldbreakerfor'A'ReactorRecircPumpwillcauseReactorPowertolower.Thepowerreductionisdueto_______.A.'A'ReactorRecircpumpcoastingdownONLY.B.'A'ReactorRecircPumpcoastingdownPLUSaspeedreductionin'B'ReactorRecircpumpbecauseof#4limiter.C.'A'ReactorRecircPumpcoastingdownPLUSaspeedreductionin'B'ReactorRecircpumpbecauseof#2and#3limiters.D.'A'ReactorRecircPumpcoastingdownPLUSaspeedreductionin'B'ReactorRecircpumpbecauseoflimiter#1limiter.Answer:AILO2015WrittenPage:1of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:Limiter4istheonlyrunbackthatwouldactuate.Atasettingof75%,itwouldhavenoeffectonthereductiononflow.ThereforethecoastdownofApumpistheonlythingloweringRxpower.DistractorExplanation:B.ThisanswerisincorrectbecausethesetpointofLimiter#4is75%,thisanswerisplausibleiftheexamineeincorrectlythought#4limiterasalowersetpoint.C.ThisanswerisincorrectandbecauseLimiters#2and#3arecutout.Thisanswerisplausibleiftheexamineeincorrectlybelieves#2limiterswillenforce.D.ThisanswerisincorrectbecauseLimiter#1isactuactedwhenRRpumpDischargeVlvisnotfullopenortotalFWflowislessthan20%.Thisanswerisplausibleiftheexamineeincorrectlybelievesflowwouldlowerduetolimiterenforcement.ReferenceInformation:23.138.01Section1.0Description(Limiter#2,#3,#4onpage8)-explainslimitersPlantProcedures23.138.01NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295001AK3.KnowledgeofthereasonsforthefollowingresponsesastheyapplytoPARTIALORCOMPLETELOSSOFFORCEDCOREFLOWCIRCULATION:295001AK3.02Reactorpowerresponse10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(10)Administrative,normal,abnormal,andemergencyoperatingproceduresforthefacility.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:2of22008September2015 ID:R02Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:NEWFollowingalossof120kVandareactorSCRAM,thefollowingindicationsexistonpanelH11-P809:BreakerPositionsBUS64BPOSB8CLOSEDBUS64BPOSB6TRIPPEDBUS11EAPOSEA3CLOSEDBUS12EBPOSEB3OPENBUS64CPOSC8CLOSEDBUS64CPOSC6TRIPPEDBasedontheseindications(1)whateventhasoccurred,and(2)whatactionsshouldtheoperatingcrewtakeinadditiontoenteringAOP20.300.120kV?A.(1)BuslockoutonBUS64B(2)Perform20.300.72B,LossOfBus72BONLY.B.(1)BuslockoutonBUS64C(2)Perform20.300.72C,LossOfBus72CONLY.C.(1)EDG12failureduetoafaultwithEDG12(2)Perform20.307.01,EmergencyDieselGeneratorFailureAND20.300.72C,LossOfBus72C.D.(1)EDG11failureduetoafaultwithEDG11(2)Perform20.307.01,EmergencyDieselGeneratorFailureAND20.300.72B,LossOfBus72B.Answer:CILO2015WrittenPage:3of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:20.300.120kVdirects20.307.01and20.300.72CiftheEDG12outputbreakerfailstoclose(ConditionK).Additionally,nobuslockoutisindicatedso20.307.01wouldbeeffectiveifthecauseoftheEDGfailureiscorrectable.DistracterExplanation:A.Isincorrectandplausiblebecausethereisnoindicationofa64BBUSLOCKOUT(indicatedbyBUSisolation).Iftherewasa64BBUSLOCKOUT,entering20.300.72Bwouldbecorrect.B.Isincorrectandplausiblebecausetherethereisnoindicationofa64CBUSLOCKOUT(indicatedbyBUSisolation).Iftherewasa64CBUSLOCKOUT,entering20.300.72Cwouldbecorrect.D.IsincorrectandplausiblebecausetheBUS11EAPOSEA3isCLOSEDsoEDG11hasstartedandloaded.IfEDG11hadfailedthen20.307.01and20.300.72Bwouldbecorrect.ReferenceInformation:20.300.120kv,page9,ConditionK.PlantProcedures20.300.120kvNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295003AA1.Abilitytooperateand/ormonitorthefollowingastheyapplytoPARTIALORCOMPLETELOSSOFA.C.POWER:295003AA1.02Emergencygenerators10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(10)Administrative,normal,abnormal,andemergencyoperatingproceduresforthefacility.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:4of22008September2015 ID:R03Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEW-CONTRACTAt1030,alossofoffsitepoweroccurred.AOP20.300.Offsite,LossofOffsitePower,isbeingimplementedtomitigatetheelectricalsystemevent.At1145(currenttime),electricalsystemindicationsandconditionsareasfollows:*AllEDGsarerunningloaded.*120kVand345kVswitchyardcomponentsaredamagedandarebeingevaluatedbypersonnelforrestoration.*10D72BOP260/130VBATTERY2PCTROUBLEisinalarm.*9D17DIVIESS130VBATTERY2PATROUBLEalarmedbutisnowclear.*10D68DIVIIESS130VBATTERY2PBTROUBLEalarmedbutisnowclear.Iftheelectricalsystemisoperatingwithinitsdesignbases,basedontheindications,(1)whatisthestatusofthestationbatteriesand(2)whatistheirabilitytosupplyloadsduringtheevent?A.(1)Battery2PCisbelowminimumcellvoltage,BOPloadsarede-energized.(2)Batteries2PAand2PBareaboveminimumcellvoltage,ESFloadsaresuppliedadequatepowertooperate.B.(1)Battery2PCisaboveminimumcellvoltage,BOPloadsaresuppliedadequatepowertooperate.(2)Batteries2PAand2PBareaboveminimumcellvoltage,ESFloadsaresuppliedadequatepowertooperate.C.(1)Battery2PCisaboveminimumcellvoltage,BOPloadsshouldbestrippedinordertosupplyadequatepowertoremainingloads.(2)Batteries2PAand2PBareaboveminimumcellvoltage,ESFloadsaresuppliedadequatepowertooperate.D.(1)Battery2PCisbelowminimumcellvoltage,BOPloadsshouldbestrippedinordertosupplyadequatepowertoremainingloads.(2)Batteries2PAand2PBarebelowminimumcellvoltage,ESFloadsshouldbestrippedinordertosupplyadequatepowertoremainingloads.Answer:CILO2015WrittenPage:5of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:BasedonthedesignoftheBOPbatteries,underloadedconditionsthebatteriescansupplyloadsforupto90minutesbeforefallingbelowminimumcellvoltagewithnochargeravailable.Basedontheconditionsofthe120kvswitchyard,currentlynoBOPchargerisavailable.TheprocedurerequiresstrippingtheDCBOPbussesafteronehouriftheDCBOPchargersremainunavailable.ThisistoretainthebatteriesavailableforDCcontrolpoweruseupto4hours.ESFbatteriesarefullyavailablewithchargersenergizedduetotheEDGpowerbeingavailable.AlarmsindicatebatterychargersareinservicefortheESFbatteriesasdirectedbytheprocedure.DistracterExplanation:A.IsincorrectandplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldincorrectlyinterprettheBOPbatterytroublealarmasalossofthebatteryvoltage.Thevoltagealarmisabovetheminimumcellvoltage.Thiswouldalsobesupportedbytheindicationthatoffsitepowercannotberestored.ESFchargersareenergizedasindicatedbythealarmstatuswhichalsoenhancestheplausibilityofthedistracter.B.IsincorrectandplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldincorrectlyinterpretthatsinceEDGpowerisavailableallavailablebatterychargersbothESFandBOPareenergized.ESFchargersareenergizedasindicatedbythealarmstatuswhichalsoenhancestheplausibilityofthedistracter.D.Isincorrectandplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldincorrectlyinterprettheindicationandapplicationoftheknowledgeofthedesignbasisof1.5hourstotheBOPbatteryandconcludethatsinceonehourhaspassedwithoutstrippingtheBOPbattery,thatthecellsarebelowminimumvoltage.ReferenceInformation:R32-00DCELECTRICALSYSTEMDBDpages26-27CriteriaforBOPbatteriesPlantProcedures20.300.OffsiteR32-00DESIGNBASISDOCUMENTFORDCELECTRICALSYSTEMNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295004AA2.Abilitytodetermineand/orinterpretthefollowingastheyapplytoPARTIALORCOMPLETELOSSOFD.C.POWER:295004AA2.03Batteryvoltage10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(10)Administrative,normal,abnormal,andemergencyoperatingproceduresforthefacility.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:6of22008September2015 ID:R04Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:BANK:802-2003-0006-008Withtheplantoperatingat90%power,aFeedwaterControllerFailure-MaximumDemandoccurs.Automaticprotectionfromthistransientisassuredbyascramgeneratedasaresultof________.A.OPRM-Upscaledirectscram,whichpreventsexceedingtheMCPRSafetyLimitB.ReactorWaterLevelHigh-Level8MainTurbineTripindirectscram,whichpreventsexceedingtheMCPRSafetyLimitC.ReactorVesselSteamDomePressure-Highdirectscram,whichpreventsexceedingtheReactorCoolantSystemPressureSafetyLimitD.APRMSimulatedThermalPowerUpscaledirectscram,whichpreventsexceedingtheReactorCoolantSystemPressureSafetyLimitAnswer:BILO2015WrittenPage:7of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:Thefeedwaterandmainturbinehighwaterleveltripinstrumentationisassumedtobecapableofprovidingaturbinetripinthedesignbasistransientanalysisforafeedwatercontrollerfailure,maximumdemandevent.TheLevel8tripindirectlyinitiatesareactorscram(above30%RTP)fromthemainturbinetripandtripsthefeedwaterpumps,therebyterminatingtheevent.ThereactorscrammitigatesthereductioninMCPR.DistracterExplanation:A.Thisisplausibleandincorrectbecausethisprotectsagainstthermalhydraulicpoweroscillations.C.Thisisplausibleandincorrectbecausethisprotectsagainstanyeventthatresultinareactorpressureincrease.D.ThisisplausibleandincorrectbecausethisprovidesprotectionagainstalossoffeedwaterheatingandensurestheMCPRSLisnotexceeded.ReferenceInformation:ForthisquestiontheT.S.B.isusedasareferenceforsysteminformationthatistaughtinthesystemscourseunderlessonplanLP-315-0127pertrainingobjectiveC013:C013.DescribetheReactorProtectionsystemtechnicalspecificationlimitingconditionsforoperation,theirbases,theassociatedsurveillancerequirement(s),andtheirrelationshiptooperability.T.S.B.3.3.2.2(pg3.3.2.2-2)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.2.38Knowledgeofconditionsandlimitationsinthefacilitylicense.295005AK1KnowledgeoftheoperationalimplicationsofthefollowingconceptsastheyapplytoMAINTURBINEGENERATORTRIP:295005AK1.02Corethermallimitconsiderations.TechnicalSpecifications3.3.2.2FeedwaterandMainTurbineHighWaterLevelTripInstrumentation10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(5)Facilityoperatingcharacteristicsduringsteadystateandtransientconditions,includingcoolantchemistry,causesandeffectsoftemperature,pressureandreactivitychanges,effectsofloadchanges,andoperatinglimitationsandreasonsfortheseoperatingcharacteristics.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:8of22008September2015 ID:R05Points:1.00Difficulty:3.50LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:BANK:315-0048-A018-001Theplantwasoperatingat15%powerduringastartup.Duetoanelectricalmalfunction,ALLTurbineControlValvesopenedresultinginaReactorScram.Nooperatoractionshavebeentaken.InadditiontoSafetyReliefValves,whichoneofthefollowingliststhesystemsavailableforDecayHeatRemovalIMMEDIATELYfollowingthescram?A.ReactorWaterCleanupONLY.B.TurbineBypassValvesandReactorWaterCleanupONLY.C.MainSteamLineDrainValvesandTurbineBypassValvesONLY.D.MainSteamLineDrainValves,TurbineBypassValvesandReactorWaterCleanup.Answer:AILO2015WrittenPage:9of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:Withpowerat15%,theModeSwitchisinRUN.TCVsopeninglowersRPVPressure.Whenpressurereaches756psigwithModeSwitchinRUN,aGP1PCISisolationoccursandaScram.WithMSIVsclosed,onlySRVsandRWCUareimmediatelyavailabletoremovedecayheat.DistracterExplanation:B.IsincorrectandplausiblebecauseTurbineBypassValvesarenotavailable.C.IsincorrectandplausiblebecauseTurbineBypassValvesandMSLDrainsarenotavailable.D.IsincorrectandplausiblebecauseTurbineBypassValvesandMSLDrainsarenotavailable.ReferenceInformation:23.601MainSteamLinePressure-Low23.601MainSteamLineIsolationValve-ClosureLimitSwitches20.000.21BasesModeSwitchinterlocksPlantProcedures20.000.2120.000.21BasesNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295006AK1.KnowledgeoftheoperationalimplicationsofthefollowingconceptsastheyapplytoSCRAM:295006AK1.01Decayheatgenerationandremoval10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(10)Administrative,normal,abnormal,andemergencyoperatingproceduresforthefacility.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:10of22008September2015 ID:R06Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEW-CONTRACTTheplantwasoperatingat100%powerwhenafireoccurredintheOwnerControlledArea.Thefireengulfedseveralbuildingsincludingtheonsitevehiclegarage.Thefollowingtimelineofeventssubsequentlyoccurred:10:30HeavyblacksmokeisdrawnintotheventilationintakemakingtheControlRoomuninhabitable.11:15Alloffsitepowerislost.Basedontheaboveplantconditions,at10:30controloftheplantwouldhaveshiftedtothe__________________.A.RemoteShutdownPanelandremainedthereforthedurationoftheeventB.DedicatedShutdownPanelandremainedthereforthedurationoftheeventC.RemoteShutdownPanelandsubsequentlytotheDedicatedShutdownPanelat11:15D.DedicatedShutdownPanelandsubsequentlytotheRemoteShutdownPanelat11:15Answer:CILO2015WrittenPage:11of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:Initiallyat10:30thecorrectlocationforremotecontroloftheplantduetoanuncomplicatedcontrolroomevacuationistheRemoteShutdownPanel.Attime11:15controloftheplantisrequiredtoshifttotheDedicatedShutdownPanelsincetheRemoteShutdownSystemisdesignedforanuncomplicatedcontrolroomevacuationeventandassuchdoesnotservetomitigatethefullrangeofdesignbasisevents.Therefore,transfertotheDedicatedShutdownPanelisrequiredsincethissystemprovidesameansofrestoringACpowertotheDiv1ESFandBOPbussesaswellasthenecessarysystemcontrolsandinstrumentationtomaintainthereactorcorecoveredintheeventofaControlRoomevacuationcoincidentwithalossofoffsitepower.DistracterExplanation:A.IsincorrectandplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldincorrectlyassumethattheRemoteShutdownPanelwasdesignedforthistypeofevent.ThecandidatecouldfailtorecognizethattheRemoteShutdownSystemisdesignedforacontrolroomevacuationevent(shorttermduration)andassuchdoesnotservetomitigatethefullrangeofdesignbasiseventsforwhichtheMainControlRoomwasdesigned.FurthermorethecandidatecouldalsofailtorecognizethattheDedicatedShutdownSystemprovidesameansofrestoringACpowertotheDiv1ESFandBOPbusses.Thepanelalsoprovidesnecessarysystemcontrolsandinstrumentationtomaintainthereactorcorecovered.Powerrestorationmaybecomenecessaryfollowingafireorlossofoffsitepower.B.IsincorrectandplausibleiftheexamineeincorrectlyassumedthatcontroloftheplantfromtheDedicatedShutdownPanelwasrequiredforallMainControlRoomevacuationeventsthatarearesultofanonsitefire.ThecandidatecouldfailtorecognizethatcontrolfromtheDedicatedShutdownPanelisonlyrequiredforfiresina3L"zoneofconcern"thathasthepotentialtoimpactsafeplantshutdowncapabilityduetomultiplehotshortsand/oropencircuitscausinglossofcontrolfromthecontrolroom.D.IsincorrectandplausibleiftheexamineeincorrectlyassumedthatcontroloftheplantfromtheDedicatedShutdownPanelwasrequiredforallMainControlRoomevacuationeventsthatarearesultofanonsitefire.Thecandidatecouldthenconcludethat,uponLossofOffsitePower,thecorrectresponsewouldbetoshiftcontroltotheRemoteShutdownPanel.ThecandidatecouldfailtorecognizethattheDedicatedShutdownSystemisdesignedtoallowforremotecontroloftheplantconcurrentwithalossofoffsitepowerevent.ReferenceInformation:20.000.19(pg2)Overide120.000.19BASES(pg2)Overide1Bases20.000.18BASES(pg2)-BASESSUMMARYILO2015WrittenPage:12of22008September2015 PlantProcedures20.000.1820.000.1920.000.18Bases20.000.19BasesNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295016AK2.KnowledgeoftheinterrelationsbetweenCONTROLROOMABANDONMENTandthefollowing:295016AK2.02Localcontrolstations:Plant-Specific10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:13of22008September2015 ID:R07Points:1.00Difficulty:2.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEW-CONTRACTTheplantisoperatingat100%powerwiththefollowingconditions:*#2GSWPumpsarerunning.*#3GSWPumpisOOSformotorreplacement.*#4GSWPumphasjusttripped.*#6GSWPumpisOOSfordischargestrainerleakrepair.*GSWHeaderPressuresteadyat70psigwiththeP4100-F841,GSWBypassLinePressureCtrlVlv,50%open.*RBCCWHeatExchangeroutlettemperatureis90°Fandrising.WhichONEofthefollowingactionsisrequiredtostabilizetheaboveconditions?A.DispatchanoperatortothrottleclosedP4100-F841,GSWBypassLinePressureCtrlVlv,inordertoraiseGSWheaderpressureandrestoreadequatecoolingwaterflow.B.DispatchanoperatortothrottleopenP4100-F840,GSWFlowTestPressureCtrlVlv,inordertoraiseGSWheaderpressureandrestoreadequatecoolingwaterflow.C.Scramthereactor,tripthemainturbineandinitiateDiv1and2EECWinordertoestablishcoolingtosafetyrelatedequipmentandrestoreGSWheaderpressuretonormalband.D.IncreasecoolingwaterflowusingP42-F400,RBCCWTempControlVlvinAUTO,orMANUALifnecessary,inordertorestoreRBCCWHeatExchangeroutlettemperatureandGSWheaderpressureinband.Answer:AILO2015WrittenPage:14of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:P4100-F841,GSWBypassLinePressureCtrlVlvisadump,orbackpressure,controlvalve.Priortothetransientandtripof#4GSWPump,thisvalvewasrequiredtobeopentomaintainGSWheaderpressuredueto3pumpsbeinginexcessoftheplantcoolingwaterrequirements.Withonly2GSWpumpsrunning,closingthisvalvewillraiseGSWheaderpressureandincreasecoolingwaterflowtotheCCWheatexchangerscooledbyGSWtherebyloweringCCWcoolingtemperatures,suchastheelevatedRBCCWHeatExchangeroutlet.DistracterExplanation:B.Isincorrectandplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldincorrectlydeterminethat,sincetheP4100-F841,GSWBypassLinePressureCtrlVlv,isatits50%openlimitthenpressurecontrolwouldlogicallytransfertotheP4100-F840,GSWFlowTestPressureCtrlVlv.Thiswouldbecorrectforahighpressurecondition.TheexamineecouldalsoincorrectlydeterminethatGSWpressurecontrolvalvesarethrottledOPENtoraiseGSWheaderpressure,however,thevalvesareactuallybackpressurecontrolvalvesandmustbethrottledCLOSEDtoraiseGSWheaderpressureandincreasecoolingwaterflowtosupportedCCWheatexchangers.C.Isincorrectandplausiblebecausethecandidatecouldincorrectlydeterminethat,sinceGSWheaderpressureisbelow65#,theplantandmainturbineshouldbetripped,andEECWinitiated,asdirectedbythelossofGSWAOP.However,thelossofGSWAOPoverridestatementonlyrequiresaplantscramifGSWheaderpressurecannotberestoredANDMAINTAINEDabove65psig.TheexamineeshoulddeterminethatthrottlingcapacityexiststorestoreGSWheaderpressurewithouttheneedforthesedrasticactions.D.IsincorrectandplausiblebecausethecandidatecouldincorrectlydeterminethatthrottlingopentheP42-F400,RBCCWTempControlVlvinAUTO,orMANUAL,wouldcorrecttheelevatedRBCCWHeatExchangeroutlettemperaturecondition.AlthoughthisactionisdirectedbyARP2D120,RBCCWHXDISCHTEMPERATUREHIGH/LOWforaHighTemperaturecondition,theactionisaccompaniedbyaconditionalstatementtomaketheadjustmentswhilemonitoringGSWheaderpressure.WithGSWheaderpressurealreadydegraded,thisactionwouldnotbeprudent.ReferenceInformation:ARP7D14(pg1)GSWpressurelowactions23.131(pg23-25)GSWpressurecontrolILO2015WrittenPage:15of22008September2015 PlantProcedures23.13107D1423.12702D120NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295018AK3.KnowledgeofthereasonsforthefollowingresponsesastheyapplytoPARTIALORCOMPLETELOSSOFCOMPONENTCOOLINGWATER:295018AK3.06Increasingcoolingwaterflowtoheatexchangers.10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(5)Facilityoperatingcharacteristicsduringsteadystateandtransientconditions,includingcoolantchemistry,causesandeffectsoftemperature,pressureandreactivitychanges,effectsofloadchanges,andoperatinglimitationsandreasonsfortheseoperatingcharacteristics.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:16of22008September2015 ID:R08Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:NEWTheplantisoperatingat100%powerwiththefollowingStationAirCompressorlineup:EastStationAirCompressorOffCenterStationAirCompressorRunningWestStationAirCompressorAutoFollowingaseismicevent,Bus72Ahasbeende-energized,andbothControlAirCompressorsautostartduetoloweringairpressure.At83psi,allairheaderpressuresbegintorecover.Assumingnooperatoraction,whatisthestatusofthefollowingStationAirvalves?P50-F401P50-F402P50-F440STATIONAIRTOTBHDRISOVLVSTATIONAIRTONIASISOVLVDIV1CONTROLAIRISOVLVA.B.C.D.Answer:BILO2015WrittenPage:17of22008September2015CLOSEDCLOSEDOPENOPENOPENCLOSEDCLOSEDOPENCLOSEDOPENOPENCLOSED AnswerExplanation:Basedonlogicprintslisted&AOP20.129.01,ControlAirCompressorsstartat85psithereforesystempresshastogotobelow85psiandthen,perthequestionsstempressurerecovers.Basedonthisthe401willgetaclosedsignal,andthe402and440willnotgetclosesignals.DistracterExplanation:Distracterareplausiblebasedonnotunderstandingsetpointsorpowersupplies/auto-startsofcompressorsA.Isincorrectbecause401willgetclosesignalat85#.Thisanswerisplausibleiftheexamineeincorrectlyassumesthesystempressuredidnotgolowenoughtocauseisolations.C.Isincorrectbecause402willnotgetclosesignaluntil75#andairheaderonlywentto83#.Thisanswerisplausibleiftheexamineeincorrectlyassumesthesystempressuredidgolowenoughtocauseisolations.D.Isincorrectbecause402&440willnotgetclosesignaluntil75#andairheaderonlywentto83#.Thisanswerisplausibleiftheexamineeincorrectlyassumesthesystempressuredidgolowenoughtocauseisolations.ReferenceInformation:I-2450-02,04,05arenotshownhere,howevertheyareincludedindevelopmentfolder,theAOPactionsmatchtheactuations.20.129.01(pg3)Systemactuationbasedonpressureperactionstatement.PlantProcedures20.129.0120.300.72ANUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295019AA1.Abilitytooperateand/ormonitorthefollowingastheyapplytoPARTIALORCOMPLETELOSSOFINSTRUMENTAIR:295019AA1.04Serviceairisolationsvalves:Plant-Specific10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:18of22008September2015 ID:R09Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:MODIFIEDBANK:ID26798TheplantisinHOTSHUTDOWNwiththefollowingconditions:*ReactorPressureis25psig.*RPVWaterLevelis250inchesandstable.*RHRPumpBisoperatinginShutdownCoolingMode.Whenthefollowingalarmoccurs:*2D26,DIVIIRHRSYSTEMLOWFLOWBYPASSINITIATED.Withoutoperatoractionwhichoneofthefollowingdescribes(1)theeffectonReactorWaterLeveland(2)reasonforthateffect?A.(1)ReactorWaterLevelwillremainthesame.(2)TheRHRpumpsminflowvalvehasopened;systemflowrateisreduced.B.(1)ReactorWaterLevelwillremainthesame.(2)TheRHRsystemflowislow,indicatingalowheatloadcondition.C.(1)ReactorWaterLevelwillrise.(2)TheRHRsystemflowfromthevesselislow,thisindicatesaflowimbalance.D.(1)ReactorWaterLevelwilllower.(2)TheRHRpumpsminflowvalvehasopened,rejectingRxwatertotheTorus.Answer:DILO2015WrittenPage:19of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:Thealarm2D26indicatestheRHRpumpsminflowvalvehasopenedresultinginincreasedpumpflow(twopaths).TheminflowvalvewillrejectRxwatertotheToruscausingleveltoloweruntilalowRxwaterlevelisolationisreached.OE:SOER87-002,InadvertentDrainingoftheReactorVesseltoSuppressionPoolatBWRsDistracterExplanation:A.ThisisplausibleandincorrectbecauseSDCisaclosedloopsystem,howeverwhentheminflowvalveisopenitbecomesarejectionpathcausingleveltolower.B.Thisisplausibleandincorrectbecausetheexamineecouldidentifythelowflowalarmtobelowflowinaclosedloopsystem,whichwouldhavenoeffectonlevel.C.ThisisplausibleandincorrectbecausetheexamineecouldidentifythelowflowalarmwithRHRoutputfromthevessel,andgivenafeedandbleedtypesystemthiscouldidentifyaconditionthatcausesleveltorise.ReferenceInformation:ARP2D26(pg1)Actionforthiscondition.FOSM-5706-1Greenhighlightofpathfordraintotorus(locatedinDevelopmentfolder)PlantProcedures03D07902D026IERs/SOERs/SERs/SENs/O&MRSOER87-2InadvertantDrainingofReactorVesseltoSuppressionPoolatBWRsNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295021AA2.Abilitytodetermineand/orinterpretthefollowingastheyapplytoLOSSOFSHUTDOWNCOOLING:295021AA2.03Reactorwaterlevel10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:20of22008September2015 ID:R10Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEW-CONTRACTCorealterationsareinprogresswiththeplantinMode5.'A'RHRpumpisoperatingintheshutdowncoolingmodeand'C'RHRpumpisavailableinstandby.'B'and'D'RHRpumpsareoutofservice.Thecontrolroomreceivesareportthatspentfuelpoollevelisslowlylowering.Anuclearoperatorisolatesthesourceoftheleakandthelevelreductionisstopped.*2D1FuelPoolLevelLowisalarmed.*2D13FuelPoolCoolingTroubleisalarmed.*FPCCUPumpshavetripped.*ThecontrolroomdeterminesthatRPVlevelis20.0ftabovetheRPVflangeusingB21-R605,RPVWaterLevelFloodUpRange.Whichoneofthefollowingactionsisrequired?A.SuspendmovementoffuelassemblieswithintheRPV.B.Verifyanalternatemethodofdecayheatremovalisavailable.C.Verifytwoalternatemethodsofdecayheatremovalareavailable.D.Initiateactiontorestoresecondarycontainmenttooperablestatus.Answer:AILO2015WrittenPage:21of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:TheexamineeshouldcorrectlydeterminethatTechnicalSpecification3.9.6(RefuelingOperations-RPVWaterLevel)requiressuspensionofmovementoffuelassemblieswithRPVlevel<20ft6inches.ThecompletiontimefortheactionisIMMEDIATELY.DistracterExplanation:B.IsincorrectandplausiblebecauseexamineemayincorrectlyidentifyTechnicalSpecification3.9.7actionsrequireoneverificationthatanalternatemethodofdecayheatremovalisavailablewithacompletiontimeofIMMEDIATELYifoneRHRSDCsubsystemisnotinoperation.Withlevel<20ft6inches,thisLCOisnotapplicable.C.IsincorrectandplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldincorrectlyidentifyTechnicalSpecification3.9.8requiresverificationofanalternatemethodofdecayheatisavailableforeachinoperablerequiredRHRSDCsubsystem.AlthoughBandDareinoperabletwostillremainandeventhoughRPVlevelislessthan20ft6incheswhichmakestheLCOapplicable,theconditionforentryisnotcurrentlymet.D.IsincorrectandplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldincorrectlyidentifyTechnicalSpecification3.9.7and3.9.8haveactionstoIMMEDIATELYrestoresecondarycontainmenttooperablestatusifthecompletiontimesofconditionAinbothLCOsarenotmet.ReferenceInformation:T.S.3.9.6(pg3.9-9)LCOandImmediateaction.NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.2.39Knowledgeoflessthanonehourtechnicalspecificationactionstatementsforsystems.295023RefuelingAccidentsTechnicalSpecifications3.9.6ReactorPressureVessel(RPV)WaterLevel10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamLOR2015Exam2SROLOR2015Exam2ROILO2015WrittenPage:22of22008September2015 ID:R11Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:NEW-CONTRACTWhichoftheresponsesbelowcompletesthefollowingregardingtheoperationalimplicationsofHighDrywellPressure?InMODES1,2and3,themaximumallowableDrywellPressureis__(1)__.Thislimitisbasedon__(2)__.A.(1)2.25psig(2)maintainingtheresultantdifferentialpressurebelowthemaximumprimarycontainmentdesigndifferentialpressureintheeventofinadvertentdrywellsprayactuation.B.(1)2.0psig(2)maintainingtheresultantdifferentialpressurebelowthemaximumprimarycontainmentdesigndifferentialpressureintheeventofinadvertentdrywellsprayactuation.C.(1)2.25psig(2)maintainingtheresultantpeakprimarycontainmentaccidentpressurebelowtheprimarycontainmentdesignpressureintheeventofaDesignBasisAccident(DBA).D.