ML19326A088: Difference between revisions
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol) |
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol) |
||
Line 18: | Line 18: | ||
=Text= | =Text= | ||
{{#Wiki_filter:. . . . . | {{#Wiki_filter:. . . . . | ||
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT , | LICENSEE EVENT REPORT , | ||
q | q CONTyL RLOCK: l 8 | ||
CONTyL RLOCK: l 8 | |||
\ l l w. l l 6 | \ l l w. l l 6 | ||
(PLEASE PRINT CR TT ALL REQUIR ED INFO RMATl!N) | (PLEASE PRINT CR TT ALL REQUIR ED INFO RMATl!N) 0 HlD 1 @l 0 l 0 l- l 0 LICENSE l 0 l NUMBER N lP l F l- l0 l2$3 l@l4 26 l1 Il l1 LICENSE T)PE l140 l@l l | ||
0 HlD 1 @l 0 l 0 l- l 0 LICENSE l 0 l NUMBER N lP l F l- l0 l2$3 l@l4 26 l1 Il l1 LICENSE T)PE l140 l@l l | |||
67 CAT 64 l@ | 67 CAT 64 l@ | ||
I LICENSEE CODE le 15 C | I LICENSEE CODE le 15 C | ||
10111- EURCE | 10111- EURCE M JiGI5l0I 101114Igl@l0(6(215l718l@l01712101718l@ 74 75 REPORT OATE 80 7 8 60 al COCKET NUMSER 68 69 EVENT OATE EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBA8LE CONSEQUENCES h i O ; a i l During the performance of surveillance testing, Contah-ent Isolation Valves CC 1407B [ | ||
g l and CC 14113 did not operate when actuated frOm an automatic test signal. The valves ,l l | |||
M JiGI5l0I 101114Igl@l0(6(215l718l@l01712101718l@ 74 75 REPORT OATE 80 7 8 60 al COCKET NUMSER 68 69 EVENT OATE EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBA8LE CONSEQUENCES h i O ; a i l During the performance of surveillance testing, Contah-ent Isolation Valves CC 1407B [ | |||
g l and CC 14113 did not operate when actuated frOm an automatic test signal. The valves ,l | |||
, o g l vere thus inoperable. There was no danger to the health and safety Of the public or 10 i s I l unit personnel. Each inonerRhlva valve is one of evn Anuhle i=olaf. inn valves. The l O 6 l redundant valve would, therefor *. h8"e "rovided coStaiS**nt f | , o g l vere thus inoperable. There was no danger to the health and safety Of the public or 10 i s I l unit personnel. Each inonerRhlva valve is one of evn Anuhle i=olaf. inn valves. The l O 6 l redundant valve would, therefor *. h8"e "rovided coStaiS**nt f | ||
* SI M ti n'* SP apch l oc M Pi n'9 l 1 | * SI M ti n'* SP apch l oc M Pi n'9 l 1 | ||
(NP-33-78-88) | (NP-33-78-88) lO17I Iif reOuired. | ||
lO17I Iif reOuired. | |||
l 10481I 80 | l 10481I 80 | ||
- E OE SU E COMPONENT CODE SUSCQdE S QQE 10l91 1 1 1 3 l@ U@ lX l@ lIl NI S l T I R l U lh y@ y @ | - E OE SU E COMPONENT CODE SUSCQdE S QQE 10l91 1 1 1 3 l@ U@ lX l@ lIl NI S l T I R l U lh y@ y @ | ||
Line 51: | Line 40: | ||
[ N ACT ON P MET l0101elof IYl@ la l@ Icl5;6l0lq | [ N ACT ON P MET l0101elof IYl@ la l@ Icl5;6l0lq | ||
\ lZ l@ Lz_l@ 171 @ | \ lZ l@ Lz_l@ 171 @ | ||
Y U33 @ @4@ . 35 36 37 40 el 42 43 44 4y | Y U33 @ @4@ . 35 36 37 40 el 42 43 44 4y CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS I | ||
CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS I | |||
I i l O l \Several wires were found broken at connectors. The wire breaks were mOst erobablv y l caused by working in close proximity tO the cOnne/ tors durine the outace. The brokan i l | I i l O l \Several wires were found broken at connectors. The wire breaks were mOst erobablv y l caused by working in close proximity tO the cOnne/ tors durine the outace. The brokan i l | ||
i1 12 I l wires were repaired. , | i1 12 I l wires were repaired. , | ||
Line 60: | Line 47: | ||
7 8 9 | 7 8 9 | ||
'sTAN % POWER OTHER STATUS On OEY OlSCOVERY OESCRIPTION l | 'sTAN % POWER OTHER STATUS On OEY OlSCOVERY OESCRIPTION l | ||
l115 l y@ l 0 l G I G l@l NA l lB l@lSurveill'anceTestST 5031.07 0 | l115 l y@ l 0 l G I G l@l NA l lB l@lSurveill'anceTestST 5031.07 0 AbVITY CO TENT ~ | ||
AbVITY CO TENT ~ | |||
LOCATION OF RELEASE RELEAsEO OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY l1 l6* l' d h l Z l@l NA l* l NA l PERSONNEL EXPOSURES | LOCATION OF RELEASE RELEAsEO OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY l1 l6* l' d h l Z l@l NA l* l NA l PERSONNEL EXPOSURES | ||
