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{{#Wiki_filter:UNITEDSTATEDOFAMERICABEFORETHENUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONPETITIONFOREMERGENCYENFORCEMENTACTIONANDREQUESTFORPUBLICHEARINGI.INTRODUCTIONI,BENL.RIDINGS(hereinafter"Petitioner")herebypetitiontheCommissionersoftheNuclearRegulatoryCommission("NRC"or"Commission")foremergencyenforcementactionagainstNiagraMohawk'sNineMile(UnitOne)Nuclearpower"plant,whichisoperatinqinviolationofboththeNRCandFederalrequirementsforavailabilityofEmergencyCoreCooling(ECCS)highpressurecoreinjection.AsanECCSsystem,theNineMileplantalsofailstoprovidethemandatoryemergencybackuppowertothehighpressurecoreinjection(HPCI)system.OverthetwentyyearstheNineMileOneplanthasbeenallowedtooperate,nosafetyrelatedpumpshaveeverbeenavailabletoinjectwaterintothevesselatreactorpressure.Atthesametimethisplantwasallowedtooperateatfullpower,therearemanypostulatedaccidentsassumedintheFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(thatarecapableofdrainingthereactorvessel)andspecificallyrelyontheECCSHPCIPumpsto'aintainreactorwaterlevel.Thesepumpshaveneverbeeninstalledandthecurrentadministrativecontrolsallowedthisplanttooperateoutsidetheminimumfederalrequirement.Thisspecifictypeofplantoperationoutsidetheknownminimumfederalrequirementsgreatlyendangershealthandpropertyrisktothepublic.Asdiscussedindetailbelow,theresponsibleutility,itsQualityAssurancegroupandtheNRChaveroutinelyfailedintheirresponsibilitytoensuretheoperationofnuclearpowerplantswithinthelicenseagreement.Evenwhenproblemsareidentified,.documentedandbroughttotheattentionoftheresponsibleparties,varioussafetyconcernsareroutinelydismissed,ignoredor9211160402921027*PDRADOCK05000220PDR
~~~M'h' administrativelyeliminated.Evenissueswhichobviouslyendangerpublicsafetyhavebeenroutinelydismissed,notonlybytheutilitybutsuchactionsauthorizedandapprovedbytheindependentqualityassurancegroupsandbytheNRC.Anyandalloftheseorganizationshavetheauthoritytostoptheop'erationofplantsoutsidetheminimumsafetyrequirements,andnotonehavecomeforwardtofulfillitsdutyandprotectthepublic.Instead,eachorganizationhasreviewedtheenclosedsafetyconcernsandcontrarytoanypracticaljustification,haveremainedsilentandallowedthismannerofplantoperationtotakeplacewiththeirapproval,givingevidencethatthesegroupshavealsofailedtoremainindependentofeachother.Independentreviewbynotonlythegovernmentagencybutthequalityassurancereviewgroupsisthebasicpremisewhichallowedcongresstograntoperationofcommercialnuclearpowerplantswithlimitedliabilityfordamages.Thecurrentadministrativecontrolsusedtodayfailedtoensuretheplantoperatewithintheminimumfederalguidelines.ItisCongress'sdutytoprotectpublicsafetyanditscurrentadministrativecontrolshavefailed.BecausetheNineNilePointUnitOneReactorviolatesbothfederallawandtheCommissions'srequirementsforHIGHPRESSURECOREINJECTION,theCommissioncanmakenofindingthatthereisresonableassuranceofnounduerisktopublichealthandsafety.PetitionerthereforerequestthattheCommissionissueimmediatelyaneffectiveorderdirectingthelicenseetoceasepoweroperationandplacethereactorinacoldshutdowncondition.Theplantshouldnotbepermittedtocontinueorresumeoperationunlessanduntilsubsequenttestsandinspectionsareshowntoprovidetherequisitereasonableassuranceofnounduerisktopublichealthandsafety.Moreover,Petitionersseekapublichearingbeforetheplantisallowedtooperateagain.
 
II.DESCRIPTIONOFPETITIINERI,BenL.Ridings,'amatechnicalconsultantforcommercialnuclearpowerplants.Overaspanofsomefifteenyears,whileworkingatsometwentyfoursites,Ihavespecializedinreviewingoflicensingagreement(FSAR,TechnicalSpecifications,FederalCodesandRegulations,ASMECodes,etc.),establishingadministrativecontrolstomeettheserequirementsandtestprogramstoensurecomplianceatalltimes.Nytestprogramsandadministratvecontrolsestablishedwhileundercontracttovariousutilitiesarestillinusetodayatmanyfacilities.III~THECOMNISSIOMSHOULDEXERCISEITSSUPERVISORYJURISDICTIONOVERTHISPETITIONA.TheCommissionhasanInherentSupervisoryJurisdictionovertheSafetyofOperationoftheNiagraNohawkNineNilePlant.ThispetitionisbroughtbeforetheCommissionpursuanttotheauthoritygrantedtoitin42USC2233(d),2236(a),2237and10CFR2.204,2.206(c)(1),50.54,50.57,50.100and50.109.ItinvokestheinherentsupervisoryauthorityoftheCommissiontooverseeallaspectsoftheregulatoryandlicensingprocessandits"overridingresponsibilityforassuringpublichealthandsafetyintheoperationofnuclearpowerfacilities."ConsolidatedEdisonCoo.ofN.Y.Inc.(IndianPoint,Units1,2and3).CLI-75-8,2NRC173(1975)~AstheCommissionhaspreviouslyobserved,itssupervisorypowersincludethepowertoorderimmediateshutdownofafacility"ifthepublichealthorsafetysorequires."tPetitionforEmerencandRemedialAction,CLI786g7NRC400'05(1978)gciting5USC558(c),42USC2236(b)~10CFR2202(f)g2204.
t~U
~rs~i~fTheCommissionhasexeiciseditsinherentauthorityonanumberofoccasions.Inadditiontotheceasescitedabove,seePetitionforResearchandDevelomentAdministration(ClinchRiverBreederReactorProject)pCLI761374NRC6777576(1976)IConsumersPowerCo.(MidlandUnits1and2),CLI-73-38,6AEC1084(1973);PublicServiceCo.ofNewN~aeshire(SeahrootNuclearPowerStation,Unitsiand2),CL1-77-8,SNPC503,515-517(1977).B.ExerciseoftheCommissions'sIndependentJurisdictionis,AppropriateinThisCase.NRCregulationsat10CFR2.206providethatunderordinarycircumstances,enforcementpetitionsaretobelodgedwiththeNRCStaff,andthattheCommissionmaytakediscretionaryreviewofStaffdenialsofsuchpetitions.However,theCommissions'sreviewingpower"doesnotlimitinanyway"its"supervisorypowerover.delegatedStaffactions",10CFR2.206(c)(1).ItisappropriateforthecommissiontoexerciseitssupervisorypowersandtakejurisdictioninthiscasebecausetheNPCStaffhasacquiescedtoNiagraMohawks'iolationsformorethantwoyears.InJan1990,NiagraMohawkComplianceSupervisorwasgivenwrittennoticeofHPCIsandotherinadequacieswhicheffectpublicsafety.Afternoapparentaction,theNineMileQualityFirstTeamwasalsogivennotice.PetitionerwaslaternotifiedbytheQualityFirstTeamthattheNRChadbeencontactedandmadeawareoftheproblemaswell.PetitionerwaslatercontactedbytheQualityFirstTeamandtoldthattheNRChadexemptedtheplantfromtheHPCIrequirementanditsneedforbackuppowerintheeventoflossofpower.PetitionerhasyettoheardirectlyfromtheNRConthismatter.
II IV.GROUNDSFORACTIONA.FederalRequirementsforhavingradioactivefuelsonsiteInaccordancewith10CFR50.10,theutilityNiagraMohawkenteredintocontractualagreementwiththefederalgovernmentundertheprovisionsofpublicdocument50-220,onfilewiththefederalregister.NowundertheJurisdictionof10CFR50,App.A(GeneralDesignCriteria),establishtheminimumrequirementsfortheprincipaldesignforwatercoolednuclearpowerplant.Criterion33and35(Attachment2)specifytheminimumneedthatasystemtoprovideabundantemergencycorecoolingshallbeprovided.Thesystemsafetyfunctionshallbetotransferheatfromthe.reactorcoreandmusthavesuitableredundancyincomponentsandonsiteelectricpowersystem(assumingoffsitepowerisnotavailable)whichwillenablethesafetyfunctiontobeaccomplished.Also(Criterion33),asystemtosupplyreactorcoolantmakeupforprotectionagainstsmallbreaksinthereactorcoolantpressureboundaryshallbeprovided.Criterion37providesc)bu"gthetestingrequirementsoftheemergencycorecoolingsystem.10CFK70detailstheutilityandNRCresponsibilityfortestingandinspectionofthesesystemsand10CFR50App.B(QualityAssuranceCriteria)detailstheQualityAssuranceProgramandtheadministrativerequirementsforInspections,TestControl,OperatingStatus,CorrectiveActionandRecords.B.AStudyofContractualAgreement(docket50-220)In,accordancewith10CFR50.34,thetechnicalspecificationshallperformanevaluationofthesafetyeffectivenessofprovidingforseparationofhighpressurecoolantinJection(HPCI)andreactorcoreisolationcooling(RCIC).ThisinvestigationfoundtheNileNilePointTechnicalSpecificationincompliancewith'hisrequirement.TechnicalSpecification4.1~8(Attachment3)givespositiveproofthattheECCS iC:.
~gl~requirementfortheHPCIsystemwasanticipatedbythedesigners.Secondly,thecorrespondingLimitingConditionforOperation(LCO)3.i.8.c(Attachment3)viewthissystemassocriticalthatif"theutilityfailstoverifyHPCIoperabilityitwilldemandanorderlyshutdownbeinitiatedwithinonehour.WhenonlyoneHPCIcomponentbecomesinoperableitsredundantcomponentshallbedemonstratedtobeoperableimmediatelyanddailythereafter(asopposedtomonthlydemonstration)."InaccordancewiththeBasesforTechnicalSpecification3.1.8,theHPCIsystemisprovidedtoensureadequatecorecoolingintheunlikelyeventofareactorcoolantlinebreak(alsoafederalrequirement-designcriterion33).TheHPCIsystemisrequiredforlinebreakswhichexceedthecapabilityoftheControlRodDrivepumpsandwhicharenotlargeenoughtoallowfastenoughdepressurizationforcorespraytobeeffective(corespray350psiasopposedtoHPCI22QQpsi).InaccordancewiththeFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(FSAR),ChapterVII(Attachment4),theDesignBasesforHPCIisdiscussed.Althoughseveralrevisionhavebeenimplementedbytheutility'inordertofabricatetheexistenceofaECCSsystemtosatisfytheHPCIfederalrequirement,itsprimarysafetyfunctionislisted;(1)provideadequatecoolingofthereactorcoreunderabnormalandaccidentconditions,(2)removetheheatfromradioactivedecayandresidualheatfromthereactorcoreatsucharatethatfuelcladmeltingwouldbeprevented,(3)provideforcontinuityofcorecoolingoverthecompleterangeofpostulatedbreaksizesintheprimarysystemprocessbarrier.Once.thesafetyfunctionsareunderstooditbecomesobviousastowhythissystemisaminimumrequirementofthefederalguidelines.
~g4 ThefollowingparagraphofFSARChapterVIIgivesthereaderanindicationofthelackofproperreviewthatexists.AtNineNilePoint,unlikeeveryothernuclearfacility,"MPCIisnotanengineeredsafeguardssystemandisnotconsideredinanyLossofCoolantAccidentAnalysis."AsstatedintheFSAR(inlaymanterms)thisfeedwatersystemdoesnotpretendtomeettheIOCFR50AppendixA(Criterion33,35,36,37)requirementsoftheminimumfederalrequirements.Infact,NineNilePointhasnosystemmeetingtheseminimumfederalrequirements.Next,reviewingtheDesignEvaluationportionofFSARChapterVII,(Attachment4)aparadoxoccursindesignphilosophy."Duringaloss-of-coolantaccidentwithinthedrywel1,highdrywel1pressureduetoalinebreakwillcauseareactorscram.Theautomatic'cramwillcauseaturbinetripafterafive-seconddelay.Inordertoreventcladdinterneraturefromexceedintheirmaximumlimitfortheentire.spectrumofbreaks,the3800gpm(fromonetrainoftheHPCIpumps)wouldhavetobeavailableObviously,theHPCIsystemisabsolutelynecessarytoensurecriticalheatflux(CHF)isnotexceeded.Withoutthecoolantwatertotransfertheheatfromthefueltothecoolant,thefuelrodwouldthenheatuprapidlyandfuelcladdingwouldtakeplaceandcause'possiblemeltdownunlessthereactorwereshutdownquickly.Further,oncethecriticalheatfluxwasexceeded,thedeparturefromnucleateboilingratio(DNBR)wouldexceedits1~25limit.TheselimitsareTechnicalSpecificationrequirementsaswellbutitgivesanindicationoftheinterdependenceoftheECCSsystems.Tomakeastatementinalicensethat"HPCIhasnotbeenconsideredinanyLossofCoolantAccidentAnalyses"isaanotherindicationofthelackofp~opcireviewthatexistsatNineNilePoint.Everysafetylimitassumed jl'I
~~,'jestattheNineMilePointplantisjeopardizedwithouttheassurancethatthefuelwillremaincoveredatalltimes.TheNRChasapprovedthenon-safetyrelatedfeedwatersystemasanappropriatesubstituteforanECCSHPCIfederalrequirement.Whatatfirstseemslikeaquibbleaboutasinglepumpisinactualityavalidargumentthateverybasesassumedbythislicenseisnullandvoid.AtNineMilePoint,standardbasicthermalreactordesignhasbeensignificantlyalteredinseveralECCSsystems.TherearenoHPCIorRCICsystemtotransferheatfromthereactorcore.Thereisnowayoftakingsteamawayfromthereactorandusingthisenergytodriveahighpressurepump.NormallytheHPCIpumpsreturnthecondensedsteam(water)backintothevesseltomaintainwaterlevel.AtNineMilePoint,thereisnoHPCIorRCICsystems.AtNineMilePoint,unlikenormalreactordesign,electricallydriven,non-quality~-relatedfeedwaterpumpsareconsidered.Thesenon-qualityrelatedfeedwaterpumpssupposedlyfulfilltheHPCIsafetyfunctionandyetdonotmeettheelectricalbackuprequirements.Itmustbenotedthatthesizeoftheseelectricalpumpsmakeitimpossibletohaveon-sitepoweravailableintheeventoflossofoff-sitepower.On-sitepoweravailabilityisassumedinthebasesoftheFSAR.Itisthereforeimpossibleforthisplanttofulfilltheminimumsafetyobligationasdictatedbyfederalstatuteoftheknownpostulatedaccidents.Thissamefeedwatersystem(beingnon-qualityrelated)waspurchasedasanon-qualityrelatedsystem.Inthissamesystem;piping,valvesfinstrumentation,wiring,electricalcomponentsandcontrolsystemswereallpurchasedandinstalledundernon-qualityrelatedcontractualprovisions.HPCIautomaticallyinitiatesonaLossCoolantAccident(LOCA)signalfromtheNSSSlogic.TheNSSSlogicperformstheECCSsafeguardfunctionsand E
alwaysinstalledunderstrictcontractualmandates,whichincludetraining,qualityassurancereviews,certifiedskilledcraftsmen,etc.Secondly,thepipingsystem,welding,hangerrestraintsandmaintenanceconsiderationswereinstalledandmaintainedundernon-qualityrelatedprovisionsaswell.Again,ECCSsafeguardsystemsarepurchased,constructedandmaintainedundermuchstricterguidelines.Thefeedwatersystemwasneverdesigned,purchased,built,maintainednorcapableoffulfillingtheHPCIrequirementsofthefederalguidelines.-AtNineNilePointtheHPCIsystemsimplydoesnotexist.Theadministrativecontrolswhichallowedacceptanceofsuchanon-qualityrelatedsystemtofulfillthismandatoryECCSfederalrequirementisnotacceptable.C.KnowledgeofExistingConcernsTheneedforanoperableECCSHPCISystemismandatoryasevidencedfromthegroundsforreliefinthisreport.AtNineNilePointy'theUtility,QualityAssurancepersonnelandtheNPCwerewellawareofthisrequirement.F'rwhateverreason,thisplantwaslicensedbytheNRCandallowedtooperatewithoutthismandatoryrequirementinstalled.Attemptsbythesesamepartiestosubstitutenon-qualityrelatedfeedwaterequipmenttofulfillthismandatorysafeguardfunctionsupportsthefacttheneedforrequirementwasunderstood.Evenifnon-qualityrelatedequipmentwas.acceptabletosupportECCSfunctions(anditsnot),thereisnoonsiteelectricpowersystemthatwillsupportthesafetyfunctionofafeedwater/HPCIsystem.Thiselec.ricsystemisanothermandatoryminimumrequirement(Attachment2-Criterion35).Toprovethecollaborationbetweenallpartiesmentioned,thelicenseeattemptstotakecreditforronsitepoweravailabilityfromtheBentonDam,some100milesaway.Obviouslythereviewersareawareofthesemandatoryrequirementsbutthere I
'Igg~'I"resolutiontothesafetyconcernsisnotacceptable.Thepossibilityofatornadodestroyingtheswitchyardisaknownpostulatedaccidentthatcanoccur.Withoutthispoweravailability,theHPCIfunctioncannotpossiblybeassumed,asstatedintheFSARChapterVII(Attachment4).Everytimethefeedwaterprocedureswererevisedthisissuewouldhavetobereviewed.EverytimetheFSAR(ChapterVII)wasrevised,theTechnicalSpecificationsrevisedorcontainmentintegritywasquestionedthisissuehadtobereviewedinaccordancewithadministrativerequirementssetoutbythefederalguidelines.EverytimetheQualityAssurancegroupsandNRCperformedtheirindependentauditsandinspectionsthisissuehadtobereviewed.Everytimethisplantwasoperatedatmodes1or2,theresponsibleSeniorReactorOperator(SRO),whoisspecificallytrained(10CFR50AppE)ontheseissueswouldhavetoquestionthevalidityofthecurrentHPCIsystem.EverytimetheHPCIsurveillance(monthly)wasperformedtoensureoperability,theresponsibleSPOwouldhavetoquestionthevalidityofanonqualityrelatedfeedwatersystemfulfillingtheHPCIsystem.Takingcreditfornon-qualityrelatedequipmenttofulfilltherequirementsofaECCSsafetyfunctionisnotacceptableanditwouldbetheSPO'sresponsibilitytoquestionthefeedwaterabilitytoperformthisHPCIsafetyfunction.Ofcourse,thatistheanotherproblemtoconsider,itwouldbetheSRO'sjob.Althoughpreviouslyawareoftheproblem,onJan18,1990,theUtilitywasservednoticeoftheseandothersafetyconcern.Ifthenon-qualityrelatedfeedwatersystemwastosupposedlyfulfilltheHPCIsafetyfunction,itfailedtomettheonsiteelectricalrequirementsandmanyof-10-
'I'I themainflowpathvalveshadneverbeenincludedintheInserviceTestProgram(10CFR50.55).Some44outof47valveswerecurrentlynotidentifiedintheInserviceTestProgram(ECCSSurveillanceviolation).Withsuchknowledge,theUtility,QualityAssurancegroupandtheNRCallowed'theplanttostartupandcontinueintofulloperating(mode1)condition.Nopumps,novalvesyetTechnicalSpecification4.1.8(Attachment.3)demandsifonevalveisnotdemonstratedoperableadailysurveillanceisrequiredtobeperformed.Thisisjustanotherlackofadministrativecontrolinwhichthereviewgroupshavefailedtoauditorreviewproperly.Unfortunately,thisdilemmaisnotuniquetoNineNilePoint,OtherplantswerealsosomehowlicensedwithoutthismandatoryHPCIcapability.Thatisanotherindicatorofthetypeofreviewthathastakenplaceatotherfacilitiesaswellbuteventuallytheseplantsinstalledthemandatorysystem.Themoststunningfactofthisinvestigationshowsthatafterliterallythousandsoftechnicalreviewsperformedbyhundredsof"qualifiedpersonnel"workingindifferentshifts,separatedepartments,sitesorregions,haveallfailedtostopthisfacilityfromoperatingoutsidetheminimumfederalguidelines.Everymonthduringfullpoweroperation,theHPCIsystemisverifiedoperablebya"qualified"SeniorPeactorOperatorandaswornaffidavitsubmittedeachmonthbytheUtilitytotheNPCattestingthatallrequirementshavebeenfulfilled.Obviously,thecurrentsystemofchecksandbalancescannotstopthisplantfromoperatingoutsidethesemandatoryfederalguidelines,anassumptionfalselymadebycongress.11
~I D.Pesponsibi1ities10CFR50App.BdetailstheadministrativerequirementsforTestControl,Inspections,OperatingStatus,CorrectiveAction,Pecordsand-independentAudits.TheserequirementsareaddressedinboththeTechnicalSpecificationsandFSAR;Sitespecificadministrativeproceduresdetailutilityandqualityassurancestaffpositionresponsibilities.10CFR50.70detailtheNRCinspectionswhileIOCFRS0.72detailreportnotificationresponsibilitiesforallparties.TheNRChavetheirownadministrativeprocedureswhichdetailstaffresponsibilities.NUREG-0800detailstheUSNRCtandardreviewplanforinservicetestingofpumpsandvalves.AllpartiesmentionedwererequiredtohaveknowledgeoftheHPCIrequirementsatthelevelofreviewforwhicheachindividualwasinvolved.Thesereviewsrequiremandatoryaction.Despiteallmentionedreviewsthisrequirementwasnotmet.OnJan18,1990theNiagraMohawk,NineMilePointNuclearRegulatoryComplianceGroupwereservednoticeofthisandmanyotherknownsafetyconcerns.OnJuly31,1990theNiagraMohawkQualityFirstTeamwereservedwrittennotice.TheNPCwasnotifiedandonandtheQualityFirstTeamnotifiedpetitionerthattheNRCexemptedtheutility'fromtherequirement.V.STATEMENTOFTHELA'W1.ThereisaminimumrequirementforaHighPressureCoreInje'ctionECCSSafeguardSystemattheNineMilePointUnitOnefacility.Thisrequirementcomesfromthefederalguidelines,TechnicalSpecificationsandFSARminimummandates.2.'oHighPressureCoreInjectionSystemmeetingthesafeguardfederalguidelinesexistsatNineMilePoint,UnitOne.-12-E~
3.Ifthenon-qualityrelatedfeedwatersystemwastosupposedlyfulfilltheHPCIsafetyfunction,itfailedtomettheonsiteelectricalrequirementsandmanyofthemainflowpathvalveshadneverbeenincludedintheInserviceTestProgram.4.IftheHPCISystemisnotasafeguardsystemandisnotconsideredinanyLossofCoolantAccidentAnalysesasstatedintheFSARChapterVII,thennoassumptioncanbemadethatthefuelwillremaincoveredbythemoderatorandrelatedsafetylimitssetinthecurrentlicensearenullandvoid.Obviouslyunreviewedsafetyquestionsexist.5.Congressmadeanassumptionofthecurrentchecksandbalancesthatwouldneverallowaplanttooperateoutsidetheminimumsafetyrequirementssetoutinfederalguidelines.Onthisassumption,unlikeanyotherindustry,thenuclearindustryhasbeenallowedtooperateunderlimitedliability.Theutility,QualityAssuranceGroups,NRCandChiefExecutiveOfficerhavereceivedwrittennoticeoftheirfailuretocomplywiththeminimumfederalguidelinesandhaveadministrativelyfailedtocomplywiththisissue.Asdiscussedabove,theNineMileUnitOnePlantfailstocomplywithboththeminimumfederalandNRC'srequirementsforHPCIECCSSystem.ThishasbeenacknowledgedbytheNRCStaffandisdemonstratedunequivocallybytheevidenceinthepublicrecord.Moreover,theStaffhasperformednovalidanalysisthatmeetstheCommission'snarrowcriteriaforcontinuingtooperateintheabsenceofcompliance.CompliancewithbothFederalandNPCsafetyregulationsisaprerequisitetosafeoperationofanuclearpowerplant.Infact,astheNRC'sAppealBoardhasobserved,regulatory 0r~
~~andsafety."MaineYankeeAtomicPowerComanALAB-161,6AEC1003,1009(1973).Compliancemaynotbeavoidedbyarguingthat,althoughanapplicableregulationisnotme,thepublichealthandsafetywillstillbeprotected.for,oncearegulationisadopted,thestandardsitembodiesrepresenttheCommission'sdefinitionofwhatisrequiredtoprotectthepublichealthandsafety.VermontYankeeNuclearPowerCor.ALAB-138,6AEC520,528(1973)(emphasisadded).TheCommission'sessentialsafetystandardsmustbemet,withoutregardtothecostorinconvenienceofachievingcompliance.10CF'R50.109SeealsoUnionofConcernedScientistsvNRC,824f.2d108(DCCir1987).VI~REQUESTFORRELIEFtF'rthereasonsenumeratedabove,petitionerstatesthatthefollowingreliefisrequired:A.ImmediateShutdownPendingDemonstrationofRegulatoryCompliance.Asdiscussedabove,theNineMilePointnuclearplantfailstocomplywithanarrayoffundamentalrequirementsforHPCIECCSmandatoryrequirements.Noexemptionstothisrequirementcanpossiblybejustifiedwithoutundueriskstopublicsafety.ConsistentwiththerequirementsoftheAtomicEnergyAct,F'ederalmandatoryrequirementsandNPCregulations,PetitionerthereforeseeksimmediateshutdownoftheNineMilePointunitonereactorpendingfullcompliancewiththeregulations.Inseekingthisrelief,PetitionernotesthatmaintainingECCSsystemsnecessarytometigatelossofcoolantaccidentsisaregulatorygoalthatwarrantsthemostimmediateandstringentenforcemenCaction.NineMilePoint'snoncompliancewithChefederalminimumdesigncriteriaandthe"coverup"activitiesofallresponsibleparCieswhichposesasafetyrisk-14-
~~
tt'fcommensurate,ifnotgraver,dimensionthanthesuspicionofECCSpipecrackingthatcausedthecommissiontoorder23plantshutdownsinl975.SeePetitionforEmerencandremedialActioniCLI78Sg7NRC400'05(i978).LiketheECCSpipecracking,thisplantdoesn'tevenhavethepipes,valvesorpumpsnecessarytometigateaknownpostulatedaccidentthateffectsknownsafetylimitsoftheFSAR.Thissystemisnecessaryforthecoolingofthecoreduringanaccidentandthissystem(whichdoesnotexist)istfleonlymeanstopreventameltdown.Again,unlikenormalECCSsystemswhichhaveredundantcomponentsandcanthereforewithstand~asinglefailure,thissystemdoesnotexistandcannotbecompensatedforbyanyothersystem.Simplyput,asmallbreakdescribedintheFSARbasesasapostulatedaccidentwillinalllikelihoodmeltdownthereactorforlackofcooling.Becausethecontainmentisnotdesignedtowithstandameltdown,such'neventwouldprobablyleadtoanuncontainedreleaseofradioactivitytothepublicenvironment.Thisutilityisnotinsuredforsuchanaccident.B.PublicHearingT.';eissuesraisedbytheNineMilePoint'snoncompliancewithfederalrequirementsraisesgravesafetyquestionsoftremendouspublicimportance.PetitionerthereforerequestthatbeforeallowingtheNineMilePointplanttocontinueoperating,theCommissionprovideforpublichearing,withrightsofdiscoveryandcrossexamination,todeterminewhetherNineMilePointisinfullcompliancewithallfederalminimumrequirementsrevelanttoHPCIandpublicsafety.Secondly,congressbenotifiedthattheadministrativecontrolsreliedupontograntthenuclearindustrytheimmunityofliabilityhavefailedtoensurepublicsafety.Afterliterallythousandsofreviewsby"qualified
 
personnel"fromdifferentdisciplines,departments,sitesandregionscompletedtheirreview,notonecameforwardanddemandthisplantoperatewithinthelawaslaidoutbyactofcongress.Shouldnoncompliancebefound,manyofthesereviewsdemandmandatoryactiononthepartofthereviewer.ThepetitionerhasnotifiedallresponsiblepartiesandaftertwoyearsNineMilePointUnitOnecontinuestooperateoutsidethefederalguidelinesatatremendousrisktopublicsafety.Acongressionalinvestigationofthismatterbeinitiatedimmediately.Thepetitioner'sserviceswerecontractedbyNiagraMohawktoreviewandensureadministrativecompliancetoTechnicalSpecificationpriortoStart-Up.Aqualifiedgroupoftenbeganalaboriousreviewandwhenenormousproblemsbegantoimmerge.Thisgroupwasdisbandedimmediately.InJan1990,theNiagraMohawk'sNuclearPegulatoryComplianceStaffwasgivenadetailedmemo(Attachment5)givingevidencethat45%ofthecontainmentisolationvalveshadadministrativedeficiencies.Twoweekslaterthereviewgroupwasdisbandedpriortocompletionoftheirreview.AlongwithHPCIconcerns,containmentisolationvalvesasfoundintheFSARTableVI-3haddeficiencieswithcorrespondingTechnicalSpecificationTables3.3.4h3.2.7.Thisplanthadoperatedfortwentyyearsandyetthelicensefailedtoevencorrespondtoitself,letaloneactualplantconditions.Thesevalvesarerequiredbyfederalguidelinestoprotectthepublicyetalmosthalfhaddeficiencies.Petitionerallegesthatwhenconcernsareidentified,theconcernsareroutinely"coveredup",dismissedoradministrativelyexempted.AproperreviewoftheNineMilePointUnitOneTechnicalSpecification4.0.5requirementsandthecomlianceofthe-16-lr ttestprogramswillshowthattheutilitysimplyhiredanotherreviewgroupthat(forwhateverreason)failedtodocumentthedeficienciesthattrulyexist.NineNilePointUnitOneresumedfullpoweroperationsevenafterthesafetyconcernswereidentifiedanddocumented.Thistypeofcoverupisnotuniquetothisplantandacongressionalinvestigationofthismatterbeinitiatedimmediately.~IMSUNDRYTherecanbenojustificationfortheoperationofnuclearpowerplantsoutsidetheminimumrequirementsspecifiedbyactofcongress.Thesearetheminimumrequirementsdeemednecessarybyactofcongresstogranttheimmunityofliabilitycurrentlyassumedbytheutility.WhenpublicsafetyisJeopardizedbyknownpostulatedaccidents,therecanbenojustificationforthelackofactionbytheresponsiblepartiesinthisinstance.Simplyput,thisutilityisnotinsuredtooperateinthismanner.Respectfullysubmitted,BenL.RidingsP.O.Box1101Kingston,TN37763-17-P' BIBLIOGRAPHYNODERNPOWERPLANTENGINEERING,WeismanhEckart,1985Prentice-HallInc.20V~4~10CFPSO.10,"RequirementofLicense."10CFR50.46,"Acceptancecriteriaforemergencycorecoolingsystemsforlightwaternuclearpowerreactors."10CFR50.55a,"CodesandStandards."1OCFP50.59,"Changes,testsandexperiments."6.10CFRS0.70,"Inspection,Notifications."Pecords,Reports,7.10CFRSO,AppendixA,GeneralDesignCriterion33,"Peactorcoolantmakeup."8.10CFP50,AppendixA,GeneralDesignCriterion35,"Emergencycorecooing."9.10CFP50,AppendixA,GeneralDesignCriterion36,"Inspectionofemergencycorecooingsystem."10..10CFR50,AppendixA,GeneralDesignCriterion37,"TestingofEmergencyCoreCoolingsystems."11.10CFR50,AppendixB,II."QualityAssuranceProgram"12.10CFR50,AppendixB,III."Design'Control."13.10CFR50,AppendixB,VI."DocumentControl."14.10CFR50,AppendixB,X."Inspections."1S.10CFR50,AppendixB,XI."TestControl."16.10CFP50,AppendixB,XIV."Inspection,TestandOperatingStatus."17.10CFR50,AppendixB,XVI."CorrectiveAction."18.10CFR50,AppendixB,XVII."QualityAssuranceRecords."19.10CFR50,AppendixE,F."Training."20.FederalRegister,PublicDocket:50-220,NiagraNohawk,UnitOne,NineNilePointThermalNuclearReactor.-18"
 
UNITEDSTATEDOFAMERICABEFOPETHENUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONAFFIDAVITOFBENL.RIDINGSI,BenL.Ridingsdomakeoathandsay:1.MynameisBenL.Ridings.Iamatechnicalconsultantforcommercialnuclearpowerplants.Overaspanofsomefifteenyears,whileworkingatsometwentyfoursites,Ihavespecializedinreviewingoflicensingagreement(FSAR,TechnicalSpecifications,FederalCodesandRegulations,ASMECodes,etc.),establishingadministrativecontrolstomeettheserequirementsandtestprogramstoensurecomplianceatalltimes.Mytestprogramsandadministrativecontrolsestablishedwhileundercontracttovariousutilitiesarestillinusetodayatmanyfacilities.2.IhavereviewedalloftherelevantpubliclyavailablecorrespondencebetweentheNucIearRegulatoryCommissionandNiagraMohawkduringtherelvanttimespan.IamfamilarwithNRCregulationsandregulatoryguidancegoverningHighPressureCoreInjection.3.ThefactualstatementmadeintheattachedPetitionforEmergencyActionandRequestforpublicHearingaretrueandcorrecttothebestofmyknowlegeandbelief.BenL.RidingsSubscribedandsworntobeforemethis~l~dayofQf~,1992.Mycommisionexpires:
l'C PartSO,App.ACtffcr(oa2y~oscbfscctrcacffo(fycosftofsysfctssCapabQ(fy.TheteactlvltycontrolsystemsshaBbedesignedtohaveacorn.binedcapabUlty.InconiuncUonwithpoisonaddIUonbytheemergencycorecooUngsystem.ofreOablyconttoOIngreactivitychangestoassurethatunderpostulatedac-cidentconditionsandwithappropriatemarginforstudcrodsthecapabOItytocool'hecorelsmaintained.CHfcrfoa3d-Reac(fv(fyI(scffa.Thereac-Uvitycontrolsystemsshallbedesignedwith~pptoprlateOmitsonthcpotentISIamount~ndrateofteactlvltyIncreasetoassurethatthccffcctsofPos'LUlatcdtcscUvI(yaccidentscanneither(1)resultlndamagetoLhereac-torcoolantpressureboundarygreaterthanUmltedlocalyieldingnor(2)suffidentlydis-'CUtbChcco~ltssupportsttUCLUfcsorotherreactorpressurevesselInternalstoImpairslgnlflcanUythecayabOltytocoolthecore.ThesepostuiatedreacUvltyacci-dentsshaBIndudeconsiderationofrodefecUon(unlesspreventedbypositivemeans),roddropout,stcamUnerupture.changesinreactorcoolanttemperatureandpressure,andcoldwateraddIUon.Crffctfoa29-Aefccffoaapafastastfcfpa(cdopcraffosafoccsttcsceaTheprotec-tionandreactivitycontrolsystemsshaBbedesignedtoassureanexttcmdyhighproba-blUtyolaccomplishingtheirsafetyfunc-tionsIntheeventolantldpatedoperationalIV.ilsMSystemsCrffcrfoa3P-Qsalffyofrcacforcoolastprcssurebousdary.Componentswhicharepattofthereactorcoolantpressurebounda-ryshaBbedesigned.fabricated,erecLed,andtestedtothehighestquaUtystandardsptac-tlcaLMeansshaBbeprovidedfordeLectlng'and.toCheextentpracUcaLIdenUfylngthelocationofthesourceofreactorcoolantleakage.Crffcr(oa31-Ftacfstcpretpcsffoaofreacforcooiaafprcssurebousdary.ThereactorcoolantpressureboundaryshaBbedesigned<<lthsufiIdentmargintoassurethatwhensttc55cdunderopclaUng.maintenance.tc5L-inC,andpostulatedacddentconditions(1)theboundarybehaveslnanonbrfttiemannersnd(2)U1cytobabOIL7offapidlypropagatingftsctutcisminI111IzccLThcdesignshaBreflectconsiderationofservicetemPeraturesandotherconditionsoftheboundarymatetMunderoperaUnc,mainte-nance,testing,andpostulatedacddentcon-ditionsandtheuncertaintiesIndetermining(I)1nstctialptopcttics,(2)UlccffcctsofIt~,radlaUononmaterialproperties.(2)residu-al,steadystateandCranslentstresses,and(4)SIseofQawLCrffet(oa32-laspccffoaqfreacforcoo(-Oatyrcsssreboesdary.ComponentswhkharepartofthereactorcoolantpressureboundaryshaBbedcslgncdCopermit(1)54610CFRCh.1(11~Ed.II)periodicInspectionandtesUngofImportantateassndfcaLutestoassesstheirstructuralandleaktightIntegrity,and(2)anSpytoprI.atematerialsutveOlanceprogramforthereactorprcssutcvesseLCrffcrfos33-Rcacforcoo(Oaftsakcup,hsystemtoSUPPlyreactorcoolantmakeupforprotectionagainsCsmallbreaksInthereactorcoolantpressureboundaryshallbeprovidecLThesystemsafetyfuncUonshallbetoassurethatspecifiedacceptablefueldesignOmitsarenoLexceededasaresultofreactorcoolantlossduetoleakagefromthereactorcoolantpressureboundaryandrup-tureofsmaUpipingorothersmaUcompo.ncntswhichatcpartoftheboundary.Thesystemshallbedesignedtoassurethatfotonslteelectrkpowersystemoperation(as-sumingoffslicpowerlstloCsvsOsblc)sndforoffslteelectricPowersystemopetatlon(assumingonsltepowerIsnotavaOable)LhesystemsafetyfuncUoncanbeaccomplishedU5lngU1cplyingipumps,sndvsivc5115cdtomaintaincoolantInventoryduringnorma)reactoroperation.Crffcr(os34-Rcsfdaalheafmnooaf.hsystemCotcmoveresidualheatshaBbepro.videcLThesystemsafetyfunctionSMlbctotransferfhsionproductdecayheatandothertesldualheatfromthereactotcoreatarateaudithatspedfledacceptablefueldesignOmitsandthedesignconditionsofthereactorcoolantptcmuteboundaryarenotexceedecLSuitableredundancyIncomponentsandfeatures,andsuitableIntetconnecUons,leakdetecUon.andISOISUoncayabOltlesshaBbeprovidedtoassureChatforonslteelectricpowersystemoperaUon(assumingoffsltepower15noLsvsOablc)andfoFoffslicclcctricpowersystemoperaUon(amumlngonsltepowerlsnotavaOable)thesystemsafetyfuncUoncanbeaccompUshccLassum-IngasinglefaOure.Crffer(oa39-Esccrpescycorecooifsp.hsystemtoprovideabundantemercencycorecooOngshaBbeptovideLThesystemsafetyfunctionshallbeCotransferheatfromthereactorcorefoUowinganylossofreactorcoolantatiratesuchthat(1)fuelandcladdamagethaLcouldInterferewithcontfriuedeffectivecoteceoUng15preventedand(2)dsdmeta)-waterrcactkaIshltedLonegU-glbleamounts.Suitabletcdundaneylncomponentsandfeatures.andsuitableInterconnections.leakdetection.ISOISUon.andcontainmenteapa-bOitlesshallbeprovidedtoassurethatforonsiicelectrkpowersystemoperation(as~sumingoffsltepowerhnotavaOable)andforoffslteelectricpowersystemoperaUon(assUnllngon5ltcpowct!5notavaOablc)ChcsystemsafeLyfuncUoncanbeaccompUshed.assursfngasingkfaOure.Crffcrfoa3g-fsspccffosOfesacrpescycorecooffspsysfcts.TheemergencycotegudcotRegulat1s~gUngsystemshappropriatepctlotantcomponents.~totptcssUfcvdes.Sndpiping.tCpabOItyofthe5-Ct(ktios3t-2'spsys(cpsT~Lcmshallbcdc.Stcperiodicprem'Losmutc(I)thc5'Legtityofitscolnl1andperformance.Ofthesystem,ansystemas~whol;dosetodesignas.Of,U1cfUllopera>thi.systeminto~UonofappUca'ILionsystem,th>>indemergencyp;ationofthe~.",.Cr(kt(os39-(,hsystemtorett.containmentshs-'afetyfunctionconststentwith1sodatedsystems'andtemperature;intacddentaniablylowlevels..':1Sultableredu.'features,andsuI'detection,IsolatibQltlesshaBbec.iinslteelectricI,sumlngoffslte.foroffsiteelect~(assumingonsit.SystemMetyf1assumingasing~Crifcr(oa39-'eatrc1sooaf5)removalsystemi~ayproprlatcpetantcomponen'.spray'nozzles,c'.tegrltyandcapCr(ter(oagp-tcmooafsysfnrmovalsystem~yproprlatepe~1testingto~leaktlghtInte>theoperabOlt~ctlvecompontheoperablUt:andunderconaspracticaltoperationalsaIntooperationcableportionstransferbetwpowersourcessodatedcooUrCt(tv{osckasup.Syst
~p~>
)1-l-88Edition)aineofbnportanLsstheirstructura)4(2)anappropri-programfortheoolanlmakcu)LAcoolantmakeupsallbreaksIntheboundaryshallbeetyfunctionshaDacceptablefuelcdedasaresultof>leakagefromthe,boundaryandcup.thersmaDcompo.heboundary.Thetoassurethatforwmoperation(as-notavailable)andsystemoperation:noLavailable)the,nbeaccomplhhedandvalvesusedto)ryduringnormal'ealremoval.AIheatshallbeyro-~functionshaDbeetdecayheatandthereactorcoreatcdacceptablefueleslgnconditionsofsureboundaryarennantsandarcs.ectlons,leak.mpabIDUesshaDbeforonslteelectric>(assumineoffsiteendforoffslCeelec-eraUon(assumingst)able)thesystemxompllshed.assum-icycorecoo(lap.AantemergencycoreLThesystemsafetyssferheatfromthe~nyIosso!reactorsat(l)fuelandcladferewithcontinuedrpreventedand(2)nhlimitedtoncgll-tncomponentsand.terconnectlons,leakIcontabunentcapa-dLoassurethaLfotistemoperation(as-snotavailable)andersystemoperationhnotavailable)thecanbeaccomplished..((onofcmcrpencytheemergencycore4lgNuciaarRegulatoryCommissioncoolingsystemshallbedesignedtopermitappropr(atePeriodicInspecUonoftantcomponent@,suchassprayringsInthereactorpressurevessel,waterIniectlonnas-zles.andpiping.toassuretheIntegrityandcapabilityofthesystem.Cr((cr(on2F-Tcrtfnpofemerpencycorecool(opsystem.TheemergencycorecoollnesystemshaDbedesignedtopermitapproprl-ateperiodicPressureandfuncUonaltestingtoassure(l)thestructuralandleaktightIn-tegrityofitscomponents.(2)theoperabllltyandperformanceoftheactivecomponentsofthesystem.and(3)theoperabllltyofthesystemasawholeand.undercondfUonsasdosetodesbcnaspractical,theperformanceofthefuDoperationalsequencethatbringsthesystemIntooperation.Includingoper.ationofapplicableportionsoftheyrotec-Uonsystem.LhetransferbeCweennormalandemergencypowersources,andtheoper-ationoftheasscclatedcoolingwatersystem.Cry(sr(on4d-Con(a(nmcn(healremoval.AsysLemtoremoveheatfromthereactorcontainmentshallbeprov(ded.Thcsystemsafetylunctlonshallbetoreducerapidly.conshtentwiththelunctlonlneofotheras.sodatedsystems.thecontalrunentpressureandtemyeraLurefollowingan)rl~fwool.antacddentandmaintainthematacceptablylowleveh.Suitableredundancylncomponentsandfeatures.andsuitableInterconnections.leakdetection.Isolation.andcontainmentcaya-bllltlesshallbeyrovidedtoassurethaCforonsiteelectricPowersystemoperaUon(as-sumingof!sitepowerhnotavailable)indforof!siteelectr@powersystemoperation(assumingonsltepowerIsnotavailable)thesystemsafetyfunctioncanbeaccomplhhed,assumingaslnelc!allure.Crffcr(on39-fnspcc((oaqfconte(amen(heatremeltsystem.ThecontainmentheatremoralsystemshaDbedesignedtapermit~ppiopr(ateperiodicInspectionofImportantcomponents.suchasthetorus,sumps,spraynuules.andplplnetaassurethein-.tegrityandcapabilityofthesystem.Cr((cr(oa40-Tcsflnpo/con(a(nmca(healremovalsys(cm.Thecontainmentheatre-movalsystemshallbedesignedtopermitapprayrhCcperlodlcpressureandfunction-sltestingtoassure(l)thestrucLuralandleaktlghtIntegrityofItscomponents.(2)theoperabilityandpecformanceoftheactivecomponentsofChesystem.and(3).theoperabllltyofthesystemasawhole.andunderconditionsascloseLothedesign~spracticaltheperformanceo!ChefulloperationalsequencethatbringsCh'esystemIntooperatio'n.IndudlngoperaUonofappli-cableportionsoftheprotectionsystem.thetransferbeLweennormalandemergencypowersources.andthe.operationoftheas,:'odatedcooDn'gwatersystem.CH(erfonef-Con(a(nmcala(mosphcredeans~Systemstocontrolfhsionprod-Part50,AppAuctshydrogenoxygenandothersub-stanceswhichmaybereleasedintothereac-torcontainmentshaDbeprovidedasneces-sarytoreduce.conshtentwiththefunctlon-Ingofotherassociatedsystems.theconcen-'trationandqualityo!fhsionproductsre-leasedtothcenvironmentfollowingpostu-latedaccidents,andtocontroltheconcen-trationofhydrogenoraxygenandothersubstancesInthecontainmentatmospherefollowlnepostulatedaccidentstoassurethatcontainmentlnteerILyhmaintained.EachsystemshaDhavesuitableredundan.cyIncomponentsandfeatures,andsuitableInterconnections.leakdetection,Isolation,andconLalnmenLcapabilitiestaassureChat(oronslteelectricpo~ersystemoperaUon(assumingof!sitepowerhnatavailable)andforof!sitedcctricyowersystemoperaLlon(assumtneonsltepowerhnotavailable)ILssafetyfunctioncanbeaccomplhhed.assum;Ingasingle!allure.Cr((er(oa42-laspcc((onofcon(a(nmca(a(morphcrecleanupsyslcms.Thecontaln-mentatmospherecleanupsystemsshaDbedesignedtopermitapprapHateyeriodh'In-spectlonofbnyortantcomponents.suchasfilterfcames.ducts,andpipingCoassuretheIntegrityandcapablDtyo!thesystema,Cr(ter(on43-Tcstfnpofconfafnmenta!-maryheredeanupsysfemaThecontainmentatmospheredeanupsystemsshaDbede-signedtopermitappropriateperiodicpres.sureandfunctionaltestingtoassure(1)thestructuralandleakUghtlntegrlLyolItscom-ponents.(2)theoperabilityandperfonn-anceofthe'ctlrecomponentsofthesys-temssuchasfans.filters,dampecs.pumps.~ndralvesand(3)theoperabOItyofthesys-temsasawholeand.undercondIUonsasclosetodesignaspracUca).theperfonnanceofthefulloperationalsequencethatbringsthesystemsIntaoperation.IndudlngoperationofapplicableyorUonsaftheyroteo.tlonsystem.thetransferbetweennormalandemergencypowersources.andtheoper-ationofassodatedsystems.Cr(fer(oa4S-Cool(nproofer.Asystemtotransferheatfromstructures,systems,andcomponentsbnportanttasafety,toanulti-mateheaCsinkshaDbeprovided.ThesystemsafetyfunctionshaDbetatransfer\hecombinedheaLloadofthesestcuctures.systems.andcomponentsundernormalop-eratingandacddentconditiona,Suitableredundancylncomponentsandfeatures.andsuitableInterconnecUons.leakdetection.andholatloncapabilitiesshallbeprovidedtaassurethatforonslteelectricpowersystemoperation(assumingoffsitepowerhnot'available)andforof!siteelec.tricpowersystemoyeraUon(assumingonsltepowerhnotavaDable)thesystemsafety!uncUoncanbeaccomplhhed.assum-Ingasingle!allure.
\
LIHITINGCONDITIONFOROPERATIOHSURVEILLANCEAE(UIAEHLHT~A3.1.8IIIQIPRESSURECOOLANTIJECTIOHAicabiit;Appliestotheoperationalstatusofthehighpressurecoolantinjectionsyst~a.;O~bectiva:Toassurethecapabilityofthehighpressurecoolantinjectionsystemtocoolreactorfuelintheeventofa1oss-of-coolantaccident.~liii)ggxf~~~e1a.Ouringthepoweroperatingcon-ditionwheneverthereactorcoolantpressureisgreaterthan110psigandthereactorcoolanttemperaturegreaterthansaturationtemperature,thehighpressurecoolantinjectionsystemshallbeoperableexceptasspecifiedinSpecification"b"below.b.Ifaredundantcomponentofthehighpressurecoolantinjectionsystembecomesinoperablethehighpressurecoolantinjectionshallbeconsideredoperableprovl~ledthatthecomponentisreturnedtoanoperableco>>ditionwltl>>n15daysandtheadditionalsur-vei1lancerequiredIsperformed.4.1.8lllGIIPAESSUAECOOLANTINJECTIONA~ilAppliestotheperiodictesti>>grequire>>iuntsforthehighpressurecoola>>ti>>juctiu>>systume~0bective:Toverifytheoperabilityofthehighpressurecoolantinjectionsystem.~Sec(fication:Thehighpressurecoolantinjectionsur-veillanceshallbeperformedasindicatedbelow:a.At1eastEnny1'.-ae~aBIIQ".-cycie=.g~Ail~<AA)AAAe~~)LMAutomaticstart-upofthehii)hpressurecoolantinjectio>>systemshallbudemon-strated.A.APumpoperabilityshallbodutermI>>ud.71 JIJ' S~UAfJLAt{C~f(}lJJJEML'N'Ic.lfSpecification"a"and"b"arenotmet,anormalorderlyshutdownshallbeinitiatedM>thinonehourandreactorcoolantpressureandtemp-eratureshallbereducedtolessthan110psigandsaturationtemperaturewithin24hours.c.SurveillancewithI~noarableCo>>>l>>>auntWhenacomponentbecomesl>>operabioitsredundantcompo>>antshallbudeulonstrdtudtobeoperablei>>mediatelyanddailjthereafter.
XJ~7 BASESFOR3.1.8AKD4.).8HTGH'PRESSURECOOLAKTIKJB.i)OKIHighPressureCoolantIn5ectionSystem(HPCl)isprovidedtoqnsureadequatecorecoolingintheunlike)yeventofa))reactorcoolant))hebreak.TheHPClSystem.isrequired.forlinebreakswhichexceedthecapabilityofthentrolRodDrivepumpsandwhicharenotlargeenoughtoallo~'fast'enoughdepressurizationforcorespraytobefective.esetofhighpressurecoolantin)ectionpumpsconsistsofacondensatepump,afeedwaterboosterpumpandamotorivenfeedwaterpump.Onesetofpumpsiscapableofdeliver)ng3,000gpmtothereactorvesselatreactoressure.TheperformancecapabilityofHPCIaloneandincon]unctionwithothersystemstoprovideadequatecore~olingforaspectrumoflinebreaksisdiscussedintheFifthSupplementoftheFSAR.ideterminingtheoperabilityofth~HPClSystem,therequiredperformancecapabilityofvariouscomponentsshallbe>ns)dered.~TheHPClSystemshal'lbecapableofmeetingitspumpheadversusflowcurve.Themotordrivenfeedwaterpumpshallbecapableofautomaticinitiationuponreceiptofeitheranautomaticturbinetripsignalorreactor)ow-water-)eve)signal..~TheCondenserhotwe)l~eve)shallnotbelessthan57inches(75,000gallons).e~)'heCondensatestoragetanksinventoryshallnotbelessthan105,000gallons.-Themotor-drivenfeedwaterpumpwillautomatlcal)ytripifreactorhigh~aterleve)issustainedfortensecondsandtheassociatedpumpdownstreamflowcontrolvalveand)owf)owcontrolvalvearenotclosed.ir)ngreactorstart-up,operationandshutdown,thecondensateandfeedwaterboosterpumpsareinoperation.At.actorpressuresupto450psig,thesepumpsarecapableofsupplyingtherequired3,800gpm.Above450pslga)tor-dr)yen-feedwaterpumpisnecessarytuprovidetherequiredf)owrate.secapabilityofthecondensate,feedwa'oosterandmotordrivenfeedwaterpumpswillbedemonstratedbytheirterat)onaspartofthefeedwatersupplyduringnormalstationoperation.Stand-bypumpswillbep)acedinservicetleastquarterlytosupplyfeedwaterduringstationoperation.Anautomaticsysteminitiationtestwil)beerformedatleastonceperoperatingcycle.Thiswl)linvolveautomaticstartingofthemotordrivenfeedwaterpumps~dflowtothereactorvessel.RevisedOctober1,190673 IJl l~)))yI.HIGH-PRESSURECOOLANTINJECTION1.0DesinBasesThehigh-pressurecoolantinjection(HPCI)systemisanoperating'odeofthefeedwatersystemavailableintheeventofasmallreactorcoolantlinebreakwhiche'xceedsthecapabilityofthecontrolroddrivepumps(0.003ft2).HPCIalongwithoneemergencycoolingsystemhasthecapabilityofkeepingtheswollenreactorcoolantlevelabovethetopofactivefuelforsmallreactorcoolantboundarybreaksupto0.07ft2foratleast1000seconds.TheHPCIsystemwithoneofthetwoemergencycoolingsystemsandtwocorespraysystems,willprovidecorecoolingforthecompletespectrumofbreaksizesuptothemaximumdesignbasisrecirculationdischargelinebreak(5.446ft2).Itsprimarypurposeisto:a.provideadequatecoolingofthereactorcoreunderabnormalandaccidentconditions.Rev.72.0b.removetheheatfromradioactivedecayandresidualheatfromthereactorcoreatsucharatethatfuelcladmeltingwouldbeprevented.c.provide,forcontinuityofcorecoolingoverthecompleterangeofpostulated"breaksizesintheprimarysystemprocessbarrier.HPCIisnotanengineeredsafeguardssystemandisnotconsideredinanyLossofCoolantAccidentAnalyses.Itisdiscussedinthissectionbecauseofitscapabilitytoprovidemakeupwateratreactoroper'atingpressure.~t.tTheHPCIsystemutilizesthetwocondensatestoragetanks,.themaincondenserhotwell,twocondensatepumps,condensatedemineralizers,twofeedwaterboosterpumps,feedwaterheaters,twomotor-drivenfeedwaterpumps,anintegratedcontrolsystemandallassociatedpipingandvalves.Thesystemiscapableofdelivering7600gpmintothereactorvesselatreactorpressurewhenusingtwotrainsoffeedwaterpumps.Thecondensateandfeedwaterboosterpumpsarecapableofsupplyingtherequired3,800gpmatapproximatelyreactorpressuresupto270psig.Above270psigamotor-drivenfeedwaterpumpisnecessarytoprovidetherequiredflowrate.Rev.7Rev.7Rev.7 F
VII-61aThefeedwatersystempumpshaverecirculationlineswithairoperatedflowcontrolvalvestopreventthepumpsfromoperatingagainstaclosedsystem.Intheeventoflossofairpressure,thesevalvesopenrecyclingpartoftheHPCIflowtothehotwell.HPCIflowwouldbereducedtoapproximately3,000gpmatareactorpressureof1,150psigand3,800gpmatareactorpressureof940psig.Condensateinventoryismaintainedatanavailableminimumvolumeof180,000gallons.Rev.7'.0OesinEvaluationDuringaloss-of-coolantaccidentwithinthedrywell,highdrywellpressureduetoalinebreakwillcauseareactorscram.Thisautomaticscramwillcauseaturbinetripafte-afive-seconddelay.Inordertopreventcladdingtemperaturesfromexceedingtheirmaximumlimitfortheentirespectrumofbreaks,the3800gpm<fromonetrainofHPCI/feedwaterpumps)wouldhavetobeavailableimmediately.Feedwaterflowwouldbeavailableforconsiderabletimefromtheshaft-drivenfeedwaterpump.Theshaft-drivenfeedwaterpumpshouldcoastdownawhiletheelectricmotor-drivencondensatepumpsandfeedwaterboosterpumpswouldcontinuetooperate.Thecoastdowntimetoreach3,800gpmdeliverytothecoreisapproximately3;2minutes(FigureVII-17),sinceboththecondensateandfeedwaterboosterpumpswillcontinuetooperateonoff-sitepower.Theturbinetripwillsignalthemotor-drivenfeedwaterpumptostart.Thesignalwillbesimultaneouswiththestartoftheshaftpumpcoastdown.Themotor-drivenfeedwaterpumpwillbeupto'peedandcapableofsupplying3,800gpminabouttenseconds.Asabackup,lowreactorwaterlevelwillalsosignalthemotor-drivenpumptostart.Theinitiati'onsignaltransferscontrolfromthenormalfeedwatertotheHPCIinstrumentationandcontrollerwhichhasbeencontinuouslytrackingthenormalfeedwatercontrolsignal.Thustherewillbeacontinuoussupplyoffeedwatertothereactor.TheHPCIsingleelementcontrolsystemwillattempttomaintainreactorvesselwaterlevelat65inchesor72inches(dependinguponwhichpump,11or12respectively,isinservice)withamaximumfeedwaterflowlimitof3800gpm.Rev.7 P't VII-62Asustainedhighreactorwaterlevelreactorprotectionsystemsignalcoincidentwithanopenfeedwaterflowcontrolvalvewillselectivelytriptheassociatedfeedwaterpump.Theclutchoftheshaft-drivenpumpwillalsobedisengagedimmediatelyuponhighreactorwaterlevel.Shouldthereactorwaterlevelreachthelo'wlevelscramsetpointthemotordrivenpumpthattrippedonhighreactorwaterlevelwi11restart.Hecessaryfeedwaterpumprecirculationisprovidedtoallowforcontinuedpumpoperationwiththeflowcontrolvalveclosed.Asfeedwaterispumpedoutofthecondenserhotwell,through'heselectedequipmentofthecondensateandfeedwatersystemsandintothereactor,thecondenserhotwe'lllevelwillfall.Sincecondensedsteamfromtheturbinenolongerreplenishesthecondenserhotwell,condensatewillbetransferredfromthecondensatestoragetankstothehotwellformakeup.Thefeedwatersystempumpsoperateon4160v.Hhentheplant.isinoperation,thepowerissuppliedfromthemaingeneratorthroughthestationservicetransformerwhenthegeneratorison-lineandconnectedtothegrid.Hhenthemaingeneratorisoff-line,thefeedwaterpumpsaresuppliedwithnormaloff-sitepowerfromthe115KVsystemthroughthereservetransformers.IfaHPCIinitiationsignalshould,occur,allHPCI/feedwatersystempumpswouldstartimmediatelywithtwofeedwaterpumptrainsavailableforHPCIinjectionusingthesingleelementfeedwatercontrolsystemforreactorvessellevelcontrol.Ifamajorpo~erdisturbanceweretooccurthatresultedinlossofthe115KVpowersupplytotheNineHilePoint115KVbus,powerwouldberestoredfromageneratorlocatedattheBennettsBridgeHydroStation.Thisgeneratorwouldhavethecapacityofsupplyingapproximately6,000KVAwhichissufficienttooperateonetrainofHPCI/feedwater.systempumps.IfHPCIinitiationweretooccur,thepreferredfeedwatertrainpumps(feedwaterpump12,feedwaterboosterpump13,condensatepump13)wouldstart.Thenon-preferredtrainpumps,wouldbelockedoutonlossofoff-sitepowerandnotstartuntiltheoperatormanuallyresetthelockout.Ifapreferredtrainpumphadbeenlockedoutpriortothelossofoff-sitepower,itwouldremainlockedoutandthenon-preferredtrainbackuppumpwouldautomaticallystartonHPCIinitiation.Ifboththepreferredandbackuppumpsarerunning,thepreferredpumpwouldremaininserviceandthebackuppumpwilltrip.TheRev.7 4A~tg VII-62auseofaBennettsBridgehydrogenerator,whilenotequivalenttoanon-siteemergencypowersource,providesahighlyreliablealternateoff-sitepowersupplyfortheHPCIfunctionofthefeedwatersystem.4.0TestsandInsectionsev7TestsandinspectionsofthevariouscomponentsaredescribedinSectionXI-SteamtoPowerConversion.
al~
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AIriAo 1If)pt~C~Mn)7)......F5'AR.Gait+,.~-...'R4~d'TS.Vglgle,a.v.~.~(~~a.~~.cv(ko)u~s(.~(~em.~~v-......FIP~MH:..~..~kJAC~VArnid&/p.AEk)hfcg~r~~-W Inyt'I MEMOFORYOURFILESOct27,1992TO:U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissonExecutiveDirectorforOperationsPublicDocumentRoomi7i7HStreetWashington,DC20555FROM:BenL.RidingsP.O.Boxii0iKingston,TN37763Ref:PetitionpursuantiOCFR2.206
 
==DearSirs:==
EnclosedforfilingPETITIONFOREMERGENCYENFORCEMENTACTIONANDREQUESTFORPUBLICHEARING.Respectfullysubmitted,BenL.RidingsCg
 
UNITEDSTATEDOFAMERICABEFORETHENUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONPETITIONFOREMERGENCYENFORCEMENTACTIONANDREQUESTFORPUBLICHEARINGI.INTRODUCTIONI,BENL.RIDINGS(hereinafter"Petitioner")herebypetitiontheCommissionersoftheNuclearRegulatoryCommission("NRC"or"Commission")foremergencyenforcementactionagainstNiagraMohawk'sNineMile(UnitOne)Nuclearpowerplant,whichisoperatinginviolationofboththeNRCandFederalrequirementsforavailabilityofEmergencyCoreCooling(ECCS)highpressurecoreinjection.AsanECCSsystem,theNineMileplantalsofailstoprovidethemandatoryemergencybackuppowertothehighpressurecoreinjection(HPCI)system.OverthetwentyyearstheNineMileOneplanthasbeenallowedtooperate,nosafetyrelatedpumpshaveeverbeenavailabletoinjectwaterintothevesselatreactorpressure.Atthesametimethisplantwasallowedtooperateatfullpower,therearemanypostulatedaccidentsassumedintheFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(thatarecapableofdrainingthereactorvessel)andspecificallyrelyontheECCSHPCIPumpstomaintainreactorwaterlevel.Thesepumpshaveneverbeeninstalledandthecurrentadministrativecontrolsallowedthisplanttooperateoutsidetheminimumfederalrequirement.Thisspecifictypeofplantoperationoutsidetheknownminimumfederalrequirementsgreatlyendangershealthandpropertyrisktothepublic.Asdiscussedindetailbelow,theresponsibleutility,itsQualityAssurancegroupandtheNRChaveroutinelyfailedintheirresponsibilitytoensuretheoperationofnuclearpowerplantswithinthelicenseagreementsEvenwhenproblemsareidentified,documentedandbroughttotheattentionoftheresponsibleparties,varioussafetyconcernsareroutinelydismissed,ignoredor
'f'f7 administrativelyeliminated.Evenissueswhichobviouslyendangerpublicsafetyhavebeenroutinelydismissed,notonlybytheutilitybutsuchactionsauthorizedandapprovedbytheindependentqualityassurancegroupsandbytheNRC.Anyandalloftheseorganizationshavetheauthoritytostoptheoperationofplantsoutsidetheminimumsafetyrequirements,andnotonehavecomeforwardtofulfillitsduty,andprotectthepublic.Instead,eachorganizationhasreviewedtheenclosedsafetyconcernsandcontrarytoanypracticaljustification,haveremainedsilentandallowedthismannerofplantoperationtotakeplacewiththeirapproval,givinqevidencethatthesegroupshavealsofailedtoremainindependentofeachother.Independentreviewbynotonlythegovernmentagencybutthequalityassurancereviewgroupsisthebasicpremisewhichallowedcongresstograntoperationofcommercialnuclearpowerplantswithlimitedliabilityfordamages.Thecurrentadministrativecontrolsusedtodayfailedtoensuretheplantoperatewithintheminimumfederalguidelines.ItisCongress'sdutytoprotectpublicsafetyanditscurrentadministrativecontrolshavefailed.BecausetheNineNilePointUnitOneReactorviolatesbothfederallawandtheCommissions'srequirementsforHIGHPRESSURECOREINJECTION,theCommissioncanmakenofindingthatthereisresonableassuranceofnounduerisktopublichealthandsafety.PetitionerthereforerequestthattheCommissionissueimmediatelyaneffectiveorderdirectingthelicenseetoceasepoweroperationandplacethereactorinacoldshutdowncondition.Theplantshouldnotbepermittedtocontinueorresumeoperationunlessanduntilsubsequenttestsandinspectionsareshowntoprovidetherequisitereasonableassuranceofnounduerisktopublichealthandsafety.Moreover,Petitionersseekapublichearingbeforetheplantisallowedtooperateagain.
 
II.DESCRIPTIONOFPETITIONERI,BenL.Ridings,amatechnicalconsultantforcommercialnuclearpowerplants.Overaspanofsomefifteenyears,whileworkingatsometwentyfoursites,Ihavespecializedinreviewingoflicensingagreement(FSAR,TechnicalSpecifications,FederalCodesandRegulations,ASMECodes,etc.),establishingadministrativecontrolstomeettheserequirementsandtestprogramstoensurecomplianceatalltimes.Mytestprogramsandadministrativecontrolsestablishedwhileundercontracttovariousutilitiesarestillinusetodayatmanyfacilities.III.THECOMMISSIONSHOULDEXERCISEITSSUPERVISORYJURISDICTIONOVERTHISPETITIONA.TheCommissionhasanInherentSupervisoryJurisdictionovertheSafetyofOperationoftheNiagraMohawkNineMilePlant.ThispetitionisbroughtbeforetheCommissionpursuanttotheauthoritygrantedtoitin42USC2233(d),2236(a),2237and10CFR2.204,2.206(c)(1),50.54,50.57,50.100and50.109.ItinvokestheinherentsupervisoryauthorityoftheCommissiontooverseeallaspectsoftheregulatoryandlicensingprocessandits"overridingresponsibilityforassuringpublichealthandsafetyintheoperationofnuclearpowerfacilities."ConsolidatedEdisonCoo.ofN.Y.Inc.(IndianPoint,Units1,2and3).CLI-75-8,2NRC173(1975).AstheCommissionhaspreviouslyobserved,itssupervisorypowersincludethepowertoorderimmediateshutdownofafacility"ifthepublichealthorsafetysorequires."PetitionforEmerencandRemedialAction,CLI-78-6,7NRC400,405(1978),citing5USC558(c),42USC2236(b),10CFR2.202(f),2.204.
"4iq(,)'
TheCommissionhasexerciseditsinherentauthorityonanumberofoccasions.Inadditiontotheceasescitedabove,seePetitionforResearchandDevelomentAdministration(ClinchRiverBreederReactorProject),CLI-76-i3,4NRC67,75-76(i976);ConsumersPowerCo.(NidlandUnitsiand2),CLI-73-38,6AECi084(i973);PublicServiceCo.ofNewH~amshire(SeabrookNuclearPoserStation,Units1and2),CLI-77-S,5NRC503,5i5-5i7(i977).B.ExerciseoftheCommissions'sIndependentJurisdictionisAppropriateinThisCase.NRCregulationsatiOCFR2.206providethatunderordinarycircumstances,enforcementpetitionsaretobelodgedwiththeNRCStaff,andthattheCommissionmaytakediscretionaryreviewofStaffdenialsofsuchpetitions.However,theCommissions'sreviewingpower"doesnotlimitinanyway"its"supervisorypoweroverdelegatedStaffactions",iOCFR2.206(c)(i)~ItisappropriateforthecommissiontoexerciseitssupervisorypowersandtakejurisdictioninthiscasebecausetheNRCStaffhasacquiescedtoNiagraMohawks'iolationsformorethantwoyears.InJani990,NiagraMohawkComplianceSupervisorwasgivenwrittennoticeofHPCIandotherinadequacieswhicheffectpublicsafety.Afternoapparentaction,theNineNileQualityFirstTeamwasalsogivennotice.PetitionerwaslaternotifiedbytheQualityFirstTeamthattheNRChadbeencontactedandmadeawareoftheproblemaswell.PetitionerwaslatercontactedbytheQualityFirstTeamandtoldthattheNRChadexemptedtheplantfromtheHPCIrequirementanditsneedforbackuppowerintheeventoflossofpower.PetitionerhasyettoheardirectlyfromtheNRConthismatter.
 
IV.GROUNDSFORENFORCEMENTACTIONA.FederalRequirementsforhavingradioactivefuelsons'iteInaccordancewith10CFR50.10,theutilityNiagraMohawkenteredintocontractualagreementwiththefederalgovernmentundertheprovisionsofpublicdocument50-220,onfilewiththefederalregister.Nowunderthejurisdictionof10CFR50,App.A(GeneralDesignCriteria),establishtheminimumrequirementsfortheprincipaldesignforwatercoolednuclearpowerplant.Criterion33and35(Attachment2)specifytheminimumneedthatasystemtoprovideabundantemergencycorecoolingshallbeprovided.Thesystemsafetyfunctionshallbetotransferheatfromthereactorcoreandmusthavesuitableredundancyincomponentsandonsiteelectricpowersystem(assumingoffsitepowerisnotavailable)whichwillenablethesafetyfunctiontobeaccomplished.Also(Criterion33),asystemtosupplyreactorcoolantmakeupforprotectionagainstsmallbreaksinthereactorcoolantpressureboundaryshallbeprovided.Criterion37providesthetestingrequirementsoftheemergencycorecoolingsystem.10CFR70detailstheutilityandNRCresponsibilityfortestingandinspectionofthesesystemsand10CFR50App.B(QualityAssuranceCriteria)detailstheQualityAssuranceProgramandtheadministrativerequirementsforInspections,TestControl,OperatingStatus,CorrectiveActionandRecords.B.AStudyofContractualAgreement(docket50-220)Inaccordancewith10CFR50.34,thetechnicalspecificationshallperformanevaluationofthesafetyeffectivenessofprovidingforseparationofhighpressurecoolantinjection(HPCI)andreactorcoreisolationcooling(RCIC).ThisinvestigationfoundtheNileMilePointTechnicalSpecificationincompliancewiththisrequirement.TechnicalSpecification4.1.8(Attachment3)givespositiveproofthattheECCS
 
requirementfortheHPCIsystemwasanticipatedbythedesigners.Secondly,thecorrespondingLimitingConditionforOperation(LCO)3.1.8.c(Attachment3)viewthissystemassocriticalthatif"theutilityfailstoverifyHPCIoperabilityitwilldemandanorderlyshutdownbeinitiatedwithinonehour.WhenonlyoneHPCIcomponentbecomesinoperableitsredundantcomponentshallbedemonstratedtobeoperableimmediatelyanddailythereafter(asopposedtomonthlydemonstration)."InaccordancewiththeBasesforTechnicalSpecification3.1.8,theHPCIsystemisprovidedtoensureadequatecorecoolingintheunlikelyeventofareactorcoolantlinebreak(alsoafederalrequirement-designcriterion33).TheHPCIsystemisrequiredforlinebreakswhichexceedthecapabilityoftheControlRodDrivepumpsandwhicharenotlargeenoughtoallowfastenoughdepressurizationforcorespraytobeeffective(corespray350psiasopposedtoHPCI2200psi)~InaccordancewiththeFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(FSAR),ChapterVII(Attachment4),theDesignBasesforHPCIisdiscussed.AlthoughseveralrevisionhavebeenimplementedbytheutilityinordertofabricatetheexistenceofaECCSsystemtosatisfytheHPCIfederalrequirement,itsprimarysafetyfunctionislisted;(1)provideadequatecoolingofthereactorcoreunderabnormalandaccident'onditions,(2)removetheheatfromradioactivedecayandresidualheatfromthereactorcoreatsucharatethatfuelcladmeltingwouldbeprevented,(3)provideforcontinuityofcorecoolingoverthecompleterangeofpostulatedbreaksizesintheprimarysystemprocessbarrier.Oncethesafetyfunctionsareunderstooditbecomesobviousastowhythissystemisaminimumrequirementofthefederalguidelines.
 
ThefollowingparagraphofFSARChapterVIIgivesthereaderanindicationofthelackofproperreviewthatexists.AtNineMilePoint,unlikeeveryothernuclearfacility,"HPCIisnotanengineeredsafeguardssystemandisnotconsideredinanyLossofCoolantAccidentAnalysis."AsstatedintheFSAR(inlaymanterms)thisfeedwatersystemdoesnotpretendtomeetthe10CFR50AppendixA(Criterion33,35,36,37)requirementsoftheminimumfederalrequirements.Infact,NineMilePointhasnosystemmeetingtheseminimumfederalrequirements.Next,reviewingtheDesignEvaluationportionofFSARChapterVII,(Attachment4)aparadoxoccursindesignphilosophy."Duringaloss-of-coolantaccidentwithinthedrywell,highdrywellpressureduetoalinebreakwillcauseareactorscram.Theautomaticscramwillcauseaturbinetripafterafive-seconddelay.Inordertoreventcladdinterneraturefromexceedintheirmaximumlimitfortheentirespectrumofbreaks,the3800gpm(fromonetrainoftheHPCIpumps)wouldhavetobeavailableObviously,theHPCIsystemisabsolutelynecessarytoensurecriticalheatflux(CHF)isnotexceeded.Withoutthecoolantwatertotransfertheheatfromthefueltothecoolant,thefuelrodwouldthenheatuprapidlyandfuelcladdingwouldtakeplaceandcauseapossiblemeltdownunlessthereactorwereshutdownquickly.Further,oncethecriticalheatfluxwasexceeded,thedeparturefromnucleateboilingratio(DNBR)wouldexceedits1.25limit.TheselimitsareTechnicalSpecificationrequirementsaswellbutitgivesanindicationoftheinterdependenceoftheECCSsystems.Tomakeastatementinalicensethat"HPCIhasnotbeenconsideredinanyLossofCoolantAccidentAnalyses"isaanotherindicationofthelackofprope:reviewthatexistsatNineMilePoint.Everysafetylimitassumed
 
attheNineMilePointplantisjeopardizedwithouttheassurancethatthefuelwillremaincoveredatalltimes.TheNRChasapprovedthenon-safetyrelatedfeedwatersystemasanappropriatesubstituteforanECCBHPCIfederalrequirement.Whatatfirstseemslikeaquibbleaboutasinglepumpisinactualityavalidargumentthateverybasesassumedbythislicenseisnullandvoid.AtNineMilePoint,standardbasicthermalreactordesignhasbeensignificantlyalteredinseveralECCSsystems.TherearenoHPCIorRCICsystemtotransferheatfromthereactorcore.Thereisnowayoftakingsteamawayfromthereactorandusingthisenergytodriveahighpressurepump.NormallytheHPCIpumpsreturnthecondensedsteam(water)backintothevesseltomaintainwaterlevel.AtNineMilePoint,thereisnoHPCIorRCICsystems.AtNineMilePoint,unlikenormalreactordesign,electricallydriven,non-qualityrelatedfeedwaterpumpsareconsidered.Thesenon-qualityrelatedfeedwaterpumpssupposedlyfulfilltheHPCIsafetyfunctionandyetdonotmeettheelectricalbackuprequirements.Itmustbenotedthatthesizeoftheseelectricalpumpsmakeitimpossibletohaveon-sitepoweravailableintheeventoflossofoff-sitepower.On-sitepoweravailabilityisassumedinthebasesoftheFSAR.Itisthereforeimpossibleforthisplanttofulfilltheminimumsafetyobligationasdictatedbyfederalstatuteoftheknownpostulatedaccidents.Thissamefeedwatersystem(beingnon-qualityrelated)waspurchasedasanon-qualityrelatedsystem.Inthissamesystem;pipingfvalves,instrumentation,wiring,electricalcomponentsandcontrolsystemswereallpurchasedandinstalledundernon-qualityrelatedcontractualprovisions.HPCIautomaticallyinitiatesonaLossCoolantAccident(LOCA)signalfromtheNSSSlogic.TheNBBSlogicperformstheECCBsafeguardfunctionsand
 
alwaysinstalledunderstrictcontractualmandates,whichincludetraining,qualityassurancereviews,certifiedskilledcraftsmen,etc.Secondly,thepipingsystem,welding,hangerrestraintsandmaintenanceconsiderationswereinstalledandmaintainedundernon-qualityrelatedprovisionsaswell~Again,ECCSsafeguardsystemsarepurchased,constructedandmaintainedundermuchstricterguidelines.Thefeedwatersystemwasneverdesigned,purchased,built,maintainednorcapableoffulfillingtheMPCIrequirementsofthefederalguidelines.AtNineNilePointtheHPCIsystemsimplydoesnotexistedTheadministrativecontrolswhichallowedacceptanceofsuchanon-qualityrelatedsystemtofulfillthismandatoryECCSfederalrequirementisnotacceptable.C.KnowledgeofExistingConcernsTheneedforanoperableECCSHPCISystemismandatoryasevidencedfromthegroundsforreliefinthisreport.AtNineNilePoint,theUtility,QualityAssurancepersonnelandtheNRCwerewellawareofthisrequirementsForwhateverreason,thisplantwaslicensedbytheNRCandallowedtooperatewithoutthismandatoryrequirementinstalled.Attemptsbythesesamepartiestosubstitutenon-qualityrelatedfeedwaterequipmenttofulfillthismandatorysafeguardfunctionsupportsthefacttheneedforrequirementwasunderstood.Evenifnon-qualityrelatedequipmentwasacceptabletosupportECCSfunctions(anditsnot),thereisnoonsiteelectricpowersystemthatwillsupportthesafetyfunctionofafeedwater/HPCIsystem.Thiselectricsystemisanothermandatoryminimumrequirement(Attachment2-Criterion35)~Toprovethecollaborationbetweenallpartiesmentioned,thelicenseeattemptstotakecreditforonsitepoweravailabilityfromtheBentonDam,some100milesaway.Obviouslythereviewersareawareofthesemandatoryrequirementsbutthere
 
0resolutiontothesafetyconcernsisnotacceptable.ThepossibilityofatornadodestroyingtheswitchyardisaknownpostulatedaccidentthatcanoccursWithoutthispoweravailability,theHPCIfunctioncannotpossiblybeassumed,asstatedintheFSARChapterVII(Attachment4)~Everytimethefeedwaterprocedureswererevisedthisissuewouldhavetobereviewed.EverytimetheFSAR(ChapterVII)wasrevised,theTechnicalSpecificationsrevisedorcontainmentintegritywasquestionedthisissuehadtobereviewedinaccordancewithadministrativerequirementssetoutbythefederalguidelines.EverytimetheQualityAssurancegroupsandNRCperformedtheirindependentauditsandinspectionsthisissuehadtobereviewed.Everytimethisplantwasoperatedatmodesior2,theresponsibleSeniorReactorOperator(SRO),whoisspecificallytrained(10CFR50AppE)ontheseissueswouldhavetoquestionthevalidityofthecurrentHPCIsystem.EverytimetheHPCIsurveillance(monthly)wasperformedtoensureoperability,theresponsibleSROwouldhavetoquestionthevalidityofanonqualityrelatedfeedwatersystemfulfillingtheHPCIsystem.Takingcreditfornon-qualityrelatedequipmenttofulfilltherequirementsofaECCSsafetyfunctionisnotacceptableanditwouldbetheSRO'sresponsibilitytoquestionthefeedwaterabilitytoperformthisHPCIsafetyfunction.Ofcourse,thatistheanotherproblemtoconsider,itwouldbetheSRO'sjob.Althoughpreviouslyawareoftheproblem,onJan18,1990,theUtilitywasservednoticeoftheseandothersafetyconcern.Ifthenon-qualityrelatedfeedwatersystemwastosupposedlyfulfilltheHPCIsafetyfunction,itfailedtomettheonsiteelectricalrequirementsandmanyof
 
themainflowpathvalveshadneverbeenincludedintheInserviceTestProgram(iOCFR50.55)~Some44outof47valveswerecurrentlynotidentifiedintheInserviceTestProgram(ECCSSurveillanceviolation).Withsuchknowledge,theUtility,QualityAssurancegroupandtheNRCallowedtheplanttostartupandcontinueintofulloperating(modei)condition.Nopumps,novalvesyetTechnicalSpecification4.i.8(Attachment3)demandsifonevalveisnotdemonstratedoperableadailysurveillanceisrequiredtobeperformed.Thisisjustanotherlackofadministrativecontrolinwhichthereviewgroupshavefailedtoauditorreviewproperly.Unfortunately,thisdilemmaisnotuniquetoNineNilePoint.OtherplantswerealsosomehowlicensedwithoutthismandatoryHPCIcapability.Thatisanotherindicatorofthetypeofreviewthathastakenplaceatotherfacilitiesaswellbuteventuallytheseplantsinstalledthemandatorysystem.Themoststunningfactofthisinvestigationshowsthatafterliterallythousandsoftechnicalreviewsperformedbyhundredsof"qualifiedpersonnel"workingindifferentshifts,separatedepartments,sitesorregions,haveallfailedtostopthisfacilityfromoperatingoutsidetheminimumfederalguidelines.Everymonthduringfullpoweroperation,theHPCIsystemisverifiedoperablebya"qualified"SeniorReactorOperatorandaswornaffidavitsubmittedeachmonthbytheUtilitytotheNRCattestingthatallrequirementshavebeenfulfilled.Obviously,thecurrentsystemofchecksandbalancescannotstopthisplantfromoperatingoutsidethesemandatoryfederalguidelines,anassumptionfalselymadebycongress.
 
D.Responsibilities10CFR50App.BdetailstheadministrativerequirementsforTestControl,Inspections,OperatingStatus,CorrectiveAction,RecordsandindependentAudits.TheserequirementsareaddressedinboththeTechnicalSpecificationsandFSAR.Sitespecificadministrativeproceduresdetailutilityandqualityassurancestaffpositionresponsibilities.10CFR50.70detailtheNRCinspectionswhile10CFR50.72detailreportnotificationresponsibilitiesforallparties.TheNRChavetheirownadministrativeprocedureswhichdetailstaffresponsibilities.NUREG-0800detailstheUBNRCstandardreviewplanforinservicetestingofpumpsandvalves.AllpartiesmentionedwererequiredtohaveknowledgeoftheHPCIrequirementsatthelevelofreviewforwhicheachindividualwasinvolved.Thesereviewsrequiremandatoryaction.Despiteallmentionedreviewsthisrequirementwasnotmet.OnJan18,1990theNiagraNohawk,NineNilePointNuclearRegulatoryComplianceGroupwereservednoticeofthisandmanyotherknownsafetyconcerns.OnJuly31,1990theNiagraMohawkQualityFirstTeamwereservedwrittennotice.TheNRCwasnotifiedandonandtheQualityFirstTeamnotifiedpetitionerthattheNRCexemptedtheutilityfromtherequirement.V.BTATENENTOFTHELAWi.ThereisaminimumrequirementforaHighPressureCoreInjectionECCSSafeguardSystemattheNineNilePointUnitOnefacility.Thisrequirementcomesfromthefederalguidelines,TechnicalSpecificationsandFSARminimummandates.2.NoHighPressureCoreInjectionSystemmeetingthesafeguardfederalguidelinesexistsatNineNilePoint,UnitOne.-12-IA,yA<<-n>mwq1='I 3.Ifthenon-qualityrelatedfeedwatersystemwastosupposedlyfulfilltheHPCIsafetyfunction,itfailedtomettheonsiteelectricalrequirementsandmanyofthemainflowpathvalveshadneverbeenincludedintheInserviceTestProgram.4.IftheHPCISystemisnotasafeguardsystemandisnotconsideredinanyLossofCoolantAccidentAnalysesasstatedintheFSARChapterVII,thennoassumptioncanbemadethatthefuelwillremaincoveredbythemoderatorandrelatedsafetylimitssetinthecurrentlicensearenullandvoid.Obviouslyunreviewedsafetyquestionsexist.5.Congressmadeanassumptionofthecurrentchecksandbalancesthatwouldneverallowaplanttooperateoutsidetheminimumsafetyrequirementssetoutinfederalguidelines.Onthisassumption,unlikeanyotherindustry,thenuclearindustryhasbeenallowedtooperateunderlimitedliability.Theutility,QualityAssuranceGroups,NRCandChiefExecutiveOfficerhavereceivedwrittennoticeoftheirfailuretocomplywiththeminimumfederalguidelinesandhaveadministrativelyfailedtocomplywiththisissue.Asdiscussedabove,theNineMileUnitOnePlantfailstocomplywithboththeminimumfederalandNRC'requirementsforHPCIECCSSystem.ThishasbeenacknowledgedbytheNRCStaffandisdemonstratedunequivocallybytheevidenceinthepublicrecord.Moreover,theStaffhasperformednovalidanalysisthatmeetstheCommission'snarrowcriteriaforcontinuingtooperateintheabsenceofcompliance.CompliancewithbothFederalandNRCsafetyregulationsisaprerequisitetosafeoperationofanuclearpowerplant.Infact,astheNRC'sAppealBoardhasobserved,regulatory
 
andsafety."NaineYankeeAtomicPowerComanALAB-161,6AEC1003,1009(19?3).Compliancemaynotbeavoidedbyarguingthat,althoughanapplicableregulationisnotme,thepublichealthandsafetywillstillbeprotected.For,oncearegulationisadopted,thestandardsitembodiesrepresenttheCommission'sdefinitionofwhatisrequiredtoprotectthepublichealthandsafety.VermontYankeeNuclearPowerCor.ALAB-138,6AEC520,528(1973)(emphasisadded).TheCommission'sessentialsafetystandardsmustbemet,withoutregardtothecostorinconvenienceofachievingcompliance.10CFR50.109SeealsoUnionofConcernedScientistsvNRC,824F.2d108(DCCir1987)~VI.REQUESTFORRELIEFForthereasonsenumeratedabove,petitionerstatesthatthefollowingreliefisrequired:A.ImmediateShutdownPendingDemonstrationofRegulatoryCompliance.Asdiscussedabove,theNineNilePointnuclearplantfailstocomplywithanarrayoffundamentalrequirementsforHPCIECCSmandatoryrequirements.Noexemptionstothisrequirementcanpossiblybejustifiedwithoutundueriskstopublicsafety.ConsistentwiththerequirementsoftheAtomicEnergyAct,FederalmandatoryrequirementsandNRCregulations,PetitionerthereforeseeksimmediateshutdownoftheNineNilePointunitonereactorpendingfullcompliancewiththeregulations.Inseekingthisrelief,PetitionernotesthatmaintainingECCSsystemsnecessarytometigatelossofcoolantaccidentsisaregulatorygoalthatwarrantsthemostimmediateandstrinqentenforcementaction.NineNilePoint'snoncompliancewiththefederalminimumdesigncriteriaandthe"coverup"activitiesofallresponsiblepartieswhichposesasafetyrisk I
ofcommensurate,ifnotgraver,dimensionthanthesuspicionofECCSpipecrackingthatcausedthecommissiontoorder23plantshutdownsin1975.SeePetitionforEmerencandremedialAction,CLI-78-6,7NRC400,405(1978).LiketheECCSpipecracking,thisplantdoesn'tevenhavethepipes,valvesorpumpsnecessarytometigateaknownpostulatedaccidentthateffectsknownsafetylimitsoftheFSAR.Thissystemisnecessaryforthecoolingofthecoreduringanaccidentandthissystem(whichdoesnotexist)istheonlymeanstopreventameltdown.Again,unlikenormalECCSsystemswhichhaveredundantcomponentsandcanthereforewithstandasinglefailure,thissystemdoesnotexistandcannotbecompensatedforbyanyothersystem.Simplyput,asmallbreakdescribedintheFSARbasesasapostulatedaccidentwillinalllikelihoodmeltdownthereactorforlackofcooling.Becausethecontainmentisnotdesignedtowithstandameltdown,suchaneventwouldprobablyleadtoanuncontainedreleaseofradioactivitytothepublicenvironment.Thisutilityisnotinsuredforsuchanaccident.B.PublicHearingTheissuesraisedbytheNineMilePoint'snoncompliancewithfederalrequirementsraisesgravesafetyquestionsoftremendouspublicimportance.PetitionerthereforerequestthatbeforeallowingtheNineMilePointplanttocontinueoperating,theCommissionprovideforpublichearing,withrightsofdiscoveryandcrossexamination,todeterminewhetherNineMilePointisinfullcompliancewithallfederalminimumrequirementsrevelanttoHPCIandpublicsafety.Secondly,congressbenotifiedthattheadministrativecontrolsreliedupontograntthenuclearindustrytheimmunityofliabilityhavefailedtoensurepublicsafety.Afterliterallythousandsofreviewsby"qualified mz personnel"fromdifferentdisciplines,departments,sitesandregionscompletedtheirreview,notonecameforwardanddemandthisplantoperatewithinthelawaslaidoutbyactofcongress.Shouldnoncompliancebefound,manyofthesereviewsdemandmandatoryactiononthepartofthereviewer.ThepetitionerhasnotifiedallresponsiblepartiesandaftertwoyearsNineMilePointUnitOnecontinuestooperateoutsidethefederalguidelinesatatremendousrisktopublicsafety.Acongressionalinvestigationofthismatterbeinitiatedimmediately.Thepetitioner'sserviceswerecontractedbyNiagraMohawktoreviewandensureadministrativecompliancetoTechnicalSpecificationpriortoStart-Up.Aqualifiedgroupoftenbeganalaboriousreviewandwhenenormousproblemsbegantoimmerge.Thisgroupwasdisbandedimmediately.InJanl990,theNiagraMohawk'sNuclearRegulatoryComplianceStaffwasgivenadetailedmemo(Attachment5)givingevidencethat45/ofthecontainmentisolationvalveshadadministrativedeficiencies.Twoweekslaterthereviewgroupwasdisbandedpriortocompletionoftheirreview.AlongwithHPCIconcerns,containmentisolationvalvesasfoundintheFSARTableVI-3haddeficiencieswithcorrespondingTechnicalSpecificationTables3.3.48<3.2.7.Thisplanthadoperatedfortwentyyearsandyetthelicensefailedtoevencorrespondtoitself,letaloneactualplantconditions.Thesevalvesarerequiredbyfederalguidelinestoprotectthepublicyetalmosthalfhaddeficiencies.Petitionerallegesthatwhenconcernsareidentified,theconcernsareroutinely"coveredup",dismissedoradministrativelyexempted.AproperreviewoftheNineMilePointUnitOneTechnicalSpecification4.0.5requirementsandthecomlianceofthe
 
testprogramswillshowthattheutilitysimplyhiredanotherreviewgroupthat(forwhateverreason)failedtodocumentthedeficienciesthattrulyexist.NineNilePointUnitOneresumedfullpoweroperationsevenafterthesafetyconcernswereidentifiedanddocumented.Thistypeofcoverupisnotuniquetothisplantandacongressionalinvestigationofthismatterbeinitiatedimmediately.INSUGARYTherecanbenojustificationfortheoperationofnuclearpowerplantsoutsidetheminimumrequirementsspecifiedbyactofcongress.Thesearetheminimumrequirementsdeemednecessarybyactofcongresstogranttheimmunityofliabilitycurrentlyassumedbytheutility.Whenpublicsafetyisjeopardizedbyknownpostulatedaccidents,therecanbenojustificationforthelackofactionbytheresponsiblepartiesinthisinstance.Simplyput,thisutilityisnotinsuredtooperateinthismanner.Respectfullysubmitted,BenL.RidingsP.O.Boxii01Kingston,TN37763 4C<t~A<"''llL.1>a-t BIBLIOGRAPHY1.NODERNPOWERPLANTENGINEERING,Weisman5Eckart,1985Prentice-HallInc.2.10CFR50.10,"RequirementofLicense."3.10CFR50.46,"Acceptancecriteriaforemergencycorecoolingsystemsforlightwaternuclearpowerreactors."4.10CFRS0.55a,"CodesandStandards."5.10CFR50.59,"Changes,testsandexperiments."6.10CFR50.70,"Inspection,Records,Reports,Notifications."7.10CFR50,AppendixA,GeneralDesignCriterion33,"Reactorcoolantmakeup."8~10CFR50,AppendixA,GeneralDesignCriterion35,"Emergencycorecooing."9.10CFR50,AppendixA,GeneralDesignCriterion36,"Inspectionofemergencycorecooingsystem."10.10CFR50,AppendixA,GeneralDesignCriterion37,"TestingofEmerqencyCoreCoolingsystems."11.10CFRSO,AppendixB,II'QualityAssuranceProgram"12.10CFR50,AppendixB,III."DesignControl."13.10CFR50,AppendixB,VI."DocumentControl,"14.10CFR50,AppendixB,X."Inspections."15.10CFR50,AppendixB,XI'TestControl."16.10CFR50,AppendixB,XIV."Inspection,-TestandOperatingStatus."17.10CFR50,AppendixB,XVI."CorrectiveAction."18.10CFR50,AppendixB,XVII."QualityAssuranceRecords."19.10CFR50;AppendixE,F."Training."20.FederalRegister,PublicDocket:50-220,Niagramohawk,UnitOne,NineNilePointThermalNuclearReactor.-18-
 
UNITEDSTATEDOFAMERICABEFORETHENUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONAFFIDAVITOFBENL~RIDINGSI,BenL.Ridingsdomakeoathandsay:1.MynameisBenL.Ridings.Iamatechnicalconsultantforcommercialnuclearpowerplants.Overaspanofsomefifteenyears,whileworkingatsometwentyfoursites,Ihavespecializedinreviewingoflicensingagreement(FSAR,TechnicalSpecifications,FederalCodesandRegulations,ASMECodes,etc.),establishingadministrativecontrolstomeettheserequirementsandtestprogramstoensurecomplianceatal)times.Mytestprogramsandadministrativecontrolsestablishedwhileundercontracttovariousutilitiesarestillinusetodayatmanyfacilities.2.IhavereviewedalloftherelevantpubliclyavailablecorrespondencebetweentheNuclearRegulatoryCommissionandNiagraMohawkduringtherelvanttimespan.IamfamilarwithNRCregulationsandregulatoryguidancegoverningHighPressureCoreInjections3.ThefactualstatementmadeintheattachedPetitionforEmergencyActionandRequestforpublicHearingaretrueandcorrecttothebestofmyknowlegeandbelief.BenL.RidingsSubscribedandsworntobeforemethis~~dayofQ~,1992.Mycommisionexpires:((<'IIg"gy((~If,f,''".,ecC'P~g,<cg<t'c"/p>>''f)~~lA>>,
Cpr,f'b Part50,App.A'riterion27-Combfrrcdreactivitycontrolsystnnscapability.Thereactivitycontrolsystemsshallbcdesignedtohaveacorn.blnedcapability,Inconiunctlonwithpoisonadditionbytheemergencycorecoolingsystem,ofreliablycontrollingreactivitychangestoassurethatunderpostulatedac-cidentconditionsandwithappropriatemarginforstuckrodsthecapabilitytocoolthccorelsmaintained.Criterion28-Reactfvffylimits.Thereac-tivitycontrolsystemsshallbedesignedwlLhappropriatelimitsonthcpotentialamountandrateofreactivityincreasetoassurethattheeffectsofpostulatedreactivityaccidentscanneither(1)resultIndamagetothcreac-torcoolantpressureboundarygreaterthanlimitedlocalyieldingnor(2)sufficientlydis-turbthecore.ItssupportstructuresorotherreactorpressurevesselinternalstoImpairsignificantlythecapabilitytocoolthecore.Thesepostulatedreactivityacci-dentsshallIncludeconsiderationofrodelection(unlesspreventedbypositivemeans),roddropout,steamlinerupture,changeslnreactorcoolanttemperatureandpressure,andcoldwateraddition.Criterion29-Prefect(orragafrrstanticf-patcdopcratfonaloccurrences.Theprotec-tionandreactivitycontrolsystemsshallbedesignedtoassureanextremelyhighproba-bilityofaccomplishingtheirsafetyfunc-tionsIntheeventofanticipatedoperationaloccurrences.IV.FluidSysfnrrsCrffcrion30-Qualityofreactorcoolantpressureb'oundary.Componentswhicharepartofthereactorcoolantpressurebounda-ryshallbedesigned,fabricated,erected.andtestedtothehighestqualitystandardsprac-tical.Meansshallbeprovidedfordetectingand,totheextentpractical,Identifyingthelocationofthesourceofreactorcoolantleakage.Crftcr(on3I-Fractureprevent(onofreac-torcoolantprcssureboundary.Thereactorcoolantpressureboundaryshallbedesignedwithsufficientmargintoassurethatwhenstressedunderoperating,maintenance,test-ing,andpostulatedaccidentconditions(1)theboundarybehavesInanonbrlttlemannerand(2)theprobabilityo!rapidlypropagatingfractureIsminimized.Thcdesignshallreflectconsiderationofservicetemperaturesandotherconditionsoftheboundarymaterialunderoperating,mainte-nance,testing,andpostulatedaccidentcon.dltlonsandtheuncertaintiesIndetermining(I)materialproperties,(2)theeffectsofIr-radiationonmaterialproperties,(3)residu-al,steadystateandtransientstresses.and<<')smofnaws.Crffcrion32-Irrspccfforrofreactorcool-antpressureboundary.Componentswhicharepartofthereactorcoolantpressureboundaryshallbedesignedtopermit(1)loCFRChI(11~8Edltlon)546periodicinsPcctlonandtestingofImportanLareasandfeaturestoassesstheirstructuralandlcaktlghtintegrity,and(2)anapproprl.atematerialsurveillanceprogramforthereactorpressurevessel.Crifcrfon33-Reactorcoolantmakeup.AsystemtosupplyreactorcoolantmakeupforprotectionagainstsmallbreaksInthcreactorcoolantpressureboundaryshallbcprovided.Thesystemsafetyfunctionshallbetoassurethatspecifiedacceptablefueldesignlimitsarenotexceededasaresultofreactorcoolantlossduetoleakagefromthereactorcoolantpressureboundaryandrup-tureofsmallpipingorothersmallcompo.nentswhicharepartoftheboundary.Thesystemshallbedesignedtoassurethatforonslteelectricpowersystemoperation(as.sumlngoffsltepowertsnotavailable)andfor'ffslteelectricpowersystemoperation(assumingonsltepowertsnotavailable)thesystemsafetyfunctioncanbeaccompltshcdusingtheplplnlr.Dumps,andvalvesusedtomaintaincoolantInventoryduringnormalreactoroperation.Criterion36-ResidualheatrcmovaLAsystemtoremoveresidualheatshallbepro.vlded.ThesystemsafetyfunctionshallbetotransferfissionproductdecayheatandotherresidualheatfromthereactorcoreataratesuchthatspecifiedacceptablefueldesignIlrnltsandthedesignconditionsofthereactorcoolantpressureboundaryarenotexceeded.SuitableredundancyIncomponentsandfeatures,andsuitableInterconnections,leakdetection,andIsolationcapabilitiesshallbeprovidedtoassurethatforonsltcelectricpowersystemoperation(assumingoffsltepowerlsnotavailable)andforoffslteelec-'ricpowersystemoperation(assumingonsltepowerhnotavailable)thesystemsafetyfunctioncanbeaccomplished.assum-Ingasinglefailure.Crffcrforr35-EmergnrcycorecooHng.Asystemtoprovideabundantemergencycorecoolingshallbeprovided.Thesystemsafetyfunctionshallbetotransferheatfromthereactorcorefollowinganylossofreactorcoolantataratesuchthat(1)fuelandcladdamagethaLcouldInterferewithcontinuedeffectivecorecoolingIspreventedand(2)cladmetal-waterreactionIslimitedtonegli-gibleamounts.SuitableredundancyIncomponentsandfeatures,andsuitableInterconnections,leakdetection.Isolation,andcontainmentcapa-bilitiesshallbeprovidedtoassurethatforons!Leelectricpowersystemoperation(as-sumingoffsltepowerIsnotavailable)andforoffslteelectricPowersystemoperation(assumingonsltepowerIsnotavallablc)thesystemsafetyfunctioncanbeaccomplished.assumingasinglefailure.Crfter(on36-Irrspccliorrofcmcrgnrcycorecoolirrpsystem.Theemergencycorevcr'iNuclearReSuiator-4~"-'ingsystemshallappropriateperlodt'antcomponents.sutorpressurevesaeandpipingLor>Pabtiityoithesys'-.Crftcriorr37-TcsIfnpsysicm.'Thes~temshallbedesb-.'ateperiodicpress<<>~;passure(1)thestr'cgrityofILscomPo>r(andperformanceor,ofthesystem,and('systemasawholer.dosetodesignaspr:of.thefulloperatlo,the,systemintoot,ationofapplicable,tlonsystem,theL~"andemergencypoa.;,ationoftheassocla~.~.."<Cr(tcrion38-Co:'.hsystemtorcmov~,".containmentshallsafetyfunctionshconsistentwiththrsoclatedsystems,t-andtemperaturef,antaccidentandr~rablyIowlevels.'W-;:jSultableredund:'featuresandsulta'r',detection,Isolatlor~bllltlesshallbepr~<lonslteelectricpov<sumlngoffsltepo':foroffslteelectric(assumingonslteg;systemsafetyfun(.'ssumingasingle:~Criterion39-Ir.;$heatremovalsystr,,removalsystemslappropriateperte"tantcomponents,.:.spray'nozzles,anr,'S,c,'.tegrltyandcapablCritcrion40-Tcremovalsystem.'ovalsystemsh:appropriateperio~,,'ltestingtoassrleaktlghtIntcgrlrtheoperabilityactivecomponcn'heoperablllLycandundercondltaspracticaltheoperationalscourIntooperation,Ir.=cableportionsoftransferbetweer':f-powersources,arsoclatcdcoolings4";,'riterion4I-cleanup.SystemQ(('I
 
.'1 88Edition)>tingofImportantssLhclrstrucLuralid(2)anapproprl-programforthevolantmakeup.A'oolantrnakcup>allbreakslntheboundaryshallbectyfunctionshall>dscccptablcfuelcdedasaresultof>leakagefromthe>oundaryandrup-thersmallcompo-.heboundary.Thetoassurethatforwmoperation(as-notavailable)and'ystemoperation:notavailable)theabcaccomplishedandvalvesusedto>ryduringnormal;healremoval.AIheatshallbepro->functionshallbe<ctdecayheatandthereactorcoreat.edacceptablefuelcslgnconditionsofsureboundaryarennentsand>cree.cctlons,leak>apabllltlcsshallbeforonslteelectric>(assumingoffslteu>dforoffslteelec->eration(assuming>liable)thcsystemxompilshed,assurn->cycorecoolfnp.AsntemergencycoreLThesystemsafeLy>sferheatfromtheanylossofreactor>ai,(1)fuelandcladferewlChcontinued>preventedand(2)nIslimitedtonegll-Incomponentsand>terconnectlons.leakIcontainmentcapa-dtoassurethatforrstemoperation(as->notavailable)sndersystemoperationIsnotavailable)thecanbeaccompltshed.e;lionofcmcrpencyfheemergencycoreJ~tNuclearRegulatoryCommissioncoolingsystemshallbedesignedtopermitappropriateperiodicInspectionofImpor-tantcomponenLs,suchassprayringsInthcreactorpressurevessel,waterInfectionnoz-stcs.sndpiping.toassuretheIntegritysndcapabilityofthesystem.Crifcrion37-Tcsf(npofemergencycorecoolinpsystem.Theemergencycorecoolingsystemshallbedesignedtopermitspproprl.ateperiodicpressureandfunctionaltestingtoassure(1)thestructuralsndleaktlghtIn-tegrityofItscomponents,(2)theoperabgltyandperformanceofLheactivecomponentsofthesystem,and(3)theoperabilityofthcsystemasawholeand,underconditionsssclosetodesignaspractical,theperformanceofthefulloperationalsequencethatbringsthesystemIntooperation,Includingoper-ationofspp)lcsbleportionsoftheprotec-tionsystem,thetransferbetweennormalsndemergencypowersources,andtheoper-ationoftheassociatedcoolingwatersystem.Crifcrion38-Confainmen(heatremoval.AsystemtoremovehestfromLhereactorcontslrunentshallbeprovided.Thesystemsafetyfunctionshallbctoreducerapidly,consistentwiththefunctioningofotheras.soclatedsystems,thecontainmentpressureandtemperaturefollowinganytoss.ofwool-antaccidentandmaintainthemataccept-ablylowlevels.Sultab)eredundancyIncomponentsandfeatures.andsuitableInterconnections,leakdetection.Isolation,andcontainmentcaps.bllltlesshallbeprovidedtoassurethatforonslteelectricpowersystemoperation(as-sumingoffsitepowerIsnotavailable)andforoffslteelectricpowersystemoperation(assumingonsitepowerIsnotavailable)thesystemsafetyfunctioncanbeaccomplished,assumingasinglefailure.Criferion39-lnspcctfo>>ofconlainmcnlhealremovalsysfcm.ThecontalnmcntheatremovalsystemshallbedesignedtopermitappropriateperiodicInspectionofimpor-tantcomponents,suchasthetorus,sumps.spraynozzles,andpipingtoassuretheIn-tegrityandcapabilityofthesystem.Criterion40-Tcsfinpofconfafnmcn(healremovalsystem.ThecontainmentheaCre-movalsystemshallbedesignedtopermitappropriateperiodicpressureandfunction-altestingtoassure(1)thestructuralandleaktlghtIntegrityofItscomponents.(2)theopcrabllltyandperformanceoftheactivecomponentsofthesystem.and(3)theoperabilityofthesystemasawhole,andunderconditionsasclosetothedesignaspractica)theperformanceofthefulloperationalsequencethatbringsthcsystemIntooperaLlon,Includingoperationofsppll-csblcportionsoftheprotectionsystem,thetransferbetweennormalandemergencypowersources.andCheoperationoftheas-sociatedcoolingwatersystem.Criteria>>41-Confainmentalmosphcrccleanup.Systemstocontrolfissionprod-Port50,App.Aucts,hydrogen,oxygen,andothersub-stanceswhichmaybereleasedIntothereac-torcontslnmenCshallbeprovidedasneces-sarytoreduce,consistentwiththefunction-ingofotherassociatedsystems,thcconcen.tratlonandqualityoffissionproductsre-leasedLotheenvironmentfollowingpostu.latedaccidents,andtoconLroltheconcen.tratlonofhydrogenoroxygenandothersubstanceslnthecontainmentatmosphcrcfollowingpostulatedaccidentstoassurethsCcontainmentlnLegrltyIsmaintained.Eachsystemshallhavesuitableredundan-cyIncomponentsandfeatures.sndsuitableInterconnections,leakdetection,isolation.andcontainmentcapabilitiestoassurethat,foronsltcelectricpowersystemopcratlon(assumingoifsltepowerIsnotavailable)andforoffsiteelectricpowersystemoperaC!on(assumingonsltepowerLsnotavailable)lissafetyfunctioncanbeaccomplished,sssum.Ingssinglefailure.Criterion42-lnspec(ionofconfainmenlalmosphcrccleanupsysfcms.Thecontain-mcnLatmospherecleanupsystemsshallbedesignedLopermlLappropr'lateperiodic'In-spectionofImportantcomponents.suchasfilterframes.ducts,andpipingtoassuretheIntegrityandcspsblHtyofthesystems.Crfferia>>43-Tcrffnpofconfafnmcnlat.mosphcrccleanupsysfcms.Thecontainmentatmospherecleanupsystemsshallbede-signedtopermitappropriateperiodicpres-sureandfunctionaltestingtoassure(1)thcstructuralandleaktlghtIntegrityofItscorn.ponents,(2)theoperabilityandperform.anceoftheactivecomponentsofthesys.ternssuchasIsns,filters,dsmpers.pumps,andvalvesand(3)theoperabilityofthesys-temsasawholeand,underconditionsssclosetodesignaspractical.thcperformanceofthefulloperationalsequencethatbringsthcsystemsintooperation,Includingoper-ationofapplicableportionsoftheprotec.Lionsystem,thetransferbetweennormalandernergcncypowersources,andtheoper-ationofassociatedsystems.Cr(ferion44-Coohnpu>afer.Asystemtotransferheatfromstructures,systems,andcomponentsimportanttosafety,toanulti-mateheatsinkshallbeprovided.ThesystemsafetyfunctionshallbetotrsnslerChecombinedhestloadofthesestructures,systems,andcomponentsundernormalop.cratingandaccidentconditions.SuitableredundancyIncomponentsandfeatures,andsuitableInterconnections,leakdetection,andIsolationcapabilitiesshallbeprovidedtoassurethatforonslteelectricpowersystemoperation(assumingoffsltepowerIsnoLavailable)andforoffslteelec-tricpowersystemoperation(assumingonsltepowerIsnol,available)thesystemsafetyfunctioncanbeaccomplished,sssum-Ingasinglefailure.54'7 rr LIHITING,CONDITIONFOROPERATIOHSURVEILLAHCEAEJUIR)'.HLHT3.1.8Illa)PRESSuRECOOLANTIHJECTIONAJJ11Appliestotheoperationalstatusofthehighpressurecoolantinjectionsyste<n.O~b<.ctive:Toassurethecapabilityofthehighpressurecoolantinjectionsystemtocoolreactorfuelintheeventofaloss-of-coolantaccident.4.1.8lllGIIPRESSURECOOLANTINJECTIONAppliestotheperiodictesti>>grequirum<.ntsforthehighpressurecoolanti>>juctiu>>cyst<.<ll.~Obective:Toverifytheoperabilityofthehigh)iressurucoolantinjectionsystem.h111<<1)a.Duringthepoweroperatingcon-"dition,wheneverthereactorcoolantpressureisgreaterthan110psigandthereactorcoolanttemperaturegreaterthansaturationtemperature,thehighpressurecoolantinjectionsysten>shallbeoperableexceptasspecifiedinSpecification"b"below.b.Ifaredundantcomponentofthehinhpressurecoolantinjectionsystembecomesinoperablethehighpressurecoolantinjectionshallbeconsideredoperableprovidedthatthecomponentisreturnedt.oanoperableconditionwithin15daysandtheadditionalsur-veillancerec)uiredisperformed.~Sectficat<on:Thehighpressurecoolanti>>jectio>>sur-veillanceshallbeperformedasindicatedbelow:a.At1east&nayel''8er'at)'hg&#x17d;cycle.Auto<natlcstart-upofthelii<)hp)essur<~coolantinjectionsystemshallbedemon-strated.Pumpoperabilityshallbedeter<)i>>ud,71 r
LierCS~UAVfLLAHCEA~F.IJIAI'.HLH'I'.=-IfSpecification"a"and"b"arenotmet,anormalorderlyshutdownshallbeinitiatedw>thinonehourandreactorcoolantpressureandtemp-eratureshallbereducedtolessthan110psigandsaturationtemperaturewithin24hours.c.SurveillancewithI~nocrableCoiigionvntWhenacomponentbecomesI>>operableitsredundantcomponentshallhudemonstratedtobeoperableiiuiedlatelyanddailythereafter.'12 ll BASESFOR3.1.8AND4.1.8HIGH'PRESSURECOOLANTIHJEL))OMaHighPressureCoolantInjectionSystem(KPCI)is.providedtoensureadequate'corecoolingintheunlikelyeventofntrolRodDrivepumpsandwhicharenotlargeenoughtoallo~'fastenoughdepressur)zatonxl)reactorcooan'nerea..e1tli"'kThHPCISystem.isrequired.forlinebreakswh')chexceedthecapab)lityoftheforcoresratobepyfeetive.eseogpressrtfhihurecoolantinjectionpumpsconsistsofacondensatepump,afeedwaterboosterpumpandamotorivenfeedwaterpump.Onesetofpumps)scapableofdel)ver.ing3,800gpmtothercreactorvesselatreactoressure.TheperformancecapabilityofHPCIaloneandinconjunctionwithothersystemstoprov)deadequatecoreso))ngforaspectrumof1)nebreaks)sdiscussed)ntheFifthSupplementoftheFSAR.tdeterm)ningtheoperabilityoftheHPCISystem,therequiredperformancecapab)l)tyofvariouscomponentsshallbe>ns)dered.~TheKPCISystemshallbecapableofmeetingitspumpheadversusflowcurve.gT.hemotordrivenfeeduaterpumpshallbecapableofautomaticinitiationuponreceiptofeitheranautomaticturbinetripsignalorreactorlow-water-levelsignal.e.'heCondenserhotwell~eve)shallnotbelessthan57)nches(75,000gallons).TheCondensatestoragetanksinventoryshallnotbelessthan105,000gallons.-Themotor-drivenfeedwaterpumpwillautomaticallytr)p)freactorh)ghwaterlevelissusta)nedfortensecondsandtheassociatedpumpdownstreamflowcontrolvalveandlowflowcontrolvalvearenotclosed.rr)ngreactorstart-up,operat)onandshutdown,thecondensateandfeedwaterboosterpumpsareinoperation.Ateactorpressuresupto450pslg,thesepumpsarecapableofsupply)ngtherequired3,800gpm.Above450ps)gavtor-driven-feedwaterpumpisnecessarytoprovidetherequiredflowrate.hbilitofthecondensate,feedwa-'boosterandmotordr)venfeedwaterpumpsw)1)bedemonstratedbytheirperationaspartofthefeedwatersupplyduringnormalstationoperation.Stand-bypumpsw)l1epecapayow)11belacedinservicetleastquarterlytosupp)yfeedwaterduringstationoperation.Anautomaticsysteminitiationtestwillbeerformedatleastonceperoperatingcycle.Th)sw)llinvolveautomaticstartingofthemotordr)venfeedwaterpumpsndflowtothereactorvessel.RevisedOctober1,198673 r
I.HIGH-PRESSURECOOLANTINJECTION1.0DesinSasesThehigh-pressurecoolantinjection(HPCI)systemisanoperatingmodeofthefeedwatersystemavailableintheeventofasmallreactorcoolantlinebreakwhichexceedsthecapabilityofthecontrolroddrivepumps(0.003ft2).HPCIalongwithoneemergencycoolingsystemhasthecapabilityofkeepingtheswollenreactorcoolantlevelabovethetopofactivefuelforsmallreactorcoolantboundarybreaksupto0.07ft2foratleast1000seconds.TheHPCIsystemwithoneofthetwoemergencycoolingsystemsandtwocorespraysystems,willprovidecorecoolingforthecompletespectrumofbreaksizesuptothemaximumdesignbasisrecirculationdischargelinebreak(5.446ft2).Itsprimarypurposeisto:a.provideadequatecoolingofthereactorcoreunderabnormalandaccidentconditions.b.removetheheatfromradioactivedecayandresidualheatfromthereactorcoreatsucharatethatfuelcladmeltingwouldbeprevented.c.provideforcontinuityofcorecoolingoverthecompleterangeofpostulated"breaksizesintheprimarysystemprocessbarrier.HPCIisnotanengineeredsafeguardssystemandisnotconsideredinanyLossofCoolantAccidentAnalyses.Itisdiscussedinthissectionbecauseofitscapabilitytoprovidemakeupwateratreactoroperatingpressure.2.0SstemDesinTheHPCIsystemutilizesthetwocondensatestoragetanks,themaincondenserhotwell,twocondensatepumps,condensatedemineralizers,twofeedwaterboosterpumps,feedwaterheaters,twomotor-drivenfeedwaterpumps,anintegratedcontrolsystemandallassociatedpipingandvalves.Thesystemiscapableofdelivering7600gpmintothereactorvesselatreactorpressurewhenusingtwotrainsoffeedwaterpumps.Thecondensateandfeedwaterboosterpumpsarecapableofsupplyingtherequired3,800gpmatapproximatelyreactorpressuresupto270psig.Above270psigamotor-drivenfeedwaterpumpisnecessarytoprovidetherequiredflowrate.
 
VII-6laThefeedwatersystempumpshaverecirculationlineswithairoperatedflowcontrolvalvestopreventthepumpsfromoperatingagainstaclosedsystem.Intheeventoflossofairpressure,thesevalvesopenrecyclingpartoftheHPCIflowtothehotwell.HPCIflowwouldbereducedtoapproximately3,000gpmatareactorpressureof1,150psigand3,800gpmatareactorpressureof940psig.Rev.7Condensateinventoryismaintainedatanavailableminimumvolumeof180,000gallons.3.0DesinEvaluationDuringaloss-of-'coolantaccidentwithinthedrywell,highdrywellpressureduetoalinebreakwillcauseareactorscram.Thisautomaticscramwillcauseaturbinetripafte"afive-seconddelay.Inordertopreventcladdingtemperaturesfromexceedingtheirmaximumlimitfortheentirespectrumofbreaks,the3800gpm(fromonetrainofHPCI/feedwaterpumps).wouldhavetobeavailableimmediately.Feedwaterflowwouldbeavailableforconsiderabletimefromtheshaft-drivenfeedwaterpump.Theshaft-drivenfeedwaterpumpwouldcoastdownwhiletheelectricmotor-drivencondensatepumpsandfeedwaterboosterpumpswouldcontinuetooperate.Thecoastdowntimetoreach3,800gpmdeliverytothecoreisapproximately3.2minutes(FigureVII-17),sinceboththecondensateandfeedwaterboosterpumpswillcontinuetooperateonoff-sitepower.Theturbinetripwillsigna1themotor-drivenfeedwaterpumptostart.Thesignalwillbesimultaneouswiththestartoftheshaftpumpcoastdown.Themotor-drivenfeedwaterpumpwillbeuptospeedandcapableofsupplying3,800gpminabout:tenseconds.Asabackup,lowreactorwaterlevelwi11alsosignalthemotor-drivenpumptostart.TheinitiationsignaltransferscontrolfromthenormalfeedwatertotheHPCIinstrumentationandcontrollerwhichhasbeencontinuouslytrackingthenormalfeedwatercontrolsignal.Thustherewillbeacontinuoussupplyoffeedwatertothereactor.TheHPCIsingleelementcontrolsystemwillattempttomaintainreactorvesselwaterlevelat65inchesor72inches(dependinguponwhichpump,llor12respectively,isinservice)withamaximumfeedwaterflowlimitof3800gpm.Rev.7 r
VII-62Asustainedhighreactorwaterlevelreactorprotectionsystemsignalcoincidentwithanopenfeedwaterflowcontrolvalvewillselectivelytriptheassociatedfeedwaterpump.Theclutchoftheshaft-drivenpumpwillalsobedisengagedimmediatelyuponhighreactorwaterlevel.Shouldthereactorwaterlevelreachthelowlevelscramsetpointthemotordrivenpumpthattrippedonhighreactorwaterlevelwillrestart.Necessaryfeedwaterpumprecirculationisprovidedtoallowforcontinuedpumpoperationwiththeflowcontrolvalveclosed.Asfeedwaterispumpedoutofthecondenserhotwell,throughtheselectedequipmentofthecondensateandfeedwatersystemsandintothereactor,thecondenserhotwelllevelwillfall.Sincecondensedsteamfromtheturbinenolongerreplenishesthecondenserhotwell,condensatewillbetransferredfromthecondensatestoragetankstothehotwellformakeup.Thefeedwatersystempumpsoperateon4160v.Whentheplantisinoperation,thepowerissuppliedfromthemaingeneratorthroughthestationservicetransformerwhenthegeneratorison-lineandconnectedtothegrid.Whenthemaingeneratorisoff-line,thefeedwaterpumpsaresuppliedwithnormaloff-sitepowerfromthe115KVsystemthroughthereservetransformers.IfaHPCIinitiationsignalshouldoccur,allHPCI/feedwatersystempumpswouldstartimmediatelywithtwofeedwaterpumptrainsavailableforHPCIinjectionusingthesingleelementfeedwatercontrolsystemforreactorvessellevelcontrol.Ifamajorpowerdisturbanceweretooccurthatresultedinlossofthe115KVpowersupplytotheNineNilePoint115KVbus,powerwouldberestoredfromageneratorlocatedattheBennettsBridgeHydroStation.Thisgeneratorwouldhavethecapacityofsupplyingapproximately6,000KVAwhichissufficienttooperateonetrainofHPCI/feedwatersystempumps.IfHPCIinitiationweretooccur,thepreferredfeedwatertrainpumps(feedwaterpump12,feedwaterboosterpump13,condensatepump13)'wouldstart.Thenon-preferredtra'inpumpswouldbelockedoutonlossofoff-sitepowerandnotstartuntiltheoperatormanuallyresetthelockout.Ifapreferredtrainpumphadbeenlockedoutpriortothelossofoff-sitepower,itwouldremainlockedoutandthenon-preferredtrainbackuppumpwouldautomaticallystartonHPCIinitiation.Ifboththepreferredandbackuppumpsarerunning,thepreferredpumpwouldremaininserviceandthebackuppumpwilltrip.TheRev.7 0r VII-62auseofaBennettsBridgehydrogenerator,whilenotequivalenttoanon-siteemergencypowersource,providesahighlyreliablealternateoff-sitepowersupplyfortheHPCIfunctionofthefeedwatersystem.ev.74.0TestsandInsections"TestsandinspectionsofthevariouscomponentsaredescribedinSectionXI-SteamtoPowerConversion.
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Revision as of 04:18, 20 April 2018

Petition for Emergency Enforcement Action Against Facility, Which Is Operating in Violation of NRC & Federal Requirements for Availability of ECCS High Pressure Core Injection & Request for Public Hearing
ML18038A721
Person / Time
Site: Nine Mile Point Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 10/28/1992
From: RIDING B L
AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED
To:
NRC
Shared Package
ML18038A720 List:
References
NUDOCS 9211160402
Download: ML18038A721 (148)
v • d • e


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UNITEDSTATEDOFAMERICABEFORETHENUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONPETITIONFOREMERGENCYENFORCEMENTACTIONANDREQUESTFORPUBLICHEARINGI.INTRODUCTIONI,BENL.RIDINGS(hereinafter"Petitioner")herebypetitiontheCommissionersoftheNuclearRegulatoryCommission("NRC"or"Commission")foremergencyenforcementactionagainstNiagraMohawk'sNineMile(UnitOne)Nuclearpower"plant,whichisoperatinqinviolationofboththeNRCandFederalrequirementsforavailabilityofEmergencyCoreCooling(ECCS)highpressurecoreinjection.AsanECCSsystem,theNineMileplantalsofailstoprovidethemandatoryemergencybackuppowertothehighpressurecoreinjection(HPCI)system.OverthetwentyyearstheNineMileOneplanthasbeenallowedtooperate,nosafetyrelatedpumpshaveeverbeenavailabletoinjectwaterintothevesselatreactorpressure.Atthesametimethisplantwasallowedtooperateatfullpower,therearemanypostulatedaccidentsassumedintheFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(thatarecapableofdrainingthereactorvessel)andspecificallyrelyontheECCSHPCIPumpsto'aintainreactorwaterlevel.Thesepumpshaveneverbeeninstalledandthecurrentadministrativecontrolsallowedthisplanttooperateoutsidetheminimumfederalrequirement.Thisspecifictypeofplantoperationoutsidetheknownminimumfederalrequirementsgreatlyendangershealthandpropertyrisktothepublic.Asdiscussedindetailbelow,theresponsibleutility,itsQualityAssurancegroupandtheNRChaveroutinelyfailedintheirresponsibilitytoensuretheoperationofnuclearpowerplantswithinthelicenseagreement.Evenwhenproblemsareidentified,.documentedandbroughttotheattentionoftheresponsibleparties,varioussafetyconcernsareroutinelydismissed,ignoredor9211160402921027*PDRADOCK05000220PDR

~~~M'h' administrativelyeliminated.Evenissueswhichobviouslyendangerpublicsafetyhavebeenroutinelydismissed,notonlybytheutilitybutsuchactionsauthorizedandapprovedbytheindependentqualityassurancegroupsandbytheNRC.Anyandalloftheseorganizationshavetheauthoritytostoptheop'erationofplantsoutsidetheminimumsafetyrequirements,andnotonehavecomeforwardtofulfillitsdutyandprotectthepublic.Instead,eachorganizationhasreviewedtheenclosedsafetyconcernsandcontrarytoanypracticaljustification,haveremainedsilentandallowedthismannerofplantoperationtotakeplacewiththeirapproval,givingevidencethatthesegroupshavealsofailedtoremainindependentofeachother.Independentreviewbynotonlythegovernmentagencybutthequalityassurancereviewgroupsisthebasicpremisewhichallowedcongresstograntoperationofcommercialnuclearpowerplantswithlimitedliabilityfordamages.Thecurrentadministrativecontrolsusedtodayfailedtoensuretheplantoperatewithintheminimumfederalguidelines.ItisCongress'sdutytoprotectpublicsafetyanditscurrentadministrativecontrolshavefailed.BecausetheNineNilePointUnitOneReactorviolatesbothfederallawandtheCommissions'srequirementsforHIGHPRESSURECOREINJECTION,theCommissioncanmakenofindingthatthereisresonableassuranceofnounduerisktopublichealthandsafety.PetitionerthereforerequestthattheCommissionissueimmediatelyaneffectiveorderdirectingthelicenseetoceasepoweroperationandplacethereactorinacoldshutdowncondition.Theplantshouldnotbepermittedtocontinueorresumeoperationunlessanduntilsubsequenttestsandinspectionsareshowntoprovidetherequisitereasonableassuranceofnounduerisktopublichealthandsafety.Moreover,Petitionersseekapublichearingbeforetheplantisallowedtooperateagain.