(1)2.0psig(2)maintainingtheresultantpeakprimarycontainmentaccidentpressurebelowtheprimarycontainmentdesignpressureintheeventofaDesignBasisAccident(DBA).Answer:DILO2015WrittenPage:23of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:Theexamineeshouldcorrectlyconcludethat,inaccordancewithLCO3.6.1.4,themaximumDrywellPressureinthespecifiedMODEsis2.0psig.TheexamineeshouldalsoconcludethatthebasesforthislimitistopreservetheinitialconditionsassumedintheaccidentanalysisfortheDesignBasisAccident(DBA)thusensuringthatthepeakprimarycontainmentpressuredoesnotexceedthedesignpressureoftheprimarycontainmentpressure.DistracterExplanation:A.IsincorrectandplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldfailtorecognizetheLCO3.6.1.4maximumallowableDrywellPressureof2.0psig.Also,theexamineecouldfailtorecognizethatthebasisgiveninthesecondpartofthedistractorisfortheminimumallowableDrywellPressurespecifiedbyLCO3.6.1.4inMODES1,2and3,whichprotectscontainmentintegritybykeepingexternaltointernaldrywelldifferentialpressurebelowthemaximumallowabledesignD/P.B.IsincorrectandplausiblebecausethefirstpartofthedistractordoesprovidethecorrectmaximumDrywellPressureallowedbyLCO3.6.1.4intheMODEsspecified.However,theexamineecouldfailtorecognizethatthebasisgiveninthesecondpartofthedistractorisfortheminimumallowableDrywellPressurespecifiedbyLCO3.6.1.4inMODES1,2and3,whichprotectscontainmentintegritybykeepingexternaltointernaldrywelldifferentialpressurebelowthemaximumallowabledesignD/P.C.IsincorrectandplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldfailtorecognizetheLCO3.6.1.4maximumallowableDrywellPressureof2.0psig.ReferenceInformation:ForthisquestiontheT.S.B.isusedasareferenceforsysteminformationthatistaughtinthesystemscourseunderlessonplanLP-315-0127pertrainingobjectiveC013:C013.DescribetheReactorProtectionsystemtechnicalspecificationlimitingconditionsforoperation,theirbases,theassociatedsurveillancerequirement(s),andtheirrelationshiptooperability.T.S.3.6.1.4(pg3.6-18)LCOstatementT.S.3.6.1.4BASES(pgB3.3.1.4-1to2)Basesforlimit.ILO2015WrittenPage:24of22008September2015 PlantProcedures03D081NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295024EK1.KnowledgeoftheoperationalimplicationsofthefollowingconceptsastheyapplytoHIGHDRYWELLPRESSURE:295024EK1.01Drywellintegrity:Plant-SpecificTechnicalSpecifications3.6.1.4PrimaryContainmentPressure10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(8)Components,capacity,andfunctionsofemergencysystems.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:25of22008September2015 ID:R12Points:1.00Difficulty:2.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:NEW-CONTRACTThereactorisneartheendofanoperatingcyclewithPowerandRecirculationFlowat100%.IftheplantrespondsasassumedintheFermi2over-pressurizationprotectionanalysis,whenatleasttwoAveragePowerRangeMonitorsreach________,thereactorwillscraminordertoterminateaMainSteamIsolationValve(MSIV)closureevent.A.107.2%NeutronFluxB.113.5%SimulatedThermalPowerC.118%NeutronFluxD.122.2%SimulatedThermalPowerAnswer:CILO2015WrittenPage:26of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:AstheMSIVclosureeventisoccurring,reactorpressurewillbeincreasing.TheincreaseinRPVpressureduringreactoroperationwillcompressthesteamvoidsandresultinapositivereactivityinsertion,whichthencausesneutronfluxandThermalPowertoincrease.TheFermi2over-pressurizationprotectionanalysisconservativelyassumesscramontheAveragePowerRangeMonitorNeutronFlux-Upscaletripof118%which,alongwiththeSRVs,limitsthepeakRPVpressuretolessthantheASMECodelimits.DistracterExplanation:A.Isincorrectandplausibleifthecandidateassumedthatthe107.2%wastheAPRMsetpoint.The107.2%istheRBMHTSPat>82%reactorpowerwhichwillonlycauseaRodWithdrawlBlock.B.IsincorrectandplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldfailtorecognizethattheAPRMSTP-UpscaletripprovidesprotectionagainsttransientswhereThermalPowerincreasesslowlyandnotforrapidlychangingpowereventssuchastheMSIVclosureand,therefore,assumesthatsincetheAPRMSTP-Upscaletripisclampedatanupperlimitof113.5%,whichislowerthantheAPRMNeutronFlux-UpscaleFunctionAllowableValueat100%recirculationflow,thatthisfunctionwillterminatetheMSIVclosureeventbeforetheAPRMUpscaleFunction.D.IsincorrectandplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldfailtorecognizethattheAPRMSTP-UpscaletripprovidesprotectionagainsttransientswhereThermalPowerincreasesslowlyandnotforrapidlychangingpowereventssuchastheMSIVclosureandthencalculatestheSTPupscaletripfor100%ReferenceInformation:ForthisquestiontheT.S.B.isusedasareferenceforsysteminformationthatistaughtinthesystemscourseunderlessonplanLP-315-0105pertrainingobjectiveC013:C013.DescribetheNuclearBoilersystemtechnicalspecificationlimitingcon¬ditionsforoperation,theirbases,theassociatedsurveillancerequirement(s),andtheirrelationshiptooperability.T.S.B.3.3.1.1(pgB3.3.1.1-14to15)BasesforMSICClosureILO2015WrittenPage:27of22008September2015 PlantProcedures03D09303D073NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295025EK2.KnowledgeoftheinterrelationsbetweenHIGHREACTORPRESSUREandthefollowing:295025EK2.09ReactorpowerTechnicalSpecifications3.3.1.1ReactorProtectionSystem(RPS)Instrumentation10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:28of22008September2015 ID:R13Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:NEW-CONTRACTWhichoftheresponsesbelowbestcompletesthefollowingstatementregardingthecriticalparameterfortheHeatCapacityLimit(HCL)curveandthebasisbehindwhythereactormustbeEmergencyDepressurizedwhenthecurveisexceeded?ThereactorisEmergencyDepressurizedwhen__(1)__exceedstheHCLtoensurethatthe__(2)__isnotexceededbeforethedepressurizationoftheRPViscomplete.A.(1)DrywellTemperature(2)DrywellDesignTemperatureB.(1)DrywellTemperature(2)PressureSuppressionPressureC.(1)TorusWaterTemperature(2)TorusDesignTemperatureD.(1)TorusWaterTemperature(2)PressureSuppressionPressureAnswer:CILO2015WrittenPage:29of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:ThecriticalparameterontheHCLcurveisTorusWaterTemperature.EmergencyDepressurizingduetoexceedingtheHCLcurveisbasedonnotexceedingeitherthetorusdesigntemperatureorthePCPLbeforethedepressurizationoftheRPViscomplete.DistracterExplanation:A.IsincorrectandplausiblebecausetheexamineecoulddeterminethatthecriticalparameterontheHCLcurveisDrywellTemperatureandthereforeconcludethatEmergencyDepressurizingduetoexceedingtheHCLcurveisbasedonnotexceedingthedrywelldesigntemperaturebeforethedepressurizationoftheRPViscomplete.B.IsincorrectandplausiblebecausetheexamineecoulddeterminethatthecriticalparameterontheHCLcurveisDrywellTemperature.ThecandidatecouldincorrectlyconcludethatEmergencyDepressurizingduetoexceedingtheHCLcurveisbasedonnotexceedingthePressureSuppressionPressureofcontainmentratherthanthePCPLlimitbeforethedepressurizationoftheRPViscomplete.D.IsincorrectandplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldcorrectlyrecognizethatthecriticalparameterontheHCLcurveisTorusWaterTemperature.However,thecandidatecouldincorrectlyconcludethatEmergencyDepressurizingduetoexceedingtheHCLcurveisbasedonnotexceedingthePressureSuppressionPressureofcontainmentratherthanthePCPLlimitbeforethedepressurizationoftheRPViscomplete.ReferenceInformation:BWROGEPGs/SAGs,AppendixB(pgB-7-24&B-17-16to17)BasesofHCL&EmergencyDepressurization.PlantProcedures29.100.01SH2BWROGEPGAppBNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295026EK3.KnowledgeofthereasonsforthefollowingresponsesastheyapplytoSUPPRESSIONPOOLHIGHWATERTEMPERATURE:295026EK3.01Emergency/normaldepressurization10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(8)Components,capacity,andfunctionsofemergencysystems.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamLOR2015QuestionPoolILO2015WrittenPage:30of22008September2015 ID:R14Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEW-CONTRACTAtwhichofthefollowingDrywellTemperatureandRPVpressuremayPRVWaterlevelindicationbecomeunreliableduetoboilingintheinstrumentrun?DrywellTemperatureRPVpressureA.250°F25PSIGB.325°F50PSIGC.350°F150PSIGD.375°F250PSIGAnswer:BILO2015WrittenPage:31of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:UsingtheRPVSaturationTemperaturecurve,at50psigintheReactor,theDrywellTemperaturelistedatwhichtheinstrumentmaybecomereliableduetoboilingintherunisaboove300°F.DistracterExplanation:DistractersaincorrectandplausiblebasedinplottingthedataintheRPVSaturationTemperaturecurve.ReferenceInformation:29.100.01SH6notincludehere,acopyisinthehandoutfolder.PlantProcedures29.100.01SH6NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295028EA2.Abilitytodetermineand/orinterpretthefollowingastheyapplytoHIGHDRYWELLTEMPERATURE:295028EA2.02Reactorpressure10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(10)Administrative,normal,abnormal,andemergencyoperatingproceduresforthefacility.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:32of22008September2015 ID:R15Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEWAplanteventhasdamagedtheReactorBuilding.TheOperatingShiftisexecutingtheEOPs.*Thereactorhasscrammedhowever12rodsarestuckat04*RWLis176inches.*ReactorPressureis900psig.*TheMSIVsareopen.TheSTAhasplottedthreepointsonthePSPbasedonvaliddatafromMCRindication.Basedonthisdata,theOperatingshiftshouldpreparefor(1)whichofthefollowingcoursesofactionand(2)why?A.(1)DepressurizeusingBypassValvesignoringcooldownrates.(2)Becausesuppressionpoolwaterlevelwillbelowenoughthatsteamdischargedfromthedrywellintothesuppressionpoolmaynotbecondensed.B.(1)DepressurizeusingBypassValvesignoringcooldownrates.(2)BecausesuppressionpoolwaterlevelwillcorrespondtotheMinimumPressureSuppressionPrimaryContainmentWaterLevel.Belowthislevel,thepressuresuppressioncapabilityoftheprimarycontainmentmaybeinsufficienttoaccommodateanRPVbreachbycoredebris.C.(1)EmergencyDepressurize(2)Becausesuppressionpoolwaterlevelwillbelowenoughthatsteamdischargedfromthedrywellintothesuppressionpoolmaynotbecondensed.D.(1)EmergencyDepressurize(2)BecausesuppressionpoolwaterlevelwillcorrespondtotheMinimumPressureSuppressionPrimaryContainmentWaterLevel.Belowthislevel,thepressuresuppressioncapabilityoftheprimarycontainmentmaybeinsufficienttoaccommodateanRPVbreachbycoredebris.ILO2015WrittenPage:33of22008September2015 Answer:CILO2015WrittenPage:34of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:SuppressionpoolwaterlevelmustbemaintainedabovetheelevationoftheMarkI/IIdowncomerventopeningsorleast2feetabovethetopoftheMarkIIIhorizontalventstoensurethatsteamdischargedfromthedrywellintothesuppressionpoolfollowingaprimarysystembreakwillbeadequatelycondensed.(ResultsoftheBodegaBayMarkIcontainmenttestsindicate95%steamcondensationmaybeachievedfromaverticaldowncomerventthatdischargesatalevelsixinchesabovethesuppressionpoolsurface.)Ifsuppressionpoolwaterlevelcannotbemaintainedabovethespecifiedminimumvalue,steammaynotbeadequatelycondensedandprimarycontainmentpressurecouldexceedallowablelimits.SincetheRPVmaynotbekeptatpressurewhenpressuresuppressioncapabilityisunavailable,EmergencyRPVDepressurizationisrequired.[Leftmostline]isthesuppressionpoolwaterlevelcorrespondingtotheelevationofthedowncomerventopeningsortwofeetabovethehorizontalvents,asappropriate.Ifsuppressionpoolwaterlevelisbelowthiselevation,theRPVmaynotbekeptinapressurizedstatesincesteamdischargedthroughtheventsmaynotbecondensed.[rightmostline]isthesuppressionpoolwaterlevelcorrespondingtotheMaximumPressureSuppressionPrimaryContainmentWaterLevel.Abovethiselevation,thepressuresuppressioncapabilityoftheprimarycontainmentmaybeinsufficienttoaccommodateanRPVbreachbycoredebris.DistractersExplanation:"(1)DepressurizeusingBypassValvesignoringcooldownrates."-Thisanswerisplausibleandincorrect.Theexamineewouldchoosethisanswerbecauseitisavalidmethodtoreduceprimarypressureanditwouldputallthatenergyofthethedepressurizationinthecondenser.HoweverthisisnotthemethodallowedbytheEOPsforthiscondition."(2)BecausesuppressionpoolwaterlevelwillcorrespondtotheMinimumPressureSuppressionPrimaryContainmentWaterLevel.Belowthislevel,thepressuresuppressioncapabilityoftheprimarycontainmentmaybeinsufficienttoaccommodateanRPVbreachbycoredebris."-Thisanswerisplausibleandincorrect.TheexamineewouldchoosethisanswerbasedonrememberingtheupperlimitforTWL.IEtheMaximumPressureSuppressionPrimaryContainmentWaterLevel.ReferenceInformation:BWREPGAppendixB(pgB-7-49)and(pgB-17-64)PlantProceduresBWROGEPGAppBNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.4.18KnowledgeofthespecificbasesforEOPs295030LowSuppressionPoolWaterLevel10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(10)Administrative,normal,abnormal,andemergencyoperatingproceduresforthefacility.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:35of22008September2015 ILO2015WrittenPage:36of22008September2015 ID:R16Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:NEW-CONTRACTWhichoneofthefollowingrepresentstheminimumRPVlevelwhere(1)adequatecorecoolingexists,and(2)themaximumexpectedcladtemperatureifSBFWpumpsaretheonlysourceinjecting?A.(1)-25"(2)1500°FB.(1)-48"(2)1500°FC.(1)-25"(2)1800°FD.(1)-48"(2)1800°FAnswer:AILO2015WrittenPage:37of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:TheMinimumSteamCoolingRPVWaterLevel(MSCRWL)isdefinedasthelowestRPVwaterlevelatwhichthecoveredportionofthereactorcorewillgeneratesufficientsteamtoprecludeanycladtemperatureintheuncoveredportionofthecorefromexceeding1500°F.AtFermi2itiscalculatedtobe-25.DistracterExplanation:AlldistractersareincorrectandplausibleiftheexamineedoesnotunderstandtheMSCRWLrequirements.TheMinimumZero-InjectionRPVWaterLevelisdefinedtobethelowestRPVwaterlevelatwhichthecoveredportionofthereactorcorewillgeneratesufficientsteamtoprecludeanycladtemperatureintheuncoveredportionofthecorefromexceeding1800oF.AdequateCoreCoolingisensuredaslongasCoreSprayrequirements(5725gpm)aresatisfiedandRPVwaterlevelcanberestoredandmaintainedatorabovetheelevationofthejetpumpsuctions(-48in).ReferenceInformation:BWROGEPG(pgB-17-58)MCSRWLMSCRWLDesignCalc(pg1)PlantProceduresBWROGEPGAppBNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295031EK1.KnowledgeoftheoperationalimplicationsofthefollowingconceptsastheyapplytoREACTORLOWWATERLEVEL:295031EK1.01AdequatecorecoolingNRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:38of22008September2015 ID:R17Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEW-CONTRACTTheplanthasexperiencedatransientthatresultedinareactorscramwithreactorpowerabove5%.Thecrewisusing29.ESP.03foralternatecontrolrodinsertion.WhichONEofthefollowingalternatecontrolrodinsertionmethodsin29.ESP.03couldbemademoreeffectivebyCLOSINGC1100-F034,CRDChargingWaterHeaderIsolationValve?A.IncreaseCRDCoolingWaterDifferentialPressureB.ScramResetAndManualScramReinitiationC.VentCRDOverPistonVolumesD.ManualControlRodInsertionAnswer:DILO2015WrittenPage:39of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:ClosingC1100-F034isaneffectivemeansofraisingdrivewaterD/P.ThisisanoptiongiveninSection3.0,ManualControlRodInsertion,fortheoperatortouseifunabletomaintainsufficientdrivewaterD/PwithC1152-F003,CRDDrive/ClgWaterPCV,andC11-K612,CRDFlowController.DistracterExplanation:A.IsincorrectandplausiblebecauseclosingC1100-F034wouldbeaneffectivemeansofraisingcoolingwaterdifferentialpressure,butifascramsignalispresentandtheCRDscramvalvesopen,havingC1100-F034openwouldactuallyincreasepressureontheundersideofthedrivepistonthesameasincreasingcoolingwaterpressure.Additionally,noproceduralguidanceisgivenforclosingC1100-F034inthissectionforthatreason.B.IsincorrectandplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldincorrectlyinterprettheconditionsunderwhichoperationofC1100-F034isdirectedtobeoperatedforthismethodandfailtorecognizethat,ifreactorpressureisnotavailabletoscramcontrolrods,thenOPENINGC1100-F034wouldbeeffectiveinprovidingtheunderpistonpressurenecessaryforcontrolrodinsertionwhenthescramsignalisre-initiated.C.IsincorrectandplausiblebecauseclosingC1100-F034wouldbeaneffectivemeansofincreasingthedifferentialpressurenecessarytoaccomplishcontrolrodinsertionwhileventingtheCRDoverpistonvolumeandfurthermore,theexamineecouldincorrectlyinterpretthestepattheendofthesectionthatdirectsopeningtheC1100-F034foranyventedcontrolrodsnotfullyinsertedasmeaningthatC11-F034shouldbeclosedwhenperformingthisevolution.ReferenceInformation:29.ESP.03Section3.0(pg.5)PlantProcedures29.ESP.03NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295037EK2.KnowledgeoftheinterrelationsbetweenSCRAMCONDITIONPRESENTANDREACTORPOWERABOVEAPRMDOWNSCALEORUNKNOWNandthefollowing:295037EK2.05CRDhydraulicsystem10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:40of22008September2015 ID:R18Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:BANK:EQOP3150001004Theplantisoperatingatfullpower.Subsequentlythefollowingconditionsoccur:*MainSteamlineRadiationMonitorsA,B,C,andDallindicate3,700mr/hr*OffGasRadiationMonitorindicates800mr/hrincreasing*RBHVACRadiationMonitorindicates11,000cpmWhatistheexpectedplantresponse?A.ReactorScramandaGroup1Isolation.B.RBHVACSystemIsolationandSGTSInitiation.C.MSIVIsolation,ReactorScramandOffGasIsolation.D.ReactorScram,RBHVACSystemIsolation,andSGTSInitiation.Answer:AILO2015WrittenPage:41of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:ReactorScramandaGroup1IsolationbasedonARP3D82DistracterExplanation:Distactersareincorrectandplausiblebasedonknowsetpointslistin3D32,3D82,&3D12ReferenceInformation:3D82(pg1&2)AutoactionsandsetpointsPlantProcedures03D08203D01203D032NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295038EK3KnowledgeofthereasonsforthefollowingresponsesastheyapplytoHIGHOFF-SITERELEASERATE:295038EK3.02Systemisolations10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(5)Facilityoperatingcharacteristicsduringsteadystateandtransientconditions,includingcoolantchemistry,causesandeffectsoftemperature,pressureandreactivitychanges,effectsofloadchanges,andoperatinglimitationsandreasonsfortheseoperatingcharacteristics.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:42of22008September2015 ID:R19Points:1.00Difficulty:2.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:NEWEDG11isrunningafteralossofpowerevent.AfiresubsequentlyoccursintheEDG11EngineRoom,andtheCO2Systemhasautomaticallyactuated.EDG11is(1)andtheventilationsystem(2).A.(1)running(2)fansanddampersarealignedtoventtheEDG11EngineroomB.(1)tripped(2)fanswillshutdown,anddamperswillisolatetheEngineroomC.(1)tripped(2)fansanddampersarealignedtoventtheEDG11EngineroomD.(1)running(2)fanswillshutdown,anddamperswillisolatetheEngineroomAnswer:DILO2015WrittenPage:43of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:TheCO2acutationisnotanessentialtripfortherunningEDG.TheRHRComplexisprotectedwithWet-pipeSprinkler,StandpipeHoseStation,andCO2FireSuppressionSystems.AfterCO2dischargesintoanEDGroom,theassociatedventilationsystemfanswillshutdown,anddamperswillisolatetheaffectedroom.DistracterExplanation:Alldistractersareplausibleiftheexamineedoesnotcompletelyunderstandtheinterlocksassociatedwithfanoperation.A.IsincorrectbecausethefansanddamperswillnotaligntoventtheEngineroomB.IsincorrectbecausetheEDGwillnottrip.C.IsincorrectbecausetheEDGwilnottriporfansanddampersalign.ReferenceInformation:23.30723.501.02PlantProcedures23.501.0223.307NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2600000AA1.Abilitytooperateand/ormonitorthefollowingastheyapplytoPLANTFIREONSITE:600000AA1.05Plantandcontrolroomventilationsystems.10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(10)Administrative,normal,abnormal,andemergencyoperatingproceduresforthefacility.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:44of22008September2015 ID:R20Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:BANK:315-0028-A020-001FollowingaGridDisturbance,conditionsareasfollows:GeneratorPower1200MweReactivePower360MVAR(LAG)GeneratorHydrogenPressure75psigTheSystemDispatcherhasrequestedadditionalreactiveloadsupporttomaintaingridvoltage.ConsideringtheattachedCapabliltyCurve,whichONEofthefollwingactionsisrequired?A.RAISERecirculationFlowtoincreasetheReactiveLoadontheGenerator.B.LOWERRecirculationFlow,becauseGeneratorLoadlimitshavebeenexceeded.C.MANUALLYRAISEtheVoltageRegulatorsettingtoincreasetheReactiveLoadontheGenerator.D.MANUALLYLOWERtheVoltageRegulatorsetting,becauseReactiveLoadlimitshaveBeenexceeded.Answer:CILO2015WrittenPage:45of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:RAISINGtheVoltageRegulatorsettinginMANUALwillincreasetheReactiveLoadontheGenerator.Isplausible;willraiseGeneratorPower.A.B.Isplausible;possiblemisconceptionregarding60psigHydrogenCurve.LoadLimitsareexceededat60psig.D.Isplausible;possiblemisconceptionregarding60psigHydrogenCurve.LoadLimitsareexceededat60psig.PlantProcedures23.118NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2700000AA2.013.5/3.6Operatingpointonthegeneratorcapabilitycurve700000AA2.Abilitytodetermineand/orinterpretthefollowingastheyapplytoGENERATORVOLTAGEANDELECTRICGRIDDISTURBANCES:NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2012AuditExamILO2015WrittenPage:46of22008September2015 ID:R21Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:NEW-CONTRACTWithReactorPowerstartingat100%,atwhichofthefollowingpointswillthefirstDIRECTEDpowerreductionoccurduringaLossofMainCondenserVacuumevent?A.CondenserVacuuminitiallystartslowering.B.InitialcrewactionsfailtostabilizeCondenserVacuumbetween0.7-2.5psia.C.CondenserVacuumreaches2.8psia.D.CondenserVacuumreaches3.68psia.Answer:BILO2015WrittenPage:47of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:Thefirstpowerreductionoccurs,duetothecrewperformingaRapidPowerReductiontotrytostabilizeCondenserVacuum,whenthecrew'sinitialactionswereunabletostabilizeCondenserVacuumbetween0.7to2.5psia.DistracterExplanation:A.AnswerisincorrectandplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldincorrectlyinterprettheAOPsymptomof'MainGeneratorMWdecreasing'asmeaningReactorPowerwouldbedecreasing.TheexamineecouldalsoincorrectlychoosethisresponseifitisassumedthataRapidPowerReductionisrequiredimmediatelyuponthestartofaloweringCondenserVacuumevent.C.AnswerisincorrectandplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldfailtorecognizetheneedtoperformaRapidPowerReductionandinsteadassumethatthefirstpowerreductionwouldoccurwhentheAOPOverrideconditionof2.8psiawasmetrequiringthecrewtoplacetheModeSwitchinShutdown.D.AnswerisincorrectandplausiblebecausetheexamineebecausetheexamineecouldfailtorecognizetheneedtoperformaRapidPowerReductionandinsteadassumethatthefirstpowerreductionwouldoccurwhentheMainTurbineTripsetpointof3.68psiawasreached,whichwouldcauseaReactorScramduetopowerbeingabove30%.ReferenceInformation:20.125.01(pg3)CONDITIONBPlantProcedures20.125.01NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295002AA2.Abilitytodetermineand/orinterpretthefollowingastheyapplytoLOSSOFMAINCONDENSERVACUUM:295002AA2.01Condenservacuum/absolutepressure.10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(10)Administrative,normal,abnormal,andemergencyoperatingproceduresforthefacility.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:48of22008September2015 ID:R22Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEW-CONTRACTConsidereachofthetransientslistedbelow:*A-ReactorPressurerises90psiabovethenormalpressureregulatorsetpoint,thenlowers.*B-ReactorPressurerisestotheReactorPressureScramsetpoint,thenlowers.*C-ReactorPressurerises100psiabovethehighestSRVsafetysetpoint,thenlowers.*D-ReactorPressurerises175psiabovethehighestSRVsafetysetpoint,thenlowers.*E-ReactorPressurerises225psiabovethehighestSRVsafetysetpoint,thenlowers.BasedontheHIGHESTReactorPressureencounteredduringeachevent,whichofthesetransientswouldhaveresultedintheplantNOTbeingincompliancewith(1)LCO3.4.1.1,ReactorSteamDomePressure,and/or(2)SL2.1.2,ReactorCoolantSystemPressureSafetyLimit?A.(1)ALLofthelistedtransients(2)TransientsDandEonlyB.(1)TransientsBthroughEonly(2)TransientsDandEonlyC.(1)ALLofthelistedtransients(2)TransientsCthroughEonlyD.(1)TransientsBthroughEonly(2)TransientsCthroughEonlyAnswer:BILO2015WrittenPage:49of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:Bycalculation,themaximumpressuresencounteredforeachofthetransientsisasfollows:*A-90psiabovethenormalpressureregulatorsetpoint(944-949psig)is1034-1039psig.*B-TheReactorPressureScramsetpointis1093psig.*C-100psiabovethehighestSRVsafetysetpoint(1155psig)is1255psig.*D-175psiabovethehighestSRVsafetysetpointis1330psig.*E-225psiabovethehighestSRVsafetysetpointis1380psig.(1)LCO3.4.1.1pressureis1045psig,and(2)SL2.1.2pressureis1325psig.OnlytransientAresultsinpressure<(1),andalloftheothertransientsare>(1).TransientsDandEwouldresultinexceeding(2).DistracterExplanation:A.Answerisplausibleandincorrectbecausetheexamineecouldincorrectlydeterminethat100#abovethepressureregulatorsetpointwouldresultinexceeding1045psig.C.Answerisplausibleandincorrectbecausetheexamineecouldincorrectlydeterminethat100#abovethepressureregulatorsetpointwouldresultinexceeding1045psigand/ortheexamineecouldincorrectlydeterminethat,sincetransientCresultedinexceeding1250psig,whichisthedesignpressureoftheRPVsuctionpiping,thattheReactorPressureSafetyLimitwasexceededwhichisacommonmisconception.However,theSLisbasedonnotexceeding110%ofthispressure.D.Answerisplausibleandincorrectbecausetheexamineecouldincorrectlydeterminethat,sincetransientCresultedinexceeding1250psig,whichisthedesignpressureoftheRPVsuctionpiping,thattheReactorPressureSafetyLimitwasexceededwhichisacommonmisconception.However,theSLisbasedonnotexceeding110%ofthispressure.ReferenceInformation:S.L.2.1T.S.3.4.11NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.2.22Knowledgeoflimitingconditionsforoperationsandsafetylimits295007HighReactorPressureTechnicalSpecifications2.1SAFETYLIMITS(SLs)3.4.11ReactorSteamDomePressure10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(5)Facilityoperatingcharacteristicsduringsteadystateandtransientconditions,includingcoolantchemistry,causesandeffectsoftemperature,pressureandreactivitychanges,effectsofloadchanges,andoperatinglimitationsandreasonsfortheseoperatingcharacteristics.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:50of22008September2015 ID:R23Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEW-CONTRACTTheplanthasexperiencedasteamleakintheDrywellduringoperationatratedpower.Thefollowingconditionscurrentlyexist:RPVwaterlevel197inchesRPVpressure800psigandloweringReactorpowerloweringontheSRMsTorusWaterTemperature98°FDrywellTemperature240°FDrywellPressure8.7psigTorusWaterLevel0.8inchesWhatisthebasisforplacingTorusSpraysinservicefortheseplantconditions?A.Toincreasethescrubbingactionofthesuppressionpoolwhileactionstoventprimarycontainmentaretakingplace.B.Tocooltheenclosedtorusairspacebyabsorbingheatenergythroughtheprocessofevaporativeandconvectivecooling.C.TolowerDrywellPressurebacktowithinthelimitsoftheDrywellSprayInitiationLimitcurvesothatactionscanbetakentospraytheDrywell.D.Toeffectthedesiredcontainmentpressurereductionnecessarytodrawnon-condensablegassesintotheTorusairspaceasameansofpreventingchugging.Answer:BILO2015WrittenPage:51of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:Thebasisfortheactiontospraythetorusistoeffectthedesiredpressuredropthroughcoolingofthetorusairspacebyabsorbingheatenergyfromtheenclosedatmospherethroughtheprocessofevaporativeandconvectivecooling.TorusspraysareinitiatedforthepurposeofreducingPrimaryContainmentPressureandTemperaturethusincreasingdrywellcooling.ThisisthebasisfortheactionsofEOPStepsPCP-4andPCP-5.A.IsplausibleandincorrectbecausethecandidatecouldcorrectlyrecallthatthePrimaryContainmentispreferentiallyventedfromthetorustotakeadvantageofsuppressionpoolscrubbingforminimizingtheamountofradioactivityreleased.ThecandidatecouldincorrectlyconcludethattheactiontospraythetorusistoincreasethisscrubbingactionforcontainmentventingwhichoccurslaterinthesameEOPparametercontrollegatstepPCP-13.C.IsplausibleandincorrectbecausetheexamineecouldcorrectlyrecallthatDrywellPressuremustbewithinthelimitsoftheDWSILinordertospraytheDrywellasdirectedfurtherdownthesameEOPparametercontrollegatstepPCP-8.TheexamineecouldincorrectlydeterminethatsprayingoftheTorusatstepPCP-5isperformedinordertoensurethatDrywellPressureiswithinthelimitsoftheDWSILwhenstepPCP-8isreached.D.Isplausibleandincorrectbecausethecandidatecouldincorrectlydeterminethatmaintainingnon-condensablegassesintheTorusairspaceiswhatpreventsthephenomenonofchuggingintheMarkIcontainment.ThecandidatecouldincorrectlyconcludethattheBeforestatementofstepPCP-4(BeforeToruspressurereaches9psig)ismeanttolowerToruspressureandthereforedrawnon-condensablegassesbackintotheTorustopreventchuggingfromoccurring,whichisacommonareaofconfusionforlicensedoperatorcandidates.ReferenceInformation:BWROGEPGAPPB(pgB-7-35TO37)PCP-4andPCP-5PlantProcedures29.100.01SH2BWROGEPGAppBNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295010AK3KnowledgeofthereasonsforthefollowingresponsesastheyapplytoHIGHDRYWELLPRESSURE:295010AK3.02Increaseddrywellcooling.10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(5)Facilityoperatingcharacteristicsduringsteadystateandtransientconditions,includingcoolantchemistry,causesandeffectsoftemperature,pressureandreactivitychanges,effectsofloadchanges,andoperatinglimitationsandreasonsfortheseoperatingcharacteristics.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:52of22008September2015 ID:R24Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:BANK:ID:41788Operationsisperformingareactorstartupfromcoldshutdown.Thereactoriscriticalwitha120secondperiod.TheOperatorwithdrawlsthenextcontrolrodfromposition08to10whichresultsinasustained20secondperiod.WhichoneofthefollowingdescribesthenextOperatoractionrequiredtobetaken?A.MonitoroverlapdatabetweenSRMsandIRMsandrangeIRMsasnecessary.B.PositionSRMdetectorsasnecessarytomaintaincountratebetween102and105cps.C.InformtheReactorEngineerofthepowerrise,andinserttheControlRodasfarasnecessarytoturnpower.D.InserttheControlRodbacktoposition08toobtainareactorperiodof>50secondsandnotifySMandStationNuclearEngineer.Answer:DILO2015WrittenPage:53of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:Therodwithdrawalhascausedasustained20secondperiodthatwouldresultin3D51SRMPERIODSHORTalarm.Thealarmresponseprocedurerequirestheoperatortoinsertcontrolrodstoturnpowerascension,andnotifytheSMandSNE.DistracterInformation:A.ThisanswerisplausibleandincorrectiftheexamineeweretoincorrectlyassumethattheSRM/IRMoverlapverificationisrequiredpriortoremovingSRMs.B.ThisanswerisplausibleandincorrectiftheexamineeincorrectlyassumestheperiodshortalarmiscausedbythepositionoftheSRMsdetectors.ThisactioniswarrantedbytheperiodshortalarmARPbutpriortyisgiventorodinsertion.C.ThisanswerisplausibleandincorrectbecausethefirstoperatoractionwouldbetoinsertthecontrolrodasopposedtoinformtheReactorEngineer.TheoperatorwouldalsonotbeabletoinsertthecontrolrodasfarasnecessarybecauseoftheRWMpreventingtherodfrominsertingpastposition8.ReferenceInformation:ARP3D51(pg1)SRMPERIODSHORTPilgrimReactivityEventPlantProcedures03D051NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295014AA1.Abilitytooperateand/ormonitorthefollowingastheyapplytoINADVERTENTREACTIVITYADDITION:295014AA1.03RMCS:Plant-Specific.10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:54of22008September2015 ID:R25Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEW-CONTRACTForwhichofthefollowingconditionswouldusingtheEmergencyInmodeofcontrolrodinsertionbeauthorizedwithoutadditionalShiftManagerconcurrence?A.ToinsertaControlRodinanattempttorecoupletherodafterbecominguncoupled.B.FollowingascramwheremultiplerodsfailedtofullyinsertandReactorPowerwas10%ontheAPRMsandsteady.C.FollowingascramwhereseveralrodsfailedtofullyinsertandReactorPowerwasonRange5oftheIRMsandlowering.D.Whenrestoringoperationoutsideofthe"Exit"RegionofthePowertoFlowmapfollowingatripofaReactorRecirculationPumpwiththeOPRMInoperable.Answer:BILO2015WrittenPage:55of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:TheindicationsprovidedareindicativeofaFailuretoScramconditionwherethereactorwasstillintheheatingrange,withpowerabovetheAPRMdownscalesetpointof3%,whichrequiresperformanceofactionspertheQlegof29.100.01,Sheet1A,RPVControl-ATWS.Theconditionsgivenwouldauthorizeuseof29.ESP.03,AlternateControlRodInsertionMethods,whichwouldthenauthorizeinsertingthecontrolrodsusingtheEmergencyInmodeofrodinsertion.DistracterExplanation:A.IsplausibleandincorrectbecausethecandidatecouldrecognizethatattemptingtorecoupleacontrolrodtoitsmechanismrequiresinsertingthecontrolrodandincorrectlydeterminethatthemethodusedtoperformthisrodinsertionrequirestheuseoftheEmergencyInMode.C.IsplausibleandincorrectbecausetheexamineecouldincorrectlydeterminethattheEmergencyInModeofRodInsertionisexplicitlyallowedforthisconditionwithoutrecognizingthattherodinsertionwouldNOTbeinaccordancewiththeQlegoftheEOPsandinsteadwouldbedirectedbytheScramAOP(duetopowerbeing<3%).ThecandidatecouldfailtorecognizethatrodinsertionpertheScramAOPisconductedusingthenormalmethodof23.623andonlyperESP29.ESP.03withconcurrenceoftheShiftManager.D.IsplausibleandincorrectbecausethecandidatecouldrecognizethatoperatingintheExitregionofthepowertoflowmap,withtheOPRMInoperable,requirescontrolrodinsertiontorestoreoperationoutsideoftheExitregion.ThecandidatecouldincorrectlyconcludethatthemethodofcontrolrodinsertionwouldrequireuseofEmergencyIninaccordancewiththeEmergencyPowerReductionsectionof23.623withoutrealizingthatthecorrectsectiontousewouldbeforaRapidPowerReductionthatonlyauthorizesuseoftheNormalInmodeofrodinsertion.ReferenceInformation:29.100.01SH129.100.01SH1A29.ESP.03PlantProcedures23.62329.100.01SH1A29.ESP.0320.106.02NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295015AK2.KnowledgeoftheinterrelationsbetweenINCOMPLETESCRAMandthefollowing:295015AK2.02RMCS:Plant-Specific10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:56of22008September2015 ILO2015WrittenPage:57of22008September2015 ID:R26Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEWAconditionhasresultedintheSpentFuelStoragePoolWaterLevelbeing1footlowoutofband.TherearenofuelmovementsoractivtiesongoingintheFuelPool.AnLCOentryisrequired,andthere__(1)__animmediateconcernforpersonnelonthe5thflooroftheReactorBuildingbecausethelevelrequirementisbasedon__(2)__.A.(1)IS(2)shieldinggammathatisproducedfromdecayinanirradiatedfuelassembly,whiletheassemblyisbeingmovedabovetheReactorCoreB.(1)ISNOT(2)absorbingiodinegasesbeforetheyarereleasedtothesecondarycontainmentduetoafuelhandlingaccidentabovetheReactorCoreC.(1)IS(2)shieldingneutronsthatareproducedfromdecayinanirradiatedfuelassembly,whiletheassemblyisbeingmovedabovethefuelracksinSpentFuelStoragePoolD.(1)ISNOT(2)absorbingkryptongasesbeforetheyarereleasedtothesecondarycontainmentduetoafuelhandlingaccidentabovetheSpentFuelStoragePoolAnswer:BILO2015WrittenPage:58of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:LCO3.7.7StatesthatThespentfuelstoragepoolwaterlevelshallbe>22ftoverthetopofirradiatedfuelassembliesseatedinthespentfuelstoragepoolracks.thisrequireperCONDITIONASpentfuelstoragepoolwaterlevelnotwithinlimit,immediatelysuspendmovementofirradiatedfuelassembliesinthespentfuelstoragepool.ThebasesstatthatthisisbasedonabsorbingiodinegasesbeforetheyarereleasedtothesecondarycontainmentduetoafuelhandlingaccidentabovetheReactorCore.DistracterExplanation:A.Thisanswerisplausibleandincorrect.TheexamineewouldchoosethisansweriftheythoughttheSpentfuelpoolwaterwasmeanttoshieldgamma.C.Thisanswerisplausibleandincorrect.TheexamineewouldchoosethisansweriftheythoughttheSpentfuelpoolwaterwasmeanttoshieldneutrons.D.Thisanswerisplausibleandincorrect.TheexamineewouldchoosethisansweriftheythoughttheaccidentsanalyzedforweredoneovertheSFPratherthanthecoreandthegasofconcernwaskrypton.ReferenceInformation:ForthisquestiontheT.S.B.isusedasareferenceforsysteminformationthatistaughtinthesystemscourseunderlessonplanLP-315-0115pertrainingobjectiveC013:C013.DescribetheFuelPoolCoolingandCleanupsystemtechnicalspecificationlimitingconditionsforoperation,theirbases,theassociatedsurveillancerequirement(s),andtheirrelationshiptooperability.T.S.3.7.7andBASESILO2015WrittenPage:59of22008September2015 NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295033EK1.KnowledgeoftheoperationalimplicationsofthefollowingconceptsastheyapplytoHIGHSECONDARYCONTAINMENTAREARADIATIONLEVELS:295033EK1.02PersonnelprotectionTechnicalSpecifications3.7.7SpentFuelStoragePoolWaterLevel10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(9)Shielding,isolation,andcontainmentdesignfeatures,includingaccesslimitations.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:60of22008September2015 ID:R27Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEWAnRHRPumpisoperatinginShutdownCoolingandthePrimaryContainmentisdeinertedwhenanexplosionseverelydamagesequipmentinthePrimaryContainment.Severalhourslater,theplanthasbeenstabilized.*CHRRMShasbeenslowingincreasingandiscurrentlyreading1041R/hr.*PrimaryContainmentH2concentrationhasbeenslowlyincreasingandiscurrentlyreading2%.*RBHVACisshutdown,andDiv1SGTSisinservice.*Aradioactivereleaseisinprogress,butthereiscurrentlynodetectablechangeindoseatthesiteboundary.WhichofthefollowingprocedureswouldbeusedtopreservePrimaryContainmentIntegrity?A.29.100.01Sheet2,PrimaryContainmentControlB.20.000.02,AbnormalReleaseOfRadioactiveMaterialC.23.406,PrimaryContainmentNitrogenInertingAndPurgeSystemD.29.ESP.06,PrimaryContainmentVentingAndPurgeForHydrogenAndOxygenControlAnswer:AILO2015WrittenPage:61of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:EntryConditionfor29.100.01Sheet2isH2>1%.DistracterExplanation:B.IsplausibleandincorrectbecausetheexamineethinksthatanAOPdealingwiththereleaseistheonlywaytodealwiththedegradationofprimarycontainment.C.IsplausibleandincorrectbecausetheexamineethinkstheSOPcanbeusetopurgeH2andthereforehelppreservePrimaryContainment.D.IsplausibleandincorrectbecausethisistheESPthattheEOPswoulddirectifventingwereallowed,butforthiscondition,ventingforH2controlisnotallowed.ReferenceInformation:29.100.01Sheet2-EntryconditionsPlantProcedures29.100.01SH2NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2500000EK1.KnowledgeoftheoperationalimplicationsofthefollowingconceptsastheyapplytoHIGHCONTAINMENTHYDROGENCONCENTRATIONS:500000EK1.01Containmentintegrity10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(8)Components,capacity,andfunctionsofemergencysystems.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:62of22008September2015 ID:R28Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEW-CONTRACTTheplantwasoperatingat100%powerwhenasmallprimarycoolantleakraiseddrywellpressureto2.2psig.Allsystemsoperatedasdesigned.Thefollowingconditionsexistwhentheplantisinitiallystabilized:*RPVlevelis195inchesbeingmaintainedusingRCIC.*RPVpressureis900psig.*Division1RHRisinTorusCoolingModeusing'A'RHRpump;'A'RHRCMCswitchisinRUN.*A'RHRPumpMANUALOVERRIDEwhitelightisilluminated.*AllotherRHRPumpsarerunningwithCMCswitchesinAUTO.Alossofoffsitepowerthenoccurs.SelecttheresponsethatdescribestheoperationoftheRHRpumpsastheEDGsautomaticallyloadwithNOoperatoraction.A.AllRHRpumpsstartimmediatelywhentheirrespectiveEDG'soutputbreakercloses.B.AllRHRpumpsstart5secondsaftertheirrespectiveEDG'soutputbreakercloses.C.RHRpumps'B','C',and'D'startimmediatelywhentheirrespectiveEDG'soutputbreakercloses.'A'RHRpumpisstopped.D.RHRpumps'B','C',and'D'start5secondsaftertheirrespectiveEDG'soutputbreakercloses.'A'RHRpumpisstopped.Answer:AILO2015WrittenPage:63of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:ThedesignoftheEDGloadsequencerstartsRHRpumpsimmediatelywithnotimedelay.Also,theARHRpumpCMCinRUNwillnotpreventthepumpfromrestartingafterhavingbeentakenoutofAUTOduringandECCSinitiation.IftheCMCwasreturnedtoAUTOafterbeingtakenoutofAUTOaftertheECCSinitiationsignalwaspresentthepumpwouldremainOFF.DistracterExplanation:B.Isincorrectandplausible.TheexamineecouldincorrectlyidentifythattheRHRpumpshaveatimeddelayforstartingasmanycomponentsinitiatedbytheEDGloadsequencerhaveassociatedtimedelays.C.Isincorrectandplausible.TheexamineecouldconfusetheMANUALOVERRIDEcircuitasbeingapplicableintheAUTOandRUNpositionsoftheCMCswitchsincethelightisilluminatedwiththeCMCinRUNwithanECCSinitiationsignalpresent.IftheCMCwasreturnedtoAUTOafterbeingtakenoutofAUTOaftertheECCSinitiationsignalwaspresentthepumpwouldremainOFF.D.Isincorrectandplausible.TheexamineecouldincorrectlyidentifythattheRHRpumpshaveatimeddelayforstartingasmanycomponentsinitiatedbytheEDGloadsequencerhaveassociatedtimedelays.TheexamineecouldconfusetheMANUALOVERRIDEcircuitasbeingapplicableintheAUTOandRUNpositionsoftheCMCswitchsincethelightisilluminatedwiththeCMCinRUNwithanECCSinitiationsignalpresent.IftheCMCwasreturnedtoAUTOafterbeingtakenoutofAUTOaftertheECCSinitiationsignalwaspresentthepumpwouldremainOFF.ReferenceInformation:I-2714-24EDGAUTOLOADSEQ(H-2)RHRisbeforestep1SOstartattime0.(drawingindevelopmentfolder)I-2201-01RHRPUMPAELECTRICALSCHEMATIC(E-3thruH-3)52XXandK9AandXK-33(drawingindevelopmentfolder)PlantProcedures23.205NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2203000RHR/LPCI:InjectionMode203000K4.KnowledgeofRHR/LPCI:INJECTIONMODE(PLANTSPECIFIC)designfeature(s)and/orinterlockswhichprovideforthefollowing:203000K4.07EmergencygeneratorloadsequencingNRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:64of22008September2015 ID:R29Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:BANK315-0141-A021-029Theplantisshutdownandthefollowingconditionsexist:*BOTHRecircPumpsaresecured.*ShutdownCoolingisbeingprovidedbyRHRLoopA.*ReactorCoolantSystemTemperatureis170°F,withacooldowninprogress.*RPVWaterLevelLOWEREDto190inchesontheNarrowRangeLevelindicators.RPVWaterLevelisaconcernbecauseitis__________________________.A.toolowtopreventRHRPumpcavitation.B.toolowtopreventRPVthermalstratification.C.lowenoughtogenerateaLowRPVLevelscramsignal.D.lowenoughtogenerateaRHRShutdownCoolingIsolationsignal.Answer:BILO2015WrittenPage:65of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:Per23.2053.2.2DuringNon-ATWS,RHRSDCModeoperation,reactorwaterlevelmustbemaintainedabove220inchestopreventtemperaturestratification.DuringATWS,RPVleveliscontrolledperEOPs.DistracterInformation:A.IsplausibleandincorrectbecauseRWLinthiscaseprovidesheadtotheRHRpump.C.IsplausibleandincorrectbecausethereisalowRPVlevelscramD.IsplausibleandincorrectbecausethereisalowRPVlevelIsolationforSDC.ReferenceInformation:23.205(pg10)P&L3.2.2PlantProcedures23.205NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2205000K5.KnowledgeoftheoperationalimplicationsofthefollowingconceptsastheyapplytoSHUTDOWNCOOLINGSYSTEM(RHRSHUTDOWNCOOLINGMODE):205000K5.03Heatremovalmechanisms10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(10)Administrative,normal,abnormal,andemergencyoperatingproceduresforthefacility.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:66of22008September2015 ID:R30Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:NEW-CONTRACTWiththeplantoperatingatfullpower,afailureoftheCSTlevelinstrumentationhascausedHPCIsuctiontoswaptotheTorus.HPCIshouldbeconsideredINOPERABLEif___________________________________.A.thisconditionismaintainedformorethan12hoursB.thisconditionismaintainedformorethan24hoursC.KeepFillisalsolostinthisconditionformorethan12hoursD.KeepFillisalsolostinthisconditionformorethan24hoursAnswer:CILO2015WrittenPage:67of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:TheSOPhasaP&LthatrequiresthatffalignedtotheTorusinstandbyformorethantwelveconsecutivehourswithoutHPCIKeepFillSysteminoperation,HPCIshouldbeconsideredINOPERABLE,duetopotentialdraindownofsystempiping.DistracterExplanation:A.IsplausiblesinceHPCIisnotalignedtoitsnormalsuctionsource,theCST.Theexamineecouldfailtorecognizethatthetransientandaccidentanalyses,whichtakecreditforHPCI,assumethattheHPCIsuctionsourceisthesuppressionpool.B.IsincorrectbutplausiblebecausetheHPCIsystempipingcouldbecomedrainedifitremainedalignedtotheTorusformorethan24hours,requiringittobedeclaredINOPERABLE.D.IsplausiblebecausethecombinationofHPCIsuctionbeingalignedtotheToruswithalossofKeepFillformorethan24hourswouldcauseHPCItobeINOPERABLE,butHPCIisINOPERABLEatmorethan12hours.ReferenceInformation:23.202(pg7)P&L3.19PlantProcedures23.202NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2206000K6.KnowledgeoftheeffectthatalossormalfunctionofthefollowingwillhaveontheHIGHPRESSURECOOLANTINJECTIONSYSTEM:206000K6.09Condensatestorageandtransfersystem:BWR-2,3,4TechnicalSpecifications3.3.5.1EmergencyCoreCoolingSystem(ECCS)Instrumentation10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:68of22008September2015 ID:R31Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:BANK:315-0140-B003-001ALOCAsignalfromDiv1CSLogicisreceivedwhileDIV1CoreSprayisoperatinginTESTMode.HowwilltheCoreSpraySystemrespond?A.Div1CoreSpraywilltrip.Div2CoreSpraywilllineuptoinject.B.Div1and2CoreSpraywilllineuptoinject.Thetestvalvewillclose.C.Div1CoreSpraywillremainrunningintheTESTmode.Div2CoreSpraywilllineuptoinject.D.Div1CoreSpraywillremainrunningintheTESTmode.Div2CoreSpraywillremaininStandby.Answer:BILO2015WrittenPage:69of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:ALOCAsignalfromeitherCSLogicwillautostartbothdivisionsofCoreSpray.Per23.203,Section5.5,AutoInitiationDiv1,"IfDiv1CoreSprayisintheTestModewhenanautomaticinitiationsignalisreceived,E2150-F015A,Div1CSTestLineIsoVlv,willcloseasthesystemalignsforinjectiontotheReactorVessel."DistracterExplanation:A.Isincorrectandplausibleifexamineeincorrectlyassumesthatsystemlineupwouldcauseatripconditionwhenaninjectionsignaloccurs.C.Isincorrectandplausibleifexamineedidnotknowabouttheautoclosure.D.IsincorectandplausibleiftheexamineefeltthataLOCAsignalfromonlyDiv1CSLogicdoesnotprovideasystemstartsignal.ReferenceInformation:23.203Section5.5(pg22)NOTEPlantProcedures23.203NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2209001A1.Abilitytopredictand/ormonitorchangesinparametersassociatedwithoperatingtheLOWPRESSURECORESPRAYSYSTEMcontrolsincluding:209001A1.08Systemlineup10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(5)Facilityoperatingcharacteristicsduringsteadystateandtransientconditions,includingcoolantchemistry,causesandeffectsoftemperature,pressureandreactivitychanges,effectsofloadchanges,andoperatinglimitationsandreasonsfortheseoperatingcharacteristics.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:70of22008September2015 ID:R32Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:BANK:315-0114-C010-006TheSLCInitiationKeylockSwitch,C4100-M004,hasbeenplacedinthePMPARUNposition.Thefollowingindicationsarenoted30secondslater:*ReactorPressureis1000psig.*C41-R601,SLCTankLevelIndicator,issteady.*SLCContinuityLightsAandBareON.*SLCPumpACMCSwitchredlightisON,andgreenlightisOFF.*C41-R600,SLCPumpDischargePressureIndicator,isoscillatingbetween1320and1370psig.Theseareindicationsof(1)whatcondition,and(2)whatactionshouldtheoperatorperform?A.(1)SLCExplosiveValvesfailedtofire.(2)StartSLCPumpB.B.(1)NormaloperationfortheSLCSystem.(2)MonitorSLCTanklevel.C.(1)C41-F001,SLCStorageTankOutletValveisclosed.(2)DispatchanoperatortoopenC41-F001.D.(1)C41-F029A,SLCPumpADischargeReliefValvefailedopen.(2)DispatchanoperatortogagshutC41-F029A.Answer:AILO2015WrittenPage:71of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:IftheC41-F004A&B,failedtofire,positivedisplacementSLCPumpAwillOPENC41-F029A,SLCPumpADischargeReliefValve,whichcausespressureoscillationsbetween1320and1370psig.ThesearetheliftandreseatpressuresforC41-F029A.StartingSLCPumpBwillfiretheotherprimerinbothvalves.DistracterExplanation:B.Isincorrectandplausible,normalIndicationwouldbedischargepressureslightlyhigherthanReactorPressureANDloweringSLCTankLevel.C.Isincorrectandplausible,theTankLevelwouldremainsteadyiftheStorageTankOutletwereshut,butdischargepressurewouldbelow.D.Isincorrectandplausible,ReliefValvehasopened,buthasnotfailed.ReferenceInformation:SOP23.139(Pg11&12)SLCinjectionPlantProcedures23.139NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2211000A2.Abilityto(a)predicttheimpactsofthefollowingontheSTANDBYLIQUIDCONTROLSYSTEM;and(b)basedonthosepredictions,useprocedurestocorrect,control,ormitigatetheconsequencesofthoseabnormalconditionsoroperations:211000A2.06Valveopenings10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(5)Facilityoperatingcharacteristicsduringsteadystateandtransientconditions,includingcoolantchemistry,causesandeffectsoftemperature,pressureandreactivitychanges,effectsofloadchanges,andoperatinglimitationsandreasonsfortheseoperatingcharacteristics.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:72of22008September2015 ID:R33Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:MODIFIED:315-0127-C010-001TheplantisshutdowninarefuelingoutagewithundervesselworkinprogressonSRMBdetector.Therestorationsequenceofthe"ModeSwitchinRefuelandOneRod-OutInterlockVerification"surveillanceisinprogress.TheReactorModeSwitchisplacedinSHUTDOWN.TheScramResetSwitchisthenturnedtotheGP1/4ANDGP2/3positions,andreleased.Aboutoneminutelater,anautomaticscramsignalisreceived.AllRPVandContainmentparametersremainconstantthroughouttheevent.Assumingnootheroperatoractionswereperformed,whichofthefollowingexplainsthecauseoftheSECONDscram?A.Alarm3D51,SRMPERIODSHORT,wasreceivedduetomovingtheSRMdetector.B.Alarm3D56,TESTABILITYLOGICA/BRPS/PWRFAILURE,wasreceivedduetoablownfuseinRPSCabinetH21-P085.C.Alarm3D86,MNSTMLINEISOVALVECLOSURECHANNELTRIP,wasreceivedduetoanupscalefailureofaMainSteamLineFlowinstrument.D.Alarm3D94,DISCHWATERVOLHILEVELCHANNELTRIP,wasreceivedduetotheSDVHighLevelChannelTripnotbeingbypassedbeforethefirstscramwasreset.Answer:DILO2015WrittenPage:73of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:SDVHighLevelwillinitiateasecondautomaticreactorscramunderthegivenconditions.ThisquestionisbasedonOEatFermi(LER96-021-00)involvingfailuretobypasstheSDVHighLevelchanneltrippriortoresetingascram.DistacterExplanation:A.Isplausibleandincorrect;thisalarmcouldbeexpectedduringSRMinsertion,butisONLYanalarm.B.Isplausibleandincorrect;RPSpowerfaillureinanRPScabinetcouldcauseanalarm,butnotascram.C.Isplausibleandincorrect;buttheMSIVClosureTripisbypassedwiththeReactorModeSwitchinSHUTDOWN.ReferenceInformation:ARP3D94SOP23.610pg10&11LER96-021PlantProcedures23.61003D094OperatingExperienceLER96-021FermiAutoScramonSDVduringShutdownNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2212000A3.AbilitytomonitorautomaticoperationsoftheREACTORPROTECTIONSYSTEMincluding:212000A3.05SCRAMinstrumentvolumelevel10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:74of22008September2015 ID:R34Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEW-CONTRACTAreactorstartupisinprogressinaccordancewith22.000.02,PlantStartupto25%Power.Reactorpoweris7%asindicatedontheAveragePowerRangeMonitors(APRMs).Sourcerangedetectorshavebeenwithdrawn.Intermediaterangedetectorsarebeingwithdrawn.Intermediaterangemonitors(IRM)A,B,C,andDindicate20onrange9.IRMsE,F,G,andHindicate30onrange10.DuringwithdrawalofIRMF,theretractpermitlogicmalfunctionsandtheRETRACTPERMITlightextinguishes.Basedontheseconditions,whichofthefollowingdescribestheIRMsystemandrelatedsystemresponse?A.IRMFstopsretracting,and3D113,CONTROLRODWITHDRAWALBLOCK,alarms.B.IRMFstopsretracting,and3D60,IRMCHB/F/D/HUPSCALETRIP/INOP,alarmscausingahalfscram.C.IRMFcontinuestoretract,and3D113,CONTROLRODWITHDRAWALBLOCK,alarms.D.IRMFcontinuestoretract,and3D60,IRMCHB/F/D/HUPSCALETRIP/INOP,alarmscausingahalfscram.Answer:CILO2015WrittenPage:75of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:TheIRMRETRACTPERMITlightshouldbeonwhentheModeSwitchisplacedinRUN.Inaccordancewithprocedure22.000.02,PlantStartupto25%Power,IRMsarenotwithdrawnuntiltheModeSwitchisplacedinRUNwhichisdirectedat5%-10%power.TheIRMRETRACTPERMITinterlockcausesarodblockiftheIRMiswithdrawnandtheinterlockisnotsatisfied(lightextinguished).Theinterlockdoesnotpreventcontinuedwithdrawalofthedetector.DistracterInformation:A.Isincorrectandplausible.MisapplyingormisunderstandingtheIRMRETRACTPERMITlogicwouldallowtheexamineetoselectthisanswer,alsoitisplausiblethatamalfunctionoftheIRMsystemduringastartupwouldcausearodblockB.Isincorrectandplausible.MisapplyingormisunderstandingtheIRMRETRACTPERMITlogicwouldallowtheexamineetoselectthisanswer,alsoitisplausibleamalfunctionoftheIRMsystemwouldcauseanIRMINOPtrip.TheINOPtripdoescauseahalfscram.D.Isincorrectandplausible.TheIRMdoescontinuetoretract,severalmalfunctionscauseanIRMINOPtripwhichdoescauseahalfscramifalarmed.MisapplyingtheIRMINOPforamalfunctionintheRETRACTPERMITlogicwouldallowtheexamineetoselectthisanswer.TheINOPtripdoescauseahalfscram.ReferenceInformation:I-2115-6ShowshowmodeswitcheffectsrodblocksfromSRM/IRMI-2145-56ShowIRMretactpermitlogicI-2145-59ShowsallrodblocksfromIRMsPlantProcedures23.60322.000.02NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2215003IRMSystem215003K1.Knowledgeofthephysicalconnectionsand/orcauseeffectrelationshipsbetweenINTERMEDIATERANGEMONITOR(IRM)SYSTEMandthefollowing:215003K1.02ReactormanualcontrolNRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:76of22008September2015 ID:R35Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:NEWWiththeReactorModeSwitchinSTARTUPHOTSTANDBY,theIntermediateRangeMonitorsareonRANGE4withthefollowingreadings:IRMChannelReadingA103B101C102D102E108F95G103H98TheP603operatorplacesIRMChannelERangeSelectorSwitchinRANGE3.WhichofthefollowingconditionsaretheresultoftheP603operator'saction?A.IRMDownscaleAlarmONLYB.IRMUpscaleTripONLYC.IRMUpscaleTripANDControlRodWithdrawalBlockONLYD.IRMUpscaleTripANDControlRodWithdrawalBlockANDHalf-ScramAnswer:DILO2015WrittenPage:77of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:IRMEisjustbelowtheUPSCALETRIP.RangingDOWNwillresultinIRMEcausinganUPSCALETRIP,RODBLOCK,andaHalfScram.DistracterExplanation:A.Isplausibleandincorrectanincorrectassumptionthatdown-rangingcausesadownscalecondition.B.Isplausibleandincorrectanincorrectassumptionthatdown-rangingcausesanupscaletriponly.C.Isplausibleandincorrectanincorrectassumptionthatdown-rangingcausesanupscaletripandrodblockwithnohalf-scram.ReferenceInformation:ARP3D113,3D59and3D60PlantProcedures03D05903D06003D113NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2215003A4.Abilitytomanuallyoperateand/ormonitorinthecontrolroom:215003A4.03IRMrangeswitches10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:78of22008September2015 ID:R36Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:MODIFIEDBANK:3150122A013005Duringareactorstartup,reactorpowerisonRange3oftheIntermediateRangeMonitors,andSourceRangeMonitor(SRM)detectorsarebeingwithdrawnfromthecore.DIV248/24VDCDistributionlosespower.Assumingnooperatoractionistaken,aControlRodBlockiscausedbypowerlossto_____.A.SRMAandSRMDONLY.B.SRMBandSRMCONLY.C.SRMA,CandIRMsA,C,E,G,I.D.SRMsB,DandIRMsB,D,F,H.Answer:DILO2015WrittenPage:79of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:PowertoIRMChannelsB,D,F,HandSRMChannelsBandDarefrom48/24VDCDistributionCabinet2IB1-3,CircuitBreaker1,DistracterExplanation:DistractersareplausibleasSRMdrivesarepoweredfrom120/208VDistributionCabinet72E-2B-1vice48/24VandknowingtheRODBLOCKsetpoint.ReferencesInformation:ARP3D113,RODBLOCK300VDCdecreasing(pg.2),SOP23.602,ENERGIZINGSRM(Pg9).PlantProcedures03D11323.602NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2215004K2.Knowledgeofelectricalpowersuppliestothefollowing:215004K2.01SRMchannels/detectors10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:80of22008September2015 ID:R37Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEW-CONTRACTWhichofthefollowingstatementsisanaccuratedescriptionoftheoperationoftheSourceRangeMonitoringSystemregardingsimultaneousmovementofallfourSRMdetectors?A.ItisNOTpossibletodosoatanytimeduetolimitationsimposedbythecontrolcircuitry.B.ItisNOTpermissibletodosoatanytimeasthiswillresultinunreliableindicationsasthedetectortravelsthroughfluxinthecore.C.ItisONLYpossibletodosointheinwarddirectionduringaReactorShutdownduetolimitationsimposedbythecontrolcircuitry.D.ItisNOTpermissibletodosoduringaReactorStartupasthiswillresultinunreliableindicationsasthedetectortravelsthroughfluxinthecore.Answer:DILO2015WrittenPage:81of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:Theexamineeshouldcorrectlydeterminethatsimultaneousdetectormovementisalwaysallowedbythedetectorcontrolcircuitry;however,23.602P&L3.11prohibitssimultaneousdetectormovementduringaReactorStartupasthiswillresultinanindicatedchangeinlogcountrateandperiodasthedetectortravelsthroughfluxinthecore.DistracterExplanation:A.Isincorrectandplausiblebecausethecandidatecouldincorrectlydeterminethatsimultaneousdetectormovementisneverallowedandenforcedbyprogrammingwithinthedetectorcontrolcircuitry.ThisisalsomadeplausiblebythefactthatmostoftheP&Lsin23.602coversystemlimitations,response,etc.,imposedbytheSRMcontrolcircuits.B.IsincorrectbutplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldincorrectlydeterminethatsimultaneousmovementofSRMdetectorsisneverpermissibleduetounreliableindications,wheninfacttheP&LonlyprohibitssimultaneousmovementduringReactorStartup.C.IsplausiblebecausethecandidatecouldrememberthatitisonlypermissibletosimultaneouslyinsertSRMdetectorsfollowingaReactorScramandincorrectlydeterminethatthislimitationmustbeimposedbythecontrolcircuitry.ThisisalsomadeplausiblebythefactthatmostoftheP&Lsin23.602coversystemlimitations,response,etc.,imposedbytheSRMcontrolcircuits.ReferenceInformation:23.602(pg8)P&L3.11PlantProcedures23.602NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.1.32Abilitytoexplainandapplysystemlimitsandprecautions215004SRMSystem10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(10)Administrative,normal,abnormal,andemergencyoperatingproceduresforthefacility.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:82of22008September2015 ID:R38Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:BANK:315-124-0008-005Whichofthefollowingdescribesasetofconditionsthatwouldgenerateafullreactorscramsignal?A.APRMs1&4faileddownscaleduringnormaloperations.B.APRM4becomesinopduringrefuelingwiththeshortinglinksinstalled.C.APRMs2&3failedupscaleduringastartupwiththemodeswitchinRUN.D.APRM1failedupscalewithIRMAfailedupscaleduringastartupwiththemodeswitchinSTARTUP/HOTSTANDBY.Answer:CILO2015WrittenPage:83of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:Per23.601INSTRUMENTTRIPSHEETSAny2APRMsinatrippedstatewillcausethe2of4voterstoinitiateafullRxScram&NeutronFlux-Upscale(Setdown)<15%RTPDistracterInformation:A.Isplausibleandincorrect,because2APRMshaveinputtovoterswhichwouldnormallybeenoughvotestocauseascram,howeverdownscalewillnotcauseavote.B.Isplausibleandincorrect,becauseanAPRMhasinputtovoterswhichcancauseascramandshortinglinksnormallyreducecoincidence,howeveronly1APRMINOPwillnotvoteascramevenwithshortinglinksinstalled.D.Isplausibleandincorrect,because2votescausesascram,howevertheIRMdoesnotinputintothevoters.ReferenceInformation:23.601(pg41)AveragePowerRangeMonitor(Scramsetpoints,inputto2of4voter)PlantProcedures23.601NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2215005K1.Knowledgeofthephysicalconnectionsand/orcauseeffectrelationshipsbetweenAVERAGEPOWERRANGEMONITOR/LOCALPOWERRANGEMONITORSYSTEMandthefollowing:215005K1.01RPS10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(6)Design,components,andfunctionofreactivitycontrolmechanismsandinstrumentation.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:84of22008September2015 ID:R39Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEW-CONTRACTAplantstartupisinprogress.Reactorpoweris30%andbeingincreasedbycontrolrodwithdrawal.APRM2malfunctionsandisindicating0%power.WhichoneofthefollowingdescribestheeffectonRodBlockMonitorsasaresultoftheAPRMfailure?A.RBMAandBareOPERABLE.OutwardControlrodmotioncancontinue.B.RBMAandBareINOPERABLE.OutwardControlrodmotionisblocked.C.RBMAisbypassedandINOPERABLE.BypassingAPRM2willallowoutwardcontrolrodmotion.D.RBMBisbypassedandINOPERABLE.BypassingAPRM2willallowoutwardcontrolrodmotion.Answer:DILO2015WrittenPage:85of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:TheexamineeshouldcorrectlyrecognizethatAPRM#2istheprimaryAPRMforRBMBanddeterminethat,underthecurrentconditionof30%power,theRBMisbypassedduetoAPRM2powerinputof0%.TheRBMisbypasseduntilpowerexceedsthesetpointof27%powerfromtheprimaryAPRM.ThesecondaryARPM(APRM4inthiscase)willbeautomaticallyselectedaftertheARPM2bypassjoystickisoperated.ThisquestionismademorechallengingbythefactthatTechSpecsrequirestheRBMtobeOPERABLEAPRM.DistracterExplanation:A.IsincorrectandplausiblebecausetheexamineemayincorrectlyrecallthattechnicalspecificationAdditionallyRBMAisassociatedwithAPRMs#1and3,andsinceitismayseemmorelogicaltoassociateAPRMs1&2withRBMA,ratherthanAPRMs2&4beingassociatedwithRBMB.AlsowiththeAPRMdownscalewiththemodeswitchinrun,outwardrodmotioncouldnotoccurduetoaAPRMdownscalecontrolrodwithdrawlblock.B.IsincorrectbutplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldincorrectlydeterminethattheARPMdownscaleeffectsbothRBMs.(RecircflowtransmitterfailurescouldaffectbothRBMsflowcomparator).OutwardcontrolrodmotionisblockedbytheAPRMdownscalefailure.C.IsincorrectbutplausiblebecausetheexamineemayincorrectlyrecallthatRBMAisassociatedwithAPRM#2sinceitismayseemmorelogicaltoassociateAPRMs1&2withRBMA,ratherthanAPRMs2&4beingassociatedwithRBMB.ReferenceInformation:23.607(pg3)1.1SystemDescriptionILO2015WrittenPage:86of22008September2015 PlantProcedures23.60503D09903D10323.607NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2215005K3.KnowledgeoftheeffectthatalossormalfunctionoftheAVERAGEPOWERRANGEMONITOR/LOCALPOWERRANGEMONITORSYSTEMwillhaveonfollowing:215005K3.07Rodblockmonitor:Plant-SpecificTechnicalSpecifications3.3.2.1ControlRodBlockInstrumentation10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:87of22008September2015 ID:R40Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:NEW-CONTRACTWhichofthefollowingRCICSystemTrips/IsolationparametersisdesignedwiththepurposeofprovidingprotectionfortheRCICTurbine?A.SteamLineFlowB.PumpSuctionPressureC.ExhaustDiaphragmPressureD.EquipmentRoomTemperatureAnswer:CILO2015WrittenPage:88of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:TheexamineeshouldcorrectlydeterminethatHighturbineexhaustdiaphragmpressureindicatesthatthepressuremaybetoohightocontinueoperationoftheRCICsystem'sturbine.Thecandidateshouldrecognizethat,whenthisisolationsetpointisreached,oneoftwoexhaustdiaphragmshasrupturedandpressureisreachingturbinecasingpressurelimits.Furthermore,thecandidateshouldunderstandthattheseisolationsareforequipmentprotectionandarenotassumedinanytransientoraccidentanalysisintheUFSAR.DistracterExplanation:A.IsplausiblebecausetheSteamLineFlowHighfunctionisprovidedtodetectabreakoftheRCICsteamlinesandinitiateclosureofthesteamlineisolationvalvesoftheRCICsystem.ThecandidatecouldincorrectlyconcludethattheSteamLineFlowHighfunctionprotectstheRCICTurbinefromeitherhighsteamflowinduceddamage,suchasoverspeed.Thisispossibleifthecandidatefailedtorecognizethat,ifthesteamisallowedtocontinueflowingoutofthebreak,thereactorwilldepressurizeandthecorecanuncover,therefore,theisolationsareinitiatedonhighflowtopreventorminimizecoredamage.B.IsplausiblebecausethePumpSuctionPressureisprovidedtoprotectthepumpagainstpossiblecavitationandlackofcooling.ThecandidatecouldincorrectlyconcludethatthePumpSuctionTripprotectstheturbinebytrippingthepump.D.IsplausiblebecauseareatemperaturesareprovidedtodetectaleakfromtheassociatedsystemsteampipingandanisolationoftheRCICsteamsupplyvalvesoccursonasensedhightemperaturecondition.ThecandidatecouldincorrectlyconcludethattheHighEquipmentRoomTemperaturefunctionprotectsequipmentintheRCICroom.Thecandidatecouldalsoincorrectlyconcludethatthischoiceispossibleifthecandidaterememberedthatthisfunctionisdiversetothehighflowinstrumentation,asdescribedintheTechnicalSpecificationBases,butfailedtorecognizethattheisolationoccurswhenaverysmallleakhasoccurredbecause,ifthesmallleakwereallowedtocontinuewithoutisolation,offsitedoselimitsmaybereached.ReferenceInformation:ForthisquestiontheT.S.B.isusedasareferenceforsysteminformationthatistaughtinthesystemscourseunderlessonplanLP-315-0143pertrainingobjectiveC013:C013.DescribetheRectorCoreIsolationCoolingsystemtechnicalspecificationlimitingconditionsforoperation,theirbases,theassociatedsurveillancerequirement(s),andtheirrelationshiptooperability.T.S.B3.3.6.1(pg3.3.6.1-16&17)RCICTurbineExhaustDiaphragmPressure-HighILO2015WrittenPage:89of22008September2015 NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2217000K4.KnowledgeofREACTORCOREISOLATIONCOOLINGSYSTEM(RCIC)designfeature(s)and/orinterlockswhichprovideforthefollowing:217000K4.04Preventsturbinedamage:Plant-SpecificTechnicalSpecifications3.3.6.1PrimaryContainmentIsolationInstrumentation10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:90of22008September2015 ID:R41Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:BANK:315-0162-0005-001WhatistheeffectontheADSSystemifUPSpowerislost?A.ADSLevel1Logicdeenergized.B.ADSLevel3Logicdeenergized.C.ADSLogicAandBdeenergized.D.ADSControlRoomTimerdeenergized.Answer:DILO2015WrittenPage:91of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:Per3D22LossofUPSAforADSTimersDistracterExplanation:A.IsincorrectandplausableLevel1isaninputtoADSB.IsincorrectandplausableLevel3isaninputtoADSC.IsincorrectandplausableA/BlogictriggersADS.ReferenceInformation:ARP3D22(pg1)ILO2015WrittenPage:92of22008September2015 ILO2015WrittenPage:93of22008September2015 PlantProcedures03D022NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2218000K2.Knowledgeofelectricalpowersuppliestothefollowing:218000K2.01ADSlogic10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:94of22008September2015 ID:R42Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEW-CONTRACTAtransienthasoccurredresultinginthefollowingconditions:*ALLMSIVsareclosed.*Nooperatoractionshavebeentaken.*RCICisoperatingandinjectingintothevessel.*RPVWaterLevelis35inches,loweringoneinchperminute.*Reactorpressureis900psigandslowlylowering5psigperminute.*Drywellpressureis1.0psigandtrendingupat0.05psigperminute.*1D57,ADS/SRV/EECWTCVPOWERSUPPLYFAILURE,isinalarm.*2PA2-5Circuit1isde-energized.WhateffectwilltheaboveconditionshaveonADSifNOoperatoractionsaretakenwithinthenext15minutes?A.TheADSvalveswillNOThavebeenopenedwhenrequiredbytheEOPstherebychallengingfueldesignlimitsduetolossofadequatecorecooling.B.TheADSvalveswillhaveautomaticallyopenedbeforebeingrequiredtodosobytheEOPstherebycomplicatingeffortstorestoreandmaintainRPVwaterlevel.C.OnlythreeoftheADSvalveswillhaveopenedautomaticallyandthereforetheRPVisNOTensuredtoremaindepressurizedunderallconditionsasrequiredbytheEOPs.D.PowertotheADSvalveswillnothavebeenrestored,therebyrenderingthemincapableofopeningautomaticallyorremotelybytheoperatorandremovingtheblowdownfunctionoftheADSvalves.Answer:BILO2015WrittenPage:95of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:Theexamineeshouldcorrectlydeterminethatin3minutes,Level1(31.8")willbereached,and7minutesafterthatthe105secondtimerwillcountdownafterwhichtheADSvalveswillopen.Theexamineeshouldconcludethat,withinthe15minuteswithnooperatoractiontaken,theADSvalveswillbeopen.TheexamineeshouldalsodeterminethatADSLogicStringAhaslostpower;however,ADSLogicStringBstillhaspowerfromanalternatesource(2PA2-6,Circuit1)andthatthepowersourcesupplyingthislogicstringalsopowersthepilotvalve'ssolenoids.TheexamineeshoulddeterminethattheEOPsrequireADStobeinhibitedatLevel1,andfailuretodowillresultinanuncontrolledADSinitiationat20"RPVlevel,whichisbeforetheEOPrequiredpointofWHENRPVlevelis=0".DistracterExplanation:A.IsplausiblebecausethecandidatecouldcalculatethattheADSvalvesshouldopenautomaticallyin10minutesandarepreventedfromdoingsoduetothelogicpowerfailureandthereforeincorrectlyconcludethat,withnoactionstakenatthatpointandtheADSvalvesnotbeingopened,thatthecrewisinviolationoftheEOPsandtheirbases.C.IsplausiblebecausetheADSvalveswillopenin10minutesandwillbeopenatthe15minutepointandthecandidatecouldincorrectlydeterminethatthetwoADSlogicpowersuppliesgotodifferentADSvalves/valvelogicstringstherebyresultinginlessthantheEPGdefinedMinimumNumberofSRVsRequiredforEmergencyDepressurization(MNSRED)tobeopen,thedefinitionofwhichisthesecondhalfofthisdistractor.D.Isincorrectbutplausiblebecause2PA2-5Circuit1isthenormalpowersupplytotheADSpilotvalvesolenoidsandtheexamineecouldincorrectlydeterminethat,sincethispowersourcewaslostandnosubsequentactiontaken,thattheADSvalveswouldbeincapableofperformingtheirrequiredfunctioneitherautomaticallyormanuallyasrequiredbytheEOPs.ReferenceInformation:ARP1D31indicatesthatADSwilltimedownfor7minutesbeforeinitiatingthetimerwithonlyaL1(31.8").Thehighdrywellpressuresignalisnotpresent,andwillnotbeduetotherateofpressureriseasgiveninthestemofthequestion.ARP1D44indicatesthatafterinitiationADSwilltimedownfor105seconds.ARP1D36indicatesthatADSvalveswillopenafterthetimeriscomplete.ARP1D57validatesthatsomeADScomponentsarede-energizeddueto2PA2-5Ckt1offasindicatedinthestemThelogicprintsforADSpowersupplies(I-2095-01)andBADSlogicpower(I-2095-07)indicatehowthelogicremainsautomaticallypoweredonalossofthepowerfrom2PA2-5Ckt1.(locatedindrawings.pdf)ThelogicprintsforADSvalvesP,J,R(I-2095-02)indicatehowthevalvesremainsautomaticallypoweredonalossofthepowerfrom2PA2-5Ckt1.ValvesHandEarethesame.(locatedindrawings.pdf)TheBWROGbasesforstepRC/L-2describesthatADSshouldbepreventedasfollows:ReferenceDiscussion:IfithasbeendeterminedthatRPVwaterlevelcanberestoredandmaintainedabovethetopoftheactivefuelwithavailableinjectionsources,emergencyRPVdepressurizationisunnecessary.AutomaticinitiationofADSisthereforeprevented.SubsequentstepsprovideexplicitanddetailedinstructionsforcontrollingRPVwaterlevelandpressureandspecifywhenemergencydepressurizationisappropriate.PermittingautomaticADSinitiationmaybeundesirableforthefollowingreasons:ILO2015WrittenPage:96of22008September2015
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ADSactuationcanimposeaseverethermaltransientontheRPVandmaycomplicateeffortstocontrolRPVwaterlevel.*Ifonlysteam-drivensystemsareavailableforinjection,ADSactuationmaydirectlyleadtolossofadequatecorecoolingandsubsequentcoredamage.*TheconditionsassumedinthedesignoftheADSactuationlogic(e.g.,nooperatoractionfor10minutesaftereventinitiation)maynotexistwhentheactionsspecifiedinthissteparebeingperformed.*TheoperatingcrewcandrawonmuchmoreinformationthanisavailabletotheADSlogic(e.g.,equipmentoutofserviceformaintenance,operatingexperiencewithcertainsystems,probabilityofrestorationofoff-sitepower,etc.)andcanbetterjudge,basedoninstructionscontainedintheEPGs/SAGs,whenandhowtodepressurizetheRPV.ADSinitiationispreventedinthisstep,however,onlyifRPVwaterlevelcanberestoredandmaintainedabovethetopoftheactivefuelandtheADStimerinitiates.IfRPVwaterlevelcannotberestoredandmaintainedabovethetopoftheactivefuel,theinstructionisnotapplicable,sincelevelcontroltransferstoContingency#1inaccordancewiththebranchattheendofStepRC/L-2.Ifthetimerdoesnotinitiate,theADSlogicisnotdefeatedsothatthesystemwillstillprovideanautomaticbackupforhighpressureinjectioninsmallbreaklossofcoolantaccidents.PlantProcedures01D3101D3601D4401D57BWROGEPGAppBNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2218000K5.KnowledgeoftheoperationalimplicationsofthefollowingconceptsastheyapplytoAUTOMATICDEPRESSURIZATIONSYSTEM:218000K5.01ADSlogicoperation10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(5)Facilityoperatingcharacteristicsduringsteadystateandtransientconditions,includingcoolantchemistry,causesandeffectsoftemperature,pressureandreactivitychanges,effectsofloadchanges,andoperatinglimitationsandreasonsfortheseoperatingcharacteristics.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:97of22008September2015 ID:R43Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:BANK:EQOP3150165A016002Followingatransientinitiatedbyalossofthe345kVand120kVswitchyards,thefollowingEmergencyDieselGeneratorconditionsexist:*EDG11JacketCoolantTemperatureHighisalarming.*EDG12CrankcasePressureHighisalarming.*EDG13OilTemperatureHighisalarming.*EDG14FuelOilPressureLowisalarming.WhichoneoftheCoreSprayPumpsisaffected?A.CoreSprayPumpAB.CoreSprayPumpBC.CoreSprayPumpCD.CoreSprayPumpDAnswer:CILO2015WrittenPage:98of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:WithaLossofOffsitePower,UndervoltageconditionshavecausedEDGstostartwithbypassednonessentialtrips.CrankcasePressureHighisanEssentialTripandEDG12isTRIPPED,thisisthepowersourcetoCoreSprayPumpC.DistracterExplanation:A.Isplausible;wouldbetrueifJacketCoolantTemperatureHighwereanEssentialTripandCrankcasePressureHighwasaNonEssentialTrip.B.Isplausible;wouldbetrueifOilTemperatureHighwereanEssentialTripandCrankcasePressureHighwasaNonEssentialTrip.D.Isplausible;wouldbetrueifFuelOilPressureLowwereanEssentialTripandCrankcasePressureHighwasaNonEssentialTrip.ReferenceInformation:SOP23.307Section1.1page5behavoirofEDGwithstartsignal&EnclBfortripsPlantProcedures23.307NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2264000K3.KnowledgeoftheeffectthatalossormalfunctionoftheEMERGENCYGENERATORS(DIESEL/JET)willhaveonfollowing:264000K3.01Emergencycorecoolingsystems10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:99of22008September2015 ID:R44Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:BANK:315-0148-0005-007Theplantisoperatingnormallyat95%power.AsignificantleakdevelopsontheH21-P004rack,andtheexcessflowcheckvalveontheVARIABLElegoftheWIDERangeinstrumentsclosesinresponsetotheleak.WhatwouldDIRECTLYbetheeffectontheplantfromthischangeinsensedlevel?A.RWCUisolates.B.TIPsretractandisolate.C.ReactorlowwaterLevel3scram.D.Level8tripofbothRFPsandMainTurbine.Answer:AILO2015WrittenPage:100of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:Widerangeinstrumentsonarackmeansthattheleakaffects2instruments,andbecausethecheckvalveisclosed,thevariablelegofthetwoinstrumentwillbelow,sothattheinstrumentswillindicatefailedlow.BecausetheracknumberisevenP004,andthelogicisNSSSA=ChannelsA,BandB=ChannelsC,D.ThereforeNSSSgroupisolationsforthewiderangeinstrumentswouldoccuronNSSSlogicA.InthiscaseGroup10forRWCUisoneisolationsthatwouldoccurDistracterExplanation:B.Isplausibleandifstudentthinksgroup15isoffofwiderangeorconnectsthisleaktoanarrowlevelinstruments.C.IsplausibleifstudentsthinksthereisaRPSTripassociatedwiththewiderangeinstrumentsorconnectstheleakanarrowrangeinstrument,D.isplausibleiftheexamineebelievesthisleakaffectsnarrowrangeorassociatestheLevel8tripwithwiderange.ReferenceInformation:SOP23.601(Pg11-12)InstrumenttripsheetsFOSM-5701-2Instrumentlocation.PlantProcedures23.601NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2223002K6.KnowledgeoftheeffectthatalossormalfunctionofthefollowingwillhaveonthePRIMARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONSYSTEM/NUCLEARSTEAMSUPPLYSHUT-OFF:223002K6.04Nuclearboilerinstrumentation10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:101of22008September2015 ID:R45Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:NEW-CONTRACTWhichofthefollowingdesignfeaturesassociatedwiththeplant'sSafetyReliefValves(SRVs)functionstomitigatecontainmentloadscausedbyreopeningsofanSRVbyreducingthefrequencyofsubsequentSRVactuationsfollowingtheinitialSRVopening.A.Two-StageTargetRockValvesB.SRVdischargelineT-quenchersC.Low-LowSetrelieffeatureoftwoSRVsD.Vacuum-reliefvalveslocatedineachSRVdischargelineAnswer:CILO2015WrittenPage:102of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:TheexamineeshouldcorrectlydeterminethatitistheLLSrelieffeatureoftwooftheplant'sSRVsthatservetoallowtimeforthewaterlegthatformsintheSRVdischargepipingfollowingSRVclosure(fromdischargepipingresidualsteamcondensation)toclear.TheexamineeshouldconcludethateliminatingthewaterlegreducestheloadingfromsubsequentSRVactuationstoacceptablelevels.DistracterExplanation:A.Isincorrectbutplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldincorrectlydeterminethatuseoftwo-stageTargetRockvalvesatFermi2wasdonetoallowproperblowdowntimeinordertoallowthewaterlegtodrainfromtheSRVdischargepipingpriortoasubsequentdischarge.TheexamineecouldincorrectlyassumethattheLLSRelieffunctionanduseofTwo-stageTargetRockvalvesworkinconjunctiontoperformthisfunctionwhen,infact,theyworktogethertomeettherequirementsofNUREG-0737toreducethefrequencyofstuckopensafetyreliefvalveeventsatFermi2.B.IsplausiblebecausetheSRVdischargelineT-quenchersarepartoftheoverallSRVdesignthatlimitsloadingforcesoncontainmentandtheexamineecouldincorrectlydeterminethattheholesintheT-quencherarewhatlimitsthelegofwaterintheSRVtailpipeandforgetthatthepurposeoftheSRVT-quenchersistolimitvalveoutletpressureto40percentofmaximumvalveinletpressurethroughtheuseoftheholesdrilledintheterminationpipe.D.Isplausiblebecausethevacuumrelieffeature(vacuumbreakers)oftheSRVdischargelinesarepartoftheoverallSRVdesignthatlimitsforcesoncontainmentandtheexamineecouldincorrectlyconcludethatthevacuumbreakersallowtimeforthelegofwatertoclearwithoutrecallingthatthevacuumreliefvalvesprovidedoneachSRVdischargelinepreventdrawinganexcessiveamountofwaterupintothelineasaresultofsteamcondensationfollowingterminationofreliefoperation.ReferenceInformation:ForthisquestiontheT.S.B.isusedasareferenceforsysteminformationthatistaughtinthesystemscourseunderlessonplanLP-315-0143pertrainingobjectiveC013:C013.DescribetheRectorCoreIsolationCoolingsystemtechnicalspecificationlimitingconditionsforoperation,theirbases,theassociatedsurveillancerequirement(s),andtheirrelationshiptooperability.T.S.B3.6.1.6Low-LowSet(LLS)Valves(pgB3.6.1.6-1to2)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESILO2015WrittenPage:103of22008September2015 NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2239002K4.KnowledgeofRELIEF/SAFETYVALVESdesignfeature(s)and/orinterlockswhichprovideforthefollowing:239002K4.03PreventssiphoningofwaterintoSRVdischargepipingandlimitsloadsonsubsequentactuationofSRV'sTechnicalSpecifications3.6.1.6Low-LowSet(LLS)Valves10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:104of22008September2015 ID:R46Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:MODIFIEDBANK:20201420011001WhichofthefollowingindicationsarecorrectforSRVoperation?A.A&CB.B&CC.A&DD.B&DAnswer:BILO2015WrittenPage:105of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:GraphforopeningandthenclosingofaSRVDistracterExplanation:DistractersareplausiblebasedonReactorresponsetoSRVopen.ReferenceInformation:AOP20.000.25(pg7)ILO2015WrittenPage:106of22008September2015 NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2239002A1.Abilitytopredictand/ormonitorchangesinparametersassociatedwithoperatingtheRELIEF/SAFETYVALVEScontrolsincluding:239002A1.05Reactorwaterlevel10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(5)Facilityoperatingcharacteristicsduringsteadystateandtransientconditions,includingcoolantchemistry,causesandeffectsoftemperature,pressureandreactivitychanges,effectsofloadchanges,andoperatinglimitationsandreasonsfortheseoperatingcharacteristics.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:107of22008September2015 ID:R47Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:MODIFIEDBANK:3150146C002003Theplantisoperatingat50%power.DigitalFeedwaterLevelControlisin3-ElementcontrolwiththeReactorLevelSelectSwitchinA.3D164,FEEDWATERCONTROLDCSTROUBLE,hasalarmed,andbothReactorFeedwaterPumpControllershaveswitchedtoEmergencyBypass.(1)WhatistheresultingimpacttoFeedwaterLevelControl(DCS),and(2)whatactionisrequiredbyprocedure?A.(1)DCSwillshifttoForcedSingleElementControl.(2)ContinuepoweroperationinSingleElementControlperSOP23.107.B.(1)DCSremainsin3ElementControl.(2)ManuallyadjustReactorFeedwaterPumpControllerstomatchFeedPumpspeedsperSOP23.107.C.(1)DCSwillshifttoForcedSingleElementControl.(2)SinceAdequatePumpingCapacityisNOTavailable,shutdownthereactorperAOP20.107.01.D.(1)DCSremainsin3ElementControl.(2)ManuallyadjustReactorFeedwaterPumpControllerstomatchFeedFlowwithSteamFlowperAOP20.107.01.Answer:DILO2015WrittenPage:108of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:WithbothReactorFeedPumpControllersinEMERGENCYBYPASS,manualfeedwatercontrolisrequiredbytheAOPtomaintainlevel.DistracterExplanation:A.Isplausible;wouldbetrueforalossofonefeedflowortwosteamflowinputs,ifNOTinEmergencyBypass.B.IsaplausiblemisconceptioninthatmatchingRFPspeedswouldbeeffectivevicematchingsteamflowandfeedflow.C.Isplausiblemisconception;testingknowledgeofpumpingcapacitywithcontrollersinEmergencyBypassReferenceInformation:ARP3D164(pg2)AOP20.107.01(pg9)PlantProcedures20.107.0103D164NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2259002A2.Abilityto(a)predicttheimpactsofthefollowingontheREACTORWATERLEVELCONTROLSYSTEM;and(b)basedonthosepredictions,useprocedurestocorrect,control,ormitigatetheconsequencesofthoseabnormalconditionsoroperations:259002A2.06Lossofcontrollersignaloutput10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(5)Facilityoperatingcharacteristicsduringsteadystateandtransientconditions,includingcoolantchemistry,causesandeffectsoftemperature,pressureandreactivitychanges,effectsofloadchanges,andoperatinglimitationsandreasonsfortheseoperatingcharacteristics.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:109of22008September2015 ID:R48Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:BANK:EQOP3150120B003005DuringcooldownoperationofDiv1SGTS,8D48,DIVISGTSCO2DISCHVLVOPEN,alarms.WhichofthefollowingistheLOWESTSGTSCharcoalBedTemperatureconsistentwiththisindication?A.150°FB.255°FC.310°FD.355°FAnswer:CILO2015WrittenPage:110of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:310°FisthesetpointatwhichtheCO2dischargevalve(F413A/B)willopen.OncethevalveisopentheCO2pressurewillbesensedandbringinthealarm8D48.DistracterExplanation:A.Isplausibleandincorrectbecause150°FisnormalCharcoalAdsorberBlanketHeatersetpointB.Isplausibleandincorrectbecause255°FisCoolingFanAutoOperationsetpointD.Isplausibleandincorrectbecause355°FisinexcessofCO2InitiationsetpointReferenceInformation:T46K002ASetpointsfromCECOI-2642-05(F413A/Bactuationlogic)PlantProcedures08D48NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2261000A3.AbilitytomonitorautomaticoperationsoftheSTANDBYGASTREATMENTSYSTEMincluding:261000A3.03Valveoperation261000A3.04Systemtemperature.10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:111of22008September2015 ID:R49Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEWTheplantisoperatingat100%reactorpowerwithEDG12currentlysyncedtotheGRIDandbeingcontrolledfromtheMainControlRoom.Alossofthe345KvmatandaReactorScramthenoccurs.Basedontheseconditions,whichofthefollowingstatementscorrectlydescribesEDGoperationandparameterresponsewhencontrolledfromtheMainControlRoom?A.WhenEDG12GovernorControlswitchistakentoraise,EDG12Generatorfrequencywillincrease.B.WhenEDG12EDGVoltageControlswitchistakentoraise,EDG12GeneratorVoltagewillincrease.C.WhenEDG13EDGVoltageControlswitchistakentoraise,EDG13GeneratorKVARSwillincrease.D.WhenEDG13GovernorControlswitchistakentoraise,EDG13Generatorfrequencywillincrease.Answer:DILO2015WrittenPage:112of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:ToanswerthisquestiontheexamineemustdeterminethatEDG12wouldbeinDroopmodeandEDG13wouldbeinisochronous.UnderstandingthisiscriticalincontrollingtheEDGandbeingabletokeepit'sparameterinbandasanoperator.BasedonthistheGovernorcontrolswitchandtheVoltagecontrolswitcheffecttheEDGdifferently.ForDROOP,GovernorControlcontrolsLOADinKWandVoltageControlcontrolsreactiveloadinVARS.ForISOCHRONOUSGovernorControlcontrolsfrequencyinHzandVoltageControlcontrolsoutputvoltage.DistracterExplanation:A.isplausibleandincorrectbecauseitwouldbetrueifEDG12wasinisochronous.B.isplausibleandincorrectbecauseitwouldbetrueifEDG12wasinisochronous.C.isplausibleandincorrectbecauseitwouldbetrueifEDG13wasindroop.ReferenceInformation:ST-OP-315-0065-001(pg26)PlantProcedures23.307NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2262001A4.Abilitytomanuallyoperateand/ormonitorinthecontrolroom:262001A4.05Voltage,current,power,andfrequencyonA.C.buses10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:113of22008September2015 ID:R50Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEW-CONTRACTAfireintheBOPswitchgearroomhascausedseveralBOPbussestobede-energizedandresultedinthefollowingindicationsbeingobservedintheControlRoom:*3D22,UPSUNITA/BTROUBLE,alarmed.*11D42,SWYDDCSTROUBLE,alarmed.*AllC32,ReactorFeedwaterDCS,indicationsonpanelH11-P603havebeenlost.*RPISindicationsontheFullCoreDisplayarede-energized.*TheRodWorthMinimizerisde-energized.WhatisthestatusoftheUPSsystem,andwhatactionsarenecessarytorestorecontrolofthe120kVmatandCTGsfromtheFermi2ControlRoomandtheH21-P623DedicatedShutdownPanel?A.UPSAandBarede-energized;temporarypowerneedstobeprovidedtoBOPBUS72L.B.UPSAandBarede-energized;temporarypowerneedstobeprovidedto120Kv/SBODCS.C.UPSAisde-energized;UPSAneedstobemanuallytransferredtoitsAlternatePowerSupplyusingtheBypasstoAltLineswitch.D.UPSBisde-energized;UPSBneedstobemanuallytransferredtoitsAlternatePowerSupplyusingtheBypasstoAltLineswitch.Answer:BILO2015WrittenPage:114of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:BasedonthealarmconditionsandindicationsprovidedintheMainControlRoom,UPSAandBisde-energized.Also,powerhasbeenlosttoUPSC,the120Kv/SBODCSunit,andtemporarypowerwillneedtobeprovidedinordertorestorecontroltotheaffectedcomponents.DistracterExplanation:A.IsplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldevaluatethecontrolroomindicationsandrecognizethatUPSAandBarede-energizedanddetermineincorrectlythatthecourseofactionwouldbetosupplytemporarypowertoUPShowever,72LwillnotprovidepowertotheUPSsystem,thenormalpowerandalternateis72Mand72R,powertoeitherofwhichcouldpowerUPSAandB.C.Isincorrectbutplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldincorrectlydetermine,fromtheindicationsgiven,thatonlyUPSAwasde-energized.IfonlyUPSAwasde-energized,thenmanuallytransferringUPSAtoitsalternatesourceusingtheBypasstoAltLineswitchcouldbeaviableoptionsincetheUPSBsourcewouldstillbeavailableasthealternatetoUPSA.D.Isincorrectbutplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldincorrectlydetermine,fromtheindicationsgiven,thatonlyUPSBwasde-energized.IfonlyUPSBwasde-energized,thenmanuallytransferringUPSBtoitsalternatesourceusingtheBypasstoAltLineswitchcouldbeaviableoptionsincetheUPSAsourcewouldstillbeavailableasthealternatetoUPSB.ReferenceInformation:ARP3D22AutoactionshowUPSA->ADSTimer.SOP23.308.01P&L3.10onpg6PlantProcedures03D02223.308.01NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.2.44Abilitytointerpretcontrolroomindicationstoverifythestatusandoperationofsystem,andunderstandhowoperatoractionsanddirectivesaffectplantandsystemconditions262002UPS(AC/DC)10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(5)Facilityoperatingcharacteristicsduringsteadystateandtransientconditions,includingcoolantchemistry,causesandeffectsoftemperature,pressureandreactivitychanges,effectsofloadchanges,andoperatinglimitationsandreasonsfortheseoperatingcharacteristics.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:115of22008September2015 ID:R51Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEWTheBOPD.C.GroundDetectionPanelhasthefollowingindicationswhentheleftpushbuttonisdepressed.Basedontheseindications,use23.309EnclosureA,toidentifythefault.A.NoneB.FaultonpositivewiringC.FaultonneutralwiringD.FaultonnegativewiringAnswer:CILO2015WrittenPage:116of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:Answerisbasedon23.309EnclA.Thelightbrightnessthatisdisplayedforthisquestionis(1)Dim(2)Dim(3)Out(4)VeryDim(5)VeryDim(6)VeryDimWithPB#1beingin"B"andPB#2beingin"A"DistracterExplanation:DistractersareplausiblebasedonunderstandingtheindicationsandcorrectlyusingEnclA.ReferenceInformation:23.309EnclAPlantProcedures23.309NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2263000K1.Knowledgeofthephysicalconnectionsand/orcauseeffectrelationshipsbetweenD.C.ELECTRICALDISTRIBUTIONandthefollowing:263000K1.04Grounddetection10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:117of22008September2015 ID:R52Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:BANK:315-0171-A014-001(M)Theplantisoperatingat100%powerwiththefollowingauxiliaryequipmentlineup:*EastStationAirCompressorrunning;CenterinAuto*SouthH2SealOilPumprunning;NorthinAuto*NorthRFPTWestLubeOilPumprunning;EastinAuto*NorthandCenterTBCCWpumpsrunning.Bus72Nislostduetoaninternalelectricalfault.Whatistheappropriateoperatorresponsetothisevent?A.Performarapidpowerreduction.B.StartbothSBFWpumpsandinjectat1200gpm.C.VerifytheSouthTBCCWpumphasautomaticallystarted.D.VerifytheCenterStationAirCompressorhasautomaticallystarted.Answer:DILO2015WrittenPage:118of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:TheEastStationAirCompressorispoweredfrom72N.TheoperatormustverifytheCenterstandbyequipmentautostartsper20.300.72AConditionC.DistracterExplanation:A.isincorrectbutplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldincorrectlydeterminethatthisactionisrequiredbasedononlyasingleTBCCWpumpbeingavailable.B.isincorrectbutplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldincorrectlydeterminethelossoftheNorthRFPTLubeoilpumpandpossibleNorthRFPTtrip.C.isincorrectbecausetheSouthandCenterTBCCWpumppowerisfrom72NandTBCCWpumpsdonotautostart.ReferenceInformation:AOP20.300.72A(pg3)ConditionCPlantProcedures20.300.72NNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2300000K2.Knowledgeofelectricalpowersuppliestothefollowing:300000K2.01Instrumentaircompressor10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(10)Administrative,normal,abnormal,andemergencyoperatingproceduresforthefacility.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2012AuditExamILO2015WrittenPage:119of22008September2015 ID:R53Points:1.00Difficulty:2.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:BANK:315-0067-C005-001Withtheplantoperatingatfullpower,ALLReactorBuildingClosedCoolingWater(RBCCW)ANDEmergencyEquipmentCoolingWater(EECW)flowisLOST.WhichONEofthefollowingcomponentsrequiresactiontobetakenwithinTWOminutes,withoutregardtotemperaturechange?A.HPCIPumpRoomCoolerB.ReactorRecirculationPumpsC.ControlRodDriveHydraulicPumpD.ReactorBuildingSteamTunnelSpaceCoolersAnswer:BILO2015WrittenPage:120of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:ReactorrecirculationpumpoperationislimitedtoTWOminuteswithoutRBCCW/EECWflow,Overidestatementfor20.127.01DistracterExplanation:DistractorsarevalidbasedonbeingloadsonthesystemaddressedbytheAOP.ReferenceInformation:AOP20.127.01(pg2)PlantProcedures20.127.01NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2400000K3.KnowledgeoftheeffectthatalossormalfunctionoftheCCWSwillhaveonthefollowing:400000K3.01LoadscooledbyCCWS10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(5)Facilityoperatingcharacteristicsduringsteadystateandtransientconditions,includingcoolantchemistry,causesandeffectsoftemperature,pressureandreactivitychanges,effectsofloadchanges,andoperatinglimitationsandreasonsfortheseoperatingcharacteristics.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:121of22008September2015 ID:R54Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEWForanormalNOTCHINofaselectedcontrolrodusingRMCS,whichofthefollowingplotsshowhowthesystemparameterswillrespond?NOTE-FortheseplotstheRODMOVEMENTCONTROLSWistakentoNOTCHIN,thenreleased.A.A&CB.A&DC.B&CD.B&DAnswer:AILO2015WrittenPage:122of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:ThisquestionaskstheexamineetopredicttheresponseofDriveWaterFlowanditsmostrelatedparameterDriveWaterDiffPressure.AandCplotsaretheNormalsystemresponse.DistracterExplanation:BPlotisplausibleandincorrectbecauseaNOTCHOUTwouldprovideaflowof2gpmDPlotisplausibleandincorrectbecauseitshowsthenormalcycleofDriveWaterDiffpressure,howeveritisforaNOTCHOUT.ReferenceInformation:SOP23.623referenceprovidedforunderstandingofnormalsystemoperations.GraphsareplotdatabasedonsystemoperationsforNOTCHINandOUT.PlantProcedures23.623NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2201002A1.Abilitytopredictand/ormonitorchangesinparametersassociatedwithoperatingtheREACTORMANUALCONTROLSYSTEMcontrolsincluding:201002A1.01CRDdrivewaterflow10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(5)Facilityoperatingcharacteristicsduringsteadystateandtransientconditions,includingcoolantchemistry,causesandeffectsoftemperature,pressureandreactivitychanges,effectsofloadchanges,andoperatinglimitationsandreasonsfortheseoperatingcharacteristics.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:123of22008September2015 ID:R55Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEW-CONTRACTTheplantwasoperatingat100%powerwithControlRod14-47atNotchPosition20whenthefollowingseriesofeventsoccurred:*At10:00ControlRod14-47starteddriftingduetoastuckcolletassembly.*At10:02ControlRod14-47wasverifiedtobefullyinserted.*At10:05ControlRod14-47washydraulicallydisarmed.*At10:15ControlRod14-47wasindividuallyscrammed.Assumingtheseweretheonlyoperatoractionsperformed,whichofthefollowingdescribeshowreactorpowerwasaffectedduringtheaboveseriesofevents?A.Powerwasincreasingat10:00andagainat10:05.B.Powerwasdecreasingat10:00andthenincreasingat10:05.C.Powerwasdecreasingat10:00andremainedsteadyafter10:02.D.Powerwasincreasingat10:00andremainedsteadyafter10:02.Answer:AILO2015WrittenPage:124of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:Astuckcolletassemblywouldcausepowertoincreaseastheroddriftedoutofthecore.TherodwasinsertedbyoperatorImmediateActionat10:02and,afterbeingdisarmedat10:05woulddriftbackoutofthecoreagaincausingpowertoincrease.Theexamineeshouldverifythisbythefactthattherodwasindividuallyscrammedat10:15,whichisonlynecessaryiftherodcontinuedtodriftoutafterbeingdisarmed,whichisanothersymptomofastuckcolletassembly.DistracterExplanation:B.Isplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldincorrectlydeterminethatastuckcolletassemblywouldcausecontrolrod14-47todriftintothecore,whichwouldrequiretheoperatortoverifythecontrolrodfullyinsertedandthentakeactiontodisarmthecontrolrod.Theoperatorcouldthenincorrectlydeterminethatthestuckcolletwouldthencausetherodtodriftout,oncehydraulicallydisarmed,whichwouldrequirefurtheractiontoindividuallyscramthecontrolrod.C.Isincorrectbutplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldincorrectlydeterminethatastuckcolletassemblywouldcausecontrolrod14-47todriftintothecore,whichwouldrequiretheoperatortoverifythecontrolrodfullyinsertedandthentakeactiontodisarmthecontrolrod,whichwouldpreventanyfurtherpowerchanges.D.Isplausiblebecausetheexamineeshouldcorrectlydeterminethatastuckcolletassemblywouldcausepowertoincreaseastheroddriftedoutofthecore.However,thecandidatecouldincorrectlyconcludethat,oncethecontrolrodwasinsertedat10:02andsubsequentlydisarmedat10:05,theseactionswouldholdcontrolrod14-47fullyinsertedandthatindividuallyscrammingtherodwasonlynecessaryforproceduralcompliance.ReferenceInformation:AOP20.106.07+BASESCaution1&ActionsD.1-D.6PlantProcedures20.106.0720.106.07BasesNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2201003K3.KnowledgeoftheeffectthatalossormalfunctionoftheCONTROLRODANDDRIVEMECHANISMwillhaveonfollowing:201003K3.01Reactorpower10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:125of22008September2015 ID:R56Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEW-CONTRACTAreactorstartupisinprogresswithpowerintheSourceRange.Duringturnover,theoncomingROreviewedthecurrentandfollowingstepsoftheRodWithdrawalSequenceandassociatedrodpositionsandidentifiedthefollowing:StepRodMoveFrom/ToCurrentPosition2714-3908to121238-1508to121238-3908to121214-1508to12102830-3108to120822-3108to120830-2308to120822-2308to1208AllotherControlRodsareattheirtargetpositionsandtheRodWorthMinimizerdoesnotindicateanyerrorsorblocks.Afterturnover,theROturnsonRodSelectPowerandselectsControlRod30-31formovement.WhichofthefollowinglistsALLoftheerrorsorblocksthatwillbedisplayedontheRodWorthMinimizer?Key:SE=SelectError;IB=InsertBlock;WB=WithdrawalBlock;IE=InsertError;WE=WithdrawalErrorA.ONLYSEB.ONLYIBandWBC.ONLYSE,IBandWBD.SE,IB,WB,IEandWEAnswer:CILO2015WrittenPage:126of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:ControlRod30-31isnotthenextrodinthesequenceandaSEwillbedisplayed.TheSEgeneratesbothaWBandanIBandwillnotpermitanyrodmotion.Withallrodsstillintheirtargetpositions,neitheranIEnoraWEwillbedisplayed.DistracterExplanation:A.IsplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldrecognizethatControlRod30-31isnotthenextrodinthesequence,soaSEwillbedisplayed;howevertheexamineecouldincorrectlydeterminethattheSEisallthatisgeneratedandfailtorecognizethataSEalsogeneratesbothaWBandanIB.B.IsincorrectbutplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldcorrectlyrecognizethatControlRod30-31isnotthenextrodinthesequenceanddeterminethatbothanIBandWBaregeneratedwithoutrecognizingthattheIBandWBaregeneratedasaresultoftheSE,whichwillalsobedisplayed.D.IsplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldrecognizethatControlRod30-31isnotthenextrodinthesequence,soaSEwillbedisplayed.TheexamineecouldalsodeterminethattheSEgeneratesbothaWBandanIBandwillnotpermitanyrodmotion.However,theexamineecouldincorrectlyconcludethatbothanIEandWEarealsogenerated,andwillbedisplayed.ReferenceInformation:ST-OP-315-0013(pg11)explansRodBlockandErrorFunctionsPlantProcedures23.608NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2201006K4.KnowledgeofRODWORTHMINIMIZERSYSTEM(RWM)(PLANTSPECIFIC)designfeature(s)and/orinterlockswhichprovideforthefollowing:201006K4.03Selectblocks/errors:P-Spec(Not-BWR6)10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:127of22008September2015 ID:R57Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:NEW-CONTRACTTheplanthasexperiencedalossofbus72B.Whilethecrewisperformingactionsinaccordancewith20.300.72Btostabilizetheplant,afailureofBOTHsealsforBReactorRecirculationpumpoccurs.WhichofthefollowingvalveswillthecrewNOTbeabletoclosetoisolateBRRPump?A.B3105-F023B,SouthRRPumpSuctionValveB.B3105-F031B,SouthRRPumpDischargeValveC.G3352-F106,RWCURRLoopBSuctionIsolationValveD.B3100-F008B,SouthRRPumpSealWaterIsolationValveAnswer:AILO2015WrittenPage:128of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:B3105-F023BneedstobeclosedinordertoisolateBRRpump,butispoweredbybus72B,andwillNOTbeabletobeclosed.ThisquestionischallengingbecauseBOTHoftheRRPumps'suctionisolationvalves(F023A&B)arepoweredbythesamebus,72B,whichisaDiv1bus,andRRPumpBhasprimarilyDiv2poweredcomponents.DistracterExplanation:B.IsplausiblebecauseB3105-F031BneedstobeclosedinordertoisolateBRRpump,andtheexamineecouldfailtorecognizethatthisvalveisstillpoweredfrombus72CFsoitISabletobeclosedtoisolateBRRPump.C.IsplausiblebecauseG3352-F106needstobeclosedinordertoisolateBRRpump,andtheexamineecouldfailtorecognizethatthisvalveisstillpoweredfromMCC72EsoitISabletobeclosedtoisolateBRRPump.D.IsplausiblebecauseB3100-F008BneedstobeclosedinordertoisolateBRRpump,andtheexamineecouldfailtorecognizethatthisvalveisnormallydirectedtobeclosedlocally,soitISabletobeclosedtoisolateBRRPump.ReferenceInformation:20.300.72NEnclApg3of4LISTOFAFFECTEDLOADSPlantProcedures23.138.0120.300.72BNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2202001K2.Knowledgeofelectricalpowersuppliestothefollowing:202001K2.03Recirculationsystemvalves10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:129of22008September2015 ID:R58Points:1.00Difficulty:5.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:MODIFIEDBANK:20204010203009TheplantisinMode2withreactorheatupinprogress.TheReactorWaterCleanupSystem(RWCU)islineduptoblowdownfromRWCUtotheMainCondenser.Thefollowingeventsthenoccur:2D119,RBCCWPUMPSDIFFPRESSHIGH/LOW,alarms.2D46,MOTORTRIPPED,alarms.BothoperatingRBCCWpumpsindicateTRIPPED.NOoperatoractionshavebeentaken.(1)ForRWCUwhatautomaticactuationswilloccur?(2)HowwillRWCUrespondtotheseactuations?A.(1)G3352-F119,RWCUInletIsolationValve,closes.(2)RWCUpumpstriponlowflow.B.(1)G3352-F044,Filter/DemineralizerBypassValve,opens.(2)RWCUFilter/Demineralizersoutlettemperaturewillstablizeandbegintolower.C.(1)G3352-F220,G3352-F004,andG3352-F001,RWCUContainmentIsolationValves,close.(2)RWCUpumpstriponlowflow.D.(1)G3300-F033,BlowdownFlowControlValve,throttlescloses.(2)RWCUFilter/Demineralizersoutlettemperaturewillstablizeandbegintolower.Answer:AILO2015WrittenPage:130of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:LossofRBCCWcoolingtoNRHXRcausesahightemperaturewhichleadstothiseffect.RWCUNRHXsNRHXOutletTempat140°F:G3352-F119closes.RWCUPumpstrip.RWCUDeminsintoHold.DistracterExplanation:Alldistractorsareplausibleandarebasedontheexamineesabilitytoproperlyinterpretindicationsandunderstandsystemoperations.ReferenceInformation:ARP2D110(pg1)AUTOACTIONPlantProcedures20.127.0102D110NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2204000A3.AbilitytomonitorautomaticoperationsoftheREACTORWATERCLEANUPSYSTEMincluding:204000A3.03Responsetosystemisolations10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:131of22008September2015 ID:R59Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEW-CONTRACTTheplantisoperatingat100%power.AfireintheReactorBuildingisreportedaffectingbothReactorPressureVessel(RPV)LevelInstrumentracks.IfonlytheWideRangeRPVlevelinstruments'referencelegtemperaturesbecomeelevatedduetothefire,whichoneofthefollowingcorrectlycompletesthefollowingstatementindicatingtheeffectontheRPVlevelactuationsascomparedtotheRPVleveltripsetpointundernormaltemperatureconditions?Duetotheelevatedtemperatureinthelevelinstrumentreferencelegs,actualRPVlevelfora__(1)__wouldbe__(2)__whentheactuationoccurred.A.(1)reactorscram(2)higherB.(1)reactorscram(2)lowerC.(1)corespraylogicactuation(2)higherD.(1)corespraylogicactuation(2)lowerAnswer:DILO2015WrittenPage:132of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:HeatingofthereferencelegsofanyRPVlevelinstrumentwouldcausetheindicatedleveltoincreaseduetothedensitychangeofthewaterinthereferenceleg.Basedontheloweringdensityinthereferenceleg,thereferencelegwouldhavelessmassascomparedtothevariableleg(actuallevel)thusmakingactualRPVlevellowerforanysetpointinitiatedactuationortrip.Thewiderangeinstrumentsalsoprovidecorespray(ECCS)actuations.DistracterExplanation:A.Isincorrectbutplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldincorrectlydeterminethatwiderangeinstrumentsprovidereactorscramfunctions.Thereactorscramfunctionsareprovidedbynarrowinstruments.Theinstrumentmalfunctionduetotheelevatedtemperaturesisindicatedonlyifthevariablelegtemperatureswereaffectedandnotthereferencelegwhichwouldbeanincorrectassessment.B.Isincorrectbutplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldincorrectlydeterminethatwiderangeinstrumentsprovidereactorscramfunctions.Theinstrumentmalfunctionduetotheelevatedtemperaturesiscommensuratewiththeelevatedreferencelegtemperatureandwouldbeanaccurateassessmentoftheeffect.C.Isincorrectbutplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldincorrectlydeterminetheinstrumentmalfunctionduetotheelevatedtemperaturesisindicatedonlyifthevariablelegtemperatureswereaffectedandnotthereferencelegwhichwouldbeanincorrectassessment.ReferenceInformation:BC07Sr4_SensorsMay2011Explainstemperatevariationsoninstruments.23.601(pg16)CoreSprayactuationfromtheseinstruments/logicI2rprod-CECO-Identifiestheinstrumentslistedin23.601asthewiderangeinstruments.PlantProcedures23.60129.ESP.01NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2216000K5.KnowledgeoftheoperationalimplicationsofthefollowingconceptsastheyapplytoNUCLEARBOILERINSTRUMENTATION:216000K5.14Density10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(5)Facilityoperatingcharacteristicsduringsteadystateandtransientconditions,includingcoolantchemistry,causesandeffectsoftemperature,pressureandreactivitychanges,effectsofloadchanges,andoperatinglimitationsandreasonsfortheseoperatingcharacteristics.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:133of22008September2015 ID:R60Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEWTheplantisshutdown.Acoolantleakresultedinanautomaticscramandanemergencydepressurization.Currentconditionsareasfollows:*Drywellpressureis19.5psig.*Toruspressureis19psig.*RPVlevelis198inchesandsteady.*Division1&2CSareinjectingandbeingusedtocontrolRWL.*AllRHRpumpsareoff.TheCRSdirectsE1150-F010closedandTorusCoolingandSprayplacedinserviceusingDivision1RHR.DrywellSprayisthenplacedinserviceusingDivision1RHRaddinganadditional12,500gpm.AleakfromtheTorusthenoccurs.InitialToruslevelis-14inchesandloweringat2inchesperminute.HowlongbeforetheRHRpump(s)providingTorusCoolingandSprayandDrywellSpraywouldhavetobeshutofforflowreduced?A.13minutesB.18minutesC.28minutesD.37minutesAnswer:BILO2015WrittenPage:134of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:Div1RHRflowfortheaboveconditionis~22859gpm(2pumpconfigurationrequiredperSOP)-14inchesstartinglevelwith-2inchesperminuteDistracterExplanation:DistractorsarevalidbasedonunderstandingsystemconfigurationsandexpectedflowsforRHR12500gpm~-40inches-1pumps(-14to-40)26inches=13minutes23000gpm~-50inches-2pumps(-14to-50)36inches=18minutes-CORRECTANSWER18500gpm~-70inches-2pumps(-14to-70)56inches=28minutes12500gpm~-88inches-2pumps(-14to-88)74inches=37minutesReferenceInformation:SOP23.205EnclA-ProcedureforRHRCONTAINMENTCOOLINGMODESOPERATION(Shows2RHRpumpswouldbeused)EOP29.100.01SH6-RHR(LPCI)VortexlimitPlantProcedures23.20529.100.01SH6NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2230000K1.Knowledgeofthephysicalconnectionsand/orcauseeffectrelationshipsbetweenRHR/LPCI:TORUS/SUPPRESSIONPOOLSPRAYMODEandthefollowing:230000K1.01Suppressionpool10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(5)Facilityoperatingcharacteristicsduringsteadystateandtransientconditions,includingcoolantchemistry,causesandeffectsoftemperature,pressureandreactivitychanges,effectsofloadchanges,andoperatinglimitationsandreasonsfortheseoperatingcharacteristics.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:135of22008September2015 ID:R61Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEW-CONTRACTAplantshutdownisinprogresswithreactorpowercurrentlystableat65%.TheTurbineFlowLimitersetpointisthenslowlyloweredto60%.WhichoneofthefollowingdescribestheGovernor/PressureRegulatorsystemvalveresponse?A.TurbineControlValveandTurbineBypassValvepositionsremainthesame.B.TurbineControlValvesthrottleclose,andTurbineBypassValvesthrottleopen.C.TurbineControlValvepositionsremainthesame,andTurbineBypassValvesthrottleopen.D.TurbineControlValvesthrottleclose,andTurbineBypassValvepositionsremainthesame.Answer:BILO2015WrittenPage:136of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:ThesetpointadjustmentshouldhavebeentomaintaintheTurbineFlowLimiter5%abovereactorpowerandnot5%belowreactorpower.LoweringtheturbineflowlimitersetpointbelowthereactorpowersetpointwillcausetheTurbineControlValvestoclose.TheTurbineBypassvalveswillopeninresponsetoareactorpressureincrease.DistracterExplanation:A.Isincorrectbutplausible.Theexamineecouldincorrectlydeterminethatsetpointwasproperlyadjusted,whichwouldcausenovalvemovementsincethesetpointdifferencefromreactorpoweris5%inthestem.Inaccordancewith22.000.03,PowerOperation25%to100%to25%,thesetpointismaintained5%above(vicebelow)reactorpowerduringtheshutdown.C.Isincorrectbutplausible.TheexamineecouldincorrectlydeterminethatthesystemresponseisacombinationofresponsesfromdistractorsAandCwhichwouldeachbepartlycorrectfortheadjustmentoftheTurbineFlowLimiterandReactorFlowLimiter.D.Isincorrectbutplausible.TheexamineecouldincorrectlydeterminethatthesystemresponsewouldbeasstatedindistractorAsincethiswouldbeacorrectresponseiftheReactorFlowLimitsetpointhadbeenadjustedto60%insteadoftheTurbineFlowLimitsetpoint.ReferenceInformation:22.000.02pg5022.000.03pg823.109pg38PlantProcedures23.10922.000.0222.000.03NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2241000K6KnowledgeoftheeffectthatalossormalfunctionofthefollowingwillhaveontheREACTOR/TURBINEPRESSUREREGULATINGSYSTEM:241000K6.12Control/governorvalvesNRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:137of22008September2015 ID:R62Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEWAreactoroperatorisperforming24.000.02Attachment1EightHour--MODE1,2,3--ControlRoom.TheDrywellFloorDrainandEquipmentDrainSumpPumpswereplacedinRUN,allowedtotrip,andreturnedtoAUTO.ThefollowingdataisrecordedonDataSheet1:TIME*CurrentTime(hr:min)0000*PreviousTime(hr:min)1600SUMPLEVEL*FloorDrainSumpLevel(in.)26.3DRYWELLFLOORDRAIN*PreviousIntegrator(gal)119043DRYWELLEQUIPMENTDRAIN*PreviousIntegrator(gal)715937CURRENTINTEGRATORREADINGS:Assuminganycalculatedleakagewouldremainconstantforthenext24hours,wouldanLCOentryberequiredandwhy?A.Yes,duetototalleakage.B.Yes,duetounidentifiedleakage.C.Yes,duetounidentifiedleakageandtotalleakage.D.No,leakageiswithinTechSpeclimits.Answer:BILO2015WrittenPage:138of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:LCO3.4.4RCSoperationalLEAKAGEshallbelimitedto:a.NopressureboundaryLEAKAGE:b.