ML060130150

Er 05000424-05-301, Er 05000425-05-301; 5/17-25/05; Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2; Licensed Operator Examinations

ML060130150
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	07/05/2005
From:	Moorman J Division of Reactor Safety II
To:	Grissette D Southern Nuclear Operating Co
References
50-424/05-301, 50-425/05-301
Download: ML060130150 (13)

See also: IR 05000424/2005301

Text

July 5, 2005

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

ATTN: Mr. D. E. Grissette, Vice President

P. O. Box 1295

Birmingham, AL 35201-1295

SUBJECT: VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT - NRC EXAMINATION REPORT

05000424/2005301 AND 05000425/2005301

Dear Mr. Grissette:

During the period May 17 - 25, 2005, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) administered

operating examinations to employees of your company who had applied for licenses to operate

the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 1 and 2. At the conclusion of the examination, the

examiners discussed the examination questions and preliminary findings with those members

of your staff identified in the enclosed report. The written examination was administered by

your staff on May 27, 2005.

One reactor operator (RO) and six senior reactor operator (SRO) applicants passed both the

written and operating examinations. One RO and two SRO applicants passed the operating

tests but failed the written examination. There were five post examination comments. These

comments are summarized in Enclosure 2. A Simulation Facility Report is included in this

report in Enclosure 3.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter

and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public

Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's

document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact me at (404) 562-4647.

Sincerely,

/RA/

James H. Moorman, III, Chief

Operator Licensing Branch

Division of Reactor Safety

Docket Nos.: 50-424, 50-425

License Nos.: NPF-68, NPF-81

Enclosures: (See page 2)

SNC 2

Enclosures: 1. Report Details

2. NRC Post Examination Comment Resolution.

3. Simulation Facility Report

cc w/encls:

J. T. Gasser

Executive Vice President Attorney General

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. Law Department

Electronic Mail Distribution 132 Judicial Building

Atlanta, GA 30334

W. F. Kitchens

General Manager, Plant Vogtle Laurence Bergen

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. Oglethorpe Power Corporation

Electronic Mail Distribution Electronic Mail Distribution

N. J. Stringfellow Resident Manager

Manager-Licensing Oglethorpe Power Corporation

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. Alvin W. Vogtle Nuclear Plant

Electronic Mail Distribution Electronic Mail Distribution

Director, Consumers' Utility Counsel Arthur H. Domby, Esq.

Division Troutman Sanders

Governor's Office of Consumer Affairs Electronic Mail Distribution

2 M. L. King, Jr. Drive

Plaza Level East; Suite 356 Senior Engineer - Power Supply

Atlanta, GA 30334-4600 Municipal Electric Authority

of Georgia

Office of the County Commissioner Electronic Mail Distribution

Burke County Commission

Waynesboro, GA 30830 Reece McAlister

Executive Secretary

Director, Department of Natural Resources Georgia Public Service Commission

205 Butler Street, SE, Suite 1252 244 Washington Street, SW

Atlanta, GA 30334 Atlanta, GA 30334

Manager, Radioactive Materials Program Robert J. Brown, Plant Training &

Department of Natural Resources Emergency Preparedness Manager

Electronic Mail Distribution Vogtle Electric Generating Plant

Southern Nuclear Operating Co., Inc.

Bin 63030 7821 River Road

Waynesboro, GA 30830

ML051870116

OFFICE RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRP

SIGNATURE /RA/ /RA/ /RA By R. Baldwin for/ /RA/ /RA/

NAME RBaldwin:pmd MBates SRose JMoorman MWidmann

DATE 6/21/05 7/5/05 7/5/05 7/5/05 7/5/05

E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

Docket Nos.: 50-424, 50-425

License Nos.: NPF-68, NPF-81

Report No.: 05000424/2005301 and 05000425/2005301

Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

Facility: Vogtle Electric Generating Plant

Location: 7821 River Road

Waynesboro, GA 30830

Dates: Operating Tests - May 17 - 25, 2005

Written Examination - May 27, 2005

Examiners: R. Baldwin, Chief, Senior Operations Examiner

S. Rose, Senior Operations Engineer

M. Bates, Operations Engineer

M. Chitty, License Examiner Trainee

F. Ehrhardt, Operations Engineer, Trainee

Approved by: James H. Moorman, III, Chief

Operator Licensing Branch

Division of Reactor Safety

Enclosure 1

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

ER 05000424/2005301, ER 05000425/2005301; 5/17 - 25/2005; Vogtle Electric Generating

Plant, Units 1 and 2; Licensed Operator Examinations.

