ML080800364: Difference between revisions
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C.Required Action and C.l Be in MODE 3.6hours-associated Completion TimeforConditionA ANDorBnot met in MODE I,2,3,or4.C.2 Be in MODE 5.36 hours-D.Required Action and 0.1 Isolate the MCR!ESGR Immediately | C.Required Action and C.l Be in MODE 3.6hours-associated Completion TimeforConditionA ANDorBnot met in MODE I,2,3,or4.C.2 Be in MODE 5.36 hours-D.Required Action and 0.1 Isolate the MCR!ESGR Immediately | ||
--associated Completion envelope normal TimeforConditionA ventilation.orBnot met during movement of recently OR irradiated fuel assemblies. | --associated Completion envelope normal TimeforConditionA ventilation.orBnot met during movement of recently OR irradiated fuel assemblies. | ||
0.2 Suspend movement of Immediately recently irradiated fuel assemblies. | |||
===0.2 Suspend=== | |||
movement of Immediately recently irradiated fuel assemblies. | |||
North AnnaUnits1 and 2 3.3.6-1 MCR/ESGR Envelope Isolation Actuation Instrumentation | North AnnaUnits1 and 2 3.3.6-1 MCR/ESGR Envelope Isolation Actuation Instrumentation | ||
| Line 179: | Line 181: | ||
-associated Completion envelope normal TimeforConditionA ventilation. | -associated Completion envelope normal TimeforConditionA ventilation. | ||
not met during movement of recently AND irradiated fuel assemblies. | not met during movement of recently AND irradiated fuel assemblies. | ||
0.1.2 Place OPERABLE EVS1hour--train in emergency (outside filtered air supply)mode.OR-D.2 Suspend movement of Immediately | |||
====0.1.2 Place==== | |||
OPERABLE EVS1hour--train in emergency (outside filtered air supply)mode.OR-D.2 Suspend movement of Immediately | |||
-recently irradiated fuel assemblies. | -recently irradiated fuel assemblies. | ||
E.One or more required E.1 Suspend movement of Immediately | E.One or more required E.1 Suspend movement of Immediately | ||
| Line 264: | Line 268: | ||
C.Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3.I)hours associated Completion TimeforConditionA ANDorBnot met in-MODE1,2,3,or4. | C.Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3.I)hours associated Completion TimeforConditionA ANDorBnot met in-MODE1,2,3,or4. | ||
C.2 Be in MODE 5.36 hours D.Required Action and 0.1 Isolate the MCR/ESGR Immediately associated Completion envelope normal Time forConditionA ventilation.orBnot met during movement of recently OR irradiated fuel assemblies. | C.2 Be in MODE 5.36 hours D.Required Action and 0.1 Isolate the MCR/ESGR Immediately associated Completion envelope normal Time forConditionA ventilation.orBnot met during movement of recently OR irradiated fuel assemblies. | ||
0.2 Suspend movement of Immediately recently irradiated fuel assemblies. | |||
===0.2 Suspend=== | |||
movement of Immediately recently irradiated fuel assemblies. | |||
North AnnaUnits1 and 2 3.3.6-1 MCR/ESGR Envelope IsolationActuationInstrumentation | North AnnaUnits1 and 2 3.3.6-1 MCR/ESGR Envelope IsolationActuationInstrumentation | ||
| Line 270: | Line 276: | ||
REQUIREMENTS SR 3.3.6.1 SURVEILLANCE | REQUIREMENTS SR 3.3.6.1 SURVEILLANCE | ||
--------------------NDTE------------------- | --------------------NDTE------------------- | ||
Verification of setpointisnot required.Perform TADDT.FREQUENCY 18 months North AnnaUnits1and2 3.3.6-2 MCR/ESGR Envelope Isolation Actuation Instrumentation 3.3.6 Table 3.3.6-1 (page1of1)MCR/ESGR Envelope Isolation Actuation Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECI FI ED FUNCTION CONDITIONS 1.Manual Initi ati on1,2,3,4,(a) | Verification of setpointisnot required.Perform TADDT.FREQUENCY 18 months North AnnaUnits1and2 3.3.6-2 MCR/ESGR Envelope Isolation Actuation Instrumentation | ||
====3.3.6 Table==== | |||
3.3.6-1 (page1of1)MCR/ESGR Envelope Isolation Actuation Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECI FI ED FUNCTION CONDITIONS 1.Manual Initi ati on1,2,3,4,(a) | |||
REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE TRIP CHANNELS REQUIREMENTS SETPOINT 2 trains SR 3.3.6.1 N/A 2.Safety InjectionReferto LCO 3.3.2,"ESFAS Instrumentation,"Function1,for all initiation functions and requirements.(a)During movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies. | REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE TRIP CHANNELS REQUIREMENTS SETPOINT 2 trains SR 3.3.6.1 N/A 2.Safety InjectionReferto LCO 3.3.2,"ESFAS Instrumentation,"Function1,for all initiation functions and requirements.(a)During movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies. | ||
North AnnaUnits1 and 2 3.3.6-3 MCR/ESGR EVS I 3.7.10 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.10 Main Control Room/Emergency Switchgear Room (MCR/ESGR) | North AnnaUnits1 and 2 3.3.6-3 MCR/ESGR EVS I 3.7.10 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.10 Main Control Room/Emergency Switchgear Room (MCR/ESGR) | ||
| Line 283: | Line 292: | ||
North AnnaUnits1 and 2 3.7.10-2 MCR/ESGR EVS I 3.7.10 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E.(continued) | North AnnaUnits1 and 2 3.7.10-2 MCR/ESGR EVS I 3.7.10 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E.(continued) | ||
OR-Two required MCR/ESGR EVS trains inoperable during movement of recently irradiatedfuelassembliesfor reasons other than Condition B.F.Two required MCR/ESGR F.l Enter LCO 3.0.3.Immediately EVS trains inoperable in MODE1,2,3,or4forreasons other than Condition B.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.10.1Operateeach required MCR/ESGR EVS train 31 days for10continuoushourswiththe heaters operating. | OR-Two required MCR/ESGR EVS trains inoperable during movement of recently irradiatedfuelassembliesfor reasons other than Condition B.F.Two required MCR/ESGR F.l Enter LCO 3.0.3.Immediately EVS trains inoperable in MODE1,2,3,or4forreasons other than Condition B.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.10.1Operateeach required MCR/ESGR EVS train 31 days for10continuoushourswiththe heaters operating. | ||
SR 3.7.10.2 Perform required MCR/ESGR EVS filterInaccordance testinginaccordancewiththe Ventilation with VFTP Filter Testing Program (VFTP).SR 3.7.10.3 Not Used SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY North AnnaUnits1 and 2 3.7.10-3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.7.10.4 Perform required MCR/ESGR Envelope unfiltered air inleakage testing inaccordancewiththe MCR/ESGR Envelope Habitability Program.MCR/ESGR EVS I 3.7.10Inaccordancewiththe MCR/ESGR Envelope Habitability Program North AnnaUnits1 and 2 3.7.10-4 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.13 Not Used North AnnaUnits1 and 2 3.7.13-1 3.7.13 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.14 Not Used North AnnaUnits1 and 2 3.7.14-1 3.7.14 Programs and Manuals 5.5 5.5 Programs and Manuals 5.5.15 5.5.16 Containment LeakageRateTesting Program (continued) d.LeakageRateacceptance criteria are: 1.Prior to entering a MODE where containment OPERABILITY is required,thecontainmentleakage rate acceptance criteria are:0.60 Laforthe Type B and Type C tests on a Maximum Path Basis and0.75 La for Type A tests.During operation where containment OPERABILITY is required,thecontainmentleakage rate acceptance criteria are:1.0 La for overallcontainmentleakage rate and0.60 Laforthe Type B and Type C tests on a Minimum Path Basis.2.Overall airlockleakage rate testing acceptance criterion is0.05 La when tested atP a.e.The provisions of SR 3.0.3 are applicabletothe Containment LeakageRateTesting Program.f.Nothing in these Technical Specifications shall be construed to modify the testing Frequencies required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix J.Main Control Room/Emergency Switchgear Room (MCR/ESGR) | SR 3.7.10.2 Perform required MCR/ESGR EVS filterInaccordance testinginaccordancewiththe Ventilation with VFTP Filter Testing Program (VFTP).SR 3.7.10.3 Not Used SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY North AnnaUnits1 and 2 3.7.10-3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.7.10.4 Perform required MCR/ESGR Envelope unfiltered air inleakage testing inaccordancewiththe MCR/ESGR Envelope Habitability Program.MCR/ESGR EVS I 3.7.10Inaccordancewiththe MCR/ESGR Envelope Habitability Program North AnnaUnits1 and 2 3.7.10-4 | ||
===3.7 PLANT=== | |||
SYSTEMS 3.7.13 Not Used North AnnaUnits1 and 2 3.7.13-1 3.7.13 | |||
===3.7 PLANT=== | |||
SYSTEMS 3.7.14 Not Used North AnnaUnits1 and 2 3.7.14-1 3.7.14 Programs and Manuals 5.5 5.5 Programs and Manuals 5.5.15 5.5.16 Containment LeakageRateTesting Program (continued) d.LeakageRateacceptance criteria are: 1.Prior to entering a MODE where containment OPERABILITY is required,thecontainmentleakage rate acceptance criteria are:0.60 Laforthe Type B and Type C tests on a Maximum Path Basis and0.75 La for Type A tests.During operation where containment OPERABILITY is required,thecontainmentleakage rate acceptance criteria are:1.0 La for overallcontainmentleakage rate and0.60 Laforthe Type B and Type C tests on a Minimum Path Basis.2.Overall airlockleakage rate testing acceptance criterion is0.05 La when tested atP a.e.The provisions of SR 3.0.3 are applicabletothe Containment LeakageRateTesting Program.f.Nothing in these Technical Specifications shall be construed to modify the testing Frequencies required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix J.Main Control Room/Emergency Switchgear Room (MCR/ESGR) | |||
Envelope Habitability Program A MCR/ESGR Envelope Habitability Program shall be established and implementedtoensure that MCR/ESGR envelope habitability ismaintainedsuch that, with an OPERABLE MCR/ESGR EVS, MCR/ESGRenvelopeoccupants can control the reactor safely under normal conditions and maintain itina safe conditionfollowinga radiological event, hazardous chemical release,ora smoke challenge. | Envelope Habitability Program A MCR/ESGR Envelope Habitability Program shall be established and implementedtoensure that MCR/ESGR envelope habitability ismaintainedsuch that, with an OPERABLE MCR/ESGR EVS, MCR/ESGRenvelopeoccupants can control the reactor safely under normal conditions and maintain itina safe conditionfollowinga radiological event, hazardous chemical release,ora smoke challenge. | ||
The program shall ensure that adequate radiation protectionisprovidedtopermitaccess and occupancyofthe MCR/ESGRenvelopeunderdesign basis accident conditions without (continued) | The program shall ensure that adequate radiation protectionisprovidedtopermitaccess and occupancyofthe MCR/ESGRenvelopeunderdesign basis accident conditions without (continued) | ||
Revision as of 21:03, 14 October 2018
| ML080800364 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | North Anna  |
| Issue date: | 03/19/2008 |
| From: | Bischof G T Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO) |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| 08-0080 | |
| Download: ML080800364 (91) | |
Text
10CFR50.90 VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23261 March 19.2008 u.s.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionAttention:DocumentControlDeskWashington,D.C.20555SerialNo.NL&OS/ETS Docket Nos.License Nos.08-0080 RO 50-338/339 NPF-4/7 VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY (DOMINION)
NORTH ANNA POWERSTATIONUNITS1AND2 PROPOSED LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST DELETIONOFTS3.7.13-MAIN CONTROL ROOM/EMERGENCY SW'ITCHGEAR ROOM BOTTLEDAIRSYSTEMFROM TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONSPursuantto10CFR50.90,Dominionrequestsamendments,intheformofchangestotheTechnicalSpecificationstoFacilityOperatingLicenseNumbersNPF-4andNPF-7forNorthAnnaPowerStationUnits1and2,respectively.Theproposed amendmentwoulddeletethe Control Room/Emergency Switchgear Room(MCR/ESGR)BottledAirSystemfromTechnicalSpecifications.OperationoftheBottledAirSystemwillbecontrolledbytheUFSAR.TheproposedchangeswillrevisetheTSequipmentoperabilityrequirementstobeconsistentwiththeassumptionsofthecurrentdoseanalysisofrecord(AOR),performedinaccordancewith10CFR50.67,AccidentSourceTermandtheresultsofthenon-pressurizedMainControlRoom/Emergency SwitchgearRoom(MCR/ESGR)envelopetracergastesting.Specifically,theAccidentSourceTermAORdoesnotrequiretheMCR/ESGRBottledAirSystemtomeettheinleakagelimitsfordosemitigation.Furthermore,theMCR/ESGRenvelopetracergastestingwasperformedinanon-pressurizedmodewiththemeasuredleakagewellwithintheAORassumedvaluesconfirmingthattheMCR/ESGRBottledAirSystemwasnotnecessarytomeet requirements.
Attachment1providesadiscussionofandthebasisfortheproposed amendment.Themarked-upandproposedTechnicalSpecificationspagesareprovidedin Attachments2and3,respectively.Theassociatedmarked-upBaseschangesareprovidedin Attachment4forinformationonlyandwillbeimplementedinaccordancewiththeTechnicalSpecificationBasesControlProgram.TheproposedchangeshavebeenreviewedandapprovedbytheFacilitySafetyReview Committee.DominionrequestsapprovalofthelicenseamendmentsbyJune30,2009witha90-day implementationperiodfollowingNRCapprovalofthelicenseamendments.
SerialNo.08-0080 Docket Nos.50-338/339BottledAirSystem Amendment Page 2 of 3 In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91, a copy of this application, with attachments, is being provided to the appropriate designated officials of Virginia.If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Mr.Thomas Shaub at (804)273-2763.Very truly yours, Vice President-Nuclear Engineering Attachments 1.Discussion of Change 2.Marked-up Technical Specifications Changes 3.Proposed Technical Specifications Pages 4.Marked-up Technical Specifications Bases Changes Commitments made in this letter: None.COMMONWEALTHOFVIRGINIA COUNTYOFHENRICOTheforegoing documentwasacknowledgedbeforeme,inandfortheCountyand Commonwealthaforesaid,todaybyGeraldT.Bischof,whoisVice President-NuclearEngineering,ofVirginiaElectricandPowerCompany.Hehasaffirmed beforemethatheisdulyauthorizedtoexecuteandfiletheforegoing documentinbehalfofthatCompany,andthat the statementsinthe documentaretruetothebestofhisknowledgeandbelief.
Acknowledgedbeforemethis/
97J1dayof.d(,fy(/z , 2008.My Commission Expires:31,.7010 (SEAL)VICKIL.HUU NotcIfy PublIc Commonwealth of VIfIInIa 1.-.1 Comml.lon......_",1010NotaryPublic cc:U.S.Nuclear Regulatory CommissionRegionIISamNunn Atlanta Federal Center 61 ForsythStreet,SW Suite 23T85 Atlanta, Georgia 30303Mr.J.E.Reasor,Jr.
Old Dominion Electric Cooperative Innsbrook Corporate Center 4201 Dominion Blvd.Suite 300GlenAllen, Virginia 23060 State Health Commissioner Virginia DepartmentofHealth James MadisonBuilding-yth floor 109 Governor Street Suite 730 Richmond, Virginia 23219 NRC Senior Resident Inspector North Anna Power StationMr.S.P.Lingam NRC Project ManagerU.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission One WhiteFlintNorthMailStop 0-8 G9A 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852Mr.R.A.Jervey NRC Project ManagerU.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission One WhiteFlintNorthMailStop 0-8 G9A 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852SerialNo.08-0080 Docket Nos.50-338/339BottledAirSystem AmendmentPage3of3 Attachment 1 (SerialNo.-08-0080)
Discussion of Change North Anna Power Station Units1and2 Virginia Electric and Power Company (Dominion)
SerialNo 08-0080ProposedTSChangetoRelocatetheBottledAirSystemfromTSDocketNos.
50-338/339Page1of18 Discussion of Change 1.0 Introduction Pursuantto10CFR50.90, Virginia Electric and Power Company (Dominion) requests an amendmenttoFacility Operating License Numbers NPF-4andNPF-7intheformof changestothe Technical Specifications(TS)forNorthAnna PowerStationUnits1and 2.The proposed changeswillrevisetheTS equipment operability requirementstobe consistent with the assumptionsofthe current dose AnalysisofRecord(AOR), performed in accordance with10CFR50.67, AccidentSourceTermandtheresultsofthe non-pressurized Main Control Room/Emergency Switchgear Room (MCR/ESGR) envelope tracer gas tes1ting.The following TS changesarebeing proposed: 1)eliminateTS3.7.13,"Main Control Room (MCR)/Emergency SwitchgearRoom(ESGR)
Bottled Air System," 2:)addTS3.3.6,"MCR/ESGR Envelope Isolation Actuation Instrumentation," to establish operability requirementsforthe MCRIESGR envelope isolation function;and,3)incorporateTS3.7.14,"MCR/ESGR Emergency VentilationSystem(EVS) during Movement of Recently Irradiated Fuel Assemblies,"into3.7.10,"MCRIESGR Emergency Ventilation System,"whichwillcontainthe requirementsforall applicable Modes or conditions consistent with Improved Technical Specifications.TSBases changes,reflectingthe proposed Technical Specification changes discussedabove,are included for informationonly.TheTS Baseswillberevisedin accordance withtheTS Bases Control Program, following NRC approvalofthelicense amendment.
The proposed changes qualify for categorical exclusionfroman environmental assessmentassetforthin10CFR51
.22(c)(9).Therefore, no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment is needed in connectionwiththe approvalofthe proposed change.2.0 Proposed Changes The changewill:1)establish operability,requiredactions, completion times and surveillance requirementsforthe MCR/ESGR Envelope Isolation Actuation Instrumentation (newTS3.3.6);2)removeTS3.7.13,"Main Control Room (MCR)/Emergency Switchgear Room(ESGR)BottledAir System," 3)modify and incorporate the operability requirementsofTS 3.7.14,"MCR/ESGREVS-During Movement Of Recently Irradiated Fuel Assemblies," intoTS3.7.10,"Main Control Room/Emergency Switchgear Room (MCRIESGR)
EVS Modes 1, 2,3,and4." The following provides a descriptionofthe changes.*Create-TS3.3.6,"MCR/ESGR Envelope Isolation Actuation Instrumentation,"whichwill include the following functions:ManualInitiationand Safety Injection.
These functions are SerialNo 08-0080ProposedTSChangetoRelocatetheBottledAirSystemfromTSDocketNos.
50-338/339Page2of18creditedintheAORfordosemitigation.ThenewTSsectionwillbe structured consistentwithITSasfollows:3.3.6MainControl Room/Emergency SwitchgearRoom(MCRIESGR)
Envelope Isolation Actuation InstrumentationLCO3.3.6The MCR/ESGREnvelopeIsolationActuation InstrumentationforeachFunctioninTable3.3.6-1shallbe OPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:AccordingtoTable3.3.6-1.
ACTIONS----------------------------------------------------------
SeparateConditionentryisallowedforeachFunction.
I CONDITIONREQUIREDACTION COMPLETION I TIME IA.Oneormore Functions with A.1Isolatethe MCRIESGR7days I.onetraininoperable.envelopenormal ventilation.
B.OneormoreFunctionswith B.1Isolatethe MCR/ESGR Immediatelytwotrainsinoperable.
envelope normal ventilation.
C.RequiredActionandC.1BeinMODE3.6hoursassociatedCompletionTimeforConditionAorBnotmetinMODE1,2,3,or4.
ANDC.2BeinMODE5.36hours D.RequiredActionand D.1Isolatethe MCR/ESGR ImmediatelyassociatedCompletionTime envelope normalforConditionAorBnotmet ventilation.
during movementofrecentlyirradiatedfuelassemblies.
OR ImmediatelyD.2Suspend movement ofrecentlyirradiatedfuel assemblies.
SerialNo08-0080ProposedTSChangetoRelocatetheBottledAirSystemfromTSDocketNos.
50-338/339Page3of18 SURVEILLANCE FREOUENCYSR3.3.6.1------------------------------------------------------------
-NOTE-Verificationofsetpointisnotrequired.
PerformTADOT.18months t r I tTable3.3.6-1IItiA MCRIESGR EnveopesoaIonctuationnsrumenaIon APPLICABLEMODESOR REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE TRIP FUNCTION OTHER CHANNELS REQUIREMENTS SETPOINT SPECIFIED CONDITIONS1.ManualInitiation1,2,3,4,(a)2trainsSR3.3.6.1NA2.SafetyInjectionRefertoLCO3.3.2,"ESFASInstrumentation,"Function1,forallinitiationfunctionsandrequirements.(a)DUringmovementofrecentlyIrradiatedfuelassemblies.*ReviseTS3.7.10,MainControl Room/Emergency SwitchgearRoom(MCR/ESGR)EVSModes1,2,3,and4oDeletetheMode ApplicabilityfromthetitlesincetheModesandConditionsof ApplicabilityareaddressedinTS3.7.10.oRevisethe ApplicabilityofTS3.7.10,MCRIESGRtoinclude"during movement ofrecentlyirradiatedfuelassemblies."TheoperabilityrequirementsfromTS3.7.14arebeingrevisedandincorporatedintoTS3.7.10andTS3.7.14isbeingdeleted.oIncludeModes 1,2,3,4inCONDITIONBtoestablish applicabilityofConditionB,nowthatTS3.7.10addressesallModesandConditionsofApplicability.oAddaREQUIREDACTIONforCONDITIONDduring movementofrecentlyirradiatedfuelassembliesconsistentwiththenewTS3.3.6,whichrequiresisolationoftheMCRIESGRenvelopeandstartatrainofEVSwithin1hour.TheseactionswillprovideadequateprotectionfortheMCR/ESGRroomoccupantsduringafuelhandlingaccidentandnotimpactfuelhandlingoperations.IncorporatetheCONDITIONS,REQUIREDACTIONS,and COMPLETIONTIMESforaninoperableMCRIESGRenvelopeboundaryortwoEVStrainswhenmovingrecentlyirradiatedfuel.ThefollowingCONDITIONS,REQUIREDACTIONSand COMPLETION TIMESarebeingaddedasdescribedbelow.
SerialNo 08-0080ProposedTSChangetoRelocatetheBottledAirSystemfromTSDocketNos.
50-338/339Page4of18D.RequiredActionand0.1.1Isolatethe ImmediatelyassociatedCompletionTimeMCRIESGRenvelopeforConditionAnotmetduringnormalventilation.
movementofrecentlyirradiatedfuelassemblies.
AND 0.1.2PlaceOPERABLE ImmediatelyEVStraininoutsidefilteredairsupply mode.OR1hour 0.2Suspendmovementofrecentlyirradiatedfuel assemblies.
E.Oneormorerequired E.1 Suspend movement of ImmediatelyMCR/ESGREVStrainsrecentlyirradiatedfuelinoperableduetoinoperable assemblies.MCR/ESGRenvelopeboundaryduringmovementofrecentlyirradiatedfuel assemblies.
ORTworequiredMCR/ESGREVStrainsinoperableduring movementofrecentlyirradiatedfuelassembliesforreasonsotherthanCondition B.F.-f>.TworequiredMCRIESGR F.1Enter3.0.3 ImmediatelyEVStrainsinoperableinMODE1,2,3,or4forreasonsotherthanConditionB.*Delete-TS3.7.13,MainControlRoom (MCR)/Emergency SwitchgearRoom(ESGR)BottledAirSystem.OperationoftheBottledAirSystemwillbecontrolledbyalicenseecontrolleddocument(e.g.,UFSAR)and10CFR50.59.*RelocatetheoperabilityrequirementsofTS3.7.14,MainControlRoom (MCR)/Emergency SwitchgearRoom(ESGR)
EmergencyVentilationSystem(EVS)duringMovementofRecentlyIrradiatedFuelAssembliesintoTS3.7'.10asdiscussed SerialNo 08-0080ProposedTSChangetoRelocatetheBottledAirSystemfrom T8DocketNos.
50-338/339Page5of 18aboveanddeleteTS3.7.14.Thisincludes establishing CONDITIONS, REQUIREDACTIONS,and COMPLETIONTIMESfor1)an inoperableEVStrain,2)an inoperable boundaryand3)two inoperableEVStrainswhenmovingrecently irradiated fuel.*Removethediscussionofthe Emergency HabitabilitySystem(EHS)andBottledAirSystemfromthefirstparagraphinTS5.5.16 MCR/ESGR Envelope Habitability Program.TheBottledAirSystemisnolongerrequiredtobeincludedintheTS,thustheEHSonly consistsofthe MCR/ESGR EVS.*Removethe"18month" frequencyfromthe"assessment" requirementofTS5.5.16.dfor the MCR/ESGRdeltapressuretesting(MCR/ESGR HabitabilityProgram)toavoidconfusionwiththe MCR/ESGR habitability 3-year assessment frequency established bytheRegulatoryGuides incorporatedintoTS5.5.16.c.Thetestresultswillbeevaluated,trendedandusedduringthe3year MCR/ESGRenvelopeassessment.TheTSBasesarebeingrevisedtoreflecttheproposedchangesandareprovidedforinformation.TheBaseschangeswillbe incorporatedintotheTSin accordancewiththeBasesControlProgramafterNRCapprovaloftheproposedTSchanges.
3.0 Background
MCRIESGREVSand MCR/ESGRBottledAirSystem-[UFSARSection9.4,(Ref.2)]Duringnormaloperation,theServiceBuilding Ventilation System suppliesfreshairtothe MCR/ESGRenvelopebysupplyfan(1-HV-AC-4)andexhaustsairtooutdoorsbyanexhaustfan(1-HV-F-15),locatedontheServiceBuildingroof.
The MCR/ESGR Emergency VentilationSystem(EVS)wasdesignedasfour100%capacityredundanttrainsthatcanfilterandrecirculateairinsidethe MCR/ESGRenvelope,orsupplyfilteredoutsideairtothe MCRIESGRenvelope.Thetwo MCR/ESGR EVStrainsontheaccidentunitactuate automaticallyinrecirculationonasafetyinjectionsignal.Withthe exceptionsdescribedbelow, eitherofthesetrainscanalsobealignedtoprovidefilteredoutsideairfor pressurization approximately60minutesaftertheevent.Ifnecessary,atrainfromtheotherunitcanbe manuallyactuatedtoprovidefilteredoutsideairtomeetthe pressurization requirement.IncaseofaDesignBasisAccident(DBA)orFuelHandlingAccident(FHA)during movementofrecentlyirradiatedfuelassemblies,anautomaticactuationormanualactuation,ofairflowfromthebottledairbanksisinitiated.Actuationofairflowfromthebottledairbanksalsoautomatically:1)isolatesthenormalventilationforthe MCRIESGR envelopetomaintainpositivepressureinthe envelopeand2)startsallavailableEVStrainsinrecirculationmode.TherequiredEVStrainscanbealignedtoprovidefilteredoutsideairand pressurization approximately60minutesaftertheevent.Duetothelocationoftheairintakefor1-HV-F-41,itcannotbeusedtoprovidefilteredoutsideair.Twoofthethreeremainingtrains(1-HV-F-SerialNo 08-0080ProposedTSChangetoRelocatethe BottledAirSystemfromTSDocketNos.
50-338/339Page6of1842,2-HV-F-41,and2-HV-F-42)arerequiredfor independenceandredundancy.OnlyoneEVStrainisrequiredtoperformthesafetyfunctionofsupplyingoutsidefilteredair.Eachfiltertrain assemblyconsistsofanelectricheatingcoil,a moisture separator (demister),charcoalfilter, high-efficiency particulateair(HEPA)filter,afan,relatedductwork,andtwoMODs.Twofiltertrain assembliesservetheMCRandtwoservetheESGR(onefortheUnit1sideandonefortheUnit2side).Thefiltertrain assemblies are desiqnedtoreducethe concentration of radioactivityenteringtheControlRoomenvelopeafteraccidents.Theheatersandmoisture separators(demisters)areusedtocontrol humidityand,thereby, preclude degradingthecharcoalfilters.Thecompressed,dryairbottlesarearrangedinfourbanks(twoperunit)toprovidebreathingair,whichalso pressurizestheenvelope,fora 1-hourperiod.TheBottledAirSystemconsistsof69bottlesperbankwithtwobanksperunit.Threeoffourbanksarealignedforservicewiththefourthbank manuallyisolatedbutavailable.Twotrainsprovidetheairrequiredfor1hourof pressurization.UponmanualinitiationorreceiptofaSafetyInjectionsignalorHiqh-HiqhradiationsignalfromthefuelbuildingradiationmonitorswiththeFuelBuildingRadiation Automatic Interlockkeyswitchintheenableposition,theMCRIESGR envelopeforUnits1and2isisolatedandtheBottledAirSystemisactuated.Thefollowingactionsoccur:
1.MCR/ESGRNormalmakeupandexhaustair dampers are automatically closed.2.SupplyFan 1-HV-AC-4andExhaustFan1-HV-F-15shutdown.3.Airfromthreeoffourbanks(eachunithastwobanks)of compressedairbottlesis released.4.TwofansfromtheEVSstart automaticallyintherecirculationmodeonaSafetyInjectionSignal.AllfourfansstartonaHigh-HighRadiationsignal.5.Afterairfromthe compressedairbottleshasbeenused,afanfromthe MCRIESGREVSis manuallyrealignedfromtherecirculationmodeorplacedinservicetoprovidefilteredoutsidemakeupair,whichalso pressurizes the MCRIESGRenvelopetoreduceinleakage.LicensingBasesInlicense amendments231and212,datedApril5,2002,NorthAnnaconvertedtoImprovedTSandseparatedthe MCR/ESGR Emergency VentilationSystemandBottledAirSystemintoseparateTS.ThefollowingTSwere implemented and considered the Emergency HabitabilitySystem(EHS):TS3.7.10,"MCR/ESGREVS-Modes1,2,3,and4,"TS3.7.13,"MCR/ESGRBottledAirSystem,"and,TS3.7.14,"MCR/ESGREVS-During Movement ofRecentlyIrradiatedFuel Assemblies."TheAnalysisofRecord(AOR)foraLOCAatthattime establishedthesystem operabilityrequirements,whichincluded automaticisolationandrecirculationandfiltrationoftheMCRIESGRenvelopeairwithatrainofEVSonaSafetyInjectionsignal.TheBottledAirSystemwasrequiredtolimitinleakagetolessthanthe10cfmassumedinthatAOA.The MCR/ESGREVSwasthenalignedtothe pressurizationmodetoprovidefilteredoutsideairtothe MCR/ESGRpriortodepletionofthebottledair SerialNo08-0080ProposedTSChangetoRelocatetheBottledAirSystemfromTSDocketNos.
50-338/339Page7of18 supply (approximately1hour).Althoughavailable,recirculationofthe envelopeairwasnotrequiredforafuelhandlingaccident.
License amendments240and221approvedonJune15,2005,permitted implementation of an AlternativeSourceTerm(AST) consistentwith10CFR50.67.TheASTdose assessmentmodifiedthe assumptionsintheADR,whichinturn permitted a changetothe operability requirementsofthe Emergency HabitabilitySystems(EHS).However,Dominionchosenot to significantlyalterthe operability requirementsforthe MCR/ESGREHSatthattime.PriortotheASTamendment,thesystemoperatedasdescribedaboveandtheADR (LDCA/FHA)creditedthefollowingmitigativeactionsinthedoseanalysis.*IsolationoftheMCR/ESGRenvelope-automaticallyonSafetyInjectionand manuallyforFHAs,*Pressurizationofthe MCR/ESGR envelopewiththeBottledAirSystemforonehourtomeetassumedinleakagelimitof10cfm.*Recirculationofthe MCRIESGRenvelopewiththeEVSforthefirsthourforfiltration, and*Pressurizationofthe MCR/ESGRenvelopeafteronehourwiththeEVStolimitinleakageandsupplyfilteredoutsidemakeupair.AftertheASTamendment,thesystemscontinuedtooperateasdescribedabove.However,theADR (LDCA/FHA)creditedonlythefollowingmitigativeactionsinthedoseanalysis:*For LDCA/Fuel Handling Accidents the MCRIESGRenvelopeinleakageisassumedat 250/400cfm,respectively.
- Automaticisolationofthe MCR/ESGRenvelopeonSafetyInjectionandmanualisolationforFHAs.
- Pressurizationofthe MCR/ESGRenvelopeisnotrequiredtolimitinleakagetolessthanADRlimits(tracergastest performed in non-pressurizedmodewith150cfm+/-3cfminleakageresult).*Recirculationandfiltrationofthe MCR/ESGRenvelopeairisnotrequiredorcredited.*Initiationoffilteredoutsidemakeupairtothe MCRIESGRenvelopewithinonehourwiththeEVSisrequired.*FortheMSLB,SGTR,andRCPLockedRotor,the MCR/ESGRenvelopeisassumedoperatingwithnormalventilationflowand500cfmofadditionalinleakage.DominionsubmittedaTSchangerequestonMay29,2007(Ref.1)tomodifytheNorthAnnaTSrequirementsrelatedtoMainControl Room/Emergency SwitchgearRoom(MCR/ESGR)envelopehabitability.Thechangeswere consistentwiththe NRC-approved Industry/Technical SpecificationTaskForce(TSTF)
TravelerTSTF-448,Hevision3, Control Room Habitability(TSTF-448).The availabilityoftheTS improvement waspublishedintheFederalRegisteron January17,2007,aspartofthe consolidatedlineitem improvementprocess(CLlIP).TheTSchangerequestincludedarevisiontotheMCRBottledAirSystem TS requirementscontainedinTS3.7.13toincludetheactionstobetakenforan inoperable MCR/ESGR envelope similartothoseincludedforthe MCRIESGREVSin3.7.10.TheTS SerialNo08-0080ProposedTSChangetoRelocatetheBottledAirSystemfromTSDocketNos.
50-338/339Page8of18changewasapprovedas amendments251and231totheNorthAnnaUnits1and2TS,respectivelyon October31,2007.4.0 Technical Analysis 4.1 Radiological Consequences Tracergastestingwasperformedwiththe MCR/ESGRenvelopein a non-pressurizedconfiguration.Duringnormaloperation,thenon safety-related(NS)supplyandexhaustsystemsmaintainthe MCR/ESGRenvelopeataslightpositivepressurerelativetoadjacentspacesbyprovidingsupplyairinexcessofexhaustair.TheBottledAirSystemand MCR/ESGREVSprovideameansof maintainingthepositive pressurewhentheNSventilationsystemisisolatedduringadesignbasisaccident.The MCRIESGR-adjacentspacepressure differentialsmayalsobedirectlyaffectedbytheoperationofventilationsystemsintheadjacentspaces.ThesesystemsarenotpoweredfromSRbusesandwould,therefore,notoperatefollowingaDBAwithLOOP.Inorderto conservativelyboundthe MCR/ESGRenvelopeinleakage,the adjacent spaceventilationsystemswerealignedintheworstcredibleconfigurationforthe tracertesting.The MCR/ESGRenvelopewas maintainedatanegativepressurerelativetotheTurbineBuilding,andapositivepressuretotheCableVault.Thiscreatedapressure differentialacrossthe entire MCRIESGRenvelope.Also, neither the MCR/ESGRenvelopenormal supply/exhaustnorthe MCRIESGREVSwasoperated.Inthisconfiguration,themeasuredinleakage,which was approximately150cfm+/-3cfmandincluded numerousdooropenings,wasmuchlessthanthe 250/400cfm(LOCA/FHA)assumedbytheASTanalyses.The MCR/ESGR Habitability SystemsarenotcreditedinanyotherDBAsanalyzedintheAOR.Therefore,the MCR/ESGRBottledAirSystemisnolongerrequiredtomitigatethe consequencesofthemostlimitingdesignbasis accidentfissionproductreleasepresentedintheUFSAR(LOCA).Theanalysisresults(dose)foreachaccidentarelessthanthelimitstipulatedin10CFR50.67,whenusingtheassumed MCRIESGRenvelopeinleakagevalues,whichare greaterthantheinleakageresultsofthe tracergasinleakagetestperformedinresponsetoGL2003-01.
Tracergastestinleakageresultswere150cfmwhiletheASTAORassumedinleakageof250cfmforLOCAand400cfmforaFHA.The MCR/ESGR Habitability SystemsarenotcreditedforanyotheranalyzedDBAs.TheASTAORforLOCAandaFHAcreditsonly MCR/ESGRisolationand subsequent(within1hourofisolation)filteredmakeupairflow,whenthe MCR/ESGREVSis manuallyrealigned,tolimitthedosewithinregulatorylimits.Thedoseanalysis assumptionsandresultswerereviewedandapprovedbytheNRCin amendments240and221dated ,June15,2005forUnits1and2,respectively.
SerialNo08-0080ProposedTSChangetoRelocatetheBottledAirSystemfromTSDocketNos.50-338/339Page9of18 4.2 ToxicGasand Smoke Hazardouschemicaleventsareevaluatedonthebasisofnoactionbeingtakenbythecontrolroom operator(i.e.,noventilationchanges).Thenominalflow provided by either thenormalsupplyor MCRIESGRenvelopeEVSfanis approximatelytwicethatoftheunfilteredinleakageallowedforradiologicalevents.Inaddition,SCBAsare availableforthecontrolroomoperators,butarenot necessary for protectiveactionfollowingatoxicgaseventorradiologicalevent.Thereareseveral combinationsofsystemsavailabletoshutdownthereactorandcoolthecoreofeither/bothunitduringandafterafire, coincidentwithalossofoffsitepower.Safe shutdown analyseshavebeenperformedforeachfireareausing AppendixRguidelines,identifyingthesafeshutdownsystemsthatwouldremain unaffectedbythe worst-casefireinthatarea.Basedontheseanalyses,NorthAnnacomplieswiththespecific requirements ofAppendixR SectionsIII.G,III.J,III.L,and 111.0 with exemptionsasnotedinthe 10 CFR 50AppendixRReport.Passivefireprotectionsystemsareprovidedtominimizefiredamage.The MCR/ESGRenvelopeisdividedintothreefireareas(MCR, U1 ESGR, U2 ESGR), separatedbywalls,floors,ceilings,firedoors,firedampers,andpenetrationsealsratedat Conduitspenetratingfirebarriersaresealedinternallyiftheconduit terminateswithin5feetofthefire barrier.Smoke detectorsandfixedandportablefire suppression systemsareprovidedtominimizetheeffectsofsmokeandfire.ThecabletrayroomsabovetheMCRareprotectedbyaCO 2system.HalonsystemsprotecttheESGRsandtheMCR underfloor(cable)area.BothESGRsandtheMCRareprovidedwithsmokedetectors.TheMCR underfloorissealedsothatactuationoftheHalonsystemwillnotrequireMCRevacuation.Portablefire extinguishersandairbottlesareavailablein,andjustoutside,theMCRfor operator use.IntheunlikelyeventofanMCRfireorsmokeevent, equipment and procedures are availabletoensuresafeshutdownoftheunits.Inthecaseofanexternal fire/smokeevent,the MCR/ESGR envelope normal supply/exhaustsystemscanbe manuallyisolated.Forinternalfiresorsmoke,anauxiliaryshutdownpanelislocatedineachESGR,andcanbeeasilyreachedviaastairwellintheMCRIESGRenvelope,orbygoingoutsidetotheTurbineBuilding.Thestairwell connectstheMCRwiththeESGRsbelow,andisprovidedwithrateddoorsateachend.SCBAsareavailableinandjustoutside thecontrolroomto facilitate evacuationtotheESGRs.ThepotentialforsmokemigrationfromtheMCRtotheESGRsthroughthenormal supply/exhaust ductworkhasbeenreviewedanddeterminedto be inconsequential.Specificsmokeandfireresponseactions(e.g.,portableexhaustfans,doorandventilationconfiguration,etc.)willdependonthenatureofthefire,andwillbemadebythefirebrigadeasnecessary.
SerialNo08-0080ProposedTSChangetoRelocatetheBottledAirSystemfromTSDocketNos.
50-338/339Page10of18
4.3 JustificationforDeletionofTS
3.7.13, MCR/ESGRBottledAirSystem The MCR/ESGRBottledAirSystemconsistsoffourbanksofairbottleswith associated piping, instrumentation,andcontrols.Twobanksarecapableofprovidingthecontrolroomareawithone hourofpressurizedairfollowinganyeventwiththepotentialforradioactivereleases.Duringnormaloperations,the MCRIESGRBottledAirSystemis maintained in standby.ConsistentwiththeapprovedAST implementationanalyses,the requirementscontainedintheBottledAirSystemTechnical Specificationsdonotmeetanyof10CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii)criteriaonitemsforwhich Technical Specificationsmustbe established.
Thiscanbejustifiedasfollows:
Technical Specification3.7.13currentlyprovides operabilityrequirement,requiredactions, and surveillance requirementforthe MCR/ESGRBottledAirSystem.
PressurizationoftheMCR/ESGRisnolonger necessarytolimitthedosetotheoperatorswithinthelimits establishedintheAOR.Therefore,the MCR/ESGRBottledAirSystemisno longer creditedintheaccidentanalysesasdescribedinSection3.Additionally,this specificationdoesnotmeetanyofthecriteriaof10CFR50.36(c)(2)(ii).10CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii)containsthe requirementsforitemsthatmustbein Technical Specifications.Thisregulationprovidesfour(4)criteriathatcanbeusedto determine the requirementsthatmustbeincludedintheTechnical Specifications.Criterion1 Installed instrumentationthatisusedtodetect,andindicateinthecontrolroom,a significant abnormal degradationofthereactorcoolantpressureboundary.
SpecificationTS3.7.13providescriteriausedin determining operability of the MCRIESGRBottledAirSystem.This specificationdoesnotcoverinstalled instrumentationthatisusedtodetectandindicateinthecontrolrooma significant degradationofthereactorcoolantpressureboundary.Therefore,this specificationdoesnotsatisfyCriterion1"Criterion2Aprocessvariable,designfeature,oroperatingrestrictionthatisaninitialconditionofaDBA or transientanalysisthateitherassumesthefailureofor presents a challengetotheintegrityofafissionproductbarrier.
SpecificationTS3.7.13providescriteriausedin determining operabilityoftheMCRIESGRBottledAirSystem.This specificationdoesnotcoveraprocessvariable,designfeature,oroperatingrestrictionthatisaninitialconditionofadesignbasis accident or transient analysisthateitherassumesthefailureofor presentsachallengetotheintegrityofafissionproductbarrier.Therefore,this specificationdoesnotsatisfyCriterion2.
SerialNo08-0080ProposedTSChangetoRelocatetheBottledAirSystemfromTSDocketNos.50-338/339Page11of18Criterion3ASystem,Structure,or Component(SSC)thatispartoftheprimary successpathandwhichfunctionsor actuatestomitigateadesignbasis accident or transientthateither assumes thefailureoforpresentsa challengetotheintegrityofafissionproductbarrier.
SpecificationTS3.7.13requires MCRIESGRBottledAirSystemtobe OPERABLE inMODES1through4,andduringrecentlyirradiatedfuelmovement.
PressurizationoftheMCR/ESGRisnolonger necessarytolimitthedosetotheoperatorswithinthelimitsestablishedintheAOR.Thechangeinstatusofthissystemprovidesthebasisforremoving Technical Specification3.7.13,becausethe MCR/ESGRBottledAirSystemisnolongercreditedinthe accidentanalysisforlimiting operatordose.Therefore,thisfeaturedoesnotcoveraSystem,Structure,or componentthatispartoftheprimarysuccesspathwhich functionsoractuatestomitigateaDBAor transientthateither assumesthefailureofor presents a challengetotheintegrityofafissionproductbarrier.This specificationdoesnotsatisfyCriterion3.Criterion4ASSCwhichoperating experience or probabilistic risk assessmenthasshowntobe significanttopublichealthandsafety.