<5gpmunidentifiedLEAKAGE:c.<25gpmtotalLEAKAGEaveragedovertheprevious24hourperiod;andd.<2gpmincreaseinunidentifiedLEAKAGEprevious24hourperiodinMODE1.unidentifiedLEAKAGE-->DRYWELLFLOORDRAIN.121539-119043=2496gal/480min=5.2gal/min==>LCOENTRYidentifiedLEAKAGE-->DRYWELLEQUIPMENTDRAIN.176701-715937=764gal/480min=1.59gal/min+5.2gal/min=6.79==>NOTLCOENTRYDistracterExplanation:DistractersareplausiblebasedonknowledgeofT.S.operationleakageandcorrectmonitoringofintegratorsReferenceInformation:ARP2D75DRYWELLSUMPRATEHIGH24.000.02Enclfilledout1-31-14(historical-fordata)24.000.02Attachment1(pg3-6)thesurveillanceT.S.3.4.4(pg3..4-9to10)LCOrequirementsPlantProcedures24.000.02NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2268000A4.Abilitytomanuallyoperateand/ormonitorinthecontrolroom:268000A4.01SumpintegratorsTechnicalSpecifications3.4.4RCSOperationalLEAKAGE10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:139of22008September2015 ID:R63Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:BANK:315-0135-A021-003Withtheplantoperatingatfullpower,thefollowingalarmsandindicationsexist:*6D21,E/WOFFGASRECOMBINERTEMPERATUREHIGH/LOW,alarms.*TheWestOffGasRecombinerisinserviceandisindicating700°FonN62-R815,OffGasComponentsTemperatureRecorder.*TheEastOffGasRecombinerisinstandbyandisindicating270°FonN62-R815,OffGasComponentsTemperatureRecorder.WhichONEofthefollowingoperatoractionsshouldbeperformedtocontrolOffGasRecombinerTemperature?A.VERIFYN62-F400,18"ManifoldSteamSupplyTCV,isOPEN.B.VERIFYN62-F400,18"ManifoldSteamSupplyTCV,isSHUT.C.VERIFYN62-N013A,C(WestRecombinerThermostaticControlledElectricHeaters)at600°F.D.VERIFYN62-N013DE,F(EastRecombinerThermostaticControlledElectricHeaters)at600°F.Answer:DILO2015WrittenPage:140of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:Basedonunderstandtheautomaticoperationoftheoffgassystemtheexamineeshouldrecognizethatthetemperatureofthestandby(East)offgasrecombinertemperatureislow(setpointof276°F)BasedontheARP,thefirstactionafterverifiyingthetemperature(providedbythequestionstem)istoverifytheheatersetpointat600°F.DistracterExplanation:A.IsincorrectandplausiblebecausetheN62-F400controlssteamflowtotherecombinerandbythis,temperature.Howeverthisisonlytruefortherecombinerinserviceandtheinservicerecombinertemperatureisinband.Theexamineewouldchoosethisansweriftheyincorreclyidentifiedtheproblemtobeintheinservicerecombinerandwantedtolowertemperture.B.IsincorrectandplausiblebecausetheN62-F400controlssteamflowtotherecombinerandbythis,temperature.Howeverthisisonlytruefortherecombinerinserviceandtheinservicerecombinertemperatureisinband.Theexamineewouldchoosethisansweriftheyincorreclyidentifiedtheproblemtobeintheinservicerecombinerandwantedtoraisetemperture.D.IsincorrectandplausiblebecausethisistheThermostaticControlledElectricHeatersfortheinservicerecombine.Theexamineewouldchoosethisansweriftheyincorreclyidentifiedtheproblemtobeintheinservicerecombinerandthoughttheheaterscouldcorrecttheproblem.ReferenceInformation:ARP6D21(pg1-3)actionsandsetpointsPlantProcedures06D21NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2271000A3AbilitytomonitorautomaticoperationsoftheOFFGASSYSTEMincluding:271000A3.03Systemtemperatures10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:141of22008September2015 ID:R64Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:NEWTheCREFSystemisdesignedtomaintainahabitableenvironmentintheControlRoomEnvelopefor____day(s)continuousoccupancyafteraDBAwithoutexceedingTotalEffectiveDoseEquivalent(TEDE)limits.A.1B.7C.14D.30Answer:DILO2015WrittenPage:142of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:TheCREFSystemisdesignedtomaintainahabitableenvironmentintheCREfora30daycontinuousoccupancyafteraDBAwithoutexceeding5remTotalEffectiveDoseEquivalent(TEDE).-fromT.S.BasisB3.7.3-2.DistracterExplanation:1,7,and14daylimitsareplausiblebasedonthereuseintechspecs.ReferenceInformation:T41-02CONTROLCENTERHEATING,VENTILATING,ANDAIR-CONDITIONING(CCHVAC)SYSTEMDBD.(4.1.12)PlantProceduresT41-02CONTROLCENTERHEATING,VENTILATING,ANDAIR-CONDITIONING(CCHVAC)SYSTEMNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.1.27Knowledgeofsystempurposeandorfunction.288000PlantVentilationSystems.TechnicalSpecifications3.7.3ControlRoomEmergencyFiltration(CREF)SystemNRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:143of22008September2015 ID:R65Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEW-CONTRACTDuetoradiationmonitoralarms,reactorpowerwasloweredinaccordancewith20.000.07,FuelCladdingFailure.Theplantiscurrentlyoperatingat95%power.Thefollowingannunciatorsandindicationsareobserved:*3D32,DIVI/IIRBVENTEXHRADNMONITORUPSCALE*3D36,DIVI/IIRBVENTEXHRADNMONITORUPSCALETRIP*WhiteDivision1ReactorBuildingIsolateTRIPPEDlight-ON*WhiteDivision2ReactorBuildingIsolateTRIPPEDlight-OFFBasedontheseindications,whichONEofthefollowingdescribes(1)thestatusofSecondaryContainmentand(2)theactions,ifany,requiredbyplantproceduresassumingallequipmentoperatesasexpected.A.(1)SecondaryContainmentisfullyisolatedandpressureisbeingmaintainednegative.(2)Noadditionalactionsarenecessarytoalignrequiredequipment.B.(1)SecondaryContainmentisNOTfullyisolatedandpressureisbeingmaintainednegative.(2)ClosetheopenSecondaryContainmentisolationvalves.C.(1)SecondaryContainmentisfullyisolatedandpressureisbeingmaintainedpositive.(2)Startthenon-runningdivisionofSGTStoensurebuildingpressureisloweredtoanegativevalue.D.(1)SecondaryContainmentisNOTfullyisolatedandpressureisbeingmaintainedpositive.(2)ClosetheopenSecondaryContainmentisolationvalves,andstartthenon-runningdivisionofSGTStoensurebuildingpressureisloweredtoanegativevalue.Answer:AILO2015WrittenPage:144of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:SecondaryContainmentisolationvalveswillallbeclosedevenwithonlyonedivision'stripisolationcircuitytripped.Whenonedivisiontrips,isolationvalvescloseineachlineforthesupplyandexhaust.Theotherisolationvalveswillgetaclosesignalwhenthefanstriponlowflow.ThealarmproceduresandAOP20.000.02,AbnormalReleaseofRadioactiveMaterial,directverificationofactions;however,basedononedivision'stripcircuitrytripping,onedivisionofSGTSwouldstartandisenoughtomaintainpressureasdescribedinAOP20.000.02bases.DistracterExplanation:B.IsincorrectbutplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldincorrectlydeterminethatallcontainmentisolationvalvesarenotclosedbasedononlyDivision1secondarycontainmentisolationcircuitytripping.C.IsincorrectbutplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldincorrectlydeterminethatallisolationvalvesclosedandthatanadditionaltrainofSGTSisrequiredtofullymaintainpressuresincethesystemtripcircuitswouldnormallystartbothdivisions.D.IsincorrectbutplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldincorrectlydeterminethatallcontainmentisolationvalvesarenotclosedbasedononlyDivision1secondarycontainmentisolationcircuitytrippingandanadditionaltrainofSGTSisrequiredtofullymaintainpressuresincethesystemtripcircuitswouldnormallystartbothdivisions.ReferenceInformation:AOP20.000.02B.1-B.5+BASESPlantProcedures20.000.0223.40423.42620.000.0720.000.02BasesNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2290001A2.Abilityto(a)predicttheimpactsofthefollowingontheSECONDARYCONTAINMENT;and(b)basedonthosepredictions,useprocedurestocorrect,control,ormitigatetheconsequencesofthoseabnormalconditionsoroperations:290001A2.04Highairborneradiation10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(5)Facilityoperatingcharacteristicsduringsteadystateandtransientconditions,includingcoolantchemistry,causesandeffectsoftemperature,pressureandreactivitychanges,effectsofloadchanges,andoperatinglimitationsandreasonsfortheseoperatingcharacteristics.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:145of22008September2015 ID:R66Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:NEW10CFR55.25states"If,duringthetermofthelicense,thelicenseedevelopsapermanentphysicalormentalconditionthatcausesthelicenseetofailtomeettherequirementsof§55.21ofthispart,thefacilitylicenseeshallnotifytheCommission..."ToensurethatFermi2meetstheserequirements,MGA13,FermiMedicalRequirements,requiresthatlicensedindividualsshallberesponsibletoimmediatelynotify_______________ofanychangeinmedicalstatus.A.MedicalonlyB.theirimmediatesupervisoronlyC.MedicalandtheirimmediatesupervisoronlyD.Medical,theirimmediatesupervisor,andtheSupervisor,OperationsTrainingAnswer:DILO2015WrittenPage:146of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:MGA13Section2.10.1states"LicensedindividualsshallberesponsibletoimmediatelynotifyMedical,theirimmediatesupervisor,andtheSupervisor,OperationsTrainingofanychangeinmedicalstatus."DistracterExplanation:A,B,C.Medical,theirimmediatesupervisor,andSupervisor,OperationsTrainingmustbenotifedbytheLicensedindividualimmediately.ReferenceInformation:MGA13pg13PlantProceduresMGA13NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.1.4Knowledgeofindividuallicensedoperatorresponsibilitiesrelatedtoshiftstaffing,suchasmedicalrequirements,no-solooperation,maintenanceofactivelicensestatus,10CFR55,etc.10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(10)Administrative,normal,abnormal,andemergencyoperatingproceduresforthefacility.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:147of22008September2015 ID:R67Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:BANK:315-0128-A013-001FollowingaMANUALReactorScramfrom50%power,thefollowingconditionsareobservedinIPCS:PIDQUALVALUEUNITSDESCRIPTIONN30DX3017GOOD0.00PCTHPTurbinecontrolvalve#1positionN30DX3018GOOD0.00PCTHPTurbinecontrolvalve#2positionN30DX3019GOOD0.00PCTHPTurbinecontrolvalve#3positionN30DX3020GOOD0.00PCTHPTurbinecontrolvalve#4positionS20DC0315GOODCLOSEDGeneratorBreakerCMS20DC0315GOODCLOSEDGeneratorBreakerCFS13DJ1212LOW0.0MWEGeneratorGrossGenerationTheMainGeneratorExciterFieldBreakerindicatesCLOSED.Basedontheseconditions,whichoneofthefollowingTurbineGeneratorTripsignalswillinitiate?A.LossofFieldB.ReversePowerC.GeneratorDifferentialD.NegativePhaseSequenceAnswer:BILO2015WrittenPage:148of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:WithTCVsSHUT,nosteamisbeingsuppliedtotheTurbineGenerator.TheGeneratorisstillconnectedtothegridandwillbeginmotoring.ReversePowerwillbesensedbythisconditionandwillgenerateaTurbineGeneratorTripwhenthe67relayisenergized.BreakerpositionmustbelookedupinSOER.DistracterExplanation:A.IsincorrectandplausiblebecauseitwouldbetrueiftheMainGeneratorFieldBreakerOPENED,orexcitationwaslost.C.IsincorrectandplausiblewouldbetrueifanelectricalfaultconditionoccurredresultinginDifferentialCurrentcondition.D.IsincorrectandplausiblewouldbetrueifaphaseopenoccurredintheGeneratorStator.LiketheReversePowertrip,theNegativePhaseSequencetripistimedependent,whichisacommonmisconception.ReferenceInformation:AOP20.000.21Bases,page5PlantProcedures20.000.21BasesNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.1.19Abilitytouseplantcomputertoevaluatesystemorcomponentstatus295005AA1.Abilitytooperateand/ormonitorthefollowingastheyapplytoMAINTURBINEGENERATORTRIP:295005AA1.04Maingeneratorcontrols10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(7)Design,components,andfunctionofcontrolandsafetysystems,includinginstrumentation,signals,interlocks,failuremodes,andautomaticandmanualfeatures.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2013AuditExam/ILO2012ExamILO2015WrittenPage:149of22008September2015 ID:R68Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEWTheplantwasoperatingat100%powerwithJetPumpTotalFlowof87.4Mlbs/hrwhenreactorpowerlowered.Thefollowingflowindicationswereobserved:BasedONLYontheindicationsabove,whateventhasoccurred?A.JetPumpFailureonLoopAB.JetPumpFailureonLoopBC.UncontrolledRecircFlowchangeof5%onAReactorRecircPump(lowering)D.UncontrolledRecircFlowchangeof5%onBReactorRecircPump(rising)Answer:BILO2015WrittenPage:150of22008September2015 ILO2015WrittenPage:151of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:20.138.02JetPumpFailureSymptoms:UnexplainedchangeinindicatedCoreFlowUnexplainedchangeinRecircLoopFlowUnexplaineddecreaseinCoreD/PJetPumpPercentDifferentialPressuredeviatesexcessivelyfromtheaverageoftheremainingJetPumpPercentDifferentialPressuresAdditionallythedifferencebetweenB21-R609BandB21-R609DshowsthatBloophasaimbalanceshowingthatthejetpumpinBloophaveafailure.DistracterExplanation:A.ThisanswerisincorrectbecausethedifferencebetweenB21-R609BandB21-R609DshowsthatBloophasaimbalanceshowingthatthejetpumpinBloop.C.ThechangeinJetPumptotalflowdoesnotmatcha5%loweringinARecircpumpanddifferencebetweenB21-R609BandB21-R609DshowsthatBloophasaimbalanceshowingthatthejetpumpinBloophasfailed.HowevertheflowindicationsforAlooparelowerthanBimplying(incorrectly)aloweringofArecircflow.D.ThechangeinJetPumptotalflowdoesnotmatcha5%increaseinBRecircpumpanddifferencebetweenB21-R609BandB21-R609DshowsthatBloophasaimbalanceshowingthatthejetpumpinBloophasfailed.HowevertheflowindicationsforBlooparehigherthanAimplying(incorrectly)aincreaseofBrecircflow.ReferenceInformation:AOP20.138.02JetPumpFailure(pg5)JetPumpFailureSymptomsPlantProcedures23.138.02NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.1.7Abilitytoevaluateplantperformanceandmakeoperationaljudgmentsbasedonoperatingcharacteristics,reactorbehavior,andinstrumentinterpretation10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(5)Facilityoperatingcharacteristicsduringsteadystateandtransientconditions,includingcoolantchemistry,causesandeffectsoftemperature,pressureandreactivitychanges,effectsofloadchanges,andoperatinglimitationsandreasonsfortheseoperatingcharacteristics.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:152of22008September2015 ID:R69Points:1.00Difficulty:4.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:BANK:804-0001-0007-009Withtheplantoperatingat80%power,at0800onAugust28,EDG11isdiscoveredINOPERABLE.WhichONEofthefollowingdescribesLATESTTIMEthatSR3.8.1.1"Verifycorrectbreakeralignmentandindicatedpoweravailabilityforeachoffsitecircuit"canbecompletedWITHOUTenteringintoaconditionwhichrequiresaunitshutdown?A.0815onAugust28B.0850onAugust28C.0905onAugust28D.0915onAugust29Answer:BILO2015WrittenPage:153of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:SR3.8.1.1isdueWITHINONEHOUR,0850August28isthelatesttimewhichcomplies.DistracterExplanation:A.Isincorrectandplausible,butNOTthelatesttime(15minutesforeventclassification)B.Isincorrectandplausible,SR3.8.1.1expiredat0900-NO1.25extensionsarepermittedoninitialperiodD.Isincorrectandplausible,SR3.8.1.1expiredat0900-NO1.25extensionsarepermittedoninitialperiodReferenceInformation:T.S.3.8.1(pg3.8-1to3.8-9)NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.2.36Abilitytoanalyzetheeffectofmaintenanceactivitiessuchasdegradedpowersources,onthestatusoflimitingconditionsforoperationsTechnicalSpecifications3.8.1ACSourcesOperating10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(10)Administrative,normal,abnormal,andemergencyoperatingproceduresforthefacility.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:154of22008September2015 ID:R70Points:1.00Difficulty:2.50LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:NEWPerMOP05,ControlofEquipment,"AccesstoProtectedAreasmaybegrantedtoallowactivitiesdeemednecessarybytheShiftManager."WhichofthefollowingpersonnelareNOTexemptfromProtectedEquipmentrestrictions?A.SecurityB.PlantManagerC.NRCinspectorsD.NuclearOperatorsAnswer:BILO2015WrittenPage:155of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:PerMOP5,ControlofEquipment,Security,Operations,andNRCinspectorsareexemptfromProtectedEquipmentrestrictions.DistracterExplanation:A/C/Dareallexempt;soincorrectandplausible.ReferenceInformation:MOP05,pages30&31PlantProceduresMOP05-ControlOfEquipmentNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.2.14KnowledgeoftheprocessforcontrollingequipmentconfigurationorstatusNRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2013AuditExam/ILO2012ExamILO2015WrittenPage:156of22008September2015 ID:R71Points:1.00Difficulty:2.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:BANK:508-0001-A013-003WhichONEofthefollowingdescribestheannuallimitsforTotalEffectiveDoseEquivalent(TEDE)assetforthin(1)10CFR20and(2)Fermi2AdministrativeGuidelinesforpersonswithRadiationTrainingandcompletecurrentyearrecords?A.(1)3rem/year(2)0.5rem/yearB.(1)3rem/year(2)1rem/yearC.(1)5rem/year(2)0.5rem/yearD.(1)5rem/year(2)1rem/yearAnswer:DILO2015WrittenPage:157of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:10CFR20limitsTEDEto5rems/yr,andAdministrativelimitsMRP03are1rem/yrforpersonswithcurrentrecords.DistracterExplanation:A.Isincorrectandplausiblebecause0.5remisfortheincompleterecords.B.Isincorrectandplausiblebecause3rem/yearisnotthefederalTEDElimit.C.Isincorrectandplausiblebecause0.5rem/yearisthelimitwithincompletecurrentyearrecords.ReferenceInformation:MRP03EnclA(pg1)PlantProceduresMRP02NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.3.43.2/3.7KnowledgeofradiationexposurelimitsundernormalandemergencyconditionsNRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2001ExamILO2015WrittenPage:158of22008September2015 ID:R72Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEW-CONTRACTTheplantisoperatingat100%powerwhenaLOCAoccurs.Whichofthefollowingsetsofalarms,ifactuatedduringtheseplantconditions,wouldindicateafuelcladdingfailurerequiringuseofStandbyLiquidControlforToruspHcontrol?A.3D8-DIVI/IIOFFGASRADNMONITORUPSCALE3D24-2MINUTEHOLDUPPIPERADNMONITORUPSCALETRIPB.3D43-DIVI/IICONTMAREARADNMONITORTROUBLE3D83-MNSTMLINECHA/B/C/DRADNMONITORUPSCALEC.8D1-TORUSHARDVENTRADIATIONHIGH/FAIL16D8-TURBINEBUILDINGHIGHRADND.3D44-EFFLUENTPROCESSRADNMONITORTROUBLE3D48-TURBINEBLDGVENTEXHAUSTRADNMONITORUPSCALE/INOPAnswer:BILO2015WrittenPage:159of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:20.000.07,FuelCladdingFailure,and3D43,DIVI/IICONTMAREARADNMONITORTROUBLE,statethatthesealarmsareindicativeofagrossfuelcladdingfailureandrequireuseofSLCfortoruspHcontrolasdirectedbybothoftheseprocedures.DistracterExplanation:A.Isincorrectandplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldincorrectlydeterminethattheradiationmonitoralarmsareindicativeofafuelcladdingfailure.TheproceduresindicatethesealarmswouldbeindicativeofasmallcladdingfailureandnotagrossfailurerequiringuseofSLCfortoruspHcontrol.C.Isincorrectandplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldincorrectlydeterminethatafuelcladdingfailurewouldresultinatorushardventradiationalarm,howeverinthecurrentplantconditionstheventpathwouldnotbealignedandtherewouldbenoflowpasttheradiationmonitor.Turbinebuildinghighradiationcouldalsobeindicativeofafuelcladfailure,howeverproceduredirectionforthisalarmdoesnotdirectuseofSLCfortoruspHcontrol.D.Isincorrectandplausiblebecausetheexamineecouldincorrectlydeterminethat3D44mayalarmforafuelelementfailuresince3D44monitors9processradmonitorsetpointsanalarmsifanyareaboverequiredtrippoints.3D44doesnotdirectactionsfortheuseofSLCfortoruspHcontrol.Similarly3D48wouldbeplausibleforacladdingfailureifradiationwastransportingthroughtheturbinebuilding.ReferenceInformation:ARP3D43(pg1&2)SubsequentactionsandInitiatingDevicesAOP20.000.07&BASES(all)grossfuelactionsandindications.PlantProcedures03D08303D04403D04816D0820.000.0203D00803D02403D04308D0120.000.07NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.3.15Knowledgeofradiationmonitoringsystems,suchasfixedradiationmonitorsandalarms,portablesurveyinstruments,personnelmonitoringequipment,etc.10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(10)Administrative,normal,abnormal,andemergencyoperatingproceduresforthefacility.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:160of22008September2015 ILO2015WrittenPage:161of22008September2015 ID:R73Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:BANK315-0141-0003-011Theplantisshutdownforarefuelingoutage.*RPVtemperatureis140°F.*Division2RHRisoperatingintheShutdownCoolingmode.*RHRPumpBisrunning.Thefollowingalarmsandindicationsarethennoted:*3D156,REACTORWATERLEVELLOW*3D79,REACVESSELWATERLEVELL3CHANNELTRIP*RPVwaterlevelis160"andsteadyonNarrowRangelevelindicators.*RPVwaterlevelis135"andloweringslowlyonWideRangelevelindicators.Basedontheseconditions,whichONEofthefollowingactionsistakenfirstinaccordancewithplantprocedures?A.Enter29.100.01Sheet1,RPVControl,andrestorelevelusingRPVFlooding.B.Enter29.100.01Sheet1,RPVControl,andrestorelevelusingTable1systems.C.Enter20.205.01,LossofShutdownCooling,andrestoreshutdowncoolingusingBRHRpump.D.Enter20.205.01,LossofShutdownCooling,andrestoreshutdowncoolingusingDivision1RHR.Answer:BILO2015WrittenPage:162of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:RPVLevel3conditionrequiresentryintotheEOPs.ItalsoresultsinalossofShutdownCooling,butsinceEOPentrytakespriority,actionsintheAOParetakenaftertheEOPactions.EOPSh1statestorestorelevelusingTable1systems.SinceRPVlevelCANbedetermined,entryintoRPVFloodingisnotrequired.DistracterExplanation:A.IsincorrectsinceRPVlevelCANbedetermined,andentryintoRPVFloodingisnotrequired.ItisplausibleiftheexamineeincorrectlyassumestheindicationdiscrepanciesasalossofRPVlevelindication.C.IsincorrectbecauseAOPentryisnotapriorityduringEOPactions.ItisplausiblebecausetheAOPactionsincluderestoringSDCusingthesameRHRlooppreviouslyinservice.D.IsincorrectbecauseAOPentryisnotapriorityduringEOPactions.ItisplausibleiftheexamineeincorrectlyassumesDiv2RHRisisolated,andDiv1RHRmustbeusedtorestoreSDC.ReferenceInformation:29.100.01Sheet1(entryconditionsandactions)QuestionCognitiveLevelAnalysis/SynthesisPlantProcedures20.205.0129.100.01SH1NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.4.1KnowledgeofEOPentryconditionsandimmediateactionsteps.10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(10)Administrative,normal,abnormal,andemergencyoperatingproceduresforthefacility.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2001ExamILO2015WrittenPage:163of22008September2015 ID:R74Points:1.00Difficulty:2.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:NEWAnALERTEmergencyActionLevelhasbeendeclaredandisNOTsecurityrelated.TheTechnicalSupportCenterandEmergencyOperationsFacilityareNOTactivated.PerRERPProcedures,the__(1)__telephoneshouldbeusedtomakeanINITIALnotificationtotheUSNuclearRegulatoryCommissionwhichmustbecompletednolaterthan__(2)__aftertheemergencydeclaration.A.(1)ENS(EmergencyNotificationSystem)(2)15minutesB.(1)ENS(EmergencyNotificationSystem)(2)60minutesC.(1)HPN(HealthPhysicsNetwork)(2)15minutesD.(1)HPN(HealthPhysicsNetwork)(2)60minutesAnswer:BILO2015WrittenPage:164of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:PerEP-290,theNRCmustbenotifiedusingtheENStelephone60minutesafterclassifyinganevent.DistracterExplanation:A.isplausiblebecause15minutesistherequirementforlocalandstateauthorizesANDtheNRCforsecurityevents.C.isplausiblebecausetheHPNisanothercommunicationsystemusedforcommunicationsdirectedfromEP-290and15minutesistherequirementforlocalandstateauthorizesANDtheNRCforsecurityevents.D.isplausiblebecausetheHPNisanothercommunicationsystemusedforcommunicationsdirectedfromEP-290ReferenceInformation:EP-290Page7(NRCNotificationrequirements)PlantProceduresEP-290NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.4.43Knowledgeofemergencycommunicationssystemsandtechniques.10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(10)Administrative,normal,abnormal,andemergencyoperatingproceduresforthefacility.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:165of22008September2015 ID:R75Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:BANK:EQOP3150032C001001DuringaLossofCondenserVacuum,thefollowingalarmstatusexists:4D108,CONDENSERPRESSUREHIGHALARMING4D46,MAINTURBINETRIPPEDALARMING3D86,MNSTMLINEISOVALVECLOSURECHANNELTRIPALARMING5D46,N/SRFPTEXHAUSTPRESSHIGHTRIP/FAULTCLEARThesealarmsareCONSISTENTwithwhichONEofthefollowingMainCondenserBackpressurevalues?A.2.5psiaB.5.0psiaC.9.5psiaD.12.5psiaAnswer:CILO2015WrittenPage:166of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:Giventhesealarms,MainCondenserBackpressureisbetween6.8and12.2psia.DistacterExplanation:A.Isplausible;wouldbetruewithONLY4D108(2.21psia)B.Isplausible;wouldbetruewith4D108and4D46(3.68psia)D.Isplausible;wouldbetruewith4D108,4D46,3D86,and5D46alarms.(12.2psia)ReferenceInformation:AOP20.125.01,LossofCondenserVacuum,pg2PlantProcedures20.125.0105D04604D04604D108NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.4.46Abilitytoverifythatthealarmsareconsistentwiththeplantconditions10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.41(b)(10)Administrative,normal,abnormal,andemergencyoperatingproceduresforthefacility.