ML18283B543

Emergency Core Cooling Systems, Low Pressure Coolant Injection Modifications for Performance Improvement

ML18283B543
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry
Issue date:	05/31/1977
From:	Tennessee Valley Authority
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
Download: ML18283B543 (71)

Text

BROGANS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS LOW PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION MODIFICATIONS FOR PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT Ms@ 1977

.. ~.....

TABLE OF CONTENTS Pacae 1 0 INTRODUCTION

~ 2 2 ' BACKGROUND . - ~ ~ ~ ~ - - 3 3o 0 DISCUSSION o o o ~ a o o s ~ ~ o e o o 4 3.1 Accident Descri tion 3.2 Modification 5 3.2.1 Suction Line Break . 5 3.2.2 Dischar e Line Break . 8

3. 3 Model A lication 9 3.4 Safet Anal sis 10

3. 4. 1 E ui ment Ca abilit to Perform as Anal zed 10

3. 4.2 ui ment Interfaces 14 3.4.3 Functional Interface 17 3.4.4 Satisfaction of A ro riate. Standards 18 3.4.5 ualit Assurance and Control 18 4 0

SUMMARY

AND CONCLUSIONS . 19

5.0 REFERENCES

. . . . ~ . . . . . . . . 20

LIST OF TABLES Table Title ECCS Pump Configuration Local Peak Cladding Temperatures and Reflood Times Following a LOCA and Horst Single Failure LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Ficiure Title System Normal Operation System Mode of Operation During Unit 1 LOCA (Suction Line Break) No Failures System Mode of Operation During Unit 1 LOCA (Suction Line Break) LPCI Injection Valve Failure System Mode of Operation During Unit 1 LOCA (Suction Line Break) Diesel Failure System Mode of Operation During Unit 1 LOCA (Suction Line Break) Battery Failure System Mode of Operation During Unit 1 LOCA (Suction Line Break) Opposite Unit Spurious Accident Signal System Mode of Operation During Unit, 1 LOCA (Discharge Line Break) - No Failure System Mode of Operation During Uni) 1 LOCA (Discharge Line Break) LPCI Injec)ion Valve Failure System Mode of Operation During Unit 1 LOCA (Discharge Line Break) Diesel Failure 10 System Mode of Operation During Unit 1 LOCA (Discharge Line Break) - Battery Failure Syst: em Mode of Operation During Unit 1 LOCA (Discharge Line Break) - Opposite Unit Spurious Accident Signal 12 Existing System Valve Bus Arrangement 13 Modified System Valve Bus Arrangement,

System Valve Control Power Arrangement 15 System RHR Pump Divisional Priorities Modified Unit 1 Recirculation Discharge Valve Circuit with Hydraulic-Pneumatic Operator (Without Backup Control) 17 Modified Unit 1 Recirculation Discharge Valve Circuit with Hydraulic-Pneumatic Operator (With Backup Control) 18 Modified Unit 1 LPCI Injection Valve Circuit With Hydraulic-Pneumatic Operator (Without Backup Control) 19 Modified Unit 1 LPCI Injection Valve Circuit With Hydraulic-Pneumatic Operator (With Backup Control) 20 Modified Unit 1 LPCI Minimum Flow Valve Circuit With Hydraulic-Pneumatic Operator (Without Backup Control) 21 Modified Unit 1 LPCI.Minimum Flow Valve Circuit With Hydraulic-Pneumatic Operator (With Backup Control) 22 Modified Unit 2 Recirculation Discharge Valve Circuit With Hydraulic-Pneumatic Operator (Without Backup Control) 23 Modified Unit 2 Recirculation Discharge Valve Circuit with Hydraulic-Pneumatic Operator (With Backup Control) 24 Modified Unit 2 LPCI Injection Valve Circuit With Hydraulic-Pneumatic Operator (>without Backup Control) 25 Modified Unit 2 LPCI Injection Valve Circuit With Hydraulic-Pneumatic Operator (With Backup Control) 26 Modified Unit 2 LPCI Minimum Flow Valve Circuit With Hydraulic-Pneumatic Operator (Without Backup Control) 27 Modified Unit 2 LPCI Minimum Flow Valve Circuit With Hydraulic-Pneumatic Operator (With Backup Control) 28 Typical Schematic for Hydraulic-Pneumatic Operator

1 0 INTRODUCTION Browns Ferry Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) design and performance for Units 1 and 2 have been the subject of a recent review. This review led to a change in the system, which provided a significant reduction in the peak cladding temperature following a postulated recirculation line break. This reduction in peak cladding temperature has been accomplished by elimination of the Low Pressure Coolant In jection (LPCI) System recirculation loop selection and keeping the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) cross-tie valve closed. A report on this previous modification was submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in a letter from J. E. Gilleland to Benard C. Rusche dated Fabruary 12, 1976.

Portions of that previous report are presented here to give a coherent description and safety analysis.

The proposed additional modification changes the power supply to the recirculation pump discharge valves, LPCI injection valves, and LPCI minimum flow valves. The change adds sufficient independent power supplies to eliminate the peed for the existing swing-bus feature.

Major areas of discussion in this report include the proposed independent power supplies and a detailed safety analysis of the modification.

2.0 BACKGROUND

With the advent 'of the Interim Acceptance Criteria, it became advisable to consider the simultaneous occurrence of spraying and flooding to meet the stringent new temperature limit of 2300 F.

The thermal-hydraulic models were refined to permit an accurate calculation of coolant remaining in the vessel following the blowdown, and of spray coolant reaching the lower plenum after the boiloff which takes place as it passes through the active fuel region. These refinements permitted an accurate calculation of the flooding rate due to spray operation, and even with the new requirement of an active component failure anywhere in the ECCS, no jet pump BWR failed to meet the Interim Acceptance Criteria. ECCS modifications which might have been suggested by the new evaluation models were therefore unnecessary.

The final ECCS acceptance criteria adopted by the AEC are more conservative than the interim acceptance criteria. These new criteria reduce operating flexibility and could result in power level restrictions. To offset the effect of the new criteria, a modification has been added to Units 1 and 2 which takes advantage of the credit given for the flooding effect achieved through the availability of additional LPCI pumps under certain single-failure conditions. TVA commited to modify the power supply to the recirculation pump discharge valves, LPCI injection valves, and LPCI minimum flow valves to eliminate the need for the existing swing-bus feature before return to power operation following the second refueling outage of the respective units.

3-' DISCUSSION, 3.1 Accident Descri tion The Design Basis Accident (DBA), Loss-of-Coolant Accident (LOCA),

is one of several hypothesized events used to evaluate the ability of the plant to operate without undue hazard'to the health and safety of the public.

The overall initial assumptions remain as described in Section 14.6.3.1 of the FSAR:

The reactor is operating at the most severe condition at the time of the LOCA, which maximizes the parameter of interest:

primary containment response, fission product release, or core standby cooling system requirements.

A complete loss of normal AC power occurs simultaneously with the LOCA. This additional condition results in the longest delay time for the core standby cooling systems to become operational.

The LOCA assumes that a recirculation loop pipeline is instantly severed. This results in the most rapid coolant loss and depressurization with coolant discharged from both ends of the break.

Ig

.3.2 Modification Modification of the system requires the following hardware and wiring changes on Units 1 and 2:

The auto-transfer feature of valve motive power is eliminated on RHR injection, recirculation pump discharge, and RHR pump minimum flow bypass valves. Motive power to these selected valves is provided by hydraulic-pneumatic operators.

Redundant power supplies to these actuators are provided for positioning the valves to the required LOCA configuration; 3.2. 1 Suction Line Break Figure 2 illustrates operation of the modified system for a break in the recirculation pump suction line. The break location producing the highest peak cladding temperature is, as before, at the nozzle on the pressure vessel. The other side of the postulated <<double-ended<< break is fed through the recirculation loop by the jet pump nozzles, whose small area limits flow to a low value and makes frictional losses negligible in the calculation.

The discharge valves of the recirculation loops will begin closing upon receipt of a permissive signal. The valves are capable of closing against a differential pressure of 200 psid.

To assure the recirculation system discharge valve is not required to close with a differential pressure greater than 200 psid, valve closures are delayed until reactor vessel pressure 4

has decreased to less than 225 psig. By the time the recirculation discharge valve has stroked sufficiently that it could present a flow-limiting restriction, the vessel pressure will have decayed below 200 psig.

Valve closure is therefore effected in about 62 seconds, of which 29 seconds represents the reactor vessel .pressure permissive and 33 seconds the maximum valve closure time. The effect is isolation of the break from the LPCI system injection point.

Approximately 46 seconds a fter the br eak, the LPCI startup sequence is complete and flow commences in both loops. Flow into P

the broken loop will not reach its expected value for an additional 16 seconds, when the recirculation discharge valve has fully closed. The LPCI pumps go nearly to full runout flow, as limited by the additional resistance in the pump discharge line,

, because each pair of pumps is delivering flow to its own bank of jet pump nozzles rather than to one bank as would be the case of loop selection logic. Additional resistance has been added to the LPCI pump discharge lines. This replaces the resistance lost when only one or two pumps are discharging into a system designed

.for three pump flow. The added resistance prevents insufficient Net Positive Suction Head (NPSH) in these modes of operation.

In analyzing the single failures for a suction line break, both AC and DC power failures are considered (see Figures 4 and 5).

For AC power considerations the most significant single failure for the modified system is a Diesel Generator failure. This failure results in two LPCI pumps operating in one loop, one LPCI

pump operating in the alternate loop, and two CS pumps operating in one CS system.

The most significant DC power single failure would be loss of a battery. For a suction line break this failure results in two LPCI pumps operating in one loop, one LPCI pump operating in the alternate loop, and two CS pumps operating in one CS system.

Table 1 shows the various pump combinations for postulated single failures.

The unique power arrangement at Browns Ferry Units 1 and 2 requires examination of an opposite unit spurious accident signal. For this event one RHR pump in each loop of each reactor and one core spray system (two pumps) plus all required valves are available. (Figure 6)

The limiting single failure is that failure which results in the longest reflood time and consequently the highest peak cladding temperature (PCT). Sensitivity studies have been performed which demonstrate that a typical limiting failure in the modified system is the failure of the LPCI injection yalve in the unbroken loop. ,This failure results in four core spray pumps, two in each CS loop, and two LPCI pumps in one loop providi'ng ECCS flow to A

the core. This combination gives a longer ref looding time than one core spray system (two pumps) and one LPCI pump in each loop which is available following an opposite unit spurious accident signal. This is due in part to the effects of counter current flow limiting (CCFL) on the amount of the core spray flow available for ref looding. The assumed occurrence of CCFL results

in there being, only a slight improvement with four CS pumps when compared to two CS pumps. Additionally, the two LPCI pumps feeding into one loop deliver significantly less than twice the flow delivered by a single pump feeding each loop due to the system orificing effects. Thus. the availability of one LPCI pump in each loop for the alternate unit spurious accident signal provides better reflood characteristics than two LPCI pumps into one loop even when supplemented by two additional CS pumps.

3. 2. 2 Di'schar e Line Break Figure 7 illustrates the operation of the modified system with a break in the recirculation pump discharge line.

When the LPCI startup sequence is complete, the LPCI flow in the broken loop is lost through the break. With the modification, the worst-case single failures are failure during opening of the LPCI injection valve opposite the break and failure during opening of the LPCI minimum flow bypass valve serving the RHR pumps intended for injection i'nto the unbroken loop. Table 1 and Figures 8-11 show the pump combination which results from the postulated single failures.

The suction line break remains the design basis accident for the modified system, but with a lower calculated peak cladding temperature.

A typical limiting single failure for the discharge line break is the LPCI injection valve failure. This failure results in four core spray pumps available for core reflooding. This condition results in a longer reflood time than the opposite unit spurious accident signal in which two core spray and one LPCI pumps are available for reflooding. As previously discussed one LPCI pump provides faster reflooding and, consequently lower PCT than two additional CS pumps.

Representative relative peak cladding temperature for the two events described above is shown in Table 2.

The present Browns Ferry Units 1 and 2 system utilizes two power supplies for the electrical distribution system providing power to the LPCI valves. Figure 12 shows the arrangement of the buses and the valves fed from these buses. Figure 13 shows the modified system which eliminates the auto-transfer feature for the electrical distribution system. Electrical interlocks will be maintained to prevent manual paralleling of the two AC sources. The AC power only supplies power for the non-essential hydraulic pumps on the valve operators. Figures 16 through 27 show the valve operator redundant DC power supplies to provide the motive power to produce the stored pneumatic energy.

3.3 Model A lication The core heatup calculations are performed using the approved Appendix K emergency core cooling evaluation models.

3.4 Safet Anal sis The proposed modification has been analyzed and evaluated to assure the changes do not introduce adverse effects to the overall plant. The areas evaluated are discussed in the balance of this section.

3.4. 1 E ui ment Ca abilit to Perform as Anal zed The major components of the proposed modification are unchanged, except for the valve operators and the power supplies for selected valves. Each major element is considere'd below:

3. 4. 1. 1 Emer enc Diesel-Generators The proposed modification does not change any of the operating requirements of the diesel generators.

The operating modes of the LPCI pumps were changed by the previous modification such that two'umps discharge to each injection header thereby changing the discharge flow characteristics from that previously established. Prior to reactor startup after the previous modification, flow tests were conducted to establish the pump discharge path characteristics from which pump flow curves were developed. This information was used to determine the additional resistance to be added on the

discharge side of each pump to ensure satisfaction of pump Net Positive Suction Head (NPSH) requirements.

3. 4. 1.3 Control Circuitr All standards for engineered safeguards control equipment are maintained. Additional relays and wiring have been added to assure single-failure capability.

3.4. 1.4 Recirculation Loo E ualizer Valve and LPCI S stem Cross-Tie. Valve Inadvertent opening of these valves could negate the LPCI system injection when needed, therefore one equalizer valve and the cross-tie valve were closed and motive power removed by the previous modification. An annunciator was added to indicate the LPCI cross-tie valve and/or equalizer valve are not fully closed.

3.4. 1.5 Recirculation Pum Dischai e Valves Closure of the recirculation pump discharge valves is of importance to the proper application of the proposed modification. Hydraulic-pneumatic operators will be added to these valves. Four aspects of valve compatibility have been investigated:

3. 4. 1. 5. 1 Environment As reported in Section 5.2 of the Browns Ferry FSAR, the recirculation system valves are designed to operate under the environmental conditions associated with the DBA-LOCA. The added hydraulic-pneumatic operators are designed to operate under the same conditions.

3.4. 1.5.2 Break Effects A study of the drywell geometry was performed prior to the previous modification to determine the effects of jet impingement resulting from a postulated recirculation line break. For the suction line break, re-routing of cable has been provided, to prevent discharge valve operator malfunction. Valve closure at the time of a discharge line break is not considered in the ECCS analysis. Also, closure of the discharge valve does not change the LPCI system input capability during a discharge line break (See Figure 7).

For the break effects study, breaks were assumed at all terminals, branch lines, and at other locations based upon stress. Breaks were assumed at all locations where pressure plus dead load plus thermal plus earthquake stresses exceed

0. 8(1.2S>+S~) . Additionally, in piping runs where no stresses occur in excess of 0.8(1.2S>+S>), a minimum of two intermediate breaks were postulated based upon the highest total stresses combined as above.

3.4. 1. 5. 3 Valve Differential Pressure Recirculation valve closure requires both a LOCA initiation signal and a decrease in reactor pressure to the permissive setting. With valve closure initiation delayed until reactor pressure has decayed to less than 225 psig (approximately 29 seconds) the differential pressure across the closed valve will always be less than the maximum 200 psid. The sensor and permissive circuitry are designed to satisfy all requirements for engineered safeguards control systems.

3.4.1.6 Minimum Flow B ass Valve Minimum flow bypass valves will be provided with hydraulic-pneumatic operators with redundant DC power supplies and flow switches to assure maximum pump protection under postulated accident conditions. This modification eliminates the need for the auto-transfer of power to these valves. AC power will only supply the nonessential hydraulic pump to the operators of these valves.

3.4. 1. 7 Batteries DC power from qualified station batteries will be the primary and redundant power sources to the hydraulic-pneumatic operator.

Each source is selected such that no single battery failure inhibits redundant power sources or results in a configuration of ECCS pump availability that is less than adequate for core cooling.

3.4.1.8 H draulic 0 erators See Figure 28. Alarms will be provided in the main control room for non-standard accumulator parameters. Accumulator pressure indication will also be provided for operator verification and interpretation.

3.4. 1.8.1 Seismic uglification The operability of the hydraulic-pneumatic valve operators and all the appurtenances vital to their operation during and after a SSE is verified in accordance with IEEE 382 and 384 as applicable to the plant. If the installation of the hydraulic-pneumatic valve operators produce increased loading condition, the LPCI system and recirculation water system shall be requalified to the standards and codes which were applied to the original unmodified system.

3.4.2 ui ment Interfaces The effects 'of the proposed change on the various operating modes of the equipment have been 'evaluated and found to be acceptable, as described below:

3.4.2. 1 Emer enc Diesel-Generators The proposed modification introduces no new or different interfaces for this equipment.

3. 4. 2. 2 Motor Control Centers and Control Panels l I Motor control centers will be modified on those valves necessary for automatic operation for LPCI injection (LPCI injection, recirculation pump discharge, and RHR pump minimum flow bypass valves) in order to accomodate the addition of hydraulic-pneumatic operators. A control panel will be added for backup control to the hydraulic-pneumatic operators. All standards for engineering safeguards control will be maintained.