SpecificationTS3.7.13whichprovidesthecriteriausedin determining operabilityofthe MCR/ESGRBottledAirSystemhasnotbeenshowntoberisk significanttopublichealthandsafetybyeitheroperating experience or probabilisticsafetyassessment.ThesubjectsystemisnotcreditedtoensureradiologicaldosecriteriafortheEAB,LPZ,orcontrolroomismet.
This specificationdoesnotsatisfyCriterion4.Inconclusion,theproposeddeletionofTS3.7.13doesnotimpactplantequipment,whichiscreditedtofunctionintheeventofaDBA.Additionally,therequirementscontainedinthiscurrentTechnical Specificationdonotmeetanyof10CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii)criteriaregardingitemsforwhich Technical Specificationsmustbeestablished.Therefore,theproposedchangetodeleteTechnical Specification3.7.13is consistentwithregulation.
5.0 Regulatory
Safety Analysis 5.1 No SignificantHazardsConsiderationTheproposedchangeswill:1)removeTS3.7.13,MainControlRoom (MCR)/Emergency SwitchgearRoom(ESGR)BottledAirSystem,2)addTS3.3.6,"MCRIESGR Isolation Actuation Instrumentation,"and,3)modifyand incorporateTS3.7.14,"MCR/ESGR EVS during MovementofRecentlyIrradiatedFuelAssemblies,"into 3.7'.10,"MCR/ESGR EmergencyVentilationSystem(EVS)Modes 1,2,3,and4andduring MovementofRecentlyIrradiatedFuelAssemblies."TheproposedchangeswillrevisetheTS equipment operability SerialNo08-0080ProposedTSChangetoRelocatetheBottledAirSystemfromTSDocketNos.
50-338/339Page12of18 requirementstobe consistentwiththe assumptionsofthecurrentdoseAnalysisofRecord (AOR), performed in accordancewith10CFR50.67,andtheresultsof ihe non-pressurized MCR/ESGR tracergasinleakagetesting.TheAST accidentanalysisdoesnotcreditthe MCR/ESGRBottledAirSystemfordosemitigation,but continues to credit the MCRIESGRenvelopeisolationfunction.Dominionhasevaluated whetherornota significant hazards considerationisinvolvedwiththeproposedchangesbyfocusingonthethree standards setforthin10CFR50.92,"Issuance of Amendment," as discussed below:1.Doestheproposedlicense amendmentinvolvea significantincreaseinthe probability or consequencesofan accident previously evaluated?Theproposedchangesdonot adversely affect accidentinitiatorsor precursorsnoralterthedesign assumptionsofthefacility.Theproposedchangesdonotalterorpreventtheabilityofstructures,systems,and components(SSCs)from performing their requiredsafetyfunctionofmitigatingthe consequencesofaninitiatingeventwithinthe established acceptancelimits.Theproposedchangestothe MCRIESGRBottledAirSystemand EmergencyVentilationSystemdonotaffectthe probabilityofan accident previouslyevaluatedbecausethesubjectSSCsarenotan initiator or precursortoany accident previouslyevaluated.TheTechnical SpecificationschangesnotedabovewillensuretheSSCsareoperabletomitigatethe consequencesofanaccident.Therefore,theproposedchangedoesnotinvolvea significantincreaseinthe probability or consequencesofanaccident previously evaluated.2.Doestheproposedlicense amendmentcreatethe possibilityofanewor different kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated?Deletionofthe MCR/ESGRBottledAirSystemdoesnotcreatethe possibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccident.Theotherproposedchangesdonotalterthe operability requirementsofthe MCRIESGR emergencyventilationsystemorMCIR/ESGRisolation.Therefore,thecontrolroom habitabilitysystemsremainoperabletomitigatethe consequencesofaDBA.Thechangesdonotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplantsystemscreditedinthe accidentanalysis(i.e.,nonewor differenttype'of equipment willbeinstalled)ora significantchangeinthemethods governingnormalplantoperation.
The MCRIESGREVSis maintainedina standbymodeanditsoperationdoesnot generateanynew accidentsoraccidentprecursors.Therefore,thischangedoesnotcreatethe possibilityofanewor differentkindof accidentfromany accident previously evaluated.3.Doestheproposed amendmentinvolvea significantreductioninamarginofsafety?Theproposedchangesdonotalterthe mannerinwhichsafetylimits,limitingsafetysystemsettings,orlimiting conditionsforoperationare determined.
The current dose analysis acceptancecriteriaarenotaffectedbythesechanges.Theproposedchangeswillnotresultinplantoperationina configurationoutsidetheanalysesordesignbasis.
SerialNo08-0080ProposedTSChangetoRelocatetheBottledAirSystemfromTSDocketNos.
50-338/339Page13of18Theproposedchangesdonot adverselyaffectsystemsthatarerequiredtorespondforsafeshutdownoftheplantandtomaintaintheplantinasafeoperatingcondition.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolvea significantreductioninamarginofsafety.Basedontheabove,Dominion concludesthattheproposedchange presents no significant hazards considerationunderthe standardssetforthin10CFR50.92(c),and,accordingly,afindingof"no significant hazards consideration"isjustified.
5.2 Regulatory
Requirements General ConformancewithGeneralDesignCriteria(GDC)NorthAnnawas originallydesignedtomeetthedraftGDCpublishedin 1967.ConstructionpermitsforUnits1and2wereissuedonFebruary19,1971.TheGDC, AppendixAto10CFR50,werepublishedFebruary20,1971.Dominion attemptedtocomplywiththeintentofthenewercriteriatotheextentpractical,recognizingpreviousdesign commitments.Asaresult,theNRCreviewassessedtheplantdesignagainsttheGDCpublishedin1971and concludedthatthedesign conformedtothenewercriteria.TheNorthAnnaSafetyEvaluationReport (NUREG-0053)wasissuedinJune1976.Criterion1-Quality StandardsandRecordsStructures,systemsand components(SSCs),whichsupportControlRoom Habitability(CRH),havebeendesigned,fabricated,erected,testedand maintained as safety-related.
The MCR/ESGRsandassociatedCRHsystemsarelocatedwithinaSeismic Category 1building.Portionsofthenormalventilationsystemsassociatedwiththecontrolroomisolationfunctionareclassifiedand maintained as safety-related.
The emergencyfiltrationsystemsandcoolingsystemsare safety-related.
The classificationofindividual componentsisnotedinthe electronic equipment database.Safety-relatedSSCsaredesigned, constructed,operatedand maintained in accordancewiththeDominionQuality Assurance Program Manual.NorthAnnais consideredtobeinfull compliancewithCriterion1.Criterion2-ProtectionagainstNatural Phenomena North Anna's MCR/ESGRVentilationSystemhasbeendesignedtowithstandtheeffectsof natural phenomenasuchasearthquakes,tornadoes,hurricanes,seiches,andfloods,asdescribedin Chapters2and3oftheUFSAR.
Tsunamisarenot applicabletotheNorthAnnasite.The MCRIESGRsandbatteryroomsareinSeismicClass1andtornadoprotectedstructures.The MCR/ESGR envelope, air-conditioningsystem,BottledAirSystem, and emergencyventilationsystemaredesignedtoremainfunctionalfollowingaseismicevent.The chillerrooms,althoughnotinthe MCRIESGRenvelope,arelocatedinSeismicClass1and missile-protected areas.
SerialNo08-0080ProposedTSChangetoRelocatetheBottledAirSystemfromTSDocketNos.50-338/339Page14of18NorthAnnaisconsideredtobeinfull compliancewithCriterion2.Criterion3-FireProtectionNorthAnnaconformstothe guidance of AppendixAtoBranch TechnicalPosition(BTP)APCSB9.5-1asdescribedinNRC'sFireProtectionSafetyEvaluationReportdatedFebruary1979,andcomplieswiththe applicablesectionsof10CFR50 Appendix R.Structures,systemsand componentsimportanttosafetyare designedandlocatedtominimizethefirehazard.FireProtectionsystemsaredesignedto minimizetheeffectsoffiresonSSCs importanttosafety.Adequatemeansareprovidedtomitigatethefirehazard encounteredintheplant.
Non-combustibleandfireresistantmaterialsareused wherever practical throughout the MCR/ESGRenvelopeand three-hourratedfirebarriersareusedtoisolatethe MCR/ESGRenvelopefromotherareas.
Penetrationsinfirebarriers,suchasdoorways,cabletrayorconduitpenetrations,andventilation penetrationsareprotectedasrequired.
Three-hourrateddampersandfiredoorsareinstalledinventilationductsand doorway penetrations offirebarriers.Cabletray penetrationsoffirebarriershavea three-hourfirerating.Pipingand conduit penetrationsaresealedaroundthepipingandconduittopreventsmoke transmittal.
Conduitspenetratingfirebarriersaresealedinternallyiftheconduit terminateswithin5feetofthefirebarrier.
ConduitsthatpenetratetheCRpressure boundaryaresealed internally in accordancewithoriginalplantdesign specificationsandcurrentprocedures.Materialsusedforairsealingofthecontrolroom boundarywereselectedtobe compatible with applicablefirebarrierrequirements.TheNorthAnnacontrolroomisequippedwithportablefire extinguishersandan underfloor Halon suppressionsystemforafirethatmightoccurinthatarea.The underfloorareaisisolatedfromtheMCRairspace.EachESGRisprotectedwithatotalfloodingHalon system.ForNorthAnna,"AlternateShutdown"is generallyintendedtodescribethatseriesofmanualactionsthataretaken independentlyofthecontrolroomtoachievesateshutdownforapostulatedexposurefireinthecontrolroom.ProceduresareprovidedforalternateshutdownofeitherunitusingtherespectiveAlternateShutdownPanelsineachESGR.
Appropriate procedures and equipment are availableandstagedforusebythestationfirebrigadeincopingwithafireineithertheMCRorESGRs.NorthAnnais consideredtobeinfull compliancewithCriterion3.Criterion4-EnvironmentalandMissileDesignBasesTheMCRandESGRsarelocatedwithintheenvelope,whichis designed formissileimpact.Inaddition,allMCR entrancescanbeprotectedbymissilebarriers.
Concretewallsand slabs surroundingtheMCRareatleast18inchesthickandalsoserveasradiationshielding.Thecontrolroom habitabilitysystemsarealsoprotectedagainstmissilesthrough similar SerialNo 08-0080ProposedTSChangetoRelocatetheBottledAirSystemfromTSDocketNos.
50-338/339Page15of18buildingdesignfeatures.Duringany postulatedDesignBasis Accident(DBA),the safety-related air conditioningsystemsmaintainthe MCR/ESGR envelope temperaturewithinlimitsforboth emergency equipment operabilityandpersonneloccupancy.ThesystemdesignisbasedonthecombinedUnit1andUnit2heatgainfrom safety-relatedcontrolroomequipment,occupancy,wall transmission,andlightingload.Theeffectsofvariouspipebreaksoutside containmentonthe MCRIESGRenvelopeandassociatedfacilitiesarediscussedin Appendix3CoftheNorthAnnaUFSAR.Inallcases, the MCR/ESGRenvelopewillremainhabitableandprovidethe capabilityforsafeshutdownandcooldownoftheplant.NorthAnnais consideredtobeinfull compliancewithCriterion4.Criterion5-SharingofStructures,Systemsand ComponentsAsnotedpreviously,NorthAnnaUnits1and2shareacommoncontrolroom.TheESGRs,althoughinthe MCRIESGRenvelopeandadjacenttoeachother,areseparateroomsandseparatefireareas,andhaveseparateAHUsforaircoolingandrecirculation.TheMCRandESGRssharecommonnormal supply/exhaustventilationsystems.
TheSE3systemsarenotneededfor accidentmitigationand automaticallyisolatethe MCR/ESGRenvelopefromtheadjacentareaspost-accident.However,thenormal supply/exhaustducts(withintheenvelope)thatconnecttheESGRsandtheMCRtoeachotherarenot automatically isolatedintheeventofaMCRfire.Afirein eitherESGR,withtheresultingHalondischarge,willclosethefiredampersintheseducts.Eachofthefourmajorareasinthe MCR/ESGRenvelope(MCRU1,MCRU2,ESGRU1,andESGRU2)is equippedwithan emergency supply fan/filtersystem.Onlyoneofthese fan/filter assembliesisrequiredtobeoperatingfortheentire MCRIESGRenvelopefollowingradiologicalevents.NorthAnnais consideredtobeinfull compliancewithCriterion5.Criterion19-ControlRoomThecontrolroom habitabilitysystemsincluderadiationshielding,redundant emergency airfilteringandair conditioningsystems,radiationmonitoring,lighting,andfireprotection equipment.TheNorthAnnacontrolroomiscommontobothunits.
Sanitaryfacilitiesandpotablewaterarelocatedinthecontrolroom,andfoodcanbebroughttothecontrolroomasneeded.Radiationprotectionisprovidedbyshielding(wallsandslabs),radiationmonitoring, emergencyfiltration,andseparateand independentcontrolroomisolation and pressurization systems.Thecontrolroomisdesignedtooperatethe nuclearpowerunitsafelyundernormalconditionsandtomaintainitinasafeconditionunder accidentconditions.Adequate SerialNo08-0080ProposedTSChangetoRelocatetheBottledAirSystemfromTSDocketNos.
50-338/339Page16of18radiationprotectionhasbeenprovidedtoensurethatradiation exposures to personnel occupyingthecontrolroomduringthe30-dayperiodfollowingaDBAwillnotexceed5remTotalEffectiveDose Equivalent (TEDE).EvaluationsoftheLBLOCAandFuelHandlingaccidents,usingAlternateSourceTerm, demonstratethatNorthAnnameetstheGDC19criterionof5rem TEDEwith250cfmforLOCAand400cfmforfuelhandling accidentofunfilteredinleakage.The evaluationsillustratethatthethyroidportionoftheTEDEdoseisthelimitingconcernforunfilteredinleakageinexcessofdesignbasis assumptions.AsubmittalofDBA analysesusingthe AST methodologywasapprovedbytheNRConJune15,2005in amendments240and241forNorthAnnaUnits1and2,respectively.TheLargeBreakLOCAisthelimitingradiologicalevent.Thedesignbasisaccidents,doseanalyses,and consequencesaredescribedin Chapter15oftheUFSAR.ToxicGasesandSmokeThedesignoftheNorthAnna MCR/ESGRenvelopemeetsthe guidanceoutlinedin RegulatoryGuides1.78,Rev0and1.95,Rev O.The complianceofNorthAnnawiththese documents is describedindetailinSections2.2and6.4oftheUFSAR,and summarized below: No gaseouschlorineisstoredonsite.Liquefiedchlorineisnotstoredonsiteexceptinsmall quantitiesforlaboratoryuse,whichislimitedto20poundsorless,asallowedbytheRegulatoryGuide.Therefore,NorthAnna complieswiththe guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.95.Thepotentialforoffsitetoxicchemicaleventswasassessedin1982andagainin1994.Thereareno manufacturingplants,chemicalplantsandstorage faciliities, major water transportationroutes,majorraillines,oroilandgaspipelineswithin5milesoftheplantsite.
Several secondaryroadspasswithin5milesofthesite.However,consiideringthelackofchemicalandindustrialfacilitiesalongtheroadsandthedistancefromtheplantsitetotheroads,itisunlikelythatthereare chemicalsshippedalongtheseroutesata frequency andamountgreatenoughtoposea significanthazardtothe habitabilityofthecontrolroom.A postulatedseismicevent, concurrent with transportfailureoftoxicgasoffsite,isnot consideredacredibleevent.TheNorthAnnaUFSAR describes potentially hazardous chemicalsstoredonsitein quantities greaterthan100lb.Theseincludehydrogen,sulfuricacid,sodiumhydroxide,hydrazine, ethanolamine,andsodiumhypochlorite.
Evaluationsforaccidentalreleaseofthese chemicalsindicatethatthe worst-case concentrationsatthecontrolroomintakewouldbeexpectedtobelessthantheirrespectivetoxicitylimit.The assessments were evaluated onthebasisofnoactionbeingtakenbythecontrolroom operator(i.e.,normalor emergency supplysystemremainsoperating).Thenominalflowofan emergencysupplyfanis1000cfm.Incontrast,themaximumallowableunfilteredinleakageforaradiologicaleventis400cfm(FHA).Therefore,theradiologicalevent,notatoxicgasevent,islimitingfromaninleakageperspective.
SerialNo 08-0080ProposedTSChangetoRelocatetheBottledAirSystemfromTSDocketNos.
50-338/339Page17of18Intheeventof fire/smokeexternaltothecontrolroom, equipment and procedures areavailabletomaintain habitabilityofthecontrolroom.Smoke detectorsareinstalledinthenormalAHUreturnductsand MCRIESGREVSsupplyducts,aswell as other numerouslocationsintheESGRsandMCR.Ifsmokeisdetected,thenormal ventilationsupplycanbe manuallyisolated.Thefireresponse proceduresprovidedirectionforremovingsmokefromtheMCRorESGRs.ShutdownOutsidetheControlRoomIntheeventthatthecontrolroommustbe evacuatedduetointernalfire/smoke, equipment isprovidedat appropriatelocationsoutsidethecontrolroom,including necessary instrumentationandcontrolstomaintaintheunitinasafecondition(HotStandby).AremoteshutdownpanelineachESGR(locatedinthelowerlevelofthe MCRlESGR envelope)providesthe capabilitytosafelyshutdowntherespectiveunitoutsideofthecontrolroom.ThepanelisdesignedtoSeismic Category 1 requirementsandislocatedinaSeismic Category1area.PortableairpacksandmultipleegresspathsareavailabletofacilitateevacuationtotheESGRs.NorthAnnais consideredtobeinfull compliancewithCriterion19.Basedonthe considerations discussedabove,(1)thereis reasonable assurancethatthehealthandsafetyofthepublicwillnotbe endangeredbyoperationintheproposedmanner,(2)suchactivitieswillbeconductedin compliancewiththe Commission'srequlations,and(3)theapprovaloftheproposedchangewillnotbeinimicaltothecommondefenseandsecurityortothehealthandsafetyofthepublic.
5.3 PrecedentsFirstEnergy
Nuclear Operating CompanyrequestedtheeliminationoftheTS requirementsforthecontrolroom emergencybottledair pressurizationsystemfor BeaverValleyPowerStation(BVPS)Units1and2aspartoftheir implementationoftheAST.TheNRCapprovedtherequestin theirsafetyevaluationreportforLicense Amendments257and139forBVPSUnits1and2,respectively,dated September10,2003(Ref.3).DominionNuclearConnecticut,Inc.requestedthe eliminationofthecontrolroomenvelope pressurizationsystemTS requirementsforMillstonePowerStation(MPS)Unit3aspartofits implementationoftheAST.TheNRCapprovedtherequestin their safety evaluation reportforLicense Amendment232forMPSUnit3dated September15,2006 (Ref.4).
SerialNo 08-0080ProposedTS Change to RelocatetheBottledAir SystemfromTS Docket Nos.50-338/339Page18of18
6.0 Environmental
Assessment This amendmentrequestmeetstheeligibilitycriteriaforcategoricalexclusionsetforthin10CFR51.22(c)(9)asfollows:(i)The amendmentinvolvesno significant hazards consideration.Asdescribedabove,theproposedchangeinvolvesno significant hazards consideration.(ii)Thereisno significantchangeinthetypesor significantincreaseintheamountsofany effluentsthatmaybereleasedoffsite.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolvetheinstallationofanynewequipment,orthemodificationofany equipmentthatmayaffectthetypesoramountsof effluentsthatmaybereleasedoffsite.Therefore,thereisno significantchangeinthetypesor significantincreaseintheamountsofany effluentsthatmaybereleasedoffsite.(iii)Thereisno significantincreaseinindividualor cumulative occupationradiationexposure.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolvephysicalplantchanges.ThecurrentdoseAnalysisofRecorddoesnotassume pressurizationofthecontrolroomortheoperationoftheBottledAirSystemtomaintain operatordosebelowtheregulatorylimitforaDBA.Therefore,thereisno significantincreaseinindividualor cumulative occupationalradiationexposure.Basedontheabove,Dominion concludesthattheproposedchangesmeetthecriteriaspecifiedin10CFR51.22foracategoricalexclusionfromthe requirementsof10CFR51.22relativetorequiringaspecific environmental assessmentbytheCommission.
7.0 References1.DominionLetterdatedMay29,2007-ProposedLicense AmendmentRequestControlRoomEnvelope Habitability In accordance with TSTF-448,Revision3,usingthe ConsolidatedLineItem ImprovementProcessforNorthAnnaPowerStationUnits1and2,SerialNo.07-0361.2.UFSAR-Section,9.4.1MainControlRoomandRelayRooms.3.BeaverValleyPowerStation,UnitNos.1And2-Issuanceof Amendment Re: Selective ImplementationofAlternateSourceTermandControlRoom Habitability Technical Specification Changes(TACNos.MB5303andMB5304),dated September10,2003.4.MillstonePowerStationUnit3-Issuanceof AmendmentRe:AlternateSourceTerm(TACMC3333),dated September 15,2006.
Attachment 2 (SerialNo.-08-0080)Marked-up Technical Specifications Changes North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2 Virginia Electric and Power Company (Dominion)
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 2.0 2.1 2.2 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.1.1 3.1.2 3.1.3 3.1.4 3.1.5 3.1.6 3.1.7 3.1.8 3.1.9 3.2 3.2.1 3.2.2 3.2.3 3.2.4 3.3 3.3.1 3.3.2 3.3.3 3.3.4 3.3.5 3.3.6 3.4 3.4.1 3.4.2 3.4.3 3.4.4 3.4.5 3.4.6 USE AND APPLICATION..Definitions
....Logical Connectors Completion Times Frequency SAFETY LIMITS (SLs)SLs.SL Violations.
LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO)APPLICABILITY SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (SR)APPLICABILITY REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS.....SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)......Core Reactivity
.Moderator Temperature Coefficient (MTC)Rod Group Alignment Limits Shutdown Bank InsertionLimits.Control Bank Insertion Limits..Rod Position Indication
.....Primary Grade Water Flow Path Isolation Valves PHYSICS TESTS Exceptions-MODE2.POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS.Heat Fl ux Hot Channel Factor (FQ(Z)).Nucl ear Enthal py Ri se Hot Channel Factor)AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE (AFD)...QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO (QPTR)....INSTRUMENTATION...............ReactorTrip System (RTS)Instrumentation Engineered SafetyFeatureActuation System (ESFAS)Instrumentation
.PostAccident Monitoring (PAM)Instrumentation Remote Shutdown System............
Loss of Power (LOP)EmergencyDieselGenerator (EDG)Start Instrumentation
.Main Control Room/Emergency Switchgear Envelope Isolation Actuation Instrumentation
.--_._.REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS).RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure fromNucleateBoiling (DNB)Limits.RCS Minimum Temperature for Criticality.
RCS Pressure and Temperature (PIT)Limits RCS Loops-MODES 1 and 2 RCS Loops-MODE3............
RCS Loops-MODE4............
1.1-1 1.1-1 1.2-1 1.3-1 1.4-1 2.0-1 2.0-1 2.0-1 3.0-1 3.0-4 3.1.1-1 3.1.1-1 3.1.2-1 3.1.3-1 3.1.4-1 3.1.5-1 3.1.6-1 3.1.7-1 3.1.8-1 3.1.9-1 3.2.1-1 3.2.1-1 3.2.2-1 3.2.3-1 3.2.4-1 3.3.1-1 3.3.1-1 3.3.2-1 3.3.3-1 3.3.4-1 3.3.5-1 3.3.6-1 3.4.1-1 3.4.1-1 3.4.2-1 3.4.3-1 3.4.4-1 3.4.5-1 3.4.6-1 North AnnaUnits1 and 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE OF CONTENTS.3.7.9-1.3.7.10-1 1.3.7.11-1.3.7.14 1.3.7.15-1.3.7.16-1.3.7.17-1.3.7.18-1.3.7.19-1 3.8.1-1 3.8.1-1 3.8.2-1 3.8.3-1 3.8.4-1 3.8.5-1 3.8.6-1 3.8.7-1 3.8.8-1 3.8.9-1.3.8.10-1 3.9.1-1 3.9.1-1 3.9.2-1 3.9.3-1 3.9.4-1 3.9.5-1 3.9.6-1 3.9.7-1 4.0-1 4.0-1 4.0-1 4.0-1.3.7.12-1 Reeffi...3.7.13 1 Reeffi ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS.AC Sources-Operating
.AC Sources-Shutdown.......Diesel Fuel Oil and Starting Air DCSources-Operating.
DC Sources-Shutdown.....BatteryCellParameters.
Inverters-Operating
.Inverters-Shutdown......
Distribution Systems-Operating Distribution Systems-Shutdown REFUELING OPERATIONS
.....BoronConcentration...
......Primary Grade Water Flow Path Isolation Valves-MODE6........Nuclear Instrumentation
.Containment Penetrations
.Residual Heat Removal (RHR)and Coolant Circulation-High Water Level Residual Heat Removal (RHR)and Coolant Circulation-Low Water LevelRefuelingCavity Water Level PLANT SYSTEMS (continued)
Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS).Main Control Room/Emergency Switchgear Room (MCR/ESGR)
Emergency Ventilation System (EVS)MODES1,2,3, afid 4.Main Control Room/Emergency Switchgear Room (MCR/ESGR)AirConditioning System (ACS)Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)Pump Room Exhaust Air Cleanup System (PREACS).... 19 Cel9trel Remtl/Effiergel9cy S',,,;tcl9gear 04CR/ESG R)Be tt1edAirSy 5te ffi 7.-'.:---:-.
--=-.""':".----:."""--:.----:---=--:-:t--:+-:-H----t Not Used Mail9 Cel9trel Reeffi/Effiergel9cy Switcl9gear Irradiated Fuel Asseffiblies Fuel Building Ventilation System (FBVS)Fuel Storage Pool Water Level....Fuel Storage Pool Boron Concentration Spent Fuel PoolStorage......
Component Cooling Water (CC)System DESIGN FEATURES.Site Location Reactor Core Fuel Storage 3.7.15 3.7.16 3.7.17 3.7.18 3.7.19 3.8 3.8.1 3.8.2 3.8.3 3.8.4 3.8.5 3.8.6 3.8.7 3.8.8 3.8.9 3.8.10 3.9 3.9.1 3.9.2 3.9.3 3.9.4 3.9.5 3.9.6 3.9.7 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 3.7.14 3.7.12 3.7.13 3.7.11 3.7 3.7.9 3.7.10 North AnnaUnits1 and 2 iii MCR/ESGR Envelope Isolation Actuation Instrumentation 3.3.6 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.6 Main Control Room/Emergency Switchgear Room (MCR/ESGR)
Envelope Isolation Actuation Instrumentation LCO 3.3.6 The MCR/ESGR Envelope Isolation Actuation Instrumentation foreachFunctioninTable 3.3.6-1 shall be OPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:
AccordingtoTable 3.3.6-1.ACTIONS----------------NOTE----------------SeparateCondition entry is allowedforeachFunction.
CONDITION REQU I RED ACTI ON COMPLETION TIME A.One or moreFunctionsA.l Isolate the MCR!ESGR 7 days-with one train-envelope normal inoperable.
ventilation.
B.One or moreFunctionsB.l Isolate the MCR!ESGR Immediately
-with two trains-envelope normal inoperable.
ventilation.
C.Required Action and C.l Be in MODE 3.6hours-associated Completion TimeforConditionA ANDorBnot met in MODE I,2,3,or4.C.2 Be in MODE 5.36 hour4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />s-D.Required Action and 0.1 Isolate the MCR!ESGR Immediately
--associated Completion envelope normal TimeforConditionA ventilation.orBnot met during movement of recently OR irradiated fuel assemblies.
0.2 Suspend
movement of Immediately recently irradiated fuel assemblies.
North AnnaUnits1 and 2 3.3.6-1 MCR/ESGR Envelope Isolation Actuation Instrumentation
3.3.6 REQUIREMENTS
SR 3.3.6.1 SURVEILLANCE
NOTE-------------------
Verification of setpoint is not required.Perform TADOT.FREQUENCY_
18 months North AnnaUnits1 and 2 3.3.6-2 MCR/ESGR Envelope Isolation Actuation Instrumentation 3.3.6
..(page1of1)
Isolation Actuation Instrumentation FUNCTION 1.Manual Initiation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECI FI ED CONDITIONS
.-----1.1._2 , 3, 4..Lill REQUIRED CHANNELS 2 trains SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.3.6.1 TRIP SETPOINT 2.Safety InjectionReferto LCO 3.3.2,"ESFAS Instrumentation," Function I, for all initiation functions and requirements.During movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies.
North Anna Units 1 and 2 3.3.6-3 MCR/ESGR EVS I 3.7.10 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.10 Main Control Room/Emergency Switchgear Room (MCR/ESGR)
Emergency Ventilation System (EVS)MODES1,2,3, and 4 LCO 3.7.10 Two MCR/ESGR EVS trains shall be OPERABLE.------------
NOTE-------------
The MCR/ESGR envelope boundary may be opened intermittently under administrative control.APPLICABILITY:
MODES1,2,3, andDuring__r1J_Qy_emenJ
__
irradiated fuel assemblies.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQU I RED ACTI ON COMPLETION TIME A.One required MCR/ESGR A.1 Restore MCR/ESGR EVS 7 days EVS train inoperable train to OPERABLEforreasons other than status.Condition B.B.One or more required B.1 Initiate action to Immediately MCR/ESGR EVS trains implement mitigating inoperable due to actions.inoperable MCR/ESGR enve lope boundary lll__AND MODES1,2,3,or4.
-B.2 Verify mitigating 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> actions ensure MCR/ESGR envelopeoccupantexposures to radiological, chemical, and smokehazardswillnot exceed limits.AND-B.3 Restore MCR/ESGR 90 days envelope boundary to OPERABLE status.North AnnaUnits1 and 2 3.7.10-1 ACTIONS MCR/ESGR EVS I 3.7.10 CONDITION REQUI RED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C.Required Action andC.1 Be in MODE 3.6hours associated Completion TimeofConditionA AND-orBnot met in MODES I,2,3,or4.C.2 Be in MODE 5.36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> D.Required Action and 0.1.1 Isolate the MCR!ESGR Immediately
-associated Completion envelope normal TimeforConditionA ventilation.
not met during movement of recently AND irradiated fuel assemblies.
0.1.2 Place
OPERABLE EVS1hour--train in emergency (outside filtered air supply)mode.OR-D.2 Suspend movement of Immediately
-recently irradiated fuel assemblies.
E.One or more required E.1 Suspend movement of Immediately
-MCR!ESGR EVS trains-recently irradiated inoperable due to fuel assemblies.
inoperable MCR!ESGR envelope boundary during movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies.(continued)
North AnnaUnits1 and 2 3.7.10-2 MCR/ESGR EVS I 3.7.10 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E.(continued)
-OR-Two required MCR!ESGR EVS trains inoperable during movement of recently irradiatedfuelassembliesfor reasons other than Condition B.Fe.Two required MCR/ESGR rcs.i Enter LCO 3.0.3.Immediately EVS trains inoperable in MODE1,2,3,or4forreasons other than Condition B.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEI LLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.10.1Operateeach required MCR/ESGR EVS train 31 days for 2 10continuoushourswiththe heaters operating.
SR 3.7.10.2 Perform required MCR/ESGR EVS filterInaccordance testing in accordancewiththe Ventilation with VFTP Filter Testing Program (VFTP).SR 3.7.10.3 Not Used SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY North AnnaUnits1 and 2 3.7.10-3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.7.10.4 Perform required MCR/ESGR Envelope unfiltered air inleakage testing inaccordancewiththe MCR/ESGR Envelope Habitability Program.MCR/ESGR EVS I 3.7.10Inaccordancewiththe MCR/ESGR Envelope Habitability Program North AnnaUnits1 and 2 3.7.10-4 MCR/ESGR Bottled Air System 3.7.13 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.13 Room (MCR/ESGR)
Air System LCO 3.7.13 air system be OPERABLE.-------------
NOTE------------
The oJ=le may be i
y APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1,2,3,4, of fl:lel assemblies.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION Cm1PLETION TH1E A-;-
A-;-!-Restore
- ' bottl ed air system bottlair system for to OPERABLE otlger statl
- ls.B.B-;- or more B-;-!-
to atel y bottlair sj'stem i ROJ=lerabl e
to il96f3 el"aele AN9-i 1, 2, 3, or 4.B-;-r Verify miti gati 1901:ll"s oJ=le eXf3osl:lres to 01 ogi cal,smoke Hill ROt limits.AN9-North AnnaUnits1 and 2 3.7.13-1 ACTIONS MCRjESGRBottledAir System 3.7.13 cmlD IT ION REQUIRED ACTION Cm4PLETION TH4E s-(cel9ti 191:Je*J)B-;-3 Restel"e 90 el9velepe sel:Jlgeal"Y te OPERABLE statl:Js.*-;-T',w el" ffiel"e l"efll:Jil"ee
- -;-l-Il9itiate actiel9 te Iffiffieei irfe+:y settlee ail" iffipleffiel9t ffiitigatil9g systeffi tl"ail9s actiel9s.ilgepel"asle il9 1,2,3, el" 4 fel" l"easel9S ANB-eU,el" tt:lal9 Celgeiti el9 B.&d Restel"e at 1 east hw 24 settlee ail" systeffi tl"ail9s te OPERABLE statl:Js.B-;-Refll:Jil"ee Actiel9 alge B-;-+/-Be il9 3.6 t:l el:J 1":;-asseciatee Ceffipletiel9 Tiffie ef Celgeiti el9 A, B ANB-el" C I98t ffiet il9 1, 2, 3, el" 4.&d Be il9 5.36 t:lel:Jl"'S" North AnnaUnits1 and 2 3.7.13-2 MCR/ESGR Bottled Air System 3.7.13 ACTIONS CONDITION f7asseciatecl Time ef A Ret met ef i rracli atecl fuel assemBlies.
THe er mere Bettlecl air system traiFlS ef irracliatecl fuel assemBlies. er mere Bettlecl air system clue tei e
ef irracliatecl fuel assemBlies.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED ACTION ef irracliateclfuelassemBlies.
Cm4PLETION TH4E-J[mmecli ately SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.13.1 Verify each Bettlecl air is te>2300 SR 3.7.13.2 Veri fy each recl Bettl ecl ai r maFlual valve leckecl, sealecl, er etherHise securecl te becluriFlg is FREQUENCY 31 clays 31 clays North AnnaUnits1 and 2 3.7.13-3 MCR/ESGR Bottled Air System 3.7.13 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.7.13.3 SR 3.7.13.4 SURVEILLANCE Vel"i fyI"e*lui feel eel ai I" systeffl tl"ail'l actuates 01'1 al'l actual Of sifflulatee actuatiol'l si§l'Ial.Vel"i fy tHO l"eEjui 1"eE':1 eel ai I" systeffl tl"ail'ls caR fflaiRtaiR a
of>0.05 Hatel"§au§e, I"elative to aEljacel'lt al"eas fol" at least 60 ffliRutes.
fRfQUENCY 18 fflol'ltffi 18 OR a STAGGERED TEST BAS-I-£North AnnaUnits1 and 2 3.7.13-4 MCRjESGR EVS-During MovementofRecently Irradiated Fuel Assemblies 3.7.14 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.14 ROOffi (MCR!ESGR)
Systeffi (EVS) of Fuel Asseffil9lies LCO 3.7.14 APPLICABI LITY: ACTIONS Two MCR/ESGR EVS 1ge OPERABLE.------------NOTE------------
ffiay 1ge of asseffil91ies.
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION Cm4PLETION TH4E fJr.-
fJr.--l-Restore EVS EVS i
e to OPERABLE forstatus.i e
B-;-B-;-l-of ately Tiffie ofA fuel asseffil9lies. ffiet.00-T',;o EVS 00- or ffiore EVS to i e
North Anna Units 1 and 2 3.7.14-1 MCR/ESGR EVS-During Movement of Recently Irradiated Fuel Assemblies 3.7.14 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.14.1 MCR/ESGR EVS for>10 SR 3.7.14.2 Pcrforffi MCR/ESGR EVS filtcr Filter Prograffi (VFTP).SR 3.7.14.3 Perforffi MCR!ESGR air testiftg MCR/ESGR Ilabi tabil ity Prograffi.
ffiEQUENCY 31 1ft accorclaftcc wi tR vr-Tfl t Ilabi tability North AnnaUnits1 and 2 3.7.14-2 Programs and Manuals 5.5 5.5 Programs and Manuals 5.5.15 5.5.16 Containment LeakageRateTesting Program (continued) d.LeakageRateacceptance criteria are: 1.Prior to entering a MODE where containment OPERABILITY is required,thecontainmentleakage rate acceptance criteria are:0.60 Laforthe Type B and Type C tests on a Maximum Path Basis and0.75 La for Type A tests.During operation where containment OPERABILITY is required,thecontainmentleakage rate acceptance criteria are:1.0 La for overallcontainmentleakage rate and0.60 Laforthe Type B and Type C tests on a Minimum Path Basis.2.Overall airlockleakage rate testing acceptance criterion is0.05 La when tested atP a.e.The provisions of SR 3.0.3 are applicabletothe Containment LeakageRateTesting Program.f.Nothing in these Technical Specifications shallbeconstruedto modify the testing Frequencies required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix J.Main Control Room/Emergency Switchgear Room (MCR/ESGR)
Envelope Habitability Program A MCR/ESGR Envelope Habitability Program shall be established and implementedtoensure that MCR/ESGR envelope habitability ismaintainedsuch that, with an OPERABLE EmergeAcy lIaBitaBility System (i.e., MCR/ESGR EVS aAcl MCR/ESGR Bottlecl Air System}, MCR/ESGRenvelopeoccupantscan control the reactor safely under normal conditions and maintain itina safe conditionfollowinga radiological event, hazardous chemical release,ora smoke challenge.
The program shall ensure that adequate radiation protection isprovidedtopermitaccess and occupancyofthe MCR/ESGRenvelopeunderdesign basis accident conditions without (continued)
North AnnaUnits1 and 2 5.5-15 Programs and Manuals 5.5 5.5 Programs and Manuals 5.5.16 ear Room Envelo e Habitability personnel receiving radiationexposuresinexcessof5 rem total effective dose equivalent for the durationofthe accident.The program shall includethefollowingelements:
a.The definitionofthe MCR/ESGR envelope and the MCR/ESGR envelope boundary.b.Requirements for maintaining the MCR/ESGR envelope boundary in its design condition including configuration control ilnd preventive maintenance.
c.Requirements for (i)determiningthe unfiltered air inleakage past the MCR/ESGR envelope into the MCR/ESGRenvelopeinaccordancewiththe testing methods and attheFrequencies specified in Sections C.1 andC.2ofRegulatory Guide 1.197 s"Demonstrating Control Room Envelope IntegrityatNuclear Power Reactors s" Revision Os May 2003 s and (ii)assessing MCR/ESGR envelope habitability attheFrequencies specified in Sections C.1 andC.2ofRegulatory Guide 1.197 s Revis"ion o.The following is anexceptionto SectionC.2ofRegulatory Guide 1.197 sRevision0:*2.C.1Licensing Bases-Vulnerability assessments for radiological s hazardous chemical and smokes and emergency ventilation system testing were completed as documentedinthe UFSAR.The exceptionstotheRegulatory Guides (RG)referenced in RG 1.196{i.e.s RG 1.52 s RG 1.78 s and RG 1.183)s which were consideredincompletingthe vulnerability assessments s are documentedinthe UFSAR/current licensing basis.Compliance with these RGs is consistentwiththe current licensing basis as describedinthe UFSAR.d.Measurements at designated locations softhe MCR/ESGR envelope pressure relative to all external areas adjacenttothe MCR/ESGR envelope boundaryduringthe pressurization mode of operation by one trainofthe MCR/ESGR EVS s operating attheflow rate required by the VFTP sata Frequency of 18 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS.The results shallbetrended and used as partofthe 18 mOAthsassessmentofthe MCR/ESGR envelope boundary.(continued)
North AnnaUnits1 and 2 5.5-16 Attachment 3 (SerialNo.-08-0080)
Proposed Technical Specifications Changes North Anna Power Station Units1and2 Virginia Electric and Power Company (Dominion)
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE OF CONTENTS...Valves 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 2.0 2.1 2.2 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.1.1 3.1.2 3.1.3 3.1.4 3.1.5 3.1.6 3.1.7 3.1.8 3.1.9 3.2 3.2.1 3.2.2 3.2.3 3.2.4 3.3 3.3.1 3.3.2 3.3.3 3.3.4 3.3.5 3.3.6 3.4 3.4.1 3.4.2 3.4.3 3.4.4 3.4.5 3.4.6 USE AND APPLICATION..Definitions
....Logical Connectors Completion Times Frequency SAFETY LIMITS (SLs)SLs.SL Violations.
LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO)APPLICABILITY SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (SR)APPLICABILITY REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS.....SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)......Core Reactivity
.Moderator Temperature Coefficient (MTC)Rod Group Alignment Limits Shutdown Bank InsertionLimits.Control Bank Insertion Limits..Rod Position Indication
.....Primary Grade Water Flow Path Isolation PHYSICS TESTS Exceptions-MODE 2...POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS.........Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor (FQ(Z)).....Nuclear Enthalpy Rise Hot Channel Factor AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE (AFD)...QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO (QPTR)....INSTRUMENTATION...............ReactorTrip System (RTS)Instrumentation EngineeredSafetyFeatureActuation System (ESFAS)Instrumentation
.PostAccident Monitoring (PAM)Instrumentation Remote Shutdown System............
Loss of Power (LOP)EmergencyDieselGenerator (EDG)Start Instrumentation
.Main Control Room/Emergency Switchgear Room (MCR/ESGR)
Envelope Isolation Actuation Instrumentation
.REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS).RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure fromNucleateBoiling (DNB)Limits.RCS Minimum Temperature for Criticality.
RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T)Limits RCS Loops-MODES 1 and 2 RCS Loops-MODE3............
RCS Loops-MODE4............
1.1-1 1.1-11.2-1 1.3-1 1.4-1 2.0-1 2.0-1 2.0-1 3.0-1 3.0-4 3.1.1-1 3.1.1-1 3.1.2-1 3.1.3-1 3.1.4-1 3.1.5-1 3.1.6-1 3.1.7-1 3.1.8-1 3.1.9-1 3.2.1-1 3.2.1-1 3.2.2-1 3.2.3-1 3.2.4-1 3.3.1-1 3.3.1-1 3.3.2-1 3.3.3-1 3.3.4-1 3.3.5-1 3.3.6-1 3.4.1-1 3.4.1-1 3.4.2-1 3.4.3-1 3.4.4-1 3.4.5-1 3.4.6-1 North AnnaUnits1 and 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE OF CONTENTS 3.4 3.4.7 3.4.8 3.4.9 3.4.10 3.4.11 3.4.12 3.4.13 3.4.14 3.4.15 3.4.16 3.4.17 3.4.18 3.4.19 3.4.20 3.5 3.5.1 3.5.2 3.5.3 3.5.4 3.5.5 3.5.6 3.6 3.6.1 3.6.2 3.6.3 3.6.4 3.6.5 3.6.6 3.6.7 3.6.8 3.7 3.7.1 3.7.2 3.7.3 3.7.4 3.7.5 3.7.6 3.7.7 3.7.8 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)(continued)
RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops Filled RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops Not Filled Pressurizer
.Pressurizer Safety Valves.Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs).Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP)System................
RCS Operational LEAKAGE.RCS Pressure Isolation Valve (PIV)Leakage RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation RCS Specific Activity..RCS Loop Isolation Valves.RCS Isolated Loop Startup.RCS Loops-TestExceptions.
Steam Generator (SG)Tube Integrity EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)Accumulators
.ECCS-Operating
.ECCS-Shutdown...........
Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST)Sea1Inj ect ion Flow....Boron Injection Tank (BIT)CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS...Containment
.....Containment Air Locks Containment Isolation Valves Containment Pressure....Containment Air Temperature.
Quench Spray (QS)System...Recirculation Spray (RS)System Chemical Addition System...PLANT SYSTEMS...........
Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs)Main Steam Trip Valves (MSTVs).Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (MFIVs), Main Feedwater Pump Discharge Valves (MFPDVs), Main Feedwater Regulating Valves (MFRVs), and Main Feedwater Regulating Bypass Valves (MFRBVs).Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves (SG PORVs).Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW)System.Emergency Condensate Storage Tank (ECST)Secondary Specific Activity.Service Water (SW)System.*3.4.7-1*3.4.8-1*3.4.9-1.3.4.10-1.3.4.11-1.3.4.12-1.3.4.13-1.3.4.14-1.3.4.15-1.3.4.16-1.3.4.17-1.3.4.18-1.3.4.19-1.3.4.20-1 3.5.1-1 3.5.1-1 3.5.2-1 3.5.3-1 3.5.4-1 3.5.5-1 3.5.6-1 3.6.1-1 3.6.1-1*3.6.2-1 3.6.3-1 3.6.4-1 3.6.5-1 3.6.6-1 3.6.7-1 3.6.8-1 3.7.1-1 3.7.1-1 3.7.2-1 3.7.3-1 3.7.4-1 3.7.5-1 3.7.6-1 3.7.7-1 3.7.8-1 North Anna Units 1 and 2ii TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE OF CONTENTS 3.7 3.7.9 3.7.10 3.7.11 3.7.12 3.7.13 3.7.14 3.7.15 3.7.16 3.7.17 3.7.18 3.7.19 3.8 3.8.1 3.8.2 3.8.3 3.8.4 3.8.5 3.8.6 3.8.7 3.8.8 3.8.9 3.8.10 3.9 3.9.1 3.9.2 3.9.3 3.9.4 3.9.5 3.9.6 3.9.7 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 PLANT SYSTEMS (continued)
Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS).Main Control Room/Emergency Switchgear Room Main Control Room/Emergency Switchgear Room (MCR/ESGR)AirConditioning System (ACS).Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)Pump Room Exhaust Air Cleanup System (PREACS)....Not Used Not Used Fuel Building Ventilation System (FBVS)Fue1Storage Pool Water Level....Fuel Storage Pool Boron Concentration Spent Fuel Pool Storage.Component Cooling Water (CC)System ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS......AC Sources-Operating
.AC Sources-Shutdown.......Diesel Fuel Oil and Starting Air DCSources-Operating.
DC Sources-Shutdown......BatteryCellParameters.
Inverters-Operating
.Inverters-Shutdown......
Distribution Systems-Operating Distribution Systems-Shutdown REFUELING OPERATIONS......Boron Concentration
.Primary Grade Water Flow Path Isolation Valves-MODE6........Nuclear Instrumentation
.Containment Penetrations
.Residual Heat Removal (RHR)and Coolant Circulation-High Water Level Residual Heat Removal (RHR)and Coolant Circulation-Low Water LevelRefuelingCavity Water Level DESIGN FEATURES.Site Location Reactor Core Fuel Storage ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS Responsibility
..Organization Unit Staff Qualifications
.3.7.9-1.3.7.10-1 I.3.7.11-1.3.7.12-1 I.3.7.15-1.3.7.16-1.3.7.17-1.3.7.18-1.3.7.19-1 3.8.1-1 3.8.1-1 3.8.2-1 3.8.3-1 3.8.4-1 3.8.5-1 3.8.6-1 3.8.7-1 3.8.8-1 3.8.9-1.3.8.10-1 3.9.1-1 3.9.1-1 3.9.2-1 3.9.3-1 3.9.4-1 3.9.5-1 3.9.6-1 3.9.7-1 4.0-1 4.0-1 4.0-1 4.0-1 5.1-1 5.2-1 5.3-1 North Anna Units 1 and 2 iii TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE OF CONTENTS 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 Procedures
.Programs and Manuals Reporting Requirements High Radiation Area..5.4-1 5.5-1 5.6-1 5.7-1 North AnnaUnits1 and 2 iv MCR/ESGR Envelope Isolation Actuation Instrumentation 3.3.6 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.6 Main Control Room/Emergency Switchgear Room (MCR/ESGR)
Envelope Isolation Actuation Instrumentation LCO 3.3.6 The MCR/ESGR Envelope Isolation Actuation Instrumentation foreachFunctioninTable 3.3.6-1 shall be OPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:
AccordingtoTable 3.3.6-1.ACTIONS----------------
NOTE----------------
Separate Condition entryisallowedforeachFunction.
CONDITION REQU I RED ACTI ON COMPLETION TIME A.One or more Functions A.1 Isolate the MCR/ESGR?days with one trai n envelope normal inoperable.
ventilation.
B.One or more Functions B.1 Isolate the MCR/ESGR Immediately with two trains envelope normal inoperable.
ventilation.
C.Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3.I)hours associated Completion TimeforConditionA ANDorBnot met in-MODE1,2,3,or4.
C.2 Be in MODE 5.36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> D.Required Action and 0.1 Isolate the MCR/ESGR Immediately associated Completion envelope normal Time forConditionA ventilation.orBnot met during movement of recently OR irradiated fuel assemblies.
0.2 Suspend
movement of Immediately recently irradiated fuel assemblies.
North AnnaUnits1 and 2 3.3.6-1 MCR/ESGR Envelope IsolationActuationInstrumentation
3.3.6 SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS SR 3.3.6.1 SURVEILLANCE
NDTE-------------------
Verification of setpointisnot required.Perform TADDT.FREQUENCY 18 months North AnnaUnits1and2 3.3.6-2 MCR/ESGR Envelope Isolation Actuation Instrumentation
3.3.6 Table
3.3.6-1 (page1of1)MCR/ESGR Envelope Isolation Actuation Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECI FI ED FUNCTION CONDITIONS 1.Manual Initi ati on1,2,3,4,(a)
REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE TRIP CHANNELS REQUIREMENTS SETPOINT 2 trains SR 3.3.6.1 N/A 2.Safety InjectionReferto LCO 3.3.2,"ESFAS Instrumentation,"Function1,for all initiation functions and requirements.(a)During movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies.
North AnnaUnits1 and 2 3.3.6-3 MCR/ESGR EVS I 3.7.10 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.10 Main Control Room/Emergency Switchgear Room (MCR/ESGR)
Emergency Ventilation System (EVS)LCO 3.7.10 Two MCR/ESGR EVS trains shall be OPERABLE.------------NOTE------------The MCR/ESGR envelope boundary may be opened intermittently under administrative control.APPLICABILITY:
MODES1,2,3, and 4, During movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.One required MCR/ESGR A.1 Restore MCR/ESGR EVS i'days EVS train inoperable train to OPERABLEforreasons other than status.Condition B.B.One or more required B.1 Initiate action to Immediately MCR/ESGR EVS trains implement mitigating inoperable due to actions.inoperable MCR/ESGR envelope boundary in AND-MODES1,2,3,or4.
B.2 Verify mitigating hours actions ensure MCR/ESGR envelopeoccupantexposures to radiological, chemical, and smokehazardswillnot exceed limits.AND-B.3 Restore MCR/ESGR 90 days envelope boundary to OPERABLE status.North AnnaUnits1 and 2 3.7.10-1 ACTIONS MCR/ESGR EVS I 3.7.10 CONDITION REQU I RED ACTI ON COMPLETION TIME C.Required Action and C.l Be in MODE 3.6hours associated Completion TimeofConditionA ANDorBnot met in-MODES1,2,3,or4.
C.2 Be in MODE 5.36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> D.Required Action and D.1.1 Isolate the MCR/ESGR Immediately associated Completion envelope normal TimeforConditionA ventilation.
not met during movement of recently AND irradiated fuel-assemblies.D.1.2Place OPERABLE EVS1hour train in emergency (outside filtered air supply)mode.OR D.2 Suspend movement of Immediately recently irradiated fuel assemblies.
E.One or more required E.l Suspend movement of Immediately MCR/ESGR EVS trains recently irradiated inoperable due to fuel assemblies.
inoperable MCR/ESGR envelope boundary during movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies.(continued)
North AnnaUnits1 and 2 3.7.10-2 MCR/ESGR EVS I 3.7.10 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E.(continued)
OR-Two required MCR/ESGR EVS trains inoperable during movement of recently irradiatedfuelassembliesfor reasons other than Condition B.F.Two required MCR/ESGR F.l Enter LCO 3.0.3.Immediately EVS trains inoperable in MODE1,2,3,or4forreasons other than Condition B.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.10.1Operateeach required MCR/ESGR EVS train 31 days for10continuoushourswiththe heaters operating.
SR 3.7.10.2 Perform required MCR/ESGR EVS filterInaccordance testinginaccordancewiththe Ventilation with VFTP Filter Testing Program (VFTP).SR 3.7.10.3 Not Used SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY North AnnaUnits1 and 2 3.7.10-3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.7.10.4 Perform required MCR/ESGR Envelope unfiltered air inleakage testing inaccordancewiththe MCR/ESGR Envelope Habitability Program.MCR/ESGR EVS I 3.7.10Inaccordancewiththe MCR/ESGR Envelope Habitability Program North AnnaUnits1 and 2 3.7.10-4
3.7 PLANT
SYSTEMS 3.7.13 Not Used North AnnaUnits1 and 2 3.7.13-1 3.7.13
3.7 PLANT
SYSTEMS 3.7.14 Not Used North AnnaUnits1 and 2 3.7.14-1 3.7.14 Programs and Manuals 5.5 5.5 Programs and Manuals 5.5.15 5.5.16 Containment LeakageRateTesting Program (continued) d.LeakageRateacceptance criteria are: 1.Prior to entering a MODE where containment OPERABILITY is required,thecontainmentleakage rate acceptance criteria are:0.60 Laforthe Type B and Type C tests on a Maximum Path Basis and0.75 La for Type A tests.During operation where containment OPERABILITY is required,thecontainmentleakage rate acceptance criteria are:1.0 La for overallcontainmentleakage rate and0.60 Laforthe Type B and Type C tests on a Minimum Path Basis.2.Overall airlockleakage rate testing acceptance criterion is0.05 La when tested atP a.e.The provisions of SR 3.0.3 are applicabletothe Containment LeakageRateTesting Program.f.Nothing in these Technical Specifications shall be construed to modify the testing Frequencies required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix J.Main Control Room/Emergency Switchgear Room (MCR/ESGR)
Envelope Habitability Program A MCR/ESGR Envelope Habitability Program shall be established and implementedtoensure that MCR/ESGR envelope habitability ismaintainedsuch that, with an OPERABLE MCR/ESGR EVS, MCR/ESGRenvelopeoccupants can control the reactor safely under normal conditions and maintain itina safe conditionfollowinga radiological event, hazardous chemical release,ora smoke challenge.
The program shall ensure that adequate radiation protectionisprovidedtopermitaccess and occupancyofthe MCR/ESGRenvelopeunderdesign basis accident conditions without (continued)
North AnnaUnits1 and 2 5.5-15 Programs and Manuals 5.5 5.5 Programs and Manuals 5.5.16 ear Room Envelo e Habitability personnel receiving radiationexposuresinexcessof5 rem total effective dose equivalentforthe durationofthe accident.The program shall includethefollowingelements:
a.The definitionofthe MCR/ESGR envelope and the MCR/ESGR envelope boundary.b.Requirements for maintaining the MCR/ESGR envelope boundary in its design condition including configuration control and preventive maintenance.
c.Requirements for (i)determiningthe unfiltered air inleakage past the MCR/ESGR envelope into the MCR/ESGRenvelopeinaccordancewiththe testing methods and attheFrequencies specified in Sections C.1 and C.2ofRegulatory Guide 1.197,"Demonstrating Control Room Envelope IntegrityatNuclear PowerReactors,"Revision0, May 2003, and (ii)assessing MCR/ESGR envelope habitabilityattheFrequencies specified in Sections C.1 and C.2ofRegulatory Guide1.197,Revision O.The following is anexceptiontoSectionC.2ofRegulatory Guide1.197,Revision0:*2.C.1Licensing Bases-Vulnerability assessments for radiological, hazardous chemical and smoke, and emergency ventilation system testing were completed as documentedinthe UFSAR.The exceptionstotheRegulatory Guides (RG)referenced in RG 1.196 (i.e., RG 1.52, RG 1.78, and RG 1.183), which were consideredincompletingthe vulnerability assessments, are documentedinthe UFSAR/current licensing basis.Compliance with these RGs is consistentwiththe current licensing basis as describedinthe UFSAR.d.Measurement, at designated locations,ofthe MCR/ESGR envelope pressure relative to all external areas adjacenttothe MCR/ESGR envelope boundaryduringthe pressurization mode of operation by one trainofthe MCR/ESGR EVS, operatingattheflow rate required by the VFTP, at a Frequency of 18 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS.The results shallbetrended and used as partoftheassessmentofthe MCR/ESGR envelope boundary.(continued)
North AnnaUnits1 and 2 5.5-16 Attachment 4 (SerialNo.-08-0080)
Marked-up Technical Specifications Bases Changes (For Information Only)North Anna Power Station Units1and2 Virginia Electric and Power Company (Dominion)
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES TABLE OF CONTENTS B 2.1 B 2.1.1 B 2.1.2 B 3.0 B 3.0 B 3.1 B 3.1.1 B 3.1.2 B 3.1.3 B 3.1.4 B 3.1.5 B 3.1.6 B 3.1.7 B 3.1.8 B 3.1.9 B 3.2 B 3.2.1 B 3.2.2 B 3.2.3 B 3.2.4 B 3.3 B 3.3.1 B 3.3.2 B 3.3.3 B 3.3.4 B 3.3.5 B 3.3.6 B 3.4 B 3.4.1 B 3.4.2 B 3.4.3 B 3.4.4 B 3.4.5 B 3.4.6 B 3.4.7 B 3.4.8 B 3.4.9 SAFETY LIMITS (SLs).............
Reactor Core SLs.ReactorCoolant System (RCS)Pressure SL LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO)APPLICABILITY
.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (SR)APPLICABILITY REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS.....SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)......Core Reactivity
.Moderator Temperature Coefficient (MTC)Rod Group Alignment Limits Shutdown Bank Insertion Limits Control Bank Insertion Limits Rod Position Indication
.....Primary Grade Water Flow Path Isolation Valves.PHYSICS TESTS Exceptions-MODE 2...POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS........Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor (FQ(Z)).....NuclearEnthalpyRise Hot Channel Factor AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE (AFD)...QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO (QPTR)....INSTRUMENTATION...............ReactorTrip System (RTS)Instrumentation Engineered SafetyFeatureActuation System (ESFAS)Instrumentation
..PostAccident Monitoring (PAM)Instrumentation
.Remote Shutdown System...........
Loss of Power (LOP)EmergencyDieselGenerator (EDG)Start Instrumentation
.Main Control Room/Emergency iMCR/ESGR)
Envelope Isolation Actuation Instrumentation
.REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS).RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure fromNucleateBoiling (DNB)Limits.RCS Minimum Temperature for Criticality.
RCS Pressure and Temperature (PIT)Limits RCS Loops-MODES 1 and2....RCS Loops-MODE3......RCS Loops-MODE4......RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops Filled RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops Not Filled Pressurizer.........B 2.1.1-1 B 2.1.1-1 B 2.1.2-1.B 3.0-1.B 3.0-12 B 3.1.1-1 B 3.1.1-1 B 3.1.2-1 B 3.1.3-1 B 3.1.4-1 B 3.1.5-1 B 3.1.6-1 B 3.1.7-1 B 3.1.8-1 B 3.1.9-1 B 3.2.1-1 B 3.2.1-1 B 3.2.2-1 B 3.2.3-1 B 3.2.4-1 B 3.3.1-1 B 3.3.1-1 B 3.3.2-1 B 3.3.3-1 B 3.3.4-1 B 3.3.5-1 B 3.3.6-1 B 3.4.1-1 B 3.4.1-1 B 3.4.2-1 B 3.4.3-1 B 3.4.4-1 B 3.4.5-1 B 3.4.6-1 B 3.4.7-1 B 3.4.8-1 B 3.4.9-1 North AnnaUnits1 and 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES TABLE OF CONTENTS.B 3.7.14 1.B 3.7.15-1.B 3.7.16-1.B 3.7.17-1.B 3.7.18-1.B 3.7.19-1 B 3.8.1-1 B 3.8.1-1 B 3.8.2-1 B 3.8.3-1 B 3.8.4-1 B 3.8.5-1 B 3.8.6-1 B 3.8.7-1 B 3.8.8-1 B 3.8.9-1.B 3.8.10-1 B 3.9.1-1 B 3.9.1-1 B 3.9.2-1 B 3.9.3-1 B 3.9.4-1 B 3.9.5-1 B 3.9.6-1 B 3.9.7-1.B 3.7.10-11.B 3.7.11-1.B 3.7.12-1 Rooffi..B 3.7.13 1 Rooffi ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS.AC Sources-Operating
.AC Sources-Shutdown.......Diesel Fuel Oil and Starting Air DC Sources-Operating
.DC Sources-Shutdown......BatteryCellParameters.
Inverters-Operating
.Inverters-Shutdown......
Distribution Systems-Operating Distribution Systems-Shutdown REFUELING OPERATIONS
.Boron Concentration
.Primary Grade Water Flow Path Isolation Valves-MODE6........Nuclear Instrumentation
.Containment Penetrations
.Residual Heat Removal (RHR)and Coolant Circulation-High Water Level Residual Heat Removal (RHR)and Coolant Circulation-Low Water LevelRefuelingCavity Water Level PLANT SYSTEMS (continued)
Main Control Room/Emergency Switchgear Room (MCR/ESGR)
Emergency Ventilation System (EVS)MODES1,2,3, 4.Main Control Room/Emergency Switchgear Room (MCR/ESGR)AirConditioning System (ACS)Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)Pump Room Exhaust Air Cleanup System (PREACS).Not Used Switchgear 01 C R/[SG R)Bo tt 1edAir Sy 5 t effi-=-.---:.:---:-.
=-.--:-.-::-.---=.----=-----=-Br--:t--:+-:-H--t Not Used SwitchgearIrradi atedFue 1 Ass effie 1ie 5---:-.-.,.........,..--:-.
Fuel Building Ventilation System (FBVS)Fue1Storage Pool Water Level....Fuel Storage Pool Boron Concentration Spent Fuel PoolStorage......
Component Cooling Water (CC)System B 3.9.3 B 3.9.4 B 3.9.5 B 3.9.6 B 3.9.7 B 3.7.15 B 3.7.16 B 3.7.17 B 3.7.18 B 3.7.19 B 3.8 B 3.8.1 B 3.8.2 B 3.8.3 B 3.8.4 B 3.8.5 B 3.8.6 B 3.8.7 B 3.8.8 B 3.8.9 B 3.8.10 B 3.9 B 3.9.1 B 3.9.2B3.7 B 3.7.10 B 3.7.11 B 3.7.12 B 3.7.13 B 3.7.14 North Anna Units 1 and 2 iii MCR/ESGR Envelope Isolation Actuation Instrumentation B 3.3.6 Main Control...B9QIn/Emergency Swi tchgear lope Isolation Actuation Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES..._.._-The MCR/ESGR Envelope Isolation function provides a protected environmentfromwhich operators can control the unit following an uncontrolled release of radioactivity.
During normal operation, the MCRandRelay Room Air Condition System provides unfiltered makeup air and cooling.Uponofan MCR/ESGREnvelopeIso 1 at-, on actuation signal from either unit Safety Injection (SI), High Badiatjgn or manuallt-the Unit 1and2 contl:Q.Lroom_lJormaL yg.D.tilation intake and exhaust ducts are isolated to
..unfiltered makeupairfrom enteri ng the control room...In.Ci.d_qttjon to MCR/ESGRenvelope signal also start the affected uQJ1:'.l'1CR1!:SGR EVS fansto..QIgvi ltered reci rcul atedair withi n the MCR/ESG_R The Fuel Building High Radiation or manual initiation starts both units available EVS train fans in the on modeManual operator action 1 s CiJJgn-.1he EVS to provi ded tiltfred makeup ai r.The EVS is describedin the Bases for
...
Swi tchgear ROQ.!!LEmergency Venti 1 at i OIl four independent and redundant t ra ins of 9.s:1LJiJ,liQQ instrumentation for the Envelope Isolation.
Each manual actuation train consists of two s), and the i ng wi.rin9_to the circuitr.Y.Onlyone switch of the four trai nsrequi red for the..st em_tQ_In.i!Jntain indepdenceand The MCR!ESGR Envelope Isolation is actuatedonaSI signal from either unit,aFuel building High Radiation signal or manual switches in the MCR.The Safety Injection Function is discussed in LCO 3.3.2,"Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS)Instrumentation.
1I The CQILtr.:9l room musJbekept habitable._for the there during accident recov.ery and post accident Q.PeratJQns.
The.MCRjESGR Envelope I?olation actuation acts tQ..9.!1.!OfT)at i cal]y onaSI signal termi nate the suppl y of (continued)
North Anna Units 1and2 B 3.3.6-1 BASES APPLICABLE sAF'IT'{-ANALYS ES (C9Dt inu eJ!l MCR/ESGR Envelope Isolation Actuation Instrumentation B 3.3.6 unfiltered outside air to the control room and initiate filtration in the rec-hculation mode.Manual actions are requi red gn the MCR/ESGItJVS to providefi 1 tered-make up air The safel:1.__
for a loss of coolaQL_.0scidenLi!L MODES 1-4 automatic i sol ati on of the MCR!ESGR._,?-nvelopeona 51 signal and manual initiation of.Jiltered outside air flow within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.No credit is taken for filtered reclfculation or pressurization provided by the.
EVS.The safety analysis for a fuel accident (FHA)assumed manual isolation of the MCR!ESGRen
...nua Lin i tti_Q!:LQI._.11 0 sitioning 0 f the MCR/ESG_R_IY.$_mt_o supply filtered air flow within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.For the basi sacci dents>MCR!ESGR isolation isnotassumed.
