ML060130150
| ML060130150 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 07/05/2005 |
| From: | Moorman J Division of Reactor Safety II |
| To: | Grissette D Southern Nuclear Operating Co |
| References | |
| 50-424/05-301, 50-425/05-301 | |
| Download: ML060130150 (13) | |
See also: IR 05000424/2005301
Text
July 5, 2005
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
ATTN: Mr. D. E. Grissette, Vice President
P. O. Box 1295
Birmingham, AL 35201-1295
SUBJECT: VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT - NRC EXAMINATION REPORT
05000424/2005301 AND 05000425/2005301
Dear Mr. Grissette:
During the period May 17 - 25, 2005, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) administered
operating examinations to employees of your company who had applied for licenses to operate
the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 1 and 2. At the conclusion of the examination, the
examiners discussed the examination questions and preliminary findings with those members
of your staff identified in the enclosed report. The written examination was administered by
your staff on May 27, 2005.
One reactor operator (RO) and six senior reactor operator (SRO) applicants passed both the
written and operating examinations. One RO and two SRO applicants passed the operating
tests but failed the written examination. There were five post examination comments. These
comments are summarized in Enclosure 2. A Simulation Facility Report is included in this
report in Enclosure 3.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter
and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public
Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's
document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact me at (404) 562-4647.
Sincerely,
/RA/
James H. Moorman, III, Chief
Operator Licensing Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
Docket Nos.: 50-424, 50-425
Enclosures: (See page 2)
SNC 2
Enclosures: 1. Report Details
2. NRC Post Examination Comment Resolution.
3. Simulation Facility Report
cc w/encls:
J. T. Gasser
Executive Vice President Attorney General
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. Law Department
Electronic Mail Distribution 132 Judicial Building
Atlanta, GA 30334
W. F. Kitchens
General Manager, Plant Vogtle Laurence Bergen
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. Oglethorpe Power Corporation
Electronic Mail Distribution Electronic Mail Distribution
N. J. Stringfellow Resident Manager
Manager-Licensing Oglethorpe Power Corporation
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. Alvin W. Vogtle Nuclear Plant
Electronic Mail Distribution Electronic Mail Distribution
Director, Consumers' Utility Counsel Arthur H. Domby, Esq.
Division Troutman Sanders
Governor's Office of Consumer Affairs Electronic Mail Distribution
2 M. L. King, Jr. Drive
Plaza Level East; Suite 356 Senior Engineer - Power Supply
Atlanta, GA 30334-4600 Municipal Electric Authority
of Georgia
Office of the County Commissioner Electronic Mail Distribution
Burke County Commission
Waynesboro, GA 30830 Reece McAlister
Executive Secretary
Director, Department of Natural Resources Georgia Public Service Commission
205 Butler Street, SE, Suite 1252 244 Washington Street, SW
Atlanta, GA 30334 Atlanta, GA 30334
Manager, Radioactive Materials Program Robert J. Brown, Plant Training &
Department of Natural Resources Emergency Preparedness Manager
Electronic Mail Distribution Vogtle Electric Generating Plant
Southern Nuclear Operating Co., Inc.
Bin 63030 7821 River Road
Waynesboro, GA 30830
OFFICE RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRP
SIGNATURE /RA/ /RA/ /RA By R. Baldwin for/ /RA/ /RA/
NAME RBaldwin:pmd MBates SRose JMoorman MWidmann
DATE 6/21/05 7/5/05 7/5/05 7/5/05 7/5/05
E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
Docket Nos.: 50-424, 50-425
Report No.: 05000424/2005301 and 05000425/2005301
Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Facility: Vogtle Electric Generating Plant
Location: 7821 River Road
Waynesboro, GA 30830
Dates: Operating Tests - May 17 - 25, 2005
Written Examination - May 27, 2005
Examiners: R. Baldwin, Chief, Senior Operations Examiner
S. Rose, Senior Operations Engineer
M. Bates, Operations Engineer
M. Chitty, License Examiner Trainee
F. Ehrhardt, Operations Engineer, Trainee
Approved by: James H. Moorman, III, Chief
Operator Licensing Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
Enclosure 1
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
ER 05000424/2005301, ER 05000425/2005301; 5/17 - 25/2005; Vogtle Electric Generating
Plant, Units 1 and 2; Licensed Operator Examinations.
The NRC examiners conducted operator licensing initial examinations in accordance with the
guidance in NUREG-1021, Revision 9, Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power
Reactors. This examination implemented the operator licensing requirements of 10 CFR
§55.41, §55.43, and §55.45.
The NRC administered the operating tests during the period of May 17 - 25, 2005. Members of
the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant training staff administered the written examination on
May 27, 2005. The written examinations and the operating test outlines were developed by the
NRC, the operating test details were developed by the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant training
staff.
One Reactor Operators (RO) and six Senior Reactor Operators (SRO) passed both the
operating test and written examination. One RO and two SRO applicants passed the operating
tests but failed the written examination. One of the SROs that failed the written examination,
passed the examination overall, however, he failed the SRO portion of that examination. The
other SRO that failed the written examination, failed overall, and also failed the SRO portion of
that examination. All of the applicants who passed their examinations were issued operator
licenses commensurate with the level of examination administered. There were five post
examination comments.
No findings of significance were identified.
Enclosure 1
Report Details
4. OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA5 Operator Licensing Initial Examinations
a. Inspection Scope
The NRC developed operating test outlines and written examinations in accordance with
NUREG-1021, Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors,
Revision 9. The licensees examination team reviewed the proposed examinations.
Examination changes agreed upon between the NRC and the licensee were made
according to NUREG-1021 and incorporated into the final version of the examination
materials.
The examiners reviewed the licensees examination security measures while preparing
and administering the examinations to ensure examination security and integrity
complied with 10 CFR 55.49, Integrity of examinations and tests.
The examiners evaluated two RO and eight SRO applicants who were being assessed
under the guidelines specified in NUREG-1021. The examiners administered the
operating tests during the period of May 17 - 25, 2005. Members of the Vogtle Electric
Generating Plant training staff administered the written examination on May 27, 2005.
The evaluations of the applicants and review of documentation were performed to
determine if the applicants, who applied for licenses to operate the Vogtle Electric
Generating Plant , met requirements specified in 10 CFR 55, Operators Licenses.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
The NRC determined that the details provided by the licensee for the walkthrough and
simulator tests were within the range of acceptability expected for the proposed tests.
One RO and six SRO applicants passed both the operating test and written
examination. One RO and two SRO applicants passed the operating tests but failed the
written examination. One of the SROs that failed the written examination, passed the
written examination overall, however, he failed the SRO portion of that examination.
The other SRO that failed the written examination, failed overall, and also failed the
SRO portion of that examination.
The combined RO and SRO written examinations with knowledge and abilities (K/As)
question references/answers, examination references and licensees post examination
comments may be accessed in the ADAMS system (ADAMS Accession Numbers,
ML0516705460, ML0516705400 and ML051810518).
Enclosure 1
2
The exam team noted generic weaknesses ending crew briefs, plant announcements
and reporting of parameter trends. Copies of these reports were sent to the facility
Training Manager for evaluation and determination of appropriate remedial training.
4OA6 Meetings
Exit Meeting Summary
On May 25, 2005, the examination team discussed generic issues with Mr. W. Kitchens
and members of his staff. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials
examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary
information was identified.
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee personnel
R. Brigdon, Training & Emergency Preparedness, Senior Operations Instructor - LORQ
R. Brown, Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager
D. Scukanec, Training & Emergency Preparedness, Operations Training Supervisor
W. Kitchens, General Manager, Plant Vogtle
L. Mansfield, Nuclear Operations Training Supervisor
K. Pope, Operations Unit Supervisor
C. Salter, Operations Training Instructor
NRC personnel
T. Morrissey, Resident Inspector
Enclosure 1
Vogtle 2005-301
NRC Resolution to the Vogtle Post Examination Comments
A complete text of the licensees post-exam comments can be found in ADAMS under
Accession Number ML051710172.
RO QUESTION # 65
COMMENT: The question concerns itself with a release being conducted in accordance with
Procedure 13202-2, Gaseous Releases. During this release the flow
transmitter A-FT-0014 fails low. The question asks the required actions in
accordance with the Procedure 13202-2. The licensee recommends that both
distractors C and D be accepted as correct answers.
The licensee states that the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) allows the
release to continue with the failure of A-FT-0014. The licensee contends that
ODCM Section 3.1 applies with this flow transmitter failure. ODCM Section 3.1
refers to ODCM Table 3-1, which states that Action 46 is applicable when A-FT-
0014 is inoperable. Action 46 requires that flow rate be estimated at least once
every four hours. The licensee contends there is conflicting information
concerning the ODCM and Procedure 13202-2. The NRC disagrees with this
comment. It is true that the ODCM allows for a continued, uninterrupted release;
however, Procedure 13202-2 , Step 2.2.3 clearly requires the release to be
terminated upon failure of A-FT-0014. The NOTE on Page 5 allows for the
release to then be recommenced when the actions of ODCM Section 3.1 have
been completed. The procedure is more restrictive than the ODCM, but not in
conflict. By adhering to the procedure, the operator also ensures compliance
with the ODCM. The question clearly asked the requirements of the procedure,
not the less restrictive requirements of the ODCM.
Failure to terminate the release upon the failure of the flow transmitter would
result in an unmonitored flow indication for the release prior to the ODCM
required calculations being completed. Therefore, to be in compliance with
Procedure 13202-2 and the ODCM, upon the failure of the flow transmitter, the
release must be terminated, the calculations performed, and then the release
may be reinitiated. The NRC believes the action in accordance with Procedure
13202-2 is consistent with that of the ODCM.
Distractor C clearly states that the release did not need to be terminated, which
is clearly not in accordance with Procedure 13202-2. Distractor D requires the
release to be terminated, which is the action required by Limitation Step 2.2.3 of
the release procedure. The stem of the question clearly asks the actions
concerning Procedure 13202-2
NRC RESOLUTION:
Recommendation not accepted. No change to the answer key is warranted.
Enclosure 2
2
SRO QUESTION # 88
COMMENT: This question concerns itself with a situation where a loss of power occurs and
both Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) voltage regulators experience a
common mode failure. Information is provided for A and B EDG concerning
alarms and output voltages. The applicant was tasked to determine what actions
the USS should direct to mitigate the electrical problems. The licensee
recommends that both distractors A and C be accepted as correct answers.
The licensee identifies that the stem of the question provides information
concerning a common voltage regulator malfunction and control over both
Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) is affected. The licensee contends that in
this situation there is no definitive procedural guidance for the situation provided
in the stem. The licensee states the only guidance is provided in 10020-C, EOP
and AOP Rules of Usage, Section 3.0 Step 3.1.1. Which in part states:
...Operators are expected to take actions that stabilize the plant and
mitigate consequences of events after performing AOP or EOP
Immediate Operator Actions when the following conditions exist:
...c. System failures require operator intervention for reactor or
personnel safety.
The licensee states that operators would not have control over either of the
EDGs voltage output as stated in the stem. In this instance the SRO could opt to
stop both EDGs and swap them over to the alternate voltage regulators. This
would be of concern about the ability to control the EDGs to prevent equipment
damage. Distractors A and C concern themselves with stopping either one or
two EDGs and swapping to the alternate voltage regulators for one or two EDGs.
The licensee states that stopping the DGs to protect equipment is consistent
with our expectations. Additionally, the licensee states that stopping both EDGs
to restore control of EDG output voltage is a viable success path for the situation
postulated in the stem.
The NRC agrees with this comment, it is recognized that distractor C (the
original correct answer) is a subset of distractor A. Since there is no definitive
guidance concerning the operation of the EDGs in this situation both answers A
and C will be accepted as correct.
NRC RESOLUTION:
Recommendation accepted. The answer key will be changed to identify that
both distractors A and C are correct answers.
Enclosure 2
3
SRO QUESTION #90
COMMENT: The licensee contends that applicant X inadvertently filled in B on his answer
sheet, vice D that he selected on his exam package. The licensee
recommends that the answer on the examination package be accepted as the
correct answer.
The licensee stated that the original exam package had been under control of
personnel covered under the exam security agreements since applicant X turned
the examination package over to the proctor following the examination on
5/27/05.
The NRC reviewed the initial (original) examination package supplied via the
Vogtle Nuclear Plant Training Department. This review revealed that applicant X
was not consistent in his markings of the correct answer on the original exam
package. There were approximately six questions that indicated different
methods for representing the answer on the exam package as compared to the
answer he marked on his exam answer sheet. These included the following: the
same answer circled on the exam package as on the answer sheet; multiple
answers circled on the exam package, one of which was listed on the answer
sheet; no answers circled on the exam package, answers marked with check
marks that correspond with the answer on the answer sheet; no marks at all on
the exam package, nothing represented the answer on the answer sheet; and a
different answer on the exam package from that on the exam answer sheet.
Based on this evaluation, the NRC could not determine, from the applicants
various methods for marking the examination package, that applicant X intended
to mark anything but his original answer, (B) on the answer sheet.
NRC RESOLUTION:
Recommendation not accepted. The question will stand as originally graded with
the applicants incorrect answer choice D as indicated on the official NRC
examination answer sheet.
Enclosure 2
4
SRO QUESTION # 94
COMMENT: The question concerns an emergency down power with the loss of all
annunciators and the appropriate emergency classification associated with this
event. The licensee recommends that both distractors B andD be accepted
as correct answers.
The licensee presented information concerning a question that was asked by an
applicant during the examination concerning this question. The key to answering
this question was based on the understanding on what emergency down power
terminology meant. The applicants question was asked to clarify if the
emergency down power was being conducted in accordance with Procedure
18013-C, Rapid Power Reduction. This information was key to answering this
question, because if the emergency down power was accomplished in this
procedure then the emergency down power would not have been considered a
transient. The Operations Manager provided guidance that if the down power
was accomplished outside of Procedure 18013-C, then the emergency down
power would be considered a transient. The licensee points out that
considering the emergency down power a transient was vital in calling the loss
of annunciators an ALERT. If the student thought the emergency down power
was not a transient, the correct declaration would be a NOUE.
During the examination the licensee contacted the NRC proctor to discuss the
response that they (the licensee proctors) should provide to the applicant who
posed the question. At that time, the decision was made to inform the entire
class, in order to, clarify a transient was in progress. During the discussion
between the examiner proctor and the licensee proctor the licensee proctor
stated that the information he will provide will clearly make this a transient. This
was done by presenting the following statement to all the applicants, The
emergency down power is not being performed in accordance with 18013-C. In
the post examination comments the licensee reports that this clarification cleared
up the issue for the applicant who originally posed the question; however, it did
the opposite for the other applicants. This caused the other applicants to believe
the emergency down power was even less significant and thus not a transient.
The NRC believes that all applicants were provided the necessary clarifying
instructions to identify a transient was occurring to answer the question correctly.
NRC RESOLUTION:
Recommendation not accepted, no change to the answer key is warranted.
Enclosure 2
5
SRO Question # 97
Comment: This question concerns itself with procedural allowances of a simultaneous dual
Waste Monitor Tank release. The licensee recommends that both distractors A
and C be accepted as corrected answers.
The licensee points out that procedure 36015-C, Radioactive Liquid Effluent
Release Permit Generation and Data Control Computer Method, requires the
approval of the Chemistry Manager for simultaneous release of waste monitor
tanks on different units. This is identified in Step 2.9 of 36015-C. The question
was written using Procedure 13216-2. In the Precautions and Limitation section
of Procedure 13216-2, Step 2.1.6, identifies that the Chemistry Superintendent
would authorize a release of more than one Waste Monitor Tank. A discrepancy
between the two procedures was identified.
The licensee stated that the most correct response would be distractor A,
which states:
A. Two Tanks may never be released at the same time under any
conditions.
This is an incorrect statement based on Step 2.9 of Procedure 36015-C and
Procedure 13216-2, as stated above. The original answer distractor C
identified the Chemistry Superintendent as the contact that is necessary to be
contacted for authorization under this circumstance. The licensee no longer has
a Chemistry Superintendent position on their staff.
NRC Resolution:
Recommendation not accepted. Since the distractors provided do not have a
correct answer, this question will be deleted from the examination. The answer
key will be changed to reflect this question was deleted from the examination.
Enclosure 2
SIMULATION FACILITY REPORT
Facility Licensee: Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 1 and 2
Facility Docket Nos.: 05000424 and 05000425
Operating Tests Administered on: May 17 - 25, 2005
This form is to be used only to report observations. These observations do not constitute audit
or inspection findings and, without further verification and review in accordance with IP 71111.11, are not indicative of noncompliance with 10 CFR 55.46. No licensee action is
required in response to these observations.
While conducting the simulator portion of the operating tests, examiners observed the following
items:
4. While transferring Steam Generator (S/G) controllers from automatic to manual and
then back to automatic the controllers did not have the expected effect on the system.
(Modification Number 2005-05-001)
5. During a LOCA scenario, with S/Gs depressurized to 200 psig, the RCS exhibited large
swings in temperature. Reactor Vessel Level Indicating System (RVLIS) level was
approximately 4%. The temperature swings were more pronounced when the Safety
Injection Accumulators injected. (Modification Number 2005-05-010)
Enclosure 3