3. 4. 2. 2. 1 Valve Power Existing Limitorque valve operators will be replaced by hydraulic-pneumatic operators on valves necessary for automatic operation for LPCI injection. This modification allows elimination of the valve motive power auto-transfer feature for redundant power supplies. Physically and electrically separate, redundant DC power supplies are provided to the new operator to assure proper valve movement to the required position during a LOCA. Valve motion times are maintained in order for previous analyses to remain applicable.

3.4. 2. 2. 2 Valve Motor Control To ensure that a malfunction in the individual valve controller does not couple back to the other valve control circuits, the redundant A and B circuits were provided separate relays and contacts in the logic panels on a previous modification. This separated, redundant arrangement has been applied to the LPCI and 4

recirculation system valves needed for operation as described.

System interfacing and protection as related to the valve motor control centers are unchanged except as noted in 3.4.2.2.

3.4.2.2.3 DC Control Power As shown in Figure 14 and Browns Ferry FSAR Figure 8. 6-3, 250 VDC from the station batteries provides control power to LPCI logic panels. After the proposed modification the same equipment receives power from this source as in the original design. These station batteries are also the power source for hydraulic-pneumatic operators. Failure of any one station battery does not cause interactions that exceed the limiting case-for core cooling capabilities. See also 3.4. 1.7.

3.4.2.3 LPCI Lo ic Panels To provide the necessary redundancy required on the previous modification, changes were made to the LPCI logic panels. To preclude valve-to-valve interface, redundant and separate relays and contacts were provided for each LPCI and recirculation system. Each of the added redundant relays was provided full separation from all others by enclosure in a metal box. The wiring from redundant contacts between the two logic panels was provided separation by enclosure in flex conduit and termination'n metal junction boxes. This logic scheme will be maintained in the new modification. The only changes to be made to the LPCI logic panels on this modification will be to add redundant flow information to the minimum flow bypass valves. Since redundant

flow switches will be added to each LPCI system, and each circuit can be kept separate to the new operators, no new interfacing will be necessary in the logic panels.

3. 4.2.4 H draulic/Pneumatic 0 erators Physical and electrical separations are maintained on the operators to assure redundant features.

3.4. 3 Functional Interface The RHR system, as discussed in this report, performs as a short-term post-LOCA core cooling function. The system also provides a long-term containment cooling function which is described in Sections 4. 8. 6. 2 and 14.6.3.3.2 of the FSAR. The effects of the proposed change to the core cooling function on the containment cooling function were evaluated and found to be acceptable after modification as described below.

In analyzing single failures which might influence long-term suppression pool cooling, both AC and DC control and emergency power failures as well as component failures in the RHR and RHRSW I

(cooling water) systems were considered. The worst case single failure (Reactor MOV Board loss) with the modified system still leaves two RHR heat exchangers, two RHR pumps, and two RHR Service Water pumps and associated valving available for suppression pool cooling. The suppression pool temperature versus time response for this combination of equipment is shown by curve C in FSAR Figure 14.6-12.

i

3. 4. 4 Satis faction of A ro riate Standards The proposed modification directly affects as .Engineered Safeguards System and has been designed to Class I system standards. The standards and guides which were applicable to the original design have been reviewed to assure the modified system design, equipment, and installation meet or exceed the qualifications of the unmodified system.

3.4.5 ualit Assurance and Control Quality assurance and control will be applied to this modification as detailed in Appendix D of the Browns Ferry FSAR.

A'ppendix D incorporates the requirement of 10CFR50, Appendix B.

4 0

SUMMARY

AND CONCLUSXONS The proposed modification involves some physical 'changes to the plant to permit elimination of the swing-bus concept and adoption of the total system availability of the new design.

The analytical methods used reflect the most recent

, determinations of NRC staff and reactor suppliers for modeling the performance of Emergency Core Cooling Systems.

The application of the proposed modification adds to the overall capability of the plant to continue operation in a manner that ensures the health and safety of the public while providing ben'efit in the production of electrical energy.

>>18-

5 0 REFERENCES

.1. Interim Policy Statement, USAEC, dated June 19, 1971;

Subject:

AEC Adopted Interim Acceptance Criteria for Performance, of ECCS for'Light-Water Power Reactors.

2. NEDE-20973, Supplement 1.

3. Letter from J. E- Gilleland (TVA) to Benard C. Rusche (NRC) dated February= 12, 1976.

TABLE 1 ECC S PUMP CONFIGURATION Suction Side Break Pum s Available++

No Failures 4 Core Spray, 2 LPCI in each Loop Opposite Unit Spurious Accident 2 Core Spray, 1 LPCI in each Loop Signal LPCI Injection Valve Failure+ ~ 4 Core Spray, 2 LPCI in one Loop LPCI Minimum Valve Failure+ 4 Core Spray, 2 LPCI in one Loop Recirculation Discharge Valve 4 Core Spray, 2 LPCI in one Loop Failure-Break Side~

Diesel Failure 2 Core Spray, 2 LPCI in one Loop, 1 LPCI in other Loop Battery. Failure 2 Core Spray, 2 LPCI in one Loop, 1 LPCI in other .Loop Dischar e Side Break Pum s Available~*

No Failures 4 Core Spray, 2 LPCI in one Loop LPCI Injection Valve Failure+ 4 Core Spray

~

LPCI Minimum Flow Valve Failure+ 4 Core Spray Diesel Failure 2 Core Spray, 1 LPCI Battery Failure 2 Core Spray, 1 LPCI

,Opposite Unit Spurious Accident 2 Core Spray, 1 LPCI Signal

+Limiting Sing3.e Failure

~>In Unbroken Loop

TABLE 2 LOCAL PEAK CLADDING TEMPERATURES AND REFLOOD TIMES FOLLOWING A LOCA AND WORST SINGLE FAILURE Peak Cladding Flooding Time Tem erature ~F seconds Suction Line Break 2200 108 Discharge Line Break 2022 126

0 IV I DIV II DIG A 0/G 8 0/G C 1A 1A 2A 2A 1C f +~%

1C 2C 2C 1

18 18 28 28 ID 1D 2D 20 CROSSTIE CROSSTIE LPCI A LPCI 8 LPCI A LPCI 8 DISCH SUCTION 0ISCH NOT RUNNING RECIRC 8 RECIRC A RECIRC 8 RECIRC A Figure 1 System Normal Operation

0 IV I 0 IV II 0/G A D/G 8 D/G C D/G 0 1A

~ 0 4 IAi I

0 2Ai

2A q

I 1C 1CI 2CI 2C 1B

~ e-4

~ 1B 2B e

2B~ 10 10 I

20 2D' L C L C C.';.  !,::L~.: C .C$

L C

'ROSSTIE CROSSTIE LPCI A LPCI B LPCI A LPCI B BREAK DISCH SUCTION DISCH DISABLED OR NOT RUNNING RECIRC 8 RECIRC 4 RECIRC B RECIRC A Figure System Mode of Operation During Unit 1 LOCA (Suction Line Break),No Failures

DIV I 0 IV II 0/G A D/G 8 D/G C . 0/G D I

IA IA 2A 2A 1C IC 2C 2C 18 18 28 28 10 1D 20 2D L C ':"',:C~g;:2g "~: L C::bg:;"::,'.,L$  :;::

C: .C,;:

CROSSTIE CRDSSTIE LPCI A LPCI 8 LPCI'A LPCI 8 BREAK OISCH SUCTION OISCH DISABLED OR NDT RUNNING RECIRC 8 RECIRC A RECIRC 8 RECIRC A System Mode of Operation During Unit 1 LOCA (Suction Line Break j LPCI Injection Va/ve Failure Figure 3

DIV I OIV II 0/G A 0/G 8 D/G C D/G D 1A IA 2A 2A 1C I ~~%

1C 2C 2C 1

18 18 28 28 10 1D 2D 20

.sr.'

,,"4';.-:.:::. C,,:Ci.:.: L C "CP. 4'.1-~g "5::j':

. I" CROSSTIE CROSSTIE LPCI A LPCI 8 LPCI A LPCI 8 BREAK OISCH SUCTION OISCH DISABLED OR NOT RUNNING RECIRC 8 RECIRC A RECIRC 8 RECIRC A Figure 4 System Mode of Operation During Uni t 7 LOCA (Suction Line Break/ Diesel Failure

0 IV I DIV II DIG A DIG 8 0/G C DIG 0 1A 1A 2A "2A 1C IC 2C 2C 18 18 28 28 10 I ~

. 10 2D 20 I

L C +'Cn:.4K%

CROSSTIE CROSSTIE LPCI A LPCI 8 LPCI A LPCI 8 BREAK DISCH SUCTION DISCH 0 ISAB LED 0 R NOT RUNNING RECIRC 8 RECIRC A RECIRC 8 RECIRC A Figure 5 System Mode of Operarion During Unit 1 LOCA (Suction Line Break/ Battery Faiiure

OIV I OIV II D/G A 0/G B OIG C D/G D IA IAi I

0 2Ai

s 2A q

I p'y.