Normal ventilation inflow with__
__LLQ_fj 1 teredinleakage is assumed.The
__
assumes normal ventilation during a_toxic gas o!:,?moke incident.The MCR!ESGR envelope isolation is not to mitigate the consequences of these events.
actuation instrumentation satisfies Cri teri on.3__QL 10 CFR 50.
The LCO requirements ensure that instrumentation necessary to initiate isolation of the MCR!ESGR envelope is OPERABLE.Manual Initiationonechannelpertrainand twotra ins The operator can initiate the MCRjESGR isolalipn at any by using anyone of the two switchesina train from the control room.This actioneactuation 0 f C omp 0nen tLjn____
as actuation signal.
consists of two switches (channe]s) and the ir:Lter_GQQDi=_<::Jing wiring to the actuation circuitry._
North Anna Units 1and2 B 3.3.6-2 BASES LCO---Tcontinued)APPLICABILITY
...........*******
_----_.._._--ACTIONS..-.._---_..__-MCR/ESGR Envelope Isolation Actuation Instrumentation B 3.3.6 2 I nj ect ion Refer to LeO 3.3.2.Function 1.for an initiati!l9"_
The MCRjESGR Envelope Isolation Functionsmustbe operable in MODES1.2.3, and 4 and during the movement of recently_irradiated fuel assemblies to provide the required MCR!ESGR isolation initiationassumedin the applicable In MODES5and6.when no fuel recently irradiated fuel{i.e'-L-fuel that has part of a critica 1 reactor__
wi thi n the previ ous__
OPERABLE whenhasbeenadded to the ACTIONS indicating that separate (Q!ldillifl entry is allowed for eachJunction.
The Conditions of this_Specification may be entered independently for each_Functi9...D_listedinTable 3.3.6-1 in the accompanying LCQ-=-__The COJJ:1J;lletion Time{s)of the inoperable train(s)of a_
tracked separately for_each Function".?-tar:ttDQ from the time the Condition was entered for that Function A.I.A.l app 1ies to the ManualFuncti qn of the MCWSG8_EVS.lLQne train is inoperable,inone or more Functions.7days tted to restore it to OPERABLf.:._
status.The7day Time is the same as is allowed if one train is inoperable.
The basis for this Completion_
Time_t?_the same as provided in LCO 3.7.10.If the train to OPERABLE statusJ..the l1orma..l_
ventLlation to the MCR!ESGR envelope must be isolated.This accomp}ishes the actuation instrumentation Function unitina conservative mode oLJ2'peration.
North Anna Units1and2 B 3.3.6-3 BASES I\CT IONS--Cf90finued)SURVEI LLANCE ENTS MCR/ESGR Envelope Isolation Actuation Instrumentation B 3.3.6 B.l.l, B.1.2_l_!1ndCondition 8 appliestothe failure of two MCR!ESGR Envelope.Isolation actuation trains.LQ.f two manual trains.The first.Required ActiQnisto isolate the normal ventilationtothe MCR!ESGRenvelopeimmediately.Thisaccomplishesthe i QD.tQ?tT!Jmentati on Function that may have been and placesina conservative mode of operation.
C.l and C.2 when the Required Action and associated CompletioQ
__
for_ConditionA or: B have not been met and the unitisin MODE I, 2, 3, or 4.The unit mustbebrought tQ__
the LCD reQQirementsarenot To achieve this status, the unit mustbebroughtto MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.The allowed Comple_tiQ.!J
__UmfS are_reasonable, based on operati1ill-reachtherequired unit cond;t;ons from full power_conditions in an orderly manner and without chall D.l and D.2.[9ndiJiot'l Q_?'pplies when the Required Action and associated T_ime forConditionAor B have not been met when recently irradiatedfuelassembliesare
_being
__
the to MCR/ESGR envelope must be isolated or movement of recently must be_suspended immediatelytoreducethe risk of accidents that woul_d require_MCR/ESGR Envelope Isolation a_ctuation.
A Note has been addedtothe SRTableto clarify that Table 3.3.6-1 determines which SRsapplyto which MCR!ESGR Envelope Isolation Actuation Functions.
SR 3.3.6.1 SR 3.3.6.1isthe performanceofa TADOT.This test is a checkofthe ManualActuationFunctions and is performed every 18 months.Each ManualActuationFunction is tested up to, and master relay coils.A successful testofthe required contact(s)ofa channel relay may be performed by the verificationofthe change of stateofa single contactofthe relay.This clarifies what is an acceptable TADOTofa relay.Thisis acceptable because all.(continued)
North Anna Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.6-4 BASES SURVEILLANCE B"EQUIREMENTS MCR/ESGR Envelope Isolation Actuation Instrumentation B 3.3.6 (continued) 9f the Clther required contacts of the relay are verified by.other..Iechnica1 Specifi cat ionsandnon-Technical cati ons tests...at 1 east once refuelin9i nterva 1 applicable extensions.
In some instances, the test.includes actuationof the eDddevice(i starts,-_
cycles, etc.).The Frequency isbasedon the known re 1 i abjJ.i!.Y...9J the Function.and the avail abl e..L_9ndhasbeen shown to be acceptableence.
modifiedbya.Note thatexcludes veri fi cati on of.?_etQ.Qjnts duri n9 the..TADOT.The Functi ons tested*haveno withthem.REFERENCES None North Anna Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.6-5 MCR/ESGR EVSB3.7.10B3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.10 Main Control Room/Emergency Switchgear Room (MCR/ESGR)
Emergency Ventilation System (EVS)P100ES1,2,3, aAd 4 BASES BACKGROUND The MCR/ESGR Emergency Ventilation IlabitabH-Hy System (EyHS)providesa protected environment from which occupants can control the unit following an uncontrolled release of radioactivity,hazardouschemicals,or smoke.The MCR!ESGR EHS COAsistsofthe P1CR/ESGR bottled air system (LCO 3.7.13)aAd the MCR/ESGR EVS (LCO 3.7.10 aAd LCO 3.7.14).The MCR/ESGR EVS consistsoffour 100%capacity redundant trains(2per unit)that can filter and recirculate air inside the MCR/ESGRenvelopeorsupply filteredtothe MCR/ESGR envelope, and a MCR/ESGR boundary that limits the inleakage of unfiltered air.Each train consistsofa heater, demister filter,ahigh efficiency particulate air (HEPA)filter, an activatedcharcoalad sorber section for removalofgaseous activity (principally iodines), andafan Ductwork, valves, dampers, doors, barriers, and instrumentation also form partofthesystem.
One EVS trainiscapableofperformingthe safety functionofsupplying outside filtered air.Intheeventofa Safety Injection_
JSI), i:fhe two MCR/ESGR EVS trai ns ontheaccident uni t-eee actuate automatically in recirculation.
8lLA!.'ailable EVS sta,rt automaticallY onafuel building radi.?:tiQfI monitor si9.Dal or manual actuationofthe MCRjESGR System.EitheroftThese trains can also be alignedtoprovide filtered outside air when appropriate.
Either train from the other unitcanbe manually actuated to provide filtered outside air approximately 60 minutes after the event.However, duetothe locationofthe air intake for 1-HV-F-41, itcannotbe used to satisfy therequirementsof LCO 3.7.10.Twoofthe three remaining trains (1-HV-F-42, 2-HV-F-41, and 2-HV-F-42) are required for independence and redundancy.
The MCR/ESGRenvelopeistheareawithinthe confinesofthe MCR/ESGR envelope boundary that containsthespaces that control room occupants inhabit to control the unit during normal and accident conditions.Thisarea encompasses the control room, and may encompass other non-criticalareasto which frequentpersonnelaccessorcontinuous occupancy is not necessaryintheeventof an accident.The MCR/ESGRenvelopeis protected during normal operation, natural (continued)
North AnnaUnits1 and 2 B 3.7.10-1 BASES BACKGROUND (continued)
MCR/ESGR EVS B 3.7.10 events, and accident conditions.
The MCR/ESGR envelope boundary is the combination of walls, floor, roof, ducting, doors, penetrations and equipment that physically form the MCR/ESGR envelope.The OPERABILITYofthe MCR/ESGR envelope boundary mustbemaintainedtoensure that the inleakage of unfiltered air into the MCR/ESGRenvelopewillnot exceed the inleakage assumedinthe licensing basis analysis of design basis accident (DBA)consequences to MCR/ESGRenvelopeoccupants.
The MCR/ESGR envelope and its boundaryaredefinedinthe MCR/ESGR Envelope Habitability Program.Upon receipt of.9IL-'Hte actuating51,fuel puiJding ra_9iationmonitorsor manual, normal airsupplyto and exhaust from the MCR/ESGRenvelopeis isolated, at least two trainsof MCR/ESGR EVSreceivea to recirculate air, and airflow from the bottled air banks QIovides ainthe MCR/ESGR envelope.Approximately 60 minutes after actuationofthe MCR/ESGR bottled airsystem,a single MCR/ESGR EVS train is manually actuated or aligned to provide filtered outside airtothe MCR/ESGR envelope through HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers.
The demisters remove any entrained water droplets present,toprevent excessivemoistureloadingofthe HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers.
Continuous operationofeach train for at least 10hoursper month,withthe heaterson,reducesmoisture buildup on the HEPA filters and adsorbers.
Both the demister and heaterareimportanttothe effectivenessofthe HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers.
Although fl.9L.0ssumedinthe analysis of record, QPressurizationofthe MCR/ESGR envelope minimizes infiltration of unfiltered airthroughthe MCR/ESGR envelope boundary from allthesurroundingareas adjacenttothe MCR/ESGR envelope boundary.A ef the MCR!ESGR EVS, at a ef<1100 Cfffi, will the MCR/ESGR te>0.04i ati'Ie te te the MCR/ESGR The MCR/ESGR EHS the P1CR/ESGR isthe UFSAR,6.4(Ref.1).
Redundant MCR/ESGR EVS supply and recirculation trainsprovidethe required filtration of air should an excessive pressuredropdevelop across the other filter train.
clesed (continued)
North AnnaUnits1 and 2 B 3.7.10-2 MCR/ESGR EVS B 3.7.10 BASES BACKGROUND (continued) are arraAged iA series so that the of OAe to will AOt iA aAofthesystem to the OA theofthe trai A.The MCR/ESGR EVS8+£isdes oj gned inaccordancewithSeismicCategoryI requirements.
Any of tfhe actuation will isolate the envelope efl+y and start the MCR/ESGR EVS trainsforthe affected uni t-.J1Lrecireu]at ion..Requi ri ng twoofthe three MCR/ESGR EVS trains provides redundancy, assuring that at least one train is availabletobe realignedtoprovide filtered outside ai r.The MCR/ESGR EVS8+£isdesignedtomaintaina habitable environmentinthe MCR/ESGR envelope for 30daysof continuous occupancy after a DBAwithoutexceedingthe control room operator dose limits of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC-19(Ref.3)for alternativesourceterms.
APPLICABLE The MCR/ESGR EVS componentsarearrangedinredundant, SAFETY ANALYSES safety related ventilation trains.The location of most components andductingwithinthe MCR/ESGRenvelopeensures anadequatesupplyof filtered air to all areas requiring access.The MCR/ESGR EVS8+£provides airborne radiological protection for the MCR/ESGR envelope occupants, as demonstrated by the MCR/ESGR envelope accident dose analyses for the most limiting DBA (LOCAl desigA accideAt fission product release presentedinthe UFSAR, Chapter 15 (Ref.2).The accident analysis assumes that at least one train is alignedtoprovide filtered outside airtothe MCR/ESGRenvelopeapproximately 60 minutes after MCR!ESGR envelope isolation of air,butdoesnot take any creditforautomatic startofthe trainsinthe recirculation mode or any filtration of recirculated air.Since, the MCR/ESGR EVS train associated with I-HV-F-41 can not be usedtoprovide filtered outside air (duetothe location of its air intake with respect to Vent Stack B)i it cannotbe used to satisfytherequirementsof LCO 3.7.10.The North Anna UFSAR describes potentially hazardous chemicals stored onsite in quantities greater than 100 lb.These include hydrogen, sulfuric acid, sodium hydroxide, hydrazine, ethanolamine, and sodium hypochlorite.
Evaluations for accidental release of these chemicals indicate that the worst-case concentrations at the control room intake wouldbeexpectedtobe less than their (continued)
North AnnaUnits1 and 2 B 3.7.10-3 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)
LCO MCR/ESGR EVS B 3.7.10 respective toxicity limit(Refs.1 and 4).The assessment assumed no actionbeingtaken by the control room operator (i.e., normal or emergencysupplysystem remains operating).Intheeventof fire/smoke externaltothe MCR/ESGR envelope, equipment andproceduresare availabletomaintain habitabilityofthe control room.Smoke detectors are installedinthe returnductstothe MCRAir-HandlingUnits (AHUs),inthenear vicinityofthe ESGR AHUs, andinthe MCR/ESGR EVS supply ducts,aswellas other numerous locationsinthe ESGRs and MCR.Smoke detectors are also installedinthe MCR/ESGR chiller rooms, which are ventilated with air fromtheTurbine Building, and the Mechanical Equipment rooms.If smoke is detected, the MCR/ESGR normal and EVSsupplycanbemanually isolated.The fireresponseproceduresprovide direction for removing smoke from the MCR or ESGRs.(Ref.5)for the remaj.D.flJ?-I.2Lthe DBAs, MCR/ESGR envelope:i_5..olation is not assumed.Normal ventilation with 500 cfm of additional infeakage is assumed.The safetyfora fuel (FHA)assumes isolationofthe MC R!E Theworstcase single active failureofa componentofthe MCR/ESGR EVS, assuming a loss of offsite power,doesnotimpairthe abilityofthe systemtoperform its design function.The MCR/ESGR EVS MODES1,2,3, aRd 4 satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).
Two independent and redundant MCR/ESGR EVS trains are required to be OPERABLEtoensure that at least one train is availabletobe manually alignedtoprovide outside filtered airtothe MCR/ESGR envelope, if a single active failure disables oneofthe two required OPERABLE trains.Total system failure,suchas from a lossofboth required EVS trains or from an inoperable MCR/ESGR envelope boundary, could resultinexceedingthe control room operator dose limits of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC-19(Ref.3)for alternativesourceterms,intheeventofa large radioactive release.(continued)
North AnnaUnits1 and 2 B 3.7.10-4 BASES LCO (continued)
MCR/ESGR EVS B 3.7.10 The MCR/ESGR EVS MODES1,2,3, aAd 4 is considered OPERABLE when the individual components necessary to limit MCR/ESGRenvelopeoccupantexposureare OPERABLEinthe two required trainsofthe MCR/ESGR EVS1,2,3, arltl-4.1-HV-F-41 cannotbe used to satisfytherequirementsof LCO 3.7.10.An MCR/ESGR EVS train is OPERABLE when the associated:
a.Fan is OPERABLE;b.Demister filters, HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers are not excessively restricting flow, andarecapableof performing their filtration functions; andc.Heater, ductwork, valves, and dampers are OPERABLE, and airflowcanbe maintained.
The MCR/ESGR EVS is shared byUnit1 andUnit2.In order for the MCR/ESGR EVS trainstobe considered OPERABLE, the MCR/ESGR envelope boundary mustbemaintained such that the MCR/ESGRenvelopeoccupantdose from a large radioactive releasedoesnot exceed the calculateddosein the licensing basis consequence analyses for DBAs, and that MCR/ESGRenvelopeoccupantsare protected from hazardous chemicals and smoke.The LCO is modified by a Noteallowingthe MCR/ESGR envelope boundarytobe opened intermittently under administrative controls.This Note only appliestoopeningsinthe MCR/ESGR envelope boundary thatcanbe rapidly restoredtothedesign condition,suchasdoors, hatches, floor plugs, and access panels.For entry and exitthroughdoors the administrative controloftheopeningis performed by the person(s)entering or exiting the area.For other openings, these controlsshouldbe proceduralized and consist of stationing a dedicated individual attheopening whoisincontinuous communicationwiththe operatorsinthe MCR/ESGR envelope.This individual will have a method to rapidly close the opening and restore the MCR/ESGR envelope boundarytoa condition equivalenttothedesign condition when a need for MCR/ESGR isolation is indicated.
North Anna Units 1 and 2 B 3.7.10-5 BASES APPLICABILITY ACTIONS MCR/ESGR EVS B 3.7.10 In MODES1,2,3, and 4, MCR/ESGR EVS must be OPERABLE to ensure that the MCR/ESGRenvelopewill remain habitable during andfollowinga DBA.The be OPERABLE.to respondtothere tease from a FHA involving recently irradiated fuel assemblies.
The MCR!ESGRis only required to be OPERABLEduringfuel handling invo1.Yi.!illJecently irradiatedfuelassemblies (i.e.,
that have occupied partofa reactor core__theprevious 300 hours0.00347 days <br />0.0833 hours <br />4.960317e-4 weeks <br />1.1415e-4 months <br />)due to r ad i 0 A.1 When one required MCR/ESGR EVS train is inoperable, for reasons other than an inoperable MCR/ESGR envelope boundary, action mustbetakento restore OPERABLE status within 7days.In this Condition,theremaining required OPERABLE MCR/ESGR EVS trainisadequatetoperformthe MCR/ESGRenvelopeoccupant protection function.However, the overall reliabilityisreducedbecausea failureinthe required OPERABLE EVS trains could result in loss of MCR/ESGR EVS function.The 7 day Completion Timeisbased on the low probabilityofa DBA occurring during this time period, and abilityoftheremaining trainstoprovidethe required capability.
B.1.8.2, and 8.3 If the unfiltered inleakage of potentially contaminated air past the MCR/ESGR envelope boundary and into the MCR/ESGR envelope can result in MCR/ESGRenvelopeoccupant radiological dose greaterthanthe calculateddoseofthe licensing basisanalysesof DBA consequences(allowedtobe upto5 rem total effective dose equivalent),orinadequate protection of MCR/ESGRenvelopeoccupants from hazardouschemicalsor smoke, the MCR/ESGR envelope boundary is inoperable.
Actions mustbetakento restore an OPERABLE MCR/ESGR envelope boundary within 90 days.Duringtheperiod that the MCR/ESGR envelope boundary is considered inoperable, action must be initiated to implement mitigating actions to lessen the effect on MCR/ESGRenvelopeoccupants from the potentialhazardsofa radiological or chemicaleventora challenge from smoke.Actions mustbetakenwithin 24hoursto verify thatintheeventofa DBA, the mitigating actionswillensure that MCR/ESGRenvelopeoccupant (continued)
North Anna Units 1 and 2 B 3.7.10-6 BASES ACTIONS MCR/ESGR EVS B 3.7.10 B.1 (continued) radiologicalexposureswillnot exceed the calculated doseofthe licensing basis analyses of DBA consequences, and that MCR/ESGRenvelopeoccupantsare protected fromhazardouschemicals and smoke.These mitigating actions (i.e., actions thataretakento offset the consequences of the inoperable MCR/ESGR envelope boundary)shouldbe preplanned for implementation upon entry into the condition, regardlessofwhether entry is intentional or unintentional.
The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Completion Time is reasonable based on the low probabilityofa DBA occurring during this time period, andtheuseof mitigating actions.The 90 day Completion Time is reasonable based on the determination that the mitigating actionswillensure protection of MCR/ESGR envelopeoccupantswithinanalyzed limits while limiting the probability that MCR/ESGRenvelopeoccupantswill have to implement protective measures that may adversely affect their ability to control the reactor and maintain itina safe shutdown conditionintheeventofa DBA.In addition, the 90 day Completion Timeisa reasonabletimetodiagnose, plan and possibly repair, and test most problemswiththe MCR/ESGR envelope boundary.C.1 and C.2 In MODE1,2, 3,or4, if the inoperable required MCR/ESGR EVS trainorthe inoperable MCR/ESGR envelolPe boundarycannotbe restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the unit mustbeplacedina MODE that minimizes accident risk.To achieve this status, the unit mustbeplacedinat least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.The allowed Completion Times are reasonab 1e,based on operatingexperience,.toreachthe required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.D.l and D.2 Q.ldtJo..9...JDovement of recently irradiated_
fuel, if the i!lQQerC!P_le traincannotberes tored to OPERA..l?JJ
__status within the.Je.n..uired Completion Time, the MCRjESGR mustbeisolatedmtmmediately andtheremaining MCR!ESGR trainplacedin servicewithi n one
...lhese__actionswillensure that the MCR!ESGR envelope fonft9.!1l:.?t i on that woul d protecttheoccupants from radioactive exposurewiththeassumptions and ensure that any active failures would be readily detected.North AnnaUnits1 and 2 B 3.7.10-7 MCR/ESGR EVS B 3.7.10 BASES An alternatiye.
to Requireg ActiQn 0.1 is to immediately_
suspend activities that present a potential for releasing oacttyjJ.LJhat mi ght requi reisol ationof the control room.
the unitina that minimizes risk..lt.lis does...llot preclude to.._
E.1 During llJovement of recent ly irradjated fuel assemblies, iiJL traLD of MCR!ESGR EVS trai n becomes i noperabledue to an MCR/ESGR envelopeboundaryor a.ction be immediatel.Y.mt9.
..suspend activities that could resuHina release of X:..ggioactivity that might require i?9lation of the contJ::'.QI._room.
This places the unitina condition that mi niThisdoesnot JlIecl ude the.r:D.ovemell.Lof fuel to a safep.95jJion
..North Anna Units 1and2 B 3.7.10-8 MCR/ESGR EVS B 3.7.10 BASES ACTIONS FB.1 (continued)
When two required MCR/ESGR EVS trains are inoperable in MODE1,2,3,or4 for reasons otherthanan inoperable MCR/ESGR envelope boundary (i.e.,ConditionB),the MCR/ESGR EVS maynotbecapableofperformingtheintended function and the unitisina condition outside the accident analyses.Therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.7.10.1 Standbysystemsshouldbe checked periodicallytoensure that they function properly.As the environment and normaloperatingconditions on the MCR/ESGR EVSarenottoo severe, testing each required train once every monthprovidesan adequate check of this system.Monthly heater operations dry out any moisture accumulatedinthecharcoal and HEPA filters fromhumidityinthe ambient air.Each required train must be operated for10continuoushourswiththe heaters energized.