~UM.ER TvPE eEsCRi,TiO~ @ ~ | ~UM.ER TvPE eEsCRi,TiO~ @ ~ | ||
Line 70: | Line 55: | ||
* l li t a l 9la lo la l@l 12NA 11 30 7 | * l li t a l 9la lo la l@l 12NA 11 30 7 | ||
LC55 OF OR OAMAGE TO FActLITY TYPE CESCRIPTION | LC55 OF OR OAMAGE TO FActLITY TYPE CESCRIPTION | ||
. ._ [, h l | . ._ [, h l 7 8 9 lzl@lNA to D Q () 1 61 V (./ ' NRC usE ONLY 80' ~ I | ||
7 8 9 lzl@lNA to D Q () 1 61 V (./ ' NRC usE ONLY 80' ~ I | |||
' l SEsCaiPTiON@ | ' l SEsCaiPTiON@ | ||
issut l 2 l a l, l Nfhl NA l lll11IIIIi111* | issut l 2 l a l, l Nfhl NA l lll11IIIIi111* | ||
Line 78: | Line 61: | ||
* 7 8 9 10 419-259-3000, Ext. 239 NAME OF PREPARER Sue KOvach/ Jim Albert PHONE: { | * 7 8 9 10 419-259-3000, Ext. 239 NAME OF PREPARER Sue KOvach/ Jim Albert PHONE: { | ||
^~ I t'' . | |||
^~ I | |||
t'' . | |||
~~.. . | ~~.. . | ||
- TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY DAVIS-BESSE UNIT ONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-78-88 DATE OF EVENT: June 25, 1978 FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit.1 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Containment Isolation Valves CC 1407B and CC 1411B inoperable . | |||
4 Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 5, with Power (NWT) = 0, and Load (MWE) = 0. . | |||
- TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY | |||
DAVIS-BESSE UNIT ONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-78-88 | |||
DATE OF EVENT: June 25, 1978 | |||
FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit.1 | |||
IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Containment Isolation Valves CC 1407B and CC 1411B inoperable . | |||
4 | |||
Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 5, with Power (NWT) = 0, | |||
and Load (MWE) = 0. | |||
Description of Occurrence: At.1300 hours on June 25, 1978 during performance of Surveillance Test ST 5031.07, " Safety Features Actuation System 18 Month or Refueling Test", Containmant Isolation Valves CC 1407B and CC 14113 did not operate when actuated from an automatic test signal. .The valves were thus in- | Description of Occurrence: At.1300 hours on June 25, 1978 during performance of Surveillance Test ST 5031.07, " Safety Features Actuation System 18 Month or Refueling Test", Containmant Isolation Valves CC 1407B and CC 14113 did not operate when actuated from an automatic test signal. .The valves were thus in- | ||
; operable. , | ; operable. , | ||
l 7 Technical Specification 3.6.3.1 requires that these containment isolation valves be operable in Mod 7s 1, 2, 3 and 4. Since the unit was in Mode 5 at the time of' 4 | l 7 Technical Specification 3.6.3.1 requires that these containment isolation valves be operable in Mod 7s 1, 2, 3 and 4. Since the unit was in Mode 5 at the time of' 4 | ||
S the occurrence, the Action Statement was not applicable. This occurrence is be- | S the occurrence, the Action Statement was not applicable. This occurrence is be-4.ing reported as documentation of a component failure. | ||
4.ing reported as documentation of a component failure. | |||
Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: CC 1407 had a broken wire external to the cabinets in cable. spreading room. This appears to be an isolated failure. | Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: CC 1407 had a broken wire external to the cabinets in cable. spreading room. This appears to be an isolated failure. | ||
Several wires were found broken at connectors which link Safety Features Actua-tion System (STAS) Channels 2 and 4. The broken wires were on the cabinet side wiring in Channel 4. The wire breaks were probably caused by strain on.the , | Several wires were found broken at connectors which link Safety Features Actua-tion System (STAS) Channels 2 and 4. The broken wires were on the cabinet side wiring in Channel 4. The wire breaks were probably caused by strain on.the , | ||