II.DESCRIPTIONOFPETITIINERI,BenL.Ridings,'amatechnicalconsultantforcommercialnuclearpowerplants.Overaspanofsomefifteenyears,whileworkingatsometwentyfoursites,Ihavespecializedinreviewingoflicensingagreement(FSAR,TechnicalSpecifications,FederalCodesandRegulations,ASMECodes,etc.),establishingadministrativecontrolstomeettheserequirementsandtestprogramstoensurecomplianceatalltimes.Nytestprogramsandadministratvecontrolsestablishedwhileundercontracttovariousutilitiesarestillinusetodayatmanyfacilities.III~THECOMNISSIOMSHOULDEXERCISEITSSUPERVISORYJURISDICTIONOVERTHISPETITIONA.TheCommissionhasanInherentSupervisoryJurisdictionovertheSafetyofOperationoftheNiagraNohawkNineNilePlant.ThispetitionisbroughtbeforetheCommissionpursuanttotheauthoritygrantedtoitin42USC2233(d),2236(a),2237and10CFR2.204,2.206(c)(1),50.54,50.57,50.100and50.109.ItinvokestheinherentsupervisoryauthorityoftheCommissiontooverseeallaspectsoftheregulatoryandlicensingprocessandits"overridingresponsibilityforassuringpublichealthandsafetyintheoperationofnuclearpowerfacilities."ConsolidatedEdisonCoo.ofN.Y.Inc.(IndianPoint,Units1,2and3).CLI-75-8,2NRC173(1975)~AstheCommissionhaspreviouslyobserved,itssupervisorypowersincludethepowertoorderimmediateshutdownofafacility"ifthepublichealthorsafetysorequires."tPetitionforEmerencandRemedialAction,CLI786g7NRC400'05(1978)gciting5USC558(c),42USC2236(b)~10CFR2202(f)g2204.