The 31 day Frequency is based on the reliabilityofthe equipment and the one train redundancy.
SR 3.7.10.2 This SR verifies that the required MCR/ESGR EVS testing is performedinaccordancewiththe Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP).The VFTP includes testing the performance of the demister filter, HEPA filter,charcoalad sorber efficiency, minimum and maximum flow rate, andthephysical propertiesofthe activated charcoal.Specific test Frequencies and additional information are discussed in detailinthe VFTP.SR 3.7.10.3 Not Used SR 3.7.10.4 This SR verifies the OPERABILITYofthe MCR/ESGR envelope boundary by testing for unfiltered air inleakage past the MCR/ESGR envelope boundary and into the MCR/ESGR envelope.The detailsofthe testing are specifiedinthe MCR/ESGR Envelope Habitability Program.(continued)
North AnnaUnits1 and 2 B 3.7.10-9 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS REFERENCES MCR/ESGR EVS B 3.7.10 SR 3.7.10.4 (continued)
The MCR/ESGRenvelopeis considered habitable when the radiologicaldoseto MCR/ESGRenvelopeoccupants calculatedinthe licensing basis analyses of DBA consequences is no morethan5 rem TEDE and the MCR/ESGRenvelopeoccupantsare protected fromhazardouschemicals and smoke.This SR verifies that the unfiltered air inleakage into the MCR/ESGR envelope is no greaterthantheflow rate assumedinthe licensing basisanalysesof DBA consequences.
When unfiltered air inleakage is greaterthanthe assumed flow rate,ConditionB must be entered.Required Action B.3 a 11 owstimetores tore the MCR/ESGR envelope boundary to OPERABLE status provided mitigating actions can ensure that the MCR/ESGRenveloperemainswithinthe licensing basis habitability limitsfortheoccupantsfollowing an accident.Compensatory measures are discussedinRegulatory Guide 1.196, Section C.2.7.3,(Ref.6)which endorses, with exceptions, NEI99-03,Section8.4 and AppendixF(Ref.7).These compensatory measures may also be used as mitt qat i nq actions as required by RequiredActionB.2.
Temporary analytical methods may also be used as compensatory measures to restore OPERABILITY (Ref.8).Options for restoring the MCR/ESGR envelope boundary to OPERABLE status include changing the licensing basis DBA consequence analysis, repairing the MCR/ESGR envelope boundary,ora combination of these actions.Depending upon the natureofthe problem and the corrective action, a full scope inleakage test maynotbenecessaryto establish that the MCR/ESGR envelope boundary has been restored to OPERABLE status.1.UFSAR, Section 6.4.2.UFSAR,Chapter15.
3.10 CFR 50, Appendix A.4.Control Room Habitability Study (Supplement to 1980OnsiteControl Room HabitabilityStudy-North Anna Power StationUnits1 and2,January 1982.5.Letter from L.N.Hartz (Virginia Electric and Power Company)tothe USNRC, dated March 3, 2004, Response to Generic Letter 2003-01,"Control Room HabitabilityControl Room Testing&Technical Information."6.Regulatory Guide 1.196.North AnnaUnits1 and 2 B 3.7.10-10 BASES REFERENCES (continued)
MCR/ESGR EVS B 3.7.10 7.NEI99-03,"Control Room Habitability Assessment," June 2001.8.Letter from Eric J.Leeds (NRC)to James W.Davis (NEI)datedJanuary30, 2004,"NEI Draft White Paper, Use of Generic Letter91-18Process and Alternative Source TermsintheContextofControl Room Habitability." (ADAMS Accession No.ML040300694)
North AnnaUnits1 and 2 B 3.7.10-11 MCR/ESGR Bottled Air System B 3.7.13B3.7 PLANT B 3.7.13 CORtrol Rooffi/EffiergeRcy ROOffi Air Systeffi BACKGROUND Hie P4CR/ESGR EffiergeRcy Ilabi tabi 1ity Systeffi (EllS) e1es a eRviroRffieRt froffi caR cORtrol Ul'lit follO'ldRg aR uRcoRtrolleei release of rilelioacti'v'ity,cals,or sffioke.IRe PKR/ESGR EllS cORsi sts of air systeffi (LCD 3.7.13)
EffiergeRcy VeRtilatioR Systeffi (EVS)(LCD 3.7.10LCD 3.7.14).
bottleel air systeffi CORsistsoffour traiRS of bottleel airto air to al'lel a boul'leiary liffiits il'lleakage of ul'lfiltereei air. air isviafour trail'ls feeel a COffiffiOI'l air to URit 1 aRei URit 2 ESGRs.
is also of beiRg to air e1irectly totraiR is air by ORe of air baRks.URit 1URit 2 two traiRS of air.Two air traiRs are of eli Rgairof breatRi Rg*Iualityto ffi,ai Rtai R a iRterior iR for URit1URit2 for a oel of ORe fEll 1 owi Rg a Desi gR Basis AccieleRt (DBA).
is area cOl'lfil'les of bouRe!ary cORtaiRS cOl'ltrol rOOffi to cORtrol uRit e!uriRg Rorffialaccie!eRt area cORtrol rOOffi, aRe!ffiay ROR critical areas to fre*lueRt persoRRelaccessor cORtiRUOUS occupaRcy is Rot Recessary iR eveRt of al'l accie!el'lt.
is e!uriRg Rorffial Ratural evel'lts, aRe!accie!el'lt cORe!itioRS.
bouRe!ary is cOffibiRatioR of walls, floor, roof, e!UCtiRg, e!oors, pel'letratiol'ls aRe!
forffi OPERABILITY of ffiUSt be ffiaiRtaiRee!
to eRsure iRleakage of uRfilteree!
air iRto will ROt iRleakage aSSUffiee!
iR liceRsiRg basis aRalysis of DBA cORse*lueRces to aRe!its are e!efiRee!iR Habitability Prograffi.(col'ltil'lueel)
North AnnaUnits1 and 2 B 3.7.13-1 MCR/ESGR Bottled Air System B 3.7.13 BASES BACKGROUND (cel9til9ueEl)
I 191,2,3, Ell" 4, uJgel9 l"ecei J9t ef tlge si§l9al(s), 19 eFffia 1 ail" SI:lJ9J91y tEl al9a exl9al:lst fl"ElffiMCR/ESGR el9veleJge is iselateEl, twe tl"ail9s ef MCR/ESGR EVS actuate te l"ecil"culate ail", al9El ail"flew fl"effi tlge ail" ffiai I9tai 195 a Jgesi ti ve J9l"eSSl:ll"e i 19 He el9vel eJge.I 19 case ef a fl:lel 19a19Ell i 19§acci Elel9t (FIlA)i 19 tlge fuel al:lteffiatic actl:latiel9 ef A FHA il9 cel9tail9ffiel9t cal9 1get cause al9 auteffiatic actl:latiel9 ef ail",
ffial9 I:la 1 actl:latiel9il9itiateEl.
Aftel" 300 1ge1:ll"s ef Elecay, actl:latiel9 ef ail" is I9*lt l"e*ll:lil"eEl fEll" a FilA.AJ9J91 oexiffiately 60 ffi"il9l:ltes aftel" actl:latiel9 of tlge MCR/ESGR ail" systeffi, a sil9§le MCR/ESGR EVS tfail9 is ffial9l:lally actl:lateEl to J9l"eviEle filtel"eEl el:ltsiEle ail" te tlge MCR/ESGR el9veleJge tl9l"el:l§19 19i§19 efficiel9cy J9al"ti cl:ll ate ai I" (HEPA)fi1 tel"S al9El cl9afceal aElsel"l:te-f5-;-
Pfessl:ll"izatiel9 ef tlge MCR/ESGR el9veleJge il9filtl"atiel9 ef I:ll9filtel"eEl ail" ffeffi tlge al"eas aEljacel9t te tlge MCR/ESGR el9veleJge Twe tl"ai 195 ef tlge eel ai 1" systeffiJ9l"essl:lfize tlge MCR/ESGR el9veleJge te>0.05 il9clges watel"§al:l§e.Tlge EllS eJgel"atiol9 il9 ffiail9tail9il9§MCR/ESGR el9veleJge is Eliscl:lsseEl il9 tlge UrSAR, Secti*lI96.4(Ref.1).T1ge EllS is Elesi§lgeEl i 19 accel"Elal9ce wi tl9 Sci sffii c Cate§el"Y I fe*ll:lil"effiel9ts.
T1ge EllS is Elesi§lgeEl te ffiai I9tai 19 a talT1-e--el9vi l"el9ffiel9t i 19 tlge el9vel eJge fEll" 30 Elayscel9til9l:lol:lS eccl:lJ9al9cy aftef a DBA witlgel:lt exceeElil9§ tlge cel9tl"ol feeffi eJgel"atel" Elose liffiits af 10 CFR 50, ApJgel9Elix A, GDC 19(Ref.2)fEll" altefl9ative sel:ll"ce tefffiS.APPLICABLE Tlge MCR/ESGR ail" systeffi is al"l"al9§eEl il9 fecll:ll9Elal9t, SAFETY ANALYSES safety felateEl tl"ail9s J9l"eviElil9§ J9fessl:ll"izeEl ail" freffi tlge l"e*ll:li l"eEl eel ai 1" te ffiai I9tai 19 a el9Vifel9ffiel9t il9 tlge MCR/ESGR el9veleJge.
Tlge MCR/ESGR EHS J9l"eviEles faEliele§ical J9retectiel9 for tlge MCR/ESGR el9veloJge occl:lJ9al9ts, as Eleffiol9stl"ateEl tlge cel9tl"el l"eeffi acciElel9t Elose al9alyses fol" tlge ffiest liffiitil9§ Elesi§19 acciElel9t fissial9 J9reEll:lct release J9resel9teEl il9 tlge UFSAR, Cl9aJ9tef 15 (Ref.4).-(cel9ti I9l:leEl)North AnnaUnits1 and 2 B 3.7.13-2 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY MIALYSES (cel'lti I'lUN!)MCR/ESGRBottledAir System B 3.7.13 Al'll'la UFSAR el'lsite il'1
§reater 100 sulfuric Evaluatiel'ls fer release ef werst case cel'lcel'ltratiel'ls at cel'ltrel reem il'ltake te less texicity limit (Refs.1 5). assessmel'lt I'le actiel'l beil'l§takel'l cel'ltre"1 reem (i.e., I'lermal er emer§el'lcy system remail'ls 11'1 evel'lt ef fi re/smeke exterl'1al te 14CR/ESGR are te mail'ltail'l ef cel'ltrel reem.Smeke areiI'lstalli I'l returl'l te Ai If' i I'l§Ul'li ts (AIIUs), il'l I'lear vicil'lity ef He ESGR AIIUs, il'l MCR!ESGR EVS aswellas I'lumereus lecatiefls ifl ESGRs MCR.Smeke are alse il'l MCR/ESGR
- reems, areair frem Turbil'le reems.If smeke is I'lermal EVS cal'l mal'lually fire fer remevil'l§ smeke frem MCR er ESGRs.(Ref.6) werst case sil'l§le active failure ef a ef MCR/ESGR air system, assumil'l§ a less ef effsite Jge...*er, flet r He 1ityef He system te Jgerferm its fUl'lctiel'l. MCR/ESGR air system satisfies Criteriel'l 3 ef 10 CFR 50.36 (c)(2)(i i).
aAd reduAdaAt MCR/ESGR air system traiAs are te be OPERABLE te el'lsure at least twe are assumil'l§ a sil'l§le failure el'le trai A.letal system fail ure,as frem a 1essef twe air system trail'ls er frem dl'l el'lvel ceulresulti I'l I'l§ cel'ltrel reem limits ef 10 CFR 50, A, GDC 19(Ref.2)fer alterAative seurce terms, il'l evel'lt ef a lar§e release.MCR/ESGR air systemtrail'lis OPERABLE I'lecessary te limit MCR/ESGR are OPERABLE.
North AnnaUnits1 and 2 B 3.7.13-3 BASES ttB (eefttiftl:lee)
APPLICABILITY MCR/ESGR Bottled Air System B 3.7.13 A Bettl ee ai 1" s:)'steffi tl"ai I'l is OPERABLEft7 Ol'le OPERABLE Bettlee ail" Bal'lk et 69 Bettlessel"viee;tr.-A tl mt 19 a U,,i I'lell:lei I'l§asseei ateevalyes al'le 19-j 19i I'l§, is OPERABLE;afte*7 IAe eeffiffiel'l eXAaust Aeaeel" is OPERABLE.IAe MCR!ESGR Bottlee ail" systeffi tl"ail'ls al"e sAal"ecl By Ul'lit 1 al'lcl Ul'lit 2.I I'l el"clel" tOl" He EVS tl"ai I'lS to Be eol'ls iOPERABLE, tAe el'lvelolge BOl:ll'lclal"Y ffil:lSt Be FAai I'ltai I'lecl sueA tAat tAe MCR/ESGR el'lvelolge oeel:ll9al'lt close tl"Offi a lal"§e l"aclioaetive l"elease clees I'let exeeecl tAe ealel:llated clese il'l tAe lieel'lsil'l§ Basisal'lalysestel" DBAs:, al'lcl tAat MCR/ESGR el'lvelelge oeeul9al'lts al"e 191"eteetecl tl"effi Aazal"clel:ls eAeffiieals al'lcl sffieke.IAe LCO is ffiocli fi ecl By a Note all mti I'l§tAe el'lvelolge Bel:ll'lclal"y te Be elgel'lecl il'ltel"ffiittel'ltly ul'lclel" aclffiil'listl"ative eOl'ltl"els.
IAis Note el'lly a19191ies te olgel'lil'l§s il'l tAC MCR/ESGR el'lvelelge Beul'lclal"Y tAat eal'l Be l"al9iclly l"estel"ecl te tAe clesi§1'l eel'lclitiel'l, Sl:leA as cloel"s, AateAes, tleel" 1911:l§S, ancl aeeess 19aftels.Fel" efttl"Y afte exit tAl"el:l§A eeel"s tAe aeffiinistl"ative eOl'ltl"el et tAe elgel'lil'l§ is 1ge1"fol"ffiecl By tAe el'ltel"il'l§ el" exitil'l§tAe al"ea.Fel" etAel" elgel'lil'l§s, tAese eel'ltl"els sAoulcl Be 191"0eecll:ll"alizee al'lcl eOl'lsist of statiol'lil'l§ a cleclieatecl il'leivicll:lal at tAe olgel'lil'l§ wAe is il'l eOl'ltil'll:lol:ls eeffiffil:lfti eati el'l tA tAe olgel"atel"s i ft tAe cl'lvel olge.IAis il'lcliviclual will Aave a ffietAocl to l"al9iclly elose tAe ol9cl'lil'lg al'ld l"cstOl"C tAC MCR/ESGR Cl'lvclol9ctoa conditiol'l te tAe clesi§1'l eOl'lclitiel'l WAel'l a I'leecl for MCR/ESGR el'lvelelge isolatiol'l is il'lclieatecl.
II'l MODES 1,2,3, al'lcl 4, al'lcl clul"il'l§ ffiOVeffiel'lt of l"ceel'ltly il"l"acliatecl fl:lel asseffiBlies, MCR/ESGR Bottlecl ail" systeffi ffil:lSt Be OPERABLE te el'lSUl"e tAat tAe MCR/ESGR el'lvelolge will l"effiail'l AaBi taBl e clul"i I'lg al'lcl foll mti I'lg a DBA.DUl"il'lg ffiOVeffiel'lt of l"eeel'ltly il"l"acliatecl fuel asseffiblies, tAe MCR!ESGR Bottlecl ail" systeffi ffiUSt Be OPERABLE to l"cslgel'lcl to tAe l"elease fl"effiafuel Aal'lcllil'lg aeeiclel'lt il'lvelving Aal'lcllil'lg
-(eel'lti I'luecl)North AnnaUnits1 and 2 B 3.7.13-4 BASES APPLICABILITY (ceflti fl\:leEl)ACTIONS MCRjESGR Bottled Air System B 3.7.13 receflt1y f\:le1. MCR/ESGR air systeffi is efl1y te OPERABLE f\:le1 receflt1y f\:le1 (i.e., f\:lc1efa critical reacter cere 300 te efle MCR/ESGR air SYStCffi traifl is fer reaseflS afl MCR/ESGR actiefl ffi\:lSt takefl te restere OPERABLE stat\:lS 7
Ifl OPERABLE MCR!ESGR air SyStCffi traifls are te efl'te1 f\:lflctiol'l.
Ilowever, He overall reliability is beca\:lse a sifl§le fail\:lre ifl ol'le of reffiaiflifl§ OPERABLE traifls res\:llt ifl 105s of MCR/ESGR air systeffi f\:lflctiofl. 7 Tiffie is Ofl lowofa DBA oCC\:lrrifl§ tiffie ability of reffiaiflil'l§ traiflS to If tRe iflleaka§e of air el'lveli fltl9 He cafl res\:llt ifl MCR/ESGR§reater of licel'lsil'l§ basis aflalyses of DBA to beto 5 reffi teta1 effective er ef MCR/ESGR freffi er sffieke, MCR!ESGR is Actiofls ffi\:lSt be takel'l to restore afl OPERABLE MCR/ESGR witRil'l 90 D\:lri I'l§ eflvel is actiol'l ffi\:lSt be to ffiiti§atil'l§ actiol'lstolessefl effect Ofl MCR/ESGR froffi tReofa erevefltora freffi sffioke.Actiofls ffi\:lSt be takefl 24 to verify tRat ifl He e'vefltefa DBA, ffiiti§atifl§ actiel'ls will el'lS\:lre MCR!ESGR will flOt of liceflsifl§ basisaflalysesof DBAtRat MCR/ESGR are froffi cReffiicals sffioke.
North AnnaUnits1 and 2 B 3.7.13-5 BASES ACTIONS MCR/ESGRBottledAir System B 3.7.13 U (cel9til9tleel) mitigatil9g actiel9s (i.e., actiel9s are takel9 te effset cel9sefltlel9ces ef i 1ge1=leral9l e
eetll9E1ar:'f)
EI ee I=lrel=ll al9lgeEl fer iml=ll emel9tati el9 tll=lel9 el9tr)'i I9te He cel9e1i ti el9, regarEilessef el9tr:'fil9tel9tiel9al er tll9il9tel9tiel9al. 24 Ceml=lletiel9 Time is reasel9al9le 19aseEi el9 lew I=lrel9al9ilit:'fefa DBA ecctlrril9g eltlril9g time l=lerieEl, al9E1 tlse ef mitigatil9g actiel9s. 90 ela:'f Ceml=lletiel9 Time is reasel9al9le 19aseEieletermi 19at i el9mitigati I9gacti el9 5 11 I=lretectiel9 ef MCR/ESCR el9velel=le eCCtll=lal9ts al9al:'fzeel limits limitil9g I=lrel9al9ilit:'f MCR/ESCR will te meastlres ma:'f aelversel:'f affect al9ilit:'f te cel9trel reacter al9e1 mail9tail9 it il9 a safe cel9e1itiel9 il9 evel9t ef a DBA.119 aElelitiel9, 90 Ela:'f Ceml=lletiel9 Timereasel9al9le time te eliaglgese, 1=l1a19 al9E1 I=lessiel:'f al9E1 test mest I=lrel9l ems el9'/el el=le eetl!flElar:'f.
twe er mere refltlireeltrail9sef MCR/ESCR 1gettleel air s:'fstem are ilgel=leral9le il9 MODE1,2, 3, er 4 fer reasel9s Hal9 al9 i 1ge1=leral9l e
1getll9e1ar:'f (i.e., Cel9e1iti el9 B), actiel9 mtlst 1ge takel9 te restere at least twe ef refltlireel eeHl eelair s:'fstem trai 195 te OPERABLE stattlS 19 24 Dtlril9g I=lerieel twe ar mere refltlireel trail9s ef MCR/ESCR 1gettleEi air s:'fstem are ilgel=leraele, meaStlres (cel9sistel9t il9tel9t ef CDC 19) 1ge tltilizeel te cel9trel ream trem as cel9tamil9atiel9.
meaStlres sAetllei 1ge availal9le te aelelress cel9cerl9s fer il9tel9tiel9al al9e1 tll9il9teAtial9al el9try il9te the cel9e1itiel9.
The 24 hetlr Time is reasal9al9le 19aseel el9 I=lral9al9ilityafa DBA Dcctlrril9g eltlril9g time I=lerieel, al9E1 tlse af meastlres. 24 Aatlr Time is a reasal9al9le time ta eliaglgese, restare, al9e1 al9e1 test mest I=lrel9lems MCR/ESCR 19attleel air s:'fstem, as rel=lresstlrizil9g s:'fstem afteril9aelvertel9t acttlatiel9.
North AnnaUnits1 and 2 B 3.7.13-6 BASES ACTIONS (cel'ltil'lt:JeEl)
SURVEILLANCE REQU I RH4ENTS MCR/ESGR Bottled Air System B 3.7.13 0.1 al'lEl 0.2 II'l MODE1,2,3, er 4, if reqt:JireEl MCR/ESGR air systeffi trail'ls er MCR/ESGR cal'll'let restereEl te OPERABLE statt:Js Tiffie, t:Jl'lit ffit:JSt placeEl il'l a MODE ffiil'liffiizes acciElel'lt risk.Te statt:Js, t:Jl'lit ffit:JSt il'l at least MODE 3 6 al'lEl il'l MODE 5 36 alleweEl Tiffies are el'l te t:Jl'lit cel'lElitiel'ls freffi ft:Jll cenElitiel'ls il'l al'l orElerly ffial'll'ler al'lEl t:Jl'lit S)'steffis.
ffieVeffiel'lt ef recel'ltly irraEliateEl ft:Jel if MCR/ESGR air systeffi trail'l cal'll'let restereEl te OPERABLE statt:Js Tiffie, two er ffiere MCR/ESGR air systeffi trail'ls are er el'le er ffiere air systeffi trail'ls Elt:Je te al'l MCR!ESGR actiel'l ffit:JSt be takel'l te"iffiffieEliately activities cet:J1El rest:Jlt il'l a release ef raElieactivity isolatiel'l af MCR/ESGR t:Jl'lit il'l a cel'lElitiel'l ffiil'liffiizes risk.*lees I'let ffieVeffiel'lt et ft:Jel te a safe J:lesitiel'l.