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2008AuditExamILO2015WrittenPage:167of22008September2015 ID:S76Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEW-CONTRACTTheplantisoperatingat100%power.Anearthquakeoccursandthefollowingindicationsareobserved:120KvBUS101Voltageindicates0ACvolts.120kvbreakerpositionsGM,GKindicateOPEN.120kvbreakerpositionsGHandGDindicateCLOSED.345kvbreakerpositionsBMandDMindicateCLOSED.345kvbreakerpositionsBT,DF,CM,andCFindicateOPEN.3D73,TripActuatorsA1/A2Trippedalarms3D74,TripActuatorsB1/B2Trippedalarms.3D85,PrimaryContainmentHighPressChannelTripalarms.OperatorsplacethemodeswitchinShutdown,andenter29.000.01Sheet1RPVcontrol.RPVlevelisbeingmaintainedinthenormalbandusing'B'SBFWPump.Electricalindicationsarereportedbyacontrolroomoperatorasfollows:EDG11-Runningwithanofoutput1000KWEDG12-Runningwithanofoutput990KWEDG13-Runningwithanofoutput0KWEDG14-Runningwithanofoutput0KWNodamageisreportedon345kvor120kvmats.Basedontheseindications,whatproceduralactionswouldbedirectedtorestorepowertode-energizedbuses?A.StartCTG11-1,OPENdisconnectGL,andrestorepowerthroughtheAlternateFeed13.2kvPeakerBus1-2BPosA6.B.Closebreaker13.2kvPeakerBus1-2BPosA6,andrestorepowerusingTrans64AlternateFeed.C.StartCTG11-1,OPENbreakerGD,andrestorepowerthroughTrans1.D.ManuallyloadEDG13andEDG14.Answer:CILO2015WrittenPage:168of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:TheSROexamineemustknowthatthehighdrywellpressurechanneltripwouldhavealsoinitiatedanautomaticstartofallfouremergencydieselgenerators.Withanautomaticstartonhighdrywellpressure,theEDGswillremainrunninguntilthehighdrywellconditionisreset.TheEDGswillnotloadautomaticallyloadontotheirrespectivebusseswithoutanexistingundervoltagesignal.TheSROexamineemustevaluatetheKWloadingindicationsgiveninthequestionstemandidentifythatSST64hasbeende-energizedfromoffsitepower.ThenormalpowertotheEDG13and14bussesisfromSST65.BecauseEDG13and14arerunningunloaded,thisisanadditionalindicationthatSST65isstillenergizedandthelossofpowerisisolatedtoSST64.TheSROexamineewouldthenevaluatethe20seriesAbnormalOperatingProcedurestoselectthecorrectprocedurebasedonSYMPTOMs(lossof120kv)andaselectionenclosureincludedintherelatedelectricalAOPs.20.300.kvwouldbeacorrectchoiceforalossofpowertoEDGbuses11and12.TheSROexamineemustknowthatthepreferredrestorationpathasdirectedby20.300.120kvisthroughTrans1.Therearemultiplerestorationoptionsbasedonthemechanismforthelossofpower.DistracterExplanation:A.Isnotcorrectandplausible.TheSROexamineecouldincorrectlydeterminethatpowershouldberestoredusingCTG-11-1usingtheAlternatepath.IfdisconnectGLisclosed(normalposition)theproceduredoesnotdirectopeningitunlessthereisdamagetothemat.B.Isnotcorrectandplausible.TheSROexamineecouldincorrectlydeterminethattheBus11alternatesourcecouldbeenergizedbasedonthe120kvbreakerlineupandchoosetorestorethispowersourcewhichwouldbepreferredifavailable.Theexamineewouldhavetohavecorrectknowledgeofthe120kvsystemflowpathfornormalandalternatesources.D.Isnotcorrectandplausible.TheSROexamineecouldapplytheinformationfor4D32generatorfrequencytoselect20.300.GRIDastheproceduretorestorepowerwhichwouldplaceEDG13and14inserviceonrespectivebusses.Alsoincorrectlyidentifyingthatdivision2powerislostbasedontheindicationsmayleadtheSROexamineetowhattopreferentiallyrestorethevitalbusses,therebyselectingthisdistractor.ReferenceInformation:AOP20.300.120(actionsfor120loss)SD-2500-01BUSlineupforcondition.PlantProcedures20.300.OffsiteNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295003PartialorCompleteLossofA.C.Power295003AA2.Abilitytodetermineand/orinterpretthefollowingastheyapplytoPARTIALORCOMPLETELOSSOFA.C.POWER:295003AA2.01CauseofpartialorcompletelossofA.C.powerNRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:169of22008September2015 ILO2015WrittenPage:170of22008September2015 ID:S77Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEWTheplantisoperatingat100%reactorpowerwhentheMainControlRoomreceivesareportofaconfirmedfireinDiv1BatteryRoom.Thecrewenters20.000.22,PlantFires,musterstheFireBrigade,andtakesactionIAW20.000.22andtheappropriatefireplan.WhenthefireisouttheFireBrigadeleaderreportsthatare-flashwatchissetandexplainsthattheDivision1Batteryhasbeenseverelydamaged.WhichofthefollowingoutlinestheMINIMUMactionsrequiredtobeincompliancewithTechnicalSpecifications?A.Completeaplantshutdownwithin14hours.B.Within2hoursrestoreDIV1DCtooperablewithonlytheDIV1BatteryChargerinservice.C.PlacetheReactorModeSwitchinShutdown,andbelessthan200°FAverageReactorCoolantTemperaturewithin12hours.D.PlacetheReactorModeSwitchinStartup/HotStandbywithin7hours,andplacetheReactorModeSwitchinShutdownwithin13hours,andbelessthan200°FAverageReactorCoolantTemperaturein37hours.Answer:AILO2015WrittenPage:171of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:ToanswerthisquestiontheexamineemustfirstidentifyarequiredT.Saction,byapplingaT.Sforasystem(G2.2.40)andthenidentifywhichplantconditionsmeettherequiredMODEofoperation(G2.2.35).TodetermineTSactionrequired(G2.2.40):3.8.4LCOTheDivisionIandDivisionIIDCelectricalpowersubsystemsshallbeOPERABLE.TheBasisstatesthebatteryisrequiredforthesubsystemtobeOPERABLE.CONDITIONB.OneDCelectricalpowersubsysteminoperableforreasonsotherthanConditionA.REQUIREDACTIONRestoreDCelectricalsubsystemtoOPERABLEstatuswithin2hours.CONDITIONC.RequiredActionandAssociatedCompletionTimenotmet.REQUIREDACTION:BeinMODE3in12hours.Todetermineactionsrequiredtoplacetheplantintherequiredmode(G2.2.35):OncetheexamineedeterminestherequirementtobeinMODE3,thenbasedonTable1.1-1,theexamineewillchoosetheconditionsthatcorrespondtoMODE3.AnswerAistheonlychoicethatplacestheplantinMODE3.DistracterExplanation:B.Thisanswerassumesyoucanbeoperablewithoutthebatterywhichisincorrect.IfthebatterywasnotrequiredthisanswerwouldbeplausiblebasedonCONDITIONB.CondtionsthatdonotchangeMODEC.IstheconditionsforMODE4,whichisincorrect(seeabove).Ifthecandidatewasonlyconsideringthe12hourrequiredactionofCONDITIONC.thisistheonlydistracterthatmeetsthattimerequirement.D.ThisanswerisLCO3.0.3,howeverisdoesnotapplybecauseT.S.3.8.4canbecompliedwith.ThisanswerisseveralMODESovertime.ReferenceInformation:TS&TSBASIS3.8.4LCO,CONDB&CNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.2.403.4/4.7AbilitytoapplytechnicalspecificationsforasystemG2.2.353.6/4.5AbilitytodetermineTechnicalSpecificationModeofOperation295004PartialorCompleteLossofD.C.PowerTechnicalSpecifications3.8.4DCSourcesOperating10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.43(b)(1)Conditionsandlimitationsinthefacilitylicense.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:172of22008September2015 ILO2015WrittenPage:173of22008September2015 ID:S78Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:BANK:802-2001-0001-007Afireisinprogress.TurbineBuildingAreaTemperaturehasexceeded200°F,andanautomaticReactorScramhasoccurred.Allcontrolrodsarefullyinserted,andtheReactorModeSwitchisinSHUTDOWN.WithsmokeaccumulatingintheMainControlRoom,evacuationtotheRemoteShutdownPanelhasbeendirected.AttheRemoteShutdownPanel,thefollowingconditionsarenoted:*RPVPressureis950psig.*RPVWaterLevelis175inches.AssumingthatCOLDShutdownisdesired,whichoneofthefollowingis(1)theprocedurallydirectedmethodforconductingacooldown,and(2)whatistheLOWESTRPVPressureallowablewithinONEhour?A.(1)LOWERthepressuresettingonpressurecontrollersinTurbineControlRelayPanel.(2)TheLOWESTRPVPressureallowablewithinONEhouris400psig.B.(1)OPENSafetyReliefValvesAorBattheRemoteShutdownPanel.(2)TheLOWESTRPVPressureallowablewithinONEhouris400psig.C.(1)LOWERthepressuresettingonpressurecontrollersinTurbineControlRelayPanel.(2)TheLOWESTRPVPressureallowablewithinONEhouris450psig.D.(1)OPENSafetyReliefValvesAorBattheRemoteShutdownPanel.(2)TheLOWESTRPVPressureallowablewithinONEhouris450psig.Answer:DILO2015WrittenPage:174of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:RISINGTurbineBuildingAreaTemperaturescausingaReactorScramindicateMSIVsareCLOSED.SRVswillbeoperated.20.000.19limitscooldownto90°F/hr.TheLOWESTRPVPressureallowablewithinONEhouris450psig.DistracterExplanation:A.isplausableiftheexamineethoughtthecauseofthescramwasnotclosedMSIVsandthoughttheywereOPENandthecooldownlimitis100°F/hr.B.isplausableiftheexamineethoughtthecooldownlimitis100°F/hr.C.isplausableiftheexamineethoughtthecauseofthescramwasnotclosedMSIVsandthoughttheywereOPEN.ReferenceInformation:AOP20.000.19CondKpg13andAttachment1,pg1PlantProcedures20.000.19NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295016AA2.Abilitytodetermineand/orinterpretthefollowingastheyapplytoCONTROLROOMABANDONMENT:295016AA2.06Cooldownrate10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.43(b)(5)Assessmentoffacilityconditionsandselectionofappropriateproceduresduringnormal,abnormal,andemergencysituations.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2008AuditExamILO2015WrittenPage:175of22008September2015 ID:S79Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:NEWYouaretheCRSandtheplantisoperatingat100%reactorpowerwhen3D85,PRIMARYCONTAINMENTHIGHPRESSCHANNELTRIP,alarms.Div1&2PCPressureRecordersindicate1.7psigandslowlyincreasing.One(1)minutehaspassedsincethescram,andnooperatoractionshavebeentaken.1D80,DIV1/2EECW/EESWSYSINMANUALOVERRIDE,isinalarm.P4400-F601A,Div1EECWRETURNISOVLV,indicatesOPEN.P4400-F601B,Div2EECWRETURNISOVLV,indicatesCLOSED.P4400-F603A,Div1EECWSUPPLYISOVLV,indicatesOPEN.P4400-F603B,Div2EECWSUPPLYISOVLV,indicatesCLOSED.Basedontheseindications,whichONEofthefollowingactionswilltheCRSdirectfortheEECWsystem?A.PlaceP4400-M001,DIV1EECWISOOVERRIDESW,inNORMAL.B.PlaceP4400-M001,DIV1EECWISOOVERRIDESW,inNORMAL,andDepressP4400-M042,DIV1EECWISORESETSW.C.PlaceP4400-M004,DIV2EECWISOOVERRIDESW,inNORMAL.D.PlaceP4400-M004,DIV2EECWISOOVERRIDESW,inNORMAL,andDepressP4400-M049,DIV2EECWISORESETSW.Answer:AILO2015WrittenPage:176of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:1D80indicatesthattheDIV1ORDIV2EECWISOOVERRIDESWisinOverride.WiththisswitchinoverrideEECWwillnotinitiateonhighdrywellpressure.SothecorrectactionistoplaceP4400-M001DIV1EECWISOOVERRIDESWinNORMALtoallowdivision1EECWtoactuateasrequired.DistactorExplanation:B.Isincorrectandplausiblebecausetheresetisolationpushbuttonisnotrequiredtoallowthesystemtostartautomaticity,howeverthepushbuttonisusedintheSOPinrelationtotheOVERRIDESWtoresetEECW.C.Isincorrectbecausedivision2EECWisalreadyrunning,thisanswerisplausiblebecausetheexaminecouldinterpreted2D14and2D17asindicationofaproblemwithDivision2EECWratherthannormalstartingalarms.D.Isincorrectbecausedivision2EECWisalreadyrunning,thisanswerisplausiblebecausetheexaminecouldinterpreted2D14and2D17asindicationofaproblemwithDivision2EECWratherthannormalstartingalarms.ReferenceInformation:ARP1D80DIVI/IIEECW/EESWSYSINMANUALOVERRIDE(cautiondescibeseffectofswitchanddirectiontoreturntonormal)NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.4.16KnowledgeofEOPimplementationhierarchyandcoordinationwithothersupportproceduresorguidelinessuchasoperatingprocedures,abnormaloperatingprocedures,andsevereaccidentmanagementguidelines295018PartialorCompleteLossofComponentCoolingWater10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.43(b)(5)Assessmentoffacilityconditionsandselectionofappropriateproceduresduringnormal,abnormal,andemergencysituations.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:177of22008September2015 ID:S80Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEW-CONTRACTTheplantisoperatingat100%powerwithrefuelflooractivitiesinprogresstocompletefuelbundlesippinginaccordancewithMOP16,ConductofRefuelFloorActivities(Non-Outage).PermissionhasbeengrantedtousetheINTERLOCKOVERRIDEkeyfortherefuelingplatforminaccordancewith23.710,FuelHandlingSystem,forsippingoperations.Ashorttimelaterthefollowingoccurs:*16D1,RBREFUELINGAREAFIFTHFLOORHIGHRADN,alarms.*PanelH11-P816ARMrecorderindicateschannels15and17inalarm(peakedat10mr/hr).*3D31,DIV1/2FPVENTEXHRADNMONITORUPSCALE,alarms.*RBHVACsupplyandexhaustfansarerunning.Thelicensedoperatorassignedtotherefuelingactivitiesreportsthatafuelbundlehadbeenwithdrawntoapproximately3feetofthespentfuelpoolsurface,howeverithasbeensubsequentlyloweredintoastoragelocation.Whatproceduralactionsarerequiredtobedirectedtoaddresstheseindicationsandreports?A.AlertpersonnelusingtheplantareaalarmandHi-com,evacuatetheRefuelFloor,andmonitorSFPlevel.B.VerifyisolationofRBHVAC,andverifysecondarycontainmentintegrity.C.ConfirmisolationofRBHVACandinitiationofSGTS.D.IsolateallsystemsdischargingintotheareaexceptsystemsrequiredbyEOPsanddamagecontrol.Answer:AILO2015WrittenPage:178of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:Theindicationsidentifythatahighradiationhasoccurredonthefifthfloorduetoareductioninshieldingfromraisingabundletoonearthesurfaceofthespentfuelpool.16D1RBREFUELINGAREAFIFTHFLOORHIGHRADNalarmsdirectevacuatingtheareaandentering20.710.01REFUELINGFLOORHIGHRADIATION.ARM15and17inalarmat10mr/hrwithasetpointof9mr/hrvalidatethealarmingcondition.20.710.01REFUELINGFLOORHIGHRADIATIONAlsodirectsalertingpersonnelusingtheplantareaalarmandHi-com,evacuatingtherefuelfloor,monitoringSFPlevelDistracterExplanation:B.IsincorrectandplausiblebecausetheSROexamineemayinterprettheARMalarmsetpointsincorrectlyalongwiththe3D31DIV1/2FPVENTEXHRADNMONITORUPSCALEalarmsanddecidethatRBHVACisolationandinitiationofSGTSisappropriateasdirectedby20.710.01REFUELINGFLOORHIGHRADIATION.3D31DIV1/2FPVENTEXHRADNMONITORUPSCALEalarmsat2mr/hrandtheTRIPoccursat3mr/hrandisindicatedbyanothersetofalarmswhichisnotinbasedonthestemconditionsgiven.IfthisincorrectassumptionisdeterminedtheproceduredirectsverifyingisolationofRBHVAC,verifyingsecondarycontainmentintegrityC.IsincorrectandplausiblebecausetheSROexamineemayinterprettheARMalarmsetpointsand3D31DIV1/2FPVENTEXHRADNMONITORUPSCALEalarmsincorrectlyandmisapplythe29.100.01Sheet5SecondaryContainmententryconditions.ARMs15and17arenotlistedinthetableforradlevelentryconditionsforsecondarycontainmentandFPVENTEXHRADNMONITORentrysetpointsare5mr/hr.Thealarmsonlyindicate2mr/hr.EscalationintotheEOPwithouttheentryconditionswouldnotbeappropriate.IfthisincorrectassumptionisdeterminedtheproceduredirectsconfirmingisolationofRBHVACandinitiationofSGTSintheoverrideD.IsincorrectandplausiblebecausetheSROexamineemayinterprettheARMalarmsetpointsand3D31DIV1/2FPVENTEXHRADNMONITORUPSCALEalarmsincorrectlyandmisapplythe29.100.01Sheet5SecondaryContainmententryconditions.ARMs15and17arenotlistedinthetableforradlevelentryconditionsforsecondarycontainmentandFPVENTEXHRADNMONITORentrysetpointsare5mr/hr.Thealarmsonlyindicate2mr/hr.EscalationintotheEOPwithouttheentryconditionswouldnotbeappropriate.IfincorrectlydeterminedtobeabovemaxnormaltheactiontoisolateallsystemsdischargingintotheareaexceptsystemsrequiredbyEOPsanddamagecontrolwouldbeappropriate.ReferenceInformation:ARP16D1(pg1)INITIALRESPONSEARP20.710.01(pg4)CONDITIONAILO2015WrittenPage:179of22008September2015 PlantProcedures16D0103D03120.710.0129.100.01SH5NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295023AA2Abilitytodetermineand/orinterpretthefollowingastheyapplytoREFUELINGACCIDENTS:295023AA2.01Arearadiationlevels.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:180of22008September2015 ID:S81Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:BANK:EQOP2020121A002007DuringanaccidentconditionAFTEREmergencyRPVDepressurization,thefollowingconditionsexist:*RPVPressureis50psig.*DrywellTemperatureis250°F,RISING.*DrywellPressureis42psig,RISING.*TorusPressureis42.5psig,RISING.*PrimaryContainmentWaterLevelis580ft,RISING.WhichONEofthefollowingactionsisREQUIRED?A.INITIATEDrywellSpraysper29.100.01Sheet2,PRIMARYCONTAINMENTCONTROL.B.VENTtheDrywellIRRESPECTIVEofoffsiteradioactivityreleaselimitsper29.ESP.07Section3.0.C.VENTtheTorusREMAININGWITHINoffsiteradioactivityreleaselimitsper29.ESP.07Section2.0.D.VENTtheTorusIRRESPECTIVEofoffsiteradioactivityreleaselimitsper29.ESP.07Section2.0.Answer:BILO2015WrittenPage:181of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:WithDrywellPressureabovePCPL,itisrequiredtoventtheDrywellIRRESPECTIVEofoffsitereleaseratelimitsper29.ESP.07Section3.0.29.100.01SH2PCP-11DistracterExplanation:A.isplausible;wouldbetrueforTorusWaterLevel<+45inches,whichis<560feet.C.isplausible;wouldbetrueforTorusWaterLevel<570feet.D.isplausible;wouldbetrueforTorusWaterLevel<570feet..ReferenceInformation:EOP29.100.01SH2PCP-11&CurvePlantProcedures29.100.01SH629.100.01SH229.ESP.07NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295024EA2.Abilitytodetermineand/orinterpretthefollowingastheyapplytoHIGHDRYWELLPRESSURE:295024EA2.01Drywellpressure.10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.43(b)(5)Assessmentoffacilityconditionsandselectionofappropriateproceduresduringnormal,abnormal,andemergencysituations.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:182of22008September2015 ID:S82Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEWAnATWShasoccurredandtheOperatingShiftisexecutingtheEOPs.SLCPumpAwasstartedat12:15withaSLCtanklevelof72inches.TheP603operatorobservesthatRWCUIsolatesasrequiredandSLCTanklevelistrendingdownnormally.AssumingthattheSLCsystemcontinuesoperatingnormallyattime12:45whichofthefollowingEOPactionswouldbedirected?A.ShutdownSLCpumpsB.DepressurizetheRPVat<90°F/hrC.KeepRPVwaterlevelbetween-25inchesand114inchesD.RestoreandkeepRPVwaterlevelbetween173inchesand214inchesAnswer:DILO2015WrittenPage:183of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:SLCTANKisa9feetI.D.x12feethighverticalcylindertank.PerDBD(4.2.1pg16)1ft³=7.48052USgalTheminimumdesignflowrateoccursat1,215psigandis41.2gpmforaSLCpumpPertheDBD(4.2.3onpg17)<45inchesSLCTANKLEVELisHOTSHUTDOWNBORONWEIGHTpertheEOP29.100.01SH1ATable1572INCHESSTARTINGLEVELfortheSLCTANK30Minutesat42.2gpm=1236galAt40Galperinchtheleveldropis30.9Inches41.1INCHES<--CurrentLevelEOPFSL-OR2directsrestoringnormalwaterlevel173-214inchesonHOTSHUTDOWNBORONWEIGHTDistracterExplanation:A.EOP29.100.01SH1ASTEPFSQ-19directsthiswhenSLCTankisempty,iftheexamineecalculatesthetankasemptytheywouldchoosethisanswerB.EOP29.100.01SH1ASTEPFSP-5directscooldown,howeverthisisonlywithnoboroninjectionorCOLDS/Dbornweight,thisanswerisplausibleiftheexamineebelievescoldS/Dbornweighthasbeeninjected.C.EOP29.100.01SH1ASTEPFSQ-OR1providesforthishowever,theconditionsarenotmet.TheexamineewouldchoosethisansweriftheyassumedthatHotShutdownBoronWeightorthatRxpower<3%withboroninjectionallowsfortheexitofthepowerlegofSH1A.ReferenceInformation:EOP29.100.01SH1A(yellowbox-TABLE15)DBDC41-00-SLC(pg16&17)PlantProcedures29.100.01SH1ANUREG1123KACatalogRev.2211000K5.063/3.2Tanklevelmeasurement295037EA2.034.3*/4.4*SBLCtanklevel10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.43(b)(5)Assessmentoffacilityconditionsandselectionofappropriateproceduresduringnormal,abnormal,andemergencysituations.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:184of22008September2015 ID:S83Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:BANK:EQOP8023002A003001WhilemitigatinganATWSper29.100.01Sheet1A,whatisthesignificanceofTorusWaterTemperaturereaching115°FwhileReactorPoweris10%?A.IfEmergencyDepressurizationisconductedatthispoint,theHeatCapacityLimitwillNOTbeexceeded.B.IfTorusWaterTemperaturecontinuestoincreaseANDisbeingusedastheinjectionsource,ReactorPowerwillLOWER.C.IfStandbyLiquidControlisinjectedatthispoint,HotShutdownBoronWeightwillbeinjectedbeforetheHeatCapacityLimitisreached.D.IfALLinjectiontotheRPVisTerminatedandPreventedatthispoint,RPVWaterLevelwillremainABOVETAFwhenReactorPowerreaches3%.Answer:CILO2015WrittenPage:185of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:BIITCurveisshown-TheslopedpartisbasedoninjectingHSBWpriortoexceedingtheHCL.TheflatpartisbasedonTechnicalSpecificationsscramrequirement.DistracterExplanation:Aisplausible;exceedingHCLrequiresEmergencyDepressurization.Bisplausible;graphshowsLOWERvaluesofpowerwithHIGHERvaluesofTorusTemperature.Displausible;ReactorPowerandTorusTemperatureareconsideredwithRPVWaterLevelby29.100.01Sheet1AATWSRPVControlFSL-8,andundertheseconditionswillrequireTerminatingandPreventingInjection.ReferenceInformation:BWROGEPG/SAGsAppendixBBasesC5pageB-14-15PlantProceduresBWROGEPGAppBNUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.1.25Abilitytointerpretstationreferencematerialssuchasgraphs,curves,tables,etc.295013HighSuppressionPoolWaterTemperature295037SCRAMConditionPresentandReactorPowerAboveAPRMDownscaleorunknown.10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.43(b)(5)Assessmentoffacilityconditionsandselectionofappropriateproceduresduringnormal,abnormal,andemergencysituations.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2008ExamILO2015WrittenPage:186of22008September2015 ID:S84Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:MODIFIED:EQOP3150148A018003Theplantisshutdownwiththefollowingconditions:*ReactorPressureis85psig.*MainSteamIsolationValvesareOPEN.*RHRLoopAisoperatinginShutdownCoolingModewithcooldowninprogress.*ReactorWaterCleanupisinservice.PowertoRPSBusAissubsequentlylostduetoatripofRPSMGSetA.Whichofthestatedactionswillrestoretheplanttonormal?A.EnterSOP23.205,RHRSystem.RestoreShutdownCoolingbystartinganRHRLoopBPumpandopeningE1150-F015B,Div2LPCIInboardIsolationValve.B.EnterSOP23.205,RHRSystem.RestoreShutdownCoolingbyplacingRPSBusAonAlternatePower,resettingtheisolation,andrealigningRHRLoopA.C.EnterAOP20.205.01,LossofShutdownCooling.RestoreShutdownCoolingbystartinganRHRLoopBPumpandopeningE1150-F015B,Div2LPCIInboardIsolationValve.D.EnterAOP20.205.01,LossofShutdownCooling.RestoreShutdownCoolingbyplacingRPSBusAonAlternatePower,resettingtheisolation,andrealigningRHRLoopA.Answer:DILO2015WrittenPage:187of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:RHRLoopAwillexperienceE1150-F015A,Div1LPCIInboardIsolationValveANDE1150-F009,RHRSDCInboardSuctionIsolationValveISOLATION.WithRPSonAlternatePower,theisolationmayberesetandthesystemrestarted.DistracterExplanation:A.Isincorrectandplausible;AOPentryisrequiredandE1150outboardswereaffectedviceinboardisolations.B.Isincorrectandplausible;AOPentryisrequired.C.Isincorrectandplausible;wouldbetrueifE1150outboardswereaffectedviceinboardisolations.ReferenceInformation:SOP23.601Pg11forE1150-F009ANDE1150-F015AISOLATIONGPAOP20.205.01LossofShutdowncoolingactions.SOP23.205.01Shutdowncoolingprocedure.SOP23.316RestoringRPSSection7.3PlantProcedures20.205.01NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2295020AA2Abilitytodetermineand/orinterpretthefollowingastheyapplytoINADVERTENTCONTAINMENTISOLATION:295020AA2.06Causeofisolation.10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.43(b)(5)Assessmentoffacilityconditionsandselectionofappropriateproceduresduringnormal,abnormal,andemergencysituations.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:188of22008September2015 ID:S85Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEWPlantwasoperatingat100%reactorpowerwhentheReactorBuildingVentExhaustRadMonitortrippedupscale(3D36).*TheCRNSOhasreviewed3D36andreportsthatthealarmisvalid.*Thesourceofthereleaseisdischargingintosecondarycontainmentandhasnotbeenidentifiedorisolated.*RBSBNESecondaryContainmentRadLevelhasreachedMaxNormandisstable.*NOOTHERAREASareatorapproachingMaxSafe.Assumingtheplantrespondedasexpectedtothisalarm,theCRSisrequiredtohaveentered__(1)__.Alongwithproceduralactionsthatverifytheplantrespondedasexpected,theCRSwilldirect__(2)__.A.(1)20.000.02,ABNORMALRELEASEOFRADIOACTIVEMATERIAL,and29.100.01SH5,SECONDARYCONTAINMENTANDRADRELEASEONLY.(2)IsolateHPCI.B.(1)20.000.02,ABNORMALRELEASEOFRADIOACTIVEMATERIAL,and29.100.01SH5,SECONDARYCONTAINMENTANDRADRELEASEONLY.(2)IsolateRCIC.C.(1)20.000.02,ABNORMALRELEASEOFRADIOACTIVEMATERIAL,and29.100.01SH5,SECONDARYCONTAINMENTANDRADRELEASE,and29.100.01SH1,RPVCONTROL.(2)IsolateHPCI.D.(1)20.000.02,ABNORMALRELEASEOFRADIOACTIVEMATERIAL,and29.100.01SH5,SECONDARYCONTAINMENTANDRADRELEASE,and29.100.01SH1,RPVCONTROL.(2)IsolateRCIC.Answer:BILO2015WrittenPage:189of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:3D36inalarmmeansthatRBVentExhaustRadiationMonitoris16,000cpmincreasing.Thereforeentryconditionsexistfor20.000.02and29.100.01SH5.Thestemofthequestionsprovidesformostoftherequiredactions,withoutthesourcebeingknown.With1maxnormtheEOPflowchartsrequireisolatingallsystemdischargingintotheareathereforetheRCICwouldneedisolated.DistracterExplanation:A.isplausibleandincorrectbecausetheAOPentryisrequiredandtheactionisanactiontheCRSwoulddirectinthiscase,thisanswerisincorrectbecausetheCRSisREQUIREDtoalsoenterEOP,additionallytheHPCIisnotinRBSBNE.C.isplausibleandincorrectiftheexamineebelievestheconditionsinthestemwillleadtoaSCRAM,thenentryintotheRPVlevelEOPchartwouldberequiredandthelistedactionwouldbeconsistentwiththeRPVlevelEOPentry,additionallytheHPCIisnotinRBSBNE.D.isplausibleandincorrectiftheexamineebelievestheconditionsinthestemwillleadtoaSCRAM,thenentryintotheRPVlevelEOPchartwouldberequiredandthelistedactionwouldbeconsistentwiththeRPVlevelEOPentryandtheEOPchartwoulddirectentryintotheSCRAMAOP.ReferenceInformation:AOP20.000.02PlantProcedures20.000.02NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.4.4Abilitytorecognizeabnormalindicationsforsystemoperatingparameterswhichareentry-levelconditionsforemergencyandabnormaloperatingprocedures295034SecondaryContainmentVentilationHighRadiation10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.43(b)(4)Radiationhazardsthatmayariseduringnormalandabnormalsituations,includingmaintenanceactivitiesandvariouscontaminationconditions.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:190of22008September2015 ID:S86Points:1.00Difficulty:3.50LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:MODIFIED:315-0141-0008-001Theplantisoperatingnormallyat100%power.Maintenancehasreportedthatduetoaninstrumentfailure,theReactorSteamDomePressure-LowinputtotheLPCILOOPSelectlogichasfailedHIGH.Shortlyafteridentifyingtheinstrumentfailure,anearthquakeoccurs.BothRecircPumpstrip,andDrywellpressurerisescausingareactorscram.Currentplantconditionsareasfollows:-RPVLevelis164inches-RPVpressureis450psig-Drywellpressureis22.3psigWhichofthefollowingidentifiesboth(1)thecurrentRHRSystemvalvelineupand(2)theCRSdirectiontotheCRNSOconcerningRHRSystemoperation?A.(1)E1150-F017A&B,LPCILoopOutboardInjectionIsoValves,areopen,andE1150-F015A&B,LPCILoopInboardIsolationValves,areclosed.(2)ManuallyopenE1150-F015ontheloopdesiredforinjectionper23.205,RHRSystem.B.(1)E1150-F017A&B,LPCILoopOutboardInjectionIsoValves,areopen,andE1150-F015A&B,LPCILoopInboardIsolationValves,areopen.(2)MaintainRPVWaterLevel173to214inchesusingLPCIperEOP29.100.01,Sheet1.C.(1)E1150-F017A&B,LPCILoopOutboardInjectionIsoValves,areopen,andE1150-F015A&B,LPCILoopInboardIsolationValves,areclosed.(2)PerformForcedLPCILoopSelectLogicOperationonthedesiredloopper23.205,RHRSystem.D.(1)E1150-F017A&B,LPCILoopOutboardInjectionIsoValves,areopen,andE1150-F015A&B,LPCILoopInboardIsolationValves,areopen.(2)ManuallycloseE1150-F015ontheloopdesiredforContainmentCoolingper23.205,RHRSystem.Answer:AILO2015WrittenPage:191of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:ReactorSteamDomePressure-LowisaninputintotheLPCILoopSelectLogic.Ifpressureis<906psig,LPCIwillalignforinjection.E1150-F015A/BgetsanopensignalfromLPCILoopSelect,butwillnotopenuntilreactorpressureis<461psig(permissive).Inthiscase,thelogicwillnever"see"reactorpressure<906psig,sothelogicwillnotinitiate.SinceE1150-F015A/Bwillnotgetanopensignalfromthelogic,itremainsclosedafterthe461psigpermissiveismetandmustbereopenedper23.205.DistracterExplanation:B.isincorrectbecauseE1150-F015A&Bareclosed.Iftheexamineeassumesthisisthecorrectlineup,actionsfromtheEOParelogical.C.isincorrectbecauseforcedLPCIloopselectisnotrequired.Bothloopsareoperable,andE1150-f015canbemanuallyopened.IfexamineeassumesE1150-F015A&Bcannotbeopened,forcedlogicoperationwouldbelogical.D.isincorrectbecauseE1150-F015A&Bareclosed.Iftheexamineeassumesthisisthecorrectlineup,actionspreventinjectionfromtheoppositeloopandsetupfortoruscoolingarelogical.ReferenceInformation:23.601pg24-ReactorSteamDomePressure-LowisaninputintotheLPCILoopSelectLogic.Itinitiatesifreactorpressureis<906psigandoneorbothRRPumpsarenotrunning.ST-OP-315-0041-001(Fig18)showstheLPCILoopSelectionLogic-if<2RRPumpsarenotrunning,andrxpressureis>906psig,theselectionlogicwillnotactuate.23.205-listssectionsforManualLPCIInitiation(whichrequiresopeningE1150-F015A/B)andForcedLPCIloopSelectionLogicoperation(plantconditionsdonotmeetrequiredprerequisites).PlantProcedures23.205NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.4.21Knowledgeoftheparametersandlogicusedtoassessthestatusofsafetyfunctionssuchasreactivitycontrol,corecoolingandheatremoval,reactorcoolantsystemintegrity,containmentconditions,radioactivityreleasecontrol,etc.203000A2.Abilityto(a)predicttheimpactsofthefollowingontheRHR/LPCI:INJECTIONMODE(PLANTSPECIFIC);and(b)basedonthosepredictions,useprocedurestocorrect,control,ormitigatetheconsequencesofthoseabnormalconditionsoroperations:203000A2.10Nuclearboilerinstrumentfailures10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.43(b)(5)Assessmentoffacilityconditionsandselectionofappropriateproceduresduringnormal,abnormal,andemergencysituations.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:192of22008September2015 ID:S87Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEW-CONTRACTTheplantwasoperatingat75%powerwhenatripoftheSouthRFPoccurred.Currentconditionsareasfollows:Recircpumpspeedslower37%Reactorpower63%SBFWinjectingat600gpmRPVlevel196"andstableHPCIlogicthenmalfunctionscausinganautomaticinitiationofHPCI.WhichofthefollowingactionswouldtheCRSdirectinaccordancewith20.107.01,LossofFeedwaterorFeedwaterControl?A.PerformaRapidPowerReduction.B.RaiseNorthRFPspeedC.InjectwithSBFWat1200gpm.D.PlacetheModeSwitchinShutdown.Answer:DILO2015WrittenPage:193of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:HPCIinitiationisnotwithintheboundoftheanalysisforincreasedcoreinletsubcoolingasdescribedintheAOPbases.ActionistotaketheMODESwitchtoShutdown.A.IsincorrectbecauseofaboveandisplausiblebecauseitisanActionfrom20.107.01ifrecircrunbackoccurs.B.IsincorrectbecauseofaboveandisplausiblebecauseitisanActionfrom20.107.01ifinadequatepumpingpowerexists.However,levelisstableandmanualcontroloftheNRFPisnotdesired.C.IsincorrectbecauseofaboveandisplausiblebecauseitisanActionfrom20.107.01;however,theoverridetakesprecedence.PlantProcedures20.107.01NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.4.49Abilitytoperformwithoutreferencetoproceduresthoseactionsthatrequireimmediateoperationofsystemcomponentsandcontrols.206000HPCISystem.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:194of22008September2015 ID:S88Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEW-CONTRACTThefollowingplantconditionsexistafteraLOCAevent:*RPVlevel-5inches*TorusWaterTemperature180°Fandstable*TorusWaterlevel-90inchesandstable*TorusPressure4psigandstable*ReactorPressure0psigandstable*CoreSprayPumpsA&Cinjectingat6000gpm*CoreSprayPumpsB&Dinjectingat3000gpmWhichofthefollowingCSSystemflowswouldtheCRSdirecttomaximizeCSflowwhileremainingwithinoperatinglimits?A.LowerDiv1to5400gpm.RaiseDiv2to8150gpm.B.LowerDiv1to5400gpm.RaiseDiv2to5400gpm.C.RaiseDiv1to8150gpm.RaiseDiv2to8150gpm.D.RaiseDiv1to7000gpm.RaiseDiv2to7000gpm.Answer:BILO2015WrittenPage:195of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:29.100.01SH6Caution4statesthatCShastobeoperatedwithinNPSHandVortexlimits.TheselimitsaredefinedbythegraphsonSH6.ForaTWLof-90,theMAXflowallowedis5400gpmandisthemostlimiting.7000gpmisincorrectbecauseofVortexLimitandplausibleifonlyCSNPSHLIMITisusedwitha:TorusOverpressure=(4psig)+3.5psig+(-90/30)=4.5,howeverSH6saysdonotinterpolate,thereforeuse0psigcurveforTorusOverpressure.Therefore180°FTWT=7000gpmfor0psigcurve.8150gpmisincorrectbecauseofVortexLimitandplausibleifonlyCSNPSHLMITisusedwithabovetorusoverpressureandtheexamineechoosestointerpolate,thisgivesavalueof8150.PlantProcedures29.100.01SH6NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.4.20KnowledgeofoperationalimplicationsofEOPwarnings,cautions,andnotes.209001LowPressureCoreSpraySystem.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:196of22008September2015 ID:S89Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEW-CONTRACTTheplantisinMode5withrefuelingoperationsinprogress.Therefuelfloorcoordinatorreportsthatafuelbundlecontactedtheedgeofastoragerackandwasdamaged.Momentslaterthefollowingindicationsareobserved.*3D31,DIVI/IIFPVENTEXHRADNMONITORUPSCALE,alarmsforallchannels.*3D35,DIVI/IIFPVENTEXHRADNMONITORUPSCALETRIP,alarmsforallchannels.*T46-R800A,Div1SGTSFlowRecorder,indicates4950scfm.*T46-R800B,Div2SGTSFlowRecorder,indicates3950scfm.*8D46,DIV1REACTORBLDGPRESSUREHIGH/LOW,alarms.*17D46,DIV2REACTORBLDGPRESSUREHIGH/LOW,alarms.*T41-R800A,Div1RBDiffPress,indicates-0.6incheswc.*T41-R800B,Div2RBDiffPress,indicates-0.6incheswc.Basedontheseindications,(1)determinetheimpactsforSGTS,and(2)determinewhatactionsarenecessarytoaddresstheconditions.A.(1)Secondarycontainmentpressureisslightlytoonegative.TheincreasedflowinDiv1SGTSincreasesthecharcoalbedadsorptionrate.(2)MaintainDiv1SGTSinservice,andshutdownDiv2SGTS.B.(1)Secondarycontainmentpressureisslightlytoonegative.TheincreasedflowinDiv1SGTSreducesthecharcoalbedadsorptionrate.(2)MaintainDiv2SGTSinservice,andshutdownDiv1SGTS.C.(1)Secondarycontainmentpressureisnotnegativeenough.ThedecreasedflowinDiv2SGTSincreasesthecharcoalbedadsorptionrate.(2)MaintainDiv2SGTSinservice,andshutdownDiv1SGTS.D.(1)Secondarycontainmentpressureisnotnegativeenough.ThedecreasedflowinDiv2SGTSreducesthecharcoalbedadsorptionrate.(2)MaintainDiv1SGTSinservice,andshutdownDiv2SGTS.Answer:BILO2015WrittenPage:197of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:DivisiononeSGTSisoperatingoutsideofthenormalflowrangeasdescribedinSOP23.404as3879-4180scfm.TheSOP23.404willdirectstoppingonedivisionofSGTSasdoesARPs8D46and17D46basedonthesecondarycontainmentpressurebeingslightlytoonegativebelowthealarmsetpointof-0.5incheswc.ToohighofaflowreducesthecharcoalbedadsorptionasdescribedinST-OP-315-0020page19.AnswerAisincorrectandplausible.TheSROexamineecouldincorrectlyidentifythatDivision1SGTSincreasedflowwouldincreasetheadsorptionratebasedonmoreairflowpastthebed.AnswerCisincorrectandplausible.TheSROexamineecouldidentifythatDivision2SGTSflowlowercomparedwouldincreasetheadsorptionratewiththegasremainingnearthebedlonger.Althoughthisisthenormalflowforthesystemdesignanddoesnotincreasetheadsorptionrate.Alsotheanswerinincorrectsincesecondarycontainmentpressureisnegativeenough.AnswerDisincorrectandplausible.TheSROexamineecouldincorrectlyidentifythatDivision2SGTSflowlowercomparedwoulddecreasetheadsorptionratewiththegasremainingnearthebedlonger.Thisisthenormalflowrangeandwouldnotdecreasetheadsorptionrate.Alsotheanswerinincorrectsincesecondarycontainmentpressureisnegativeenough.PlantProcedures17D4608D4623.404NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2261000StandbyGasTreatmentSystem261000A2Abilityto(a)predicttheimpactsofthefollowingontheSTANDBYGASTREATMENTSYSTEM;and(b)basedonthosepredictions,useprocedurestocorrect,control,ormitigatetheconsequencesofthoseabnormalconditionsoroperations:261000A2.02HighsystemflowNRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:198of22008September2015 ID:S90Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEWTheplantisoperatingat100%reactorpowerwiththeCenterstationaircompressorinserviceandtheEaststationaircompressorinstandby.IASEastDRYERUNIThasbeenremovedfromserviceper23.129andtaggedout.AmalfunctionoftheIASWestDRYERUNITstartsloweringIASairpressure.IsolationandbypassingoftheIASdryerunitisbeingattemptedbyfieldpersonnel.Thiseventcausesthefollowingplanttransient:*IASHEADERPRESSUREindicates70psigandslowlylowering*STATIONAIRHEADERPRESSUREindicates105psigandsteady*NIASHEADERPRESSUREindicates97psigoneachdivisionandiscyclingwithinnormalband.Thefollowingvalveshaveclosed:*P5000-F440,DIV1CONTROLAIRISOVLV*P5000-F441,DIV2CONTROLAIRISOVLVAdditionallythefollowingalarmsarein:*7D50DIVI/DIV2CONTROLAIRCOMPRESSORAUTOSTART*7D54INTERRUPTIBLECONTROLAIRHEADERPRESSURELOW*7D56INTERRUPTIBLECONTROLAIRDRYERTROUBLE*7D60RHRCOMPLEXCONTROLAIRPRESSURELOW*3D80CONTROLRODDRIFTWhichofthefollowingmusttheCRSdirect?A.PlaceReactorModeswitchinSHUTDOWNB.StartanyavailableStationAirCompressor.C.SupplyNIASfromStationAirD.CrosstieDiv2NIASwithIASAnswer:AILO2015WrittenPage:199of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:IASpressureisloweringand3D80indicatescontrolroddrift.ThereforetheCRSwillhavetodirectthemodeswitchtoshutdown.B.IsplausibleandincorrectbecauseitisanactionintheAOPforStationAirPressure<95.HowevertheIASairdryerisalreadypassingthemaximumcubicfeetofairthatitcan.TheexamineewillchoosethisansweriftheybelievemoreaircanbepassedtoIASfromStationairorthatStationAirPressurewilllowerasIASlowerssothattheymeetthe<95psigtostartaStationAirCompressor.C.IsplausibleandincorrectbecauseNIASisnormallyaloadonIAS,howeveritisnotcurrentlyaloadbecausethecontrolaircompressorsaresupplyingNIAS.TheexaminewillchoosethisansweriftheybelieveNIASisstillaloadforIASandbelievetheloadreductioncanhelp.D.IsplausibleandincorrectbecausethisconnectionexistsinthesystemviatheP500F403,howeverthisconnectionisonlyusedtosupplyNIASfromIAS.ThereisnoproceduralthatsupportsforsupplyingIASfromDIV2NIASbecausetheconnectionisnotdesignedtosupportsupplingIASbecausethedemandofIASismuchgreaterthanDIV2NIAScanprovide.Ref20.129.01Basis(pg2)and20.129.01(overridestatement)PlantProcedures20.129.01NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2300000A2.Abilityto(a)predicttheimpactsofthefollowingontheINSTRUMENTAIRSYSTEMand(b)basedonthosepredictions,useprocedurestocorrect,control,ormitigatetheconsequencesofthoseabnormaloperation:300000A2.01Airdryerandfiltermalfunctions10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.43(b)(5)Assessmentoffacilityconditionsandselectionofappropriateproceduresduringnormal,abnormal,andemergencysituations.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:200of22008September2015 ID:S91Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEWTheplantisoperatingat100%power.AnIASleakaffectingbothCRDflowcontrolvalveshasoccurred.Systemflowhasbeenrestoredinaccordancewith20.106.03CRDFlowControlFailure.TheIASleakworsensandrod02-19beginsdriftingintothecore.Whatisthe(1)expectedimpactand(2)whatactionswilltheCRSdirect?A.(1)Additionalcontrolrodswillbegindriftingintothecore.(2)PlacethemodeswitchinS/DandCLOSEtheflowcontrolvalvelocally.B.(1)Asinglecontrolrodisdriftingintothecore.(2)Manuallyinsertrod02-19usingEMERRODIN.C.(1)Additionalcontrolrodswillbegindriftingintothecore.(2)PlacethemodeswitchinS/Dwhen2ormorerodsbegindrifting.D.(1)Asinglecontrolrodisdriftingintothecore.(2)Disarmthedriftingcontrolrod.Answer:AILO2015WrittenPage:201of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:ThecandidatemustrealizethattheIASleakwillaffecttheremainderofthecontrolrodsinthesamemannerandcontinuetodriftadditionalrods.Procedureforlossofair20.129.01onlyrequiresoneroddrifttoplacethemodeswitchinshutdown.Alsoprocedure20.106.03FCVfailurehasacautionstatingthatisareactorscramoccurs,aFCVinmanualmustbefullyclosedlocally.DistracterExplanation:B.Althoughthefirsthalfiscorrectthatasinglecontrolrodisdrifting,morewilldriftbasedontheIASleakandtheactiontomanuallyinsertitwouldbegivenif20.106.07ControlRodDriftwasapplicable.20.129.01requiresascramifasinglecontrolrodisdrifting.C.Additionalrodswillbedrifting,andmonitoringforanotherroddriftingwouldbeappropriateif20.106.07wasapplicableinthecurrentconditions,howeveritisnot.D.Althoughthefirsthalfiscorrectthatasinglecontrolrodisdrifting,morewilldriftbasedontheIASleakandtheactiontodisarmtherodwouldbegivenif20.106.07ControlRodDriftwasapplicable,aftertherodwasinserted.Ref(20.129.01)PlantProcedures20.129.01NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2201001A2.Abilityto(a)predicttheimpactsofthefollowingontheCRDHYDRAULICSYSTEM;and(b)basedonthosepredictions,useprocedurestocorrect,control,ormitigatetheconsequencesofthoseabnormalconditionsoroperations:201001A2.09Lossofapplicableplantairsystems.10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.43(b)(5)Assessmentoffacilityconditionsandselectionofappropriateproceduresduringnormal,abnormal,andemergencysituations.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:202of22008September2015 ID:S92Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:MODIFIEDBANKID:31046AnATWSisinprogresswiththefollowingconditions:*RPVlevelisbeingcontrolledat-15to0inches.*ALLMSIVsareclosed.*AllControlRodsareNOTinserted.*TorusCooling,TorusSpraysandDrywellSpraysarebeingsuppliedfromRHR.*ContainmentVentingisbeingperformedtomaintainTorusPressurebelowthePrimaryContainmentPressureLimit.*TheSLCSystemhasfailed,andAlternateBoronInjection(29.ESP.02)isbeingimplemented.*ContainmentHighRangeRadiationMonitorsindicate3000R/hr(40minutesafterthescram).InaccordancewithEP-101,whichONEofthefollowingEmergencyActionLevelsisappropriatebasedsolelyonFissionProductBarrierDegradation?A.UnusualEventFU1-AnyLossORAnyPotentialLossofPrimaryContainment.B.AlertFA1-AnyLossORAnyPotentialLossofEITHERFuelCladORReactorCoolantSystem.C.SiteAreaEmergencyFS1-LossORPotentialLossofAnyTwoBarriers.D.GeneralEmergencyFG1-LossofAnyTwoBarriersANDPotentialLossofThirdBarrierAnswer:DILO2015WrittenPage:203of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:CHRRMSisanindicationofFuelCladbreach,andVentingduetoapproachingPCPL(duetoinadequateTorusCooling)isRCSandCTBarrierbreach.ThisquestionisconceptualonFPBarriers.DistracterExplanation:A.IsplausibleifcandidatecannotassociateventingirrespectiveofreleaserateswithCTfailure.B.IsplausibleifcandidatecannotassociateCHRRMindicationwithfuelfailureORContainmentPressurewithRCSfailureORassociateventingirrespectiveofreleaserateswithCTfailure.C.IsplausibleifcandidatecannotassociateCHRRMindicationwithfuelfailureandContainmentPressurewithRCSfailure.ReferenceInformation:EP-101TABF-ProvidedinHandoutfolder.PlantProceduresEP-101NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.4.41Knowledgeoftheemergencyactionlevelthresholdsandclassifications219000RHR/LPCI:Torus/SuppressionPoolCoolingModeNRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:204of22008September2015 ID:S93Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEWTheplantisoperatingat100%powerwithDiv1CCHVACinservicewhenthefollowingoccurs:*3D36DIVI/IIRBVENTEXHRADNMONITORUPSCALETRIPalarms.*DivI/IIRBVentExhaustRadiationMonitorreads16,500cpmonbothdivisions.*Allautomaticactionsoccurasexpected.BasedontheaboveconditionswhichofthefollowingactionswouldbeincludedintheactionstheCRSdirect?A.Per22.000.03and22.000.04,GENERALOPERATINGPROCEDURE,ShutdowntheReactor.B.Per23.427,PRIMARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONSYSTEM,VerifyGroup18isolationsC.Per20.000.02,ABNORMALRELEASEOFRADIOACTIVEMATERIAL,ShutdownDiv1CCHVACEmergMakeupFan.D.Per20.000.02,ABNORMALRELEASEOFRADIOACTIVEMATERIAL,ShutdownDiv2CCHVACEmergMakeupFan.Answer:DILO2015WrittenPage:205of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:20.000.02ConditionCdirectstheshutdownCCHVACEmergMakeupFanofthenon-operatingdivisionifbothmakeupfansarerunning.A.IsincorrectandplausablebecausethisactionislistedintheEOPshowevertheGOPshutdownisonlyusedifNOTHINGisdischargingfromaprimarysystemintosecondarycontainment.Thisanswerisplausibleiftheexamineefeelsthattheconditionsabovemeritsshutdown,butascramisundesirable.B.Isincorrectandplausablebecausegroup18isPrimaryContainmentPneumaticSupplySystem,iftheexaminedoesnotknowthegroupisolationrequirements,thisanswerisplausibleasapenetrationofprimarycontainmentthatcouldneedisolation.AdditionallyGroup14&16isolationsdooccur.C.Isincorrectandplausablebecauseamakeupfandoesneedshutdown,howeverbecauseDiv1wasinservice,Div2isthecorrectanswer.Ref:20.000.02pg3,4,&5PlantProcedures20.000.0229.100.01SH5NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2290003A2.Abilityto(a)predicttheimpactsofthefollowingontheCONTROLROOMHVAC;and(b)basedonthosepredictions,useprocedurestocorrect,control,ormitigatetheconsequencesofthoseabnormalconditionsoroperations:290003A2.01Initiation/reconfiguration10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.43(b)(5)Assessmentoffacilityconditionsandselectionofappropriateproceduresduringnormal,abnormal,andemergencysituations.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:206of22008September2015 ID:S94Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:NEWYouaretheRefuelFloorSupervisor.TheplantisshutdownandplantisinMODE5.Whichofthefollowingactionsmustbecompletedpriortocommencingcorealterations?A.Verify50hourshaveelapsedsinceReactorShutdown.B.ObtainpermissiontocommencecorealterationsfromOperationsEngineer.C.RestrictaccesstotheupperelevationsoftheDrywellabovethe627ft.elevation.D.ConfirmtheSupervisor,ReactorEngineeringshallestablishoversightofcorealterationsfromthecontrolroom.Answer:CILO2015WrittenPage:207of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:MOP13requiresthatpriortoCoreAlterationsthatAccesstotheupperelevationsoftheDrywellduringmovementofirradiatedcorecomponentsorfuelwillberestrictedabovethe627ft.elevation.Accessabovethe627ft.elevationbutbelowthe633ft.elevationwillbeallowedonacasebycasebasis.Accessisprohibitedabovethe633ft.elevation.A.IsincorrectandplauseablebecauseMOP13requires60hourstoelaspesinceRxShutdownbeforecoreAlterations.50hoursisincorrect.B.IsincorrectandplauseablebecauseMOP13requirestheShiftManagergivepermissionforcorealterations.TheOperationsEngineeristheSupervisorfortheShiftManagers.D.Isincorrectandplauseablebecausethemaincontrolroomdoesmaintainoversight,howeverthisisnotwhattheSupervisor,ReactorEngineeringdoesforcorealterationsRef:MOP13Section4.1andSection4.2PlantProceduresMOP13NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.1.41Knowledgeoftherefuelingprocess10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.43(b)(7)Fuelhandlingfacilitiesandprocedures.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:208of22008September2015 ID:S95Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:LowSource:BANKID:27039Duringcorealterationswithfuelmovements,inadditiontominimumshiftcomplementsperMOP03,PoliciesandPractices,whatistheminimumshiftcomplementrequiredperMOP13?1RefuelFloorSupervisor,1FuelHandler,_____________A.andnoothersrequiredB.and1FuelMovementVerifieronlyC.1FuelMovementVerifier,and1ReactorEngineeronlyD.1FuelMovementVerifier,1ReactorEngineer,and1RefuelFloorCoordinatorAnswer:BILO2015WrittenPage:209of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:TheminimumshiftcomplementforcorealterationsshallconsistofthosepositionslistedinMOP03,"PoliciesandPractices,"plusoneRefuelFloorSupervisor;andduringfuelmovements,additionalpositionsrequirementofone(1)fuelhandler,andone(1)FuelMovementVerifier.AisincorrectbecausethereisnoFuelMovementVerifierC.isincorrectbecauseReactorEngineerisnotrequiredD.isincorrectbecauseReactorEngineerandRefuelFloorCoordinatorarenotrequired
Reference:
MOP13,page2PlantProceduresMOP13NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.1.42KnowledgeofnewandspentfuelmovementproceduresNRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2013AuditExam/ILO2012ExamILO2015WrittenPage:210of22008September2015 ID:S96Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:BANK:ILO2010NRCEXAMDuetoanerrorinthecalibrationprocedurefortheRPSDrywellPressureinstruments,thehighpressuretripsetpointforallfourchannelswereadjustedsuchthatthechannelswouldnottripuntilDrywellPressurereaches2.2psig.InordertosatisfytherequiredTechnicalSpecifications,readjustthetripsetpointforchannels__________________________.A.AandDtobelowTechnicalSpecificationlimitswithin1hour.B.AandCtobelowTechnicalSpecificationlimitswithin6hours.C.BandDtobelowTechnicalSpecificationlimitswithin1hour.D.BandCtobelowTechnicalSpecificationlimitswithin6hours.Answer:AILO2015WrittenPage:211of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:TorestoretripcapabilityforDrywellPressure,atleastoneofthetripsystemsmustberestored(tripsetpointlessthan1.88psig)within1hour.Torestoreatripsystemthetwochannelsforthattripsystem[(AorC)and(BorD)]mustberestored.DistracterExplanation:Distractersareplausibleandincorrectbasedonunderstandingtripsetpointandlogiclistedabove.ReferenceInformation:23.601Pg20(LogicforDrywellPressure-High)T.S.3.3.1.1(setpointandrequirement)NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.2.23AbilitytotrackTechnicalSpecificationlimitingconditionsforoperations.295024HighDrywellPressure.TechnicalSpecifications3.3.1.1ReactorProtectionSystem(RPS)Instrumentation10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.43(b)(2)Facilityoperatinglimitationsinthetechnicalspecificationsandtheirbases.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2010ExamILO2015WrittenPage:212of22008September2015 ID:S97Points:1.00Difficulty:3.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:MODIFIEDBANKID:32686TheRHRSWSystemisdesignedtoprovidecoolingwaterfortheResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)Systemheatexchangers,requiredforasafereactorshutdownfollowingaDesignBasisAccident(DBA).WhichONEofthefollowingwillensurethisdesigncapacity?A.DivIRHRReservoirat26feet,DivIIReservoirat25.5feetRHRReservoiraveragetemperatureof64°FB.DivIRHRReservoirat25.5feet,DivIIReservoirat25.2feetRHRReservoiraveragetemperatureof81°FC.DivIRHRReservoirat25.4feet,DivIIReservoirat25.6feetRHRReservoiraveragetemperatureof82°FD.DivIRHRReservoirat24feet,DivIIReservoirat25feetRHRReservoiraveragetemperatureof77°FAnswer:AILO2015WrittenPage:213of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:RHRServiceWaterrequiresanadequatesuctionsource(UltimateHeatSink)boundedbyaminimumindependentandaveragelevelof25ftandtemperature<80°Fwithbothtowersandfansoperable.DistracterExplainationB.IsincorrectandplausiblebecauseRHRReservoiraveragetemperatureistoohigh.TheexamineeincorrectlyfocusontheReservoirlevelonly.C.IsincorrectandplausiblebecauseRHRReservoiraveragetemperatureistoohigh.TheexamineeincorrectlyfocusontheReservoirlevelonly.D.IsincorrectandplausiblebecauseAverageofbothlevelsislessthantherequired25ft.TheexamineeincorrectlyfocusontheRHRReservoiraveragetemperatureonly.NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.2.25KnowledgeofbasesinTechnicalSpecificationsforlimitingconditionsforoperationsandsafetylimits.TechnicalSpecifications3.7.1ResidualHeatRemovalServiceWater(RHRSW)System3.7.2EmergencyEquipmentCoolingWater(EECW)/EmergencyEquipmentServiceWater(EESW)SystemandUltimateHeatSink(UHS)10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.43(b)(2)Facilityoperatinglimitationsinthetechnicalspecificationsandtheirbases.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:214of22008September2015 ID:S98Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:BANK:EQOP8320001A002001EmergencyOperationsFacilitiesareNOTmanned.Followinganaccident,itisrequiredtoestimateCore/FuelDamageusingthefollowingContainmentHighRangeRadiationMonitor(CHRRM)readingsandconditions:*ReactorwasSHUTDOWNat1200.*CHRRMReadingsweretakenat1300.*DIV1CHRRMindicates2.0x104R/hr.*DIV2CHRRMindicates1.5x104R/hr.WhichONEofthefollowingisthecorrectCore/FuelDamagecalculation,basedonthesereadings?%GapRelease(H)%ofFermi-2UpperBoundLOCA(J)%ofRegulatoryGuide1.3LOCA(K)A.B.C.D.Answer:BILO2015WrittenPage:215of22008September201540.011.821.45.01.9115.430.08.828.66.72.511.8 AnswerExplanation:AnswercalculatedusingEnl.B1hourvaluesfor(E)7E+4,(F)3E+5,and(G)8E+5PlantProceduresEP-547NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.3.5Abilitytouseradiationmonitoringsystems,suchasfixedradiationmonitorsandalarms,portablesurveyinstruments,personnelmonitoringequipment,etc.10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.43(b)(4)Radiationhazardsthatmayariseduringnormalandabnormalsituations,includingmaintenanceactivitiesandvariouscontaminationconditions.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2008ExamILO2015WrittenPage:216of22008September2015 ID:S99Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEWTheplantwasoperatingat100%power.TheNorthRFPtripped.Thefollowingactionsareinprogress:*SBFWhasbeenstartedandisinjectingat1200gpm.*TheP603operatorisinsertingtheCRAMarraytolowerReactorPower.*Reactorwaterlevelis185inchesandrisingslowly.Assumingnootherplanteventsandthatreactorpowerisloweredtobelow65%byfullyinsertingtheCRAMarraywhichONEofthefollowingdescribesarequiredfollowupactionthatwillbedirectedbyCRSbasedontheactionstakensofar?A.PlaceRecircA&BFlowLimiter2/3DefeatswitchinDEFEAT.B.PlacetheReactorModeswitchinSHUTDOWNC.PerformaReactorshutdownusingtheGOP.D.ShutdownSBFW.Answer:DILO2015WrittenPage:217of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:20.107.01LOSSOFFEEDWATERORFEEDWATERCONTROLdirectsactionsforatrippedRFPandRWLisloworloweringbecausealackofAdequatepumpingcapacity.CONDITIOND.ReactorPower>65%ANDRFPtripped.(pg5)ACTION:D.1VerifyRRrunsbackto2/3Limiter.D.2PlaceRecircA&BFlowLimiter2/3DefeatswitchinNORMAL.D.3InjectwithSBFWat1200gpm.D.4InsertCRAMarraytolowerReactorPower<65%.AdditionallywhenCONDITIONE.CRAMarrayinserted.(pg5)ACTION:E.1VerifyReactorPower<65%.E.2ShutdownSBFW.E.3MonitorCoreThermalLimits.E.4NotifySNE.A.IsplausibleandincorrectbecauseitrequiredactionforthisswitchtobeplaceinNORMALfortheconditionslisted.B.IsplausibleandincorrectbecauseloweringpowerandflowcanputthecoreinaSCRAMregion,howevertheseconditionswillnot.C.Isplausibleandincorrectbecausetheexamineemayincorrectlyassumeconditiontonotallowcontinuedpoweroperations.Ref(20.107.01pg3,5)PlantProcedures20.107.01NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.4.11Knowledgeofabnormalconditionprocedures.295031ReactorLowWaterLevel.10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.43(b)(5)Assessmentoffacilityconditionsandselectionofappropriateproceduresduringnormal,abnormal,andemergencysituations.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:218of22008September2015 ID:S100Points:1.00Difficulty:0.00LevelofKnowledge:HighSource:NEWTheplantisoperatingat100%powerwhen,duetoalossoffeedwaterareactorSCRAMoccurs.TheShiftenterstheEOPsonRPVwaterlevel3,andtakesappropriateactions.20minuteslater,theplantisstablewithRPVwaterlevelbeingmaintained173-214inches,when16D27FIREALARMoccurs.FireDetectionZone14/FireZone11ABW:Div2BatteryChargerRoomisalarming.ThefieldoperatorreportsthatthefiredoortoDiv2BatteryChargerRoomishottothetouchandthereisastrongodorofsmokeinthearea.TheCRSEnters20.000.22PlantFiresandbeginsdirectingtheshifttorespondtothefire.IfthefireweretospreadthroughtheDiv2BatteryChargerRoomfiredoorstotheadjacentareas,whichofthefollowingactionswouldtheCRSdirectandwhy?A.PERFORM20.000.18,ControlOfThePlantFromTheDedicatedShutdownPanel,becauseofafireina3Lzone.B.DIRECTtheCRNSOtouseHPCIandSBFWaspreferredmakeupsources,becausethefirehasorcouldimpactRCIC.C.DIRECTtheCRNSOtouseRCICandSBFWaspreferredmakeupsources,becausethefirehasorcouldimpactHPCI.D.PERFORM20.000.19ShutdownFromOutsideTheControlRoom,becauseofafirehasdamagedtheabilityofMCRtocontrolsafeshutdownequipment.Answer:AILO2015WrittenPage:219of22008September2015 AnswerExplanation:TheDCMCCAreaisoneoftheimmediatelyadjacentareas.Therefore:Per20.000.22CONDITIONCFirein3LZone(8,9A,11,12,12A,14(DCMCCArea)or16(AB4only).ACTION:C.1PERFORM20.000.18,ControlOfThePlantFromTheDedicatedShutdownPanelB&C.BothHPCIandRCICarecompromisedbythefirewithspreadtoadjacentareas,BothoftheseareplausibleiftheexamineefailstounderstandtherelationshipsbetweenHPCI,RCICandESFDivisionalDCpower.Additionallythesedistractersarequotedfromthefirestrategieslistedin20.000.22Plantfires.D.ThisanswerisplausibleiftheexaminedoesnotunderstandthepurposeoftheAOPorconfusesthepurposeofthisAOPwith20.000.18ControlOfThePlantFromTheDedicatedShutdownPanel.BothAOPsdocontroltheplantfromoutsidetheMCR.B&CMORE:AllRCICpumpandvalvemotors(exceptF084andF007)receive260VDCmotorpowerand130VDCcontrolpowerfrom260VDCMCC2PA-1.PowertoF084issuppliedfrom260VDCMCC2PB-1.PowertoF007issuppliedvia480VACMCC72F-4A.AllHPCIpumpandvalvemotors,exceptF075andF002,receive260VDCmotorpowerand130VDCcontrolpowerfrom260VDCMCC2PB-1.PowertoF075issuppliedfrom260VDCMCC2PA-1.PowertoF002issuppliedvia480VACMCC72C-3A(120/24VACcontrolpowerissuppliedby2transformersfromthesameMCCposition).260VDCMCC2PA(B)-1islocatedAB2-H11(Zone14)PlantProcedures20.000.22NUREG1123KACatalogRev.2G2.4.273.4/3.9Knowledgeof"fireintheplant"procedure10CFR55RO/SROWrittenExamContent10CFR55.43(b)(5)Assessmentoffacilityconditionsandselectionofappropriateproceduresduringnormal,abnormal,andemergencysituations.NRCExamUsageILO2015ExamILO2015WrittenPage:220of22008September2015