The NRC examiners conducted operator licensing initial examinations in accordance with the

guidance in NUREG-1021, Revision 9, Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power

Reactors. This examination implemented the operator licensing requirements of 10 CFR

§55.41, §55.43, and §55.45.

The NRC administered the operating tests during the period of May 17 - 25, 2005. Members of

the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant training staff administered the written examination on

May 27, 2005. The written examinations and the operating test outlines were developed by the

NRC, the operating test details were developed by the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant training

staff.

One Reactor Operators (RO) and six Senior Reactor Operators (SRO) passed both the

operating test and written examination. One RO and two SRO applicants passed the operating

tests but failed the written examination. One of the SROs that failed the written examination,

passed the examination overall, however, he failed the SRO portion of that examination. The

other SRO that failed the written examination, failed overall, and also failed the SRO portion of

that examination. All of the applicants who passed their examinations were issued operator

licenses commensurate with the level of examination administered. There were five post

examination comments.

No findings of significance were identified.

Enclosure 1

Report Details

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA5 Operator Licensing Initial Examinations

a. Inspection Scope

The NRC developed operating test outlines and written examinations in accordance with

NUREG-1021, Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors,

Revision 9. The licensees examination team reviewed the proposed examinations.

Examination changes agreed upon between the NRC and the licensee were made

according to NUREG-1021 and incorporated into the final version of the examination

materials.

The examiners reviewed the licensees examination security measures while preparing

and administering the examinations to ensure examination security and integrity

complied with 10 CFR 55.49, Integrity of examinations and tests.

The examiners evaluated two RO and eight SRO applicants who were being assessed

under the guidelines specified in NUREG-1021. The examiners administered the

operating tests during the period of May 17 - 25, 2005. Members of the Vogtle Electric

Generating Plant training staff administered the written examination on May 27, 2005.

The evaluations of the applicants and review of documentation were performed to

determine if the applicants, who applied for licenses to operate the Vogtle Electric

Generating Plant , met requirements specified in 10 CFR 55, Operators Licenses.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

The NRC determined that the details provided by the licensee for the walkthrough and

simulator tests were within the range of acceptability expected for the proposed tests.

One RO and six SRO applicants passed both the operating test and written

examination. One RO and two SRO applicants passed the operating tests but failed the

written examination. One of the SROs that failed the written examination, passed the

written examination overall, however, he failed the SRO portion of that examination.

The other SRO that failed the written examination, failed overall, and also failed the

SRO portion of that examination.

The combined RO and SRO written examinations with knowledge and abilities (K/As)

question references/answers, examination references and licensees post examination

comments may be accessed in the ADAMS system (ADAMS Accession Numbers,

ML0516705460, ML0516705400 and ML051810518).

Enclosure 1

2

The exam team noted generic weaknesses ending crew briefs, plant announcements

and reporting of parameter trends. Copies of these reports were sent to the facility

Training Manager for evaluation and determination of appropriate remedial training.

4OA6 Meetings

Exit Meeting Summary

On May 25, 2005, the examination team discussed generic issues with Mr. W. Kitchens

and members of his staff. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials

examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary

information was identified.

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Licensee personnel

R. Brigdon, Training & Emergency Preparedness, Senior Operations Instructor - LORQ

R. Brown, Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager

D. Scukanec, Training & Emergency Preparedness, Operations Training Supervisor

W. Kitchens, General Manager, Plant Vogtle

L. Mansfield, Nuclear Operations Training Supervisor

K. Pope, Operations Unit Supervisor

C. Salter, Operations Training Instructor

NRC personnel

T. Morrissey, Resident Inspector

Enclosure 1

Vogtle 2005-301

NRC Resolution to the Vogtle Post Examination Comments

A complete text of the licensees post-exam comments can be found in ADAMS under

Accession Number ML051710172.

RO QUESTION # 65

COMMENT: The question concerns itself with a release being conducted in accordance with

Procedure 13202-2, Gaseous Releases. During this release the flow

transmitter A-FT-0014 fails low. The question asks the required actions in

accordance with the Procedure 13202-2. The licensee recommends that both

distractors C and D be accepted as correct answers.

The licensee states that the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) allows the

release to continue with the failure of A-FT-0014. The licensee contends that

ODCM Section 3.1 applies with this flow transmitter failure. ODCM Section 3.1

refers to ODCM Table 3-1, which states that Action 46 is applicable when A-FT-

0014 is inoperable. Action 46 requires that flow rate be estimated at least once

every four hours. The licensee contends there is conflicting information

concerning the ODCM and Procedure 13202-2. The NRC disagrees with this

comment. It is true that the ODCM allows for a continued, uninterrupted release;

however, Procedure 13202-2 , Step 2.2.3 clearly requires the release to be

terminated upon failure of A-FT-0014. The NOTE on Page 5 allows for the

release to then be recommenced when the actions of ODCM Section 3.1 have

been completed. The procedure is more restrictive than the ODCM, but not in

conflict. By adhering to the procedure, the operator also ensures compliance

with the ODCM. The question clearly asked the requirements of the procedure,

not the less restrictive requirements of the ODCM.

Failure to terminate the release upon the failure of the flow transmitter would

result in an unmonitored flow indication for the release prior to the ODCM

required calculations being completed. Therefore, to be in compliance with

Procedure 13202-2 and the ODCM, upon the failure of the flow transmitter, the

release must be terminated, the calculations performed, and then the release

may be reinitiated. The NRC believes the action in accordance with Procedure

13202-2 is consistent with that of the ODCM.

Distractor C clearly states that the release did not need to be terminated, which

is clearly not in accordance with Procedure 13202-2. Distractor D requires the

release to be terminated, which is the action required by Limitation Step 2.2.3 of

the release procedure. The stem of the question clearly asks the actions

concerning Procedure 13202-2

NRC RESOLUTION:

Recommendation not accepted. No change to the answer key is warranted.

Enclosure 2

2

SRO QUESTION # 88

COMMENT: This question concerns itself with a situation where a loss of power occurs and

both Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) voltage regulators experience a

common mode failure. Information is provided for A and B EDG concerning

alarms and output voltages. The applicant was tasked to determine what actions

the USS should direct to mitigate the electrical problems. The licensee

recommends that both distractors A and C be accepted as correct answers.

The licensee identifies that the stem of the question provides information

concerning a common voltage regulator malfunction and control over both

Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) is affected. The licensee contends that in

this situation there is no definitive procedural guidance for the situation provided

in the stem. The licensee states the only guidance is provided in 10020-C, EOP

and AOP Rules of Usage, Section 3.0 Step 3.1.1. Which in part states:

...Operators are expected to take actions that stabilize the plant and

mitigate consequences of events after performing AOP or EOP

Immediate Operator Actions when the following conditions exist:

...c. System failures require operator intervention for reactor or

personnel safety.

The licensee states that operators would not have control over either of the

EDGs voltage output as stated in the stem. In this instance the SRO could opt to

stop both EDGs and swap them over to the alternate voltage regulators. This

would be of concern about the ability to control the EDGs to prevent equipment

damage. Distractors A and C concern themselves with stopping either one or

two EDGs and swapping to the alternate voltage regulators for one or two EDGs.

The licensee states that stopping the DGs to protect equipment is consistent

with our expectations. Additionally, the licensee states that stopping both EDGs

to restore control of EDG output voltage is a viable success path for the situation

postulated in the stem.

The NRC agrees with this comment, it is recognized that distractor C (the

original correct answer) is a subset of distractor A. Since there is no definitive

guidance concerning the operation of the EDGs in this situation both answers A

and C will be accepted as correct.

NRC RESOLUTION:

Recommendation accepted. The answer key will be changed to identify that

both distractors A and C are correct answers.

Enclosure 2

3

SRO QUESTION #90

COMMENT: The licensee contends that applicant X inadvertently filled in B on his answer

sheet, vice D that he selected on his exam package. The licensee

recommends that the answer on the examination package be accepted as the

correct answer.

The licensee stated that the original exam package had been under control of

personnel covered under the exam security agreements since applicant X turned

the examination package over to the proctor following the examination on

5/27/05.

The NRC reviewed the initial (original) examination package supplied via the

Vogtle Nuclear Plant Training Department. This review revealed that applicant X

was not consistent in his markings of the correct answer on the original exam

package. There were approximately six questions that indicated different

methods for representing the answer on the exam package as compared to the

answer he marked on his exam answer sheet. These included the following: the

same answer circled on the exam package as on the answer sheet; multiple

answers circled on the exam package, one of which was listed on the answer

sheet; no answers circled on the exam package, answers marked with check

marks that correspond with the answer on the answer sheet; no marks at all on

the exam package, nothing represented the answer on the answer sheet; and a

different answer on the exam package from that on the exam answer sheet.

Based on this evaluation, the NRC could not determine, from the applicants

various methods for marking the examination package, that applicant X intended

to mark anything but his original answer, (B) on the answer sheet.

NRC RESOLUTION:

Recommendation not accepted. The question will stand as originally graded with

the applicants incorrect answer choice D as indicated on the official NRC

examination answer sheet.

Enclosure 2

4

SRO QUESTION # 94

COMMENT: The question concerns an emergency down power with the loss of all

annunciators and the appropriate emergency classification associated with this

event. The licensee recommends that both distractors B andD be accepted

as correct answers.

The licensee presented information concerning a question that was asked by an

applicant during the examination concerning this question. The key to answering

this question was based on the understanding on what emergency down power

terminology meant. The applicants question was asked to clarify if the

emergency down power was being conducted in accordance with Procedure

18013-C, Rapid Power Reduction. This information was key to answering this

question, because if the emergency down power was accomplished in this

procedure then the emergency down power would not have been considered a

transient. The Operations Manager provided guidance that if the down power

was accomplished outside of Procedure 18013-C, then the emergency down

power would be considered a transient. The licensee points out that

considering the emergency down power a transient was vital in calling the loss

of annunciators an ALERT. If the student thought the emergency down power

was not a transient, the correct declaration would be a NOUE.

During the examination the licensee contacted the NRC proctor to discuss the

response that they (the licensee proctors) should provide to the applicant who

posed the question. At that time, the decision was made to inform the entire

class, in order to, clarify a transient was in progress. During the discussion

between the examiner proctor and the licensee proctor the licensee proctor

stated that the information he will provide will clearly make this a transient. This

was done by presenting the following statement to all the applicants, The

emergency down power is not being performed in accordance with 18013-C. In

the post examination comments the licensee reports that this clarification cleared

up the issue for the applicant who originally posed the question; however, it did

the opposite for the other applicants. This caused the other applicants to believe

the emergency down power was even less significant and thus not a transient.

The NRC believes that all applicants were provided the necessary clarifying

instructions to identify a transient was occurring to answer the question correctly.

NRC RESOLUTION:

Recommendation not accepted, no change to the answer key is warranted.

Enclosure 2

5

SRO Question # 97

Comment: This question concerns itself with procedural allowances of a simultaneous dual

Waste Monitor Tank release. The licensee recommends that both distractors A

and C be accepted as corrected answers.

The licensee points out that procedure 36015-C, Radioactive Liquid Effluent

Release Permit Generation and Data Control Computer Method, requires the

approval of the Chemistry Manager for simultaneous release of waste monitor

tanks on different units. This is identified in Step 2.9 of 36015-C. The question

was written using Procedure 13216-2. In the Precautions and Limitation section

of Procedure 13216-2, Step 2.1.6, identifies that the Chemistry Superintendent

would authorize a release of more than one Waste Monitor Tank. A discrepancy

between the two procedures was identified.

The licensee stated that the most correct response would be distractor A,

which states:

A. Two Tanks may never be released at the same time under any

conditions.

This is an incorrect statement based on Step 2.9 of Procedure 36015-C and

Procedure 13216-2, as stated above. The original answer distractor C

identified the Chemistry Superintendent as the contact that is necessary to be

contacted for authorization under this circumstance. The licensee no longer has

a Chemistry Superintendent position on their staff.

NRC Resolution:

Recommendation not accepted. Since the distractors provided do not have a

correct answer, this question will be deleted from the examination. The answer

key will be changed to reflect this question was deleted from the examination.

Enclosure 2

SIMULATION FACILITY REPORT

Facility Licensee: Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 1 and 2

Facility Docket Nos.: 05000424 and 05000425

Operating Tests Administered on: May 17 - 25, 2005

This form is to be used only to report observations. These observations do not constitute audit

or inspection findings and, without further verification and review in accordance with IP 71111.11, are not indicative of noncompliance with 10 CFR 55.46. No licensee action is

required in response to these observations.

While conducting the simulator portion of the operating tests, examiners observed the following

items:

4. While transferring Steam Generator (S/G) controllers from automatic to manual and

then back to automatic the controllers did not have the expected effect on the system.

(Modification Number 2005-05-001)

5. During a LOCA scenario, with S/Gs depressurized to 200 psig, the RCS exhibited large

swings in temperature. Reactor Vessel Level Indicating System (RVLIS) level was

approximately 4%. The temperature swings were more pronounced when the Safety

Injection Accumulators injected. (Modification Number 2005-05-010)

Enclosure 3