SR 3.7.13.1 SR verifies MCR/ESGR air is at J:lresst:Jre. el'lst:Jres ceffibil'leEl ef OPERABLE air ffiil'liffiUffi requireEl air flow will be ffiail'ltail'leEl to el'lsure MCR/ESGR el'lveleJ:le J:lresst:Jrizatiol'l fer aJ:lJ:lrexiffiately 60 ffiil'lt:Jtes MCR/ESGR air systeffi is actt:JateEl. 31*lay is el'l SR 3.7.13.2 SR verifies of MCR/ESGR air are il'l service,el'le ef 69 air il'lreqt:JireEl trail'l. SR verificatiel'l air ffial'lt:Jal valve I'let leckeEl, scaleEl, er sect:JreEl al'lEl te oJ:lel'l acciElel'lt (cel'ltil'lt:JeEl)
North AnnaUnits1 and 2 B 3.7.13-7 BASES SURVEI LLANCE REQUI RD4ENTS REFERENCES MCR/ESGRBottledAir System B 3.7.13 SR 3.7.13.2 cORsitioRS is SR to air to OPERABLE to HCR!ESGR are iR service. 31 say is bases OR Reerij aRs Has to se of correct SR soes ROt to valves are lockes, seales, or iR siRce Here verifies to iR correct to or SR 3.7.13.3 SR verifies HCR!ESGR air systeffl trai R veri fyi fl mtj s aRs Rorfflal air to aRs from HCR!ESGR is isolates OR aR or sifflulates of 18 is cORsisteRt test OR a iRterval SR 3.7.13.4 SR verifies, HCR/ESGR i of He eRvel aRs rates of cORtaffliRates air.
eRvel ti ve cORtaffliRates asjaceRt areas, is testes to verify of HCR/ESGR air systeffl.
fflose of HCR/ESGR air systeffl is to HCR/ESGR to>0.05 Hater to asjaceRt areas iR orser to HCR/ESGR air systeffl is to fflaiRtaiRtwo traiRs for at least 60 two traiRSata tiffle at of 18 OR a STAGGERED TEST BASISt-s-cORsi steRt',d saRce ses i R NUREG 081}G--(Ref.3).f7 UFSAR, SectioR 6.4.10 CFR 50, A.37 NUREG 0800, Rev.2, 1981.47 UFSAR, 15.North AnnaUnits1 and 2 B 3.7.13-8 BASES REFERENCES (C6l9ti 19l-Je*J)MCR/ESGRBottledAir System B 3.7.13 5-:-C619tf6l R66ffi IlaBi taBi 1 i ty Stl-JEly (Sl-J\9\9l effiCl9t t6 1980 Ol9si te C619tf6l R66ffi!laBi taBi 1 i ty Stl-JEly N6ftR Al9l9a Stati619 Ul9its 1 al9E1 2, Jal9l-JafY 1982.6-:-Lettef ff6ffi L.N.Ilaftz (Vif§il9ia Electfic alge P6Hef C6ffi\9aI9Y) t6 tRe USNRC, eatee HafcR3,2004, ReS\96I9Se t6Gelgefic Lettef 2003 01,"C6l9tf6l R66ffi Ilabi taBi 1 i ty C619tf6l R66ffi Testil9§&TecRl9ical 1I9f6fffiati619." North AnnaUnits1 and 2 B 3.7.13-9 MCR/ESGR EVS-During Movement of Recently Irradiated Fuel Assemblies B 3.7.14B3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.14 MaiA COAtrol Rooffi!Effier§eAcy ROOffi (MCR/ESGR)
Effier§eAcy VeAtilatioA Systeffi (EVS)
MoveffieAt of ReceAtly Irradiated Fuel Asseffiblies BACKGROUND IRe Effier§eAcy Ilabi tabi 1 i ty Systeffi (EllS) des a eAvirOAffieAt froffi caA cOAtrol UAit foll owi A§aA uAcoAtroll edreleaseof rildi oacti vity ,cals,or sffioke.
EllS cOAsi sts of MCR/ESGR bottled air systeffi (LCO 3.7.13)aAd MCR/ESGR EVS (LCO 3.7.10 aAd LCO 3.7.14). MCR/ESGR EVScOAsistsoffour reduAdaAt traiAs caA filter aAd air iAside MCR/ESGR or filtered air te MCR!ESGR aAd MCR!ESGR liffiits iAleaka§e of uAfiltered air.traiA COAsistsofa deffiister filter, aefficieAcy air (HEPA)filter, aA activated adsorber sectioA for reffieval of acti vity Aci y i odi Aes), aAd a faA.Ouch/ork, valves aAd doors, barriers aAd iAstruffieAtatioA also forffi of systeffi.OAe EVS traiA is of safety of filtered outside air.
are AD restri eti OAS OAuseof 1 IIV F 41 i A recirculatioA ffiode.Ilowner, due tolocatioAof He air i Atake for 1 IIV F 41, it caA ADt be used to sati sfy He of LCO 3.7.14.Two of reffiaiAiA§ traiAS (l II'/F42,2 IIV F 41, aAd 2 IIV F 42)are for aAd redUAdaAcy. MCR/ESGR is area cOAfiAes of 0l3e cOAtai AS sl3aces cOAtrol rOOffi to cOAtrol tAe uAit duriA§ADrffial aAd accideAt cOAditioAS. area He cOAtrol rOOffi, aAd ffiay AOA criticalareastoaccessor cOAtiAuOUS is AOt Aecessary i A He e'teAt of aA acci deAt.TRe eAvelol3e is I3rotected Aorffial ol3eratioA, Aatural eveAts, aAd accideAt cOAditioAS. MCR/ESGR eAvelol3e is He cOffibi Aati OA of\/all s, floor, roof, ducti A§, doors, l3eAetratioAs aAd forffi MCR/ESGR OPERABILITY of MCR/ESGR be ffiaiAtaiAed to eAsure iAleaka§e of air iAtO MCR/ESGR will AOt exceed North AnnaUnits1and2 B 3.7.14-1 MCR/ESGR EVS-During MovementofRecently Irradiated Fuel Assemblies B 3.7.14 BASES BACKGROUND (COflti fll:leEj) iflleaka§e ifl liceflsifl§ aflalysis of (DBA) to eflveloJge OCCl:lJ9aflts.
IRe eflvel oJgei ts al"e fleEl i fl Efl'tel oJge1ity Pl"o§l"am.
Iflcaseofa DBA Ell:ll"ifl§ movemeflt of l"ecefltly il"l"aEliateEl fl:lel afl al:ltomatic (si§flal fl"om fl:lel l"aEliatiofl mOflitol"s) 01" mafll:lal actl:latioflofail"flow fl"om ail" is Actl:latiofl of ail"flo\i fl"om ail" also al:ltomatically isolates HCR/ESGR eflveloJge to maifltaifl J90sitive J9l"essl:ll"e ifl HCR/ESGR eflveloJgeal:ltomatically stal"ts all EVS tl"aiflS ifl l"ecil"cl:llatiofl AJ9J9l"oximately 60 mifll:ltes aftel" actl:latiofl of HCR/ESGRail"system,a sifl§le HCR/ESGR EVS tl"aifl is mafll:lally actl:lateEl 01" ali§fleEl to J9l"oviEle ol:ltsiEleail"to eflvel oJge IIEPAfi1 tel"S aflEl fol" J9l"essl:ll"izatiofl. Elemistel"s l"emove aflY watel" J9l"eSeflt iflail",to J9reveflt excessive moistl:ll"e of HEPA filtel"s afld COfltifll:lOl:lS 0Jgel"atiofl oftl"aifl fol" at least 10 Jgel" Ofl, l"eEll:lces moistl:ll"e 1
Ofl tt:!e IIEPAfi1 tel"S aflEl Bott:! Elemi stel" al"e imJ90l"taflt to He effectivefless of He HEPA filtel"s aflEl ct:!al"coal Pl"essl:ll"izatiofl of tt:!e HCR/ESGR eflveloJge miflimizes iflfiltl"atiofl of ail" fl"om al"eas to He eflveloJge.
A sifl§le tl"aifl of HCR/ESGR EVS will J9l"essl:ll"ize eflveloJge to>0.04 i fldes§al:l§e.IRe EllS 0Jgel"ati Ofl i fl mai fltai fli fl§ eflvel oJge e is Eliscl:lsseEl ifl tt:!e UFSAR, Sectiofl 6.4(Ref.1).ReEll:lflElaflt HCR/ESGR EVS sl:lJ9J9ly tl"aiflS J9l"oviEle filtl"atiofl st:!ol:llEl afl excessive J9l"essl:ll"e ElI"OJ9 EleveloJ9 acl"OSS filtel" tl"aifl.NOl"mally isolatiofl al"e al"l"afl§eEl ifl sel"ies J9ail"s 50 faill:ll"e of Ofle ElamJgel" to oJgefl will flOt l"esl:llt ifl afl of tt:!e system to Jgel"fol"m tt:!e fl:lflCtiofl Ofl tt:!e J9l"eSeflCe of tl"aifl.IRe EllS is ifl witt:!Seismic Cate§ol"Y I(cofltifll:leEl)
North AnnaUnits1 and 2 B 3.7.14-2 MCR/ESGR EVS-During Movement of Recently Irradiated Fuel Assemblies B 3.7.14 BASES BACKGROUND (cel9til9l:lee)
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES HIe EllS is ees i!jlgee te ffiai I9tai 19 a e el9Virel9ffiel9t il9 MCR/ESGR fer 30 eays ef cel9til9l:lel:ls after a DBA exeeeeil9!j cel9trel reeffi eese liffiits ef 10 CFR 50, A, GDC 19(Ref.2)fer alterl9ative sel:lrce EVS are arraR!jee il9 reel:llgeal9t, safety relatee vel9tilatiel9 trail9s. lecatiel9 ef ffiest alge el:lctiR!j MCR/ESGR el9Sl:lres al9 ef filteree air te all areas access. P1CRjESGR EllS ees ai rl3erlge raei el e!ji cal fer MCRjESGR as eeffiel9stratee l3y MCRjESGR accieel9t eese al9alyses fer ffiest liffiitil9!j eesi!j19 l3asis accieeRt fissiel9 release il9 UFSAR, 15(Ref.4).
Al9l9a UFSAR eescril3es hazareel:ls steree el9site il9
!jreater 100 113.
il9cll:lee sl:llfl:lric acie, seeiuffi alge Seeil:lffi Evall:latiel9s fer accieel9tal release ef ilgeicate werst case cel9cel9tratiel9s at cel9trel reeffi il9take wel:lle l3e te l3e less texicity liffiit (Refs.1 alge 5). aSSeSSffiel9t aSSl:lffiee 1ge actiel9 l3eil9!j takel9 l3y cel9trel reeffi (i.e., 1gerffial er effier!jel9cy systeffi reffiail9s 119 evel9t ef firejsffieke exterl9al te MCRjESGR alge are availa131e te ffiail9tail9 ef cel9trel reeffi.Sffieke eetecters areiI9stall ee i 19 retl:lrl9 el:lcts te P1CR Ai r Halgel i 19!j Ul9i ts (AIIUs), i R Rearvici Rity ef ESGR AIIUs, alge i 19 He MCRjESGR EVS el:lcts, as well as I9l:lffierel:lS locatiel9s in ESGRs alge MCR.Sffioke cletecters are alse il9stallecl il9 MCRjESGR
- reeffiS, are vel9tilateclair freffi Tl:lrl3ilge Bl:lilein!j, alge reeffiS.If sffieke is cletectee, MCR/ESGR 1gerffial al9cl EVS cal9 l3e ffial9l:lally iselatee. fire clirectiel9 fer reffieviR!j sffieke freffi MCR er ESGRs.(Ref.9) werst case sil9!jle active faill:lre ef a ef MCR/ESGR EVS, assl:lffiil9!j a less ef effsite clees 1get al3ility ef systeffi te its clesi!j19 fl:ll9ctiel9.(cel9til9l:lecl)
North AnnaUnits1 and 2 B 3.7.14-3 MCR/ESGR EVS-During MovementofRecently Irradiated Fuel Assemblies B 3.7.14 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (COI9ti 19 uee::I) MCR/ESGR EVS Movemel9t of Recel9tly Fuel Assemblies satisfies 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(e)(2)(ii).THO i al9*1 EllS to be OPERABLE to at least OAe is available if a sil9§le active Total systemas a loss of vel9tilatiol9 al9 il9
- lose limits of 10 CFR SO, A, GO(;..(Ref.2),
il9 eveAtofa A MCR/ESGR EVS Movemel9t of Recel9tly Fuel Assemblies is OPERABLE il9EliviElualto1 imit OPERABLE.AI9 E)lS 19 is OPERABLE He associft7 Fal9 is OPERABLE, HEPA al9*1 190t excessively floH, al9*1 of fUl9ctiol9s;*-;- valves, OPERABLE,floH cal9 be MCR/ESGR EllS is by Ul9it 1 al9*1 Ul9it 2.119 EllS I9S to be cOl9si OPERABLE, MCR/ESGR must be mail9tailgeEl MCRjESGR
- lose a Eloes 190t calculated il9 licel9sil9§ basis al9alysesOBAs, al9*1 MCR/ESGR al9*1 smoke. LCO is by a Note alloHil9§ MCR/ESGR to be Note ol9ly to il9 MCR/ESGR cal9 be to Elesigl9 cOI9Elitiol9,as aAEl access-(col9ti 19ueEl)North AnnaUnits1 and 2 B 3.7.14-4 BASES MCR/ESGR EVS-During Movement of Recently Irradiated Fuel Assemblies B 3.7.14 t*B (col9til9l:Jes)
APPLICABI LIlY ACTIONS l3algels.For el9try al9s exit Hrol:J!j19 soors tl9c asmil9istrative cOl9trol of tlge 0l3e19i19!j is l3erformea ey tlge l3ersol9(s) el9teril9!j or exitil9!j tlge area.For otlger 0l3eni19!js, tlgese cOl9trols sl9ol:Jla ee I3rOCeal:Jralizea al9s cOl9sist of statiol9il9!j a aeaicatea il9sivisl:Jal at tlge 0l3e19i19!j wl90 is il9 cOl9til9l:Jol:JS comml:Jl9i cati 019 witl9 tlge ol3erators i 1'1 tlge el'lvel 0l3e.119is il9sivisl:Jal will 19ave a metl90a to ra13is1y close tlge 0l3e19i 19!j al9s restore tlge el9velol3e BOl:Jl9aarytoa cOl9sitiol9 to tlge sesi!j19 cOl9sitiol9 wlgel9 a 1gees for MCR!ESGR isolatiol9 is il9sicates.
Dl:Jril9!j movemel9tofrecel9tly irrasiates fl:Jel assemBlies, MCR/ESGR EVS Dl:Jril9!j Movemel9t of Recel9tly Irraaiatea Fl:Jel Assemelies ml:Jst ee OPERABLE to el9Sl:Jre tl9at ilge MCR!ESGR el9velol3e will remail9 19aeitaele sl:Jril9!j al9a followil9!j a DBA.Dl:Jril9!j movemel9tofrecel9tly irraaiatea fl:Jel assemelies, tlge EVS ml:Jst ee OPERABLE to resl3019a to tlge release from a fl:Jel 19a19alil9!j acciael9t il9volvil9!j 19a19alil9!j recel9tly irraaiatea fl:Jel.11ge MCR/ESGR EVS is 0191y to ee OPERABLE al:Jril9!j fl:Jel 19a19alil9!j il9volvil9!j 19a19dlil9!j recel9tly i naai atea fl:Jel (i.e., fl:Jel Hat 19as occl:Jl3i ca l3artofa critical reactor core witl9il9 tlge I3reviol:Js 300 1901:Jrs), al:Je to rasioactive aecay.Re!jarail9!j tlge MCR/ESGR EVS, it sl9ol:Jla ee 190tes tl9at tlgey are to Be OPERABLE By otlger LCOs il9 other MODES.Wlgel9 olge MCR!ESGR EVS trail9 is il9ol3eraBle, for reasol9s otlger tl9al9 al9 il9ol3eraele MCR!ESGR el9velol3e eOl:Jl9aary, actiol9 ml:Jst Be takel9 to restore OPERABLE statl:JS witl9il9 7*lays.119 tl9is COl9aitiol9, tlge remail9il9!j OPERABLE MCR/ESGR EVStrail9is to l3erform the MCR!ESGR el9velol3e I3rotecti 019 fl:Jl9cti 019.Hmiever, tlge overall reliaBility is real:JCea Becal:Jse a sil9!jle faill:Jre il9 tlge OPERABLE MCR/ESGR EVS trail9 cOl:Jla resl:Jlt il9 loss of EVS fl:Jl9ctiol9.
11ge 7*lay Com131etio19limeis Basea 019 tlge low I3roeaeilityofa DBA occl:Jrril9!j al:JriA!j tl9is time l3eriOa, al9a aeility of tlge remail9il9!jtrail9sto I3roviae tlge cal3aeility.
North AnnaUnits1 and 2 B 3.7.14-5 MCR/ESGR EVS-During MovementofRecently Irradiated Fuel Assemblies B 3.7.14 BASES ACTIONS(col9til9l::Jes) ffiOyeffiel9t of fl::Jel asseffihlies, if tl'le nEll::Ji i e P4CR/ESGR EVS 19 to OPERABLE statl::JS tl'le CSffif3letiol9 Tiffie, two MCR!ESGR EVSORe MCR!ESGR EVS Sl::Jf to al9 MCR/ESGR el9yelof3e actiol9 ffil::JSt ee takeR to iffiffiesiately Sl::JSf3e19s activities tl'lat cOl::Jls il9 a of tl'lat isolatiol9 of tl'le P4CR/ESGR el9velof3e.
Tl'lis f3laces tl'le l::Jl9it il9 a cOl9sitiol9 tl'lat ffiiRiffiizes Tl'lis soes Rot tl'le ffiOVeffieftt of fl::Jeltoa safe f3ositioR.
SURVEILLANCE REQU I RD4ENTS SR 3.7.14.1 StaRsey systeffis sl'lol::Jls ee cl'leckes to tl'lat tl'ley fl::JRCtioR As tl'le afis CORsitioRS OR tl'le MCR/ESGR EVS ROt too testiR§eacl'l ol9ce ffiORtl'l aR aseEll::Jate cl'leck of tl'lis systeffi.MOl9tl'lly Ol::Jt aRy ffioi accl::Jffil::Jl ates i 19 tl'le al9s l'll::Jffiisity il9 tl'le affieiel9tEacl'l ffil::JSt se>10 cOl9til9l::Jol::JS tl'le Tl'le 31 say is eases SI9 tl'le of tl'le eEll::Jif3ffie19t al9s tl'le ORe a'ta i 1 ae i 1 i ty.SR 3.7.14.2 Tl'lis SR tl'lat tl'le MCR/ESGR EVS is il9 witl'l tl'le Vel9tilatioR (VFTP).Tl'le VFTP il9cll::Jses tl'le of tl'1e deffiiti 1 tel", IIEPA ti 1 tete, cl'1al"coal efficiel9cy, ffiil9iffil::Jffi aRs ffiaxiffil::Jffi flow al9s tl'le f3l'lysical et tl'le activates Sf3ecific al9s assitiol9al siscl::Jsses il9 setai 1 i 19 He VFTP.SR 3.7.14.3 Tl'lis SR tl'le OPERABILITY of tl'le MCR/ESGR el9velof3e ey tl'le P4CR/ESGR el9yel of3e al9s i I9tO tl'le P4CR/ESGR el9vel ef3e.Tl'le setails ef tl'le sf3ecifies il9 tl'le MCR/ESGR EI9'lel ef3e Ilasi tasi1i ty
- (col9ti Rl::Jes)North AnnaUnits1 and 2 B 3.7.14-6 BASES MCR/ESGR EVS-During Movement of Recently Irradiated Fuel Assemblies B 3.7.14 SURVEI LLANCE REFERENCES SR 3.7.14.3 MCR/ESGR is eeMsiseres rasiele§ieal sese te MCR/ESGR iM lieeMsiM§ aMalyses ef DBA is Me ffiere 5 reffi tetal effeetive sese aMs MCR/ESGR are freffi aMs sffieke. SR verifies air iMleaka§e iMte MCR/ESGR is Me§reater flew rate iM lieeMsiM§ aMalyses ef DBA air iMleaka§e is§reater He fl mi rate, CeMsiti eM B be eMteres.
res AetieM B ffieveffieMt ef reeeMtly irrasiates iffiffiesiately te risk ef te a
aeeiseMt.f7 UFSAR, SeetieM 6.4.10 CFR 50, A.37 NUREG 0800, Rev.2, 1981.40 UFSAR, 15.5-:-CeMtrel Reeffi te 1980 OMsi te CeMtrel Reeffi1i ty AMM Pewer StatieM UMits 1 aMs 2, 1982.67 1.196.:j-;.NEI 99 03,"CeMtrel Reeffi AssessffieMt," 2001.&:-Letter freffiErie J.Leess (NRC)te Jaffies\L Davi 5 (NEI)sates 30, 2004,"NEI Draft Use ef GeMerie Letter 91 18 Preeess aMs AlterMative TerffiS i M CeMtext ef CeMtrel Reeffi lIabi tabi1i ty.II AeeessieM Ne.ML040300694).
9-;-Letter freffi L.N.Ilartz (Vi rgi Mi a El eetri e aMs Pe\ier te USNRC, sates 3, 2004, te GeMeri e Letter 2003 01, II CeMtrel Reeffi i ty CeMtrel Reeffi Testi Mg&ealI Mferffiati eM.II North AnnaUnits1 and 2 B 3.7.14-7