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| {{#Wiki_filter:NRC Form 3M (94)3)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED 0M B NO.3)500104 EXPIRES: BI31/88 FACILITY NAME (1)Washington Nuclear Plant-Unit 2 PAGE 3I DOCKET NUMBER (2)o 5 o o o3 97 i oFO 4 FACILITY NA YEAR OAY AcvlsioN MONTH NUMBER LEA NUMBER (6)EVENT DATE(5)REPORT DATE (7I OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)YEAR MONTH SEGVENT IAL NUMBER DOCKET NUMBER(5)0 5 0 0 0 DAY YEAR lg ressure ore pray ys em ree-uar er-nc one rea urging Surveillance Testing While Plant was Shutdown-Component Failure 0 5 12 89 015 0 0 6 0 8 8 9 0 5 0 0 0 OPERATING MODE (9)POWE R LEYE(.0 0 0 20.402(5)20.405(~)(1)(i)20AOS(~)(1)(iil 20AGS I~)(I l(ili)20,405(~l(1)(lv)20A05 (~I(1)(v)20 405(cl 60.35(c)(1) 60,35(cl(2) 50.73(~l(21(il 50.73(~)(2)l ii)50,7 3(v)(2)I li I I LICKNSEE CONTACT FOR THIS I.EA (12I 50.73(~)(2)(iv)50,73(~)(2)(vl 50,73(s)(2)(vsl 60.73(o)(2)(viill(A) 60,73(~i(2)I viiil(BI 50.73(~)(2)(s I THIS AEPOAT IS SUBMIT'TEO PURSUANT T 0 THE AEOVIAEMENTS OF 10 CFR$;fChtch oi t or moit of tht foi(oivinpf (ll 73.71(5)73.71(c)OTHKR ISPtcify in AOttrstt osfovr snd in Ttvt ffRC Form 35SA)NAME J.D.Arbuckle, Compliance Engineer TELEPHOtvE NUMBF R AREA CODE 50 937 7-211 5 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCAIBEO IN THIS REPORT (13)CAUSE SYSTEMI COMPONEIvT MANVF AC'TVRKR cIEPORTABI.E TO NPADS CAUSE SYSTEM COMPOIvENT MANUFAC TVRER REPORTABLE TO NPRDS': v"i r<*SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14I YES fff yN Comport EXPECTED S(fBMISSION OA TEI ABSTRACT fLimit to tt00 totctf I~toorommtrtry fiftttn Iinpit ttlttt tyotvrrrittn finttf (15)EXPECTED SUBIVIISSIO"II DATE',"l5i MONTvr DAY YEAR fg roofs DOQ.40 DO Oi IA FJ0 4O (MID GA<CC DiC O'A CEIL.(FP On Hay 12, 1989 during the performance of the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS)System operability procedure, a three-quarter-inch high point vent line failed approximately one-ha'if inch above the fillet weld.The vent line is on the 12-inch HPCS test return line to the suppression pool and is located on approximately the 466'levation of the Reactor Building.At the time of the event the Plant was shutdown for the annual maintenance and refueling outage.The procedure was being performed as part of normal surveillance testing.During the course of the surveillance, Plant Operators noted vibration on the test line while the Full-Flow Suppression Pool Test Return Valve (HPCS-V-23) was open.At 0315 hours the high point vent line failed, spraying water on two Equipment Operators and a Health Physics Technician. | | {{#Wiki_filter:NRC Form 3M U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (94)3) |
| However, none of the personnel were contaminated. | | APPROVED 0M B NO. 3)500104 EXPIRES: BI31/88 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) |
| At 0330 hours, Plant Operators secured and partially drained the HPCS System to stop the leak.The cause of the HPCS vent line failure was due to reverse bending fatigue caused by vibration. | | FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) PAGE 3I Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 o 5 o o o3 97 i oFO 4 lg ressure ore pray ys em ree- uar er- nc one rea urging Surveillance Testing While Plant was Shutdown - Component Failure EVENT DATE(5) LEA NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7I OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8) |
| The vibration was due to turbulence caused by high flow rates in the 12-inch test return line.Although primary containment was open for refueling activities, an HPCS high point vent line failure during operation would have been considered to be a breach of containment (open to the submerged portion of the suppression pool).However, had this occurred during operation, the line failure would only have affected the HPCS test mode.The normal injection mode would not have been affected.Corrective actions consisted of 1)implementing a design change to strengthen the high point vent piping, and 2)performing an Engineering evaluation of similar (vents and drains)piping failures at the Plant.NRC Form 356 (9 83( | | SEGVENT IAL AcvlsioN OAY YEAR FACILITY NA DOCKET NUMBER(5) |
| NRC Form 355A (94)3)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION V.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO.3150-0(04 EXPIRES: 9/31/SB FACILITY NAME (1)DOCKET NUMBER (3)LER NI/MBER (5)PAGE (3)YEAR)N SEOUENTIAL NUMBER'~P.'EVISION NUMBER Washin ton Nuclear Plant-Unit 2 TEXT/I/moro FIN co lr rooulrod, uro oddkr/onrr////IC Form 36SA'4/(IT)0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 8 9 0 1 5 000 2 0 4 Abstract (continued) | | MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR NUMBER NUMBER MONTH 0 5 0 0 0 0 5 12 89 015 0 0 6 0 8 8 9 0 5 0 0 0 OPERATING THIS AEPOAT IS SUBMIT'TEO PURSUANT T 0 THE AEOVIAEMENTS OF 10 CFR $ ; fChtch oi t or moit of tht foi(oivinpf (ll MODE (9) 20.402(5) 20 405(cl 50.73( ~ ) (2)(iv) 73.71(5) |
| This event did not effect the health and safety of either the public or Plant personnel.
| | POWE R 20.405( ~ ) (1)(i) 60.35(c)(1) 50,73( ~ )(2)(vl 73.71(c) |
| Plant Conditions a)Power Level-0%b)Plant Node-5 (Refueling) | | LEYE(. |
| Event Descri tion On Hay 12, 1989 during the performance of Plant Procedure (PPII)7.4.5.1.11,"High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS)System Operability Test," a three-quarter-inch high point vent line t.HPCS (55-1-7): containing val ves HPCS-V-83/84] | | 0 0 0 20AOS( ~ )(1)(iil 60,35(cl(2) 50,73(s)(2)(vsl OTHKR ISPtcify in AOttrstt osfovr snd in Ttvt ffRC Form 20AGS I ~ ) (I l(ili) 50.73( ~ l(21(il 60.73(o) (2)(viill(A) 35SA) 20,405( ~ l(1) (lv) 50.73( ~ ) (2) l ii) 60,73( ~ i(2) I viiil(BI 20A05 (~ I(1) (v) 50,7 3(v ) (2) I liI I 50.73( ~ ) (2)(s I LICKNSEE CONTACT FOR THIS I.EA (12I NAME TELEPHOtvE NUMBF R AREA CODE J.D. Arbuckle, Compliance Engineer 50 937 7- 211 5 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCAIBEO IN THIS REPORT (13) |
| failed approximat'ely one-half inch above the fillet weld.The vent line is on the HPCS test return line to the suppression pool and is located on approximately the 466'levation of the Reactor Building (in the HPCS pump room).At the time of the event, the Plant was shutdown for the annual maintenance and refue'ling'utage. | | MANUFAC CAUSE SYSTEMI COMPONEIvT MANVFAC |
| The procedure was being performed as part of normal survei 1 lance testing.In accordance with the procedure, Plant Operators had aligned the system, proper ly vented and filled the piping and started the HPCS pump (HPCS-P-1). | | 'TVRKR cIEPORTABI.E TO NPADS CAUSE SYSTEM COMPOIvENT TVRER REPORTABLE TO NPRDS ': v "i r<* |
| During the course of the surveillance they noted vibration on the test line while the Full-Flow Suppression Pool Test Return'alve (HPCS-V-23) was open.At 0315 hours the high point vent line failed, spraying water on two Equipment Operators and a Health Physics Technician. | | SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14I MONTvr DAY YEAR EXPECTED SUBIVIISSIO "II DATE ',"l5i YES fff yN Comport EXPECTED S(fBMISSION OA TEI ABSTRACT fLimit to tt00 totctf I~ toorommtrtry fiftttn Iinpit ttlttt tyotvrrrittn finttf (15) |
| However, none of the personnel were contaminated. | | On Hay 12, 1989 during the performance of the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System operability procedure, a three-quarter-inch high point vent line failed approximately one-ha'if inch above the fillet weld. The vent line is on the 12-inch HPCS test return line to the suppression pool and is located on approximately the 466'levation of the Reactor Building. At the time of the event the Plant was shutdown for the annual maintenance and refueling outage. |
