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{{#Wiki_filter:* ( I i e ATTACHMENT 1 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE 8509160363 B50909 *
{{#Wiki_filter:e ATTACHMENT 1 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE SURRY POWER STATION
* (
I i
8509160363 B50909 *
* PDR
* PDR
* ADOCK 05000280 P PDR SURRY POWER STATION \ !
* ADOCK 05000280 P               PDR
* FUNCTIONAL UNIT 17. Low Steam Generator Water Level With Steam/Feedwater*
                              \
Mismatch Flow 18. A. Reactor Trip Breakers B. Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker TABLE 3.7-1 REACTOR TRIP INSTRUMENT OPERATING CONDITIONS COLUMN 1 MINIMUM OPERABLE CHANNELS !/non-isolated loop !/non-isolated loop 2 1 COLUMN 2 DEGREE OF REDUNDANCY 1 0 COLUMN 3 PERMISSIBLE BYPASS CONDITIONS COLUMN 4 OPERATOR ACTION IF CONDITIONS OF COLUMN 1 OR 2, EXCEPT AS CONDITIONED BY COLUMN 3, CANNOT BE M~ Maintain hot shutdown Maintain hot shutdown; if one diverse trip feature (undervoltage or shunt trip attachment) is inoperable, restore it to operable status within 48 hours or declare the breaker inoperable and maintai, hot shutdown.  
                                !
*** t-3 C/) i I I I I FUNCTIONAL UNIT 19. Auto Trip Logic A. Undervoltage Trip Logic B. Shunt Trip Logic TABLE 3. 7-1 REACTOR TRIP INSTRUMENT OPERATING CONDITIONS COLUMN 1 MINIMUM OPERABLE CHANNELS 2 2 COLUMN 2 DEGREE OF REDUNDANCY 1 1 COLUMN 3 PERMISSIBLE BYPASS CONDITIONS
* I TABLE 3.7-1 REACTOR TRIP                                                       iI INSTRUMENT OPERATING CONDITIONS                                               I I
* COLUMN 4 OPERATOR ACTION IF CONDITIONS OF COLUMN 1 OR 2, EXCEPT AS CONDITIONED BY COLUMN 3, CANNOT BE MET Maintain hot shutdown; if one diverse trip feature (undervoltage or shunt trip attachment) is inoperable, restore it to operable status within 48 hours or declare the breaker inoperable and maintain hot shutdown.
COLUMN 1             COLUMN 2           COLUMN 3             COLUMN 4 OPERATOR ACTION IF CONDITIONS OF MINIMUM                                                COLUMN 1 OR 2, EXCEPT OPERABLE            DEGREE OF        PERMISSIBLE        AS CONDITIONED BY FUNCTIONAL UNIT          CHANNELS            REDUNDANCY      BYPASS CONDITIONS  COLUMN 3, CANNOT BE M~
Maintain hot shutdown; if one diverse trip feature (undervoltage or shunt trip attachment) is inoperable, restore it to operable status within 48 hours or declare the breaker inoperable and maintain hot shutdown.  
: 17. Low Steam Generator      !/non-isolated                                          Maintain hot shutdown Water Level With        loop Steam/Feedwater*        !/non-isolated Mismatch Flow            loop
** If both misalignment monitors (a and b) inoperable  
: 18. A. Reactor Trip Breakers      2                    1                            Maintain hot shutdown; if one diverse trip feature (undervoltage or shunt trip attachment) is inoperable, restore it to operable status within 48 hours or declare the breaker inoperable and maintai, hot shutdown.
*for 2 hours or more, the nuclear overpower trip shall be reset to 93 percent of rated power in addition to the increased surveillance noted. *** Terminate testing of Reactor Trip Breakers and open the Reactor Trip Bypass Breakers.
B. Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker                    1                    0
Channel Description
                                                                                    ***                     t-3 C/)
: 26. Environmental Radiation Monitors 27. Logic Channel Testing 28. Turbine Overspeed Protection Trip Channel (Electrical)
 