1C f ~IC I 2C

+

I 2C 1

L IB

~ e~

~ 18~

.I o

2BI 2B~ 1D l

ID

.'"C" I

2O C

2O I

L c (c:.:-::::>I.',;. '.",L','1 C ';.C,~  :.-;:C:1 C CROSSTIE CROSSTIE LPCI A LPCI B LPCI A LPCI B BREAK 0 ISCH SUCTION DISCH DISABLED OR NOT RUNNING RECIRC 8 RECIRC A RECIRC B RECIRC A system Mode of Operation During Unit 1 LOCA (Suction Line Breaki Opposite Unit Spurious Accident Signal Figure 6

. DIV I DIV I I 0/G A D/G 8 D/G C D/G 0 1A 1A 2A 2A 1C 1C 2C 2C 18 18 28 28 1D ID 2D 2D C g5g A'g rr I C L C CROSSTIE CROSSTIE LPCI A LPCI 8 LPCI A LPCI 8 DISCH SUCTION DISCH zjz~p;:

.ge..

;. DISABLED, NOT RUNNING

'Sj+c,'R NOT CONSIDERED IN ANALYSIS RECIRC 8 RECIRC A RECIRC 8 RECIRC A Figure System Mode of Operation During Unit 1 LOCA (Discharge Line BreakJ. No Faf/urea

DIV I DIV II D/G A 0/G 8 0/G C 0/G 0 1A 1A 2A 2A 1C 1C 2C 2C 18 28, 28 1D 10 20 20

..."5;:

C i~Q@3;4':~g'8 c r'cj:..-:::'i;'". .=-I.'=. C CROSSTIE CROSSTIE LPCI A 4c LPCI 8 LPCI A LPCI 8 DISCH SUCTION DISCH DISABLED, NOT RUNNING OR NOT CONSIDERED IN ANALYSIS RECIRC 8 RECIRC A RECIRC 8 RECIRC A Figure 8 stem Mode of Operation During Unit 1 LOCA (Discharge Line Breakj LPCI Injection Valve Failure

'IVI DIV II 0/G A 0/G 8 0/G C D/G D 1A I ~~IA 2A 2A I

1C I ~~~

1C 2C 2C 1

18 18 28 28 1D 10 2D 2D 1

CROSSTIE CROSSTIE LPCI A LPCI 8 LPCI A LPCI 8 0 ISCH SUCTION DISCH DISABLED, NOT RUNNING

;~~,::P'. OR NOT CONSIDERED IN ANALYSIS RECIRC 8 RECIRC A RECIRC 8 RECIRC A Figure 9 System Mode of Operation During Unit 1 LOCA fDischarge Line Breaki Diesel Failure

DIY I DIV II 0/G A 0/G B 0/G C 0/G 0 IC 'IC 2C 2C 1B 2B 2B 10 I W 1D 20 2D l

.C

.:,L','--:- .'jC~  :~t.";: C 'jg~ '";<<4>>'B CROSSTIE CROSSTIE LPCI A LPCI 8 LPCI A LPCI B DISCH SUCTION DISCH DISABLED,NOT RUNNING

~$ ';~) OR NOT CONSIDERED IN ANALYSIS RECIRC B RECIRC A RECIRC B RECIRC A Figure QQ System Mode of Operation During Unit 1 LOCA (Disc/Iarge Line Break/ Battery Failure

DIV I DIV II 0/G A 0/G B D/G C D/G 0 1A 1A 2A 2A 1C 1C 2C 2C 18 18 2B 2B I 10 1D 2D 2D I

C+ v x% w?

CROSSTIE CROSSTIE LPCI A LPCI B LPCI A LPCI 8 IL DISCH SUCTION DISCH DISABLE, NOT RUNNING

',A,;; OR NOT CONSIDERED IN ANALYSIS RECIRC B RECIRC A RECIRC B RECIRC A Figure System Mode of Operation During Unit 1 LOCA (Discharge Line Breakl Opposite Unit Spurious Accident Signal

D/G A D/G C D/G 8 O/G O DIV I DIV II- OIV I D IV II k kV SBTDN 4 kV SHTDN 4 kV SHTDN 4 kV SPAN BD A BD C )NO .BDB )NO BDD .0 1A IA . 2A 2A 18 28 28 1C 1C 2C 2C 10 1D 2D 2D C C L L C C L L C L

)NC ): C UNIT 1 )NC UNIT 2 480V SHTON 480V SHTDN

) NC480V SHTDN 480V SHTOiY, BO IA BO 18 BO 2A BD 28

) NC

) Nc )'Nc )Nc ) Nc ) NC )"'C )NC NC

)N

'O NO )NO

) )

Nc iiic NO 4SOV RX 5 480VRX 480V RX 3 480V RX MOV BD 10 ) MOVBD tC MOY BD 2D ) ~ MOVBD2C

)Nc ) Nc )NC )Nc )NC )1C NC NC NC bC NC ~IC iC NC )Nc )Nc 2458 2458 'l0.1GA 263A 10-258 10 16A 243A 0-258 2.538 10.25 A 245A 10.168 2-538 10-25 A 245A 10 168 gp td 0'K z 0 N 0 I-0 UD

~a o" o~

hz z - ELECTRICAL lNTERLOCK Ir. 0 Figure 3;2 Existing System Valve Bus Arrangement

1. Valve closed and motive power removed.

0/G A 0/G C 0/G 8 D/G 0 DIY I DIV II OIV 1 0 IV II k kV SBKDK 4 kV SHTDN 4 kV SHTDN 4 av SHTDN BD A BOO NO BD B KO BD D KO lA IA . 2A 2A 18 18 28 28 1C 1C 2C 2C 1D 1D 2D 20 L L c c

)KC

) HC NC )KC T. ) N 480V SHTDN IJNIT1 480V SHTON

) NC ~) KC 480V SHTDN UNIT 2 480V SHTON BO IA 80 18 BD 2A BD 28

) NC )KC )NC )KC )NC .)KC )KC )KC

)HC )KO )HO NC NO ~NC PBQV RX 48QV RX 480V RX 480Y RX MOV BD 1D ) MOV BD 'IC MOV 80 20 J MOV BD 2C

'C

)NC )HC NC NC XC NC NC )NC )KC

) KC )VC PC )NC )KC ) HC 2458 2458 10.16A 243A 10 258 10.16A 243A 0.258 2.538 10 25A 245A IQ 168 2438 10-25 A 2.65A 10 168 gg KJ z 0 N

C 0

o

~a -o Ill z o~

tt:a 1 2 Figure 13 h/odified System Vabe Bvs Arrengemene

1. Valve closed. and motive power removed.

2. Power for hydraulic pump - not required for valve closure.

Power for hydraulic ~mp - not required for valve opening.

Power for hydraulic pump - not required for one cycle of valve operation.

LOGIC 8 250 YDC LOCA LOGIC B OPEM LPC I RX PRESS C II50 PRIG VALVE.

IO-258 D/SCAPI.

LOGIC 8 CLOSE DECI LOFTI FLDhf DiV I PHP.

YALUE 2-$3 LOGIC 8 RX PREM OPE N C 2.25 PRIG AflNIFLOW L06IC A BYPASS YLY LOW FLOQ IO- IbA DIV T LOGIC B OPEN LOQ FLOW MINIFLO4/

DIV ZZ BYPASS VLV.

IO-Ih 8 L06'I C 4 RX PRES~ .

LOGIC A -< aP.SPSIS LOSE DECI LOhf Flo PHP. Orich'.

Dll/2I VLY. 2-53B OPIUM LPC I LOGIC A VALVE RX PRESS IO-25 A K ISOPDIG LOGIC A LocA 2SOVS C 8QT.. VALVE COMTZOL RPuec IA POlKE'CZAMGEHEAfT

C 4

UNIT 1 UNIT 2 ACCIDENT INITIATINGCIRCUITS ACCIDENT INITIATINGCIRCUITS BLOCKS UNIT 'I RHR PUMP 1C

'LOCKS UNIT 1 RHR PUMP 1Doo BLOCKS UNIT 2 RHR PUMP 2800 BLOCKS UNIT 2 RHR PUMP 2A" RHR PUMPS RHR PUMPS RHR PUMPS RHR PUMPS 1A AND 1C 18 AND 10 2A AND 2C 28 AND 20

'OR CORE SPRAY PUMP PRIORITIES. SEE BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT FSAR, FIGURE BRAC

~ ~

STOPS IF RUNNING Figure gg MO~ajSystem RHR Pump Divisional Priorities '

I SYHBOLSI LOCAIEO LOCAL PAHfL C LOCATED HATH CONTROL ROCXI PANEL LOCAIEO 9.32 PANEL Aecv Ac RHov BOID UNIT 1 jt LOCATED 9-33 P/HEL N LOCATXO 9-2I PAHfL RECIRCULATION R/NP DISCHAR6E VALVE LOCATED HYU OP 8/CKUP OUHTCOC PANEL p HUIES.

