IR 05000334/2013003

IR 5000334-2013003 and 5000412-2013003, 04-01-2013 - 06-30-2013, Beaver Valley Power Station - NRC Integrated Inspection Report

ML13211A101
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	07/30/2013
From:	Hunegs G NRC/RGN-I/DRP/PB6
To:	Emily Larson FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co
HUNEGS, GK
References
IR-13-003
Download: ML13211A101 (37)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION uly 30, 2013

SUBJECT:

BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000334/2013003 AND 05000412/2013003

Dear Mr. Larson:

On June 30, 2013, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on July 10, 2013 with Eric Larson, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

This report documents one NRC-identified Severity Level IV non-cited violation (NCV) with an associated Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) finding of very low safety significance (Green).

Additionally, one licensee-identified violation, which was determined to be of very low safety significance, is listed in this report. However, because of the very low safety significance, and because they are entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating these findings as NCVs, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest any NCVs in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Beaver Valley Power Station.

In addition, if you disagree with the cross-cutting aspect assigned to any finding in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region I, and the NRC Resident Inspector at Beaver Valley Power Station. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRCs Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of the NRCs Agencywide Documents Access Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.htmL (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely, /RA/ Gordon K. Hunegs, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-334, 50-412 License Nos.: DPR-66, NPF-73

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000334/2013003 and 05000412/2013003 w/Attachment: Supplementary Information

REGION I== Docket Nos.: 50-334, 50-412 License Nos.: DPR-66, NPF-73 Report No.: 05000334/2013003 and 05000412/2013003 Licensee: FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) Facility: Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Location: Shippingport, PA 15077 Dates: April 1, 2013 to June 30, 2013 Inspectors: D. Spindler, Senior Resident Inspector E. Carfang, Resident Inspector N. Floyd, Reactor Inspector D. Kern, Senior Reactor Inspector P. Kaufman, Senior Reactor Inspector J. Kulp, Resident Inspector T. Moslak, Health Physicist T. Ziev, Reactor Inspector Approved By: Gordon Hunegs, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY

IR 05000334/2013003, 05000412/2013003; 04/01/2013 - 06/30/2013; Beaver Valley Power

Station, Units 1 and 2; Licensed Operator Requalification Program.

This report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced inspections performed by regional inspectors. Inspectors identified one Severity Level IV non-cited violation (NCV) and one associated Finding (FIN) of very low safety significance (Green).

The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (i.e., greater than Green, or Green, White, Yellow, Red) and determined using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP), dated June 2, 2011. Cross-cutting aspects are determined using IMC 0310, Components Within Cross-Cutting Areas, dated October 28, 2011. All violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy, dated January 28, 2013. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 4.

Cornerstone: Initiating Events

Severity Level IV. The inspectors identified a Severity Level (SL) IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.59, Changes, Tests and Experiments, and associated Green finding because FENOC did not perform a written 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation to support the adequacy of an abnormal operating procedure (AOP) for response to a security threat. Specifically, FENOC did not adequately implement the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59 and procedure NOBP-LP-4003A, FENOC 10 CFR 50.59 User Guidelines for procedure 1/2OM-53C.4A.100.1 Security Threat Procedure. This procedure prescribed steps to exceed the reactor coolant system (RCS) maximum cooldown rate as described in the updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR) and technical specifications (TS) without a written evaluation supporting the adequacy of the AOP. FENOC generated CR-2013-06122, 06382, and 07557. FENOC revised the abnormal operating procedure (AOP) to comply with TS as part of the immediate corrective actions.

The inspectors evaluated the performance deficiency using traditional enforcement in conjunction with the significance determination process (SDP) because the performance deficiency had the potential to impact the regulatory process. The finding is more than minor because if left uncorrected, could have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, if the procedure were implemented during a security event, FENOC would exceed cooldown rates assumed in the UFSAR accident analyses, potentially challenging the integrity of the RCS. In accordance with IMC 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Exhibit 1 of IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, issued June 19, 2012, the inspectors determined that this finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the performance deficiency represented a transient initiator that would not cause a reactor trip and loss of mitigation equipment relied upon to transition the plant from the onset of a trip to a stable shutdown condition. Additionally, in accordance with Section 6.1.d.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, this violation is categorized as an SL IV because the resulting conditions were evaluated as having very low safety significance (Green) by the SDP. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Work Practices because FENOC did not implement its regulatory applicability process which erroneously concluded that 50.59 was not applicable to implementation of procedure 1/2OM-53C.4A.100.1. Although the performance deficiency occurred in 2005, the inspectors determined this performance deficiency is indicative of current performance because subsequent revisions of 1/2OM-53C.4A.100.1 and 100.2 (the most recent revision implemented on December 12, 2012) did not identify the failure to adequately implement the 10 CFR 50.59 User Guidelines [H.4(b)]. (Section 1R11)

Other Findings

One violation of very low safety significance identified by FENOC was reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions planned by FENOC have been entered into FENOCs corrective action program. The violation and its corrective action tracking number is listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Unit 1 began the inspection period at 100 percent power. The unit remained at or near 100 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period.

Unit 2 began the inspection period at 100 percent power and operated at or near full power until May 28, 2013, when operators shut down the unit to repair the main unit generator. On June 9, 2013, operators commenced a reactor startup and returned the unit to 100 percent power on June 11, 2013. The unit remained at or near 100 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

.1 Readiness for Seasonal Extreme Weather Conditions

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a review of FENOCs readiness for the onset of seasonal high temperatures. The review focused on the Unit 1 and Unit 2 switchgear chillers. The inspectors reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), technical specifications, control room logs, and the corrective action program to determine what temperatures or other seasonal weather could challenge these systems, and to ensure FENOC personnel had adequately prepared for these challenges. The inspectors reviewed station procedures, including FENOCs seasonal weather preparation procedure and applicable operating procedures. The inspectors performed walkdowns of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 switchgear chillers to ensure station personnel identified issues that could challenge the operability of the systems during hot weather conditions.

Documents reviewed for each section of this inspection report are listed in the .

b. Findings

No findings were identified. ==1R04 Equipment Alignment

.1 Partial System Walkdowns

==

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following systems: 3A and 3B motor driven auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pumps during testing of the steam turbine driven AFW pump on May 2, 2013 A train river water (RW) supply to 1CH-E-7A and 1CH-E-7B charging pump lube oil coolers with B train RW supply secured on May 14, 2013 Refueling water storage tank (RWST) silica removal system during initial use on June 18, 2013 C service water system (SWS) pump with B SWS pump out of service for motor refurbishment on June 20, 2013 The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk-significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, the UFSAR, technical specifications, work orders, condition reports, and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could have impacted system performance of their intended safety functions. The inspectors also performed field walkdowns of accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and were operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no deficiencies. The inspectors also reviewed whether FENOCs staff had properly identified equipment issues and entered them into the corrective action program for resolution with the appropriate significance characterization.

b. Findings

No findings were identified. ==1R05 Fire Protection