: 29. Turbine Trip Setpoint 30. Seismic Instrumentation
TABLE 3. 7-1 REACTOR TRIP INSTRUMENT OPERATING CONDITIONS
: 31. Reactor Trip Breaker a. Undervoltage Trip Logic b. Shunt Trip Logic 32. Reactor Coolant Pressure 33. Auxiliary Feedwater
* COLUMN 1               COLUMN 2         COLUMN 3                 COLUMN 4 OPERATOR ACTION IF CONDITIONS OF MINIMUM                                                    COLUMN 1 OR 2, EXCEPT OPERABLE                DEGREE OF      PERMISSIBLE          AS CONDITIONED BY FUNCTIONAL UNIT                CHANNELS              REDUNDANCY    BYPASS CONDITIONS      COLUMN 3, CANNOT BE MET
: a. b. c. d. e. Steam Generator Water Level Low-Low RCP Undervoltage
: 19. Auto Trip Logic A. Undervoltage Trip Logic            2                      1                              Maintain hot shutdown; if one diverse trip feature (undervoltage or shunt trip attachment) is inoperable, restore it to operable status within 48 hours or declare the breaker inoperable and maintain hot shutdown.
: s. I. Station Blackout Main Feedwater Pump Trip Check *M N.A. N.A. N.A. M N.A N.A. . N.A. N.A. s s (All N.A. N.A. TABL~i-1 (Continued)
B. Shunt Trip Logic                  2                      1                              Maintain hot shutdown; if one diverse trip feature (undervoltage or shunt trip attachment) is inoperable, restore it to operable status within 48 hours or declare the breaker inoperable and maintain hot shutdown.
Calibrate N.A. N.A. R R R N.A N.A. N.A. R. R R Test N.A. M R R M M M M N.A. M M
** If both misalignment monitors (a and b) inoperable *for 2 hours or more, the nuclear overpower trip shall be reset to 93 percent of rated power in addition to the increased surveillance noted.
* Remarks TLD Dosimeters Stop valve closure or low EH fluid pressure The test shall independently verify operability of the voltage and shunt trip attachments Safety Injection surveillance requirements)
*** Terminate testing of Reactor Trip Breakers and open the Reactor Trip Bypass Breakers.
R N.A. N.A. R -I-' I 00
 
* * * --Page 4.1-8a is deleted. Item 34, Loss of Power, also appears on page 4.1-9. The legend at the bottom of page 4.1-8a has also been moved to page 4.1-9
Channel Description       Check TABL~i-1 (Continued)
Calibrate    Test                    Remarks
                                                                                                    *
: 26. Environmental Radiation Monitors   *M        N.A.        N.A. TLD Dosimeters
: 27. Logic Channel Testing             N.A.      N.A.        M
: 28. Turbine Overspeed Protection       N.A.      R          R Trip Channel (Electrical) 29.
30.
Turbine Trip Setpoint Seismic Instrumentation N.A.
M N.A R
R N.A R
M Stop valve closure or low EH fluid pressure The test shall independently
                                                                                                          -
: 31. Reactor Trip Breaker                                     M verify operability of the under-
: a. Undervoltage Trip Logic       N.A.       N.A.       M        voltage and shunt trip attachments
: b. Shunt Trip Logic            . N.A.       N.A.       M
: 32. Reactor Coolant Pressure          N.A.       R.         N.A.
: 33. Auxiliary Feedwater
: a. Steam Generator Water Level    s         R          M Low-Low
: b. RCP Undervoltage              s         R          M
: c. s. I.                         (All Safety Injection surveillance requirements)
: d. Station Blackout              N.A.       R           N.A.
: e. Main Feedwater Pump Trip      N.A.       N.A.       R I-'
I 00
 
                                                      --
* Page 4.1-8a is deleted. Item 34, Loss of Power, also appears on page 4.1-9.
The legend at the bottom of page 4.1-8a has also been moved to page 4.1-9 *
*
* TABLE 4.1-1 (Continued)
* TABLE 4.1-1 (Continued)
Channel Description Check Calibrate.
Channel Description         Check   Calibrate. Test                     Remarks
Test Remarks 34. Loss of Power a. 4.16 KV Emergency Bus Under-N.A. R M voltage (Loss of Voltage) b. 4.16 KV Emergency Bus Under-N.A. R M voltage .(Degraded Voltage) 3.5. Control Room Chlorine Detectors s R M 36. Manual Reactor Trip N.A. N.A. R The test shall independently verify the operability of the undervoltage and shunt trip attachments for the manual reactor trip function.
: 34. Loss of Power
The test shall also verify the operability of the bypass breaker trip circuit. 37. Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker a. Undervoltage attachment N.A. N.A. M Test prior to placing in service b. Shunt trip attachment N.A. N.A. R S -Each shift D -Daily W Weekly N.A. -Not applicable SA -Semiannually Q -Every 90 effective
: a. 4.16 KV Emergency Bus Under-     N.A.       R           M voltage (Loss of Voltage)
*See Specification 4.lD M -Monthly P Prior to each startup if not done previous week R Each Refueling Shutdown BW -Every two weeks AP -After each startup if not. done previous week full power days I ~I I-'' I '°
: b. 4.16 KV Emergency Bus Under-     N.A.       R           M voltage .(Degraded Voltage) 3.5. Control Room Chlorine Detectors     s         R           M
*. ' *" .
: 36. Manual Reactor Trip                 N.A.       N.A.       R         The test shall independently verify the operability of the     I undervoltage and shunt trip attachments for the manual reactor trip function. The test shall also verify the operability of the bypass breaker trip circuit.
: 37. Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker
: a. Undervoltage attachment         N.A.       N.A.       M         Test prior to placing in service
: b. Shunt trip attachment           N.A.       N.A.       R S - Each shift                     M - Monthly D - Daily                           P   Prior to each startup if not done previous week W Weekly                            R   Each Refueling Shutdown N.A. - Not applicable                    BW - Every two weeks SA - Semiannually                  AP - After each startup if not. done previous week Q - Every 90 effective full power days
                                                                                                                ~I
*See Specification 4.lD                                                                                        I-'
I
                                                                                                                '°
 
  *.
  ' *" .
* ATTACHMENT 2
* ATTACHMENT 2
* DISCUSSION OF PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES *
* DISCUSSION OF PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES
----~-----===-----*-
*
--~ . .. "I, . .,..' ,*'), * *
 
* e SAFETY EVALUATION FOR SUPPLEMENTAL PROPOSED CHANGE This supplemental proposed change to the Technical Specification provides clarification for the required testing of the reactor trip breakers, reactor trip bypass breakers and the manual scram switches; and provides further definition of operability for the reactor trip breakers.
----~-----===-----*- --~ .
To meet the guidance of the Generic Letter 85-09, "Technical Specifications for Generic Letter 83-28, item 4 .3," a supplemental proposed change is submitted to provide a Limiting Condition for Operation for the reactor trip breakers; and trative notes to clarify the surveillance testing requirements for the reactor trip breakers, reactor trip bypass breakers, and the manual scram switches.
            .
50.59 Safety Review Pursuant to lOCFRS0.59, we have reviewed the supplemental proposed change and have concluded that no unreviewed safety question exists: In that, (i) The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment importantant to safety is not increased by these supplemental changes. One change redefines the operability of the reactor trip breaker with one of the diverse trip features (undervoltage or shunt trip attachments) inoperable.
    " I ,..,..' ,*'),
Since either trip feature being operable would initiate a reactor trip the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety is not increased from that previously evaluated in the UFSAR, (ii) The possibility of a different type of accident other than discussed in the UFSAR has not been created by this supplemental proposed change. The proposed changes are bounded by the previous submittal and no new or different type of accidents are created by this additional change. (iii) The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced by this change. The proposed changes provide further definition of reactor trip breaker operability and clarification of surveillance test requirements for the reactor trip and reactor trip bypass breakers, and the manual scram switches.
e
These supplemental changes are bounded by the previous submittal and do not*reduce the margin of safety *   
* SAFETY EVALUATION FOR SUPPLEMENTAL PROPOSED CHANGE This supplemental proposed change to           the Technical Specification provides clarification for the required testing of the reactor trip breakers, reactor trip bypass breakers and the manual scram switches;               and provides further definition of operability for the reactor trip breakers.             To meet the guidance of the Generic Letter 85-09,       "Technical Specifications for Generic Letter 83-28, item 4 .3," a supplemental proposed change is submitted to provide a Limiting Condition for Operation for the reactor trip breakers; and adminis-trative notes to clarify the surveillance testing requirements for the reactor trip breakers, reactor trip bypass breakers, and the manual scram switches.
* * *
50.59 Safety Review Pursuant to lOCFRS0.59, we have reviewed the supplemental proposed change and have concluded that no unreviewed safety question exists: In that,                 (i) The
* e* Page 2 50.92 Significant Hazards Review The supplemental proposed changes do not pose a significant hazards tion as definec:I in 10CFR50. 92. The Commission has provided examples of changes that constitute no significant safety hazards consideration in Federal Regiiter, Volume 48, page 14870. Example (ii) consist of additional tion, restrictions or controls beyond those presently specified in the Technical Specifications.
* probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment   importantant   to   safety is   not   increased by     these   supplemental changes. One change redefines the operability of the reactor trip breaker with one of the diverse trip features (undervoltage or shunt trip attachments) inoperable. Since either trip feature being operable would initiate a reactor trip   the   probability   of   occurrence     or   consequence   of   an   accident   or malfunction of equipment       important   to   safety is not     increased from that previously evaluated in the UFSAR,       (ii)     The possibility of a different type of accident other than discussed in the UFSAR has not been created by this supplemental     proposed change. The   proposed     changes   are   bounded   by   the previous submittal and no new or different type of accidents are created by this additional change.       (iii) The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced by this change.               The proposed changes provide further definition of reactor trip breaker operability and clarification of surveillance test requirements             for the   reactor   trip   and reactor   trip   bypass breakers,   and   the   manual   scram   switches.     These supplemental changes are bounded by the previous submittal and do not*reduce
Example (vii) consists of a change to make the licensee conform to changes in Commission guidances.
* the margin of safety *
The supplemental proposed change is similar to example (ii) in that it clarifies the intent of the su.rveill~nce testing requirements for reactor trip and reactor trip bypass breakers, and the manual scram switches.
 
Specifically, the Technical Specification requires independent testing of the undervoltage and shunt trip attachments in the reactor trip and reactor trip bypass breakers.
  **
In addition the p*roposed change is similar to example (vii) in that it clarifies operability of the reactor trip breakers in the action statement.
e*                                                       Page 2
Specifically the Commission's guidance, in Generic Letter 85-09, permits power operation of the reactor with one (1) of the diverse trip features of a reactor-trip breaker (undervoltage or shunt trip attachment) inoperable for up to 48 hours prior to shuting down. Based on the above we concluded that this proposed Technical Specification supplemental change does not involve an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10CFR50.59 nor a significant hazards consideration as defined in 10CFR50.92.
* 50.92 Significant Hazards Review The supplemental proposed changes do not pose a significant hazards considera-tion as   definec:I   in 10CFR50. 92.       The Commission has       provided examples     of changes that constitute no significant safety hazards consideration in Federal Regiiter, Volume 48, page 14870.           Example (ii) consist of additional limita-tion,   restrictions     or   controls   beyond   those   presently   specified     in the Technical Specifications.           Example (vii) consists of a change to make the licensee   conform     to   changes   in   Commission   guidances. The   supplemental proposed change is similar to example (ii) in that it clarifies the intent of the su.rveill~nce testing requirements for reactor trip and reactor trip bypass breakers,   and     the   manual   scram   switches.     Specifically,     the   Technical Specification requires independent testing of the undervoltage and shunt trip attachments in the reactor trip and reactor trip bypass breakers.                 In addition
* the   p*roposed   change     is   similar   to   example   (vii) in   that   it   clarifies operability     of     the     reactor   trip   breakers     in   the   action     statement.
Specifically the Commission's guidance, in Generic Letter 85-09, permits power operation of the reactor with one             (1) of the diverse trip features of a reactor-trip breaker (undervoltage or shunt trip attachment) inoperable for up to 48 hours prior to shuting down.
Based on the above we concluded that this proposed Technical Specification supplemental change does not involve an unreviewed safety question as defined in   10CFR50.59     nor   a   significant   hazards   consideration     as   defined in 10CFR50.92.
ETS/acm/m045}}
ETS/acm/m045}}

Revision as of 02:08, 21 October 2019

Proposed Tech Spec Changes,Revising Limiting Conditions for Operation & Surveillance Requirements for Reactor Trip & Bypass Breakers,Undervoltage Trip Logic & Shunt Trip Logic
ML18143B513
Person / Time
Site: Surry  Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 09/09/1985
From:
VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:
Shared Package
ML18143B511 List:
References
NUDOCS 8509160363
Download: ML18143B513 (9)


Text

e ATTACHMENT 1 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE SURRY POWER STATION

  • (

I i

8509160363 B50909 *

  • ADOCK 05000280 P PDR

\

!

  • I TABLE 3.7-1 REACTOR TRIP iI INSTRUMENT OPERATING CONDITIONS I I

COLUMN 1 COLUMN 2 COLUMN 3 COLUMN 4 OPERATOR ACTION IF CONDITIONS OF MINIMUM COLUMN 1 OR 2, EXCEPT OPERABLE DEGREE OF PERMISSIBLE AS CONDITIONED BY FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHANNELS REDUNDANCY BYPASS CONDITIONS COLUMN 3, CANNOT BE M~

17. Low Steam Generator  !/non-isolated Maintain hot shutdown Water Level With loop Steam/Feedwater*  !/non-isolated Mismatch Flow loop
18. A. Reactor Trip Breakers 2 1 Maintain hot shutdown; if one diverse trip feature (undervoltage or shunt trip attachment) is inoperable, restore it to operable status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or declare the breaker inoperable and maintai, hot shutdown.

B. Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker 1 0

      • t-3 C/)

TABLE 3. 7-1 REACTOR TRIP INSTRUMENT OPERATING CONDITIONS

  • COLUMN 1 COLUMN 2 COLUMN 3 COLUMN 4 OPERATOR ACTION IF CONDITIONS OF MINIMUM COLUMN 1 OR 2, EXCEPT OPERABLE DEGREE OF PERMISSIBLE AS CONDITIONED BY FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHANNELS REDUNDANCY BYPASS CONDITIONS COLUMN 3, CANNOT BE MET
19. Auto Trip Logic A. Undervoltage Trip Logic 2 1 Maintain hot shutdown; if one diverse trip feature (undervoltage or shunt trip attachment) is inoperable, restore it to operable status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or declare the breaker inoperable and maintain hot shutdown.

B. Shunt Trip Logic 2 1 Maintain hot shutdown; if one diverse trip feature (undervoltage or shunt trip attachment) is inoperable, restore it to operable status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or declare the breaker inoperable and maintain hot shutdown.

    • If both misalignment monitors (a and b) inoperable *for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> or more, the nuclear overpower trip shall be reset to 93 percent of rated power in addition to the increased surveillance noted.

Channel Description Check TABL~i-1 (Continued)

Calibrate Test Remarks

26. Environmental Radiation Monitors *M N.A. N.A. TLD Dosimeters
27. Logic Channel Testing N.A. N.A. M
28. Turbine Overspeed Protection N.A. R R Trip Channel (Electrical) 29.

30.

Turbine Trip Setpoint Seismic Instrumentation N.A.

M N.A R

R N.A R

M Stop valve closure or low EH fluid pressure The test shall independently

-

31. Reactor Trip Breaker M verify operability of the under-
a. Undervoltage Trip Logic N.A. N.A. M voltage and shunt trip attachments
b. Shunt Trip Logic . N.A. N.A. M
32. Reactor Coolant Pressure N.A. R. N.A.
33. Auxiliary Feedwater
a. Steam Generator Water Level s R M Low-Low
b. RCP Undervoltage s R M
c. s. I. (All Safety Injection surveillance requirements)
d. Station Blackout N.A. R N.A.
e. Main Feedwater Pump Trip N.A. N.A. R I-'

I 00

--

  • Page 4.1-8a is deleted. Item 34, Loss of Power, also appears on page 4.1-9.

The legend at the bottom of page 4.1-8a has also been moved to page 4.1-9 *

  • TABLE 4.1-1 (Continued)

Channel Description Check Calibrate. Test Remarks

34. Loss of Power
a. 4.16 KV Emergency Bus Under- N.A. R M voltage (Loss of Voltage)
b. 4.16 KV Emergency Bus Under- N.A. R M voltage .(Degraded Voltage) 3.5. Control Room Chlorine Detectors s R M
36. Manual Reactor Trip N.A. N.A. R The test shall independently verify the operability of the I undervoltage and shunt trip attachments for the manual reactor trip function. The test shall also verify the operability of the bypass breaker trip circuit.
37. Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker
a. Undervoltage attachment N.A. N.A. M Test prior to placing in service
b. Shunt trip attachment N.A. N.A. R S - Each shift M - Monthly D - Daily P Prior to each startup if not done previous week W Weekly R Each Refueling Shutdown N.A. - Not applicable BW - Every two weeks SA - Semiannually AP - After each startup if not. done previous week Q - Every 90 effective full power days

~I

  • See Specification 4.lD I-'

I

  • .

' *" .

  • ATTACHMENT 2
  • DISCUSSION OF PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES

~-----===-----*- --~ .

.

" I ,..,..' ,*'),

e

  • SAFETY EVALUATION FOR SUPPLEMENTAL PROPOSED CHANGE This supplemental proposed change to the Technical Specification provides clarification for the required testing of the reactor trip breakers, reactor trip bypass breakers and the manual scram switches; and provides further definition of operability for the reactor trip breakers. To meet the guidance of the Generic Letter 85-09, "Technical Specifications for Generic Letter 83-28, item 4 .3," a supplemental proposed change is submitted to provide a Limiting Condition for Operation for the reactor trip breakers; and adminis-trative notes to clarify the surveillance testing requirements for the reactor trip breakers, reactor trip bypass breakers, and the manual scram switches.

50.59 Safety Review Pursuant to lOCFRS0.59, we have reviewed the supplemental proposed change and have concluded that no unreviewed safety question exists: In that, (i) The

  • probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment importantant to safety is not increased by these supplemental changes. One change redefines the operability of the reactor trip breaker with one of the diverse trip features (undervoltage or shunt trip attachments) inoperable. Since either trip feature being operable would initiate a reactor trip the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety is not increased from that previously evaluated in the UFSAR, (ii) The possibility of a different type of accident other than discussed in the UFSAR has not been created by this supplemental proposed change. The proposed changes are bounded by the previous submittal and no new or different type of accidents are created by this additional change. (iii) The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced by this change. The proposed changes provide further definition of reactor trip breaker operability and clarification of surveillance test requirements for the reactor trip and reactor trip bypass breakers, and the manual scram switches. These supplemental changes are bounded by the previous submittal and do not*reduce
  • the margin of safety *

e* Page 2

  • 50.92 Significant Hazards Review The supplemental proposed changes do not pose a significant hazards considera-tion as definec:I in 10CFR50. 92. The Commission has provided examples of changes that constitute no significant safety hazards consideration in Federal Regiiter, Volume 48, page 14870. Example (ii) consist of additional limita-tion, restrictions or controls beyond those presently specified in the Technical Specifications. Example (vii) consists of a change to make the licensee conform to changes in Commission guidances. The supplemental proposed change is similar to example (ii) in that it clarifies the intent of the su.rveill~nce testing requirements for reactor trip and reactor trip bypass breakers, and the manual scram switches. Specifically, the Technical Specification requires independent testing of the undervoltage and shunt trip attachments in the reactor trip and reactor trip bypass breakers. In addition
  • the p*roposed change is similar to example (vii) in that it clarifies operability of the reactor trip breakers in the action statement.

Specifically the Commission's guidance, in Generic Letter 85-09, permits power operation of the reactor with one (1) of the diverse trip features of a reactor-trip breaker (undervoltage or shunt trip attachment) inoperable for up to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> prior to shuting down.

Based on the above we concluded that this proposed Technical Specification supplemental change does not involve an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10CFR50.59 nor a significant hazards consideration as defined in 10CFR50.92.

ETS/acm/m045