| At 0326 hours, Plant Operators tripped pump HPCS-P-1.The control fuses for the pump were removed at 0330 hours and the system was secured and partially drained to stop the leak.Immediate Corrective Action Plant Operators secured HPCS-P-1 and isolated the HPCS System to stop the leakage.Further Evaluation and Corrective Action A.Further Evaluation This event is being reported per the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(.ii) as an event or condition that resulted in the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principle safety barriers, being seriously degraded.Although primary containment was open for refueling activities, an HPCS high point vent line failure during operation would have been considered to be a breach of primary containment (open to the submerged portion of the Suppression Pool).2.With the exception of the line break, there were no structures, systems or components that were inoperable at the start'f this event that contributed to the event.NRC FORM 355A (943)~U.S.CPOI 1955-330-959 00010 NRC Form 366A (943)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO.3)50-0104 EXPIRES: 6/31/SB FACILITY NAME (ll DOCKET NUMBER (2)LER NUMBER (61 SEOUENTIAL NUMBER REVrelON NUMBER IIAGE (3)Washington Nuclear Plant-Unit 2 TEXT///mors cpsse is Nrr/oirsd. | | The procedure was being performed as part of normal surveillance testing. During the course of the surveillance, Plant Operators noted vibration on the test line while the Full-Flow Suppression Pool Test Return Valve (HPCS-V-23) was open. At 0315 hours the high point vent line failed, spraying water on two Equipment Operators and a Health fg Physics Technician. However, none of the personnel were contaminated. At 0330 hours, roofs Plant Operators secured and partially drained the HPCS System to stop the leak. |
| oss sdde'one///I C Form 36SA's/(17)0 s o 0 0 397 89 0 1 5 0 0 3 OF 0 4 3.On tray 15, 1989 a field examination of the failed HPCS vent line was performed. | | DOQ. |
| As previously stated, the line failed one-half inch above the fillet weld.The failure was due to reverse bending fatigue caused by vibration. | | 40 DO Oi IA The cause of the HPCS vent line failure was due to reverse bending fatigue caused by FJ0 vibration. The vibration was due to turbulence caused by high flow rates in the 12-inch 4O test return line. Although primary containment was open for refueling activities, an (MID HPCS high point vent line failure during operation would have been considered to be a GA breach of containment (open to the submerged portion of the suppression pool). However, |
| The vibration was due to turbulence caused by high flow rates in the 12-inch test return line.The line that failed is a three-quarter-inch, Schedule 160, SA105 (Grade B)pipe (Carbon steel: ASHE III/2).B.Further Corrective Action 1.A design change has been implemented to strengthen the high point vent piping.Specifically, one-inch butt we'id piping was used (coming off the 12-inch test return line)and reduced to three-quarter inch to connect to the valves (which have been close-coupled and an elbow deleted), and a gusset plate was installed to rigidly support the vent valves to the 12-inch test return line.2.Generation Engineering has performed an evaluation of similar (vents and drains)piping failures at WNP-2.Extensive efforts have been ongoing to preclude repetitive failures of similar connections. | | <CC had this occurred during operation, the line failure would only have affected the HPCS DiC test mode. The normal injection mode would not have been affected. |
| The Supply System will continue to focus on eliminating the causes of these failures through improved design configuration and minimizing the source of cyclic loading.Safet Si nificance There are no unacceptable consequences associated with this event.At the time of the event, the reactor vessel head was removed and reactor water level was greater than 22 feet above the reactor vessel flange.In addition, the Residual Heat Removal (RHR)System was in service for shutdown cooling.Furthermore, the HPCS was not required for trode 5 (Refueling). | | O'A CEIL.(FP Corrective actions consisted of 1) implementing a design change to strengthen the high point vent piping, and 2) performing an Engineering evaluation of similar (vents and drains) piping failures at the Plant. |
| If this event had occurred during operation, the failure of the HPCS high point vent line would have been considered to be a breach of primary containment (between the subsurface of the suppression pool and the outside containment atmosphere). | | NRC Form 356 (9 83( |
| However, had this occurred the l.ine failure would have only affected the HPCS test mode.The normal HPCS injection mode would not have been affected.Accordingly, this event did not affect the health and safety of either the public or Plant personnel. | | |
| Similar Events\LERs 85-011-00 and 85-011-01 NRC FORM 366D IS Ser~O.e.CPcr Ieee-Sc<-eee One;I NRC Form 3BSA (943)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO.3150&)04 EXPIRES: 8(3)i88 FACILITY NAME (1)DOCKET NUMBER (2)LER NUMBER (6)YEAR$g+SEQUENTIAL pili REVISION NUMBER B:X.NUMBBR PACE (3)Washington Nuclear Plant-Unit 2 o s o o 0 3 9 7 TEXT iil mors spsssis~Irirsd.oss sddnerel NRC Form 3SSA'si (ll)89-01 5 0 0 0 Q OF 0 4 EI I S Information Text Reference EIIS Reference System Component High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS)System HPCS High Point Vent Line[HPCS (55-1-7): containing HPCS-V-83/84] | | NRC Form 355A V.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (94)3) |
| Pump HPCS-P-1 Valve HPCS-V-23 Residual Heat Removal (RHR)System Primary Containment BG BG BG BG BO NH P TV NRC FORM SBBA (9 83)~II.S.CPOI)BBP-S2O-SBPrOOO'IO}} | | LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0(04 EXPIRES: 9/31/SB FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (3) LER NI/MBER (5) PAGE (3) |
| | SEOUENTIAL '~P.'EVISION YEAR )N NUMBER NUMBER Washin ton Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 8 9 0 1 5 000 2 0 4 TEXT /I/ moro FINco lr rooulrod, uro oddkr/onrr////IC Form 36SA'4/ (IT) |
| | Abstract (continued) |
| | This event did not effect the health and safety of either the public or Plant personnel. |
| | Plant Conditions a) Power Level - 0% |
| | b) Plant Node - 5 (Refueling) |
| | Event Descri tion On Hay 12, 1989 during the performance of Plant Procedure (PPII) 7.4.5.1.11, "High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System Operability Test," a three-quarter-inch high point vent line t.HPCS (55-1-7): containing val ves HPCS-V-83/84] failed approximat'ely one-half inch above the fillet weld. The vent line is on the HPCS test return line to the suppression pool and is located on approximately the 466'levation of the Reactor Building (in the HPCS pump room). At the time of the event, the Plant was shutdown for the annual maintenance and refue'ling'utage. |
| | The procedure was being performed as part of normal survei 1 lance testing. In accordance with the procedure, Plant Operators had aligned the system, proper ly vented and filled the piping and started the HPCS pump (HPCS-P-1). During the course of the surveillance they noted vibration on the test line while the Full-Flow Suppression Pool Test Return'alve (HPCS-V-23) was open. At 0315 hours the high point vent line failed, spraying water on two Equipment Operators and a Health Physics Technician. However, none of the personnel were contaminated. |
| | At 0326 hours, Plant Operators tripped pump HPCS-P-1. The control fuses for the pump were removed at 0330 hours and the system was secured and partially drained to stop the leak. |
| | Immediate Corrective Action Plant Operators secured HPCS-P-1 and isolated the HPCS System to stop the leakage. |
| | Further Evaluation and Corrective Action A. Further Evaluation This event is being reported per the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(.ii) as an event or condition that resulted in the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principle safety barriers, being seriously degraded. Although primary containment was open for refueling activities, an HPCS high point vent line failure during operation would have been considered to be a breach of primary containment (open to the submerged portion of the Suppression Pool). |
| | : 2. With the exception of the line break, there were no structures, systems or components contributed to the event. |
| | that were inoperable at the start 'f this event that NRC FORM 355A ~ U.S. CPOI 1955-330-959 00010 (943) |
| | |
| | NRC Form 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (943) |
| | LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED OMB NO. 3)50-0104 EXPIRES: 6/31/SB FACILITYNAME (ll DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (61 IIAGE (3) |
| | SEOUENTIAL REVrelON NUMBER NUMBER Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0 s o 0 0 397 89 0 1 5 0 0 3 OF 0 4 TEXT /// mors cpsse is Nrr/oirsd. oss sdde'one ///IC Form 36SA's/ (17) |
| | : 3. On tray 15, 1989 a field examination of the failed HPCS vent line was performed. As previously stated, the line failed one-half inch above the fillet weld. The failure was due to reverse bending fatigue caused by vibration. The vibration was due to turbulence caused by high flow rates in the 12-inch test return line. The line that failed is a three-quarter-inch, Schedule 160, SA105 (Grade B) pipe (Carbon steel: |
| | ASHE III/2). |
| | B. Further Corrective Action |
| | : 1. A design change has been implemented to strengthen the high point vent piping. Specifically, one-inch butt we'id piping was used (coming off the 12-inch test return line) and reduced to three-quarter inch to connect to the valves (which have been close-coupled and an elbow deleted), and a gusset plate was installed to rigidly support the vent valves to the 12-inch test return line. |
| | : 2. Generation Engineering has performed an evaluation of similar (vents and drains) piping failures at WNP-2. Extensive efforts have been ongoing to preclude repetitive failures of similar connections. The Supply System will continue to focus on eliminating the causes of these failures through improved design configuration and minimizing the source of cyclic loading. |
| | Safet Si nificance There are no unacceptable consequences associated with this event. At the time of the event, the reactor vessel head was removed and reactor water level was greater than 22 feet above the reactor vessel flange. In addition, the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System was in service for shutdown cooling. Furthermore, the HPCS was not required for trode 5 (Refueling). |
| | If this event had occurred during operation, the failure of the HPCS high point vent line would have been considered to be a breach of primary containment (between the subsurface of the suppression pool and the outside containment atmosphere). |
| | However, had this occurred the l.ine failure would have only affected the HPCS test mode. The normal HPCS injection mode would not have been affected. |
| | Accordingly, this event did not affect the health and safety of either the public or Plant personnel. |
| | Similar Events |
| | \ |
| | LERs 85-011-00 and 85-011-01 NRC FORM 366D ~ O.e. CPcr Ieee-Sc<-eee One;I IS Ser |
| | |
| | NRC Form 3BSA U.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION (943) |
| | LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED OMB NO. 3150&)04 EXPIRES: 8(3) i88 FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PACE (3) |
| | $ SEQUENTIAL pili REVISION YEAR g+ NUMBER B:X. NUMBBR Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 o s o o 0 3 9 7 89 01 5 0 0 0 Q OF 0 4 TEXT iilmors spsssis ~Irirsd. oss sddnerel NRC Form 3SSA'si (ll) |
| | EI I S Information Text Reference EIIS Reference System Component High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System BG HPCS High Point Vent Line [HPCS (55-1-7): containing HPCS-V-83/84] BG Pump HPCS-P-1 BG P Valve HPCS-V-23 BG TV Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System BO Primary Containment NH NRC FORM SBBA ~ II.S. CPOI )BBP-S2O-SBPrOOO'IO (9 83)}} |
LER 89-015-00:on 890512,three-quarter-inch High Point Vent Line Failed During Performance of HPCS Sys Operability Procedure.Caused by Reverse Bending Fatigue Caused by Vibration.Design Change Implemented| ML17285A542 |
| Person / Time |
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| Site: |
Columbia  |
|---|
| Issue date: |
06/08/1989 |
|---|
| From: |
Arbuckle J
WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM |
|---|
| To: |
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| Shared Package |
|---|
| ML17285A541 |
List: |
|---|
| References |
|---|
| LER-89-015, LER-89-15, NUDOCS 8906140264 |
| Download: ML17285A542 (4) |
|
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Category:LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (SEE ALSO AO
MONTHYEARML17292B7421999-07-20020 July 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 990628,ESF Signal Closed All Eight MSIVs While Plant Was Shutdown.Caused by Failure of Relay RPS-RLY-K10D.Subject Relay Was Replaced & Tested on 990630. with 990720 Ltr
ML17292B4451998-10-27027 October 1998
LER 98-012-01:on 980715,failure to Comply with Requirements of TS SR 3.8.4.7 Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Training Session Was Held with Personnel.With 981027 Ltr
ML17284A7561998-09-0303 September 1998
LER 98-013-00:on 980805,ESF Actuations Were Noted Due to Deenergization of Vital Electrical Bus SM-8.Caused by Inadequate Direction in Troubleshooting Plan.Will Conduct Training for Engineering Personnel.With 980903 Ltr
ML17284A7571998-09-0202 September 1998
LER 98-014-00:on 980807,completion of TS 3.8.1.F Required Shutdown Due to Inoperability of EDG-2 Was Noted.Caused by Degraded Voltage Regulator for DG-2.Replaced Voltage Regulator & Associated Scrs.With 980902 Ltr
ML17284A7551998-09-0202 September 1998
LER 98-015-00:on 980808,discovered Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leak During Shutdown Conditions.Caused by Leakage from Socket Weld (Fwb 63) on Elbow Connection.Failed Piping Connection Was Replaced.With 980902 Ltr
ML17284A7311998-08-17017 August 1998
LER 98-012-00:on 980716,determined That 24-month SR 3.8.4.7 Had Not Been Fulfilled within Specified Frequency.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.License Requested & Received Enforcement Discretion Re Battery Svc test.W/980817 Ltr
ML17284A7121998-07-23023 July 1998
LER 98-006-01:on 980520,discovered Discrepancies in Low Voltage Bus Calculations During Review of 10CFR50,App R Calculations for High Impedance Faults.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Implemented Procedural Changes
ML17284A6951998-07-17017 July 1998
LER 98-011-00:on 980617,ECCS Pump Room Flooding Was Noted Due to FP Sys Pipe Break.Caused by Inadequate Design of FP Sys.Detailed Review of FP Sys Design Was Conducted. W/980717 Ltr
ML17284A6961998-07-15015 July 1998
LER 98-010-00:on 980615,TS Required Shutdown Due to Inoperability of TIP Sys Isolation Valve Was Noted.Caused by Improper Installation of TIP Tubing.Reattached Affected Tubing & Inspected Other TIP tubing.W/980715 Ltr
ML17284A6731998-07-0101 July 1998
LER 98-009-00:on 980606,nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff Sys Group 3 & 4 Isolations During Testing Was Noted.Caused by Procedural Deficiency.Counseled Individuals Involved in preparation.W/980701 Ltr
ML17284A6651998-06-24024 June 1998
LER 98-007-00:on 980530,inadvertent Full Scram & Division 1 ECCS Injection Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Meet Mgt Work Practice Expectation When Encountering Deficient Procedure. Incident Review Board Convened to Review event.W/980624 Ltr
ML17284A6641998-06-24024 June 1998
LER 98-008-00:on 980531,inadvertent Full Scram During RPV Leak Testing in Mode 4 Was Noted.Caused by Change in Mgt Techniques.Revised Procedures to Take Into Account Addl Water Head in Pressure Sensing lines.W/980624 Ltr
ML17284A6631998-06-19019 June 1998
LER 98-006-00:on 980520,discovered Discrepancies in Low Voltage Bus Calculations During Review of App R Calculations for High Impedance Fault Analysis.Caused Indeterminate. Implemented Procedural Changes Involving Operator Action
ML17284A6551998-06-0404 June 1998
LER 98-005-00:on 980506,potential for Failure of RHR Sys Valve to Close on Isolation Signal Was Noted.Caused by Design Deficiency.Caution Tag Was Placed on RHR-V-40 Control Switch to Inform Plant Operators of limitation.W/980604 Ltr
ML17284A6421998-06-0101 June 1998
LER 98-004-00:on 980502,determined That Primary Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protection Does Not Meet Reg Guide 1.63 Requirements.Caused by Inadequate Design Changes. Installed Addl Fuse in RHR-MO-9 circuit.W/980601 Ltr
ML17292B3281998-04-0909 April 1998
LER 98-002-00:on 980311,reactor Scram & Plant Transient Occurred,Due to Failed Closed Main Steam Isolation Valve. Caused by Loss of Pneumatic Actuating Supply Pressure. Problem Evaluation Request Written for Failure of MS-V-22D
ML17292B3291998-04-0909 April 1998
LER 98-003-00:on 980311,WNP-2 Experienced SCRAM Signal as Result of Low Rpv.Caused by Less than post-SCRAM Operational Strategy for Resetting SCRAM Signal in Conditions.Changes in post-SCRAM Operational Strategy implemented.W/980409 Ltr
ML17292B2661998-03-0404 March 1998
LER 98-001-00:on 980203,automatic Start of HPCS EDG Was Noted.Caused by Operator Error.Operations Crew Stabilized Plant at Approximately 75% Reactor Power & Investigation of Event Was initiated.W/980304 Ltr
ML17292B1111997-11-10010 November 1997
LER 97-011-00:on 971010,HPCS Battery Charger Failed.Caused by Failure of a Phase Firing Control Circuit Board Due to Aging During 7 Yrs of Use.Hpcs Sys Was Immediately Declared inoperable.W/971110 Ltr
ML17292B1151997-11-0707 November 1997
LER 97-010-00:on 970906,discovered That TS SR 3.4.5.1 for Identified Portion of RCS Total Leakage Would Not Be Able to Perform within Time Limits of SR 3.0.2.Caused by Inadequate Methods.Method of Meeting SR 3.4.5.1 Established
ML17292B0641997-09-24024 September 1997
LER 97-004-01:on 970327,plant Operators Manually Scrammed Reactor as Required by TS Due to Indication of Entry Into Region a of power-to-flow Map.Caused by Inadequate Attention to Detail.Established Event Evaluation teams.W/970924 Ltr
ML17292B0241997-08-18018 August 1997
LER 97-009-00:on 970717,discovered Error in Recently Performed Inservice Testing procedure,OSP-TIP/IST-R701. Caused by Procedure Inadequacy.Plant Procedure OSP/TIP/IST-R701 Will Be changed.W/970818 Ltr
ML17292B0291997-08-15015 August 1997
LER 97-008-00:on 970716,wire Seal Used to Lock Containment Instrument Air Pressure Control valve,CIA-PCV-2B,found Not Intact.Cause of Misadjustment of CIA-PCV-2B Unknown.Event Will Be Communicated to Plant employees.W/970815 Ltr
ML17292B0201997-08-15015 August 1997
LER 97-S01-00:on 970718,failure to Take Compensatory Measure for Inoperative Microwave Security Zone Occurred. Caused by Personnel Error.Training Will Be Conducted W/ Appropriate Members of Security force.W/970815 Ltr
ML17292A9481997-07-23023 July 1997
LER 97-007-00:on 970611,voluntary Rept of Automatic Start of DG-1 & DG-2 Was Experienced.Caused by Undervoltage Condition on Electrical Busses SM-7 & SM-8.Circulating Water Pump CW-P-1C Control Switch Placed in pull-to-lock.W/970723 Ltr
ML17292A9201997-06-26026 June 1997
LER 97-006-00:on 970527,non-performance of Surveillance Requirement 3.6.1.3.2 for Blind Fanges,Was Noted.Caused Because Misunderstanding of Intent of Specs.Added Five Structural Assemblies for SP.W/970626 Ltr
ML17292A8331997-04-28028 April 1997
LER 97-004-00:on 970327,plant Operators Manually Scrammed Reactor as Required by TS Due to Entry Into Region a of power-to-flow Map Following Planned Trip of Single Mfp. Event Evaluation teams,established.W/970428 Ltr
ML17292A8311997-04-28028 April 1997
LER 97-005-00:on 970327,valid Reactor Scram Signal Received Due to Low Water Level Condition During Preparations for SRV Testing.Caused by Risks & Consequences of Decisions Not Completely Identified.Restored Water level.W/970428 Ltr
ML17292A8251997-04-21021 April 1997
LER 97-003-00:on 970320,notification of Noncompliance W/Ts as TS SRs for Response Time Testing Were Not Being Met for Specified Instrumentation in Rps,Pcis & Eccs.Requested Enforcement Discretion for One Time exemption.W/970421 Ltr
ML17292A7431997-03-20020 March 1997
LER 97-002-00:on 970218,determined That Rod Block Monitor (RBM) Calibr Values Were Not Set IAW Tech Specs.Caused by Calibr Procedures Inadequacies.Revised & re-performed RBM Channel Calibr procedures.W/970330 Ltr
ML17292A7401997-03-13013 March 1997
LER 97-001-00:on 970211,reactor Water Cleanup Sys Blowdown Flow Isolation Setpoint Was Slightly Above TS Allowable Valve Occurred Due to Calculation Error.Lds Fss LD-FS-15 LD-FS-16 Were Declared inoperable.W/970313 Ltr
ML17292A6641997-01-22022 January 1997
LER 96-009-00:on 961220,miscalculation of Instantaneous Overcurrent Relay Settings Resulted in Inoperability of safety-related Equipment.Caused by Utilization of Inappropriate Design.Testing Was completed.W/970122 Ltr
ML17292A6461997-01-0606 January 1997
LER 96-008-00:on 961205,failure to Comply with TS Action Requirement for Emergency Core Cooling Sys Actuation Instrumentation Occurred Due to Unidentified Inoperability Condition.Pmr initiated.W/970106 Ltr
ML17292A6371996-12-19019 December 1996
LER 96-007-00:on 961122,electrical Breakers Were Not Seismically Qualified in Test/Disconnect Position.Circuit Breaker Mfg Did Not Consider Raced Out Breaker Position During Testing.Relocated Circuit breakers.W/961217 Ltr
ML17292A4121996-08-0808 August 1996
LER 96-006-00:on 960709,average Power Range Monitor Rod Block Downscale Surveillance Not Performed Prior to Entry Into Mode 1.Caused by long-standing Misinterpretation of Requirements of Tss.Procedures revised.W/960808 Ltr
ML17292A3801996-07-24024 July 1996
LER 96-004-00:on 960624,plant Was Manually Scrammed by Control Room Personnel Due to Reactor Water Level Transient Experienced During Testing of Digital Feedwater Sys.Caused by Programming Error.Sys Was corrected.W/960724 Ltr
ML17292A3771996-07-24024 July 1996
LER 96-005-00:on 960624,determined Missed Surveillance Test Re Channel Check of Average Power Range Monitor.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Revised Surveillance Procedure Re When APRM Checks Must Be performed.W/960724 Ltr
ML17292A3641996-07-12012 July 1996
LER 96-003-00:on 960615,required Surveillance Test Not Performed When Required by TS 3.4.1.3.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Implementing Surveillance Procedure & Reactor Plant Startup Procedures revised.W/960712 Ltr
ML17292A3361996-06-20020 June 1996
LER 96-002-00:on 960504,critical Bus SM-8 Lost Power When Supply Breaker 3-8 Tripped.Caused by Personnel Error. Operators Counselled & Procedures revised.W/960620 Ltr
ML17292A2861996-05-24024 May 1996
LER 96-001-00:on 960425,inadvertent ESF Actuations Occurred Due to Tripping of Temporary Power Supply to IN-3.Caused by Personnel Error.Operations Restored to IN-3 Loads & Reset ESF actuations.W/960524 Ltr
ML17291B0891995-10-19019 October 1995
LER 95-011-00:on 950919,failed to Comply W/Ts SR for RCIC Sys Due to Analysis Deficiency That Resulted in Inadequate Surveillance Test Procedure.Surveillance Procedure Revised to Correct deficiency.W/951019 Ltr
ML17291A9021995-07-0707 July 1995
LER 95-010-00:on 950609,HPCS DG Declared Inoperable Due to Discovery That TS Test Method Incomplete.Caused by Inadequate Testing Procedure.Test Procedure for HPCS DG Reviewed & Special Test Procedures written.W/950707 Ltr
ML17291A9031995-07-0707 July 1995
LER 95-009-00:on 950607,inadvertent MSIV Closure Occurred During Surveillance Test Due to Poor Communication Between Test Team.Determined That MSIV Closure Not Valid Because Closure Not Triggered by Plant conditions.W/950707 Ltr
ML17291A8501995-06-0808 June 1995
LER 95-006-01:on 950405,reactor Scram Occurred During Surveillance Testing Due to Protective Sys Relay Failure. Replaced Failed Relay Before Plant Startup
ML17291A8101995-05-12012 May 1995
LER 95-008-00:on 940125,TS Wording Lead to Potential TS Violation.Caused by Lack of Clarity in Ts.Submitted Improved TS for Plant to Provide Addl clarity.W/950512 Ltr
ML17291A7841995-05-0505 May 1995
LER 95-007-00:on 950222,emergency Diesel Start Occurred Due to Voltage Transient on BPA Grid.Confirmation Was Received at 17:51 H That Disturbance Had Originated in BPA Grid
ML17291A7801995-05-0404 May 1995
LER 95-006-00:on 950405,main Turbine Trip Occurred During Performance of Surveillance Test Due to Protective Sys Relay Failed.Replaced Failed Relay Before Plant startup.W/950504 Ltr
ML17291A7851995-05-0303 May 1995
LER 95-005-00:on 950222,inoperable IRM Had Been Relied Upon to Meet TS Requirements During Reactor Startup.Caused by Lack of Neutron Source to Test Instrumentation. Sys Knowledge Gained Will Be incorporated.W/950503 Ltr
ML17291A7071995-03-25025 March 1995
LER 95-004-00:on 950226,malfunction in Main Turbine DEH Control Sys Caused All Four High Pressure Turbine Governor Valves to Rapidly Close.Caused by Blown Fuse.Suspected Faulty Circuit Card replaced.W/950325 Ltr
ML17291A7011995-03-20020 March 1995
LER 95-002-00:on 950218,automatic Reactor Scram Occurred. Caused by Erroneous Positioning of Control During Performance of Scheduled Periodic Functional Test.Control repositioned.W/950320 Ltr
1999-07-20
[Table view]
Category:RO)
MONTHYEARML17292B7421999-07-20020 July 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 990628,ESF Signal Closed All Eight MSIVs While Plant Was Shutdown.Caused by Failure of Relay RPS-RLY-K10D.Subject Relay Was Replaced & Tested on 990630. with 990720 Ltr
ML17292B4451998-10-27027 October 1998
LER 98-012-01:on 980715,failure to Comply with Requirements of TS SR 3.8.4.7 Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Training Session Was Held with Personnel.With 981027 Ltr
ML17284A7561998-09-0303 September 1998
LER 98-013-00:on 980805,ESF Actuations Were Noted Due to Deenergization of Vital Electrical Bus SM-8.Caused by Inadequate Direction in Troubleshooting Plan.Will Conduct Training for Engineering Personnel.With 980903 Ltr
ML17284A7571998-09-0202 September 1998
LER 98-014-00:on 980807,completion of TS 3.8.1.F Required Shutdown Due to Inoperability of EDG-2 Was Noted.Caused by Degraded Voltage Regulator for DG-2.Replaced Voltage Regulator & Associated Scrs.With 980902 Ltr
ML17284A7551998-09-0202 September 1998
LER 98-015-00:on 980808,discovered Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leak During Shutdown Conditions.Caused by Leakage from Socket Weld (Fwb 63) on Elbow Connection.Failed Piping Connection Was Replaced.With 980902 Ltr
ML17284A7311998-08-17017 August 1998
LER 98-012-00:on 980716,determined That 24-month SR 3.8.4.7 Had Not Been Fulfilled within Specified Frequency.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.License Requested & Received Enforcement Discretion Re Battery Svc test.W/980817 Ltr
ML17284A7121998-07-23023 July 1998
LER 98-006-01:on 980520,discovered Discrepancies in Low Voltage Bus Calculations During Review of 10CFR50,App R Calculations for High Impedance Faults.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Implemented Procedural Changes
ML17284A6951998-07-17017 July 1998
LER 98-011-00:on 980617,ECCS Pump Room Flooding Was Noted Due to FP Sys Pipe Break.Caused by Inadequate Design of FP Sys.Detailed Review of FP Sys Design Was Conducted. W/980717 Ltr
ML17284A6961998-07-15015 July 1998
LER 98-010-00:on 980615,TS Required Shutdown Due to Inoperability of TIP Sys Isolation Valve Was Noted.Caused by Improper Installation of TIP Tubing.Reattached Affected Tubing & Inspected Other TIP tubing.W/980715 Ltr
ML17284A6731998-07-0101 July 1998
LER 98-009-00:on 980606,nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff Sys Group 3 & 4 Isolations During Testing Was Noted.Caused by Procedural Deficiency.Counseled Individuals Involved in preparation.W/980701 Ltr
ML17284A6651998-06-24024 June 1998
LER 98-007-00:on 980530,inadvertent Full Scram & Division 1 ECCS Injection Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Meet Mgt Work Practice Expectation When Encountering Deficient Procedure. Incident Review Board Convened to Review event.W/980624 Ltr
ML17284A6641998-06-24024 June 1998
LER 98-008-00:on 980531,inadvertent Full Scram During RPV Leak Testing in Mode 4 Was Noted.Caused by Change in Mgt Techniques.Revised Procedures to Take Into Account Addl Water Head in Pressure Sensing lines.W/980624 Ltr
ML17284A6631998-06-19019 June 1998
LER 98-006-00:on 980520,discovered Discrepancies in Low Voltage Bus Calculations During Review of App R Calculations for High Impedance Fault Analysis.Caused Indeterminate. Implemented Procedural Changes Involving Operator Action
ML17284A6551998-06-0404 June 1998
LER 98-005-00:on 980506,potential for Failure of RHR Sys Valve to Close on Isolation Signal Was Noted.Caused by Design Deficiency.Caution Tag Was Placed on RHR-V-40 Control Switch to Inform Plant Operators of limitation.W/980604 Ltr
ML17284A6421998-06-0101 June 1998
LER 98-004-00:on 980502,determined That Primary Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protection Does Not Meet Reg Guide 1.63 Requirements.Caused by Inadequate Design Changes. Installed Addl Fuse in RHR-MO-9 circuit.W/980601 Ltr
ML17292B3281998-04-0909 April 1998
LER 98-002-00:on 980311,reactor Scram & Plant Transient Occurred,Due to Failed Closed Main Steam Isolation Valve. Caused by Loss of Pneumatic Actuating Supply Pressure. Problem Evaluation Request Written for Failure of MS-V-22D
ML17292B3291998-04-0909 April 1998
LER 98-003-00:on 980311,WNP-2 Experienced SCRAM Signal as Result of Low Rpv.Caused by Less than post-SCRAM Operational Strategy for Resetting SCRAM Signal in Conditions.Changes in post-SCRAM Operational Strategy implemented.W/980409 Ltr
ML17292B2661998-03-0404 March 1998
LER 98-001-00:on 980203,automatic Start of HPCS EDG Was Noted.Caused by Operator Error.Operations Crew Stabilized Plant at Approximately 75% Reactor Power & Investigation of Event Was initiated.W/980304 Ltr
ML17292B1111997-11-10010 November 1997
LER 97-011-00:on 971010,HPCS Battery Charger Failed.Caused by Failure of a Phase Firing Control Circuit Board Due to Aging During 7 Yrs of Use.Hpcs Sys Was Immediately Declared inoperable.W/971110 Ltr
ML17292B1151997-11-0707 November 1997
LER 97-010-00:on 970906,discovered That TS SR 3.4.5.1 for Identified Portion of RCS Total Leakage Would Not Be Able to Perform within Time Limits of SR 3.0.2.Caused by Inadequate Methods.Method of Meeting SR 3.4.5.1 Established
ML17292B0641997-09-24024 September 1997
LER 97-004-01:on 970327,plant Operators Manually Scrammed Reactor as Required by TS Due to Indication of Entry Into Region a of power-to-flow Map.Caused by Inadequate Attention to Detail.Established Event Evaluation teams.W/970924 Ltr
ML17292B0241997-08-18018 August 1997
LER 97-009-00:on 970717,discovered Error in Recently Performed Inservice Testing procedure,OSP-TIP/IST-R701. Caused by Procedure Inadequacy.Plant Procedure OSP/TIP/IST-R701 Will Be changed.W/970818 Ltr
ML17292B0291997-08-15015 August 1997
LER 97-008-00:on 970716,wire Seal Used to Lock Containment Instrument Air Pressure Control valve,CIA-PCV-2B,found Not Intact.Cause of Misadjustment of CIA-PCV-2B Unknown.Event Will Be Communicated to Plant employees.W/970815 Ltr
ML17292B0201997-08-15015 August 1997
LER 97-S01-00:on 970718,failure to Take Compensatory Measure for Inoperative Microwave Security Zone Occurred. Caused by Personnel Error.Training Will Be Conducted W/ Appropriate Members of Security force.W/970815 Ltr
ML17292A9481997-07-23023 July 1997
LER 97-007-00:on 970611,voluntary Rept of Automatic Start of DG-1 & DG-2 Was Experienced.Caused by Undervoltage Condition on Electrical Busses SM-7 & SM-8.Circulating Water Pump CW-P-1C Control Switch Placed in pull-to-lock.W/970723 Ltr
ML17292A9201997-06-26026 June 1997
LER 97-006-00:on 970527,non-performance of Surveillance Requirement 3.6.1.3.2 for Blind Fanges,Was Noted.Caused Because Misunderstanding of Intent of Specs.Added Five Structural Assemblies for SP.W/970626 Ltr
ML17292A8331997-04-28028 April 1997
LER 97-004-00:on 970327,plant Operators Manually Scrammed Reactor as Required by TS Due to Entry Into Region a of power-to-flow Map Following Planned Trip of Single Mfp. Event Evaluation teams,established.W/970428 Ltr
ML17292A8311997-04-28028 April 1997
LER 97-005-00:on 970327,valid Reactor Scram Signal Received Due to Low Water Level Condition During Preparations for SRV Testing.Caused by Risks & Consequences of Decisions Not Completely Identified.Restored Water level.W/970428 Ltr
ML17292A8251997-04-21021 April 1997
LER 97-003-00:on 970320,notification of Noncompliance W/Ts as TS SRs for Response Time Testing Were Not Being Met for Specified Instrumentation in Rps,Pcis & Eccs.Requested Enforcement Discretion for One Time exemption.W/970421 Ltr
ML17292A7431997-03-20020 March 1997
LER 97-002-00:on 970218,determined That Rod Block Monitor (RBM) Calibr Values Were Not Set IAW Tech Specs.Caused by Calibr Procedures Inadequacies.Revised & re-performed RBM Channel Calibr procedures.W/970330 Ltr
ML17292A7401997-03-13013 March 1997
LER 97-001-00:on 970211,reactor Water Cleanup Sys Blowdown Flow Isolation Setpoint Was Slightly Above TS Allowable Valve Occurred Due to Calculation Error.Lds Fss LD-FS-15 LD-FS-16 Were Declared inoperable.W/970313 Ltr
ML17292A6641997-01-22022 January 1997
LER 96-009-00:on 961220,miscalculation of Instantaneous Overcurrent Relay Settings Resulted in Inoperability of safety-related Equipment.Caused by Utilization of Inappropriate Design.Testing Was completed.W/970122 Ltr
ML17292A6461997-01-0606 January 1997
LER 96-008-00:on 961205,failure to Comply with TS Action Requirement for Emergency Core Cooling Sys Actuation Instrumentation Occurred Due to Unidentified Inoperability Condition.Pmr initiated.W/970106 Ltr
ML17292A6371996-12-19019 December 1996
LER 96-007-00:on 961122,electrical Breakers Were Not Seismically Qualified in Test/Disconnect Position.Circuit Breaker Mfg Did Not Consider Raced Out Breaker Position During Testing.Relocated Circuit breakers.W/961217 Ltr
ML17292A4121996-08-0808 August 1996
LER 96-006-00:on 960709,average Power Range Monitor Rod Block Downscale Surveillance Not Performed Prior to Entry Into Mode 1.Caused by long-standing Misinterpretation of Requirements of Tss.Procedures revised.W/960808 Ltr
ML17292A3801996-07-24024 July 1996
LER 96-004-00:on 960624,plant Was Manually Scrammed by Control Room Personnel Due to Reactor Water Level Transient Experienced During Testing of Digital Feedwater Sys.Caused by Programming Error.Sys Was corrected.W/960724 Ltr
ML17292A3771996-07-24024 July 1996
LER 96-005-00:on 960624,determined Missed Surveillance Test Re Channel Check of Average Power Range Monitor.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Revised Surveillance Procedure Re When APRM Checks Must Be performed.W/960724 Ltr
ML17292A3641996-07-12012 July 1996
LER 96-003-00:on 960615,required Surveillance Test Not Performed When Required by TS 3.4.1.3.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Implementing Surveillance Procedure & Reactor Plant Startup Procedures revised.W/960712 Ltr
ML17292A3361996-06-20020 June 1996
LER 96-002-00:on 960504,critical Bus SM-8 Lost Power When Supply Breaker 3-8 Tripped.Caused by Personnel Error. Operators Counselled & Procedures revised.W/960620 Ltr
ML17292A2861996-05-24024 May 1996
LER 96-001-00:on 960425,inadvertent ESF Actuations Occurred Due to Tripping of Temporary Power Supply to IN-3.Caused by Personnel Error.Operations Restored to IN-3 Loads & Reset ESF actuations.W/960524 Ltr
ML17291B0891995-10-19019 October 1995
LER 95-011-00:on 950919,failed to Comply W/Ts SR for RCIC Sys Due to Analysis Deficiency That Resulted in Inadequate Surveillance Test Procedure.Surveillance Procedure Revised to Correct deficiency.W/951019 Ltr
ML17291A9021995-07-0707 July 1995
LER 95-010-00:on 950609,HPCS DG Declared Inoperable Due to Discovery That TS Test Method Incomplete.Caused by Inadequate Testing Procedure.Test Procedure for HPCS DG Reviewed & Special Test Procedures written.W/950707 Ltr
ML17291A9031995-07-0707 July 1995
LER 95-009-00:on 950607,inadvertent MSIV Closure Occurred During Surveillance Test Due to Poor Communication Between Test Team.Determined That MSIV Closure Not Valid Because Closure Not Triggered by Plant conditions.W/950707 Ltr
ML17291A8501995-06-0808 June 1995
LER 95-006-01:on 950405,reactor Scram Occurred During Surveillance Testing Due to Protective Sys Relay Failure. Replaced Failed Relay Before Plant Startup
ML17291A8101995-05-12012 May 1995
LER 95-008-00:on 940125,TS Wording Lead to Potential TS Violation.Caused by Lack of Clarity in Ts.Submitted Improved TS for Plant to Provide Addl clarity.W/950512 Ltr
ML17291A7841995-05-0505 May 1995
LER 95-007-00:on 950222,emergency Diesel Start Occurred Due to Voltage Transient on BPA Grid.Confirmation Was Received at 17:51 H That Disturbance Had Originated in BPA Grid
ML17291A7801995-05-0404 May 1995
LER 95-006-00:on 950405,main Turbine Trip Occurred During Performance of Surveillance Test Due to Protective Sys Relay Failed.Replaced Failed Relay Before Plant startup.W/950504 Ltr
ML17291A7851995-05-0303 May 1995
LER 95-005-00:on 950222,inoperable IRM Had Been Relied Upon to Meet TS Requirements During Reactor Startup.Caused by Lack of Neutron Source to Test Instrumentation. Sys Knowledge Gained Will Be incorporated.W/950503 Ltr
ML17291A7071995-03-25025 March 1995
LER 95-004-00:on 950226,malfunction in Main Turbine DEH Control Sys Caused All Four High Pressure Turbine Governor Valves to Rapidly Close.Caused by Blown Fuse.Suspected Faulty Circuit Card replaced.W/950325 Ltr
ML17291A7011995-03-20020 March 1995
LER 95-002-00:on 950218,automatic Reactor Scram Occurred. Caused by Erroneous Positioning of Control During Performance of Scheduled Periodic Functional Test.Control repositioned.W/950320 Ltr
1999-07-20
[Table view]
Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML17284A9001999-10-31031 October 1999
Rev 0 to COLR 99-15, WNP-2 Cycle 15,COLR
GO2-99-177, LER 99-S01-00:on 990903,failure to Take Compensatory Measure within Required Time Upon Failure of Isolation Zone Microwave Unit,Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Provided Refresher Training on Compensatory Measures.With1999-10-0101 October 1999
LER 99-S01-00:on 990903,failure to Take Compensatory Measure within Required Time Upon Failure of Isolation Zone Microwave Unit,Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Provided Refresher Training on Compensatory Measures.With
ML17284A8941999-09-30030 September 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for WNP-2.With 991012 Ltr
ML17284A8801999-08-31031 August 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for WNP-2.With 990910 Ltr
ML17284A8691999-07-31031 July 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for WNP-2.With 990813 Ltr
ML17292B7421999-07-20020 July 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 990628,ESF Signal Closed All Eight MSIVs While Plant Was Shutdown.Caused by Failure of Relay RPS-RLY-K10D.Subject Relay Was Replaced & Tested on 990630. with 990720 Ltr
ML17292B7271999-06-30030 June 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for WNP-2.With 990707 Ltr
ML17292B6961999-05-31031 May 1999
Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for WNP-2.With 990608 Ltr
ML17292B6641999-04-30030 April 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for WNP-2.With 990507 Ltr
ML17292B6391999-03-31031 March 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for WNP-2.With 990413 Ltr
ML17292B5871999-02-28028 February 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for WNP-2.With 990311 Ltr
ML17292B5571999-01-31031 January 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1999 for WNP-2.With 990210 Ltr
ML17292B5621999-01-31031 January 1999
Rev 1 to COLR 98-14, WNP-2 Cycle 14 Colr.
ML17292B5341999-01-15015 January 1999
Part 21 Rept Re Incorrect Modeling of BWR Lower Plenum Vol in Bison.Defect Applies Only to Reload Fuel Assemblies Currently in Operation at WNP-2.BISON Code Model for WNP-2 Has Been Revised to Correct Error
ML17292B5331999-01-15015 January 1999
Part 21 Rept Re XL-S96 CPR Correlation for SVEA-96 Fuel. Defect Applies Only to WNP-2,during Cycles 12,13 & 14 Operation.Evaluations of Defect Performed by ABB-CE
ML17292B4791998-12-31031 December 1998
Washington Public Power Supply Sys 1998 Annual Rept. with 981215 Ltr
ML17292B5351998-12-31031 December 1998
Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for WNP-2.With 990112 Ltr
ML17292B5741998-12-31031 December 1998
WNP-2 1998 Annual Operating Rept. with 990225 Ltr
ML17284A8231998-11-30030 November 1998
Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for WNP-2.With 981207 Ltr
ML17284A8081998-10-31031 October 1998
Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for WNP-2.With 981110 Ltr
ML17292B4451998-10-27027 October 1998
LER 98-012-01:on 980715,failure to Comply with Requirements of TS SR 3.8.4.7 Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Training Session Was Held with Personnel.With 981027 Ltr
ML17284A7831998-09-30030 September 1998
Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for WNP-2.With 981007 Ltr
ML17284A7491998-09-10010 September 1998
WNP-2 Inservice Insp Summary Rept for Refueling Outage RF13 Spring,1998.
ML17284A7561998-09-0303 September 1998
LER 98-013-00:on 980805,ESF Actuations Were Noted Due to Deenergization of Vital Electrical Bus SM-8.Caused by Inadequate Direction in Troubleshooting Plan.Will Conduct Training for Engineering Personnel.With 980903 Ltr
ML17284A7571998-09-0202 September 1998
LER 98-014-00:on 980807,completion of TS 3.8.1.F Required Shutdown Due to Inoperability of EDG-2 Was Noted.Caused by Degraded Voltage Regulator for DG-2.Replaced Voltage Regulator & Associated Scrs.With 980902 Ltr
ML17284A7551998-09-0202 September 1998
LER 98-015-00:on 980808,discovered Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leak During Shutdown Conditions.Caused by Leakage from Socket Weld (Fwb 63) on Elbow Connection.Failed Piping Connection Was Replaced.With 980902 Ltr
ML17284A7681998-08-31031 August 1998
Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1998 for WNP-2.With 980915 Ltr
ML17284A7311998-08-17017 August 1998
LER 98-012-00:on 980716,determined That 24-month SR 3.8.4.7 Had Not Been Fulfilled within Specified Frequency.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.License Requested & Received Enforcement Discretion Re Battery Svc test.W/980817 Ltr
ML17284A7261998-07-31031 July 1998
Monthly Operating Rept for July 1998 for WNP-2.W/980810 Ltr
ML17284A7121998-07-23023 July 1998
LER 98-006-01:on 980520,discovered Discrepancies in Low Voltage Bus Calculations During Review of 10CFR50,App R Calculations for High Impedance Faults.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Implemented Procedural Changes
ML17284A6951998-07-17017 July 1998
LER 98-011-00:on 980617,ECCS Pump Room Flooding Was Noted Due to FP Sys Pipe Break.Caused by Inadequate Design of FP Sys.Detailed Review of FP Sys Design Was Conducted. W/980717 Ltr
ML17284A6961998-07-15015 July 1998
LER 98-010-00:on 980615,TS Required Shutdown Due to Inoperability of TIP Sys Isolation Valve Was Noted.Caused by Improper Installation of TIP Tubing.Reattached Affected Tubing & Inspected Other TIP tubing.W/980715 Ltr
ML17284A6731998-07-0101 July 1998
LER 98-009-00:on 980606,nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff Sys Group 3 & 4 Isolations During Testing Was Noted.Caused by Procedural Deficiency.Counseled Individuals Involved in preparation.W/980701 Ltr
ML17284A6751998-06-30030 June 1998
Ro:On 980617,flooding of RB Northeast Stairwell with Consequential Flooding of Two ECCS Pump Rooms.Caused by Inadequate Fire Protection Sys Design.Pumped Out Water from Affected Areas to Point Below Berm Areas of Pump Rooms
ML17284A6641998-06-24024 June 1998
LER 98-008-00:on 980531,inadvertent Full Scram During RPV Leak Testing in Mode 4 Was Noted.Caused by Change in Mgt Techniques.Revised Procedures to Take Into Account Addl Water Head in Pressure Sensing lines.W/980624 Ltr
ML17284A6651998-06-24024 June 1998
LER 98-007-00:on 980530,inadvertent Full Scram & Division 1 ECCS Injection Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Meet Mgt Work Practice Expectation When Encountering Deficient Procedure. Incident Review Board Convened to Review event.W/980624 Ltr
ML17284A6631998-06-19019 June 1998
LER 98-006-00:on 980520,discovered Discrepancies in Low Voltage Bus Calculations During Review of App R Calculations for High Impedance Fault Analysis.Caused Indeterminate. Implemented Procedural Changes Involving Operator Action
ML17284A6551998-06-0404 June 1998
LER 98-005-00:on 980506,potential for Failure of RHR Sys Valve to Close on Isolation Signal Was Noted.Caused by Design Deficiency.Caution Tag Was Placed on RHR-V-40 Control Switch to Inform Plant Operators of limitation.W/980604 Ltr
ML17284A6421998-06-0101 June 1998
LER 98-004-00:on 980502,determined That Primary Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protection Does Not Meet Reg Guide 1.63 Requirements.Caused by Inadequate Design Changes. Installed Addl Fuse in RHR-MO-9 circuit.W/980601 Ltr
ML17284A6491998-05-31031 May 1998
Rev 0 to COLR 98-14, WNP-2,Cycle 14 Colr.
ML17292B4031998-05-31031 May 1998
Monthly Operating Rept for May 1998 for WNP-2.W/980608 Ltr
ML17292B3921998-04-30030 April 1998
Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1998 for WNP-2.W/980513 Ltr
ML17292B3291998-04-0909 April 1998
LER 98-003-00:on 980311,WNP-2 Experienced SCRAM Signal as Result of Low Rpv.Caused by Less than post-SCRAM Operational Strategy for Resetting SCRAM Signal in Conditions.Changes in post-SCRAM Operational Strategy implemented.W/980409 Ltr
ML17292B3281998-04-0909 April 1998
LER 98-002-00:on 980311,reactor Scram & Plant Transient Occurred,Due to Failed Closed Main Steam Isolation Valve. Caused by Loss of Pneumatic Actuating Supply Pressure. Problem Evaluation Request Written for Failure of MS-V-22D
ML17292B3371998-03-31031 March 1998
Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1998 for WNP-2.W/980409 Ltr
ML17292B2641998-03-0404 March 1998
Performance Self Assessment,WNP-2.
ML17292B2661998-03-0404 March 1998
LER 98-001-00:on 980203,automatic Start of HPCS EDG Was Noted.Caused by Operator Error.Operations Crew Stabilized Plant at Approximately 75% Reactor Power & Investigation of Event Was initiated.W/980304 Ltr
ML17292B2911998-02-28028 February 1998
Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1998 for WNP-2.W/980313 Ltr
ML17284A7971998-02-17017 February 1998
Rev 28 to Operational QA Program Description, WPPSS-QA-004.With Proposed Rev 29
ML17292B3591998-02-12012 February 1998
WNP-2 Cycle 14 Reload Design Rept.
1999-09-30
[Table view] |
Text
NRC Form 3M U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (94)3)
APPROVED 0M B NO. 3)500104 EXPIRES: BI31/88 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) PAGE 3I Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 o 5 o o o3 97 i oFO 4 lg ressure ore pray ys em ree- uar er- nc one rea urging Surveillance Testing While Plant was Shutdown - Component Failure EVENT DATE(5) LEA NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7I OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)
SEGVENT IAL AcvlsioN OAY YEAR FACILITY NA DOCKET NUMBER(5)
MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR NUMBER NUMBER MONTH 0 5 0 0 0 0 5 12 89 015 0 0 6 0 8 8 9 0 5 0 0 0 OPERATING THIS AEPOAT IS SUBMIT'TEO PURSUANT T 0 THE AEOVIAEMENTS OF 10 CFR $ ; fChtch oi t or moit of tht foi(oivinpf (ll MODE (9) 20.402(5) 20 405(cl 50.73( ~ ) (2)(iv) 73.71(5)
POWE R 20.405( ~ ) (1)(i) 60.35(c)(1) 50,73( ~ )(2)(vl 73.71(c)
LEYE(.