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~rs~i~fTheCommissionhasexeiciseditsinherentauthorityonanumberofoccasions.Inadditiontotheceasescitedabove,seePetitionforResearchandDevelomentAdministration(ClinchRiverBreederReactorProject)pCLI761374NRC6777576(1976)IConsumersPowerCo.(MidlandUnits1and2),CLI-73-38,6AEC1084(1973);PublicServiceCo.ofNewN~aeshire(SeahrootNuclearPowerStation,Unitsiand2),CL1-77-8,SNPC503,515-517(1977).B.ExerciseoftheCommissions'sIndependentJurisdictionis,AppropriateinThisCase.NRCregulationsat10CFR2.206providethatunderordinarycircumstances,enforcementpetitionsaretobelodgedwiththeNRCStaff,andthattheCommissionmaytakediscretionaryreviewofStaffdenialsofsuchpetitions.However,theCommissions'sreviewingpower"doesnotlimitinanyway"its"supervisorypowerover.delegatedStaffactions",10CFR2.206(c)(1).ItisappropriateforthecommissiontoexerciseitssupervisorypowersandtakejurisdictioninthiscasebecausetheNPCStaffhasacquiescedtoNiagraMohawks'iolationsformorethantwoyears.InJan1990,NiagraMohawkComplianceSupervisorwasgivenwrittennoticeofHPCIsandotherinadequacieswhicheffectpublicsafety.Afternoapparentaction,theNineMileQualityFirstTeamwasalsogivennotice.PetitionerwaslaternotifiedbytheQualityFirstTeamthattheNRChadbeencontactedandmadeawareoftheproblemaswell.PetitionerwaslatercontactedbytheQualityFirstTeamandtoldthattheNRChadexemptedtheplantfromtheHPCIrequirementanditsneedforbackuppowerintheeventoflossofpower.PetitionerhasyettoheardirectlyfromtheNRConthismatter.

II IV.GROUNDSFORACTIONA.FederalRequirementsforhavingradioactivefuelsonsiteInaccordancewith10CFR50.10,theutilityNiagraMohawkenteredintocontractualagreementwiththefederalgovernmentundertheprovisionsofpublicdocument50-220,onfilewiththefederalregister.NowundertheJurisdictionof10CFR50,App.A(GeneralDesignCriteria),establishtheminimumrequirementsfortheprincipaldesignforwatercoolednuclearpowerplant.Criterion33and35(Attachment2)specifytheminimumneedthatasystemtoprovideabundantemergencycorecoolingshallbeprovided.Thesystemsafetyfunctionshallbetotransferheatfromthe.reactorcoreandmusthavesuitableredundancyincomponentsandonsiteelectricpowersystem(assumingoffsitepowerisnotavailable)whichwillenablethesafetyfunctiontobeaccomplished.Also(Criterion33),asystemtosupplyreactorcoolantmakeupforprotectionagainstsmallbreaksinthereactorcoolantpressureboundaryshallbeprovided.Criterion37providesc)bu"gthetestingrequirementsoftheemergencycorecoolingsystem.10CFK70detailstheutilityandNRCresponsibilityfortestingandinspectionofthesesystemsand10CFR50App.B(QualityAssuranceCriteria)detailstheQualityAssuranceProgramandtheadministrativerequirementsforInspections,TestControl,OperatingStatus,CorrectiveActionandRecords.B.AStudyofContractualAgreement(docket50-220)In,accordancewith10CFR50.34,thetechnicalspecificationshallperformanevaluationofthesafetyeffectivenessofprovidingforseparationofhighpressurecoolantinJection(HPCI)andreactorcoreisolationcooling(RCIC).ThisinvestigationfoundtheNileNilePointTechnicalSpecificationincompliancewith'hisrequirement.TechnicalSpecification4.1~8(Attachment3)givespositiveproofthattheECCS iC:.

~gl~requirementfortheHPCIsystemwasanticipatedbythedesigners.Secondly,thecorrespondingLimitingConditionforOperation(LCO)3.i.8.c(Attachment3)viewthissystemassocriticalthatif"theutilityfailstoverifyHPCIoperabilityitwilldemandanorderlyshutdownbeinitiatedwithinonehour.WhenonlyoneHPCIcomponentbecomesinoperableitsredundantcomponentshallbedemonstratedtobeoperableimmediatelyanddailythereafter(asopposedtomonthlydemonstration)."InaccordancewiththeBasesforTechnicalSpecification3.1.8,theHPCIsystemisprovidedtoensureadequatecorecoolingintheunlikelyeventofareactorcoolantlinebreak(alsoafederalrequirement-designcriterion33).TheHPCIsystemisrequiredforlinebreakswhichexceedthecapabilityoftheControlRodDrivepumpsandwhicharenotlargeenoughtoallowfastenoughdepressurizationforcorespraytobeeffective(corespray350psiasopposedtoHPCI22QQpsi).InaccordancewiththeFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(FSAR),ChapterVII(Attachment4),theDesignBasesforHPCIisdiscussed.Althoughseveralrevisionhavebeenimplementedbytheutility'inordertofabricatetheexistenceofaECCSsystemtosatisfytheHPCIfederalrequirement,itsprimarysafetyfunctionislisted;(1)provideadequatecoolingofthereactorcoreunderabnormalandaccidentconditions,(2)removetheheatfromradioactivedecayandresidualheatfromthereactorcoreatsucharatethatfuelcladmeltingwouldbeprevented,(3)provideforcontinuityofcorecoolingoverthecompleterangeofpostulatedbreaksizesintheprimarysystemprocessbarrier.Once.thesafetyfunctionsareunderstooditbecomesobviousastowhythissystemisaminimumrequirementofthefederalguidelines.

~g4 ThefollowingparagraphofFSARChapterVIIgivesthereaderanindicationofthelackofproperreviewthatexists.AtNineNilePoint,unlikeeveryothernuclearfacility,"MPCIisnotanengineeredsafeguardssystemandisnotconsideredinanyLossofCoolantAccidentAnalysis."AsstatedintheFSAR(inlaymanterms)thisfeedwatersystemdoesnotpretendtomeettheIOCFR50AppendixA(Criterion33,35,36,37)requirementsoftheminimumfederalrequirements.Infact,NineNilePointhasnosystemmeetingtheseminimumfederalrequirements.Next,reviewingtheDesignEvaluationportionofFSARChapterVII,(Attachment4)aparadoxoccursindesignphilosophy."Duringaloss-of-coolantaccidentwithinthedrywel1,highdrywel1pressureduetoalinebreakwillcauseareactorscram.Theautomatic'cramwillcauseaturbinetripafterafive-seconddelay.Inordertoreventcladdinterneraturefromexceedintheirmaximumlimitfortheentire.spectrumofbreaks,the3800gpm(fromonetrainoftheHPCIpumps)wouldhavetobeavailableObviously,theHPCIsystemisabsolutelynecessarytoensurecriticalheatflux(CHF)isnotexceeded.Withoutthecoolantwatertotransfertheheatfromthefueltothecoolant,thefuelrodwouldthenheatuprapidlyandfuelcladdingwouldtakeplaceandcause'possiblemeltdownunlessthereactorwereshutdownquickly.Further,oncethecriticalheatfluxwasexceeded,thedeparturefromnucleateboilingratio(DNBR)wouldexceedits1~25limit.TheselimitsareTechnicalSpecificationrequirementsaswellbutitgivesanindicationoftheinterdependenceoftheECCSsystems.Tomakeastatementinalicensethat"HPCIhasnotbeenconsideredinanyLossofCoolantAccidentAnalyses"isaanotherindicationofthelackofp~opcireviewthatexistsatNineNilePoint.Everysafetylimitassumed jl'I

~~,'jestattheNineMilePointplantisjeopardizedwithouttheassurancethatthefuelwillremaincoveredatalltimes.TheNRChasapprovedthenon-safetyrelatedfeedwatersystemasanappropriatesubstituteforanECCSHPCIfederalrequirement.Whatatfirstseemslikeaquibbleaboutasinglepumpisinactualityavalidargumentthateverybasesassumedbythislicenseisnullandvoid.AtNineMilePoint,standardbasicthermalreactordesignhasbeensignificantlyalteredinseveralECCSsystems.TherearenoHPCIorRCICsystemtotransferheatfromthereactorcore.Thereisnowayoftakingsteamawayfromthereactorandusingthisenergytodriveahighpressurepump.NormallytheHPCIpumpsreturnthecondensedsteam(water)backintothevesseltomaintainwaterlevel.AtNineMilePoint,thereisnoHPCIorRCICsystems.AtNineMilePoint,unlikenormalreactordesign,electricallydriven,non-quality~-relatedfeedwaterpumpsareconsidered.Thesenon-qualityrelatedfeedwaterpumpssupposedlyfulfilltheHPCIsafetyfunctionandyetdonotmeettheelectricalbackuprequirements.Itmustbenotedthatthesizeoftheseelectricalpumpsmakeitimpossibletohaveon-sitepoweravailableintheeventoflossofoff-sitepower.On-sitepoweravailabilityisassumedinthebasesoftheFSAR.Itisthereforeimpossibleforthisplanttofulfilltheminimumsafetyobligationasdictatedbyfederalstatuteoftheknownpostulatedaccidents.Thissamefeedwatersystem(beingnon-qualityrelated)waspurchasedasanon-qualityrelatedsystem.Inthissamesystem;piping,valvesfinstrumentation,wiring,electricalcomponentsandcontrolsystemswereallpurchasedandinstalledundernon-qualityrelatedcontractualprovisions.HPCIautomaticallyinitiatesonaLossCoolantAccident(LOCA)signalfromtheNSSSlogic.TheNSSSlogicperformstheECCSsafeguardfunctionsand E

alwaysinstalledunderstrictcontractualmandates,whichincludetraining,qualityassurancereviews,certifiedskilledcraftsmen,etc.Secondly,thepipingsystem,welding,hangerrestraintsandmaintenanceconsiderationswereinstalledandmaintainedundernon-qualityrelatedprovisionsaswell.Again,ECCSsafeguardsystemsarepurchased,constructedandmaintainedundermuchstricterguidelines.Thefeedwatersystemwasneverdesigned,purchased,built,maintainednorcapableoffulfillingtheHPCIrequirementsofthefederalguidelines.-AtNineNilePointtheHPCIsystemsimplydoesnotexist.Theadministrativecontrolswhichallowedacceptanceofsuchanon-qualityrelatedsystemtofulfillthismandatoryECCSfederalrequirementisnotacceptable.C.KnowledgeofExistingConcernsTheneedforanoperableECCSHPCISystemismandatoryasevidencedfromthegroundsforreliefinthisreport.AtNineNilePointy'theUtility,QualityAssurancepersonnelandtheNPCwerewellawareofthisrequirement.F'rwhateverreason,thisplantwaslicensedbytheNRCandallowedtooperatewithoutthismandatoryrequirementinstalled.Attemptsbythesesamepartiestosubstitutenon-qualityrelatedfeedwaterequipmenttofulfillthismandatorysafeguardfunctionsupportsthefacttheneedforrequirementwasunderstood.Evenifnon-qualityrelatedequipmentwas.acceptabletosupportECCSfunctions(anditsnot),thereisnoonsiteelectricpowersystemthatwillsupportthesafetyfunctionofafeedwater/HPCIsystem.Thiselec.ricsystemisanothermandatoryminimumrequirement(Attachment2-Criterion35).Toprovethecollaborationbetweenallpartiesmentioned,thelicenseeattemptstotakecreditforronsitepoweravailabilityfromtheBentonDam,some100milesaway.Obviouslythereviewersareawareofthesemandatoryrequirementsbutthere I

'Igg~'I"resolutiontothesafetyconcernsisnotacceptable.Thepossibilityofatornadodestroyingtheswitchyardisaknownpostulatedaccidentthatcanoccur.Withoutthispoweravailability,theHPCIfunctioncannotpossiblybeassumed,asstatedintheFSARChapterVII(Attachment4).Everytimethefeedwaterprocedureswererevisedthisissuewouldhavetobereviewed.EverytimetheFSAR(ChapterVII)wasrevised,theTechnicalSpecificationsrevisedorcontainmentintegritywasquestionedthisissuehadtobereviewedinaccordancewithadministrativerequirementssetoutbythefederalguidelines.EverytimetheQualityAssurancegroupsandNRCperformedtheirindependentauditsandinspectionsthisissuehadtobereviewed.Everytimethisplantwasoperatedatmodes1or2,theresponsibleSeniorReactorOperator(SRO),whoisspecificallytrained(10CFR50AppE)ontheseissueswouldhavetoquestionthevalidityofthecurrentHPCIsystem.EverytimetheHPCIsurveillance(monthly)wasperformedtoensureoperability,theresponsibleSPOwouldhavetoquestionthevalidityofanonqualityrelatedfeedwatersystemfulfillingtheHPCIsystem.Takingcreditfornon-qualityrelatedequipmenttofulfilltherequirementsofaECCSsafetyfunctionisnotacceptableanditwouldbetheSPO'sresponsibilitytoquestionthefeedwaterabilitytoperformthisHPCIsafetyfunction.Ofcourse,thatistheanotherproblemtoconsider,itwouldbetheSRO'sjob.Althoughpreviouslyawareoftheproblem,onJan18,1990,theUtilitywasservednoticeoftheseandothersafetyconcern.Ifthenon-qualityrelatedfeedwatersystemwastosupposedlyfulfilltheHPCIsafetyfunction,itfailedtomettheonsiteelectricalrequirementsandmanyof-10-

'I'I themainflowpathvalveshadneverbeenincludedintheInserviceTestProgram(10CFR50.55).Some44outof47valveswerecurrentlynotidentifiedintheInserviceTestProgram(ECCSSurveillanceviolation).Withsuchknowledge,theUtility,QualityAssurancegroupandtheNRCallowed'theplanttostartupandcontinueintofulloperating(mode1)condition.Nopumps,novalvesyetTechnicalSpecification4.1.8(Attachment.3)demandsifonevalveisnotdemonstratedoperableadailysurveillanceisrequiredtobeperformed.Thisisjustanotherlackofadministrativecontrolinwhichthereviewgroupshavefailedtoauditorreviewproperly.Unfortunately,thisdilemmaisnotuniquetoNineNilePoint,OtherplantswerealsosomehowlicensedwithoutthismandatoryHPCIcapability.Thatisanotherindicatorofthetypeofreviewthathastakenplaceatotherfacilitiesaswellbuteventuallytheseplantsinstalledthemandatorysystem.Themoststunningfactofthisinvestigationshowsthatafterliterallythousandsoftechnicalreviewsperformedbyhundredsof"qualifiedpersonnel"workingindifferentshifts,separatedepartments,sitesorregions,haveallfailedtostopthisfacilityfromoperatingoutsidetheminimumfederalguidelines.Everymonthduringfullpoweroperation,theHPCIsystemisverifiedoperablebya"qualified"SeniorPeactorOperatorandaswornaffidavitsubmittedeachmonthbytheUtilitytotheNPCattestingthatallrequirementshavebeenfulfilled.Obviously,thecurrentsystemofchecksandbalancescannotstopthisplantfromoperatingoutsidethesemandatoryfederalguidelines,anassumptionfalselymadebycongress.11

~I D.Pesponsibi1ities10CFR50App.BdetailstheadministrativerequirementsforTestControl,Inspections,OperatingStatus,CorrectiveAction,Pecordsand-independentAudits.TheserequirementsareaddressedinboththeTechnicalSpecificationsandFSAR;Sitespecificadministrativeproceduresdetailutilityandqualityassurancestaffpositionresponsibilities.10CFR50.70detailtheNRCinspectionswhileIOCFRS0.72detailreportnotificationresponsibilitiesforallparties.TheNRChavetheirownadministrativeprocedureswhichdetailstaffresponsibilities.NUREG-0800detailstheUSNRCtandardreviewplanforinservicetestingofpumpsandvalves.AllpartiesmentionedwererequiredtohaveknowledgeoftheHPCIrequirementsatthelevelofreviewforwhicheachindividualwasinvolved.Thesereviewsrequiremandatoryaction.Despiteallmentionedreviewsthisrequirementwasnotmet.OnJan18,1990theNiagraMohawk,NineMilePointNuclearRegulatoryComplianceGroupwereservednoticeofthisandmanyotherknownsafetyconcerns.OnJuly31,1990theNiagraMohawkQualityFirstTeamwereservedwrittennotice.TheNPCwasnotifiedandonandtheQualityFirstTeamnotifiedpetitionerthattheNRCexemptedtheutility'fromtherequirement.V.STATEMENTOFTHELA'W1.ThereisaminimumrequirementforaHighPressureCoreInje'ctionECCSSafeguardSystemattheNineMilePointUnitOnefacility.Thisrequirementcomesfromthefederalguidelines,TechnicalSpecificationsandFSARminimummandates.2.'oHighPressureCoreInjectionSystemmeetingthesafeguardfederalguidelinesexistsatNineMilePoint,UnitOne.-12-E~

3.Ifthenon-qualityrelatedfeedwatersystemwastosupposedlyfulfilltheHPCIsafetyfunction,itfailedtomettheonsiteelectricalrequirementsandmanyofthemainflowpathvalveshadneverbeenincludedintheInserviceTestProgram.4.IftheHPCISystemisnotasafeguardsystemandisnotconsideredinanyLossofCoolantAccidentAnalysesasstatedintheFSARChapterVII,thennoassumptioncanbemadethatthefuelwillremaincoveredbythemoderatorandrelatedsafetylimitssetinthecurrentlicensearenullandvoid.Obviouslyunreviewedsafetyquestionsexist.5.Congressmadeanassumptionofthecurrentchecksandbalancesthatwouldneverallowaplanttooperateoutsidetheminimumsafetyrequirementssetoutinfederalguidelines.Onthisassumption,unlikeanyotherindustry,thenuclearindustryhasbeenallowedtooperateunderlimitedliability.Theutility,QualityAssuranceGroups,NRCandChiefExecutiveOfficerhavereceivedwrittennoticeoftheirfailuretocomplywiththeminimumfederalguidelinesandhaveadministrativelyfailedtocomplywiththisissue.Asdiscussedabove,theNineMileUnitOnePlantfailstocomplywithboththeminimumfederalandNRC'srequirementsforHPCIECCSSystem.ThishasbeenacknowledgedbytheNRCStaffandisdemonstratedunequivocallybytheevidenceinthepublicrecord.Moreover,theStaffhasperformednovalidanalysisthatmeetstheCommission'snarrowcriteriaforcontinuingtooperateintheabsenceofcompliance.CompliancewithbothFederalandNPCsafetyregulationsisaprerequisitetosafeoperationofanuclearpowerplant.Infact,astheNRC'sAppealBoardhasobserved,regulatory 0r~

~~andsafety."MaineYankeeAtomicPowerComanALAB-161,6AEC1003,1009(1973).Compliancemaynotbeavoidedbyarguingthat,althoughanapplicableregulationisnotme,thepublichealthandsafetywillstillbeprotected.for,oncearegulationisadopted,thestandardsitembodiesrepresenttheCommission'sdefinitionofwhatisrequiredtoprotectthepublichealthandsafety.VermontYankeeNuclearPowerCor.ALAB-138,6AEC520,528(1973)(emphasisadded).TheCommission'sessentialsafetystandardsmustbemet,withoutregardtothecostorinconvenienceofachievingcompliance.10CF'R50.109SeealsoUnionofConcernedScientistsvNRC,824f.2d108(DCCir1987).VI~REQUESTFORRELIEFtF'rthereasonsenumeratedabove,petitionerstatesthatthefollowingreliefisrequired:A.ImmediateShutdownPendingDemonstrationofRegulatoryCompliance.Asdiscussedabove,theNineMilePointnuclearplantfailstocomplywithanarrayoffundamentalrequirementsforHPCIECCSmandatoryrequirements.Noexemptionstothisrequirementcanpossiblybejustifiedwithoutundueriskstopublicsafety.ConsistentwiththerequirementsoftheAtomicEnergyAct,F'ederalmandatoryrequirementsandNPCregulations,PetitionerthereforeseeksimmediateshutdownoftheNineMilePointunitonereactorpendingfullcompliancewiththeregulations.Inseekingthisrelief,PetitionernotesthatmaintainingECCSsystemsnecessarytometigatelossofcoolantaccidentsisaregulatorygoalthatwarrantsthemostimmediateandstringentenforcemenCaction.NineMilePoint'snoncompliancewithChefederalminimumdesigncriteriaandthe"coverup"activitiesofallresponsibleparCieswhichposesasafetyrisk-14-

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tt'fcommensurate,ifnotgraver,dimensionthanthesuspicionofECCSpipecrackingthatcausedthecommissiontoorder23plantshutdownsinl975.SeePetitionforEmerencandremedialActioniCLI78Sg7NRC400'05(i978).LiketheECCSpipecracking,thisplantdoesn'tevenhavethepipes,valvesorpumpsnecessarytometigateaknownpostulatedaccidentthateffectsknownsafetylimitsoftheFSAR.Thissystemisnecessaryforthecoolingofthecoreduringanaccidentandthissystem(whichdoesnotexist)istfleonlymeanstopreventameltdown.Again,unlikenormalECCSsystemswhichhaveredundantcomponentsandcanthereforewithstand~asinglefailure,thissystemdoesnotexistandcannotbecompensatedforbyanyothersystem.Simplyput,asmallbreakdescribedintheFSARbasesasapostulatedaccidentwillinalllikelihoodmeltdownthereactorforlackofcooling.Becausethecontainmentisnotdesignedtowithstandameltdown,such'neventwouldprobablyleadtoanuncontainedreleaseofradioactivitytothepublicenvironment.Thisutilityisnotinsuredforsuchanaccident.B.PublicHearingT.';eissuesraisedbytheNineMilePoint'snoncompliancewithfederalrequirementsraisesgravesafetyquestionsoftremendouspublicimportance.PetitionerthereforerequestthatbeforeallowingtheNineMilePointplanttocontinueoperating,theCommissionprovideforpublichearing,withrightsofdiscoveryandcrossexamination,todeterminewhetherNineMilePointisinfullcompliancewithallfederalminimumrequirementsrevelanttoHPCIandpublicsafety.Secondly,congressbenotifiedthattheadministrativecontrolsreliedupontograntthenuclearindustrytheimmunityofliabilityhavefailedtoensurepublicsafety.Afterliterallythousandsofreviewsby"qualified

personnel"fromdifferentdisciplines,departments,sitesandregionscompletedtheirreview,notonecameforwardanddemandthisplantoperatewithinthelawaslaidoutbyactofcongress.Shouldnoncompliancebefound,manyofthesereviewsdemandmandatoryactiononthepartofthereviewer.ThepetitionerhasnotifiedallresponsiblepartiesandaftertwoyearsNineMilePointUnitOnecontinuestooperateoutsidethefederalguidelinesatatremendousrisktopublicsafety.Acongressionalinvestigationofthismatterbeinitiatedimmediately.Thepetitioner'sserviceswerecontractedbyNiagraMohawktoreviewandensureadministrativecompliancetoTechnicalSpecificationpriortoStart-Up.Aqualifiedgroupoftenbeganalaboriousreviewandwhenenormousproblemsbegantoimmerge.Thisgroupwasdisbandedimmediately.InJan1990,theNiagraMohawk'sNuclearPegulatoryComplianceStaffwasgivenadetailedmemo(Attachment5)givingevidencethat45%ofthecontainmentisolationvalveshadadministrativedeficiencies.Twoweekslaterthereviewgroupwasdisbandedpriortocompletionoftheirreview.AlongwithHPCIconcerns,containmentisolationvalvesasfoundintheFSARTableVI-3haddeficiencieswithcorrespondingTechnicalSpecificationTables3.3.4h3.2.7.Thisplanthadoperatedfortwentyyearsandyetthelicensefailedtoevencorrespondtoitself,letaloneactualplantconditions.Thesevalvesarerequiredbyfederalguidelinestoprotectthepublicyetalmosthalfhaddeficiencies.Petitionerallegesthatwhenconcernsareidentified,theconcernsareroutinely"coveredup",dismissedoradministrativelyexempted.AproperreviewoftheNineMilePointUnitOneTechnicalSpecification4.0.5requirementsandthecomlianceofthe-16-lr ttestprogramswillshowthattheutilitysimplyhiredanotherreviewgroupthat(forwhateverreason)failedtodocumentthedeficienciesthattrulyexist.NineNilePointUnitOneresumedfullpoweroperationsevenafterthesafetyconcernswereidentifiedanddocumented.Thistypeofcoverupisnotuniquetothisplantandacongressionalinvestigationofthismatterbeinitiatedimmediately.~IMSUNDRYTherecanbenojustificationfortheoperationofnuclearpowerplantsoutsidetheminimumrequirementsspecifiedbyactofcongress.Thesearetheminimumrequirementsdeemednecessarybyactofcongresstogranttheimmunityofliabilitycurrentlyassumedbytheutility.WhenpublicsafetyisJeopardizedbyknownpostulatedaccidents,therecanbenojustificationforthelackofactionbytheresponsiblepartiesinthisinstance.Simplyput,thisutilityisnotinsuredtooperateinthismanner.Respectfullysubmitted,BenL.RidingsP.O.Box1101Kingston,TN37763-17-P' BIBLIOGRAPHYNODERNPOWERPLANTENGINEERING,WeismanhEckart,1985Prentice-HallInc.20V~4~10CFPSO.10,"RequirementofLicense."10CFR50.46,"Acceptancecriteriaforemergencycorecoolingsystemsforlightwaternuclearpowerreactors."10CFR50.55a,"CodesandStandards."1OCFP50.59,"Changes,testsandexperiments."6.10CFRS0.70,"Inspection,Notifications."Pecords,Reports,7.10CFRSO,AppendixA,GeneralDesignCriterion33,"Peactorcoolantmakeup."8.10CFP50,AppendixA,GeneralDesignCriterion35,"Emergencycorecooing."9.10CFP50,AppendixA,GeneralDesignCriterion36,"Inspectionofemergencycorecooingsystem."10..10CFR50,AppendixA,GeneralDesignCriterion37,"TestingofEmergencyCoreCoolingsystems."11.10CFR50,AppendixB,II."QualityAssuranceProgram"12.10CFR50,AppendixB,III."Design'Control."13.10CFR50,AppendixB,VI."DocumentControl."14.10CFR50,AppendixB,X."Inspections."1S.10CFR50,AppendixB,XI."TestControl."16.10CFP50,AppendixB,XIV."Inspection,TestandOperatingStatus."17.10CFR50,AppendixB,XVI."CorrectiveAction."18.10CFR50,AppendixB,XVII."QualityAssuranceRecords."19.10CFR50,AppendixE,F."Training."20.FederalRegister,PublicDocket:50-220,NiagraNohawk,UnitOne,NineNilePointThermalNuclearReactor.-18"

UNITEDSTATEDOFAMERICABEFOPETHENUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONAFFIDAVITOFBENL.RIDINGSI,BenL.Ridingsdomakeoathandsay:1.MynameisBenL.Ridings.Iamatechnicalconsultantforcommercialnuclearpowerplants.Overaspanofsomefifteenyears,whileworkingatsometwentyfoursites,Ihavespecializedinreviewingoflicensingagreement(FSAR,TechnicalSpecifications,FederalCodesandRegulations,ASMECodes,etc.),establishingadministrativecontrolstomeettheserequirementsandtestprogramstoensurecomplianceatalltimes.Mytestprogramsandadministrativecontrolsestablishedwhileundercontracttovariousutilitiesarestillinusetodayatmanyfacilities.2.IhavereviewedalloftherelevantpubliclyavailablecorrespondencebetweentheNucIearRegulatoryCommissionandNiagraMohawkduringtherelvanttimespan.IamfamilarwithNRCregulationsandregulatoryguidancegoverningHighPressureCoreInjection.3.ThefactualstatementmadeintheattachedPetitionforEmergencyActionandRequestforpublicHearingaretrueandcorrecttothebestofmyknowlegeandbelief.BenL.RidingsSubscribedandsworntobeforemethis~l~dayofQf~,1992.Mycommisionexpires:

l'C PartSO,App.ACtffcr(oa2y~oscbfscctrcacffo(fycosftofsysfctssCapabQ(fy.TheteactlvltycontrolsystemsshaBbedesignedtohaveacorn.binedcapabUlty.InconiuncUonwithpoisonaddIUonbytheemergencycorecooUngsystem.ofreOablyconttoOIngreactivitychangestoassurethatunderpostulatedac-cidentconditionsandwithappropriatemarginforstudcrodsthecapabOItytocool'hecorelsmaintained.CHfcrfoa3d-Reac(fv(fyI(scffa.Thereac-Uvitycontrolsystemsshallbedesignedwith~pptoprlateOmitsonthcpotentISIamount~ndrateofteactlvltyIncreasetoassurethatthccffcctsofPos'LUlatcdtcscUvI(yaccidentscanneither(1)resultlndamagetoLhereac-torcoolantpressureboundarygreaterthanUmltedlocalyieldingnor(2)suffidentlydis-'CUtbChcco~ltssupportsttUCLUfcsorotherreactorpressurevesselInternalstoImpairslgnlflcanUythecayabOltytocoolthecore.ThesepostuiatedreacUvltyacci-dentsshaBIndudeconsiderationofrodefecUon(unlesspreventedbypositivemeans),roddropout,stcamUnerupture.changesinreactorcoolanttemperatureandpressure,andcoldwateraddIUon.Crffctfoa29-Aefccffoaapafastastfcfpa(cdopcraffosafoccsttcsceaTheprotec-tionandreactivitycontrolsystemsshaBbedesignedtoassureanexttcmdyhighproba-blUtyolaccomplishingtheirsafetyfunc-tionsIntheeventolantldpatedoperationalIV.ilsMSystemsCrffcrfoa3P-Qsalffyofrcacforcoolastprcssurebousdary.Componentswhicharepattofthereactorcoolantpressurebounda-ryshaBbedesigned.fabricated,erecLed,andtestedtothehighestquaUtystandardsptac-tlcaLMeansshaBbeprovidedfordeLectlng'and.toCheextentpracUcaLIdenUfylngthelocationofthesourceofreactorcoolantleakage.Crffcr(oa31-Ftacfstcpretpcsffoaofreacforcooiaafprcssurebousdary.ThereactorcoolantpressureboundaryshaBbedesigned<<lthsufiIdentmargintoassurethatwhensttc55cdunderopclaUng.maintenance.tc5L-inC,andpostulatedacddentconditions(1)theboundarybehaveslnanonbrfttiemannersnd(2)U1cytobabOIL7offapidlypropagatingftsctutcisminI111IzccLThcdesignshaBreflectconsiderationofservicetemPeraturesandotherconditionsoftheboundarymatetMunderoperaUnc,mainte-nance,testing,andpostulatedacddentcon-ditionsandtheuncertaintiesIndetermining(I)1nstctialptopcttics,(2)UlccffcctsofIt~,radlaUononmaterialproperties.(2)residu-al,steadystateandCranslentstresses,and(4)SIseofQawLCrffet(oa32-laspccffoaqfreacforcoo(-Oatyrcsssreboesdary.ComponentswhkharepartofthereactorcoolantpressureboundaryshaBbedcslgncdCopermit(1)54610CFRCh.1(11~Ed.II)periodicInspectionandtesUngofImportantateassndfcaLutestoassesstheirstructuralandleaktightIntegrity,and(2)anSpytoprI.atematerialsutveOlanceprogramforthereactorprcssutcvesseLCrffcrfos33-Rcacforcoo(Oaftsakcup,hsystemtoSUPPlyreactorcoolantmakeupforprotectionagainsCsmallbreaksInthereactorcoolantpressureboundaryshallbeprovidecLThesystemsafetyfuncUonshallbetoassurethatspecifiedacceptablefueldesignOmitsarenoLexceededasaresultofreactorcoolantlossduetoleakagefromthereactorcoolantpressureboundaryandrup-tureofsmaUpipingorothersmaUcompo.ncntswhichatcpartoftheboundary.Thesystemshallbedesignedtoassurethatfotonslteelectrkpowersystemoperation(as-sumingoffslicpowerlstloCsvsOsblc)sndforoffslteelectricPowersystemopetatlon(assumingonsltepowerIsnotavaOable)LhesystemsafetyfuncUoncanbeaccomplishedU5lngU1cplyingipumps,sndvsivc5115cdtomaintaincoolantInventoryduringnorma)reactoroperation.Crffcr(os34-Rcsfdaalheafmnooaf.hsystemCotcmoveresidualheatshaBbepro.videcLThesystemsafetyfunctionSMlbctotransferfhsionproductdecayheatandothertesldualheatfromthereactotcoreatarateaudithatspedfledacceptablefueldesignOmitsandthedesignconditionsofthereactorcoolantptcmuteboundaryarenotexceedecLSuitableredundancyIncomponentsandfeatures,andsuitableIntetconnecUons,leakdetecUon.andISOISUoncayabOltlesshaBbeprovidedtoassureChatforonslteelectricpowersystemoperaUon(assumingoffsltepower15noLsvsOablc)andfoFoffslicclcctricpowersystemoperaUon(amumlngonsltepowerlsnotavaOable)thesystemsafetyfuncUoncanbeaccompUshccLassum-IngasinglefaOure.Crffer(oa39-Esccrpescycorecooifsp.hsystemtoprovideabundantemercencycorecooOngshaBbeptovideLThesystemsafetyfunctionshallbeCotransferheatfromthereactorcorefoUowinganylossofreactorcoolantatiratesuchthat(1)fuelandcladdamagethaLcouldInterferewithcontfriuedeffectivecoteceoUng15preventedand(2)dsdmeta)-waterrcactkaIshltedLonegU-glbleamounts.Suitabletcdundaneylncomponentsandfeatures.andsuitableInterconnections.leakdetection.ISOISUon.andcontainmenteapa-bOitlesshallbeprovidedtoassurethatforonsiicelectrkpowersystemoperation(as~sumingoffsltepowerhnotavaOable)andforoffslteelectricpowersystemoperaUon(assUnllngon5ltcpowct!5notavaOablc)ChcsystemsafeLyfuncUoncanbeaccompUshed.assursfngasingkfaOure.Crffcrfoa3g-fsspccffosOfesacrpescycorecooffspsysfcts.TheemergencycotegudcotRegulat1s~gUngsystemshappropriatepctlotantcomponents.~totptcssUfcvdes.Sndpiping.tCpabOItyofthe5-Ct(ktios3t-2'spsys(cpsT~Lcmshallbcdc.Stcperiodicprem'Losmutc(I)thc5'Legtityofitscolnl1andperformance.Ofthesystem,ansystemas~whol;dosetodesignas.Of,U1cfUllopera>thi.systeminto~UonofappUca'ILionsystem,th>>indemergencyp;ationofthe~.",.Cr(kt(os39-(,hsystemtorett.containmentshs-'afetyfunctionconststentwith1sodatedsystems'andtemperature;intacddentaniablylowlevels..':1Sultableredu.'features,andsuI'detection,IsolatibQltlesshaBbec.iinslteelectricI,sumlngoffslte.foroffsiteelect~(assumingonsit.SystemMetyf1assumingasing~Crifcr(oa39-'eatrc1sooaf5)removalsystemi~ayproprlatcpetantcomponen'.spray'nozzles,c'.tegrltyandcapCr(ter(oagp-tcmooafsysfnrmovalsystem~yproprlatepe~1testingto~leaktlghtInte>theoperabOlt~ctlvecompontheoperablUt:andunderconaspracticaltoperationalsaIntooperationcableportionstransferbetwpowersourcessodatedcooUrCt(tv{osckasup.Syst

~p~>

)1-l-88Edition)aineofbnportanLsstheirstructura)4(2)anappropri-programfortheoolanlmakcu)LAcoolantmakeupsallbreaksIntheboundaryshallbeetyfunctionshaDacceptablefuelcdedasaresultof>leakagefromthe,boundaryandcup.thersmaDcompo.heboundary.Thetoassurethatforwmoperation(as-notavailable)andsystemoperation:noLavailable)the,nbeaccomplhhedandvalvesusedto)ryduringnormal'ealremoval.AIheatshallbeyro-~functionshaDbeetdecayheatandthereactorcoreatcdacceptablefueleslgnconditionsofsureboundaryarennantsandarcs.ectlons,leak.mpabIDUesshaDbeforonslteelectric>(assumineoffsiteendforoffslCeelec-eraUon(assumingst)able)thesystemxompllshed.assum-icycorecoo(lap.AantemergencycoreLThesystemsafetyssferheatfromthe~nyIosso!reactorsat(l)fuelandcladferewithcontinuedrpreventedand(2)nhlimitedtoncgll-tncomponentsand.terconnectlons,leakIcontabunentcapa-dLoassurethaLfotistemoperation(as-snotavailable)andersystemoperationhnotavailable)thecanbeaccomplished..((onofcmcrpencytheemergencycore4lgNuciaarRegulatoryCommissioncoolingsystemshallbedesignedtopermitappropr(atePeriodicInspecUonoftantcomponent@,suchassprayringsInthereactorpressurevessel,waterIniectlonnas-zles.andpiping.toassuretheIntegrityandcapabilityofthesystem.Cr((cr(on2F-Tcrtfnpofemerpencycorecool(opsystem.TheemergencycorecoollnesystemshaDbedesignedtopermitapproprl-ateperiodicPressureandfuncUonaltestingtoassure(l)thestructuralandleaktightIn-tegrityofitscomponents.(2)theoperabllltyandperformanceoftheactivecomponentsofthesystem.and(3)theoperabllltyofthesystemasawholeand.undercondfUonsasdosetodesbcnaspractical,theperformanceofthefuDoperationalsequencethatbringsthesystemIntooperation.Includingoper.ationofapplicableportionsoftheyrotec-Uonsystem.LhetransferbeCweennormalandemergencypowersources,andtheoper-ationoftheasscclatedcoolingwatersystem.Cry(sr(on4d-Con(a(nmcn(healremoval.AsysLemtoremoveheatfromthereactorcontainmentshallbeprov(ded.Thcsystemsafetylunctlonshallbetoreducerapidly.conshtentwiththelunctlonlneofotheras.sodatedsystems.thecontalrunentpressureandtemyeraLurefollowingan)rl~fwool.antacddentandmaintainthematacceptablylowleveh.Suitableredundancylncomponentsandfeatures.andsuitableInterconnections.leakdetection.Isolation.andcontainmentcaya-bllltlesshallbeyrovidedtoassurethaCforonsiteelectricPowersystemoperaUon(as-sumingof!sitepowerhnotavailable)indforof!siteelectr@powersystemoperation(assumingonsltepowerIsnotavailable)thesystemsafetyfunctioncanbeaccomplhhed,assumingaslnelc!allure.Crffcr(on39-fnspcc((oaqfconte(amen(heatremeltsystem.ThecontainmentheatremoralsystemshaDbedesignedtapermit~ppiopr(ateperiodicInspectionofImportantcomponents.suchasthetorus,sumps,spraynuules.andplplnetaassurethein-.tegrityandcapabilityofthesystem.Cr((cr(oa40-Tcsflnpo/con(a(nmca(healremovalsys(cm.Thecontainmentheatre-movalsystemshallbedesignedtopermitapprayrhCcperlodlcpressureandfunction-sltestingtoassure(l)thestrucLuralandleaktlghtIntegrityofItscomponents.(2)theoperabilityandpecformanceoftheactivecomponentsofChesystem.and(3).theoperabllltyofthesystemasawhole.andunderconditionsascloseLothedesign~spracticaltheperformanceo!ChefulloperationalsequencethatbringsCh'esystemIntooperatio'n.IndudlngoperaUonofappli-cableportionsoftheprotectionsystem.thetransferbeLweennormalandemergencypowersources.andthe.operationoftheas,:'odatedcooDn'gwatersystem.CH(erfonef-Con(a(nmcala(mosphcredeans~Systemstocontrolfhsionprod-Part50,AppAuctshydrogenoxygenandothersub-stanceswhichmaybereleasedintothereac-torcontainmentshaDbeprovidedasneces-sarytoreduce.conshtentwiththefunctlon-Ingofotherassociatedsystems.theconcen-'trationandqualityo!fhsionproductsre-leasedtothcenvironmentfollowingpostu-latedaccidents,andtocontroltheconcen-trationofhydrogenoraxygenandothersubstancesInthecontainmentatmospherefollowlnepostulatedaccidentstoassurethatcontainmentlnteerILyhmaintained.EachsystemshaDhavesuitableredundan.cyIncomponentsandfeatures,andsuitableInterconnections.leakdetection,Isolation,andconLalnmenLcapabilitiestaassureChat(oronslteelectricpo~ersystemoperaUon(assumingof!sitepowerhnatavailable)andforof!sitedcctricyowersystemoperaLlon(assumtneonsltepowerhnotavailable)ILssafetyfunctioncanbeaccomplhhed.assum;Ingasingle!allure.Cr((er(oa42-laspcc((onofcon(a(nmca(a(morphcrecleanupsyslcms.Thecontaln-mentatmospherecleanupsystemsshaDbedesignedtopermitapprapHateyeriodh'In-spectlonofbnyortantcomponents.suchasfilterfcames.ducts,andpipingCoassuretheIntegrityandcapablDtyo!thesystema,Cr(ter(on43-Tcstfnpofconfafnmenta!-maryheredeanupsysfemaThecontainmentatmospheredeanupsystemsshaDbede-signedtopermitappropriateperiodicpres.sureandfunctionaltestingtoassure(1)thestructuralandleakUghtlntegrlLyolItscom-ponents.(2)theoperabilityandperfonn-anceofthe'ctlrecomponentsofthesys-temssuchasfans.filters,dampecs.pumps.~ndralvesand(3)theoperabOItyofthesys-temsasawholeand.undercondIUonsasclosetodesignaspracUca).theperfonnanceofthefulloperationalsequencethatbringsthesystemsIntaoperation.IndudlngoperationofapplicableyorUonsaftheyroteo.tlonsystem.thetransferbetweennormalandemergencypowersources.andtheoper-ationofassodatedsystems.Cr(fer(oa4S-Cool(nproofer.Asystemtotransferheatfromstructures,systems,andcomponentsbnportanttasafety,toanulti-mateheaCsinkshaDbeprovided.ThesystemsafetyfunctionshaDbetatransfer\hecombinedheaLloadofthesestcuctures.systems.andcomponentsundernormalop-eratingandacddentconditiona,Suitableredundancylncomponentsandfeatures.andsuitableInterconnecUons.leakdetection.andholatloncapabilitiesshallbeprovidedtaassurethatforonslteelectricpowersystemoperation(assumingoffsitepowerhnot'available)andforof!siteelec.tricpowersystemoyeraUon(assumingonsltepowerhnotavaDable)thesystemsafety!uncUoncanbeaccomplhhed.assum-Ingasingle!allure.

\

LIHITINGCONDITIONFOROPERATIOHSURVEILLANCEAE(UIAEHLHT~A3.1.8IIIQIPRESSURECOOLANTIJECTIOHAicabiit;Appliestotheoperationalstatusofthehighpressurecoolantinjectionsyst~a.;O~bectiva:Toassurethecapabilityofthehighpressurecoolantinjectionsystemtocoolreactorfuelintheeventofa1oss-of-coolantaccident.~liii)ggxf~~~e1a.Ouringthepoweroperatingcon-ditionwheneverthereactorcoolantpressureisgreaterthan110psigandthereactorcoolanttemperaturegreaterthansaturationtemperature,thehighpressurecoolantinjectionsystemshallbeoperableexceptasspecifiedinSpecification"b"below.b.Ifaredundantcomponentofthehighpressurecoolantinjectionsystembecomesinoperablethehighpressurecoolantinjectionshallbeconsideredoperableprovl~ledthatthecomponentisreturnedtoanoperableco>>ditionwltl>>n15daysandtheadditionalsur-vei1lancerequiredIsperformed.4.1.8lllGIIPAESSUAECOOLANTINJECTIONA~ilAppliestotheperiodictesti>>grequire>>iuntsforthehighpressurecoola>>ti>>juctiu>>systume~0bective:Toverifytheoperabilityofthehighpressurecoolantinjectionsystem.~Sec(fication:Thehighpressurecoolantinjectionsur-veillanceshallbeperformedasindicatedbelow:a.At1eastEnny1'.-ae~aBIIQ".-cycie=.g~Ail~<AA)AAAe~~)LMAutomaticstart-upofthehii)hpressurecoolantinjectio>>systemshallbudemon-strated.A.APumpoperabilityshallbodutermI>>ud.71 JIJ' S~UAfJLAt{C~f(}lJJJEML'N'Ic.lfSpecification"a"and"b"arenotmet,anormalorderlyshutdownshallbeinitiatedM>thinonehourandreactorcoolantpressureandtemp-eratureshallbereducedtolessthan110psigandsaturationtemperaturewithin24hours.c.SurveillancewithI~noarableCo>>>l>>>auntWhenacomponentbecomesl>>operabioitsredundantcompo>>antshallbudeulonstrdtudtobeoperablei>>mediatelyanddailjthereafter.

