05000298/FIN-2010005-06: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = | | Inspection procedure = | ||
| Inspector = M Chambers, T Farina, V Gaddy, C Steely, G George, J Joseyg, | | Inspector = M Chambers, T Farina, V Gaddy, C Steely, G George, J Joseyg, Guerrap Elkmann, J Josey, V Gaddy, M Chambers, E Ruesch | ||
| CCA = N/A for ROP | | CCA = N/A for ROP | ||
| INPO aspect = | | INPO aspect = | ||
| description = The team identified an unresolved item concerning external flood protection for plant areas considered vital to allow the reactor to achieve cold shutdown. Specifically, the issue concerns the ability of the licensee to protect the Cooper Nuclear Station reactor building and intake structure from external floods as stated in Updated Safety Analysis Report, Technical Specifications, and emergency procedures. The inspectors reviewed the historical information for hydrology in the Cooper Nuclear Station Updated Safety Analysis Report Section II-4, Hydrology. The inspectors noted that this information was used to establish the design basis floods levels and flood protection at Cooper Nuclear Station. By reviewing recent industry operating experience and the 2010 floods along the Missouri River, the inspectors identified that actual river flow rates yielded higher flood levels than previously evaluated in the Updated Safety Analysis Report. Additionally, the US Army Corps of Engineers published new data in January 2004 that river flows on the Missouri River created the potential for higher flood levels than previous published data. Because of the potential for increased flood levels, the inspectors questioned the licensees ability to protect nuclear plant structures from the design basis flood levels. Based on questions from the inspectors, the licensee entered the condition into the corrective action program. The inspectors determined that more inspection is necessary to resolve the issue. Since more information is necessary, the issue is considered an unresolved item pending further NRC Region IV review. The NRC Region IV review will determine: 1. If the licensees flood protection strategy will adequately protect to the flood levels stated in the Updated Safety Analysis Report, 2. If failure to meet these standards of flood protection is a performance deficiency in accordance with NRC Manual Chapter 0612, and 3. If a violation of NRC requirements is associated with the performance deficiency. | | description = The team identified an unresolved item concerning external flood protection for plant areas considered vital to allow the reactor to achieve cold shutdown. Specifically, the issue concerns the ability of the licensee to protect the Cooper Nuclear Station reactor building and intake structure from external floods as stated in Updated Safety Analysis Report, Technical Specifications, and emergency procedures. The inspectors reviewed the historical information for hydrology in the Cooper Nuclear Station Updated Safety Analysis Report Section II-4, Hydrology. The inspectors noted that this information was used to establish the design basis floods levels and flood protection at Cooper Nuclear Station. By reviewing recent industry operating experience and the 2010 floods along the Missouri River, the inspectors identified that actual river flow rates yielded higher flood levels than previously evaluated in the Updated Safety Analysis Report. Additionally, the US Army Corps of Engineers published new data in January 2004 that river flows on the Missouri River created the potential for higher flood levels than previous published data. Because of the potential for increased flood levels, the inspectors questioned the licensees ability to protect nuclear plant structures from the design basis flood levels. Based on questions from the inspectors, the licensee entered the condition into the corrective action program. The inspectors determined that more inspection is necessary to resolve the issue. Since more information is necessary, the issue is considered an unresolved item pending further NRC Region IV review. The NRC Region IV review will determine: 1. If the licensees flood protection strategy will adequately protect to the flood levels stated in the Updated Safety Analysis Report, 2. If failure to meet these standards of flood protection is a performance deficiency in accordance with NRC Manual Chapter 0612, and 3. If a violation of NRC requirements is associated with the performance deficiency. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 19:40, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Cooper  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000298/2010005 Section 4OA5 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2010 (2010Q4) |
| Type: | URI: |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | M Chambers T Farina V Gaddy C Steely G George J Joseyg Guerrap Elkmann J Josey V Gaddy M Chambers E Ruesch |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |