Information Notice 1996-71, Licensee Response to Indications of Tampering, Vandalism, or Malicious Mischief

Licensee Response to Indications of Tampering, Vandalism, or Malicious Mischief

ML031050461
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant
Issue date:	12/27/1996
From:	Martin T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-96-071, NUDOCS 9612300051
Download: ML031050461 (8)

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION-

WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 December 27, 1996 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 96-71: LICENSEE RESPONSE TO INDICATIONS OF

TAMPERING, VANDALISM, OR MALICIOUS

MISCHIEF

Addressees

All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power reactors.

Purpose

This information notice is being issued to alert licensees to the benefits of planning a

response to indications of tampering, vandalism, or malicious mischief. It is expected that

recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate. However, suggestions contained in this information notice are not NRC

requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.

Description of Circumstances

Recent events at operating reactors indicate that some licensee personnel may not

recognize the potential significance of early indications of potential tampering, vandalism, or malicious mischief. As a result, licensee response may be untimely and of limited scope

and depth. Failure to promptly question, resolve the significance and implement an

appropriate strategy to mitigate the consequence of a potential tampering, vandalism, or

malicious mischief situation, could leave the plant in a vulnerable state for a significant

period of time. Lack of detailed planning, procedures, and training frequently plays a role

in the quality of response to these events. Brief accounts of two events illustrate the

issue:

Improperly Positioned Valve at Beaver Valley

During the conduct of a quarterly surveillance on Friday, July 14, 1995, to verify the

position of certain safety-related locked valves; the licensee determined that the service

water cross-connect valve at the discharge of the recirculation spray heat exchanger was

in the incorrect position (shut in lieu of open), that the chain used to secure the valve in

the proper position had been cut, and that the lock appeared to have been placed back on

the chain in a manner that made it difficult to detect the condition. The licensee's staff

initially assumed the valve had been inadvertently mispositioned during earlier operational

evolutions, but subsequent interviews and analysis were unable to confirm this

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IN 96-71 December 27, 1996 Licensee management first learned of the event on Tuesday, July 18, 1995. Consequ- ently, licensee management was not able to oversee the licensee evaluation of the event

until considerable time had elapsed. The licensee's determination that potential tampering

could not be ruled out was not made until six days after the incorrect valve position

was identified. Thorough valve lineup checks and locked valve surveillances were not

completed for both Beaver Valley units until after the plant staff made an emergency

notification system (ENS) call on Thursday evening, July 20, 1995. The similarity of this

event to an event in the early 1980s heightened the concern of both licensee and NRC

personnel who knew of the previous events.

Misadjusted Valves and Disabled Locks at St. Lucie

In May 1996, St. Lucie personnel identified two pressure-relief valves which, when tested, were found to have pressure setpoints 55 percent and 9 percent above their design values.

These valves also had broken wire seals. The root cause could not be determined.

Although tampering could not be ruled out, it was concluded that the more likely cause for

the misadjusted valves was poor maintenance. Licensee management decided to alert the

Security force; however, site Security was not notified. The failure to follow through on

alerting site Security precluded coordinated actions of Operations and Security staffs to

enhance awareness to other possible tampering events.

On July 26, 1996, St. Lucie staff identified nine padlocks and two door locks in vital areas

that were intentionally damaged to inhibit opening the locks. These locks controlled

personnel access to various pieces of plant equipment. The licensee did not identify

keylock switches as needing to be checked; consequently, these switches were not

checked until August 1996. Although the tampering of components within a vital area

indicated the need to be alert to additional tampering, other than alerting Security, the

licensee failed to consider additional measures to detect tampering. On August 14, 1996, St. Lucie staff identified three additional examples of tampering in vital areas that inhibited

the opening of locks associated with safety-related equipment.

Discussion

The following factors may have contributed to these events:

(1) The licensees' contingency plans required by 10 CFR 73.55(h)(1) and the

implementing procedures required by Appendix C to Part 73 did not adequately

address tampering, vandalism, and malicious mischief. Other licensee procedures

touched some aspects of these situations; however, no plan or process was used to

evaluate the potential malevolent event and determine its importance. Factors such

as safety significance, overtness, intent, sophistication of method, and the history

of similar incidents were not considered. Information Notice 83-27, "Operational

Response to Events Concerning Deliberate Acts Directed Against Plant Equipment,"

described events in which licensees were not prepared to assess the situation and

take necessary steps to ensure the operability of systems important to safety or

make decisions concerning continued operation. The information notice indicated

that guidelines or procedures prepared by the licensee outlining a process of

i

IN 96-71 December 27, 1996 following up on both deliberate and inadvertent acts with respect to plant operation

should be available.

(2) The licensees' actions were limited in scope and depth, at least initially, in pursuing

the events.