wire due to the ,iumpering of DH-11 for testing during the outage, or possibly due to other routine access to cabinet 4 during the outage. | wire due to the ,iumpering of DH-11 for testing during the outage, or possibly due to other routine access to cabinet 4 during the outage. | ||
Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or to unit personnel. Each inoperable valve is one of two double isolation - | Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or to unit personnel. Each inoperable valve is one of two double isolation - | ||
vavles. The redundant valve would, therefore, have prom ded, containment isolation at each location if required. If an event requiring these valves te'be closed - | vavles. The redundant valve would, therefore, have prom ded, containment isolation at each location if required. If an event requiring these valves te'be closed - | ||
Line 130: | Line 78: | ||
Corrective Action: The broken wires were repaired. All wires, except those which are part of spare circuits or have yet to be functionally tested in other tests, were scheme checked. The valves were returned to operability on June 30, ,' | Corrective Action: The broken wires were repaired. All wires, except those which are part of spare circuits or have yet to be functionally tested in other tests, were scheme checked. The valves were returned to operability on June 30, ,' | ||
1978. . | 1978. . | ||
LER #78-074 5 | |||
5 | |||
- 1 | - 1 | ||
. . . _ . - - - ~ _ _ _ . . , . . . . . , . - | . . . _ . - - - ~ _ _ _ . . , . . . . . , . - | ||
. g | . g | ||
. w | |||
. w | * TOLEDO EDISON CCEPANY DAVIS-BESSE UNIT ONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-78-88 PAGE 2 0F 2 Failure Data: | ||
TOLEDO EDISON CCEPANY | |||
DAVIS-BESSE UNIT ONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-78-88 PAGE 2 0F 2 | |||
Failure Data: | |||
There have been no previous reportable occurrences. | There have been no previous reportable occurrences. | ||
9 4 | 9 4 | ||
LER #78-074 . | LER #78-074 . | ||
W e | W e | ||
O r | O r | ||
i | i 9 | ||
e B | |||
9 e | |||
4 e | |||
O G | |||
e | 9 m | ||
m | |||
- . - - , - - - - . . - - - , . . - = - . - -. .--..-...--.4--..- ~ . - - ---,--.-,.r,-w-+ . w 1, m,-}} | - . - - , - - - - . . - - - , . . - = - . - -. .--..-...--.4--..- ~ . - - ---,--.-,.r,-w-+ . w 1, m,-}} |
Latest revision as of 01:22, 1 February 2020
ML19326A088 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Davis Besse ![]() |
Issue date: | 07/20/1978 |
From: | Albert J, Kovach S TOLEDO EDISON CO. |
To: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
Shared Package | |
ML19326A086 | List: |
References | |
LER-78-074-03L, LER-78-74-3L, NUDOCS 8001310655 | |
Download: ML19326A088 (3) | |
Text
. . . . .
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ,
q CONTyL RLOCK: l 8
\ l l w. l l 6
(PLEASE PRINT CR TT ALL REQUIR ED INFO RMATl!N) 0 HlD 1 @l 0 l 0 l- l 0 LICENSE l 0 l NUMBER N lP l F l- l0 l2$3 l@l4 26 l1 Il l1 LICENSE T)PE l140 l@l l
67 CAT 64 l@
I LICENSEE CODE le 15 C
10111- EURCE M JiGI5l0I 101114Igl@l0(6(215l718l@l01712101718l@ 74 75 REPORT OATE 80 7 8 60 al COCKET NUMSER 68 69 EVENT OATE EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBA8LE CONSEQUENCES h i O ; a i l During the performance of surveillance testing, Contah-ent Isolation Valves CC 1407B [
g l and CC 14113 did not operate when actuated frOm an automatic test signal. The valves ,l l
, o g l vere thus inoperable. There was no danger to the health and safety Of the public or 10 i s I l unit personnel. Each inonerRhlva valve is one of evn Anuhle i=olaf. inn valves. The l O 6 l redundant valve would, therefor *. h8"e "rovided coStaiS**nt f
(NP-33-78-88) lO17I Iif reOuired.
l 10481I 80
- E OE SU E COMPONENT CODE SUSCQdE S QQE 10l91 1 1 1 3 l@ U@ lX l@ lIl NI S l T I R l U lh y@ y @
12 13 18 19 20 7 8 9 10 11 -
REVISION SEQUENTIAL OCCURRENCE REPORT REPORT NO. CODE TYPE NO.
LE R/Ro EVENT YEAR
- h ,R Ey l7l8l l@ l7 l4 l l@ l3 l lL l l-] {g ]_
24 26 27 28 3 30 31 32
_ 23 22 23 MOUR$ $ 8 IT FOR 8. PPLIE
- MANUFA RER T
[ N ACT ON P MET l0101elof IYl@ la l@ Icl5;6l0lq
\ lZ l@ Lz_l@ 171 @
Y U33 @ @4@ . 35 36 37 40 el 42 43 44 4y CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS I
I i l O l \Several wires were found broken at connectors. The wire breaks were mOst erobablv y l caused by working in close proximity tO the cOnne/ tors durine the outace. The brokan i l
i1 12 I l wires were repaired. ,
1 l i 131 1 -
l It 141 l -
7 8 9
'sTAN % POWER OTHER STATUS On OEY OlSCOVERY OESCRIPTION l
l115 l y@ l 0 l G I G l@l NA l lB l@lSurveill'anceTestST 5031.07 0 AbVITY CO TENT ~
LOCATION OF RELEASE RELEAsEO OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY l1 l6* l' d h l Z l@l NA l* l NA l PERSONNEL EXPOSURES
~UM.ER TvPE eEsCRi,TiO~ @ ~
l li l 7110 la lo l@l Zl@l NA
==
> - - PER,0N~Er,Na E, NuM.ER OEsCRiPTiO~@
- l li t a l 9la lo la l@l 12NA 11 30 7
LC55 OF OR OAMAGE TO FActLITY TYPE CESCRIPTION
. ._ [, h l 7 8 9 lzl@lNA to D Q () 1 61 V (./ ' NRC usE ONLY 80' ~ I
' l SEsCaiPTiON@
issut l 2 l a l, l Nfhl NA l lll11IIIIi111*
68 69 80
- 7 8 9 10 419-259-3000, Ext. 239 NAME OF PREPARER Sue KOvach/ Jim Albert PHONE: {
^~ I t .
~~.. .
- TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY DAVIS-BESSE UNIT ONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-78-88 DATE OF EVENT: June 25, 1978 FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit.1 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Containment Isolation Valves CC 1407B and CC 1411B inoperable .
4 Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 5, with Power (NWT) = 0, and Load (MWE) = 0. .
Description of Occurrence: At.1300 hours0.015 days <br />0.361 hours <br />0.00215 weeks <br />4.9465e-4 months <br /> on June 25, 1978 during performance of Surveillance Test ST 5031.07, " Safety Features Actuation System 18 Month or Refueling Test", Containmant Isolation Valves CC 1407B and CC 14113 did not operate when actuated from an automatic test signal. .The valves were thus in-
- operable. ,
l 7 Technical Specification 3.6.3.1 requires that these containment isolation valves be operable in Mod 7s 1, 2, 3 and 4. Since the unit was in Mode 5 at the time of' 4
S the occurrence, the Action Statement was not applicable. This occurrence is be-4.ing reported as documentation of a component failure.
Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: CC 1407 had a broken wire external to the cabinets in cable. spreading room. This appears to be an isolated failure.
Several wires were found broken at connectors which link Safety Features Actua-tion System (STAS) Channels 2 and 4. The broken wires were on the cabinet side wiring in Channel 4. The wire breaks were probably caused by strain on.the ,
wire due to the ,iumpering of DH-11 for testing during the outage, or possibly due to other routine access to cabinet 4 during the outage.
Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or to unit personnel. Each inoperable valve is one of two double isolation -
vavles. The redundant valve would, therefore, have prom ded, containment isolation at each location if required. If an event requiring these valves te'be closed -
had occurred, the operator would have been able to close these valver using the
' control room switch, 4
Corrective Action: The broken wires were repaired. All wires, except those which are part of spare circuits or have yet to be functionally tested in other tests, were scheme checked. The valves were returned to operability on June 30, ,'
1978. .
LER #78-074 5
- 1
. . . _ . - - - ~ _ _ _ . . , . . . . . , . -
. g
. w
- TOLEDO EDISON CCEPANY DAVIS-BESSE UNIT ONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-78-88 PAGE 2 0F 2 Failure Data:
There have been no previous reportable occurrences.
9 4
LER #78-074 .
W e
O r
i 9
e B
9 e
4 e
O G
9 m
- . - - , - - - - . . - - - , . . - = - . - -. .--..-...--.4--..- ~ . - - ---,--.-,.r,-w-+ . w 1, m,-