I WETHOUT eACK-UP CONTROL)

I. 2A.K6l, K63, K6A, KTI, Kro. Ket JOOOTHO CIRCUET FCV 68- T9 (24SB) e. IOA. A34 COCA b CX PÃXAA PERPIAMIVC 2SOY OC RHOV 80 3. RELAY ENCASED TN STEfL BOX FLEX CONDUIT PRON CONTACTS To 2$ 0Y DC AHOY 80 Id /A EHCLOSEO JUNCTION BOX. CAelf RUII IN FLEX COHOUET BETWEEN PANELS 9-32 8 9-33.

lh TRAIH A CLOSE dOCEHOlo Va TRAIN 8 CLUE dOCEHOID VX TRNIJ b OPEH dOL EHgID I

I L

1, j A TRARI b

/Af re~

OPEN dOLENOO 7FHI Aeo/If0 Nl 2A Nl 2A- Nl 2A 2 H368. Ir I Hsgb- I OA.RBBA

<<Igb gr/8 IXA XC98 TTA IDA-)gers Tl 'll TI 2I j,

~ H36e H368 TAA TRA Ar 3 IOA-II38A CX I

0 IOA KSbd I I

~J FCV 68-33 IT IXIALTFrf0 C ANN THSTRUHEHT ANN BUS SUPPLY (Teo) BUS i CloSED wHEH ~ OPENS UPON +CLOSED WHEN CLOSED WHEN) I OPENS FHEN 1 I CLOSES XHEN,)

I PISTON I v~lvf Hor VALVE NOT I VALVE FULLY I PRESSURE IpfsroH CDHT ACTI I FULLY OPE>> I CDHTAcr FULLr OPEN I FULLY CLOSED OPEN I I )pro I c reo I I L L ~ J I J I J I L I I

/

LSI YR prl l$3 HYDRAULIC f

OP RATDR

~

8 R 0 P ~ ACCUXULATOR AccgvULATOR ACCUHULATOR 2A 2A- fA- PRf$ $ URf LOW HYDRAULICS HOT KBAS Kelb KBTD Scr il.< P FULLY CHARCED rgr 4p- rt HYDRAULICS HOT FULLY CHAROEO Far Al /Y ACCUHULATOR PRESSURE RECIRCULATION PUMP LOW rate'AV Tt DISCHARGE VALVE VALVE SHONV OPEN CONTROL CIRCUIT WITH C FIG. /4I ) HYDRAULIC OPERATOR 8ROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2

SVHBOLS f LOCATEO LOCAL PANEL LOCATfb HAIN CONTROL IXX'ANEL l.OCATED 9-32 PANEL 480V AC RHOV BOK UNI71 LOCATEO 9-33 PANfL RECIRCULATION POIMP DISCHARGE VALVE 0 LOCATfD 9-tl PANEL 9 LOCATED NCC (tITH BACK UP CONTROL) 8 LOCATED HTD OP BACNVP CONTROL PANEL rCIF f e.a (e-r~O HOTES:

250 VDC I. 2A.XGI. X63. X6A. Xrl. XTO. X69- JOGGING CIRCUIT.

RTOV BD lb 2$ 0V DC RNOV 80 lh

t. X$ 6d- -BACX-VP CONTROL TRANSFER.

3. lDA.X39.LOCA & RX PRfss PERNISSIVE.

A. RfLAV ENCASED I>> STEEL BOX. FLEX CONDUIT PRON CONTACTS TO fNCLOSED JUNCTION BOX. CABLE RVN IN FLEX CONDUIT BETVEEN PANELS 9-32 8 9-33.

5. DPEC4rlOHAL IHJTRUCTlONJ ALL IHCTATX'TCJE FIAJBJ 86 RSHN10 b b WHEN OPE thllHB tl BACÃTAP CONTCOL PNME'.

xsde-3 XSde-3 8 Vg TBA/M h CLCVC JOLCllbrD I CB I L Vt Vl TERAI b CLOJE JOLflAHD Tthdr A OPEN JOc,Ewer 8 TCAtll 0 OPKN JOLfmlb xsde-3 480/l20 xl rl II- Nl rl 'l tg-PI eh-xddher

~

HJ68 g

C H$ 68- t

's X$68- '

'IOA.K39A 31 A ~ HJ 68.JA H$68 JA Ar Jr

-- CH J IOA.KJJB I

Hsdd-JC lOA -XJJAI I

I LA HOTf A b r.'9th X$ 68 9 H 8 Xsdd- 3 6 FCV68 33 N

lxlALIFIEO INSTRUHENT ANN SOURCf TBD BVS CLOSED tHEN OPENS UPON ~CLOSED NHEN CLOSES tHEN I I I I VALVEoNor' VALVE HOT PIKE vhuf Hor I VALVE FULlV I Pwz spa 4A' L~

I FULLV OPE>> I FULLV CLCSED coxrmr J I OPEN I ) rro I I PRESSURE <

I coxrhcr I

/ L ~ I J L I Lst LSJ V2 lbORAVLIC

<</ OPERATOR a 6 8 R

a R II ~

K\

C

~ ~ R R r, rat 9 r rrhl.j rrrst P 24 ~ 2A- Ct 3568 ACCUHULATON ACCUHULATOR ACCUHULA TON X6HA XQA BC3A R PRESSURE HYDRAULICS HYDRAULICS G R 9 LOV NOT FULLV NOT FUl.l.r lV CHARGED CHARGE 0 I

e X$68 3 rrrst.A 8 B ACCUHUl.A TOR PRESSVRf RECIRCULATION PUMP X$68-3 RfTVRH X$68 3 LOVT DISCHARGE VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT WITH RETURN HYDRAULIC OPERATOR VALVE SHOSN OPEN (Fm. IV) BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT l.

I csv Arcldv dd re Id SYNIdOLS 44O VAC RAIOV ADIT E COCATED LOCAL PANEL NEAR VACVE UNIT' LOCATED AIAIN CONTROL ROOAI PANfL LOCATED t SE PANEL RHR INI30ARD INJECTION VALVE If CO4 TED S -SS PANEL (WITHOVT dACIIVP CONTIIOL) CO4TED 4/dO 5WITCHOEAR FCV rV-SS IO-ZSA

~

ESO V DC RIAIIV dO

~/A d NOTES LOCATED AICC LOCA TED HYO OP dACIIVP CONTIIOL r%NEL i

I. RLl -N4T ~ COCA Rr FIIESS PEIIIIIISSIVE'.

IOA-RSS - PCIS ~g COW PRESS

5. V, TRAIN A CLOSE Vj TRAIN d CCDSE Vj TRAIN A OPfN YIIAIII d OPEN Cd HSrs-SSA HS/I SSd I

Ig HS/4 ~

SSA T

/Ol ROTd pc ~ aAP rAt STOP

~/IED IOA II I(ISA /OA E E Efrsd ccc I /ISII-g C I ssd CLOSE N 0 HSTd HSTd Rd TA SSA SSA Cg AAdd R I

T /OA IOA S TOTE IfSSA IfbTA ICP-HATA /OA.

XLTa A/IN OVALIF/fD A/VII ANN dVS INS TRVLIENT dVS dVS SVPPLY (TSD) j/

I Opf J v/jCW I CCOSED WHEN i CCOSED I/HEN I I PIS/fjj/

C I OPENS W//EN I r;-.;--.~ r I

CCOsfS w/IENI I

I I f CcosES Cw 1

I I VAlVE NUIT VAC,VE NOT PrIESMC' l IPRESsvRE < I I PIS TO/I I Ccjj/rAC L

7 I l I'VCCY OFcN L FVCLY CLOSED l~N I

VALVE FVCCY j ) rdO I CO/V TACT LSI C5E I

AIDTOR Vj Vg I

jcro//ABULIC I <~oPcruroe L E R 0 FCV TN-55 FCV TII 59 P er/+-5$

I '

ACCVMVCA/f/R ACCVjrIVCATfjR ACCVAIVCA Gjlt jrrMPvcIcg jcrojc4uc/cs P/f4 S5VcVE rVCI/ FVCC r %01 FVLLY C/IlR4 EO CIIAR4CO FCV 14 SS ACCVRVLAYOII RHR INBOARD VALVE SHONN CLOSED Pcf ESS VRC COccc INJECTION VALVE

(,FI6. IB )

CONTROL CIRCUIT WITH AftVII HYDRAULIC OPERATOR BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1

I 't srplooL 3:

. LINIT' C LOCATED LOCAL PANEL NEAZ vALVE 6/8 IMIMAE'D IMTECTIOQ VALVE LOCATED PAIN CONTROL ROON PAIVEL cvlTN BncK.Up coNreoa) LOCATEO 9-32 PANEL vaoYAc ehIov 8o lc FCV 7 I-67 (10-858) LOCATED 9 SS PANEI.

Locnreo %leo sNITcA'GEAR 15OVDC RIRW BDIA ~

+ LOCATED HCC g LocATED HYD Dp 8ncKUP courzol pANEL NOTES 250 VOC I. XSTN-dr BACA'UP COAflZOL TRAIVS FEZ ALARNS EI 8 RHOV DDI8 IH CONTROL ZOOM IN EMERGENCY POSITION.

K$ 7 I -CT XSTH Cr - Locn ex peessueE pERHlsslvE.

e. Ion-Hcc 8

XPP-

3. Ion ~ Kcs - pt/s + ex Low pzess IS re.ar IVOTE q..... Vl- TRAIN A CLOSE N YZ. TRAIN 8 CLOSE 5'OA-YS- TEAVT A OPEN e VLI TRAIN 6 OPEN I CD I Hs ru- crA HSTg CT KCGA 5. OPEZAIING INSTRVCTIONS WILL RQlUIZE REPIOYAL L 2T usrH- CTS OF rHESE FUSES <eI DUZIHB OPEZATION CN STOP 8ACIIUP CONTROL PIOOE.

'IOOI I20 IOA- id'-p g r/

E' E KCSD IOA KQSA uSTv- rniV CTB OPEN o C 4 LOSE 5 HS TN.

HSTII CTC T IIS TH-C7A C7A 5T II5 TII-CI CTC 7 d 5 Tu.co IN KS58 ISTIC-BT eh KCC'8 OL S 8

IOA-KCCA EI ID'-Cr N

aUALIFIED ANII INSTRVHEKT ANN BUaS SUPPLr C IlIDI BVS OV5 I

I,'

+cpENs upou +CLOSED WHEHI ~CLOSEN IIHEN I IOPENS VHEu1 I opENs 5~NIzu~

' CLOSES 0I7I CLOSES ON

'ISTON j pM$

I VALVE Hor I vALVE. FULLVI I PRESSURE I I VALVE HOT II I PISTO~

Co,v rnC r OPEN '. 'FVLLr ULLY'LOSED~ I OPEN I prao I I C TDD J f I coNTAcr

/ l J L LSI

~se Lse LSS VII V5 VI q IIroenvLIc

~< OPLRAroe EST'I.CT II Ill B CT N

l)T1 9 z e<oB C FRv pl.cr FCV TN-Cr CI lCQlNVIAT I5ru-cr Hroc4ULes ACCUHULATOR'ITDRAULIC J

CX 8 EN c e Fcv pf Gr NOT FULLr IIOT FULLV G C R ACCUHULATOZ CHARGE,D G CHARE ED XSI5 peE55URE OL cr LOW N I l5 lf cr IDrvcr L5TH Br RETUeu szv ru-cr RHR INBOARD ACCUHVLATOZ N E, peEssURE I

LOLV INJECTION VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT WITH RETURN NLVE QIIOWN CLOSED HYDRAULIC OPERATOR

( FIG. 19) BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1

J VN/7 I HHR PVACP MINIMVAIFLOW BYPASS VALVE YhlbOLS dbO VAC llAC7V CID lb C v/I TNour /slee" ur courmu. ) rsvp z~rv do r~ rd E LOCATED LOClL PlHEL HEAR VALVE I.OCATED MAIN CONTROL ROOM PANE/.

FCV 74-7 /0-ISA 0 LOCATED 9 52 PANEL LOCATED 9 SS PANEL

~

LOCATED lido SIIITCIIOEAR LOCATED l/CC 250 VDC d lOCATED HYD Or.'ACKVP CONTROL /rAHEL

~IA'~

Rheo/ 8D NOTES:

/ IOA A'/OS LOW FLOH sr + pep /Ol. K/09 LOW FACY IA S. Vj TRAIN A CLOSE IDA KIOWA V2 TRAIII 0 CLOSE VS TRAIN A OPEN Vg TRAIN 0 OPEN E sr PllP e 9/ rDrt- ebs r.eCR Cb HS rf IIS/f /elf. IC 2r /r rA 5 AIA.

S/r EN' f~l2O E

fax ass. /OA g IVEN 0 C g CIOSE KA&b 5

HSI( HSTI 14.2 rA rl dr + dT Is/P

/A IC d

8 IS TD 9.b 5EC d

TD PIJ QUALIFIED IN5TRVMENT SUPPLY CrbD) ANN A IVN b~I bIIS b Lls OPENS UPON I I CLOSED WmP., CLOSED VIRENI loPEHS wu7N I ICLOSE5 ICLOSES OV" I Ir asm' IOPENS WV7u~

IP/5/ISN VlLVE NDT IVALVE FIILLY I

WRY'PAI.SSURE

('lsroH c IVlLVE NDT lard raD I <Tbo IcoNTAcr L~ IFVLLYOPEI/ LLVCLOSE6 J J 1 P I L

Ls/

P52 L52 LSS AloTOR VV Vk I

HTDRAIILA OPEJIA TO/I +

f 9 C pcv rf r Fcv rf -( Fcv ri-r g O R R ACCllAIIILATDR PFESs VA'E ACCUNIKATOR HYDRAULIC5 NDT l ACCI/lrvl IOR HYD/IAULICS NOT Lolv FULLY CIIARGED FIILLYCHARGED VALVE SHONN CVEN RE TVIIII'cv ri.r ACCUMULATOR PRE 5 SUIIE COPY RHR PUMP MINIMUM F OW BYPASS VALVE

( FIS. ED) CONTROL CIRCUIT WITH HYDRAULIC OPERATOR PCI vRAr BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT I

I UNIT I RHR PVkP NININUM FLOW'YPASS VALVE fWITH BACK UP CONTROL J FCY 74-90 /0-/88 STAIBOLS:

C LOCATED LOCAL PAKEL FEAR VlLYE rso vlc RAIOY an e ~ LOClrED MAIN CONTROL R¹(PANEL dso vnc Rhlov BD/w LOCl TED !-St PANEL LOCATED t-tt PlNEL LOCA TED rl60 SIVITCHGEAR LOCl TED AICC dSO VDC 8 LOClrED HI'D OR BlCKVP CIJNTROL PAh'EL ssrr Asri-50 A' ~ ~

RAIOY BD IB IVOTES:

L A$68-90-BACKVP CON'TR'OL TRAIVSFE'R lLARAIS IN CONTROL Rooll IN EAIERCENCT POSITION Norrs 8 /OA-K/08-LOW FLOW

/OA Kloda 8 Isrr-Jo PAIP /D IOA-Riot-LOWFLOW LOCA VI TRAIN A CLOSE i

/I TRA/h' CLOSE 0

C

' Nsrc- IOA-VZ VS TRl/N l OPEh'r TRAIN 8 OPEIV

) CB I II5Pf Jdl Hsrr-5oLb C OPERlTlh'G I/'STRVCTIoh'S /YILL REOVIRE PAIPlP IOAIodb REMOVAL OF rHESE ruSES fZJ DVRINC STOP OPERATION /V BACIIVP CON'TROL hIODE.

rd&'/20 /OA-C C Nsrr. K/0th Q Sbb OPEN 'LOSE h 0 PAIP/B Nsrr sop Hsll-I 30A Tr.ds ST Cg 8'srr.so 8 Agrres0 Is rrQL TD M SEC TDPV OVALIF/ED ANN BVS INsrRv/rEKT SVPPL lfTBDJ l/IN BIIS ANN BVS l

1 OPEIIS V/OT ~CLOSED IVI/EN CL OSED ~OPENS VI/EN'~ COPENS WHEN CLOSES 0/V I

PISTON I i YlLYE NOT ( IVNEh'ALVE h'OT i VALVE FVLLr ' I Pgc'Ssu&

i CONTlCT FLLLT OPEN

~] FVLLrCLOSED> OPEN J

I 7 F4FD lr I PS 5 I

0 LSI PSI Lsd LSS h/OTOR

~TDRAVLIC'

/L oPERlroR ysrl.so N

8 8 8 C ~ i C 8 v Iv Fcv r4 so

~

ACC VAIVI.A TON FCY rr-So ACCIIRVLA/OR G C C R R R ESTC-8y PRESS//RE HYDRAVLICS hTT N

stir.s0 NOTE S FVLLT CHARGED NIDRAVLICSNOT IV I'VLLI'NARC D slrr sb N

FL'v rr-so Asrr~ RETVRN l ACCVAIVL TOR RHR PUMP MINIMUM N PRESS VRE LOW FLOW BYPASS VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT WITH RETVRN VALVE SHONN OPEN HYDRAULIC OPERATOR

( Flax/) BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT I

i I STÃ80LS l C IDCATEO LIK:AL PNIEL LCCATED NAIN CIJITROL RNRI PNffL LOCArf0 9-32 PANEL ARDY AC RNOY 80 2C UNIT 2 LOCATfD 9-3J PNIEL

~ LIX'ATKO 9-tl PANEI.

RECIRCULA7XN PUMP DISCHARGE VALVE g LOCATE 0 Hflk OP M'%UP IRHTTNOL pANRL.

MTESl IrfrHour eAGK-up ccHTROL)

I. tA.KSI, Kds, KSA, Krt, <<10. K69-JDGDIK CIMlfr.

FCV 68-8 (2-Qa) t. loA R39 LOCA.b RA tNKAS PEClfaLSIVC tsoV DC RHOV 8024 J. RELAT ENCASED IN STfEL 40K FLEK CO+III FROI CONTACTS TO fRcLDJED JUNGTIol 80K. cARLE RUN IN FLEK coNDUIT efrrffN PANELS 9.3t 8 9-JJ TRAIN A CLOJC DOLE IIOlo TRAIN 8 CUE f JOL llolo

• VJ rfle) i OPEN .DOLE hfUO TtARI ~ AKN JOCCAOO I Ce I L g Adorlto Nl A Nl tA Nl tA- 2 H368 rr I HJItb I IOA K394 I ~A)A A'39A A)A. 39A K49A KTOA A'TIA AI C TI K Tl I 2 R

Hsdd Hsdd

/Pit JA Kdfe Ar JT 3 IOA-R398 CK A I 3 IOA..NJIJA I I I A I I

IKITZ 4 FCY 68-33 0 OIALIF!Eo C INSIRUN&r ARN ANN S SLPPLT I f80) 8VS ~ eus I VALVE Nor I CLOSED lHEH YALYE Hor I I OPENS VPOf PISTON

+CLOSED KHEN I VALVE Hor CLOSED tHEN)

VALVE Nor

~OPENS r&~N I VAI.VE FULLY I I rwzssL I I CLosfs rHEN I PRESSURf ) Ipfsroa coNTAGII Lptdo JI I FULLY CLOSED I coNrmr I c reo L~

I FVLLT OPfN I I FULLT OPE>> FULLY CLOSED ~

I OPEN I I I I I

/ L ~ J J J L

/

LSI rsvp 1

PSt V2 Yl gn HTCRAUI.IC OPERATOR I L

a t 4/.7 st S R ~ R AccuglLATDR ACC(PlULAIOR ACCUwVLATOR 2A 2A +'CJA PRESSURE LOT HYDRAULICS Nor Hl'DRAULICS Ror KSAA KSIA FULLl'HARGED FULLT CHARGED

/C tt 9 ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE RECIRCULATION PUMP RETURN Lor DISCHARGE VALVE VALVE SHONV OPEN CONTROL CIRCUIT WITH (Flo. ee )

HYDRAULIC OPERATOR BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2

SYKBOLS E LOCATEO lOCAL PANEL LOCA(ED HAIN CONTROL R(QK PAKfL LOCAIED 9.37 PANEL

>>BOY AC PKCY BD 2D UNIT 2 (I LocarEO 9.S3 PANEL o Locarfo 9.2I pAKEL RECIRCULATION PUMP DISCHARG'E VALVE LOCArfo KCC filrH BACK-UP CONTROL) g Loclrfo HTD OP 4/CHVP CONneoL PANEL FCV 6S-T9 (8-55@ HOTES:

850 VOC I, 2A.<<6l. <<63. <<6i. Krl. <<lb. <<69. AMINO CIRCUIT.

RHOY BD 81

2. <<$ 68:t .BACK.UP CONTROL TRANSFfR 7SOV DC RKOV BD 28

3. IOA KSB LOCA 8 RX PRESS PERKISSfVE A. RELAY ENCASfo IN Srffl. BOX FLEX CONDUIT FROK CONTACTS TO ENCLOSED JVHCTTDK BCX CAB(f RUK IH FLEX CONDUIT Bfrl'EEN PAKfLS 9 32 8 9.33.

Orc<<AT(DNAL IHsrevc Do+9 ALL frcTATE rrcsE F(L363 BE cft(DYED WHEN OPECATINt>> (N BACKUP CONi COL t90OC.

e II XS68-T9 X$6d Tb 8 Vg TCAlN A CLOSC SOLCN(KP I

L. Yl TCAAI 0 CLOSE SOLEtCK4 Vt TEA/N 1 Orftr SOLENC>>4 rcllu b opcN 30(Em' xs6e-r9 Aeo/l20 rm- a~ n gt' Nl 2A (Id NI 21- Nl ~21-IO4 94 2 >> 8 ~ I IOA XSQ Ir Iy IOA-NSbb C xsee-N$ 68.

'le Tl Tl TI 2T H$ 68 2 e 791 TSIA E R

usrb T91 H$ 68-T9A Al e ST fl

-- C>>

3 IOA-rab1 I 3 e H$ 8 I $

I A L

NOTE 6 fr xsde-79 H 8 6 FCV68-33 xsee-H OUALIFIEO 8

'AKN INSMVKENI 0 8 US SOURCE TBD 1

I CLOSED KPEH OPEIIS UPON +CLOSED YHEN CLOSED tHEN OPENS YHEH 1 CLOSES YHEH I

VALVE Hor I

plsroH I I I VALVE FULLY I /~ass~ I L~

IFVLLLY OPEN I FULLT CLOSED l L cowrAcr

~ J VAI.VE HOT FULLT OPEN J

VALVE HOT I OPEN J

I I

L ) re JI L

PRESSURf <

TBD I CONTAcr P$ 3 />>S9/

LSI I P$ 2 Lse L$ 3 KOTOR Vl HVi.P>>VLIC p orf<<AICYI a

LS6rf T9 (S(T'I 19 e

t( R R ff 7A ~

<<6HO 7A

<<Qb

~ >>

~ ~

Il630 C>>

8>>>> 0 R R XST N

8-TS X568

-.re R R >>/ ~

AccvKULATDR PRESSURE

/., a/ tr ACCUKVLAICR HYDRAULICS

/; ~ >>/ rr ACAIKVLAIOII Ht DR AV( IC $

L(HY Nor FULLY NOI FULLY CHARCEO CKARCE 0 I

e X$6d-

/., +/. ~t 8

RECIRCULATION PUMP xs68-79 <<$ 68 T9 RETURN E

DISCHARGE VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT WITH RETURN HYDRAULIC OPERATOR VALVE SHOSN OPEN (I:IC. a9 ) BROWNS FERRY NU(;LEAR PLANT UNIT '2

a+Pe N roc CrO Z>

SYMBOLS leo vlc RMov do ec E LOCATED LOCAL PAIIEL HEAP VALVE UNI7 2 e Loclrfo MAIR coHTRBL RODE PAHEL LOCATED F St PAHEL RHR INBOARO INJECTION VALVE LOCATED 7 Ss PlirEL LOCATED l'ISO SVRTCIIOEAR (YIITHOUT BACKUP COHTROQ FCV 8-GT /0-0'8 PSO V DC RMOV dogb d LOCATED AtCC LOCAtED HYO OP BACh'CA+ CORTROL PAIIEL AC71Ã5 I. AQ KSb LOCA r Fp PRfSS PERAIISSIVE

t. IDA-Res - Pcis ~g Low PRESS S V TRAII A CLOSE V, TRAiH a CLOSE V) TRAIH A OPfif Vy 7PAIH g Cd IISIW-GTA E

HSTE HSTS CTA Rebl S'. nv-A:ttI /dP Icdv TAP I IT T G7d STOP Ado IPD iN

'I ReSS IOA C X'4SA g Nfl'PER e

HSTS HSTS-KESB CITA 4TA S

Cg 1

S TS-4d KSSB 4

ASA ~

KS CsA lHH OUA L Il'IED AHR AHH IRS TRUMEH1' r

BUS I US BUS Copcus upou I ~C I pisryu OSED fH CLOsfD WHEN~

C OPEHS WHEE

l. a' CLOSES WafirI SUPPLY TBD)

I f

CLOSES I P/SI5W CW I

I I VALTE HOT VALVE HOT I I VALVE FVLLY P~SSaeCE IPRESSURf <

L~

I Courlcr J

I I IULLY OPfir J POLLY CLOSED 'pfir J

)re I I Coir TACT I

~

LSI LSE MOTOR Ve VS VE uroaAULIc

+opoRl rcNz R 0 Fcv ro-r r rcv rv-f r C rC VIS-GT ACCULIULArOR CX G lTOR

'CCUMUL ACCUMULATOR uroa>UL/cs uroaAULIcs PRSSSVaic IVVI FULL r uol FULLY Letu 1

cul Rsco CA'ARCS AFrvau PCV TS GT ACCUMULATOR RHR INBOARD PRESS uRC VAC VZ SHONN CLOSED LEW INJECTION VALVE (nd. eu) CONTROL CIRCUIT WITH HYDRAULIC OPERATOR BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2

I (\

esvs(ool es

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UNIT 2 E LOCATE D LOCAl PANEL /eEAC VALVE.

EVE INMAED IMTECTIOM VALVE LOCATED /IA(u CONTROL PUON PANEL

<N(ru blca-UP CavreoL) LOCArKO 9-se Pll/EL

~ (soxAC CAArY BO 20 Tu-59 (IO-85'A) LOCATF.O 9.JS PANE'L FC V LOCArEo u(co OM(rcu6EAe I eddvdc eteeeddee LCCATEO /ICC g LOCATED HVD DP bACKUP COMTROL P>I/EL NOTES 250 voc CHOV bD eh lsd. 5S BACKUP COMIROL TCAHJFER ALAC/FJ 8 w courzoL Rood w E~ERCENCY pos/T(oM.

KSTN -SS XS Tel.bs

e. (Oa-((c - LOCA cx peEssueE FEe/rlsJNE.

8 XSTN- NOTE IOA KCS - PC(S

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~ I..... Vl-TlAIN i CA LO(e/ Pec SJ Jre/.JJ XJ 5'S A CLOSE N C YZ TCAIN b CLOSE VJ TRAIN A OPEN (F IOA- V(I TCAIN b OPEN I Cb HSTN-5SA Kcrb 5. DFECAIINC wsreUcnous w(LL cf/LU(eE eE/rovAL zr i(sr'I.5sb II'rop CÃ THESE FUSES Eel OUR(NC OPECATIOM IM bACIIUP CONTROL /erOOE.

e/00//20 KISI-KCSA C. rOe-/Cur in+. re~a rssr e\ee (Oh K6sb Idle 0 g OPE o- C g OSE

8. 8

/OAeKCTA NJ Tel HJTN Ssc us TN-ssh. 5SA ST IISTN Cx 53C T 0 5 TN-52 IOA A'S5A IOA KCTA C b N >

/OA- IOA-/ICrb AC7 C 8 XJTN-5S X JTN-5S IV IXUALIFIED Aul/ wsreUHE((r AMN BUeS JUPPLY C rbDI BUS I

I OPENS UPON ICLDSED wkPI closEu uuful Copf us I/Nful Io/Kus vms I- CLOSES OM CLOSES OM p(s Tou I VALVE Hor v~LvE uor I VALVE FULLY I I r wrssrw I PRESSURE I I I PISTON I < rbo I I covrAcr I I FULI.Y OPEN FULLY CLOSED~ OPE N J

I >rahu L J t I CONTACT PSS LSI ede LSC VI V'I V2 q

~ ~ opLel NYDCAUL(C roe xsr5-5s TITS e I

N e RTO C C FCV re( 5J rcv TN- 5a

/srr e 6 ACCUNUl l ACCUMULAroe

]4 SS xsr~-os H10EAUL CJ IIYOCAULICJ Cl 8 P E e FCV TN.SS ACE UNULATOC NOT Il!U.Y Nor FULLY G O C C CNARCLO CkARGEO lslr PCES JUCE SS L0 le/

OL I N

xsam se FLv TM-ss RHR INBOARD l'S T'I.S l QS r(I 5S eE7I/Ru ACCUP!ULA TOC H C PRESSURE LO LV INJ ECTION VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT WITH ef.rl/eu HYDRAULIC OPERATOR VALVE JIIOIA/N C'LOBED

( FIG. 25') BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2

ViVIT 2 RHR PUMP MININVAIFEDOS'YPASS VALVE SYA/dOLS (w/TNovr bAce:vr courex.) -gy mt l'OCATED LOCAL PAHEL HEAR VALVE 4OO VAC ITALY /SD Zi Prttdt'0 LOCATED A/A/N CONTROL ROOAI PA4/EL FCV 74-30 /0-168 gA LOCATED 9 32 PANE/

LOCATED 9 SS PANEL LOCATED 4/bo 3IIITCHGEAR lOCATED l/CC 250 LOCATED NYD. 0o. dACIIVP CONTROL PANEL VPC

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RAIOV gD NOTES:

/ /OA g/Ob L OW FLOW ST +FVP IOL g/09 LOW FLOW Vj TRAIN A CLOSE

/DA A'/Odb Vg TRAIN b CLOSE Vy TRAIN A OPEII Vg TRAIN b OPEN I

Cb I 2

HS1-I y AF$74 sr PA/p ED

~ rCAA L 4S Sob IT SOA +A, /0 /OA.

sror ///Odd I/graf 4+GO l' E IISII. HEN Sdd OPEN 0 C g Cldsf IDA~

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/NSTRVAIEIV AHN <rbo)1'vrrLv AHH ANN e S/AS blls bl/S C

I OPENS VPOI/ +CLOSED WIIEV C'LOS ED WlfENI lOCN Vd/EN l I OPENS WP~/~ ~CLOSES W//& /CLOSES aA/ ~

IP/STOH COVDEII IVALVE NDT vALvE AArr I IVALVE I /ILLY I IrmSSVRE I PISTON . I

~< IornV ) <Tdo IcoNrAcr l

IFVLLY I I I I L~ J I LCF CLOSEDI J J FdD rs5 L J I

LSI P52 LSR AIOTOR VC Vg VS Vl HTDRAlfLA mcaaTOR

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R C G R R LOW'CV FCV 1C.3g ACCCIAIVLATOR I'RESSVge ACCUAIULATOR HYDRAULICS NOT FVLLYC//ARGED ra.aO HYDRAULICy IIOT FuLLY CHARGED FCV 7C. SO RHR PUMP MINIMUM RETllJIV A CCVAf VLA~

VALVE SHONN OPEN t'RES SV/IE LCVV FLOW BYPASS VALVE (Fla. ea) CONTROL CIRCUIT WITH HYDRAULIC OPERATOR BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 9

Ui/IT Z RHR PUNP MINIMUM FLOVV BYPASS VALVE fWITH 8ACA'-UP CDN'TROLI FCV F4-7 /0-/81 SI'AIBOLS:

C LoCATEOLOCAL PA//EL NEAR V~LvE COO VAC RAIOV 8D gD ~ LOCATED kMN CONTROL Rood/ PANEL ZSO YDC RMOV 8D Z8 4 LOClTED J.JZ PANEL LOCATED S JJ PANEL 8 lOCATED A/do SWITCHOEAR LOCl TED AICC Zso YDC 8 LOCATED HTD OP.8ACNUP CONTROL PlNEL JSTASTA 7/H 7/F

~ ZA~

RAIOV 8D NOTES:

1$ dd-7 -8ACA'VP CON'TROL TRANSFER lLARMS IN COA TROL Rood/ IN EMERCENCT POSIT/ON S /OA- PAIP NOTES 8 Z. /OA-N'/Od-LOW FLOW R/OJA 8 ZA J, IOA.EIOJ. LOW FL OW A$ 7d $ VI TRAIN A CLOSE 7/H VZ TRAIN 8 CLOSE C

' Hsrc-Sr /OA.

VJ TRAIN A OPEN vi TRAIN e OPEN I ce I Hsrd- TA S IP rote S OPERA Tlh'$ INSTRVCTIOI/S IYILL REOVIRE 78 PAIPZC IOA- REMOVAL OF THESE FVSES fZI DVRINC STOP

/LIDHA OPERlr/ON /N eACNVP CONrROL MODE.

O w-<d4 daV<ZO /OA-h5rd. NIOJ8 L'PEN Te

'LOSE 4

PMP ZA NSIA HSTd.

IA TAZ Td.Z Jr drd d Cg d rd-IJ A'Jrd 8

A'$7A.

7/N 1/4 TD J.d SEC ID TDPV OVALIFIED NN /NSTRVNENT lNN ANN vs svPPLyfreDI 8VS 8VS OPENS VPON CLOSED WI/EN CL OSED IVHEN OPENS NNEN~ iOPENS IYHENi CLOSES IV/IEN CLOSL'$ ON I

p/sroN I I VALVE Nor II I

VALVE Nor I VlLVE FULLT I Pussy i I PRESSURE creD I p/sroN I I

> red L~ I FLCLT OPEN I OPEN I CONTlCT I I CONTACT J J FVLLYCLOSEDJ J

I L J L J 7

4 LSI PSI LSZ LSJ Y II hIOTOR VI HYDRAVL/C

/OPERATOR I

rSrC<

N C 8 8 8 R O L ~ e a 8 FCVrd.r ACCQAIVLATOR Fcv rd r Fcv rd ACCVMVLATOR O O R R R +gv 'v PRESSURE NyoRAVLICS Nor ACCVQVLATOR l$74< 4v v)v+ ISA-7 /VOTE S FVLLTPARSED HypRAVL/CS Nor

/V FVLLy CHARCED IV A'SAY'V Fcv Td-r RHR PUMP MINIMUM ldrl 7 RETURN l AccvAIUL TOR PRESSURE LOW FLOW BYPASS VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT 'WITH RETURN ~

VALVE SHONN OPEN HYDRAULIC OPERATOR

( FID. er) BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT R

Pressure Transmi tte r Pneuma tic Electric (PS-l) Accumulator Motor PT Check ~

Pressure

'alve Switch (PS-2)

Check Hyd raulic External r Valve Pump I

curn Gas L Pressure Supply Regulator Relief (6000 psi) Valve Level Switch (LS -l ) Hyd raulic.,

c ula to Res ervoi r Level Swi tch (LS-2 h 3)

V V V l low Solenoid Valve ~ R gulator (4 Plcs) 1 S Shuttle Valve 4 Way, 3 Pos ition Valve (2 Plcs)

Hyd raulic Cylinder Open Clos e Figure 28 Typical Schematic For lfydraulic - Pneumatic Operator