(3) The licensees' Operations staff were not sensitive to abnormalities identified earlier

and apparently assumed no malice. Since the Operations staff may be the first to

encounter signs of tampering, vandalism, or malicious mischief during its tours and

surveillance activities, sensitivity to precursors plays a key role in timely response to

events of this nature. Therefore, licensees may wish to periodically refresh their

Operations staff's sensitivity to and awareness of the evaluation process to ensure

effective response to these acts.

(4) The licensee's Security staff was not told about these problems until well into the

sequence of events at St. Lucie. Security's ability to identify the perpetrators and

institute other protective measures diminishes severely as time elapses.

Events of this nature are required by Appendix G to Part 73 of 10 CFR to be reported to

the NRC Operations Center within one hour of discovery.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any

questions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts

listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation project manager.

Thomas T. Martin, Director

Division of Reactor Program Management

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts: Loren Bush, NRR

(301) 415-2944 E-mail: llb(nrc.gov

David Skeen, NRR

(301) 415-1174 E-mail: dls@nrc.gov

Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

AM -chrobL~A 4?f-r

S

W-

Attachment

IN 96-71 December 27, 1996 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

NRC INFORMATION NOTICES

Information Date of

Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to

96-70 Year 2000 Effect on Computer 12/24/96 All U.S. Nuclear

System Software Regulatory Commission

licensees, certificate

holders, and registrants

96-69 Operator Actions Affecting 12/20/96 All holders of OLs

Reactivity or CPs for nuclear

power reactors

96-68 Incorrect Effective Diaphragm 12/19/96 All holders of OLs

Area Values in Vendor Manual or CPs for nuclear

Result in Potential Failure power reactors

of Pneumatic Diaphragm

Actuators

96-67 Vulnerability of Emergency 12/19/96 All holders of OLs

Diesel Generators to Fuel or CPs for nuclear

Oil/Lubricating Oil Incom- power reactors

patibility

96-66 Recent Misadministrations 12/13/96 All U.S. Nuclear

Caused by Incorrect Cali- Regulatory Commission

brations of Strontium-90 Medical Use Licensees

Eye Applicators authorized to use

strontium-90 (Sr-90)

eye applicators

96-65 Undetected Accumulation 12/11/96 All holders of OLs

of Gas in Reactor Coolant or CPs for nuclear

System and Inaccurate power reactors

Reactor Water Level

Indication During Shutdown

OL = Operating License

CP = Construction Permit

IN 96-71 December 27, 1996 following up on both deliberate and inadvertent acts with respect to plant operation

should be available. t

(2) The licensees' actions were limited in scope and depth, at least initially, in pursuing

the events.

(3) The licensees' Operations staff were not sensitive to abnormalities identified earlier

and apparently assumed no malice. Since the Operations staff may be the first to

encounter signs of tampering, vandalism, or malicious mischief during its tours and

surveillance activities, sensitivity to precursors plays a key role in timely response to

events of this nature. Therefore, licensees may wish to periodically refresh their

Operations staff's sensitivity to and awareness of the evaluation process to ensure

effective response to these acts.

(4) The licensee's Security staff was not told about these problems until well into the

sequence of events at St. Lucie. Security's ability to identify the perpetrator(s) and

institute other protective measures diminishes severely as time elapses.

Events of this nature are required by Appendix G to Part 73 of 10 CFR to be reported to

the NRC Operations Center within one hour of discovery.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any

questions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts

listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation project manager.

original signed by D.B. Matthews

Thomas T. Martin, Director

Division of Reactor Program Management

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts: Loren Bush, NRR David Skeen, NRR

(301) 415-2944 (301) 415-1174 E-mail: llb@nrc.gov E-mail: dls@nrc.gov

Tech Editor has reviewed and concurred on 9/27/96 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

DOCUMENT NAME: 96-71.IN

To receive a copy of this document. hIdlcate I the box: 'C' - Copy w/o

attachmentlenclosure 'E' - Copy wfattachmentlenclosure 'N' - No copy

OFFICE TECH CONTS I C/PECB:DRPM I D/DRP I I

NAME LBush* AChaffee* TMart

DSkeen* L ' I

DATE 10/31/96 11/01/96 12 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

• IN 96- December , 1996 following up on both deliberate and inadvertent acts with respect to plant operation

should be available.

(2) The licensees' actions were limited in scope and depth, at least initially, in pursuing

the events.

(3) The licensees' Operations staff were not sensitive to abnormalities identified earlier

and apparently assumed no malice. Since the Operations staff may be the first to

encounter signs of tampering, vandalism, or malicious mischief during its tours and

surveillance activities, sensitivity to precursors plays a key role in timely response to

events of this nature. Therefore, licensees may wish to periodically refresh their

Operations staff's sensitivity to and awareness of the evaluation process to ensure

effective response to these acts.

(4) The licensee's Security staff was not told about these problems until well into the

sequence of events at St. Lucie. Security's ability to identify the perpetrators and

institute other protective measures diminishes severely as time elapses.

Events of this nature are required by Appendix G to Part 73 of 10 CFR to be reported to

the NRC Operations Center within one hour of discovery.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any

questions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts

listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation project manager.

Thomas T. Martin, Director

Division of Reactor Program Management

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts: Loren Bush, NRR David Skeen, NRR

(301) 415-2944 (301) 415-1174 E-mail: llb@nrc.gov E-mail: dls@nrc.gov

Tech Editor has reviewed and concurred on 9/27/96 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DLS\96-XXX

To receive a copy of this document. indicate In the box: 'C - Copy w/o

attachment/enclosure WE- Copy wlettachmenlenClosure N - No copy

OFFICE TECH CONTS C/PECB:DRPM l D/DRPJ- I

NAME LBush* AChaffee* Toard n

DSkeen1 A a e haW

10/31/96 11/01/96 12/zo /96 DATE

Al. -r. .. - .

U11l.IWAL KLLUKU HUrY 4 AIn-nn/I

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• IN 96-XX

November xx, 1996 available. Furthermore, the licensee contingency plans requiredby 10 CFR

73.55(h)(1) and the implementing procedures required by Appendix C to Part 73 did

not adequately address tampering, vandalism, and malicious mischief.

(2) The licensee actions were limited in scope and depth, at least initially, in pursuing the

events.

(3) The Operations staff was not sensitive to abnormalities identified earlier and

apparently assumed no malice. Since the Operations staff may be the first to

encounter signs of tampering, vandalism, or malicious mischief during its tours and

surveillance activities, sensitivity to precursors plays a key role in timely response to

events of this nature. Therefore, licensees may wish to periodically refresh their

Operations staffs sensitivity to and awareness of the evaluation process to ensure

effective response to these acts.

(4) The licensee's Security staff was not told about these problems until well into the

sequence of events. Security's ability to identify the perpetrator(s) and institute other

protective measures diminishes severely as time elapses.

Events of this nature are required by Appendix G to Part 73 of 10 CFR to be reported to the

NRC Operations Center within one hour of discovery.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any

questions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts

listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Thomas T. Martin, Director

Division of Reactor Program Management

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Loren Bush, NRR

(301) 415-2944 E-mail: llb@nrc.gov

David Skeen, NRR

(301) 415-1174 E-mail: dls@nrc.gov

Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

DOCUMENT NAME: G:MDLS\IN96-XX.TPR

To receive a copy of this document. hIdicate hI the box: 'C' - Copy w/o

attachmenVenclosure 'E' - Copy wlattachmentlenclosure 'N' - No copy

OFFICE PECB:DRPM IC PSGB:DRPM C/PSGB:DRPM C/PECB:DRPM , D/DRPM

NAME DSkeenZot-C LBush* LCunninghamnM AChaffeeCifv-' TMartin

DATE 10/3//96 10/xv/96 10/ /96 1l// /96 3y9 10/ /96

-i

• -pervias OFFICIAL RECORD COPY 44I 1i

K.IN 96-XX

October xx, 1996 available. Furthermore, the licensee contingency plans requiredby 10 CFR

73.55(h)(1) and the implementing procedures required by Appendix C to Part 73 did

not adequately address tampering, vandalism, and malicious mischief.

(2) The licensee actions were limited in scope and depth, at least initially, in pursuing the

events.

(3) The Operations staff was not sensitive to abnormalities identified earlier and

apparently assumed no malice. Since the Operations staff may be the first to

encounter signs of tampering, vandalism, or malicious mischief during its tours and

surveillance activities, sensitivity to precursors plays a key role in timely response to

events of this nature. Therefore, licensees may wish to periodically refresh their

Operations staffs sensitivity to and awareness of the evaluation process to ensure

effective response to these acts.

(4) The licensee's Security staff was not told about these problems until well into the

sequence of events. Security's ability to identify the perpetrator(s) and institute other

protective measures diminishes severely as time elapses.

Events of this nature are required by Appendix G to Part 73 of 10 CFR to be reported to the

NRC Operations Center within one hour of discovery.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any

questions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts

listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Thomas T. Martin, Director

Division of Reactor Program Management

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Loren Bush, NRR

(301) 415-2944 E-mail: llbenrc.gov

David Skeen, NRR

(301) 415-1174 E-mail: dIs@nrc.gov

Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

DOCUMENT NAME: G:IDLSIN96-XX.TPR

To receive a copy of this document,. Indicate i the box: 'C' - Copy w/o

attachment/enclosure 'E' - Copy w/attachmenVenclosure 'N' - No copy

OFFICE PECB:DRPM - I PSGB:DRPM C/PSWJ RM/ )C/PECB:DRPM I D/DRPM

INAME

DATE

US-keen A50L-

10/6/4/96 ILBush Xx:i'

10t796 ILCurh&FaIIt V AChaffee

10 9E

910/ - /96 TMartin

10/ /96 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY