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{{Adams
{{Adams
| number = ML081840502
| number = ML081840484
| issue date = 07/02/2008
| issue date = 07/02/2008
| title = North Anna Retake Exam 05000338-06-302 Draft Job Performance Measures (Part 2 of 2)
| title = Retake Exam 05000338-06-302 Draft Sample Plan & Written Exam Quality Checklist (ES-401-6)
| author name =  
| author name =  
| author affiliation = - No Known Affiliation
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-II
| addressee name =  
| addressee name =  
| addressee affiliation = NRC/RGN-II
| addressee affiliation =  
| docket = 05000338
| docket = 05000338, 05000339
| license number = NPF-004
| license number =  
| contact person =  
| contact person =  
| case reference number = 50-338/06-302
| case reference number = 50-338/06-302
| document type = License-Operator Examination Report
| document type = License-Operator, Part 55 Examination Related Material
| page count = 63
| page count = 40
}}
}}


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=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:CRITICAL STEP EXPLANATIONS:
{{#Wiki_filter:Draft Submittal (Pink Paper)
STEP#Explanation 1&2Requiredtodeterminepath'sdose.3Requiredtodeterminepathwithlowestdose
/J ()~/fl !JJJ ;-J/t ol {){) 6 -J 0 2
.NAPSAdmin-3Page6of7 NAPSAdmin-3Page7of7 CANDIDATE CUE SHEET(TOBE RETURNED TO EXAMINER UPON COMPLETIONOFTASK)INITIAL CONDITIONS:*Thecrewis attemptingtoplaceasystemin service ,buttheyareunableto remotelyopena valve.*Youhavebeentaskedwithentering containment and locallyopeningthe valve.*HealthPhysicspersonnelare currently unavailable to provide assistance.*Tworoutesare availabletothe valve: oRoute1consistsof two segments.*Segment1hasyouwalkthrougha 200mRlhrgeneralfieldfor2 minutes.*Segment2hasyouwalkina300 mRlhrgeneralfieldtothe valvefor8 minutes oRoute2consistsof two segments.*Segment1hasyouwalkthrougha50 mRlhrgeneralfieldfor4minutes.
  !?E i/J-f!-b
  - !f?o (J/U T 7 E rJ
  - ,0 VJ H i) Iv{ J r-::>
DRAFT Written Exam Quality Checklist (ES-401-6)
& Written Exam Sample Plan


*Segment2hasyouwalkina150 mRlhrgeneralfieldtothe valvefor12 minutes o The tworoutesas detailedaretobe considered separatelyandarelistedastheround-triptimetoandfromthemanual valve.INITIATING CUE:Youareto determinewhichrouteallowsthelowestexposur I" NAPS Admin-4Page1of7 DRAFT REGION II INITIAL LICENSE EXAMINATION JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Admin-4 EPIP-1.01 EMERGENCY MANAGER CONTROLLING PROCEDURE Determine highest EPIP classification.
DRAFT Comments on North Anna Administrative Walk-Through Exam.


CANDIDATE EXAMINER DRAFT NAPS Admin-4Page2of7REGIONIIINITIALLICENSEEXAMINATIONJOBPERFORMANCEMEASURE Classify an emergency event (EPIP-1.01)
~in 1A 1-PT-23 QPTR Determination Review:
.Alternate Path: Facility JPM#: KIA Rating(s):Gen2.4.29 (2.6/4.0)Task Standard: Event is classifiedasa NotificationofUnusualEvent(NOUE)perTABB.8 Preferred Evaluation Location: Preferred Evaluation Method: Simulate_X_Perform X Simulator X Classroom_....<..:..._
This JPM IS a go/no-go with only one critical step . It should have a Key that will be kept with the exam material in ADAMS .
References:
",,-
EPIP-1.01,"EMERGENCY MANAGER CONTROLLING PROCEDURE ,Rev.42.EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL TECHNICAL BASIS DOCUMENT,Rev.13ValidationTime:10min.Time Critical: NO===============================================
Ad in 1B Calc te the maximum allowable reactor vessel Hydrogen venting time.
====================================
Candidate:
NAME Time Start:_Time Finish:_Performance Rating:SATUNSAT_Performance Time_Examiner:_NAME SIGNATURE/DATE================
=====================================
==============================Comments SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS:
NONENAPSAdmin-4Page3of7 NAPSAdmin-4Page4of7 Tools/Equipment/Procedures Needed: EPIP-1.01,"EMERGENCY MANAGER CONTROLLINGPROCEDURE,Rev42.


EMERGENCYACTIONLEVEL TECHNICALBASISDOCUMENT,Rev.13READTO OPERATOR DIRECTIONS TO STUDENT:Iwillexplaintheinit ialconditions,andstatethetasktobeperformed.Allcontrolroomstepsshallbe performedforthisJPM
Need change inif ting cue to:
,includinganyrequired communications
Perform step 22 of 1- R-1.3 to determine.....
.Iwillprovideinitiatingcuesandreportsonotheractionswhendirectedbyyou.Ensureyouindicatetomewhenyou understandyourassignedtask.Toindicatethatyouhavecompletedyourass ignedtaskreturn the handoutsheetIprovidedyou.
A~ 2 O-PT-BO AC Sou"rc Operability Verification" At step 6 have the applicant apply appropriate TIS , and LCO entry .
A in 3 Assess personnel exposure.


INITIAL CONDITIONS:
This PM is a math problem and does not discrim inate between a competent operator and a non-competent operator. Need to develop something more discriminating.
Unit-1 ShutdownBankshadbeenpulledandanRCSdilutionwasabouttobegin,in preparationforaunitstart-up.Duetoanincreasein containmentsumppumpingrate,thecontrolroomcrewcompletesaleakratePTand determines that unidentified RCS leakageinsideUnit
-1 containmenthasincreasedto1.01gpm.TheleakratePTwas completedat0415hours.Theoperatingcrewenteredthe applicable Technical Specification.Effortsto determinethelocationoftheleakandreducetheleakagehavebeen unsuccessful.At1300hourstheshutdownbankswereinserted.At1415hours,theOATCoperatestheSteamDumpstobegincoolingdowntheunit.INITIATINGCUE:Youarerequestedtoclassifythe emergencyeventand determineanyProtectiveAction Recommendationifrequired.Assumeany support personnel designatedbythe procedureareperform ingasrequire START TIME:_NAPSAdmin-4 Page5of 7STEP1:Determinetheeventcategoryusingthe emergencyactionleveltableindex.


-SAT STANDARD:Eventis identifiedasa"Reactor CoolantSystem"event COMMENTS: UNSAT-STEP2:Reviewthe emergencyactionleveltab associatedwiththeevent category.SAT-STANDARD: Emergencyactionleveltabisreviewed.
Admin 4 Event Classification. No discriminating value, no pars . Need something more discriminatin DRAFT Comments on North Anna Administrative Walk-Through Exam.


COMMENTS: UNSAT-STEP3:Useavailableresourcestoobtain indications of emergency conditions.
Admin 1A 1-PT-23 QPTR Determination Review:
This JPM is a go/no-go with only one critical step. It should have a Key that will be kept with the exam material in ADAMS.


-SAT STANDARD: Conditionsarereviewed.
Admin 1B Calculate the maximum allowable reactor vessel Hydrogen venting time.


COMMENTS: UNSAT-STEP4:Verifythatan emergencyactionlevelhasbeen exceeded.CRITICAL STEP STANDARD:Eventisclassifiedasa NotificationofUnusualEvent(NOUE)per SATTABB.8-COMMENTS: UNSAT-ENDOFTASK TIME STOP:_
Need to change initiating cue to: i\_, , ~
NAPS Admin-4Page6of7 CRITICAL STEP EXPLANATIONS:
Perform step 22 of 1-FR-1.3 to determine.~
STEP#Explanation4ThecandidateneedstobeabletoutilizetheprocedureanddeterminethataNotificationofUnusualEvent(NOUE)needstobedeclare NAPS Admin-4Page7of7 CANDIDATE CUE SHEET(TOBE RETURNEDTOEXAMINERUPON COMPLETION OF TASK)INITIAL CONDITIONS:Unit-1ShutdownBankshadbeenpulledandanRCS dilutionwasabouttobegin,inpreparationforaunitstart-up.Duetoanincreasein containmentsumppumpingrate
  ''-'
,thecontrolroomcrew completes aleakratePTand determines that unidentif iedRCSleakageinsideUnit-1 containment has increasedto1.01gpm.TheleakratePTwascompletedat0415hours.Theoperatingcrewenteredthe applicable Technical Specification.Effortstodeterminethelocationoftheleakandreducethe leakagehavebeen unsuccessful.At1300hourstheshutdownbankswereinserted.At1415hours,theGATC operatestheSteamDumpstobegin coolingdowntheunit.INITIATINGCUE:Youarerequestedto classify the emergencyeventand determineanyProtectiveActionRecommendationifrequired.Assumeany support personne l designatedbythe procedureareperformingasrequire RCS Operational LEAKAGE 3.4.13 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)3.4.13 RCS Operational LEAKAGE LCO 3.4.13 RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to: a.No pressure boundary LEAKAGE;b.1 gpm unidentified LEAKAGE;c.10 gpm identified LEAKAGE;d.1 gpm total primary to secondary LEAKAGE through all steam generators (SGs);and e.500 gallons per day primary to secondary LEAKAGE through anyone SG.APPLICABILITY:
Admin 2 O-PT-80 AC Sources Operability Verification.
MODES1,2,3, and 4.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.RCS LEAKAGEnotwithin A.1 Reduce LEAKAGEto4hours limitsforreasons within limits.other than pressure boundary LEAKAGE.B.Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3.6 hours associated Completion TimeofConditionA ANDnotmet.B.2 Be in MODE 5.36 hours OR Pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists.North AnnaUnits1 and 2 3.4.13-1 Amendments 231/212 RCS Operational LEAKAGE 3.4.13 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.13.1----------------
---NOTE--------------------
Not requiredtobe performed until 12 hours after establishmentofsteady state operation.


Verify RCS operat ional LEAKAGE is within limits by performance of RCS waterinventorybalance.
At step 6 have the applicant apply the appropriate T/S, and LCO entry.


FREQUENCY 72 hours SR 3.4.13.2 Verify steam generator tube integrity is inaccordancewiththe Steam Generator Tube Surveillance Program.Inaccordancewiththe Steam Generator Tube Surveillance Program North AnnaUnits1 and 2 3.4.13-2 Amendments 231/212 VIRGINIA POWER NORTH ANNA POWER STATION___EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING*.ll.,;1'o r.3YJ_.-...NUMBER PROCEDURE TITLE REVISION EPIP-l.01 EMERGENCY MANAGER CONTROLLING PROCE DURE 42 (W ith 3 Attachments)
Admin 3 Assess personnel exposure.
PAGE 1 of 7*PURPOSE To asses s potential emergency conditions and initiate corrective actions.ENTRY CONDITIONS Any of the following:
1.Another station procedure directs initiation of this procedure.


*2.A potential emergency condition is reported to the Shift Manager.*Approvalson File Effective Date 7-I'D-t26
This JPM is a math problem and does not discriminate between a competent operator and ,?.
*NUMBER PROCEDURE TITLE REVISION EPIP-l.01 EMERGENCY MANAGER CONTROLLING PROCEDURE 42 PAGE2of7 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED***************************************CAUTION: Declaration of the highest emergency class for wh ich an EmergencyActionLevel is exceeded shall be made.***************************************NOTE: The PCS is potentially unreliable in the eventofan earthquake.
non-competent operator. Need to develop something more discriminating. (Ai>DefJ ~)
Admin 4 EyeDt Classification. No discriminating value, no pars. Need something more discriminatrng:~
DRAFT


Therefore.PCS parametersshouldbe evaluated for accuracy should this s ituation occur.*__1 EVALUATE EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:a)Determine event category usingAttachment1.
DRAFT ES-401, Rev. 9 North Anna 2006-302 RO  Written Examination Review Worksheet    Form ES-401-9 I LOK I LOD I 4 . Job Content Flaws I 5. Other I .
Q#
(F/H) (1-5)  T/F Icred'lpartiall JOb-' Minutia Dist . Link I I#/ BaCk-I Q=
units ward KIA I SRO Only I U/EiS  Explanation Inst ructions
  [Refer to Section 0 of ES-401 and Appendix B for additional information regarding each of the following concepts .] Enter the level of knowledge (LOK) of each question as either (F)undamental or (H)igher cognitive level. Enter the level of difficulty (LOO) of each question using a 1 - 5 (easy - difficult) rating scale (questions in the 2 - 4 range are acceptable). Check the appropriate box if a psychometric flaw is identified:
* The stem lacks sufficient focus to elicit the correct answer (e.g., unclear intent, more information is needed, or too much needless information).


EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL TABLE INDEX b)Review EAL Tab associated with event category c)Use Control Room monitors.PCS.and outside reports to get indications of emergency conditions listed in the EAL Table d)Verify EAL-CURRENTLY EXCEEDED (STEP 1 CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)d)1&#xa3;basis for EAL no longer exists when discovered AND no other reason s exist for an emergency declaration
* The stem or distractors contain cues (i.e., clues, specific determiners, phrasing, length, etc).
.THEN do the following:
*RETURN TO procedure in effect.*GO TO VPAP-2802.


NOTIFICA TIONS AND REPORTS.to make one-hour.non-emergency reports for classification without declaration.
* The answer choices are a collection of unrelated true/false statements .
* The distractors are not credible; single implausible distractors should be repaired, more than one is unacceptable .
* One or more distractors is (are) partially correct (e.g., if the applicant can make unstated assumptions that are not contradicted by stem). Check the appropriate box if a job content error is identified:
* The question is not linked to the job requirements (i.e., the question has a valid KIA but, as written, is not operational in content).


1&#xa3;EAL was NOT exceeded.THEN RETURN TO procedure in effec *NUMBER PROCEDURE TITLE REVISION EPIP-I.OI EMERGENCY MANAGER CONTROLLING PROCEDURE 42 PAGE3of7 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED*I EVALUATE EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS: (Continued)e)Record procedure initiation:*By: Date: Time: f)Initiate a chronologicallogof events g)Declare position of Station Emergency Manager NOTE: Assembly.accountability and/or initiation of facility staffing maynotbe desired during certain situations (e.g..security event.severe weather.anticipated grid disturbance)
* The question requires the recall of knowledge that is too specific for the closed reference test mode (i.e., it is not required to be known from memory).
or may have already been completed.


These activities shouldbeimplementedas quickly as achievable given the specific situation.*______2 CHECK-CONDITIONS ALLOW FOR NORMAL IMPLEMENTATION OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE ACTIONS 1&#xa3;deviationfromnormalemergency response actions warranted.
* The question contains data with an unrealistic level of accuracy or inconsistent units (e.g., panel meter in percent with question in gallons) .
* The question requires reverse logic or application compared to the job requirements. Check questions that are sampled for conformance with the approved KIA and those that are designated SRO-only (KIA and license level mismatches are unacceptable). Based on the reviewer's judgment , is the question as written (U)nsatisfactory (requiring repair or replacement), in need of (E)ditorial enhancement ,
or (S)atisfactory? At a minimum, explain any "U" ratings (e.g., how the Appendix B psychometric attributes are not being met).


THEN do the following:a)Referto Attachment 3.Considerations for Operations Response Under Abnormal Conditions.
1 H 2      S I002K3 .03 Question appears to match KIA. BANK DR4Fr . 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other .
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred o Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SAO U/E/S  Explanat ion Focu Dis!. Link units ward KIA Only s
2 F 2 X  X  U 003A1.03 Question appears to match KIA. All the distractors can be considered correct. Stem should read "W hich ONE of the following describes the effect on Rep temperatures, and the action that is required to mitigate the event" or someth ing similar. Also need to work on how to make the distractors incorrect. Need to rework question. NEW 3 H 2 X    U 003AA2.04 Question appears to match KIA. Wi ll NI's actually reach these values? Does the plant have a positive or negative flux trip? If it does the reactor will trip before these conditions can be reached. Need to verify that the plant could actually get to these cond itions with only one dropped rod. NE F 2  X    E 003K6 .04 Quest ion appea rs to match the KI Very simple What is the PDTT, is this a credible (2)
distractor. BANK 5 H 3      S 004K5.35 Question appears to match the KI SAT NEW 6 H 2      S 005K5 .02 Kind of matches KIA, NPSH relates to subcooling. BANK . 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other .
Q# LOK LaD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred o Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back - Q= SRO U/E/S  Explanation Focu Dis!. Link units ward KIA Only s
7 F 2      S 006K6.19 Question appears to match KI Question is actually at the fundamental leveL If you took the conditions in the top of the stem and placed them in the Which ONE of the .....statement the question would be the same. SAT NEW.


b)Consider applicability of 50.54(x).c)1&#xa3;classification/as sembly announcement deferred.THEN GO TOStep *NUMBER PROCEDURE TITLE REVISION EPI P-l.01 EMERGENCY MANAGER CONTROLLING PROCEDURE 42 PAGE4of7 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED**__3 NOn FY PLANT STAFF OF ALERT OR HIGHER CLASSIFICATION:
8 H 2  X    E 007A3.01 Question appears to match the KI simple What is the POD, is this a credible distractor. BANK 9 F 2      S 007EA2.05 Question appears to match the KI Kind of simple, but matches KIA. SAT NEW 10 H 2  X    U 007K3.01 Question appears to match KIA. What makes the distractors credible. Need to have (2)
a)Check classification
some numbers that are variations of the psia/psig relationship. The correct answer is the only answer with a .something in it. Fix distractors to make others plausible. (the set point should be a distractor also. NEW 11 F 2  X    U 008A4 .07 Question appears to match KIA. If primary grade water is not able to be sent to the (2)
-ALERT OR HIGHER b)Check ifemergencyassemblyand accountability
CC Surge tank then distractors A and B are not credible. (What is the back up source for makeup to the CC surge tank). NEW . 3. Psychom etric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other .
-PREVIOUSLY CONDUCTED c)Have Control Room sound EMERGENCYalarmand makeannouncementon station Gai-Tronicssystemas follows: "(Emergency classification)
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minut ia #1 Back - Q= SRO U/EJS  Explanation Focu  Dis!. Link units ward KIA Only s
has been declared as the result of (event)d)Repeat Step 3.c a)GO TOStep4.b)Do the following:
12 H 2 X    U 008AA 1.02 Question appears to match KIA. Due to the way the stem is worded, distractors A and D (2)
1)Have Control Room sound EMERGENCYalarmand makeannouncementon station Gai-Tronicssystemas follows: "(Emergency classification)hasbeen declared as the result of (event)"All Emergency Response personnel report to your assigned stations""All contractor personnel not responding to theemergencyand all visitors report to the Security Building""All other personnel reporttoyour Emergency Assembly Areas"2)Repeat RNO Step 3.b.1.3)GO TOStep *NUMBER PROCEDURE TITLE REVISION EPIP-l.Ol EMERGENCY MANAGER CONTROLLING PROCEDURE 42 PAGE5of7 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED*****************************************CAUTION: Continue through this and all further instructions unless otherwise directed to hold.***************************************______4 INITIATE SUPPORTING PROCEDURES:
are not credible. The stem states in accordance with ES-1.2 Continuous Action Page. Only two of hese items are on the continuous action pag Need to reword stem to allow distractors A and D to become credible. NEW.
a)Direct Emergency Communicators to initiate the following procedures:
1)EPIP-2.0l.NOTIFICATION OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 2)EPIP-2.02.


NOTIFICATION OF NRC b)Direct HP to initiate EPIP-4.0l.
13 H 2  X    E 009EK3.27 Question appears to match KI Distractor D as written is not credible. The reason that is listed in the distractor analys is is much more credible. Use it. Otherwise question is SA (Minimize subcoollnq to maintain pressureizer level above the lower limit to allow pressurizer heater operation to reduce the rate of increase of pressurizer level) BANK 14 F 3      S 01 0K2.02 Question appears to match KIA. SAT NEW .
15 H 3  X    U 012A2.07 Question appears to match KI Distractors need some work. Distractor A second (3)
part, to make this credible put some actions listed in ARP. What other annunciators would come in based on a DC power supply failure? Distractors need some work. BANK . 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Othe r .
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred o Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SAO Ul EtS  Explanation Focu Dis!. Link units ward KJA Only s
16 H 2      S 012A3.05 Question appears to match KIA. SAT BANK 17 H 3      S 013A1.06 Question kind of matches KIA. SAT BANK 18 H 2  X    E 014K5.02 Question appears to match KI Distractors C and 0 do not appea r to be cred ibl (2)
Why would anyone think that the reactor would trip, and that only 2 group step counters would reset to zero. Work on C and 0 distractors.


RADIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT DIRECTOR CONTROLLING PROCEDURE c)Establishcommunicationswith Security Team Leader: 1)Provide Security with current emergency classification 2)Notify Security which Operations Shift is designated for coverage 3)Direct Security to initiate EPIP-5.09.
19 H 2      S 015AA1 .07 Question appears to match KIA. SAT .
NEW 20 F 1     X U 017K1 .01 Question does not meet the KIA. The KIA is for the Core Exit Thermocouple system and the knowledge of the physical connections and or cause-effect relationships between the system and the plant computer. Needs to be written to match KIA. NEW 21 H 2      S 022K3.02 Question appears to match KIA. SAT BANK . 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other .
Q# LOK LOD (F/ H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job - Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO U/EiS  Explanation Focu Dis!. Link units ward KIA Only s
22 H 2      E 022AK 3.05 Question appears to match KIA. How does a loss of power render the blender inoperable. Is this credible? Otherwise quest ion appears to be sat. Is this based on procedure guidance? NEW.


SECURITY TEAM LEADER CONTROLLING PROCEDURE
23 H 2      E 025AA1 .03 Question kind of matches KIA. Use of the word "Preferred" in the stem should be avoided because if it is preferred, it is not require Maybe use lAW AP11. Otherw ise SAT. NEW 24 F 2      S 026A4.0 1 Question appears to match KIA. SAT BANK 25 H 2      E 027AK2.03 Question appears to match KIA. An applicant could by knowing that one of the channels opens the sprays and a PORV could discount distractor A. Try something like this:
*NUMBER PROCEDURE TITLE REVISION EPIP-l.OI EMERGENCY MANAGER CONTROLLING PROCEDURE 42 PAGE6of7 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED*__5 CHECK TSC-ACTIVATED__6 IMPLEMENT EPI P FOR EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION IN EFFECT:*Notification of EventGO TO EPIP-I.02, RESPONSE TO NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT*Alert-GO TO EPIP-I.03, RESPONSE TO ALERT*Site Area Emergency-GO TO EPIP-I.04, RESPONSE TO SITE AREA EMERGENCY*General Emergency-GO TO EPIP-I.05, RESPONSE TO GENERAL EMERGENCY 1&#xa3;TSC NOT activated.
      (A) Initiate an open signal to both spray valves and 1455C (8) Initiate an open signal to both spray valves and 1456C (C) Initiate an open signal to 1455C ONLY (0) Initiate an open signal to 1456C ONLY . 3. Psychom etric Flaws 4. Job Cont ent Flaws 5. Othe r .
Q# LOK LOD (F/ H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/EIS  Explanation Focu  Dls Link units ward KIA Only s
26 H 2      S 029A4.04 Question appears to match KIA. Fuel building is capitalized in A, and Containment is not in C. They should be the same . Pick one .
Otherwise SAT. NEW 27 F 2 X  X    U 029EG2.2.22 Question kind of matches KIA. The knowledge of limiting conditio ns for operation as well as safety limits are not being tested. Th is is a good attempt. C and D have ATWS in the distractor and ATWS is stated in the stem which directs the applicant to either Cor D. The applicant need only know that AMSAC trips the turbine. Needs some work. NEW The first A in AMSAC stands for ATWS. Page 33 of 49 Topic 7.1 Reactor Protect ion System lesso n plan 77-A.


THEN do the following:
28 F 2      E 033K5 .04 Question appears to match KIA. This is one way that SDM is being maintained there are other ways to prevent criticality such as fuel placement, boron spacers Boroflex panels , et NEW 29 H 2      S 034A4 .02 Question appears to match KIA. SAT NEW . 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other .
a)Have STA report to the Control Room.b)Notify Manager Nuclear Operations or Operations Manager On Call.c)Consider having Radiological Assessment Director report to the Control Room.d)WHEN relief SEM arrives.THEN perform turnover using EPIP-I.OI.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/EIS  Explanation FOGU Dis Link units ward KIA Only s
30 F 2    X U 035K4.03 Question appears to match a portion of he KlA*, the reset of these signals is not teste Can this be put into the question? NEW 31 F 2    E 036AA 1.04 Question kind of matches KIA. The AP calls for a safe location. Need to make sure that the other locations are not "safe". Otherwise SAT. NEW 32 F 2    E 038EA2.16 Question matches KIA Not sure D is otally credible, might use open two PORVs. E-3 does not direct opening 2 PORVs so it would be plausible and wrong. NEW 33 H 2  X    U 039A2.05 Question appears to match KI Distractors C and D are not credible. Even if the the main turbine was in imp out reactor power will increase some what due to the inefficient dumping of steam straight to the condenser. Attempt to word question using Mwe to further differentiate right from wrong. NEW 34 F 2    E 039K1.04 Kind of matches KIA, no mention of RCS temperature although that is what is being controlled. Low level of discrimination. Look at using tave-tref and tave and t-no-Ioad. BANK . 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other .
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred o Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO U/EIS  Explanation Focu Dis Link units ward KIA Only s
35 H/F 2  X  U 045A2.12 Question matches KIA. Do rods have to be withdrawn in manual after the RCS boration?
The AR states to manually withd raw control rods .
If this is correct, manual needs to be in the distractors. This question could also be considered as memory for actions contained in the AR. NEW 36 H 2      E 056AK1.03 Question appears to match KIA. No value was determined from an incorrect use of RCS pressure (1865) . This would make a good distractor along with Thot, and CETCs. Attempt to place a value based on this for one of the distractors. NEW 37 F 1  X  U 056G2.1.30 Question kind of matches KIA. If suction pressure decreases, so will discharge pressure, therefore 0 could be considered correc This question is very simple, is there not someth ing that is controlled locally like a start stop switch or breaker that could be operated on a control room evacuation or plant fire? BANK . 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other .
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/EIS  Explanation Focu Dis Link units ward KIA Only s
38 H 2      S 057AA2.15 Question appears to match KIA. Kind of simple. NE (Could any of the associated control signals cause a reactor trip allowing B to be correct)?
39 F 2  X  X U 058AK1.01 Question does not appears to match KIA. There is no loss of DC power. Distractor D does not appear to be credible. NEW Rated as a fundamental knowledge, This question could be asked by Just using the stem without the conditions. NEW 40 F 2  X    U 059K1.03 Question kind of matches KIA. This question is asking what does P-14 do? Maybe a reason why would help tie it to the KIA bette NEW This is a fundamental level question. If you took away the stem you could ask which one of
      ~he following is correct and the answer would be the same. NEW 41 H 2  X  E 059K3.02 Question appears to match KIA. Where does the FF to the SG get measured. If the leak was down steam of these flow measurement devices then the FF/SF mismatch would not be seen and no reactor trip will occur, and C would be the correct answer. NEW . 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Conte nt Flaws 5. Other .
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/EIS  Explan ation Focu Dis Link units ward KIA Only s
42 F 2      E 061AK1.01 Question appears to match KIA. Very simple . Use a value higher than E-7 so that some knowledge is tested . (One could get this correct ust by guessing the highest value listed must be correct. NEW 43 H 2      E The sample plan has this KIA listed as 061K6.08 which has an importance factor of 2.1 for RO The question is actually written to 061 K6.02 which has an importance factor of 2.6 for ROs. Does the turbine driven if it starts feed all three steam generators? Some assumptions need to be taken as written . Leave the KIA as is (061 K6.02) and ensure that the correct answer is the only correct answer. NEW 44 H 2 X  X X  U 062AG2.4.6 Question appears to match KI However, the step in E-O states if less than 4 service water pumps are running then ensure Unit 2 operator initiates 0-AP-47. This is different than the correct answer in the question. Need to find a resolution. Maybe you sent me the incorrect reference. NEW 45 H 2      S 062K2.01 Question appears to match KIA SA BANK . 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other .
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO U/E/S  Explanation Focu Dis Link units ward KIA Only s
46 H 2 X    X U 063K2.01 Question does not really meet the KI The KIA asks for the knowledge of electrical power supplies to Major DC loads. By stating that DC power was loss to the 2J bus (I understand hat control power could be considered a major DC load) but all the question requires is that the applicant know what comes off of 2J AC bu Furthermore can you have a loss of DC power to only one bus. Can this be verified? This question requires some more work. BANK 47 H 2    S 064A3.01 Question appears to match KIA The distractor analysis states that D is the correct answer. Although the check is on B, and the explanation supports selection B. If B is the correct answer, then question appears to be SA NEW 48 H 2    X U 065AG2.1.23 This question is based on a note at the beginning of AP-28, and with pressurizer level approaching this level the reactor should be tripped. I am not sure this meets the intent of the KIA. If any other scenario was taking place or if nothing else was taking place, this still would be he correct action to take. I believe the intent of he KIA is to show the ability to perform actions lAW a Loss of instrument air, not a loss of pressurizer level unless they are related. NEW . 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other .
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred o Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SAO U/E/S  Explanation Focu Dis Link units ward KIA Only s
49 F 2    X U 069AK1.01 Question does not really meet the KIA here is not a loss of containment integrity involved . In fact this is the design accident that
      ~he containment can survive and maintain integrity. Needs more work . Is Not NEW . BANK 50 F 2      S 073A1.01 Question appears to match KIA. Do the vacuum pumps trip due to the discharge valves going closed, or is it a direct trip? It may be better to pursue this. BANK.


Attachment 2.Turnover Checklis *NUMBER PROCEDURE TITLE REVISION EPI P-l.01 EMERGENCY MANAGER CONTROLLING PROCEDURE 42 PAGE 7 of 7 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED**__7 NOTI FY OFFSITE AUTHORITI ES OF EMERGENCY TERMINATION:
51 H 2 X X  U 076G2.1 .2 Question appears to match KI Required action in accordance with? D distractor does not appear to be cred ible. It would be more credible to commence a shutdown within one hour and be in cold shutdown in.... Do you expect ROs to know technical specifications of this natur BANK 52 F 2    S* 076K1 .17 *Assuming these pumps are from the Service Water system this question matches the KIA. If not we have more work to do. Otherwise SAT. NEW 53 F 2      S 078G2 .1.28 Question appears to match KI Distractors A and C need to say automatically closes above 90 psig increasing instead of a This is not credible . Otherwise SAT . NEW . 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other .
a)State and local governments (made by LEOF or CEOF when activated)
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO U/EiS  Explanation Focu Dis Link units ward KIA Only s
b)NRC__8 NOTI FY STATION PERSONNEL ABOUT THE FOLLOWING:
54 F 2      S 078K4.01 Question appears to match KIA Very simple. NEW 55 F 2      S 086G2.1.28 Kind of matches KIA. SAT BANK 56 F 2      S 103K4.01 Question appears to match KIA. NEW 57 H 2      S WE03EA2.1 Question appears to match KIA SAT BANK 58 F 2      S ~E04EK3.4 Question appears to match KIA. SAT BANK 59 H 2    X U WE05EK1.3 Does not really match KIA. There are annunciators in the stem but also a statement that all attempts to establish AFW were unsuccessfu So there are no remedial actions based on the annunciators. See if we can work on something to ie it to the KIA BAN . . Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other .
*Emergency termination
Q# LOK LaD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/EIS  Explanation Focu Dis Link units ward KIA Only s
*Facility de-activation
60 H 2 X    X U WE06EK3.1 Question does not really meet the KIA. The only tie to the degraded core cooling is that you discuss you are there in the stem. The injection of the accumulators at any time could cause the same problem. I understand that it is in a note at the beginning of the procedure, but the applicant is not figuring out that he has degraded core conditions, you are telling him that he doe Also teaching in the distractors, you list four of the six CSFs. This question needs some wor BANK 61 H 2    E WE09EA1.3 Question appears to match KI Distractor C is not credible, Why would you attempt to block low pressure SI prior to going below 2000 psig? Cooldown continues throughout he procedure until the unit is on RHA. BANK 62 H 2    S WE10EK2.2 Question appears to match KI SAT BANK . 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other .
*Selective release of personnel*Completionand collection of procedures*Recovery__9 TERMINATE EPI P-l.01:*GivecompletedEPIPs.formsand other applicable records to Nuclear Emergency Preparedness (TSC Emergency Procedures Coordinator if TSC activated)*Completed By: Date: Time:-END-  
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/EIS  Explanation Focu Dis Link units ward KIA Only s
*NUMBER ATTACHMENT TITLE REVISION EPIP-1.01 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL TABLE 42 ATTACHMENT PAGE INDEX 1 1 I"\-F L1.?*****************************************************************************
63 H 2    U WE11 EK2.1 Question appears to match KI How does one verify that NO back flow is occurring from the RWST to the CTMT sump?
CAUTION:*Declaration of the highest emergency class forwhichan EAL is exceeded shall be made.*EmergencyActionLevels shall be conservatively classified based on actual or anticipated plant conditions.
Distractors A and B do not mention quench spray pumps. But Distractors C and 0 state to secure all pumps. So with only two pumps listed in A and B why would you pick them. Not Credibl Verifying no back flow is not credible unless you can come up with a way this is accomplishe BANK 64 H 2    E WE12EK2.1 Question appears to match KIA. Not enough procedures steps included in material to verify that this is the correct actions lAW your procedures. Provide more info. BANK 65 H 2    S IWE15EG2.1.23 Question appears to match KI SAT NEW.


*****************************************************************************
66 F 2     E G2.1.1 Kind of matches KIA, better matches 2.1.29. Under what KIA did this question appear on the 2004 North Anna Exam? Wait on determination until this is researched. BANK 67 F 2    S G2.1.22 Question appears to match KIA. SAT MOD . 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other .
EVENT CATEGORY: I.2.3.4.5.*6.7.8.9.10.II.12.13.Safety, Shutdown,orAssessment System Event A Reactor CoolantSystemEvent B Fuel FailureorFuelHandling Accident CContai nment Event D Radioactivity Event E DELETED LossofSecondary Coolant.G Electrical Failure H Fire ISecuri ty Event JHazardto Station Operation K Natural Events L Miscellaneous Abnormal Events M NUMBER ATTACHMENT TITLE REVISION EPIP-l.01 EMERGENCY ACT ION LEVEL TABLE 42 ATTACHMENT (TAB A)PAGE SAFETY.SHUTDOWN.OR ASSESSMENT 1 SYSTEM EVENT2of42 CONDITION/APPLICABILITY INDICATION CLASSI FICATION CAUTION: EAL C.2 is duplicated below for cross-reference/comparison to EAL A.1: C.2.Probable large radioactivity release initiated by loss of heat sink leading to cor e degradation MODES1.2.3&4 Lossof Main Feedwater Sy stem.Conden sate Sy stem and Auxiliary Feedwater Sy stem G ENERAL E MERGENCY1.Lossof function needed for unit HSD condition MODES1.2.3&4*Total loss of the Charging/SI System OR Total loss of the Main Feedwate r and AuxiliaryFeedwatersystems SITE AREA EMERGENCY 2.Failure of the*Reactor trip setpoint and SITE AREA Reactor Protection coincidences
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SAO U/EiS  Explanation Focu Dis Link units ward KIA Only s
-EXCEEDED EMERGENCY System to init iate and complete a AND required trip while at power*Automatic trip from RPS-FAI LED MODES 1&2 AND*Manual t rip from Control Room-FAILED
68 F 1    U G2.1.3 Question Matches KIA. But has little discriminatory value. What is included in a short-term relief? Distractor D is not credible BANK 69 F 2     S G2.2.11 Question appears to match KIA SAT NEW 70 F 2     S G2.2.24 Question appears to match KIA. SAT NEW. Question is at the Fundamental level.
*NUMBER ATTACHMENT TITLE REVISION EPIP-l.Ol EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL TABLE 42 ATTACHMENT (TAB A)PAGE SAFETY*SHUTDOWN.OR ASSESSMENT 1 SYSTEM EVENTof 47 INDICATION CONDITION/APPLICABILITY 3.Inability to monitorasi gnifi cant transient in progress MODES1.2.3&4**Most (>75%)or all annunciatoralarmson panels"A" to"K"-NOT AVAILABLE ANDAllcomputer monitoring capability (e.g.*PCS)-NOT AVAILABLE AND CLASSI FI CATI ON SITE AREA EMERGENCY***4.Evacuation of Main Control Room with control not established within15minutes ALL MODES*Significant transient-IN PROGRESS (e.g.*reactor trip.SI actuation.


turbine runback>25%thermal reactorpower.thermal power oscillations
71 F 2 X    E 2.2.4 Question appears to match KIA. Very Simple BANK Explain plausibility of Band D.
>10%)AND Inability to directly monitor anyone of the following using Control Room indications:
*Subcriticality*CoreCooling*HeatSink*Vessel Integrity*Containment Integrity EvacuationoftheControl Room SITE AREA with local shutdown control not EMERGENCY established within15minutes
*NUMBER ATTACHMENT TITLE REVISION EPI P-l.01 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL TABLE 42 ATTACHMENT (TAB A)PAGE SAFETY, SHUTDOWN, OR ASSESSMENT 1 SYSTEM EVENT 4 of 47 INDICATION
*Lossofanyof the following systems:*Service Water*Component Cooling.RHR CONDITION/APPLICABILITY 5.Total loss of function needed for unit CSD condition MODES 5&6*Secondarysystem cooling capability
-UNAVAILABLE AND CLASSI FI CATI ON ALERT AND*RCS temperature GREATER THAN 140 0 F 6.Failureof the*Reactor trip setpoint and ALERT Reactor Protection coincidences
-EXCEEDED System to a*trip which ta es the AND Reactor Subcritical
*Automatic trip from RPS-MODES 1&2 FAI LED AND*Manual trip-REQUIRED AND*Manual trip from Contro l Room-SUCCESSFUL
*
*NUMBER ATTACHMENT TITLE REVISION EPIP-l.01 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL TABLE 42 ATTACHMENT (TAB A)PAGE SAFETY.SHUTDOWN.OR ASSESSMENT 1 SYSTEM EVENT I)of4?INDICATION CONDITION/APPLICABILITY 7.Unplanned loss of safety system annunciators with compensatory indicators unavailableora transient in progress MODES1.2.3&4**Unplanned lossofmost (>75%)or all annunciator alarms on panels"A" to"K" for GREATER THAN 15 minutes ANDAllcomputer monitoring capability (e.g..PCS)-NOT AVAILABLE OR CLASSI FICATION ALERT*8.Evacuation of Main Control Room required ALL MODES Significant transientINITIATED OR IN PROGRESS (e.g..reactor trip.SI.turbinerunback>25%thermal reactor power.thermal power oscillations
>10%)Evacuation of the Control Room with shutdown control established within 15 minutes ALERT 9.Inability to reach required mode within technical specification limits*Intentional reduction inpower.loador temperature lAWT.S.Action StatementHAS COMMENCEDNonFICAn ON OF UNUSUAL EVENT*MODES1.2.3&4 AND*T.S.Action Statement time limit for modechange CANNOT BE MET
*NUMBER ATTACHMENT TITLE REVISION EPI P-l.01 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL TABLE 42 ATTACHMENT (TAB A)PAGE SAFETY.SHUTDOWN.OR ASSESSMENT 1 SYSTEM EVENT6of42*Main Steam INDICATION CLASSI FI CATI ON*RCS NOTI FICATION OF UNUSUAL*RCS pressure-LESS EVENT THAN 2000 psig OR NOT Protection System-IN SERVICE AND*Any indication after lift or actuation that Pressurizer Safety or PORV-REMAINS OPEN AND*Flow-UNISOLABLE
*CONDITION/APPLICABILITY 10.Failureofa safety or relief valve to close after pressure reduction.


which may affect the health and safety of the public MODES1.2.3.4&5*Excessive Steam Generator Safety.PORV or DecayHeatReleaseflowas indicated by rapid RCS cool down rate AND*11.Unplanned loss ofmostor all safety system annunciators for greaterthan15 minutes MODES1.2.3&4**Main Steam pressure greaterthan100psi below setpoint of affected valve Unplanned lossofmost<>75%)or all annunciators on panels"A" to"K" for GREATER THAN15minutes NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT
72 F 2   X  E G2.3.2 Question appears to match KIA. This is a NOT question and should be avoided. BANK 73 F 2    E G2.3.9 Question appears to match KIA. There is no documentation to prove that 100A or 101 cannot be used. Is there any documentation, or do we need to say lAW 1-0P-21.2 after containment? NEW 74 H 2     E G2.4.14 Question Kind of matches KIA. Distractor D is not credible. BANK . 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Cont ent Flaws 5. Other .
*NUMBER ATTACHMENT TITLE REVISION EPI P-l.01 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL TABLE 42 ATTACHMENT (T AB A)PAGE SAFETY*SHUTDOWN.OR ASSESSMENT 1 SYSTEM EVENT 7 of 42**CONDITION/APPLICABILITY 12.Lossof communications capability ALL MODES INDICATION
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/ F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back* Q= SRO Ul EtS  Explanation Focu Dis Link units ward KIA Only s
*Station PBX phone systemFAI LED*Station Gai-tronics system-FAILED AND*Station UHF radio systemFAILED CLASSI FI CATI ON NOTI FICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT NUMBER ATTACHMENT TITLE REVISION EPI P-1.01 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL TABLE 42 ATTACHMENT (TAB B)PAGE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM EVENT 1 R of 47 Any t woofa).b)orc)e xist G ENERA Landthe third i s imminent: EM ERG ENCY a)Fuel clad integrity failur e a s indicated byanyo f th e fol lo wing:*RCS specific activity greaterthanorequalto300.0 dose equ ivalent 1-131 OR CONDI TION/APPLICABILITY1.Lossof2of3 fis sion product ba rri e rs w it h potential loss of3rdbar rier AL L MODES I NDICATION CLA SSI FICATION5or more cor e exit thermocou ple s great erthan1 200 0 F OR Conta inmen t H igh Range Radiation Monitor RM-RMS-165.-166or RM-RMS-265.-266 GR EATER T H A N 1.88xl0 2 R/hr b)Loss of RCS int egrity a s indirated byanyo f th e f o ll o wing:*RCS pressure greater than 2735psig OR Los sofReactor Coolantinp rogre ss c)Los sofcontainment integr i ty as indicated byanyoft he fol l o wing:*Containmen t pre s sur e g reater t han 60 psia a nd not decrea sing OR Releasepathto environment
75 F 2   X  E G2.4.43 Question appears to match KIA. Is the notification time normally the job of the RO?
-EXIST S
Otherwise SAT. NEW I          I Genera l Comment; the material included for support of the correct answer was usually satisfactory. The informat ion on why a distractor was credible on not credible was not. For example the PDn was used several times but no information was given as to what drains to it, its location , and what makes it a credible distractor.
*NUMBER ATTACHMENT TITLE REVISION EPI P-l.01 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL TABLE 42 ATTACHMENT (TAB B)PAGE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM EVENT 1 gof42 CONDITION/APPLICABILITY INDICATION
**2.Fuelfa ilure with steam generator tube rupture ALL MODES Any two of a),b)orc)exist and the third is imminent:a)Fuel clad integrity failure as ind icated byanyof the following:
*RCS specific activity greater than 300 dose equivalent 1-131 OR 5 or more core exit thermocouples GREATER THAN 1200 of OR High Range Letdown radiation monitor 1-CH-RI-128or2-CH-RI-228 GREATER THAN 5.9x10 4 mR/hr b)Steam Generator tube rupture as indicated bybothof the following:*SI coincidence
-SATISFIED AND*Steam Generator tube rupture-IN PROGRESS c)Loss of secondary integrity associated with ruptured steam generatorpathwayas indicated byanyof the following:*Steam Generator PORV-OPEN OR Main Steam Code Safety Valve-OPEN Lossofseconda ry coolant outside containment
-IN PROGRESS CLASSI FICATION GENERAL EMERGENCY NUMBER ATTACHMENT TITLE REVISION EPI P-l.01 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL TABLE 42 ATTACHMENT (TAB B)PAGE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM EVENT 1 10of42 CLASSIFICATION SITE AREA EMERG ENCY INDICATION
*Primarysystem leak (LOCA)-IN PROGRESS AND Safety Injection-REQUIRED AND*RCS subcoolingbasedon Core Exit Thermocouple sLESS THAN 30&deg;F 3.Res 1 eak rate exceeds*makeup capacity MODES 1.2.3.&4 CONDITION/APPLICABILITY OR RCS inventory cannot be maintainedbasedon pressurizer level or RVLIS indication
**4.Gross primary to secondary leakage with loss of offsite power MODES1.2.3.&4 Steam Generator Tube Rupture-IN PROGRESS AND Safety Injection-REQUIRED AND*VentVrntA MGPI Monitor SITE AREA EMERGENCY RM-VG-179 GREATER THAN 1.25x10 8 Steam Generator Blowdown monitor on affected pathway RM-SS-122.-222 RM-SS-123.-223 RM-SS-124.-2211 GREATER THAN 1x10 6 cpm AND*A subsequent loss of offsite power indicated by zero volts on voltmeters for 4160VbusesD.E.&F
*NUMBER ATTACHMENT TITLE REVISION EPI P-l.01 EMERGENCY ACTION LE VE L TABLE 42 ATTACHMENT (TAB B).PAGE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM EVENT 1 11 of 47*Pressurizer level cannot be ALERT maintained greater than 20%withone(1)
Charging/SI pump in operation AND*RCS inventory balance indicates leakage-greaterthan50 gpm CONDITION/APPLICABILITY 5.RCS leak rate limit-EXCEEDED MODES1.2.3.&4 INDICATION CLASSI FI CATI ON6.Gros s primary to'secondary leakage MODES1.2.3.&4 primary to leakage of offsite AND*VentVentA MGPI Monitor ALERT ALERT Intentional reduction in power.load or temperature lAW T.S.3.4.13to-secondary leakage LCO Action Statement Steam Generator Tube Rupture IN PROGRESS AND Safety Injection-REQUIRED*Exces sive secondary with loss power MODES 1.2.3.&4 7.*RM-VG-179 GREATER THAN 1.73x10 6 Steam Generator Blowdown monitor on affected pathway RM-SS-122.


-222 RM-SS-123.-223 RM-SS-124*-224 GREATER THAN 1x10 5 cpm AND*A subsequent loss of offsite power indicated by zero volts on voltmeters for 4160V buses D.E.&F
23 Unsats 23 enhancements 29 satisfactory = 75 total RO questions.
*NUMBER ATTACHMENT TITLE REVISION EPIP-l.01 EMERGENCY AC TION LEVEL TABLE 4 2 ATTACHMENT (TAB B)PAGE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM EVEN T 1 1 2 of 42**CONDITION/APPLICABILITY 8.RCS operational leakage requiring plant shutdown I AW 1.S.3.4.13 MODES1.2.3.&4 INDICATION Intentional reduction in power load or temperature lAW T.S.3.4.13 leakage limit action statement-HAS COMMENCED CLASSIFICATION NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT NUMBER ATTACHMENT TITLE REVISION EPIP-1.01 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL TABLE 42 ATTACHMENT (TAB C)PAGE FUEL FAILURE OR FUEL HANDLING ACCIDENT 1 n of 47 INDICATION CONDITION/APPLICABILITY 1.Probable large radioactivity release initiated by LOCA with ECCS failure leading to core degradation ALL MODES**Loss of reactor coolant in progress AND RCS specific activitygreaterthan300 dose equivalent 1-131 OR Containment High Range Radiation Monitor RM-RMS-165.


-166 or RM-RMS-265.
Severa l questions off of 2004 exam 8 quest ions that do not match the KI DRAFT ES-401  Written Examination Quality Checklist  Form ES-401-6 Facility : I. h r-.""  Date of Exam : /1// /f/ O ~ Exam Level : RO * SRo D
        -
Initial Item Description    a b* c- Questions and answers are technically accurate and applicable to the facility .  -)<.. tY~ NRC J<JAs are referenced for all question Facilitv leam lna obiectives are referenced as available . Y<- {r 1 SRO Questions are appropriate in accordance with Section D.2.d of ES-101  <<" ""~j The sampling process was random and systematic (If more than 4 RO or 2 SRO questions were repeated from the last 2 NRC licensing exams, consult the NRR OL program office) . Question duplication from the license screening/audit exam was controlled as indicated below (chack the item that applies ) and appears appropriate:
@ A tha audit exam was systematically and randomly developed; or
_ the audit exam was completed before the license exam was started ; or
_ the examinations were developed Independently; or
_ the licensee certifies that there Is no duplication; or other (explain)  t:kt  t;L fJ-?
- t'lJ r...r c"',.r tt"1IP * ftl$r -f: bf/ 'l-lcIW~ Bank use meets limits (no more than 75 percent  Bank Modified New from the bank, at least 10 percent new, and the rest new or modified); enter the actual RO I SRQ-only Question distribution(s) at righ H4fJI'A t.J'{. I ~' ,4 flJ.7~ ,.""
Y- ~ Between 50 and 60 percent of the questions on the RO  Memory CIA exam are written at the comprehension! analys is level ;
the SRO exam may exceed 60 percent If the randomly selected J<JAs support the higher cognitive levels ; enter )!dcj, I
      &t'1/ f l4- <<: 1,L- "'7 the actual RO I SRO Question distribution(s) at riQh . Referenceslhandouts provided do not give away answers or aid in the elimination of dislractors . fL [1...-5 Question content conforms with specific J<JA statements in the previously approved examination outline and Is appropriate for the lier to which they are assigned ;  1(
deviations are justified .      iv7 1 Question osvchometric aualitv and format meet the auldelines In ES Aooendix r /;.-7 1 The exam contains the required number of one-point, multiple choice items ;  yt.--
the lotal is correct and aqrees with the value on the cover shee (;..j t~"~~
Date
        <;jUjOb
    '~:Sb.w:-: ~~
a. Author Facility Reviewer (*)      ~
c. NRC Chief Examiner (#)      --- NRC Regional Supervisor      ---
Note: * The facility reviewer's initials/signature are not applicable for NRC-developed examination # indeoendent NRC reviewer initial items in Column "CO; chief examiner concurrence reauired .
ES-401, Page 29 of 33


-266 GREATER THAN 1.88x10 2 R/hr CLASSI FI CATI ON GENERAL EMERGENCY AND*High or low head ECCS flownotbeing delivered to the core (if expected by plant conditions)
  - - ~ ~ ~~ ~, - ~ - --, _ .
CAU TION: EAL A.l is duplicated belo w for cross-reference/comparison to EA L C.2: A.I.Lossof f unction*Total lossofthe needed for unitCharging/51System HSD con diti on SITE AREA EMERGENCY M ODES1.2.3&4 OR Total lossofthe Main Feed water and Auxiliary Fee d water syste ms 2.Probable large radioactivity release initiated by loss of heat sink leading to core degradation MODES1.2.3&4 Loss of MainFeedwaterSystem.
_....-.,. . . . . . , - - _ ._ --
ES-401    PWR Examination Outline  Form ES-401 2 Fa cilitv: North Anna      Date of Exarr Tier Group  RO KIA Category Points    SRO-On l~ Points K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G* Total  K IA A2 G'" Total 1.


GENERALCondensateSystemand Auxiliary EMERGENCY Feedwater System
Emerqency 1 3 3 3  3 3 3 I 18
*NUMBER ATTACHMENT TITLE REVISION EPI P-l.01 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL TABLE 42 ATTACHMENT (TAB C)PAGE FUEL FAILURE OR FUEL HANDLING ACCIDENT 1 14 of 42 INDICATION
& 2 2 1 1  2 2 1 9 Abnorma Plant lIer Evou lutiom Totals 5 4 4  5 5 4 27 Plan t 2 1 0 1 2 1 0 0 1 0 2 2 10 Systems Tier Total s 4 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 38 3. Generic Knowledge and   1 2 3 4  1 2 3 4 Abilities Category 3 3 2 2 10 1. Ensure that at least two topics from every KIA category are sampled within each tier of the RO outline (Le., the ''Tier Totals" in each KIA category shall not be less than two). Refer to Section D.1.c for additional guidance regarding SRO sampling .
*Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump not operable AND*Restoration of either of theabovenot likely within2hours**CONDITION/APPLICABILITY 3.Probable large radi oacti v i ty release initiated by failure of protectionsystemto bring Rx subcritical and causing core degradation ALL MODES 4.Probable large radioactivity release initiated by loss of AC power and all feedwater ALL MODES***Rx nuclear power after a trip-greater than 5%AND RCS pressure greater thanorequalto 2485 psig OR Containment pressure and temperature rapidly increasing Loss of all onsite and offs ite AC power AND CLASSI FI CATI ON GENERAL EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY
2. The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table. The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by +/-1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions. The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 point . Select topics from many systems and evolutions ; avoid selecting mo re than two KiA topics from a given system or evolution unless they relate to plant-specific priorities .
*NUMBER ATTACHMENT TITLE REVISION EPIP-l.01 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL TABLE 42 ATTACHMENT (TAB C)PAGE FUEL FAILURE OR FUEL HANDLING ACCIDENT 1 15of42**CONDITION/APPLICABILITY 5.Probable large radioactivity release initiated by LOCA with loss of ECCS and containment cooling ALL MODES INDICATION*Lossof reactor coolant in progress AND*High or low head ECCS flow not being delivered to the core (if expected by plant conditions)*Containment RS sump temperature greater than 190 0F and NOT decreasing OR All QuenchSprayand Recirculation Spray systems-NOT OPERABLE CLASS!FICATION GENERAL EMERGENCY
4. Systems/evolutions with in each group are identified on the associated outl ine .
*NUMBER ATTACHMENT TITLE REVISION EPIP-l.01 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL TABLE 42 ATTACHMENT (TAB C)PAGE FUEL FAILURE OR FUEL HANDLING ACCIDENT 116of42**CONDITION/APPLICABILITY6.Core damage with possible loss of coolable geometry MODES1.2.3.&4 INDICATIONa)Fuel clad failure as indicatedbyanyof the foll owi ng:*RCS Specific activity greater than 60/lCi/gram dose equivalent 1-131 OR High Range Letdown radiation monitor 1-CH-RI-128 or 2-CH-RI-228 GREATER THAN 1.2x10 4 mR/hr ANDb)Lossof cooling as indicatedbyanyof the following:*5 confirmed core exit thermocouples greater than 1200 0 F OR Core deltaT-zero OR Core deltaT-rapidly diverging CLASSI FICATION SITE AREA EMERGENCY
5. The shaded areas are not applicable to the category/tie .* The generic (G) KlAs in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the KIA Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. The SRO KlAs must also be linked to 10 CFR 55.43 or an SRQ-levelleaming objectiv . On the following pages, enter the KIA numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics'
*NUMBER ATTACHMENT TITLE REVISION EPIP-l.Ol EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL TABLE 42 ATTACHMENT (TAB C)PAGE FUEL FAILURE OR FUEL HANDLING ACCIDENT 117of47 INDICATION CONDITION/APPLICABILITY7.Major fuel damage accident with radioactivity release to containment or fuel buildings ALL MODES*Water level in Rx vessel during refueling below thetopof core Water level in spent fuel pool belowtopof spent fuel CLASSI FICATION SITE AREA EMERGENCY**AND*Verified damage to irradiated fuel resulting in reading s on Vent Vent"B" MGPI monitor RM-VG-180 GREATER THAN 2.69x10 8 8.SevereFuel Clad*High Range Letdown ALERT Damage radiation monitor MODES 1.2.3.&4l-CH-RI-128 or 2-CH-RI-228 Increases to GREATER THANHiHi Alarm setpoint (representing 1%fuel failure)within30minutesandremains for at least15minutes OR*ReS specifi c activity-greaterthan300 dose equivalent 1-131
importance ratings (IR) for the applicable license level, and the point tota ls for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above; summarize all the SRo-only knowledge and non-A2 ability categories in the columns labeled "K" and "A" . Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exam . For Tier 3, enter the KIA numbers, descriptions, importance ratings, and point totals on Form E8-401 -3 .
*NUMBER ATTACHMENT TITLE REVISION EPI P-l.01 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL TABLE 42 ATTACHMENT (TAB C)PAGE FUEL FAILURE OR FUEL HANDLING ACCIDENT 1 1R of 47 CLASSIFICATION ALERT INDICATION
9 . Refer to ES-401, Attachment 2, for guidance regard ing the elimination of inappropriate KIA NUREG-1021, Revision 9    2 2 of 34
*Verified accident involving damage to irradiated fuel AND*Health Physics confirm s fission product release from fuel OR CONDITION/APPLICABILITY9.Fuel damage accident with release of radioactivity to containment or fuel buildings ALL MODESVentVent"B" MGPI monitor RM-VG-180 GREATER THAN1.99x10 6
*10.Potential for fuel damage to occur during refueling MODE 6 Continuing uncontrolled decrease of water level in Reactor Refueling Cavity orSpentFuel Pool ALERT*
*NUMBER ATTACHMENT TITLE REVISION EPI P-1.01 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL TABLE 42 ATTACHMENT (TAB C)PAGE FUEL FAILURE OR FUEL HANDLING ACCIDENT 1 19 of 4?CONDITION/APPLICABILITY11.Fuel clad damage indication MODES1.2.3.&4 INDICATION
*Intentional reduction inpower.loador temperature lAW reactor coolant activityT.S.Action Statement-HAS COMMENCED OR High Range Letdown radiation monitorl-CH-RI-128or 2-CH-RI-228 Increases to GREATER THAN Hi Alarm setpoint (representing 0.1%fuel failure)within 30 minutesandremains for for at least 15 minutes CLASSI FICATI ON NOTI FICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT**12.Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (lSFSI)event ALL MODES*Verified Sealed Surface Storage Cask (SSSC)seal leakage OR Sealed Surface Storage Cask (SSSC)droppedor mishandled NOTI FICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT
*NUMBER ATTACHMENT TITLE REVISION EPI P-1.01 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL TABLE 42 ATTACHMENT (TAB D)PAGE CONTAINMENT EVENT 1?O of 4?INDICATION CONDITION/APPLICABILITY1.Extremelyhigh containment radiation.


pressure and temperature MODES 1.2.3.&4*Containment High Range radiation monitor RM-RMS-165.-166or RM-RMS-265.
Tier 1 Group 1 ime/Safety Function K1 K2 K3 Ai A2 G KA  Question Type  KIA Toplc(s)  RQTSRO
.eactor Tnp - 0 0 0 0 1 0 007EA2.05 Ability to determine and interpretthe Reactortrip first-out indication .9 tabilization -  following as they apply to (EMERGENCY ecovery/1  PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41 .10/43.5/
45.13)
ressurizer Vapor 0 0 0 1 0 0 008AA1 .02 Ability to operate and / or monitorthe HPI pump to control PZR level/pressure .9 pace Accident/3  following as they apply to (ABNORMAL PLANTEVOLUTION):(CFR: 41 .7/45.5/
45.6)
mall Break LOCA/ 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 009EK3.27 Knowledge of the reasons for the following Manual depressunzation or HPI .8 responses as they apply to (EMERGENCY recirculation for sustained high pressure PLANT EVOLUTlON):(CFR: 41 .5/41.10/
45.6/45.13)
arge Break LOCA/ 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 011EK2.02 Knowledge of the interrelations between KIA RandomlyRejected .7 (EMERGENCY PLANT EVOLUTION) and the following:(CFR: 41.7 /45.7 /45.8)
I
.CP Malfunctions / 4 0 0 0 1 0 o 015AA1 .07 Ability to operate and / or monitor the RCP seal water injection subsystem .4 following as they apply to (ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41 .7 /45.5/
45.6)
ass of Rx Coolant 0 0 1 0 0 o 022AK3.05 Knowledge of the reasons for the following Need to avoid planttransients .4 lakeup/2   responses as they apply to (ABNORMAL PLANTEVOLUTION):(CFR: 41 .5/41.10 /
45.6/45.13)
oss of RHR System / 0 0 0 1 0 o 025AA1.19 Ability to operate and / or monitorthe Block orifice bypass valve controller and .4 following as they apply to (ABNORMAL indicators PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41 .7/45.5/
45.6)
-     - -
A ** __ ** _ " A"''"'''' ....


-266 GREATER THAN3.76x10 2 R/hr CLASSI FICATION GENERAL EMERGENCY*Containment pressure greaterthan45 psia and not decreasing
Tier 1 Group 1
*2.High-high containment radiation.
      -  ._---_._~-
me/Safety Function K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G KA  Question Type  KIA Topic(s) RO SRO
)SS of Component 0 0 0 0 a 0 026AK2 Knowledge of the interrelations between KIA Randomly Rejected  0 Ia Doling Water / 8  (ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION) and the    i following :(CFR: 41.7/45.7/45.8)
I I
'essurizer Pressure 0 1 0 0 0 0 027AK2.03 Knowledge of the interrelations between Controllers and positioners .8 antral System  (ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION) and the alfunction / 3  following:(CFR: 41.7/45.7/45.8)
rWS/1  0 0 0 0 0 1 029EG2.2.22 This Is a Generic, no stem statementIs Knowledge of limiting conditions for .1 associate operations and safety limits.


pressure.and temperature MODES1.2.3.&4*Containment temperature greater than 280 0F Containment High Range radiation monitor RM-RMS-165.-166or RM-RMS-265.-266 GREATER THAN 1.88x10 2 R/hr SITE AREA EMERGENCY**Containment pressuregreaterthan27.75 psia and not decreasing Containment temperaturegreater than 200 of  
.eam Gen. Tube 0 0 0 0 1 0 038EA2.16 Abilityto determine and interpretthe Actions to be taken if S/G goes solid and .6 upture/ 3  following as they applyto (EMERGENCY water enters steam line PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41 .10 / 43.5 /
*NUMBER ATTACHMENT TITLE REVISION EPIP-l.01 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL TABLE 42 ATTACHMENT (T AB D)PAGE CONTAINMENT EVENT 1 21 of 42**CONDITION/APPLICABILITY 3.HighContai nment radiation.
45.13)
:eam Line Rupture- 0 0 a 0 0 0 040AK2.02 KnOWledge of the interrelations between KIA Randomly Rejected .6
<<iessive Heat  (ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION) and the
'ansfer / 4  following:(CFR: 41.7/45.7/45.8)
iss of Main 0 0 0 0 0 0 054AA1.01 Ability to operate and / or monitorthe KIA Randomly Rejected .4 sedwater / 4  following as they apply to (ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41.7/45.5/
45.6)
tation Blackout/ 6 0 0 0 0 0 o 055EG2.1.27 This is a Generic, no stem statement IS KIA Randomly Rejected .9 associate )55 of Off-site Power / 1 0 0 0 0 o 056AK1.03 Knowledge of the operational implications Definition of subcooling: use of steam .4 of the following concepts as they apply to tables to determine it the (ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41.8 to 41.10 145.3)


pressure and temperature MODES1.2.3.&4 INDICATION*Containment High Range radiation monitor RM-RMS-165.-166or RM-RMS-265.
Tier 1 Group 1
          -
Ime/Safety Function K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G KA  Question Type  KIA Topic(s) RO SRO
)5S of Vital AC lns AA2.02 Ability to determine and Interpret the Core flood tank pressure and level .8 us /6    following as they apply to ABNORMAL Indicators PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41 .10/43.5/
45.13)
)5S of DC Power /6 1 0 0 0 0 0 058AK1 .01 Knowledge of the operational Implications Battery charger equipment and .1 of the following concepts as they apply to instrumentation the (ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41.8 to 41 .10 /45.3)
::ISS of Nuclear Svc 0 0 0 0 0 1 062AG2. This is a Generic, no stem statementis Knowledge symptom based EOP later /4   associate mitigation strategies.


-266 GREATER THAN 8l.5R/hr*Containment pressure greater than 17 p sia OR Containment temperaturegreaterthan150 0F CLASSI FI CATION ALERT
oss of InstrumentAir / 0 0 0 a a 1 065AG2.1 .23 This Is a Generic, no stem statementis Ability to perform specific system and associate integrated plant procedures during all modesof plant operation .
*NUMBER ATTACHMENT TITLE REVISION EPI P-l.01 EMERGENCY ACTION LEV EL TABLE 42 ATTACHMENT (T AB E)PAGE RADIOACTIVITY EVENT 1 22 of 47 INDICATION CONDITION/APPLICABILITY 1.Release imm inent or in progress and siteboundarydoses projectedtoexceed 1.0 Rem TEDEor5.0 Rem Thyroid CDE ALL MODES*HP assessment indicates actual or projected dose s at or beyond site boundary greater than 1.0 Rem TEDE or 5.0 Rem Thyroid CDE CLA SSI FI CATION G ENERAL EMERGENCY**2.Releaseimminentor in progress and siteboundarydoses projected to exceed 0.1 Rem TEDE or 0.5 Rem Thyroid CDE ALL MODES*HP assessment indicates SITE AREA actual or projected dose at EMERGENCY or beyond Site Boundaryexceeds0.1 Rem TEDE or 0.5 Rem Thyroid CDE
OCAOutside 0 0 1 0 0 0 WE04EK Knowledge of the reasons for the following RO or SRO function within the control .8 ontainment /3  responses as they apply to (EMERGENCY room team as appropriate to the PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR:41.5/41.10 / assigned position, In such a way that 45.6/45.13)   procedures are adhered to and the limitations in the facilities license and amendments are not violate DSS of Emergency 0 1 0 0 0 a WE11EK Knowledge of the Interrelations between Components and functions of control .9 oolant Recirc. /4   (EMERGENCY PLANT EVOLUTION) and and safety systems, including the following:(CFR: 41.7 /45.7 /45.8) instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes and automatic and manual feature team Line Rupture - 0 1 a 0 0 a WE12EK Knowledge of the interrelations between Components and functions of control .7 xcessive Heat  (EMERGENCY PLANTEVOLUTION) and and safetysystems, Including ransfer 14  the following:(CFR: 41.7/45.7/45.8) instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes and automatic and manual feature Tier 1 Group 1 lme/Safety Function K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G KA  Question Type  --~----KiA- Topic(s) RO SRO adequate Heat 1 0 0 0 0 0 WE05EK1 .3 Knowledge of the operational implications Annunciators and conditions indicating 3.9 4.1 ransfer- Loss of  of the following concepts as they applyto signals, and remedial actions associated econdary Heat Sink/  the EMERGENCY PLANT  with the (Loss of Secondary HeatSink).
*NUMBER ATTACHMENT TITLE REVISION EPIP-l.Ol EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL TABLE 42 ATTACHMENT (TAB E)PAGE RADIOACTIVITY EVENT 1?1 of 47**CONDITION/APPLICABILITY 3.Effluent relea se greater than 10 times ODCM allowable 1 imit ALL MODES INDICATION a)Any of the following monitors indicate valid readings above the specified values for greater than15minute s*Clarifier Effluent RM-LW-l11 GREATER THAN 4.8 x 10 5 cpm*Discharge Canal RM-SW-130 or-230 GREATER THAN 5 x 10 4 cpm*VentVentA MGPI RM-VG-179 GREATER THAN 1.73 x 10 6*VentVentB MGPI RM-VG-180 GREATER THAN 1.99 x 106
*Process Vent MGPI RM-GW-178 GREATER THAN 1.35 x 10 7 OR b)HP assessment (sample resultsordose projections)
indicate greater than 10 times ODCM allowable 1 imit CLASSI FICATION ALERT
*NUMBER ATTACHMENT TITLE REVISION EPIP-1.01 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL TABLE 42 ATTACHMENT (TAB E)PAGE RADIOACTIVITY EVENT 1 24 of 47 CONDITION/APPLICABILITY 4.High radiation or airborne contamination levels indicate a severe degradation in control of radioactive material ALL MODES INDICATION Valid readingsonanyof the following monitors have increasedbya factorof1000andremain for at least 15 minutes:*Ventilation Ventsample gaseous or particulate monitor I RM-VG-106or-105*Control Room Area I RMS-157 CLASSI FICATION ALERT*Aux.Bldg.Control Area I RMS-154**Decon.Bldg.Area I RMS-151**Fuel PoolBridgeArea I RMS-153*New fuel storage Area I RMS-152*Laboratory Area I RMS-158*Sample Room Area I RMS-156
*NUMBER ATTACHMENT TITLE REVISION EPIP-l.01 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL TABLE 42 ATTACHMENT (TAB E)PAGE RADIOACTIVITY EVENT 1 25of42**CONDITION/APPLICABILITY 5.Effluent release greater than ODCM allowable limit ALL MODES INDICATION a)Any of the following monitors indicate valid readingsabovethe specified value for morethan1hour:
*Clarifier Effluent RM-LW-111 GREATER THAN 4.8x10 4 cpm*Discharge Canal RM-SW-130or-230 GREATER THAN 5 x 10 3 cpm*VentVent A MGPI RM-VG-179 GREATER THAN 1.73 x 10 5
*VentVent B MGPI RM-VG-180 GREATER THAN 1.99 x 10 5*Process Vent MGPI RM-GW-178 GREATER THAN 1.35 x 10 6 OR b)HP assessment (sample resultsordose projections)
indicates greater than ODCM allowable limit CLASSI FICATION NOTI FICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT NUMBER ATTACHMENT TITLE REVISION EPI P-1.01 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL TABLE 42 ATTACHMENT (TAB G)PAGE LOSS OF SECONDARY COOLANT 1 2fi of 42 CONDITION/APPLICABIL ITY INDICAT ION 1.Major secondary line break w it h sign ificant primary to secondary1eakageand fuel damage indicated Conditionsa)andb)exist with c): a)Uncontrolled loss of secondary coolant-IN PROGRESS AN D CLASSI F I CATION SITE AREA EMERGENCY b)RCS specific activity exceeds MODES1.2.3.&4 limitsofT.S.Figure 3.4.16-1 OR High Range Letdow n radiation monitor 1-CH-RI-128 o r 2-CH-RI-228 GREATER THAN Hi Alarm setpoint ANDc)Vent VentA MGPI Monitor RM-VG-179 GREATER THAN 6.21 x 107OR Affected path way Steam Gene rator S lo wdo wn monitor RM-SS-122.-123.-124.-222.-223.-224 GRE ATER THAN1x10 6 cpm OR Affecte d p at h way MainStea m Line Hig h Range monitor RM-MS-170.-171.-172.-270.-271.-272 GRE ATER THAN12.2 mR/hr
*NUMBER ATTACHMENT TITLE REVISION EPI P-l.01 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL TABLE 42 ATTACHMENT (TAB G)PAGE LOSS OF SECONDARY COOLANT 1'17of4?***CONDITION/APPLICABILITY 2.Majo r secondary line break with significant primary to secondary leakage MODES1.2.3.&43.Major secondary line break MODES1.2.3.&4 INDICATION Uncont rolled loss of secondary coolant-IN PROGRESS AND*VentVentA MGPI Monitor RM-VG-179 GREATER THAN1.76x106 Steam Generator Blowdown monitor on affected pathway RM-SS-122.-123.-124 RM-SS-22 2.-223.-224 GREATER T HAN lx l05 cpm OR Main Steam Line High Range monitor on affected pathway RM-MS-170.-171.-172 RM-MS-270.


-271.-272 GREATER THAN 0.14 mR/hr Uncontrolled loss of secondary coolant-IN PROGRESS CLASSI FICATION ALERT NOTI FICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT
EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41.8to 41.10 /45 .3)
*NUMBER ATTACHMENT TITLE REVISION EPI P-l.01 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL TABLE 42 ATTACHMENT (TAB H)PAGE ELECTRICAL FAILURE 1 7R of 47 CONDITION/APPLICABILITY INDICATION CLASSIFICATION l.Lossof offsite and The following conditions exist SITE AREA onsite AC power for for greaterthan15 minutes: EMERGENCY more than 15 minutes*Ammeters for 4160V Reserve ALL MODES Station Service Buses D.E.&F all indicate-zero (0)amps AND*Ammeters for 4160V Station Service Buses A.B.&Call indicate-zero (0)amps AND*Ammeters for 4160V EmergencyBusesH&J both indicate-zero (0)amps2.Loss of all onsite The following conditions exist SITE AREA*DC power for greater for greater than 15 minutes: EMERGENCY than 15 minutes*All station battery ALL MODES voltmeters indicate zero (0)volts AND*No light indication available to Reserve Station Service breakers1501.15Eland15Fl
_. ---- - - -- .-
*
NUMBER ATTACHMENT TITLE REVISION EPI P-I.01 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL TABLE 42 ATTACHMENT (TAB H)PAGE ELECTRICAL FAILURE 1?g o f 4?CONDITION/APPLICABILITY INDICATION CLASSI FICATION CAUTION: EAL A.l i s duplicat ed b elow for cros s-re f erenc e/c omparison to EAL H.3: A.I.Lossoffu nction needed for unit HSD condition MOD ES 1.2.3&4*Total lossoft he Charg ing/SI Sy stem OR Total loss of the Main Feed water and Auxiliary Feedw ater System s SITE A REA E ME R GENCY 3.Loss of all offsite*Ammeter s for 4160V Reserve ALERT and onsite AC power Station Service Bu ses D.E.&F all indicate-ze ro (0)ALL MODES amps AND*Ammeters for 4160V Station Service Buses A.B.&Call indicate-zero (0)amps AND*Ammeters for 4160V EmergencyBusesHand J both indicate-zero (0)amps 4.Lossof all onsite*All station battery ALERT DC power voltmeters indicate-zero (0)volts ALL MODES AND*No light indication availabletoReserve Station Service Breakers 1501.15E1and15Fl
*NUMBER ATTACHMENT TITLE REVISION EPIP-1.01 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL TABLE 42 ATTACHMENT (TAB H)PAGE ELECTRICAL FAILURE 1:i0of42*CONDITION/APPLICABILITY 5.Loss of offsite power or onsite AC power capabil ity ALL MODES INDICATION*Unit main generator and both emergency diesel generatorsoutof service OR Loss of all 34.5 KV reserve station service buses CLASSI FICATION NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT
*NUMBER ATTACHMENT TITLE REVISION EPIP-1.01 EMERGENCY ACTI ON LEVEL TABLE 42 ATTACHMENT (TAB 1)PAGE FIRE 1 11 of 47***CONDITION/APPLICABILITY 1.Fire resulting in degradation of safety systems MODES1.2.3.&4 2.Fire potentially affecting station safety systems MODES1.2.3.&4 3.Fire lasting greater than 10 minutes in ProtectedAreaor Service Water Pump/Valve House ALL MODES INDICATION Fire which causes major degradationofa safety system function required for protection of the public AND*Affected systems are causedtobe NOT operable as definedbyTech.Specs.


Firewhichhas potential for causing a safetysystemnotto be operable as defined by Tech.Specs.Fire within the Protected Area or Service Water Pump/Valve House which isnotunder control within10minutes after FireBrigade-DISPATCHED CLASSI FI CATION SITE AREA EMERGENCY ALERT NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT
Tier 1 Group 2
*NUMBER ATTACHMENT TITLE REVISION EPIP-1.01 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL TABLE 42 ATTACHMENT (TAB J)PAGE SECURITY EVENT 1 1/of 4/**CONDITION/APPLICABILITY1.Lossof physical control of the facil ity ALL MODES 2.Immi nent loss of physical control of the plant ALL MODES 3.Ongoing Security compromise ALL MODES INDICATION A hostile force has taken control of plant equipment such that plant personnel are unable to operate equipment required to maintain safety functions*A confirmed security event within a plant Vital Area OR A notification from the site security force that an armed attack.explosive attack.airliner impact.or other hostile action is occurringorhas occurred within the Protected Area*A confirmed security event within the Protected Area A validated notification from NRCofan airliner attack threat less than 30 minutes away A notification from the site security forceofan armed attack.explosive attack.airliner impact.or other hostile action within the Owner Controlled Area CLASSIFICATION GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY ALERT
      .*
*NUMBER ATTACHMENT TITLE REVISION EPI P-l.01 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL TABLE 42 ATTACHMENT (T AB J)PAGE SECURITY EVENT 1 33 of 47 CONDITION/APPLICABILITY INDICATION CLASSIFICATION
arne I Safety Function K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G KA  Question Type  K/A Topic(s} RO SRO
**4.Security threat.unauthorized attempted entry.or attempted sabotage ALL MODES*A credible site-specific security threat notification OR A validated notification from NRC providing informationofan aircraft threat A confirmed security event which indicates a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plantsuchas a violent civil disturbance or strike action.attempted sabotage.a hostage/extortion situation.
.ontinuous Rod Withdr a a 0 0 0 0 001AA1 .06 Ability to operate and/ or monitorthe KiA Randomly Rejected  3 following as they apply to (ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41 .7 /45.5/
45.6)
iropped Control Rod / 0 0 0 0 1 0 003AA2.04 Ability to determine and interpret the Rod motion stops dueto dropped rod 3.4 following as they apply to ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41.10/43.5/
45.13)
ioperable/Stuck Contn a 0 0 0 0 0 005AA2.01 Ability to determine and interpret the KiA Randomly Rejected  3.3 following as theyapply to ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41 .10 /43.5/
45.13)
.mergency Boration /1 0 0 0 0 0 0 024AK1.02 Knowledge of the operational implications of KiA Randomly Rejected  . 3.6 the following concepts as they applyto the (ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR:
41.8 to 41 .10/ 45.3)
ressurizer Level Malfu 0 0 0 0 0 o 028AK1 .01 Knowledge of the operatlonallmplications of KIA Randomly Rejected  2.8 the following concepts as they applyto the (ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR:
41.8to 41.10 /45.3)
ass of Source Range I 0 0 0 0 0 o I032AK2.01 Knowledge of the interrelations between KIA Randomly Rejected  2.7 (ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION) and the following:(CFR: 41.7 /45.7 /45.8)
ass of Intermediate R~ 0 0 0 0 0 o 033AK1.01 Knowledge of the operational implications of KIA Randomly Rejected  2.7 3 the following concepts as they applyto the (ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR:
41.8 to 41.10 / 45.3)
uel Handling Accident 0 0 a 1 0 o 036AA1.03 Ability to operate and/ or monitor the Reactor-building containment evacuation 3.5 following asthey apply to (ABNORMAL alarm enable switch


or attempted intrusion in the Protected Area NOTI FICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT
Tier 1 Group 2 ame / Safety Function K1 K2 K3 Ai A2 G KA  Question Type  KIA Topic(s) RO SRO PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41.7 145.51 45.6)
*NUMBER ATTACHMENT TITLE REVISION EPI P-l.01 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL TABLE 42 ATTACHMENT (T AB K)PAGE HAZARD TO STATION OPERATION 1 34 of 42 CONDITION/APPLICABILITY 1.Aircraft damage to vital plant systems MODES1.2.3.&4 2.Severe explosive damage MODES1.2.3.&4 INDICATION Aircraft crash which affect s vital structuresbyimpactor fire Explosion which results in severe degradationofanyof the following systems required for safe shutdown: CLASSI FICATION SITE AREA EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY*CVCS System OR ECCS System OR**3.Entryof toxic or flammable gases into plant vital areas other than the Control Room MODES1.2.3.&4**Main/Auxiliary Feedwater System Uncontrolled release of toxicorflammable agents greater than life threatening or explosive limits in Vital A reas AND Evacuation of Vital Area other than Control RoomREOUIRED OR Significant degradation of plant safetysystems resulting in lossofa safety system function required for protection of the public SITE AREA EMERGENCY
team Generator Tube 0 0 0 0 0 0 037AA2.01 Ability to determine and interpretthe KIA Randomly Rejected 3 following as they applyto ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41.10 /43.5/
*NUMBER ATTACHMENT TITLE REVISION EPI P-l.01 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL TABLE 42 ATTACHMENT (TAB K)PAGE HAZARD TO STATION OPERATION 1 of 47 CONDITION/APPLICABILITY 4.Severe missile damage to safety systems MODES1.2.3.&4 INDICATION Missile impact causing severe degradation of safety systems required for unit shutdown CLASSI FICATION SITE AREA EMERGENCY 5.Aircraft crash on the facil ity ALL MODES Aircraft crash within the ProtectedAreaor Switchyard (other thanimpactfrom airliner attack-See TAB J)ALERT 6.Explosion damage to Unplanned explosion resulting ALERT facility in damage to plant structure or equipment that affects plant ALL MODES operations
45.13)
*7.Entry of toxic or Notification of uncontrolled ALERT flammable gases or release of toxicorflammable liquids into plant agent which causes: facil i ty*Evacuation of personnel ALL MODES from plant areas AND*Safety related equipment is rendered inoperable 8.Turbine failure or Failure of turbine/generator ALERT missile impact rotating equipment resulting in casing penetration MODES 1&2*
ass of CondenserVac 0 a 0 0 0 0 051AA2.02 Abilityto determine and interpret the KIA Randomly Rejected 3.9 following asthey apply to ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR:41.10 /43.5/
*NUMBER ATTACHMENT TITLE REVISION EPIP-l.Ol EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL TABLE 42 ATTACHMENT (TAB K)PAGE HAZARD TO STATION OPERATION 1:if)of42 CONDITION/APPLICABILITY INDICATION CLASSI FICATION 9.Missile damage to safety relatedequipmentor structures MODES1.2.3.&4 Notification of missile impact ALERT causing damage to safety relatedequipmentor structure s*10.Aircraft crash or unusual aircraft activity ALL MODES*Confirmed notification of an aircraft crash within the site boundary (other thanimpactfrom airliner attack-See TAB J)OR Unusual aircraft activity in the vicinity of the siteasdeterm ined by the Operations Shift Ma nager/Station Emergency Manager or the Security Shift Supervisor NOTI FICATION O F UNUSUAL EVENT*11.Train derailment within Protected Area ALL MODES 12.Explosion within Protected Area ALL MODES 13.Onsite or nearsite release of toxic or flammable liquids or gases ALL MODES Confirmed report of train derailment within Pro tected Area Confirmed reportofunplanned explosion within Protected Area Notificationofunplanned release of toxicorflammable agent s which may affect safety of station personnel or equipment NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT NOTI FICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT
45.13)
*NUMBER ATTACHMENT TITLE REVISION EPI P-l.01 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL TABLE 42 ATTACHMENT (T AB K)PAGE HAZARD TO STATION OPERATION 1: nof42**CONDITION/APPLICABILITY 14.Turbine rotating component failure with no casing penetration MODES 1&2 INDICATION Failure of turbine/generator rotating equipment resulting in immediate unit shutdown CLASSI FICATION NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT NUMBER ATTACHMENT TITLE REVISION EPIP-l.0 1 EME RG ENC Y ACTION LEVE L TAB LE 42 ATTACHMENT (TAB L)PAGE NA T URAL EV ENTS 1 3 8 o f 4 2 CON DITIO N/APPLIC ABILI TY I NDICATION C L AS SI FIC ATIO N l.Earthquak e greater*Confirmed earthquake SIT E AR EAthanorequa l to DB E whic h activate s the Event EMER GENCY le ve ls I n dicator on the Strong MotionAccelerograph MOD ES 1.2.3.&4 AND*Alarmsonthe Peak S hock Annunci ator i nd icate a horizon talmotionof g reaterthanorequalto 0.12gora vertical motion of greate rthanorequal to 0.08g 2.Su stainedwindsin Sustained w i nd s 1 50mph SITE AR EA excessofdesign OR GREATER experienced E MERGENCY level s experiencedorpro ject ed or projected M ODES1.2.3.&4 3.NOT USED
ccidental Liquid Rad\l\ i 0 0 0 0 0 a 059AK3.03 Knowledge of the reasons for the following KIA Randomly Rejected 3 responses as they applyto (ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR:41.5/41.10 /
*NUMBER ATTACHMENT TITLE REVISION EPIP-l.01 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL TABLE 42 ATTACHMENT (TAB l)PAGE NATURAL EVENTS 1of42 CONDITION/APPLICABILITY INDICATION CLASSIFICATION 4.Earthquake greater*Confirmed earthquake which ALERT thanorequalto OBE activates Event Indicator levels on the Strong Motion Accelerograph ALL MODES AND*Alarms on thePeakShock Annunciator indicate a horizontalmotionof greater thanorequalto 0.06gora verticalmotionof greater thanorequalto 0.04g 5.Tornado striking Tornado visually detected ALERT facil ity striking structures within the ProtectedAreaor Switchyard ALL MODES*6.Hurricane winds Hurricanewinds120 mph ALERT near design basis OR GREATER experienced level experienced or projected or projected ALL MODES*7.Flood near design levels ALL MODESFloodin the Lake Anna ALERT Reservoir with indicated levelgreater than 263 feet MSL
45.6/45.13)
*NUMBER ATTACHMENT TITLE REVISION EPI P-l.01 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL TABLE 42 ATTACHMENT (TAB l)PAGE NATURAL EVENTS 140of42 CONDITION/APPLICABILITY 8.Earthquake detected ALL MODES9.Tornado within Protected Area orSwitchyard ALL MODES INDICATION Confirmed earthquake which activatestheEvent Indicator on the Strong Motion Accelerograph Tornado visually detected within Protected Area or Switchyard CLASSI FICATION NOTI FICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT NOTI FICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT 10.Hurricane force*ConfirmationbyWeather NOTI FI CATION winds projected Center that hurricane force OF UNUSUAL ons ite within12 winds (greaterthan73 mph)EVENT hours onsite within 12 ours ALL MODES*1l.50 year floodFloodin the Lake Anna NOTI FICATION Reservoir with indicated level-OF UNUSUAL ALL MODES greater than 254 feet MSL EVENT*
ccidental Gaseous Ra 0 0 0 0 0 o 060AK1.04 Knowledge of the operational implications of KIA Randomly Rejected 2.5 the following concepts as they apply to the (ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR:
*NUMBER ATTACHMENT TITLE REVISION EPIP-l.01 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL TABLE 42 ATTACHMENT (TAB M)PAGE MISCELLANEOUS ABNORMAL EVENTS 1 41of42 CONDITION/APPLICABILITY INDICATION CLASSI FICATION 1.Any major internal or external events which singlyorin combination cause massive damage to station facilities or may warrant evacuation of the public ALL MODES Shift Manager/Station Emergency GENERAL Manager judgement EMERGENCY 2.Station conditions Shift Manager/Station Emergency SITE AREA which may warrant Manager judgement EMERGENCY notification of the public near the site ALL MODES*3.Station cond itions Shift Manager/Station Emergency ALERTwhichhave the Manager judgement potential to degrade or are actually degrading the level of safety of the station ALL MODES*
41.8 to 41.10/45.3)
*NUMBER ATTACHMENT TITLE REVISION EPIP-l.Ol EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL TABLE.42 ATTACHMENT (TAB M)PAGE MISCELLANEOUS ABNORMAL EVENTS 142nf42 INDICATION Shift Manager/Station Emergency Manager judgement that any of the following exist:**CONDITION/APPLICABILITY 4.Station conditions which warrant increased awareness of state and/or local autho rities ALL MODES*Unitshutdown is other thanaco ntrolled shutdown Unit isinan uncontrolled condition during opera tion A condition exists which has the potential for escalation and therefore warrants notification CLASSI FICATION NOTI FI CATI ON OF UNUSUAL EVENT
RM System Alarms / i 1 0 a 0 0 o 061AK1.01 Knowledge of the operational implications of Detector limitations 2.5 the following concepts as they apply to the (ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR:
***NUMBER ATTACHMENT TITLE REVISION EPIP-I.OI TURNOVER CHECKLIST 42 ATTACHMENT PAGE 21of1Conducta turnover between the on shift and relief SEMinac cordance with the following checklist.
41.8 to 41 .10 145.3)
lant Fire On-site /98 0 0 0 0 0 o 067AK3.04 KnOWledge of the reasonsfor the following KIA Randomly Rejected 3.3 responses as they apply to (ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR:41.5/41 .10/
45.6/45.13)
ontrol Room Evac. I 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 068AK1 KnOWledge of the operational implications of KIA Randomly Rejected 0 0 the following concepts as they applyto the (ABNORMAL PLANTEVOLUTION):(CFR:
          .


U se placekeeping aid at left of item."".to track comp letion.1.Determine the status of primary responder notification.
Tier 1 Group 2 arne / Safety Function K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G KA  Question Type  KIA Topic(s) RO SRO 41.8to 41.10 /45.3)
oss of CTMT Integrity , 1 0 0 0 0 0 1069AK1 .01 Knowledge of the operational implications of Effectof pressure on leak rate 2.6 the following concepts as they applyto the (ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR:
41 .8 to 41.10 /45.3)
lad. Core Cooling /4 0 0 0 0 a 0 074EK3.10 Knowledge of the reasons for the following KIA Randomly Rejected  3,5 responses as they applyto (EMERGENCY PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41 .5/41.10 /
45.6/45.13)
ligh Reactor Coolant /J a 0 0 0 0 0 076AA1.04 Ability to operate and/ or monitor the KIA Randomly Rejected  3.2 following as theyapplyto (ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41 .7/45.5/
45.6)
:ediagnosis /3 0 0 0 0 0 o WE01 EG2. This is a Generic, no stem statement IS KIA Randomly Rejected  3.4 associate team Generator Over- a a a 0 0 o WE13EK Knowledge of the interrelations between KIA Randomly Rejected  3.0 (EMERGENCY PLANT EVOLUTION) and the following:(CFR: 41.7 /45.7 /45.8)
ontainment Flooding / 0 0 0 0 0 1 WE15EG2 .1 .3~ Thisis a Generic, no stem statement is lAbility to recognize indications for system 3.4 14 associate operating parameters which are entry-level conditions for technical specification igh Containment Radi 0 0 0 0 0 o WE16EA Ability to determine and interpret the KIARandomly Rejected  3.0 following as theyapplyto (EMERGENCY PLANT EVOLUTlON) :(CFR: 41 .10/43.5/
45.13)
I Termination /3 0 0 0 0 0 o WE02EK Knowledge of the Interrelations between KIARandomly Rejected .9


2.Det ermine the statusof"Report of Emergency to StateandLocal Governments." EPIP-2.0I.Attachment2.Get completed copies if available.
Tier 1 Group 2
-- - - - - - - - :;-:-:-
KIA Topic(s) RO SRO arne I Safety Function K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G KA  Question Type (EMERGENCY PLANTEVOLUTION) and the following:(CFR: 41.7 /45.7 /45.8)
)CA Cooldown - Depi 0 0 a a 1 0 WE03EA Ability to determine and interpret the Facility conditions and selection of 3.4 following as they applyto (EMERGENCY appropriate procedures during abnormal PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41.10 /43.5/ and emergency operation .13)
atural Circ./ 4  0 0 a 1 0 a WE09EA Ability to operate and I or monitorthe Desired operating results during abnormal 3.5 following asthey applyto (EMERGENCY and emergency situation PLANTEVOLUTION):(CFR: 41.7 /45.5/
45.6)
atural Circ. With Sean 0 1 0 0 0 0 WE10EK KnOWledge of the Interrelations between Facility's heat removal systems, including 3.6 (EMERGENCY PLANT EVOLUTION) and primary coolant, emergency coolant, the the following:(CFR: 41 .7/45.7/45.8) decay heat removal systems and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.


3.Determine status of the"Report of Radiological Conditions to the S t ate." EPIP-2.01.
CS Overcooling - PTS 0 0 0 a 0 o WE08EG2.1.3~ Thisis a Generic, no stem statement Is KiA Randomly Rejected  3.4 associate egraded Core Coolin& 0 0 1 a 0 o WE06EK KnOWledge of the reasons for the following Facility operating characteristics during 3.4 responses asthey applyto (EMERGENCY transient conditions, including coolant PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41 .5/41 .10/ chemistry and the effects of temperature, 45.6/45.13)  pressure and reactivity changes and operating limitations and reasons for these operating characteristics.


Attachment3.Get completed copy if available.
aturated Core Cooling a a a a 0 o WE07EG2 .4.4~ This Is a Generic, no stem statement is KiA Randomly Rejected  4 4 associated.


4.Determine stat us of Emergency Notification Sy stem (ENS)commun ications and completion statu s of NRC Event Notification Work sheet (EPIP-2.02 Attachment 1).5.Review clas sification and initial PAR status.6.Review present plant conditions and status.Getcopy of Critica l Safety Function s form.7.Review status of station firewatches and r e-establish if conditions allow.8.Determine readines s of TSC for activation.
JSS of CTMT Integrity . 0 0 0 a 0 o WE14EG2.4.4~ This is a Generic, no stem statement is KiA Randomly Rejected  4 4 associate Tier 2 Group 1 me I Safety-Functio K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 KG A1 A~ A3 A4 G  Question Type  KIA Toplc(s) r KA RO SRO sactor Coolant 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 Knowledge of the effect that a loss or Containment isolation valves affectmg 003K6.04 12.8 ~.1 imp    malfunction of the following will have on RCP operation the (SYSTEM):(CFR: 41 .7/45.7)
temical and 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 Knowledge of the operational  Types and effects of radiation, dosimetry 004K5.17 1 ~ .1 alums Control  implications of the following concepts as and shielding-time-distance they applyto the (SYSTEM):(CFR: 41.5 /
45.7)
esidual Heat 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 Knowledge of the operational  Needfor adequate subcoollng  005K5.02 ~.4 ~ .5 emoval    implications of the following conceptsas they apply to the (SYSTEM) :(CFR: 41.5/
45.7)
mergency Core 0 0 0 0 o 1 o 0 o 0 0 I Knowledge of the effect that a loss or HPI/LPI systems (mode change) 006K6.19  ~ .9 Doling    malfunction of the following will have on the (SYSTEM):(CFR: 41.7/45.7)      [7 ressurlzer o 0 0 o 0 o 0 0 1 0 0 Ability to monitor automatic operations of Components which discharge to the PRT * 007A3.01  12.9 elief/Quench Tank  the (SYSTEM) Includlng:(CFR: 41.7/
45.5)      [7 omponent Cooling o 0 o 0 a 0 o 0 o 1 o Ability to manuallyoperate and/or Control of minimum level in the CCWS 008A4.07 D.9 12.9 later    monitorin the control room:(CFR: 41.7 / surge tank 45.5 to 45.8)
ressurizer 0 1 o 0 o 0 o 0 o 0 0 Knowledge of electrical powersupplies Controller for PZR sprayvalve 010K2.02 i:'.5 12.7 ressure Control  to the following:(CFR: 41.7)
eactor Protection o 0 o a a 0 o 0 1 o a Ability to monitor automatic operations of Single and multiple channel trip 012A3.05 ~.7 the (SYSTEM) Includlng:(CFR: 41.7/ indicators 45.5)
ngineered Safety a 0 o 0 o 0 1 o 0 a o Ability to predictand/ormonitor changes RWSTlevel  013A1 .06 ;3.6 \ .. _ ...... n "nne


9.Afte r all information i s obtained.transfer location to TSC.(Consider direct tran sfer of State&local notificatio ns to LEOF/CEOF.)10.Call the Control Room and asses sanychanges that may have occurred during transition to the TSC.11.When sufficient pe rsonnel are available.
Tier 2 Group 1
_._- _._--~- --,.---
me I Safety Functio K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A'). A3 A4 G  Question Type  KIA Topfc(s)  KA RO SHO iatures Actuation  in parameters associated with operating the (SYSTEM) controls inciuding:(CFR:
41.5/45.5)
mtalnment 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Knowledge of the effectthat a loss or  Containment instrumentation readings 022K3.02 3.0 13.3
)oling    malfunction of the (SYSTEM) will have on the following:(CFR: 41.7 145.6)
e Condenser 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0    KIARejected  025A2.04 0 P
:mtainment Spray 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 Ability to manually operate and/or  CSS controls  026A4.01 ~.3 monitorin the control room:(CFR: 41.71 45.5 to 45.8)
ain and Reheat o 0 0 0 o 0 0 1 0 0 0 Ability to (a) predict the impactsof the Increasing steam demand, its 039A2.05 ~.3 ~.6
:eam    following on the (SYSTEM) and (b) relationship to increases in reactor power based on thosepredictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operation:(CFR: 41.5/43.51 45.3/45.13)
ain Feedwater 1 o 0 o 0 o 0 o 0 o 0 IKnowledge of the physical connections S/GS  059K1.03 ~.1 ~.3 and/orcausa-effect relationships between (SYSTEM) and the following:(CFR: 41.2to 41.9/45.7 to 45.8)
Jxiliary/Emergency o 0 o 0 o 1 o 0 o 0 o KnOWledge of the effectthat a loss or Pumps  061K6.08 f6 ~.7 sedwater    malfunction of the following will haveon the (SYSTEM):(CFR: 41.7/45.7)
;: Electrical 0 1 o 0 o 0 o 0 o 0 o Knowledge of electrical powersupplies Majorsystem loads  062K2.01 ~.4 istribution  to the following:(CFR: 41.7)
          . -"..""'-
          -.


the relief SEM is to assume the follow ing responsibilities from the onshift Station Emergency Manager:a.Recla ssification.
Tier 2 Group 1
          - - , - --
me I Safety Functlo K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G  Question Type  KIA Topic(s)  KA RO fIRO C Electrical 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Knowledge of electrical power supplies Major DC loads  063K2.01 2.9 ~ .1 istribution  to the following:(CFR: 41 .7)
l1ergency Diesel 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 Abilityto monitor automatic operations of Automaticstart of compressor and ED/G 064A3.01  4.1 ~.O enerator  the (SYSTEM) including:(CFR: 41.7/
45.5)
rocess Radiation 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 Abilityto predict and/or monitor changes Radiation levels  073A1.01 ;3.2 onitoring  in parameters associated with operating the (SYSTEM) controls including:(CFR:
41.5/45.5)
ervice Water 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 This is a Generic, no stem statement is ! Knowledge of operator responsibilities 076GG2.1.2 ~.O associate during all modes of plant operatio strument Air 0 0 0 0 o 0 o 0 o 0 1 This is a Generic, no stem statement Is Knowledge of the purpose and function 078GG2.1.28 ;3.2 associate of major system components and control ontainment o 0 o 1 o 0 0 0 o 0 o Knowledge of (SYSTEM) design Vacuum breaker protection  103K4.01 ;3.0 feature(s) and or interlock{s)which provide for the followlng:(CFR: 41 .7}
eactor Protection o 0 o 0 o 0 0 1 o 0 o Abilityto (a) predictthe impacts of the Incorrectchannel bypassing 012A2.03 ;3.4 following on the (SYSTEM) and (b)
based on those predictions, use proceduresto correct, control, or mitigatethe consequences of those abnormal operation:(CFR: 41.5/43.51 45.3/45.13)
ressurizer o 0 1 0 o 0 o 0 o 0 o KnOWledge of the effect that a loss or Containment  007K3.01 .6 elieflQuench Tank  malfunction of the (SYSTEM) will have on the following:(CFR: 41.7/45.6)
          . . - -


b.Protective Action Recommendations until LEOF act ivated.c.Notifications (i.e..state.local.&NRC).Upon LEOF activation.
Tier 2 Group 1 me I Safety Functio K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G  Question Type  KIA Topic(s)  KA RO ~RO irvlce Water 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Knowledge of the physical connections PRMS  076K1.17 ~ .6 ~.7 and/orcause-effect relationships between (SYSTEM) and the following :(CFR: 41 .2 to 41 .9/45.7 to 45.8)
sin and Reheat 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Knowledge of the physical connections .RCS temperature monitoring and control 039K1.04 3.1 3.1 eam    and/orcause-effect relationships between (SYSTEM) and the following:(CFR: 41.2to 41.9/45.7 to 45.8)
rin Feedwater 0 0 1 0 0 0 a 0 0 0 0 Knowledge of the effectthat a loss or AFWsystem  059K3.02 ~.6 malfunction of the (SYSTEM) will have on the followlng:(CFR: 41.7 /45.6)
iactor Coolant 0 0 0 0 o 0 1 o 0 0 o Ability to predict and/ormonitorchanges RCP motorstatorwinding temperatures 003A1.03 ~ .6 imp    in parameters associated with operating the (SYSTEM) controls including :(CFR:
41 .S/45.S}
essurizer o 0 0 0 o 0 0 o 0 0 0  KIA Rejected  007K4.01 p D
!lief/Quench Tank trurnent Air o 0 0 1 o 0 o 0 o 0 o Knowledge of (SYSTEM) design Manual/automatic transfers of control 078K4.01 2.7 feature(s) and or interlock(s) which provide for the following:(CFR: 41 .7)


transfer notification responsibilitie s except for the NRC ENS.d.Site evacuation authorization.
Tier 2 Group 2 me J Safety Functio K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 ~ M M ~  Question Type  KIA Topic(s) KA RO SRO vdrogen  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 This Is a Generic, no stem statement is K/A Randomly Rejected  028GG2.4.50 3.3 3.3 ecombiner and  associated.


e.Emergency exposure authorization.
.u ge Control Dntainment Purge 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 AbIlity to manually operate and/or Containment evacuation signal 029A4.04 3.5 monitor In the control room:(CFR: 41.7/
45.5to 45.8)
cent Fuel Pool 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 o 0 o Knowledge of (SYSTEM) design Adequate 80M (boron concentration) 033K4.05 3.1 3.3 Doling    feature(s) and or interlock(s) which provide for the following:(CFR: 41.7)
rel Handling 0 0 o 0 o 0 o 0 0 1 o Ability to manuallyoperate and/or Neutron levels  034A4.02 3.5 3.9 qulprnent  monitor in the control room:(CFR: 41.7/
45.5to 45.8)
:eam Generator 0 0 0 1 o 0 o 0 o 0 o Knowledge of (SYSTEM) design Automatic blowdown and sample line 035K4.03 2.6 feature(s) and or Interlock(s) which isolation and reset provide for the following:(CFR: 41.7)
:eam  0 0 o 0 o 0 o 0 o 0 o Ability to (a) predictthe impactsof the IKIA Randomly Rejected  041A2.02 3.6 umplTurbine  following on the (SYSTEM) and (b)
(passControl  based on thosepredictions, use procedures to correct, control , or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operation:(CFR: 41.5/43.5 /
45.3/45.13)
ainTurbine o 0 o 0 o 0 0 1 o 0 o Ability to (a) predictthe impactsof the Control rod insertion limitsexceeded 045A2.12 2.5 enerator  following on the (SYSTEM) and (b) (stabilize secondary)
based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operation:(CFR: 41.5/43.5 /
45.3 /45.13)


f.Command/controlof onsite response.12.Formally relieve the Interim SEMandas sume control i n the TSC.Announce name and facility act ivation status to facilit ***NUMBER ATTACHMENT TITLE REVISION EPIP-I.OI CONSIDERATIONS FOR OPERATIONS RESPONSE 42 ATTACHMENT UNDER ABNORMAL CONDITIONS PAGE 3Iof2 This attachment provides procedural guidance for controll ing selected emergency response actions when their implementationwouldhave adver se results.Station Emergency Manager (SEM)approval is required before any required action is postponed.
Tier 2 Group 2 K1 K2 K4 K5 K6 A1 1'\2 ~3
          -
me I Safety Functio K3  M P  Question Type  KIA Toplcls) KA RO ~RO mdenserAir 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Ability to (a) predict the Impacts of the KiA Randomly Rejected  055A2 0 0 smoval    following on the (SYSTEM) and (b)
based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operation:(CFR: 41 .5/43.51 45.3/45.13)
~uid Radwaste 0 0 0 0 o 0 0 0 0 0 o Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the KiA Randomly Rejected  068A2.03 2.5 following on the (SYSTEM) and (b)
based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operation:(CFR: 41 .5/43.51 45.3/45.13)
aste Gas Disposal 0 0 o 0 o 0 0 0 Q o 0 Knowledge of the effectthat a loss or KiA Randomly Rejected  071K6 0 10 malfunction of the following will have on the (SYSTEM):(CFR: 41.7/45.7)
ea Radiation 0 o 0 o 0 o 0 0 0 o 0 IAbility to manually operate.andlor KJA Randomly Rejected  072A4.03 3.1 3.1
)nitoring    monitor in the control room :(CFR: 41.71 45.5to 45.8)
rculating Water o 0 o 0 o 0 o 0 o 0 o Ability to manually operate andlor KJA Randomly Rejected  075A4.01 3.2 monitor in the control room:(CFR: 41 .71 45.5 to 45.8)
ation Air o 0 o 0 o 0 o 0 o 0 0 IKnOWledge of the effectthat a loss or IKiA Randomly Rejected  079K3 0 0 malfunction of the (SYSTEM) will have on the following:(CFR: 41.7/45.6)
'e Protection o a o 0 o 0 o 0 o 0 1 Thisis a Generic, no stem statement Is KnOWledge of the purpose and function 086G2.1 .28 3.2 associate of majorsystem components and controls.


suspended or modified.The guidancebelowi s not all-inclusive.
-


UNANTICIPATED HAZARD EXISTS (e.g..security event.tornado or toxic release): II notifying off-duty augmentation could create a safety hazard for personnel coming to the station.THEN consider the following alternatives:
Tier 2 Group 2 ne f Safety Functlo K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 ru A.3 ~4 ~  Question Type  KIA Toplc(s) KA RO r3RCf mtrot Rod Drive 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Knowledge of electrical power supplies  KiA Randomly Rejected 001K2.05 3.1 to the foliowing:(CFR: 41.7)
*Station Security (if available)canbe directed to notify off-duty personnel to report to the remote mustering area (Louisa Fire Training Center).*Corporate Security.at 804-273-3161.canbe directed to notify off-duty personnel to report to the remote mustering area (Louisa Fire Training Center).*Corporate Security.at 804-273-3161.canbe directed to notify corporate emergency response organizationonlyu sing CPIP-3.4.INNSBROOK SECURITY SUPPORT.*Notificationscanbe deferred unti l hazardous cond itions are resolved.II implementationofemergency response actions could compromise Security Plan response strategies.
iactor Coolant 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Knowledge of the effectthat a lossor  Containment  002K3.03 4.2 malfunction of the (SYSTEM) will have on the following:(CFR: 41.7 /45.6)
essurizer Level 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Knowledge of the effectthat a lossor  KiA Randomly Rejected 011K3.02 3.5 3.7 mtrol    malfunction of the (SYSTEM) will have onthe following:(CFR: 41.7 145.6}
>d Position 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 Knowledge of the operational  RPIS Independent of demand position 014K5.02 2.8 3.3
::lication  implications of the following concepts as theyapply to the (SYSTEM):(CFR: 41.5/
45.7)
rclear 0 0 0 o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Ability to monitor automatic operations of KiA Randomly Rejected  015A3.02 13.7 3.9 stru mentation  the (SYSTEM) Including:{CFR: 41.7/
45.5)
on-nuclear 0 0 0 o 0 0 0 0 0 o 0 Ability to monitor automatic operations of KiA Randomly Rejected 016A3.01 2.9 2.9 strumentation  the (SYSTEM) including:(CFR: 41.7/
45.5)
-core  1 0 o 0 o 0 0 0 0 o 0 Knowledge of the physical connections Plant computer  017K1.01 3.2 3.2 smperature    and/or cause-effect relationships onltor    between (SYSTEM) andthe foliowing:(CFR: 41.2to 41.9/45.7 to 45.8)
antainrnent Iodine 0 0 o 0 o 0 0 0 0 o 0 Knowledge Ofthe effect that a lossor KIARandomly Rejected  027K3 0 0 srnoval    malfunction of the (SYSTEM) will have on thefollowing:(CFR: 41.7/45.6)
andensate 0 0 o 0 o 0 a 0 0 o 1 Thisis a Generic, nostem statement is Ability to locate and operate 056G2.1.30 3.9 . - _......... ->_.~


THEN consider postponing or suspending emergency response actions until threathasbeen resolved.e.g..on-site announcement directingassemblyandemergency response facility activation.
Tier 2 Group 2 me I Safety Functlo K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 ~ ~3 1\4 G Question Type KIA Topic(s) KA RO SRO associate components, including local control Tier 3
  -        ---
Group  KA    Topic  RO SRO induct of Operations 02. Knowledge of shift turnover practice .4 induct of Operations G2.1.22 Ability to determine Mode of Operatio .8 3.3 induct of Operations G2. Knowledge of conduct of operations requirement .7 3.8
[uipment Control G2.2.11 Knowledge of the process for controlling temporary change .5 3.4
[uipment Control 02.2.24 Ability to analyze the affeetofmaintenance activities on LeO statu .6 3.8
[uipment Control G2.2A (multi-unit) Ability to ex-plain the variations in control board layouts, systems, instrumentation and procedural actions between units at a facility.


pager activation andoutper EPIP-3.05.AUGMENTATION OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION.
idiation Control G2. Knowledge of tbeprocess for performing a containment purg .5 3.4 idiation Control G2. Knowledge of facility ALARA progra .5 nergency Procedures/Plan G2.4.14 Knowledge of general guidelines for EOPflowchart us .9 nergency ProceduresIPlan G2.4.43 Knowledge of emergency communications systems and technique .8 August 8, 2006
 
dispatch of Security Team members to the LEOF per EPIP-3.04.ACTIVATION OF LOCAL EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY.and stagingofroad blocks per EPIP-5.04.
 
ACCESS CONT ROL.II assembling on-site personnel for accountability or activationofemergency response facilities could endanger plant personnel.
 
THEN consider postponingemergencyassembly until hazardous conditions are resolved.Corporate Security.at 804-273-3161.canbe directed to notify corporate emergency response organization only using CPIP-3.4.INNSBROOK SECURITY SUPPORT.Personnel in unaffected areas on-sitecanbe notified selectively.
 
II primary ingress/egress route is NO T available.
 
THEN evaluate alternate route for use during site evacuation or off-duty augmentation (e.g..access via Dyke 1).
 
NUMBER ATTACHMENT TITLE REVISION EPIP-I.OI CONSIDERATIONS FOR OPERATIONS RESPONSE 42 ATTACHMENT UNDER ABNORMAL CONDITIONS PAGE 32of2 ANTICIPATED SITUA TIO N (e.g., forecasted severe weatheror grid d isturbance)
: 1&#xa3;allorpa rtoft he EROhasbeen staged i n ant icipationofa predicted event , THENnotify Securitytoomitperformanceof augmentation notification (as describedinEPIP-3.05, AUGMENTATION OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION)
.1&#xa3;ade quate con trols havebeen estab lishedt o continua lly accou nt forp er s onnel stagedin a nticipationofap re dicted event, T HE N notify Securitytoomit perfo r manceofin itia l accountability (as describedin EPIP-5.03, PERSO NNEL ACCOUNTABILITY)
.1&#xa3;a decision hasbeen madeto staff t he Central EOF in lieuof the LEOF , THE N n otif y Security t hatperformanceof EPIP-3.04, ACTIVA TION OF LOCA L EMERGENCY OPERAT IONS FACILITY ,isnotreq uired.1&#xa3;environmental conditions are hazardous , THEN consult with Security TeamLeadera bout suspending procedural requirements for staging road blocks (lAW EPIP-5.04,A C CESSC O NTRO L).
}}
}}

Latest revision as of 16:14, 14 November 2019

Retake Exam 05000338-06-302 Draft Sample Plan & Written Exam Quality Checklist (ES-401-6)
ML081840484
Person / Time
Site: North Anna  Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 07/02/2008
From:
NRC/RGN-II
To:
References
50-338/06-302
Download: ML081840484 (40)


Text

Draft Submittal (Pink Paper)

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DRAFT Written Exam Quality Checklist (ES-401-6)

& Written Exam Sample Plan

DRAFT Comments on North Anna Administrative Walk-Through Exam.

~in 1A 1-PT-23 QPTR Determination Review:

This JPM IS a go/no-go with only one critical step . It should have a Key that will be kept with the exam material in ADAMS .

",,-

Ad in 1B Calc te the maximum allowable reactor vessel Hydrogen venting time.

Need change inif ting cue to:

Perform step 22 of 1- R-1.3 to determine.....

A~ 2 O-PT-BO AC Sou"rc Operability Verification" At step 6 have the applicant apply appropriate TIS , and LCO entry .

A in 3 Assess personnel exposure.

This PM is a math problem and does not discrim inate between a competent operator and a non-competent operator. Need to develop something more discriminating.

Admin 4 Event Classification. No discriminating value, no pars . Need something more discriminatin DRAFT Comments on North Anna Administrative Walk-Through Exam.

Admin 1A 1-PT-23 QPTR Determination Review:

This JPM is a go/no-go with only one critical step. It should have a Key that will be kept with the exam material in ADAMS.

Admin 1B Calculate the maximum allowable reactor vessel Hydrogen venting time.

Need to change initiating cue to: i\_, , ~

Perform step 22 of 1-FR-1.3 to determine.~

-'

Admin 2 O-PT-80 AC Sources Operability Verification.

At step 6 have the applicant apply the appropriate T/S, and LCO entry.

Admin 3 Assess personnel exposure.

This JPM is a math problem and does not discriminate between a competent operator and ,?.

non-competent operator. Need to develop something more discriminating. (Ai>DefJ ~)

Admin 4 EyeDt Classification. No discriminating value, no pars. Need something more discriminatrng:~

DRAFT

DRAFT ES-401, Rev. 9 North Anna 2006-302 RO Written Examination Review Worksheet Form ES-401-9 I LOK I LOD I 4 . Job Content Flaws I 5. Other I .

Q#

(F/H) (1-5) T/F Icred'lpartiall JOb-' Minutia Dist . Link I I#/ BaCk-I Q=

units ward KIA I SRO Only I U/EiS Explanation Inst ructions

[Refer to Section 0 of ES-401 and Appendix B for additional information regarding each of the following concepts .] Enter the level of knowledge (LOK) of each question as either (F)undamental or (H)igher cognitive level. Enter the level of difficulty (LOO) of each question using a 1 - 5 (easy - difficult) rating scale (questions in the 2 - 4 range are acceptable). Check the appropriate box if a psychometric flaw is identified:

  • The stem lacks sufficient focus to elicit the correct answer (e.g., unclear intent, more information is needed, or too much needless information).
  • The stem or distractors contain cues (i.e., clues, specific determiners, phrasing, length, etc).
  • The answer choices are a collection of unrelated true/false statements .
  • The distractors are not credible; single implausible distractors should be repaired, more than one is unacceptable .
  • One or more distractors is (are) partially correct (e.g., if the applicant can make unstated assumptions that are not contradicted by stem). Check the appropriate box if a job content error is identified:
  • The question is not linked to the job requirements (i.e., the question has a valid KIA but, as written, is not operational in content).
  • The question requires the recall of knowledge that is too specific for the closed reference test mode (i.e., it is not required to be known from memory).
  • The question contains data with an unrealistic level of accuracy or inconsistent units (e.g., panel meter in percent with question in gallons) .
  • The question requires reverse logic or application compared to the job requirements. Check questions that are sampled for conformance with the approved KIA and those that are designated SRO-only (KIA and license level mismatches are unacceptable). Based on the reviewer's judgment , is the question as written (U)nsatisfactory (requiring repair or replacement), in need of (E)ditorial enhancement ,

or (S)atisfactory? At a minimum, explain any "U" ratings (e.g., how the Appendix B psychometric attributes are not being met).

1 H 2 S I002K3 .03 Question appears to match KIA. BANK DR4Fr . 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other .

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred o Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SAO U/E/S Explanat ion Focu Dis!. Link units ward KIA Only s

2 F 2 X X U 003A1.03 Question appears to match KIA. All the distractors can be considered correct. Stem should read "W hich ONE of the following describes the effect on Rep temperatures, and the action that is required to mitigate the event" or someth ing similar. Also need to work on how to make the distractors incorrect. Need to rework question. NEW 3 H 2 X U 003AA2.04 Question appears to match KIA. Wi ll NI's actually reach these values? Does the plant have a positive or negative flux trip? If it does the reactor will trip before these conditions can be reached. Need to verify that the plant could actually get to these cond itions with only one dropped rod. NE F 2 X E 003K6 .04 Quest ion appea rs to match the KI Very simple What is the PDTT, is this a credible (2)

distractor. BANK 5 H 3 S 004K5.35 Question appears to match the KI SAT NEW 6 H 2 S 005K5 .02 Kind of matches KIA, NPSH relates to subcooling. BANK . 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other .

Q# LOK LaD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred o Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back - Q= SRO U/E/S Explanation Focu Dis!. Link units ward KIA Only s

7 F 2 S 006K6.19 Question appears to match KI Question is actually at the fundamental leveL If you took the conditions in the top of the stem and placed them in the Which ONE of the .....statement the question would be the same. SAT NEW.

8 H 2 X E 007A3.01 Question appears to match the KI simple What is the POD, is this a credible distractor. BANK 9 F 2 S 007EA2.05 Question appears to match the KI Kind of simple, but matches KIA. SAT NEW 10 H 2 X U 007K3.01 Question appears to match KIA. What makes the distractors credible. Need to have (2)

some numbers that are variations of the psia/psig relationship. The correct answer is the only answer with a .something in it. Fix distractors to make others plausible. (the set point should be a distractor also. NEW 11 F 2 X U 008A4 .07 Question appears to match KIA. If primary grade water is not able to be sent to the (2)

CC Surge tank then distractors A and B are not credible. (What is the back up source for makeup to the CC surge tank). NEW . 3. Psychom etric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other .

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minut ia #1 Back - Q= SRO U/EJS Explanation Focu Dis!. Link units ward KIA Only s

12 H 2 X U 008AA 1.02 Question appears to match KIA. Due to the way the stem is worded, distractors A and D (2)

are not credible. The stem states in accordance with ES-1.2 Continuous Action Page. Only two of hese items are on the continuous action pag Need to reword stem to allow distractors A and D to become credible. NEW.

13 H 2 X E 009EK3.27 Question appears to match KI Distractor D as written is not credible. The reason that is listed in the distractor analys is is much more credible. Use it. Otherwise question is SA (Minimize subcoollnq to maintain pressureizer level above the lower limit to allow pressurizer heater operation to reduce the rate of increase of pressurizer level) BANK 14 F 3 S 01 0K2.02 Question appears to match KIA. SAT NEW .

15 H 3 X U 012A2.07 Question appears to match KI Distractors need some work. Distractor A second (3)

part, to make this credible put some actions listed in ARP. What other annunciators would come in based on a DC power supply failure? Distractors need some work. BANK . 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Othe r .

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred o Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SAO Ul EtS Explanation Focu Dis!. Link units ward KJA Only s

16 H 2 S 012A3.05 Question appears to match KIA. SAT BANK 17 H 3 S 013A1.06 Question kind of matches KIA. SAT BANK 18 H 2 X E 014K5.02 Question appears to match KI Distractors C and 0 do not appea r to be cred ibl (2)

Why would anyone think that the reactor would trip, and that only 2 group step counters would reset to zero. Work on C and 0 distractors.

19 H 2 S 015AA1 .07 Question appears to match KIA. SAT .

NEW 20 F 1 X U 017K1 .01 Question does not meet the KIA. The KIA is for the Core Exit Thermocouple system and the knowledge of the physical connections and or cause-effect relationships between the system and the plant computer. Needs to be written to match KIA. NEW 21 H 2 S 022K3.02 Question appears to match KIA. SAT BANK . 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other .

Q# LOK LOD (F/ H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job - Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO U/EiS Explanation Focu Dis!. Link units ward KIA Only s

22 H 2 E 022AK 3.05 Question appears to match KIA. How does a loss of power render the blender inoperable. Is this credible? Otherwise quest ion appears to be sat. Is this based on procedure guidance? NEW.

23 H 2 E 025AA1 .03 Question kind of matches KIA. Use of the word "Preferred" in the stem should be avoided because if it is preferred, it is not require Maybe use lAW AP11. Otherw ise SAT. NEW 24 F 2 S 026A4.0 1 Question appears to match KIA. SAT BANK 25 H 2 E 027AK2.03 Question appears to match KIA. An applicant could by knowing that one of the channels opens the sprays and a PORV could discount distractor A. Try something like this:

(A) Initiate an open signal to both spray valves and 1455C (8) Initiate an open signal to both spray valves and 1456C (C) Initiate an open signal to 1455C ONLY (0) Initiate an open signal to 1456C ONLY . 3. Psychom etric Flaws 4. Job Cont ent Flaws 5. Othe r .

Q# LOK LOD (F/ H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/EIS Explanation Focu Dls Link units ward KIA Only s

26 H 2 S 029A4.04 Question appears to match KIA. Fuel building is capitalized in A, and Containment is not in C. They should be the same . Pick one .

Otherwise SAT. NEW 27 F 2 X X U 029EG2.2.22 Question kind of matches KIA. The knowledge of limiting conditio ns for operation as well as safety limits are not being tested. Th is is a good attempt. C and D have ATWS in the distractor and ATWS is stated in the stem which directs the applicant to either Cor D. The applicant need only know that AMSAC trips the turbine. Needs some work. NEW The first A in AMSAC stands for ATWS. Page 33 of 49 Topic 7.1 Reactor Protect ion System lesso n plan 77-A.

28 F 2 E 033K5 .04 Question appears to match KIA. This is one way that SDM is being maintained there are other ways to prevent criticality such as fuel placement, boron spacers Boroflex panels , et NEW 29 H 2 S 034A4 .02 Question appears to match KIA. SAT NEW . 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other .

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/EIS Explanation FOGU Dis Link units ward KIA Only s

30 F 2 X U 035K4.03 Question appears to match a portion of he KlA*, the reset of these signals is not teste Can this be put into the question? NEW 31 F 2 E 036AA 1.04 Question kind of matches KIA. The AP calls for a safe location. Need to make sure that the other locations are not "safe". Otherwise SAT. NEW 32 F 2 E 038EA2.16 Question matches KIA Not sure D is otally credible, might use open two PORVs. E-3 does not direct opening 2 PORVs so it would be plausible and wrong. NEW 33 H 2 X U 039A2.05 Question appears to match KI Distractors C and D are not credible. Even if the the main turbine was in imp out reactor power will increase some what due to the inefficient dumping of steam straight to the condenser. Attempt to word question using Mwe to further differentiate right from wrong. NEW 34 F 2 E 039K1.04 Kind of matches KIA, no mention of RCS temperature although that is what is being controlled. Low level of discrimination. Look at using tave-tref and tave and t-no-Ioad. BANK . 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other .

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred o Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO U/EIS Explanation Focu Dis Link units ward KIA Only s

35 H/F 2 X U 045A2.12 Question matches KIA. Do rods have to be withdrawn in manual after the RCS boration?

The AR states to manually withd raw control rods .

If this is correct, manual needs to be in the distractors. This question could also be considered as memory for actions contained in the AR. NEW 36 H 2 E 056AK1.03 Question appears to match KIA. No value was determined from an incorrect use of RCS pressure (1865) . This would make a good distractor along with Thot, and CETCs. Attempt to place a value based on this for one of the distractors. NEW 37 F 1 X U 056G2.1.30 Question kind of matches KIA. If suction pressure decreases, so will discharge pressure, therefore 0 could be considered correc This question is very simple, is there not someth ing that is controlled locally like a start stop switch or breaker that could be operated on a control room evacuation or plant fire? BANK . 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other .

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/EIS Explanation Focu Dis Link units ward KIA Only s

38 H 2 S 057AA2.15 Question appears to match KIA. Kind of simple. NE (Could any of the associated control signals cause a reactor trip allowing B to be correct)?

39 F 2 X X U 058AK1.01 Question does not appears to match KIA. There is no loss of DC power. Distractor D does not appear to be credible. NEW Rated as a fundamental knowledge, This question could be asked by Just using the stem without the conditions. NEW 40 F 2 X U 059K1.03 Question kind of matches KIA. This question is asking what does P-14 do? Maybe a reason why would help tie it to the KIA bette NEW This is a fundamental level question. If you took away the stem you could ask which one of

~he following is correct and the answer would be the same. NEW 41 H 2 X E 059K3.02 Question appears to match KIA. Where does the FF to the SG get measured. If the leak was down steam of these flow measurement devices then the FF/SF mismatch would not be seen and no reactor trip will occur, and C would be the correct answer. NEW . 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Conte nt Flaws 5. Other .

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/EIS Explan ation Focu Dis Link units ward KIA Only s

42 F 2 E 061AK1.01 Question appears to match KIA. Very simple . Use a value higher than E-7 so that some knowledge is tested . (One could get this correct ust by guessing the highest value listed must be correct. NEW 43 H 2 E The sample plan has this KIA listed as 061K6.08 which has an importance factor of 2.1 for RO The question is actually written to 061 K6.02 which has an importance factor of 2.6 for ROs. Does the turbine driven if it starts feed all three steam generators? Some assumptions need to be taken as written . Leave the KIA as is (061 K6.02) and ensure that the correct answer is the only correct answer. NEW 44 H 2 X X X U 062AG2.4.6 Question appears to match KI However, the step in E-O states if less than 4 service water pumps are running then ensure Unit 2 operator initiates 0-AP-47. This is different than the correct answer in the question. Need to find a resolution. Maybe you sent me the incorrect reference. NEW 45 H 2 S 062K2.01 Question appears to match KIA SA BANK . 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other .

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO U/E/S Explanation Focu Dis Link units ward KIA Only s

46 H 2 X X U 063K2.01 Question does not really meet the KI The KIA asks for the knowledge of electrical power supplies to Major DC loads. By stating that DC power was loss to the 2J bus (I understand hat control power could be considered a major DC load) but all the question requires is that the applicant know what comes off of 2J AC bu Furthermore can you have a loss of DC power to only one bus. Can this be verified? This question requires some more work. BANK 47 H 2 S 064A3.01 Question appears to match KIA The distractor analysis states that D is the correct answer. Although the check is on B, and the explanation supports selection B. If B is the correct answer, then question appears to be SA NEW 48 H 2 X U 065AG2.1.23 This question is based on a note at the beginning of AP-28, and with pressurizer level approaching this level the reactor should be tripped. I am not sure this meets the intent of the KIA. If any other scenario was taking place or if nothing else was taking place, this still would be he correct action to take. I believe the intent of he KIA is to show the ability to perform actions lAW a Loss of instrument air, not a loss of pressurizer level unless they are related. NEW . 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other .

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred o Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SAO U/E/S Explanation Focu Dis Link units ward KIA Only s

49 F 2 X U 069AK1.01 Question does not really meet the KIA here is not a loss of containment integrity involved . In fact this is the design accident that

~he containment can survive and maintain integrity. Needs more work . Is Not NEW . BANK 50 F 2 S 073A1.01 Question appears to match KIA. Do the vacuum pumps trip due to the discharge valves going closed, or is it a direct trip? It may be better to pursue this. BANK.

51 H 2 X X U 076G2.1 .2 Question appears to match KI Required action in accordance with? D distractor does not appear to be cred ible. It would be more credible to commence a shutdown within one hour and be in cold shutdown in.... Do you expect ROs to know technical specifications of this natur BANK 52 F 2 S* 076K1 .17 *Assuming these pumps are from the Service Water system this question matches the KIA. If not we have more work to do. Otherwise SAT. NEW 53 F 2 S 078G2 .1.28 Question appears to match KI Distractors A and C need to say automatically closes above 90 psig increasing instead of a This is not credible . Otherwise SAT . NEW . 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other .

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO U/EiS Explanation Focu Dis Link units ward KIA Only s

54 F 2 S 078K4.01 Question appears to match KIA Very simple. NEW 55 F 2 S 086G2.1.28 Kind of matches KIA. SAT BANK 56 F 2 S 103K4.01 Question appears to match KIA. NEW 57 H 2 S WE03EA2.1 Question appears to match KIA SAT BANK 58 F 2 S ~E04EK3.4 Question appears to match KIA. SAT BANK 59 H 2 X U WE05EK1.3 Does not really match KIA. There are annunciators in the stem but also a statement that all attempts to establish AFW were unsuccessfu So there are no remedial actions based on the annunciators. See if we can work on something to ie it to the KIA BAN . . Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other .

Q# LOK LaD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/EIS Explanation Focu Dis Link units ward KIA Only s

60 H 2 X X U WE06EK3.1 Question does not really meet the KIA. The only tie to the degraded core cooling is that you discuss you are there in the stem. The injection of the accumulators at any time could cause the same problem. I understand that it is in a note at the beginning of the procedure, but the applicant is not figuring out that he has degraded core conditions, you are telling him that he doe Also teaching in the distractors, you list four of the six CSFs. This question needs some wor BANK 61 H 2 E WE09EA1.3 Question appears to match KI Distractor C is not credible, Why would you attempt to block low pressure SI prior to going below 2000 psig? Cooldown continues throughout he procedure until the unit is on RHA. BANK 62 H 2 S WE10EK2.2 Question appears to match KI SAT BANK . 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other .

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/EIS Explanation Focu Dis Link units ward KIA Only s

63 H 2 U WE11 EK2.1 Question appears to match KI How does one verify that NO back flow is occurring from the RWST to the CTMT sump?

Distractors A and B do not mention quench spray pumps. But Distractors C and 0 state to secure all pumps. So with only two pumps listed in A and B why would you pick them. Not Credibl Verifying no back flow is not credible unless you can come up with a way this is accomplishe BANK 64 H 2 E WE12EK2.1 Question appears to match KIA. Not enough procedures steps included in material to verify that this is the correct actions lAW your procedures. Provide more info. BANK 65 H 2 S IWE15EG2.1.23 Question appears to match KI SAT NEW.

66 F 2 E G2.1.1 Kind of matches KIA, better matches 2.1.29. Under what KIA did this question appear on the 2004 North Anna Exam? Wait on determination until this is researched. BANK 67 F 2 S G2.1.22 Question appears to match KIA. SAT MOD . 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other .

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SAO U/EiS Explanation Focu Dis Link units ward KIA Only s

68 F 1 U G2.1.3 Question Matches KIA. But has little discriminatory value. What is included in a short-term relief? Distractor D is not credible BANK 69 F 2 S G2.2.11 Question appears to match KIA SAT NEW 70 F 2 S G2.2.24 Question appears to match KIA. SAT NEW. Question is at the Fundamental level.

71 F 2 X E 2.2.4 Question appears to match KIA. Very Simple BANK Explain plausibility of Band D.

72 F 2 X E G2.3.2 Question appears to match KIA. This is a NOT question and should be avoided. BANK 73 F 2 E G2.3.9 Question appears to match KIA. There is no documentation to prove that 100A or 101 cannot be used. Is there any documentation, or do we need to say lAW 1-0P-21.2 after containment? NEW 74 H 2 E G2.4.14 Question Kind of matches KIA. Distractor D is not credible. BANK . 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Cont ent Flaws 5. Other .

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/ F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back* Q= SRO Ul EtS Explanation Focu Dis Link units ward KIA Only s

75 F 2 X E G2.4.43 Question appears to match KIA. Is the notification time normally the job of the RO?

Otherwise SAT. NEW I I Genera l Comment; the material included for support of the correct answer was usually satisfactory. The informat ion on why a distractor was credible on not credible was not. For example the PDn was used several times but no information was given as to what drains to it, its location , and what makes it a credible distractor.

23 Unsats 23 enhancements 29 satisfactory = 75 total RO questions.

Severa l questions off of 2004 exam 8 quest ions that do not match the KI DRAFT ES-401 Written Examination Quality Checklist Form ES-401-6 Facility : I. h r-."" Date of Exam : /1// /f/ O ~ Exam Level : RO * SRo D

-

Initial Item Description a b* c- Questions and answers are technically accurate and applicable to the facility . -)<.. tY~ NRC J<JAs are referenced for all question Facilitv leam lna obiectives are referenced as available . Y<- {r 1 SRO Questions are appropriate in accordance with Section D.2.d of ES-101 <<" ""~j The sampling process was random and systematic (If more than 4 RO or 2 SRO questions were repeated from the last 2 NRC licensing exams, consult the NRR OL program office) . Question duplication from the license screening/audit exam was controlled as indicated below (chack the item that applies ) and appears appropriate:

@ A tha audit exam was systematically and randomly developed; or

_ the audit exam was completed before the license exam was started ; or

_ the examinations were developed Independently; or

_ the licensee certifies that there Is no duplication; or other (explain) t:kt t;L fJ-?

- t'lJ r...r c"',.r tt"1IP * ftl$r -f: bf/ 'l-lcIW~ Bank use meets limits (no more than 75 percent Bank Modified New from the bank, at least 10 percent new, and the rest new or modified); enter the actual RO I SRQ-only Question distribution(s) at righ H4fJI'A t.J'{. I ~' ,4 flJ.7~ ,.""

Y- ~ Between 50 and 60 percent of the questions on the RO Memory CIA exam are written at the comprehension! analys is level ;

the SRO exam may exceed 60 percent If the randomly selected J<JAs support the higher cognitive levels ; enter )!dcj, I

&t'1/ f l4- <<: 1,L- "'7 the actual RO I SRO Question distribution(s) at riQh . Referenceslhandouts provided do not give away answers or aid in the elimination of dislractors . fL [1...-5 Question content conforms with specific J<JA statements in the previously approved examination outline and Is appropriate for the lier to which they are assigned ; 1(

deviations are justified . iv7 1 Question osvchometric aualitv and format meet the auldelines In ES Aooendix r /;.-7 1 The exam contains the required number of one-point, multiple choice items ; yt.--

the lotal is correct and aqrees with the value on the cover shee (;..j t~"~~

Date

<;jUjOb

'~:Sb.w:-: ~~

a. Author Facility Reviewer (*) ~

c. NRC Chief Examiner (#) --- NRC Regional Supervisor ---

Note: * The facility reviewer's initials/signature are not applicable for NRC-developed examination # indeoendent NRC reviewer initial items in Column "CO; chief examiner concurrence reauired .

ES-401, Page 29 of 33

- - ~ ~ ~~ ~, - ~ - --, _ .

_....-.,. . . . . . , - - _ ._ --

ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401 2 Fa cilitv: North Anna Date of Exarr Tier Group RO KIA Category Points SRO-On l~ Points K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G* Total K IA A2 G'" Total 1.

Emerqency 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 I 18

& 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 9 Abnorma Plant lIer Evou lutiom Totals 5 4 4 5 5 4 27 Plan t 2 1 0 1 2 1 0 0 1 0 2 2 10 Systems Tier Total s 4 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 38 3. Generic Knowledge and 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 Abilities Category 3 3 2 2 10 1. Ensure that at least two topics from every KIA category are sampled within each tier of the RO outline (Le., the Tier Totals" in each KIA category shall not be less than two). Refer to Section D.1.c for additional guidance regarding SRO sampling .

2. The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table. The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by +/-1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions. The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 point . Select topics from many systems and evolutions ; avoid selecting mo re than two KiA topics from a given system or evolution unless they relate to plant-specific priorities .

4. Systems/evolutions with in each group are identified on the associated outl ine .

5. The shaded areas are not applicable to the category/tie .* The generic (G) KlAs in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the KIA Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. The SRO KlAs must also be linked to 10 CFR 55.43 or an SRQ-levelleaming objectiv . On the following pages, enter the KIA numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics'

importance ratings (IR) for the applicable license level, and the point tota ls for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above; summarize all the SRo-only knowledge and non-A2 ability categories in the columns labeled "K" and "A" . Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exam . For Tier 3, enter the KIA numbers, descriptions, importance ratings, and point totals on Form E8-401 -3 .

9 . Refer to ES-401, Attachment 2, for guidance regard ing the elimination of inappropriate KIA NUREG-1021, Revision 9 2 2 of 34

Tier 1 Group 1 ime/Safety Function K1 K2 K3 Ai A2 G KA Question Type KIA Toplc(s) RQTSRO

.eactor Tnp - 0 0 0 0 1 0 007EA2.05 Ability to determine and interpretthe Reactortrip first-out indication .9 tabilization - following as they apply to (EMERGENCY ecovery/1 PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41 .10/43.5/

45.13)

ressurizer Vapor 0 0 0 1 0 0 008AA1 .02 Ability to operate and / or monitorthe HPI pump to control PZR level/pressure .9 pace Accident/3 following as they apply to (ABNORMAL PLANTEVOLUTION):(CFR: 41 .7/45.5/

45.6)

mall Break LOCA/ 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 009EK3.27 Knowledge of the reasons for the following Manual depressunzation or HPI .8 responses as they apply to (EMERGENCY recirculation for sustained high pressure PLANT EVOLUTlON):(CFR: 41 .5/41.10/

45.6/45.13)

arge Break LOCA/ 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 011EK2.02 Knowledge of the interrelations between KIA RandomlyRejected .7 (EMERGENCY PLANT EVOLUTION) and the following:(CFR: 41.7 /45.7 /45.8)

I

.CP Malfunctions / 4 0 0 0 1 0 o 015AA1 .07 Ability to operate and / or monitor the RCP seal water injection subsystem .4 following as they apply to (ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41 .7 /45.5/

45.6)

ass of Rx Coolant 0 0 1 0 0 o 022AK3.05 Knowledge of the reasons for the following Need to avoid planttransients .4 lakeup/2 responses as they apply to (ABNORMAL PLANTEVOLUTION):(CFR: 41 .5/41.10 /

45.6/45.13)

oss of RHR System / 0 0 0 1 0 o 025AA1.19 Ability to operate and / or monitorthe Block orifice bypass valve controller and .4 following as they apply to (ABNORMAL indicators PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41 .7/45.5/

45.6)

- - -

A ** __ ** _ " A""'' ....

Tier 1 Group 1

- ._---_._~-

me/Safety Function K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G KA Question Type KIA Topic(s) RO SRO

)SS of Component 0 0 0 0 a 0 026AK2 Knowledge of the interrelations between KIA Randomly Rejected 0 Ia Doling Water / 8 (ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION) and the i following :(CFR: 41.7/45.7/45.8)

I I

'essurizer Pressure 0 1 0 0 0 0 027AK2.03 Knowledge of the interrelations between Controllers and positioners .8 antral System (ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION) and the alfunction / 3 following:(CFR: 41.7/45.7/45.8)

rWS/1 0 0 0 0 0 1 029EG2.2.22 This Is a Generic, no stem statementIs Knowledge of limiting conditions for .1 associate operations and safety limits.

.eam Gen. Tube 0 0 0 0 1 0 038EA2.16 Abilityto determine and interpretthe Actions to be taken if S/G goes solid and .6 upture/ 3 following as they applyto (EMERGENCY water enters steam line PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41 .10 / 43.5 /

45.13)

eam Line Rupture- 0 0 a 0 0 0 040AK2.02 KnOWledge of the interrelations between KIA Randomly Rejected .6

<<iessive Heat (ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION) and the

'ansfer / 4 following:(CFR: 41.7/45.7/45.8)

iss of Main 0 0 0 0 0 0 054AA1.01 Ability to operate and / or monitorthe KIA Randomly Rejected .4 sedwater / 4 following as they apply to (ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41.7/45.5/

45.6)

tation Blackout/ 6 0 0 0 0 0 o 055EG2.1.27 This is a Generic, no stem statement IS KIA Randomly Rejected .9 associate )55 of Off-site Power / 1 0 0 0 0 o 056AK1.03 Knowledge of the operational implications Definition of subcooling: use of steam .4 of the following concepts as they apply to tables to determine it the (ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41.8 to 41.10 145.3)

Tier 1 Group 1

-

Ime/Safety Function K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G KA Question Type KIA Topic(s) RO SRO

)5S of Vital AC lns AA2.02 Ability to determine and Interpret the Core flood tank pressure and level .8 us /6 following as they apply to ABNORMAL Indicators PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41 .10/43.5/

45.13)

)5S of DC Power /6 1 0 0 0 0 0 058AK1 .01 Knowledge of the operational Implications Battery charger equipment and .1 of the following concepts as they apply to instrumentation the (ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41.8 to 41 .10 /45.3)

ISS of Nuclear Svc 0 0 0 0 0 1 062AG2. This is a Generic, no stem statementis Knowledge symptom based EOP later /4 associate mitigation strategies.

oss of InstrumentAir / 0 0 0 a a 1 065AG2.1 .23 This Is a Generic, no stem statementis Ability to perform specific system and associate integrated plant procedures during all modesof plant operation .

OCAOutside 0 0 1 0 0 0 WE04EK Knowledge of the reasons for the following RO or SRO function within the control .8 ontainment /3 responses as they apply to (EMERGENCY room team as appropriate to the PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR:41.5/41.10 / assigned position, In such a way that 45.6/45.13) procedures are adhered to and the limitations in the facilities license and amendments are not violate DSS of Emergency 0 1 0 0 0 a WE11EK Knowledge of the Interrelations between Components and functions of control .9 oolant Recirc. /4 (EMERGENCY PLANT EVOLUTION) and and safety systems, including the following:(CFR: 41.7 /45.7 /45.8) instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes and automatic and manual feature team Line Rupture - 0 1 a 0 0 a WE12EK Knowledge of the interrelations between Components and functions of control .7 xcessive Heat (EMERGENCY PLANTEVOLUTION) and and safetysystems, Including ransfer 14 the following:(CFR: 41.7/45.7/45.8) instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes and automatic and manual feature Tier 1 Group 1 lme/Safety Function K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G KA Question Type --~----KiA- Topic(s) RO SRO adequate Heat 1 0 0 0 0 0 WE05EK1 .3 Knowledge of the operational implications Annunciators and conditions indicating 3.9 4.1 ransfer- Loss of of the following concepts as they applyto signals, and remedial actions associated econdary Heat Sink/ the EMERGENCY PLANT with the (Loss of Secondary HeatSink).

EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41.8to 41.10 /45 .3)

_. ---- - - -- .-

Tier 1 Group 2

.*

arne I Safety Function K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G KA Question Type K/A Topic(s} RO SRO

.ontinuous Rod Withdr a a 0 0 0 0 001AA1 .06 Ability to operate and/ or monitorthe KiA Randomly Rejected 3 following as they apply to (ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41 .7 /45.5/

45.6)

iropped Control Rod / 0 0 0 0 1 0 003AA2.04 Ability to determine and interpret the Rod motion stops dueto dropped rod 3.4 following as they apply to ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41.10/43.5/

45.13)

ioperable/Stuck Contn a 0 0 0 0 0 005AA2.01 Ability to determine and interpret the KiA Randomly Rejected 3.3 following as theyapply to ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41 .10 /43.5/

45.13)

.mergency Boration /1 0 0 0 0 0 0 024AK1.02 Knowledge of the operational implications of KiA Randomly Rejected . 3.6 the following concepts as they applyto the (ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR:

41.8 to 41 .10/ 45.3)

ressurizer Level Malfu 0 0 0 0 0 o 028AK1 .01 Knowledge of the operatlonallmplications of KIA Randomly Rejected 2.8 the following concepts as they applyto the (ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR:

41.8to 41.10 /45.3)

ass of Source Range I 0 0 0 0 0 o I032AK2.01 Knowledge of the interrelations between KIA Randomly Rejected 2.7 (ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION) and the following:(CFR: 41.7 /45.7 /45.8)

ass of Intermediate R~ 0 0 0 0 0 o 033AK1.01 Knowledge of the operational implications of KIA Randomly Rejected 2.7 3 the following concepts as they applyto the (ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR:

41.8 to 41.10 / 45.3)

uel Handling Accident 0 0 a 1 0 o 036AA1.03 Ability to operate and/ or monitor the Reactor-building containment evacuation 3.5 following asthey apply to (ABNORMAL alarm enable switch

Tier 1 Group 2 ame / Safety Function K1 K2 K3 Ai A2 G KA Question Type KIA Topic(s) RO SRO PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41.7 145.51 45.6)

team Generator Tube 0 0 0 0 0 0 037AA2.01 Ability to determine and interpretthe KIA Randomly Rejected 3 following as they applyto ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41.10 /43.5/

45.13)

ass of CondenserVac 0 a 0 0 0 0 051AA2.02 Abilityto determine and interpret the KIA Randomly Rejected 3.9 following asthey apply to ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR:41.10 /43.5/

45.13)

ccidental Liquid Rad\l\ i 0 0 0 0 0 a 059AK3.03 Knowledge of the reasons for the following KIA Randomly Rejected 3 responses as they applyto (ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR:41.5/41.10 /

45.6/45.13)

ccidental Gaseous Ra 0 0 0 0 0 o 060AK1.04 Knowledge of the operational implications of KIA Randomly Rejected 2.5 the following concepts as they apply to the (ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR:

41.8 to 41.10/45.3)

RM System Alarms / i 1 0 a 0 0 o 061AK1.01 Knowledge of the operational implications of Detector limitations 2.5 the following concepts as they apply to the (ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR:

41.8 to 41 .10 145.3)

lant Fire On-site /98 0 0 0 0 0 o 067AK3.04 KnOWledge of the reasonsfor the following KIA Randomly Rejected 3.3 responses as they apply to (ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR:41.5/41 .10/

45.6/45.13)

ontrol Room Evac. I 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 068AK1 KnOWledge of the operational implications of KIA Randomly Rejected 0 0 the following concepts as they applyto the (ABNORMAL PLANTEVOLUTION):(CFR:

.

Tier 1 Group 2 arne / Safety Function K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G KA Question Type KIA Topic(s) RO SRO 41.8to 41.10 /45.3)

oss of CTMT Integrity , 1 0 0 0 0 0 1069AK1 .01 Knowledge of the operational implications of Effectof pressure on leak rate 2.6 the following concepts as they applyto the (ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR:

41 .8 to 41.10 /45.3)

lad. Core Cooling /4 0 0 0 0 a 0 074EK3.10 Knowledge of the reasons for the following KIA Randomly Rejected 3,5 responses as they applyto (EMERGENCY PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41 .5/41.10 /

45.6/45.13)

ligh Reactor Coolant /J a 0 0 0 0 0 076AA1.04 Ability to operate and/ or monitor the KIA Randomly Rejected 3.2 following as theyapplyto (ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41 .7/45.5/

45.6)

ediagnosis /3 0 0 0 0 0 o WE01 EG2. This is a Generic, no stem statement IS KIA Randomly Rejected 3.4 associate team Generator Over- a a a 0 0 o WE13EK Knowledge of the interrelations between KIA Randomly Rejected 3.0 (EMERGENCY PLANT EVOLUTION) and the following:(CFR: 41.7 /45.7 /45.8)

ontainment Flooding / 0 0 0 0 0 1 WE15EG2 .1 .3~ Thisis a Generic, no stem statement is lAbility to recognize indications for system 3.4 14 associate operating parameters which are entry-level conditions for technical specification igh Containment Radi 0 0 0 0 0 o WE16EA Ability to determine and interpret the KIARandomly Rejected 3.0 following as theyapplyto (EMERGENCY PLANT EVOLUTlON) :(CFR: 41 .10/43.5/

45.13)

I Termination /3 0 0 0 0 0 o WE02EK Knowledge of the Interrelations between KIARandomly Rejected .9

Tier 1 Group 2

-- - - - - - - - :;-:-:-

KIA Topic(s) RO SRO arne I Safety Function K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G KA Question Type (EMERGENCY PLANTEVOLUTION) and the following:(CFR: 41.7 /45.7 /45.8)

)CA Cooldown - Depi 0 0 a a 1 0 WE03EA Ability to determine and interpret the Facility conditions and selection of 3.4 following as they applyto (EMERGENCY appropriate procedures during abnormal PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41.10 /43.5/ and emergency operation .13)

atural Circ./ 4 0 0 a 1 0 a WE09EA Ability to operate and I or monitorthe Desired operating results during abnormal 3.5 following asthey applyto (EMERGENCY and emergency situation PLANTEVOLUTION):(CFR: 41.7 /45.5/

45.6)

atural Circ. With Sean 0 1 0 0 0 0 WE10EK KnOWledge of the Interrelations between Facility's heat removal systems, including 3.6 (EMERGENCY PLANT EVOLUTION) and primary coolant, emergency coolant, the the following:(CFR: 41 .7/45.7/45.8) decay heat removal systems and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

CS Overcooling - PTS 0 0 0 a 0 o WE08EG2.1.3~ Thisis a Generic, no stem statement Is KiA Randomly Rejected 3.4 associate egraded Core Coolin& 0 0 1 a 0 o WE06EK KnOWledge of the reasons for the following Facility operating characteristics during 3.4 responses asthey applyto (EMERGENCY transient conditions, including coolant PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41 .5/41 .10/ chemistry and the effects of temperature, 45.6/45.13) pressure and reactivity changes and operating limitations and reasons for these operating characteristics.

aturated Core Cooling a a a a 0 o WE07EG2 .4.4~ This Is a Generic, no stem statement is KiA Randomly Rejected 4 4 associated.

JSS of CTMT Integrity . 0 0 0 a 0 o WE14EG2.4.4~ This is a Generic, no stem statement is KiA Randomly Rejected 4 4 associate Tier 2 Group 1 me I Safety-Functio K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 KG A1 A~ A3 A4 G Question Type KIA Toplc(s) r KA RO SRO sactor Coolant 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 Knowledge of the effect that a loss or Containment isolation valves affectmg 003K6.04 12.8 ~.1 imp malfunction of the following will have on RCP operation the (SYSTEM):(CFR: 41 .7/45.7)

temical and 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 Knowledge of the operational Types and effects of radiation, dosimetry 004K5.17 1 ~ .1 alums Control implications of the following concepts as and shielding-time-distance they applyto the (SYSTEM):(CFR: 41.5 /

45.7)

esidual Heat 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 Knowledge of the operational Needfor adequate subcoollng 005K5.02 ~.4 ~ .5 emoval implications of the following conceptsas they apply to the (SYSTEM) :(CFR: 41.5/

45.7)

mergency Core 0 0 0 0 o 1 o 0 o 0 0 I Knowledge of the effect that a loss or HPI/LPI systems (mode change) 006K6.19 ~ .9 Doling malfunction of the following will have on the (SYSTEM):(CFR: 41.7/45.7) [7 ressurlzer o 0 0 o 0 o 0 0 1 0 0 Ability to monitor automatic operations of Components which discharge to the PRT * 007A3.01 12.9 elief/Quench Tank the (SYSTEM) Includlng:(CFR: 41.7/

45.5) [7 omponent Cooling o 0 o 0 a 0 o 0 o 1 o Ability to manuallyoperate and/or Control of minimum level in the CCWS 008A4.07 D.9 12.9 later monitorin the control room:(CFR: 41.7 / surge tank 45.5 to 45.8)

ressurizer 0 1 o 0 o 0 o 0 o 0 0 Knowledge of electrical powersupplies Controller for PZR sprayvalve 010K2.02 i:'.5 12.7 ressure Control to the following:(CFR: 41.7)

eactor Protection o 0 o a a 0 o 0 1 o a Ability to monitor automatic operations of Single and multiple channel trip 012A3.05 ~.7 the (SYSTEM) Includlng:(CFR: 41.7/ indicators 45.5)

ngineered Safety a 0 o 0 o 0 1 o 0 a o Ability to predictand/ormonitor changes RWSTlevel 013A1 .06 ;3.6 \ .. _ ...... n "nne

Tier 2 Group 1

_._- _._--~- --,.---

me I Safety Functio K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A'). A3 A4 G Question Type KIA Topfc(s) KA RO SHO iatures Actuation in parameters associated with operating the (SYSTEM) controls inciuding:(CFR:

41.5/45.5)

mtalnment 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Knowledge of the effectthat a loss or Containment instrumentation readings 022K3.02 3.0 13.3

)oling malfunction of the (SYSTEM) will have on the following:(CFR: 41.7 145.6)

e Condenser 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 KIARejected 025A2.04 0 P

mtainment Spray 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 Ability to manually operate and/or CSS controls 026A4.01 ~.3 monitorin the control room:(CFR: 41.71 45.5 to 45.8)

ain and Reheat o 0 0 0 o 0 0 1 0 0 0 Ability to (a) predict the impactsof the Increasing steam demand, its 039A2.05 ~.3 ~.6

eam following on the (SYSTEM) and (b) relationship to increases in reactor power based on thosepredictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operation:(CFR: 41.5/43.51 45.3/45.13)

ain Feedwater 1 o 0 o 0 o 0 o 0 o 0 IKnowledge of the physical connections S/GS 059K1.03 ~.1 ~.3 and/orcausa-effect relationships between (SYSTEM) and the following:(CFR: 41.2to 41.9/45.7 to 45.8)

Jxiliary/Emergency o 0 o 0 o 1 o 0 o 0 o KnOWledge of the effectthat a loss or Pumps 061K6.08 f6 ~.7 sedwater malfunction of the following will haveon the (SYSTEM):(CFR: 41.7/45.7)

Electrical 0 1 o 0 o 0 o 0 o 0 o Knowledge of electrical powersupplies Majorsystem loads 062K2.01 ~.4 istribution to the following
(CFR: 41.7)

. -"..""'-

-.

Tier 2 Group 1

- - , - --

me I Safety Functlo K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G Question Type KIA Topic(s) KA RO fIRO C Electrical 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Knowledge of electrical power supplies Major DC loads 063K2.01 2.9 ~ .1 istribution to the following:(CFR: 41 .7)

l1ergency Diesel 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 Abilityto monitor automatic operations of Automaticstart of compressor and ED/G 064A3.01 4.1 ~.O enerator the (SYSTEM) including:(CFR: 41.7/

45.5)

rocess Radiation 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 Abilityto predict and/or monitor changes Radiation levels 073A1.01 ;3.2 onitoring in parameters associated with operating the (SYSTEM) controls including:(CFR:

41.5/45.5)

ervice Water 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 This is a Generic, no stem statement is ! Knowledge of operator responsibilities 076GG2.1.2 ~.O associate during all modes of plant operatio strument Air 0 0 0 0 o 0 o 0 o 0 1 This is a Generic, no stem statement Is Knowledge of the purpose and function 078GG2.1.28 ;3.2 associate of major system components and control ontainment o 0 o 1 o 0 0 0 o 0 o Knowledge of (SYSTEM) design Vacuum breaker protection 103K4.01 ;3.0 feature(s) and or interlock{s)which provide for the followlng:(CFR: 41 .7}

eactor Protection o 0 o 0 o 0 0 1 o 0 o Abilityto (a) predictthe impacts of the Incorrectchannel bypassing 012A2.03 ;3.4 following on the (SYSTEM) and (b)

based on those predictions, use proceduresto correct, control, or mitigatethe consequences of those abnormal operation:(CFR: 41.5/43.51 45.3/45.13)

ressurizer o 0 1 0 o 0 o 0 o 0 o KnOWledge of the effect that a loss or Containment 007K3.01 .6 elieflQuench Tank malfunction of the (SYSTEM) will have on the following:(CFR: 41.7/45.6)

. . - -

Tier 2 Group 1 me I Safety Functio K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G Question Type KIA Topic(s) KA RO ~RO irvlce Water 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Knowledge of the physical connections PRMS 076K1.17 ~ .6 ~.7 and/orcause-effect relationships between (SYSTEM) and the following :(CFR: 41 .2 to 41 .9/45.7 to 45.8)

sin and Reheat 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Knowledge of the physical connections .RCS temperature monitoring and control 039K1.04 3.1 3.1 eam and/orcause-effect relationships between (SYSTEM) and the following:(CFR: 41.2to 41.9/45.7 to 45.8)

rin Feedwater 0 0 1 0 0 0 a 0 0 0 0 Knowledge of the effectthat a loss or AFWsystem 059K3.02 ~.6 malfunction of the (SYSTEM) will have on the followlng:(CFR: 41.7 /45.6)

iactor Coolant 0 0 0 0 o 0 1 o 0 0 o Ability to predict and/ormonitorchanges RCP motorstatorwinding temperatures 003A1.03 ~ .6 imp in parameters associated with operating the (SYSTEM) controls including :(CFR:

41 .S/45.S}

essurizer o 0 0 0 o 0 0 o 0 0 0 KIA Rejected 007K4.01 p D

!lief/Quench Tank trurnent Air o 0 0 1 o 0 o 0 o 0 o Knowledge of (SYSTEM) design Manual/automatic transfers of control 078K4.01 2.7 feature(s) and or interlock(s) which provide for the following:(CFR: 41 .7)

Tier 2 Group 2 me J Safety Functio K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 ~ M M ~ Question Type KIA Topic(s) KA RO SRO vdrogen 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 This Is a Generic, no stem statement is K/A Randomly Rejected 028GG2.4.50 3.3 3.3 ecombiner and associated.

.u ge Control Dntainment Purge 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 AbIlity to manually operate and/or Containment evacuation signal 029A4.04 3.5 monitor In the control room:(CFR: 41.7/

45.5to 45.8)

cent Fuel Pool 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 o 0 o Knowledge of (SYSTEM) design Adequate 80M (boron concentration) 033K4.05 3.1 3.3 Doling feature(s) and or interlock(s) which provide for the following:(CFR: 41.7)

rel Handling 0 0 o 0 o 0 o 0 0 1 o Ability to manuallyoperate and/or Neutron levels 034A4.02 3.5 3.9 qulprnent monitor in the control room:(CFR: 41.7/

45.5to 45.8)

eam Generator 0 0 0 1 o 0 o 0 o 0 o Knowledge of (SYSTEM) design Automatic blowdown and sample line 035K4.03 2.6 feature(s) and or Interlock(s) which isolation and reset provide for the following:(CFR: 41.7)
eam 0 0 o 0 o 0 o 0 o 0 o Ability to (a) predictthe impactsof the IKIA Randomly Rejected 041A2.02 3.6 umplTurbine following on the (SYSTEM) and (b)

(passControl based on thosepredictions, use procedures to correct, control , or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operation:(CFR: 41.5/43.5 /

45.3/45.13)

ainTurbine o 0 o 0 o 0 0 1 o 0 o Ability to (a) predictthe impactsof the Control rod insertion limitsexceeded 045A2.12 2.5 enerator following on the (SYSTEM) and (b) (stabilize secondary)

based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operation:(CFR: 41.5/43.5 /

45.3 /45.13)

Tier 2 Group 2 K1 K2 K4 K5 K6 A1 1'\2 ~3

-

me I Safety Functio K3 M P Question Type KIA Toplcls) KA RO ~RO mdenserAir 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Ability to (a) predict the Impacts of the KiA Randomly Rejected 055A2 0 0 smoval following on the (SYSTEM) and (b)

based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operation:(CFR: 41 .5/43.51 45.3/45.13)

~uid Radwaste 0 0 0 0 o 0 0 0 0 0 o Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the KiA Randomly Rejected 068A2.03 2.5 following on the (SYSTEM) and (b)

based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operation:(CFR: 41 .5/43.51 45.3/45.13)

aste Gas Disposal 0 0 o 0 o 0 0 0 Q o 0 Knowledge of the effectthat a loss or KiA Randomly Rejected 071K6 0 10 malfunction of the following will have on the (SYSTEM):(CFR: 41.7/45.7)

ea Radiation 0 o 0 o 0 o 0 0 0 o 0 IAbility to manually operate.andlor KJA Randomly Rejected 072A4.03 3.1 3.1

)nitoring monitor in the control room :(CFR: 41.71 45.5to 45.8)

rculating Water o 0 o 0 o 0 o 0 o 0 o Ability to manually operate andlor KJA Randomly Rejected 075A4.01 3.2 monitor in the control room:(CFR: 41 .71 45.5 to 45.8)

ation Air o 0 o 0 o 0 o 0 o 0 0 IKnOWledge of the effectthat a loss or IKiA Randomly Rejected 079K3 0 0 malfunction of the (SYSTEM) will have on the following:(CFR: 41.7/45.6)

'e Protection o a o 0 o 0 o 0 o 0 1 Thisis a Generic, no stem statement Is KnOWledge of the purpose and function 086G2.1 .28 3.2 associate of majorsystem components and controls.

-

Tier 2 Group 2 ne f Safety Functlo K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 ru A.3 ~4 ~ Question Type KIA Toplc(s) KA RO r3RCf mtrot Rod Drive 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Knowledge of electrical power supplies KiA Randomly Rejected 001K2.05 3.1 to the foliowing:(CFR: 41.7)

iactor Coolant 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Knowledge of the effectthat a lossor Containment 002K3.03 4.2 malfunction of the (SYSTEM) will have on the following:(CFR: 41.7 /45.6)

essurizer Level 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Knowledge of the effectthat a lossor KiA Randomly Rejected 011K3.02 3.5 3.7 mtrol malfunction of the (SYSTEM) will have onthe following:(CFR: 41.7 145.6}

>d Position 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 Knowledge of the operational RPIS Independent of demand position 014K5.02 2.8 3.3

lication implications of the following concepts as theyapply to the (SYSTEM):(CFR: 41.5/

45.7)

rclear 0 0 0 o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Ability to monitor automatic operations of KiA Randomly Rejected 015A3.02 13.7 3.9 stru mentation the (SYSTEM) Including:{CFR: 41.7/

45.5)

on-nuclear 0 0 0 o 0 0 0 0 0 o 0 Ability to monitor automatic operations of KiA Randomly Rejected 016A3.01 2.9 2.9 strumentation the (SYSTEM) including:(CFR: 41.7/

45.5)

-core 1 0 o 0 o 0 0 0 0 o 0 Knowledge of the physical connections Plant computer 017K1.01 3.2 3.2 smperature and/or cause-effect relationships onltor between (SYSTEM) andthe foliowing:(CFR: 41.2to 41.9/45.7 to 45.8)

antainrnent Iodine 0 0 o 0 o 0 0 0 0 o 0 Knowledge Ofthe effect that a lossor KIARandomly Rejected 027K3 0 0 srnoval malfunction of the (SYSTEM) will have on thefollowing:(CFR: 41.7/45.6)

andensate 0 0 o 0 o 0 a 0 0 o 1 Thisis a Generic, nostem statement is Ability to locate and operate 056G2.1.30 3.9 . - _......... ->_.~

Tier 2 Group 2 me I Safety Functlo K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 ~ ~3 1\4 G Question Type KIA Topic(s) KA RO SRO associate components, including local control Tier 3

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Group KA Topic RO SRO induct of Operations 02. Knowledge of shift turnover practice .4 induct of Operations G2.1.22 Ability to determine Mode of Operatio .8 3.3 induct of Operations G2. Knowledge of conduct of operations requirement .7 3.8

[uipment Control G2.2.11 Knowledge of the process for controlling temporary change .5 3.4

[uipment Control 02.2.24 Ability to analyze the affeetofmaintenance activities on LeO statu .6 3.8

[uipment Control G2.2A (multi-unit) Ability to ex-plain the variations in control board layouts, systems, instrumentation and procedural actions between units at a facility.

idiation Control G2. Knowledge of tbeprocess for performing a containment purg .5 3.4 idiation Control G2. Knowledge of facility ALARA progra .5 nergency Procedures/Plan G2.4.14 Knowledge of general guidelines for EOPflowchart us .9 nergency ProceduresIPlan G2.4.43 Knowledge of emergency communications systems and technique .8 August 8, 2006