0 0 0 20AOS( ~ )(1)(iil 60,35(cl(2) 50,73(s)(2)(vsl OTHKR ISPtcify in AOttrstt osfovr snd in Ttvt ffRC Form 20AGS I ~ ) (I l(ili) 50.73( ~ l(21(il 60.73(o) (2)(viill(A) 35SA) 20,405( ~ l(1) (lv) 50.73( ~ ) (2) l ii) 60,73( ~ i(2) I viiil(BI 20A05 (~ I(1) (v) 50,7 3(v ) (2) I liI I 50.73( ~ ) (2)(s I LICKNSEE CONTACT FOR THIS I.EA (12I NAME TELEPHOtvE NUMBF R AREA CODE J.D. Arbuckle, Compliance Engineer 50 937 7- 211 5 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCAIBEO IN THIS REPORT (13)
MANUFAC CAUSE SYSTEMI COMPONEIvT MANVFAC
'TVRKR cIEPORTABI.E TO NPADS CAUSE SYSTEM COMPOIvENT TVRER REPORTABLE TO NPRDS ': v "i r<*
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14I MONTvr DAY YEAR EXPECTED SUBIVIISSIO "II DATE ',"l5i YES fff yN Comport EXPECTED S(fBMISSION OA TEI ABSTRACT fLimit to tt00 totctf I~ toorommtrtry fiftttn Iinpit ttlttt tyotvrrrittn finttf (15)
On Hay 12, 1989 during the performance of the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System operability procedure, a three-quarter-inch high point vent line failed approximately one-ha'if inch above the fillet weld. The vent line is on the 12-inch HPCS test return line to the suppression pool and is located on approximately the 466'levation of the Reactor Building. At the time of the event the Plant was shutdown for the annual maintenance and refueling outage.
The procedure was being performed as part of normal surveillance testing. During the course of the surveillance, Plant Operators noted vibration on the test line while the Full-Flow Suppression Pool Test Return Valve (HPCS-V-23) was open. At 0315 hours0.00365 days <br />0.0875 hours <br />5.208333e-4 weeks <br />1.198575e-4 months <br /> the high point vent line failed, spraying water on two Equipment Operators and a Health fg Physics Technician. However, none of the personnel were contaminated. At 0330 hours0.00382 days <br />0.0917 hours <br />5.456349e-4 weeks <br />1.25565e-4 months <br />, roofs Plant Operators secured and partially drained the HPCS System to stop the leak.
DOQ.
40 DO Oi IA The cause of the HPCS vent line failure was due to reverse bending fatigue caused by FJ0 vibration. The vibration was due to turbulence caused by high flow rates in the 12-inch 4O test return line. Although primary containment was open for refueling activities, an (MID HPCS high point vent line failure during operation would have been considered to be a GA breach of containment (open to the submerged portion of the suppression pool). However,
<CC had this occurred during operation, the line failure would only have affected the HPCS DiC test mode. The normal injection mode would not have been affected.
O'A CEIL.(FP Corrective actions consisted of 1) implementing a design change to strengthen the high point vent piping, and 2) performing an Engineering evaluation of similar (vents and drains) piping failures at the Plant.
NRC Form 356 (9 83(
NRC Form 355A V.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (94)3)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0(04 EXPIRES: 9/31/SB FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (3) LER NI/MBER (5) PAGE (3)
SEOUENTIAL '~P.'EVISION YEAR )N NUMBER NUMBER Washin ton Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 8 9 0 1 5 000 2 0 4 TEXT /I/ moro FINco lr rooulrod, uro oddkr/onrr////IC Form 36SA'4/ (IT)
Abstract (continued)
This event did not effect the health and safety of either the public or Plant personnel.
Plant Conditions a) Power Level - 0%
b) Plant Node - 5 (Refueling)
Event Descri tion On Hay 12, 1989 during the performance of Plant Procedure (PPII) 7.4.5.1.11, "High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System Operability Test," a three-quarter-inch high point vent line t.HPCS (55-1-7): containing val ves HPCS-V-83/84] failed approximat'ely one-half inch above the fillet weld. The vent line is on the HPCS test return line to the suppression pool and is located on approximately the 466'levation of the Reactor Building (in the HPCS pump room). At the time of the event, the Plant was shutdown for the annual maintenance and refue'ling'utage.
The procedure was being performed as part of normal survei 1 lance testing. In accordance with the procedure, Plant Operators had aligned the system, proper ly vented and filled the piping and started the HPCS pump (HPCS-P-1). During the course of the surveillance they noted vibration on the test line while the Full-Flow Suppression Pool Test Return'alve (HPCS-V-23) was open. At 0315 hours0.00365 days <br />0.0875 hours <br />5.208333e-4 weeks <br />1.198575e-4 months <br /> the high point vent line failed, spraying water on two Equipment Operators and a Health Physics Technician. However, none of the personnel were contaminated.
At 0326 hours0.00377 days <br />0.0906 hours <br />5.390212e-4 weeks <br />1.24043e-4 months <br />, Plant Operators tripped pump HPCS-P-1. The control fuses for the pump were removed at 0330 hours0.00382 days <br />0.0917 hours <br />5.456349e-4 weeks <br />1.25565e-4 months <br /> and the system was secured and partially drained to stop the leak.
Immediate Corrective Action Plant Operators secured HPCS-P-1 and isolated the HPCS System to stop the leakage.
Further Evaluation and Corrective Action A. Further Evaluation This event is being reported per the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(.ii) as an event or condition that resulted in the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principle safety barriers, being seriously degraded. Although primary containment was open for refueling activities, an HPCS high point vent line failure during operation would have been considered to be a breach of primary containment (open to the submerged portion of the Suppression Pool).
- 2. With the exception of the line break, there were no structures, systems or components contributed to the event.
that were inoperable at the start 'f this event that NRC FORM 355A ~ U.S. CPOI 1955-330-959 00010 (943)
NRC Form 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (943)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED OMB NO. 3)50-0104 EXPIRES: 6/31/SB FACILITYNAME (ll DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (61 IIAGE (3)
SEOUENTIAL REVrelON NUMBER NUMBER Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0 s o 0 0 397 89 0 1 5 0 0 3 OF 0 4 TEXT /// mors cpsse is Nrr/oirsd. oss sdde'one ///IC Form 36SA's/ (17)
- 3. On tray 15, 1989 a field examination of the failed HPCS vent line was performed. As previously stated, the line failed one-half inch above the fillet weld. The failure was due to reverse bending fatigue caused by vibration. The vibration was due to turbulence caused by high flow rates in the 12-inch test return line. The line that failed is a three-quarter-inch, Schedule 160, SA105 (Grade B) pipe (Carbon steel:
ASHE III/2).
B. Further Corrective Action
- 1. A design change has been implemented to strengthen the high point vent piping. Specifically, one-inch butt we'id piping was used (coming off the 12-inch test return line) and reduced to three-quarter inch to connect to the valves (which have been close-coupled and an elbow deleted), and a gusset plate was installed to rigidly support the vent valves to the 12-inch test return line.
- 2. Generation Engineering has performed an evaluation of similar (vents and drains) piping failures at WNP-2. Extensive efforts have been ongoing to preclude repetitive failures of similar connections. The Supply System will continue to focus on eliminating the causes of these failures through improved design configuration and minimizing the source of cyclic loading.
Safet Si nificance There are no unacceptable consequences associated with this event. At the time of the event, the reactor vessel head was removed and reactor water level was greater than 22 feet above the reactor vessel flange. In addition, the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System was in service for shutdown cooling. Furthermore, the HPCS was not required for trode 5 (Refueling).
If this event had occurred during operation, the failure of the HPCS high point vent line would have been considered to be a breach of primary containment (between the subsurface of the suppression pool and the outside containment atmosphere).
However, had this occurred the l.ine failure would have only affected the HPCS test mode. The normal HPCS injection mode would not have been affected.
Accordingly, this event did not affect the health and safety of either the public or Plant personnel.
Similar Events
\
LERs 85-011-00 and 85-011-01 NRC FORM 366D ~ O.e. CPcr Ieee-Sc<-eee One;I IS Ser
NRC Form 3BSA U.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION (943)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED OMB NO. 3150&)04 EXPIRES: 8(3) i88 FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PACE (3)
$ SEQUENTIAL pili REVISION YEAR g+ NUMBER B:X. NUMBBR Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 o s o o 0 3 9 7 89 01 5 0 0 0 Q OF 0 4 TEXT iilmors spsssis ~Irirsd. oss sddnerel NRC Form 3SSA'si (ll)
EI I S Information Text Reference EIIS Reference System Component High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System BG HPCS High Point Vent Line [HPCS (55-1-7): containing HPCS-V-83/84] BG Pump HPCS-P-1 BG P Valve HPCS-V-23 BG TV Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System BO Primary Containment NH NRC FORM SBBA ~ II.S. CPOI )BBP-S2O-SBPrOOO'IO (9 83)