XJ~7 BASESFOR3.1.8AKD4.).8HTGH'PRESSURECOOLAKTIKJB.i)OKIHighPressureCoolantIn5ectionSystem(HPCl)isprovidedtoqnsureadequatecorecoolingintheunlike)yeventofa))reactorcoolant))hebreak.TheHPClSystem.isrequired.forlinebreakswhichexceedthecapabilityofthentrolRodDrivepumpsandwhicharenotlargeenoughtoallo~'fast'enoughdepressurizationforcorespraytobefective.esetofhighpressurecoolantin)ectionpumpsconsistsofacondensatepump,afeedwaterboosterpumpandamotorivenfeedwaterpump.Onesetofpumpsiscapableofdeliver)ng3,000gpmtothereactorvesselatreactoressure.TheperformancecapabilityofHPCIaloneandincon]unctionwithothersystemstoprovideadequatecore~olingforaspectrumoflinebreaksisdiscussedintheFifthSupplementoftheFSAR.ideterminingtheoperabilityofth~HPClSystem,therequiredperformancecapabilityofvariouscomponentsshallbe>ns)dered.~TheHPClSystemshal'lbecapableofmeetingitspumpheadversusflowcurve.Themotordrivenfeedwaterpumpshallbecapableofautomaticinitiationuponreceiptofeitheranautomaticturbinetripsignalorreactor)ow-water-)eve)signal..~TheCondenserhotwe)l~eve)shallnotbelessthan57inches(75,000gallons).e~)'heCondensatestoragetanksinventoryshallnotbelessthan105,000gallons.-Themotor-drivenfeedwaterpumpwillautomatlcal)ytripifreactorhigh~aterleve)issustainedfortensecondsandtheassociatedpumpdownstreamflowcontrolvalveand)owf)owcontrolvalvearenotclosed.ir)ngreactorstart-up,operationandshutdown,thecondensateandfeedwaterboosterpumpsareinoperation.At.actorpressuresupto450psig,thesepumpsarecapableofsupplyingtherequired3,800gpm.Above450pslga)tor-dr)yen-feedwaterpumpisnecessarytuprovidetherequiredf)owrate.secapabilityofthecondensate,feedwa'oosterandmotordrivenfeedwaterpumpswillbedemonstratedbytheirterat)onaspartofthefeedwatersupplyduringnormalstationoperation.Stand-bypumpswillbep)acedinservicetleastquarterlytosupplyfeedwaterduringstationoperation.Anautomaticsysteminitiationtestwil)beerformedatleastonceperoperatingcycle.Thiswl)linvolveautomaticstartingofthemotordrivenfeedwaterpumps~dflowtothereactorvessel.RevisedOctober1,190673 IJl l~)))yI.HIGH-PRESSURECOOLANTINJECTION1.0DesinBasesThehigh-pressurecoolantinjection(HPCI)systemisanoperating'odeofthefeedwatersystemavailableintheeventofasmallreactorcoolantlinebreakwhiche'xceedsthecapabilityofthecontrolroddrivepumps(0.003ft2).HPCIalongwithoneemergencycoolingsystemhasthecapabilityofkeepingtheswollenreactorcoolantlevelabovethetopofactivefuelforsmallreactorcoolantboundarybreaksupto0.07ft2foratleast1000seconds.TheHPCIsystemwithoneofthetwoemergencycoolingsystemsandtwocorespraysystems,willprovidecorecoolingforthecompletespectrumofbreaksizesuptothemaximumdesignbasisrecirculationdischargelinebreak(5.446ft2).Itsprimarypurposeisto:a.provideadequatecoolingofthereactorcoreunderabnormalandaccidentconditions.Rev.72.0b.removetheheatfromradioactivedecayandresidualheatfromthereactorcoreatsucharatethatfuelcladmeltingwouldbeprevented.c.provide,forcontinuityofcorecoolingoverthecompleterangeofpostulated"breaksizesintheprimarysystemprocessbarrier.HPCIisnotanengineeredsafeguardssystemandisnotconsideredinanyLossofCoolantAccidentAnalyses.Itisdiscussedinthissectionbecauseofitscapabilitytoprovidemakeupwateratreactoroper'atingpressure.~t.tTheHPCIsystemutilizesthetwocondensatestoragetanks,.themaincondenserhotwell,twocondensatepumps,condensatedemineralizers,twofeedwaterboosterpumps,feedwaterheaters,twomotor-drivenfeedwaterpumps,anintegratedcontrolsystemandallassociatedpipingandvalves.Thesystemiscapableofdelivering7600gpmintothereactorvesselatreactorpressurewhenusingtwotrainsoffeedwaterpumps.Thecondensateandfeedwaterboosterpumpsarecapableofsupplyingtherequired3,800gpmatapproximatelyreactorpressuresupto270psig.Above270psigamotor-drivenfeedwaterpumpisnecessarytoprovidetherequiredflowrate.Rev.7Rev.7Rev.7 F

VII-61aThefeedwatersystempumpshaverecirculationlineswithairoperatedflowcontrolvalvestopreventthepumpsfromoperatingagainstaclosedsystem.Intheeventoflossofairpressure,thesevalvesopenrecyclingpartoftheHPCIflowtothehotwell.HPCIflowwouldbereducedtoapproximately3,000gpmatareactorpressureof1,150psigand3,800gpmatareactorpressureof940psig.Condensateinventoryismaintainedatanavailableminimumvolumeof180,000gallons.Rev.7'.0OesinEvaluationDuringaloss-of-coolantaccidentwithinthedrywell,highdrywellpressureduetoalinebreakwillcauseareactorscram.Thisautomaticscramwillcauseaturbinetripafte-afive-seconddelay.Inordertopreventcladdingtemperaturesfromexceedingtheirmaximumlimitfortheentirespectrumofbreaks,the3800gpm<fromonetrainofHPCI/feedwaterpumps)wouldhavetobeavailableimmediately.Feedwaterflowwouldbeavailableforconsiderabletimefromtheshaft-drivenfeedwaterpump.Theshaft-drivenfeedwaterpumpshouldcoastdownawhiletheelectricmotor-drivencondensatepumpsandfeedwaterboosterpumpswouldcontinuetooperate.Thecoastdowntimetoreach3,800gpmdeliverytothecoreisapproximately3;2minutes(FigureVII-17),sinceboththecondensateandfeedwaterboosterpumpswillcontinuetooperateonoff-sitepower.Theturbinetripwillsignalthemotor-drivenfeedwaterpumptostart.Thesignalwillbesimultaneouswiththestartoftheshaftpumpcoastdown.Themotor-drivenfeedwaterpumpwillbeupto'peedandcapableofsupplying3,800gpminabouttenseconds.Asabackup,lowreactorwaterlevelwillalsosignalthemotor-drivenpumptostart.Theinitiati'onsignaltransferscontrolfromthenormalfeedwatertotheHPCIinstrumentationandcontrollerwhichhasbeencontinuouslytrackingthenormalfeedwatercontrolsignal.Thustherewillbeacontinuoussupplyoffeedwatertothereactor.TheHPCIsingleelementcontrolsystemwillattempttomaintainreactorvesselwaterlevelat65inchesor72inches(dependinguponwhichpump,11or12respectively,isinservice)withamaximumfeedwaterflowlimitof3800gpm.Rev.7 P't VII-62Asustainedhighreactorwaterlevelreactorprotectionsystemsignalcoincidentwithanopenfeedwaterflowcontrolvalvewillselectivelytriptheassociatedfeedwaterpump.Theclutchoftheshaft-drivenpumpwillalsobedisengagedimmediatelyuponhighreactorwaterlevel.Shouldthereactorwaterlevelreachthelo'wlevelscramsetpointthemotordrivenpumpthattrippedonhighreactorwaterlevelwi11restart.Hecessaryfeedwaterpumprecirculationisprovidedtoallowforcontinuedpumpoperationwiththeflowcontrolvalveclosed.Asfeedwaterispumpedoutofthecondenserhotwell,through'heselectedequipmentofthecondensateandfeedwatersystemsandintothereactor,thecondenserhotwe'lllevelwillfall.Sincecondensedsteamfromtheturbinenolongerreplenishesthecondenserhotwell,condensatewillbetransferredfromthecondensatestoragetankstothehotwellformakeup.Thefeedwatersystempumpsoperateon4160v.Hhentheplant.isinoperation,thepowerissuppliedfromthemaingeneratorthroughthestationservicetransformerwhenthegeneratorison-lineandconnectedtothegrid.Hhenthemaingeneratorisoff-line,thefeedwaterpumpsaresuppliedwithnormaloff-sitepowerfromthe115KVsystemthroughthereservetransformers.IfaHPCIinitiationsignalshould,occur,allHPCI/feedwatersystempumpswouldstartimmediatelywithtwofeedwaterpumptrainsavailableforHPCIinjectionusingthesingleelementfeedwatercontrolsystemforreactorvessellevelcontrol.Ifamajorpo~erdisturbanceweretooccurthatresultedinlossofthe115KVpowersupplytotheNineHilePoint115KVbus,powerwouldberestoredfromageneratorlocatedattheBennettsBridgeHydroStation.Thisgeneratorwouldhavethecapacityofsupplyingapproximately6,000KVAwhichissufficienttooperateonetrainofHPCI/feedwater.systempumps.IfHPCIinitiationweretooccur,thepreferredfeedwatertrainpumps(feedwaterpump12,feedwaterboosterpump13,condensatepump13)wouldstart.Thenon-preferredtrainpumps,wouldbelockedoutonlossofoff-sitepowerandnotstartuntiltheoperatormanuallyresetthelockout.Ifapreferredtrainpumphadbeenlockedoutpriortothelossofoff-sitepower,itwouldremainlockedoutandthenon-preferredtrainbackuppumpwouldautomaticallystartonHPCIinitiation.Ifboththepreferredandbackuppumpsarerunning,thepreferredpumpwouldremaininserviceandthebackuppumpwilltrip.TheRev.7 4A~tg VII-62auseofaBennettsBridgehydrogenerator,whilenotequivalenttoanon-siteemergencypowersource,providesahighlyreliablealternateoff-sitepowersupplyfortheHPCIfunctionofthefeedwatersystem.4.0TestsandInsectionsev7TestsandinspectionsofthevariouscomponentsaredescribedinSectionXI-SteamtoPowerConversion.

al~

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AIriAo 1If)pt~C~Mn)7)......F5'AR.Gait+,.~-...'R4~d'TS.Vglgle,a.v.~.~(~~a.~~.cv(ko)u~s(.~(~em.~~v-......FIP~MH:..~..~kJAC~VArnid&/p.AEk)hfcg~r~~-W Inyt'I MEMOFORYOURFILESOct27,1992TO:U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissonExecutiveDirectorforOperationsPublicDocumentRoomi7i7HStreetWashington,DC20555FROM:BenL.RidingsP.O.Boxii0iKingston,TN37763Ref:PetitionpursuantiOCFR2.206

DearSirs:

EnclosedforfilingPETITIONFOREMERGENCYENFORCEMENTACTIONANDREQUESTFORPUBLICHEARING.Respectfullysubmitted,BenL.RidingsCg

UNITEDSTATEDOFAMERICABEFORETHENUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONPETITIONFOREMERGENCYENFORCEMENTACTIONANDREQUESTFORPUBLICHEARINGI.INTRODUCTIONI,BENL.RIDINGS(hereinafter"Petitioner")herebypetitiontheCommissionersoftheNuclearRegulatoryCommission("NRC"or"Commission")foremergencyenforcementactionagainstNiagraMohawk'sNineMile(UnitOne)Nuclearpowerplant,whichisoperatinginviolationofboththeNRCandFederalrequirementsforavailabilityofEmergencyCoreCooling(ECCS)highpressurecoreinjection.AsanECCSsystem,theNineMileplantalsofailstoprovidethemandatoryemergencybackuppowertothehighpressurecoreinjection(HPCI)system.OverthetwentyyearstheNineMileOneplanthasbeenallowedtooperate,nosafetyrelatedpumpshaveeverbeenavailabletoinjectwaterintothevesselatreactorpressure.Atthesametimethisplantwasallowedtooperateatfullpower,therearemanypostulatedaccidentsassumedintheFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(thatarecapableofdrainingthereactorvessel)andspecificallyrelyontheECCSHPCIPumpstomaintainreactorwaterlevel.Thesepumpshaveneverbeeninstalledandthecurrentadministrativecontrolsallowedthisplanttooperateoutsidetheminimumfederalrequirement.Thisspecifictypeofplantoperationoutsidetheknownminimumfederalrequirementsgreatlyendangershealthandpropertyrisktothepublic.Asdiscussedindetailbelow,theresponsibleutility,itsQualityAssurancegroupandtheNRChaveroutinelyfailedintheirresponsibilitytoensuretheoperationofnuclearpowerplantswithinthelicenseagreementsEvenwhenproblemsareidentified,documentedandbroughttotheattentionoftheresponsibleparties,varioussafetyconcernsareroutinelydismissed,ignoredor

'f'f7 administrativelyeliminated.Evenissueswhichobviouslyendangerpublicsafetyhavebeenroutinelydismissed,notonlybytheutilitybutsuchactionsauthorizedandapprovedbytheindependentqualityassurancegroupsandbytheNRC.Anyandalloftheseorganizationshavetheauthoritytostoptheoperationofplantsoutsidetheminimumsafetyrequirements,andnotonehavecomeforwardtofulfillitsduty,andprotectthepublic.Instead,eachorganizationhasreviewedtheenclosedsafetyconcernsandcontrarytoanypracticaljustification,haveremainedsilentandallowedthismannerofplantoperationtotakeplacewiththeirapproval,givinqevidencethatthesegroupshavealsofailedtoremainindependentofeachother.Independentreviewbynotonlythegovernmentagencybutthequalityassurancereviewgroupsisthebasicpremisewhichallowedcongresstograntoperationofcommercialnuclearpowerplantswithlimitedliabilityfordamages.Thecurrentadministrativecontrolsusedtodayfailedtoensuretheplantoperatewithintheminimumfederalguidelines.ItisCongress'sdutytoprotectpublicsafetyanditscurrentadministrativecontrolshavefailed.BecausetheNineNilePointUnitOneReactorviolatesbothfederallawandtheCommissions'srequirementsforHIGHPRESSURECOREINJECTION,theCommissioncanmakenofindingthatthereisresonableassuranceofnounduerisktopublichealthandsafety.PetitionerthereforerequestthattheCommissionissueimmediatelyaneffectiveorderdirectingthelicenseetoceasepoweroperationandplacethereactorinacoldshutdowncondition.Theplantshouldnotbepermittedtocontinueorresumeoperationunlessanduntilsubsequenttestsandinspectionsareshowntoprovidetherequisitereasonableassuranceofnounduerisktopublichealthandsafety.Moreover,Petitionersseekapublichearingbeforetheplantisallowedtooperateagain.

II.DESCRIPTIONOFPETITIONERI,BenL.Ridings,amatechnicalconsultantforcommercialnuclearpowerplants.Overaspanofsomefifteenyears,whileworkingatsometwentyfoursites,Ihavespecializedinreviewingoflicensingagreement(FSAR,TechnicalSpecifications,FederalCodesandRegulations,ASMECodes,etc.),establishingadministrativecontrolstomeettheserequirementsandtestprogramstoensurecomplianceatalltimes.Mytestprogramsandadministrativecontrolsestablishedwhileundercontracttovariousutilitiesarestillinusetodayatmanyfacilities.III.THECOMMISSIONSHOULDEXERCISEITSSUPERVISORYJURISDICTIONOVERTHISPETITIONA.TheCommissionhasanInherentSupervisoryJurisdictionovertheSafetyofOperationoftheNiagraMohawkNineMilePlant.ThispetitionisbroughtbeforetheCommissionpursuanttotheauthoritygrantedtoitin42USC2233(d),2236(a),2237and10CFR2.204,2.206(c)(1),50.54,50.57,50.100and50.109.ItinvokestheinherentsupervisoryauthorityoftheCommissiontooverseeallaspectsoftheregulatoryandlicensingprocessandits"overridingresponsibilityforassuringpublichealthandsafetyintheoperationofnuclearpowerfacilities."ConsolidatedEdisonCoo.ofN.Y.Inc.(IndianPoint,Units1,2and3).CLI-75-8,2NRC173(1975).AstheCommissionhaspreviouslyobserved,itssupervisorypowersincludethepowertoorderimmediateshutdownofafacility"ifthepublichealthorsafetysorequires."PetitionforEmerencandRemedialAction,CLI-78-6,7NRC400,405(1978),citing5USC558(c),42USC2236(b),10CFR2.202(f),2.204.

"4iq(,)'

TheCommissionhasexerciseditsinherentauthorityonanumberofoccasions.Inadditiontotheceasescitedabove,seePetitionforResearchandDevelomentAdministration(ClinchRiverBreederReactorProject),CLI-76-i3,4NRC67,75-76(i976);ConsumersPowerCo.(NidlandUnitsiand2),CLI-73-38,6AECi084(i973);PublicServiceCo.ofNewH~amshire(SeabrookNuclearPoserStation,Units1and2),CLI-77-S,5NRC503,5i5-5i7(i977).B.ExerciseoftheCommissions'sIndependentJurisdictionisAppropriateinThisCase.NRCregulationsatiOCFR2.206providethatunderordinarycircumstances,enforcementpetitionsaretobelodgedwiththeNRCStaff,andthattheCommissionmaytakediscretionaryreviewofStaffdenialsofsuchpetitions.However,theCommissions'sreviewingpower"doesnotlimitinanyway"its"supervisorypoweroverdelegatedStaffactions",iOCFR2.206(c)(i)~ItisappropriateforthecommissiontoexerciseitssupervisorypowersandtakejurisdictioninthiscasebecausetheNRCStaffhasacquiescedtoNiagraMohawks'iolationsformorethantwoyears.InJani990,NiagraMohawkComplianceSupervisorwasgivenwrittennoticeofHPCIandotherinadequacieswhicheffectpublicsafety.Afternoapparentaction,theNineNileQualityFirstTeamwasalsogivennotice.PetitionerwaslaternotifiedbytheQualityFirstTeamthattheNRChadbeencontactedandmadeawareoftheproblemaswell.PetitionerwaslatercontactedbytheQualityFirstTeamandtoldthattheNRChadexemptedtheplantfromtheHPCIrequirementanditsneedforbackuppowerintheeventoflossofpower.PetitionerhasyettoheardirectlyfromtheNRConthismatter.

IV.GROUNDSFORENFORCEMENTACTIONA.FederalRequirementsforhavingradioactivefuelsons'iteInaccordancewith10CFR50.10,theutilityNiagraMohawkenteredintocontractualagreementwiththefederalgovernmentundertheprovisionsofpublicdocument50-220,onfilewiththefederalregister.Nowunderthejurisdictionof10CFR50,App.A(GeneralDesignCriteria),establishtheminimumrequirementsfortheprincipaldesignforwatercoolednuclearpowerplant.Criterion33and35(Attachment2)specifytheminimumneedthatasystemtoprovideabundantemergencycorecoolingshallbeprovided.Thesystemsafetyfunctionshallbetotransferheatfromthereactorcoreandmusthavesuitableredundancyincomponentsandonsiteelectricpowersystem(assumingoffsitepowerisnotavailable)whichwillenablethesafetyfunctiontobeaccomplished.Also(Criterion33),asystemtosupplyreactorcoolantmakeupforprotectionagainstsmallbreaksinthereactorcoolantpressureboundaryshallbeprovided.Criterion37providesthetestingrequirementsoftheemergencycorecoolingsystem.10CFR70detailstheutilityandNRCresponsibilityfortestingandinspectionofthesesystemsand10CFR50App.B(QualityAssuranceCriteria)detailstheQualityAssuranceProgramandtheadministrativerequirementsforInspections,TestControl,OperatingStatus,CorrectiveActionandRecords.B.AStudyofContractualAgreement(docket50-220)Inaccordancewith10CFR50.34,thetechnicalspecificationshallperformanevaluationofthesafetyeffectivenessofprovidingforseparationofhighpressurecoolantinjection(HPCI)andreactorcoreisolationcooling(RCIC).ThisinvestigationfoundtheNileMilePointTechnicalSpecificationincompliancewiththisrequirement.TechnicalSpecification4.1.8(Attachment3)givespositiveproofthattheECCS

requirementfortheHPCIsystemwasanticipatedbythedesigners.Secondly,thecorrespondingLimitingConditionforOperation(LCO)3.1.8.c(Attachment3)viewthissystemassocriticalthatif"theutilityfailstoverifyHPCIoperabilityitwilldemandanorderlyshutdownbeinitiatedwithinonehour.WhenonlyoneHPCIcomponentbecomesinoperableitsredundantcomponentshallbedemonstratedtobeoperableimmediatelyanddailythereafter(asopposedtomonthlydemonstration)."InaccordancewiththeBasesforTechnicalSpecification3.1.8,theHPCIsystemisprovidedtoensureadequatecorecoolingintheunlikelyeventofareactorcoolantlinebreak(alsoafederalrequirement-designcriterion33).TheHPCIsystemisrequiredforlinebreakswhichexceedthecapabilityoftheControlRodDrivepumpsandwhicharenotlargeenoughtoallowfastenoughdepressurizationforcorespraytobeeffective(corespray350psiasopposedtoHPCI2200psi)~InaccordancewiththeFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(FSAR),ChapterVII(Attachment4),theDesignBasesforHPCIisdiscussed.AlthoughseveralrevisionhavebeenimplementedbytheutilityinordertofabricatetheexistenceofaECCSsystemtosatisfytheHPCIfederalrequirement,itsprimarysafetyfunctionislisted;(1)provideadequatecoolingofthereactorcoreunderabnormalandaccident'onditions,(2)removetheheatfromradioactivedecayandresidualheatfromthereactorcoreatsucharatethatfuelcladmeltingwouldbeprevented,(3)provideforcontinuityofcorecoolingoverthecompleterangeofpostulatedbreaksizesintheprimarysystemprocessbarrier.Oncethesafetyfunctionsareunderstooditbecomesobviousastowhythissystemisaminimumrequirementofthefederalguidelines.

ThefollowingparagraphofFSARChapterVIIgivesthereaderanindicationofthelackofproperreviewthatexists.AtNineMilePoint,unlikeeveryothernuclearfacility,"HPCIisnotanengineeredsafeguardssystemandisnotconsideredinanyLossofCoolantAccidentAnalysis."AsstatedintheFSAR(inlaymanterms)thisfeedwatersystemdoesnotpretendtomeetthe10CFR50AppendixA(Criterion33,35,36,37)requirementsoftheminimumfederalrequirements.Infact,NineMilePointhasnosystemmeetingtheseminimumfederalrequirements.Next,reviewingtheDesignEvaluationportionofFSARChapterVII,(Attachment4)aparadoxoccursindesignphilosophy."Duringaloss-of-coolantaccidentwithinthedrywell,highdrywellpressureduetoalinebreakwillcauseareactorscram.Theautomaticscramwillcauseaturbinetripafterafive-seconddelay.Inordertoreventcladdinterneraturefromexceedintheirmaximumlimitfortheentirespectrumofbreaks,the3800gpm(fromonetrainoftheHPCIpumps)wouldhavetobeavailableObviously,theHPCIsystemisabsolutelynecessarytoensurecriticalheatflux(CHF)isnotexceeded.Withoutthecoolantwatertotransfertheheatfromthefueltothecoolant,thefuelrodwouldthenheatuprapidlyandfuelcladdingwouldtakeplaceandcauseapossiblemeltdownunlessthereactorwereshutdownquickly.Further,oncethecriticalheatfluxwasexceeded,thedeparturefromnucleateboilingratio(DNBR)wouldexceedits1.25limit.TheselimitsareTechnicalSpecificationrequirementsaswellbutitgivesanindicationoftheinterdependenceoftheECCSsystems.Tomakeastatementinalicensethat"HPCIhasnotbeenconsideredinanyLossofCoolantAccidentAnalyses"isaanotherindicationofthelackofprope:reviewthatexistsatNineMilePoint.Everysafetylimitassumed

attheNineMilePointplantisjeopardizedwithouttheassurancethatthefuelwillremaincoveredatalltimes.TheNRChasapprovedthenon-safetyrelatedfeedwatersystemasanappropriatesubstituteforanECCBHPCIfederalrequirement.Whatatfirstseemslikeaquibbleaboutasinglepumpisinactualityavalidargumentthateverybasesassumedbythislicenseisnullandvoid.AtNineMilePoint,standardbasicthermalreactordesignhasbeensignificantlyalteredinseveralECCSsystems.TherearenoHPCIorRCICsystemtotransferheatfromthereactorcore.Thereisnowayoftakingsteamawayfromthereactorandusingthisenergytodriveahighpressurepump.NormallytheHPCIpumpsreturnthecondensedsteam(water)backintothevesseltomaintainwaterlevel.AtNineMilePoint,thereisnoHPCIorRCICsystems.AtNineMilePoint,unlikenormalreactordesign,electricallydriven,non-qualityrelatedfeedwaterpumpsareconsidered.Thesenon-qualityrelatedfeedwaterpumpssupposedlyfulfilltheHPCIsafetyfunctionandyetdonotmeettheelectricalbackuprequirements.Itmustbenotedthatthesizeoftheseelectricalpumpsmakeitimpossibletohaveon-sitepoweravailableintheeventoflossofoff-sitepower.On-sitepoweravailabilityisassumedinthebasesoftheFSAR.Itisthereforeimpossibleforthisplanttofulfilltheminimumsafetyobligationasdictatedbyfederalstatuteoftheknownpostulatedaccidents.Thissamefeedwatersystem(beingnon-qualityrelated)waspurchasedasanon-qualityrelatedsystem.Inthissamesystem;pipingfvalves,instrumentation,wiring,electricalcomponentsandcontrolsystemswereallpurchasedandinstalledundernon-qualityrelatedcontractualprovisions.HPCIautomaticallyinitiatesonaLossCoolantAccident(LOCA)signalfromtheNSSSlogic.TheNBBSlogicperformstheECCBsafeguardfunctionsand

alwaysinstalledunderstrictcontractualmandates,whichincludetraining,qualityassurancereviews,certifiedskilledcraftsmen,etc.Secondly,thepipingsystem,welding,hangerrestraintsandmaintenanceconsiderationswereinstalledandmaintainedundernon-qualityrelatedprovisionsaswell~Again,ECCSsafeguardsystemsarepurchased,constructedandmaintainedundermuchstricterguidelines.Thefeedwatersystemwasneverdesigned,purchased,built,maintainednorcapableoffulfillingtheMPCIrequirementsofthefederalguidelines.AtNineNilePointtheHPCIsystemsimplydoesnotexistedTheadministrativecontrolswhichallowedacceptanceofsuchanon-qualityrelatedsystemtofulfillthismandatoryECCSfederalrequirementisnotacceptable.C.KnowledgeofExistingConcernsTheneedforanoperableECCSHPCISystemismandatoryasevidencedfromthegroundsforreliefinthisreport.AtNineNilePoint,theUtility,QualityAssurancepersonnelandtheNRCwerewellawareofthisrequirementsForwhateverreason,thisplantwaslicensedbytheNRCandallowedtooperatewithoutthismandatoryrequirementinstalled.Attemptsbythesesamepartiestosubstitutenon-qualityrelatedfeedwaterequipmenttofulfillthismandatorysafeguardfunctionsupportsthefacttheneedforrequirementwasunderstood.Evenifnon-qualityrelatedequipmentwasacceptabletosupportECCSfunctions(anditsnot),thereisnoonsiteelectricpowersystemthatwillsupportthesafetyfunctionofafeedwater/HPCIsystem.Thiselectricsystemisanothermandatoryminimumrequirement(Attachment2-Criterion35)~Toprovethecollaborationbetweenallpartiesmentioned,thelicenseeattemptstotakecreditforonsitepoweravailabilityfromtheBentonDam,some100milesaway.Obviouslythereviewersareawareofthesemandatoryrequirementsbutthere

0resolutiontothesafetyconcernsisnotacceptable.ThepossibilityofatornadodestroyingtheswitchyardisaknownpostulatedaccidentthatcanoccursWithoutthispoweravailability,theHPCIfunctioncannotpossiblybeassumed,asstatedintheFSARChapterVII(Attachment4)~Everytimethefeedwaterprocedureswererevisedthisissuewouldhavetobereviewed.EverytimetheFSAR(ChapterVII)wasrevised,theTechnicalSpecificationsrevisedorcontainmentintegritywasquestionedthisissuehadtobereviewedinaccordancewithadministrativerequirementssetoutbythefederalguidelines.EverytimetheQualityAssurancegroupsandNRCperformedtheirindependentauditsandinspectionsthisissuehadtobereviewed.Everytimethisplantwasoperatedatmodesior2,theresponsibleSeniorReactorOperator(SRO),whoisspecificallytrained(10CFR50AppE)ontheseissueswouldhavetoquestionthevalidityofthecurrentHPCIsystem.EverytimetheHPCIsurveillance(monthly)wasperformedtoensureoperability,theresponsibleSROwouldhavetoquestionthevalidityofanonqualityrelatedfeedwatersystemfulfillingtheHPCIsystem.Takingcreditfornon-qualityrelatedequipmenttofulfilltherequirementsofaECCSsafetyfunctionisnotacceptableanditwouldbetheSRO'sresponsibilitytoquestionthefeedwaterabilitytoperformthisHPCIsafetyfunction.Ofcourse,thatistheanotherproblemtoconsider,itwouldbetheSRO'sjob.Althoughpreviouslyawareoftheproblem,onJan18,1990,theUtilitywasservednoticeoftheseandothersafetyconcern.Ifthenon-qualityrelatedfeedwatersystemwastosupposedlyfulfilltheHPCIsafetyfunction,itfailedtomettheonsiteelectricalrequirementsandmanyof

themainflowpathvalveshadneverbeenincludedintheInserviceTestProgram(iOCFR50.55)~Some44outof47valveswerecurrentlynotidentifiedintheInserviceTestProgram(ECCSSurveillanceviolation).Withsuchknowledge,theUtility,QualityAssurancegroupandtheNRCallowedtheplanttostartupandcontinueintofulloperating(modei)condition.Nopumps,novalvesyetTechnicalSpecification4.i.8(Attachment3)demandsifonevalveisnotdemonstratedoperableadailysurveillanceisrequiredtobeperformed.Thisisjustanotherlackofadministrativecontrolinwhichthereviewgroupshavefailedtoauditorreviewproperly.Unfortunately,thisdilemmaisnotuniquetoNineNilePoint.OtherplantswerealsosomehowlicensedwithoutthismandatoryHPCIcapability.Thatisanotherindicatorofthetypeofreviewthathastakenplaceatotherfacilitiesaswellbuteventuallytheseplantsinstalledthemandatorysystem.Themoststunningfactofthisinvestigationshowsthatafterliterallythousandsoftechnicalreviewsperformedbyhundredsof"qualifiedpersonnel"workingindifferentshifts,separatedepartments,sitesorregions,haveallfailedtostopthisfacilityfromoperatingoutsidetheminimumfederalguidelines.Everymonthduringfullpoweroperation,theHPCIsystemisverifiedoperablebya"qualified"SeniorReactorOperatorandaswornaffidavitsubmittedeachmonthbytheUtilitytotheNRCattestingthatallrequirementshavebeenfulfilled.Obviously,thecurrentsystemofchecksandbalancescannotstopthisplantfromoperatingoutsidethesemandatoryfederalguidelines,anassumptionfalselymadebycongress.

D.Responsibilities10CFR50App.BdetailstheadministrativerequirementsforTestControl,Inspections,OperatingStatus,CorrectiveAction,RecordsandindependentAudits.TheserequirementsareaddressedinboththeTechnicalSpecificationsandFSAR.Sitespecificadministrativeproceduresdetailutilityandqualityassurancestaffpositionresponsibilities.10CFR50.70detailtheNRCinspectionswhile10CFR50.72detailreportnotificationresponsibilitiesforallparties.TheNRChavetheirownadministrativeprocedureswhichdetailstaffresponsibilities.NUREG-0800detailstheUBNRCstandardreviewplanforinservicetestingofpumpsandvalves.AllpartiesmentionedwererequiredtohaveknowledgeoftheHPCIrequirementsatthelevelofreviewforwhicheachindividualwasinvolved.Thesereviewsrequiremandatoryaction.Despiteallmentionedreviewsthisrequirementwasnotmet.OnJan18,1990theNiagraNohawk,NineNilePointNuclearRegulatoryComplianceGroupwereservednoticeofthisandmanyotherknownsafetyconcerns.OnJuly31,1990theNiagraMohawkQualityFirstTeamwereservedwrittennotice.TheNRCwasnotifiedandonandtheQualityFirstTeamnotifiedpetitionerthattheNRCexemptedtheutilityfromtherequirement.V.BTATENENTOFTHELAWi.ThereisaminimumrequirementforaHighPressureCoreInjectionECCSSafeguardSystemattheNineNilePointUnitOnefacility.Thisrequirementcomesfromthefederalguidelines,TechnicalSpecificationsandFSARminimummandates.2.NoHighPressureCoreInjectionSystemmeetingthesafeguardfederalguidelinesexistsatNineNilePoint,UnitOne.-12-IA,yA<<-n>mwq1='I 3.Ifthenon-qualityrelatedfeedwatersystemwastosupposedlyfulfilltheHPCIsafetyfunction,itfailedtomettheonsiteelectricalrequirementsandmanyofthemainflowpathvalveshadneverbeenincludedintheInserviceTestProgram.4.IftheHPCISystemisnotasafeguardsystemandisnotconsideredinanyLossofCoolantAccidentAnalysesasstatedintheFSARChapterVII,thennoassumptioncanbemadethatthefuelwillremaincoveredbythemoderatorandrelatedsafetylimitssetinthecurrentlicensearenullandvoid.Obviouslyunreviewedsafetyquestionsexist.5.Congressmadeanassumptionofthecurrentchecksandbalancesthatwouldneverallowaplanttooperateoutsidetheminimumsafetyrequirementssetoutinfederalguidelines.Onthisassumption,unlikeanyotherindustry,thenuclearindustryhasbeenallowedtooperateunderlimitedliability.Theutility,QualityAssuranceGroups,NRCandChiefExecutiveOfficerhavereceivedwrittennoticeoftheirfailuretocomplywiththeminimumfederalguidelinesandhaveadministrativelyfailedtocomplywiththisissue.Asdiscussedabove,theNineMileUnitOnePlantfailstocomplywithboththeminimumfederalandNRC'requirementsforHPCIECCSSystem.ThishasbeenacknowledgedbytheNRCStaffandisdemonstratedunequivocallybytheevidenceinthepublicrecord.Moreover,theStaffhasperformednovalidanalysisthatmeetstheCommission'snarrowcriteriaforcontinuingtooperateintheabsenceofcompliance.CompliancewithbothFederalandNRCsafetyregulationsisaprerequisitetosafeoperationofanuclearpowerplant.Infact,astheNRC'sAppealBoardhasobserved,regulatory

andsafety."NaineYankeeAtomicPowerComanALAB-161,6AEC1003,1009(19?3).Compliancemaynotbeavoidedbyarguingthat,althoughanapplicableregulationisnotme,thepublichealthandsafetywillstillbeprotected.For,oncearegulationisadopted,thestandardsitembodiesrepresenttheCommission'sdefinitionofwhatisrequiredtoprotectthepublichealthandsafety.VermontYankeeNuclearPowerCor.ALAB-138,6AEC520,528(1973)(emphasisadded).TheCommission'sessentialsafetystandardsmustbemet,withoutregardtothecostorinconvenienceofachievingcompliance.10CFR50.109SeealsoUnionofConcernedScientistsvNRC,824F.2d108(DCCir1987)~VI.REQUESTFORRELIEFForthereasonsenumeratedabove,petitionerstatesthatthefollowingreliefisrequired:A.ImmediateShutdownPendingDemonstrationofRegulatoryCompliance.Asdiscussedabove,theNineNilePointnuclearplantfailstocomplywithanarrayoffundamentalrequirementsforHPCIECCSmandatoryrequirements.Noexemptionstothisrequirementcanpossiblybejustifiedwithoutundueriskstopublicsafety.ConsistentwiththerequirementsoftheAtomicEnergyAct,FederalmandatoryrequirementsandNRCregulations,PetitionerthereforeseeksimmediateshutdownoftheNineNilePointunitonereactorpendingfullcompliancewiththeregulations.Inseekingthisrelief,PetitionernotesthatmaintainingECCSsystemsnecessarytometigatelossofcoolantaccidentsisaregulatorygoalthatwarrantsthemostimmediateandstrinqentenforcementaction.NineNilePoint'snoncompliancewiththefederalminimumdesigncriteriaandthe"coverup"activitiesofallresponsiblepartieswhichposesasafetyrisk I

ofcommensurate,ifnotgraver,dimensionthanthesuspicionofECCSpipecrackingthatcausedthecommissiontoorder23plantshutdownsin1975.SeePetitionforEmerencandremedialAction,CLI-78-6,7NRC400,405(1978).LiketheECCSpipecracking,thisplantdoesn'tevenhavethepipes,valvesorpumpsnecessarytometigateaknownpostulatedaccidentthateffectsknownsafetylimitsoftheFSAR.Thissystemisnecessaryforthecoolingofthecoreduringanaccidentandthissystem(whichdoesnotexist)istheonlymeanstopreventameltdown.Again,unlikenormalECCSsystemswhichhaveredundantcomponentsandcanthereforewithstandasinglefailure,thissystemdoesnotexistandcannotbecompensatedforbyanyothersystem.Simplyput,asmallbreakdescribedintheFSARbasesasapostulatedaccidentwillinalllikelihoodmeltdownthereactorforlackofcooling.Becausethecontainmentisnotdesignedtowithstandameltdown,suchaneventwouldprobablyleadtoanuncontainedreleaseofradioactivitytothepublicenvironment.Thisutilityisnotinsuredforsuchanaccident.B.PublicHearingTheissuesraisedbytheNineMilePoint'snoncompliancewithfederalrequirementsraisesgravesafetyquestionsoftremendouspublicimportance.PetitionerthereforerequestthatbeforeallowingtheNineMilePointplanttocontinueoperating,theCommissionprovideforpublichearing,withrightsofdiscoveryandcrossexamination,todeterminewhetherNineMilePointisinfullcompliancewithallfederalminimumrequirementsrevelanttoHPCIandpublicsafety.Secondly,congressbenotifiedthattheadministrativecontrolsreliedupontograntthenuclearindustrytheimmunityofliabilityhavefailedtoensurepublicsafety.Afterliterallythousandsofreviewsby"qualified mz personnel"fromdifferentdisciplines,departments,sitesandregionscompletedtheirreview,notonecameforwardanddemandthisplantoperatewithinthelawaslaidoutbyactofcongress.Shouldnoncompliancebefound,manyofthesereviewsdemandmandatoryactiononthepartofthereviewer.ThepetitionerhasnotifiedallresponsiblepartiesandaftertwoyearsNineMilePointUnitOnecontinuestooperateoutsidethefederalguidelinesatatremendousrisktopublicsafety.Acongressionalinvestigationofthismatterbeinitiatedimmediately.Thepetitioner'sserviceswerecontractedbyNiagraMohawktoreviewandensureadministrativecompliancetoTechnicalSpecificationpriortoStart-Up.Aqualifiedgroupoftenbeganalaboriousreviewandwhenenormousproblemsbegantoimmerge.Thisgroupwasdisbandedimmediately.InJanl990,theNiagraMohawk'sNuclearRegulatoryComplianceStaffwasgivenadetailedmemo(Attachment5)givingevidencethat45/ofthecontainmentisolationvalveshadadministrativedeficiencies.Twoweekslaterthereviewgroupwasdisbandedpriortocompletionoftheirreview.AlongwithHPCIconcerns,containmentisolationvalvesasfoundintheFSARTableVI-3haddeficiencieswithcorrespondingTechnicalSpecificationTables3.3.48<3.2.7.Thisplanthadoperatedfortwentyyearsandyetthelicensefailedtoevencorrespondtoitself,letaloneactualplantconditions.Thesevalvesarerequiredbyfederalguidelinestoprotectthepublicyetalmosthalfhaddeficiencies.Petitionerallegesthatwhenconcernsareidentified,theconcernsareroutinely"coveredup",dismissedoradministrativelyexempted.AproperreviewoftheNineMilePointUnitOneTechnicalSpecification4.0.5requirementsandthecomlianceofthe

testprogramswillshowthattheutilitysimplyhiredanotherreviewgroupthat(forwhateverreason)failedtodocumentthedeficienciesthattrulyexist.NineNilePointUnitOneresumedfullpoweroperationsevenafterthesafetyconcernswereidentifiedanddocumented.Thistypeofcoverupisnotuniquetothisplantandacongressionalinvestigationofthismatterbeinitiatedimmediately.INSUGARYTherecanbenojustificationfortheoperationofnuclearpowerplantsoutsidetheminimumrequirementsspecifiedbyactofcongress.Thesearetheminimumrequirementsdeemednecessarybyactofcongresstogranttheimmunityofliabilitycurrentlyassumedbytheutility.Whenpublicsafetyisjeopardizedbyknownpostulatedaccidents,therecanbenojustificationforthelackofactionbytheresponsiblepartiesinthisinstance.Simplyput,thisutilityisnotinsuredtooperateinthismanner.Respectfullysubmitted,BenL.RidingsP.O.Boxii01Kingston,TN37763 4C<t~A<"llL.1>a-t BIBLIOGRAPHY1.NODERNPOWERPLANTENGINEERING,Weisman5Eckart,1985Prentice-HallInc.2.10CFR50.10,"RequirementofLicense."3.10CFR50.46,"Acceptancecriteriaforemergencycorecoolingsystemsforlightwaternuclearpowerreactors."4.10CFRS0.55a,"CodesandStandards."5.10CFR50.59,"Changes,testsandexperiments."6.10CFR50.70,"Inspection,Records,Reports,Notifications."7.10CFR50,AppendixA,GeneralDesignCriterion33,"Reactorcoolantmakeup."8~10CFR50,AppendixA,GeneralDesignCriterion35,"Emergencycorecooing."9.10CFR50,AppendixA,GeneralDesignCriterion36,"Inspectionofemergencycorecooingsystem."10.10CFR50,AppendixA,GeneralDesignCriterion37,"TestingofEmerqencyCoreCoolingsystems."11.10CFRSO,AppendixB,II'QualityAssuranceProgram"12.10CFR50,AppendixB,III."DesignControl."13.10CFR50,AppendixB,VI."DocumentControl,"14.10CFR50,AppendixB,X."Inspections."15.10CFR50,AppendixB,XI'TestControl."16.10CFR50,AppendixB,XIV."Inspection,-TestandOperatingStatus."17.10CFR50,AppendixB,XVI."CorrectiveAction."18.10CFR50,AppendixB,XVII."QualityAssuranceRecords."19.10CFR50;AppendixE,F."Training."20.FederalRegister,PublicDocket:50-220,Niagramohawk,UnitOne,NineNilePointThermalNuclearReactor.-18-

UNITEDSTATEDOFAMERICABEFORETHENUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONAFFIDAVITOFBENL~RIDINGSI,BenL.Ridingsdomakeoathandsay:1.MynameisBenL.Ridings.Iamatechnicalconsultantforcommercialnuclearpowerplants.Overaspanofsomefifteenyears,whileworkingatsometwentyfoursites,Ihavespecializedinreviewingoflicensingagreement(FSAR,TechnicalSpecifications,FederalCodesandRegulations,ASMECodes,etc.),establishingadministrativecontrolstomeettheserequirementsandtestprogramstoensurecomplianceatal)times.Mytestprogramsandadministrativecontrolsestablishedwhileundercontracttovariousutilitiesarestillinusetodayatmanyfacilities.2.IhavereviewedalloftherelevantpubliclyavailablecorrespondencebetweentheNuclearRegulatoryCommissionandNiagraMohawkduringtherelvanttimespan.IamfamilarwithNRCregulationsandregulatoryguidancegoverningHighPressureCoreInjections3.ThefactualstatementmadeintheattachedPetitionforEmergencyActionandRequestforpublicHearingaretrueandcorrecttothebestofmyknowlegeandbelief.BenL.RidingsSubscribedandsworntobeforemethis~~dayofQ~,1992.Mycommisionexpires:((<'IIg"gy((~If,f,".,ecC'P~g,<cg<t'c"/p>>f)~~lA>>,

Cpr,f'b Part50,App.A'riterion27-Combfrrcdreactivitycontrolsystnnscapability.Thereactivitycontrolsystemsshallbcdesignedtohaveacorn.blnedcapability,Inconiunctlonwithpoisonadditionbytheemergencycorecoolingsystem,ofreliablycontrollingreactivitychangestoassurethatunderpostulatedac-cidentconditionsandwithappropriatemarginforstuckrodsthecapabilitytocoolthccorelsmaintained.Criterion28-Reactfvffylimits.Thereac-tivitycontrolsystemsshallbedesignedwlLhappropriatelimitsonthcpotentialamountandrateofreactivityincreasetoassurethattheeffectsofpostulatedreactivityaccidentscanneither(1)resultIndamagetothcreac-torcoolantpressureboundarygreaterthanlimitedlocalyieldingnor(2)sufficientlydis-turbthecore.ItssupportstructuresorotherreactorpressurevesselinternalstoImpairsignificantlythecapabilitytocoolthecore.Thesepostulatedreactivityacci-dentsshallIncludeconsiderationofrodelection(unlesspreventedbypositivemeans),roddropout,steamlinerupture,changeslnreactorcoolanttemperatureandpressure,andcoldwateraddition.Criterion29-Prefect(orragafrrstanticf-patcdopcratfonaloccurrences.Theprotec-tionandreactivitycontrolsystemsshallbedesignedtoassureanextremelyhighproba-bilityofaccomplishingtheirsafetyfunc-tionsIntheeventofanticipatedoperationaloccurrences.IV.FluidSysfnrrsCrffcrion30-Qualityofreactorcoolantpressureb'oundary.Componentswhicharepartofthereactorcoolantpressurebounda-ryshallbedesigned,fabricated,erected.andtestedtothehighestqualitystandardsprac-tical.Meansshallbeprovidedfordetectingand,totheextentpractical,Identifyingthelocationofthesourceofreactorcoolantleakage.Crftcr(on3I-Fractureprevent(onofreac-torcoolantprcssureboundary.Thereactorcoolantpressureboundaryshallbedesignedwithsufficientmargintoassurethatwhenstressedunderoperating,maintenance,test-ing,andpostulatedaccidentconditions(1)theboundarybehavesInanonbrlttlemannerand(2)theprobabilityo!rapidlypropagatingfractureIsminimized.Thcdesignshallreflectconsiderationofservicetemperaturesandotherconditionsoftheboundarymaterialunderoperating,mainte-nance,testing,andpostulatedaccidentcon.dltlonsandtheuncertaintiesIndetermining(I)materialproperties,(2)theeffectsofIr-radiationonmaterialproperties,(3)residu-al,steadystateandtransientstresses.and<<')smofnaws.Crffcrion32-Irrspccfforrofreactorcool-antpressureboundary.Componentswhicharepartofthereactorcoolantpressureboundaryshallbedesignedtopermit(1)loCFRChI(11~8Edltlon)546periodicinsPcctlonandtestingofImportanLareasandfeaturestoassesstheirstructuralandlcaktlghtintegrity,and(2)anapproprl.atematerialsurveillanceprogramforthereactorpressurevessel.Crifcrfon33-Reactorcoolantmakeup.AsystemtosupplyreactorcoolantmakeupforprotectionagainstsmallbreaksInthcreactorcoolantpressureboundaryshallbcprovided.Thesystemsafetyfunctionshallbetoassurethatspecifiedacceptablefueldesignlimitsarenotexceededasaresultofreactorcoolantlossduetoleakagefromthereactorcoolantpressureboundaryandrup-tureofsmallpipingorothersmallcompo.nentswhicharepartoftheboundary.Thesystemshallbedesignedtoassurethatforonslteelectricpowersystemoperation(as.sumlngoffsltepowertsnotavailable)andfor'ffslteelectricpowersystemoperation(assumingonsltepowertsnotavailable)thesystemsafetyfunctioncanbeaccompltshcdusingtheplplnlr.Dumps,andvalvesusedtomaintaincoolantInventoryduringnormalreactoroperation.Criterion36-ResidualheatrcmovaLAsystemtoremoveresidualheatshallbepro.vlded.ThesystemsafetyfunctionshallbetotransferfissionproductdecayheatandotherresidualheatfromthereactorcoreataratesuchthatspecifiedacceptablefueldesignIlrnltsandthedesignconditionsofthereactorcoolantpressureboundaryarenotexceeded.SuitableredundancyIncomponentsandfeatures,andsuitableInterconnections,leakdetection,andIsolationcapabilitiesshallbeprovidedtoassurethatforonsltcelectricpowersystemoperation(assumingoffsltepowerlsnotavailable)andforoffslteelec-'ricpowersystemoperation(assumingonsltepowerhnotavailable)thesystemsafetyfunctioncanbeaccomplished.assum-Ingasinglefailure.Crffcrforr35-EmergnrcycorecooHng.Asystemtoprovideabundantemergencycorecoolingshallbeprovided.Thesystemsafetyfunctionshallbetotransferheatfromthereactorcorefollowinganylossofreactorcoolantataratesuchthat(1)fuelandcladdamagethaLcouldInterferewithcontinuedeffectivecorecoolingIspreventedand(2)cladmetal-waterreactionIslimitedtonegli-gibleamounts.SuitableredundancyIncomponentsandfeatures,andsuitableInterconnections,leakdetection.Isolation,andcontainmentcapa-bilitiesshallbeprovidedtoassurethatforons!Leelectricpowersystemoperation(as-sumingoffsltepowerIsnotavailable)andforoffslteelectricPowersystemoperation(assumingonsltepowerIsnotavallablc)thesystemsafetyfunctioncanbeaccomplished.assumingasinglefailure.Crfter(on36-Irrspccliorrofcmcrgnrcycorecoolirrpsystem.Theemergencycorevcr'iNuclearReSuiator-4~"-'ingsystemshallappropriateperlodt'antcomponents.sutorpressurevesaeandpipingLor>Pabtiityoithesys'-.Crftcriorr37-TcsIfnpsysicm.'Thes~temshallbedesb-.'ateperiodicpress<<>~;passure(1)thestr'cgrityofILscomPo>r(andperformanceor,ofthesystem,and('systemasawholer.dosetodesignaspr:of.thefulloperatlo,the,systemintoot,ationofapplicable,tlonsystem,theL~"andemergencypoa.;,ationoftheassocla~.~.."<Cr(tcrion38-Co:'.hsystemtorcmov~,".containmentshallsafetyfunctionshconsistentwiththrsoclatedsystems,t-andtemperaturef,antaccidentandr~rablyIowlevels.'W-;:jSultableredund:'featuresandsulta'r',detection,Isolatlor~bllltlesshallbepr~<lonslteelectricpov<sumlngoffsltepo':foroffslteelectric(assumingonslteg;systemsafetyfun(.'ssumingasingle:~Criterion39-Ir.;$heatremovalsystr,,removalsystemslappropriateperte"tantcomponents,.:.spray'nozzles,anr,'S,c,'.tegrltyandcapablCritcrion40-Tcremovalsystem.'ovalsystemsh:appropriateperio~,,'ltestingtoassrleaktlghtIntcgrlrtheoperabilityactivecomponcn'heoperablllLycandundercondltaspracticaltheoperationalscourIntooperation,Ir.=cableportionsoftransferbetweer':f-powersources,arsoclatcdcoolings4";,'riterion4I-cleanup.SystemQ(('I

.'1 88Edition)>tingofImportantssLhclrstrucLuralid(2)anapproprl-programforthevolantmakeup.A'oolantrnakcup>allbreakslntheboundaryshallbectyfunctionshall>dscccptablcfuelcdedasaresultof>leakagefromthe>oundaryandrup-thersmallcompo-.heboundary.Thetoassurethatforwmoperation(as-notavailable)and'ystemoperation:notavailable)theabcaccomplishedandvalvesusedto>ryduringnormal;healremoval.AIheatshallbepro->functionshallbe<ctdecayheatandthereactorcoreat.edacceptablefuelcslgnconditionsofsureboundaryarennentsand>cree.cctlons,leak>apabllltlcsshallbeforonslteelectric>(assumingoffslteu>dforoffslteelec->eration(assuming>liable)thcsystemxompilshed,assurn->cycorecoolfnp.AsntemergencycoreLThesystemsafeLy>sferheatfromtheanylossofreactor>ai,(1)fuelandcladferewlChcontinued>preventedand(2)nIslimitedtonegll-Incomponentsand>terconnectlons.leakIcontainmentcapa-dtoassurethatforrstemoperation(as->notavailable)sndersystemoperationIsnotavailable)thecanbeaccompltshed.e;lionofcmcrpencyfheemergencycoreJ~tNuclearRegulatoryCommissioncoolingsystemshallbedesignedtopermitappropriateperiodicInspectionofImpor-tantcomponenLs,suchassprayringsInthcreactorpressurevessel,waterInfectionnoz-stcs.sndpiping.toassuretheIntegritysndcapabilityofthesystem.Crifcrion37-Tcsf(npofemergencycorecoolinpsystem.Theemergencycorecoolingsystemshallbedesignedtopermitspproprl.ateperiodicpressureandfunctionaltestingtoassure(1)thestructuralsndleaktlghtIn-tegrityofItscomponents,(2)theoperabgltyandperformanceofLheactivecomponentsofthesystem,and(3)theoperabilityofthcsystemasawholeand,underconditionsssclosetodesignaspractical,theperformanceofthefulloperationalsequencethatbringsthesystemIntooperation,Includingoper-ationofspp)lcsbleportionsoftheprotec-tionsystem,thetransferbetweennormalsndemergencypowersources,andtheoper-ationoftheassociatedcoolingwatersystem.Crifcrion38-Confainmen(heatremoval.AsystemtoremovehestfromLhereactorcontslrunentshallbeprovided.Thesystemsafetyfunctionshallbctoreducerapidly,consistentwiththefunctioningofotheras.soclatedsystems,thecontainmentpressureandtemperaturefollowinganytoss.ofwool-antaccidentandmaintainthemataccept-ablylowlevels.Sultab)eredundancyIncomponentsandfeatures.andsuitableInterconnections,leakdetection.Isolation,andcontainmentcaps.bllltlesshallbeprovidedtoassurethatforonslteelectricpowersystemoperation(as-sumingoffsitepowerIsnotavailable)andforoffslteelectricpowersystemoperation(assumingonsitepowerIsnotavailable)thesystemsafetyfunctioncanbeaccomplished,assumingasinglefailure.Criferion39-lnspcctfo>>ofconlainmcnlhealremovalsysfcm.ThecontalnmcntheatremovalsystemshallbedesignedtopermitappropriateperiodicInspectionofimpor-tantcomponents,suchasthetorus,sumps.spraynozzles,andpipingtoassuretheIn-tegrityandcapabilityofthesystem.Criterion40-Tcsfinpofconfafnmcn(healremovalsystem.ThecontainmentheaCre-movalsystemshallbedesignedtopermitappropriateperiodicpressureandfunction-altestingtoassure(1)thestructuralandleaktlghtIntegrityofItscomponents.(2)theopcrabllltyandperformanceoftheactivecomponentsofthesystem.and(3)theoperabilityofthesystemasawhole,andunderconditionsasclosetothedesignaspractica)theperformanceofthefulloperationalsequencethatbringsthcsystemIntooperaLlon,Includingoperationofsppll-csblcportionsoftheprotectionsystem,thetransferbetweennormalandemergencypowersources.andCheoperationoftheas-sociatedcoolingwatersystem.Criteria>>41-Confainmentalmosphcrccleanup.Systemstocontrolfissionprod-Port50,App.Aucts,hydrogen,oxygen,andothersub-stanceswhichmaybereleasedIntothereac-torcontslnmenCshallbeprovidedasneces-sarytoreduce,consistentwiththefunction-ingofotherassociatedsystems,thcconcen.tratlonandqualityoffissionproductsre-leasedLotheenvironmentfollowingpostu.latedaccidents,andtoconLroltheconcen.tratlonofhydrogenoroxygenandothersubstanceslnthecontainmentatmosphcrcfollowingpostulatedaccidentstoassurethsCcontainmentlnLegrltyIsmaintained.Eachsystemshallhavesuitableredundan-cyIncomponentsandfeatures.sndsuitableInterconnections,leakdetection,isolation.andcontainmentcapabilitiestoassurethat,foronsltcelectricpowersystemopcratlon(assumingoifsltepowerIsnotavailable)andforoffsiteelectricpowersystemoperaC!on(assumingonsltepowerLsnotavailable)lissafetyfunctioncanbeaccomplished,sssum.Ingssinglefailure.Criterion42-lnspec(ionofconfainmenlalmosphcrccleanupsysfcms.Thecontain-mcnLatmospherecleanupsystemsshallbedesignedLopermlLappropr'lateperiodic'In-spectionofImportantcomponents.suchasfilterframes.ducts,andpipingtoassuretheIntegrityandcspsblHtyofthesystems.Crfferia>>43-Tcrffnpofconfafnmcnlat.mosphcrccleanupsysfcms.Thecontainmentatmospherecleanupsystemsshallbede-signedtopermitappropriateperiodicpres-sureandfunctionaltestingtoassure(1)thcstructuralandleaktlghtIntegrityofItscorn.ponents,(2)theoperabilityandperform.anceoftheactivecomponentsofthesys.ternssuchasIsns,filters,dsmpers.pumps,andvalvesand(3)theoperabilityofthesys-temsasawholeand,underconditionsssclosetodesignaspractical.thcperformanceofthefulloperationalsequencethatbringsthcsystemsintooperation,Includingoper-ationofapplicableportionsoftheprotec.Lionsystem,thetransferbetweennormalandernergcncypowersources,andtheoper-ationofassociatedsystems.Cr(ferion44-Coohnpu>afer.Asystemtotransferheatfromstructures,systems,andcomponentsimportanttosafety,toanulti-mateheatsinkshallbeprovided.ThesystemsafetyfunctionshallbetotrsnslerChecombinedhestloadofthesestructures,systems,andcomponentsundernormalop.cratingandaccidentconditions.SuitableredundancyIncomponentsandfeatures,andsuitableInterconnections,leakdetection,andIsolationcapabilitiesshallbeprovidedtoassurethatforonslteelectricpowersystemoperation(assumingoffsltepowerIsnoLavailable)andforoffslteelec-tricpowersystemoperation(assumingonsltepowerIsnol,available)thesystemsafetyfunctioncanbeaccomplished,sssum-Ingasinglefailure.54'7 rr LIHITING,CONDITIONFOROPERATIOHSURVEILLAHCEAEJUIR)'.HLHT3.1.8Illa)PRESSuRECOOLANTIHJECTIONAJJ11Appliestotheoperationalstatusofthehighpressurecoolantinjectionsyste<n.O~b<.ctive:Toassurethecapabilityofthehighpressurecoolantinjectionsystemtocoolreactorfuelintheeventofaloss-of-coolantaccident.4.1.8lllGIIPRESSURECOOLANTINJECTIONAppliestotheperiodictesti>>grequirum<.ntsforthehighpressurecoolanti>>juctiu>>cyst<.<ll.~Obective:Toverifytheoperabilityofthehigh)iressurucoolantinjectionsystem.h111<<1)a.Duringthepoweroperatingcon-"dition,wheneverthereactorcoolantpressureisgreaterthan110psigandthereactorcoolanttemperaturegreaterthansaturationtemperature,thehighpressurecoolantinjectionsysten>shallbeoperableexceptasspecifiedinSpecification"b"below.b.Ifaredundantcomponentofthehinhpressurecoolantinjectionsystembecomesinoperablethehighpressurecoolantinjectionshallbeconsideredoperableprovidedthatthecomponentisreturnedt.oanoperableconditionwithin15daysandtheadditionalsur-veillancerec)uiredisperformed.~Sectficat<on:Thehighpressurecoolanti>>jectio>>sur-veillanceshallbeperformedasindicatedbelow:a.At1east&nayel8er'at)'hgŽcycle.Auto<natlcstart-upofthelii<)hp)essur<~coolantinjectionsystemshallbedemon-strated.Pumpoperabilityshallbedeter<)i>>ud,71 r

LierCS~UAVfLLAHCEA~F.IJIAI'.HLH'I'.=-IfSpecification"a"and"b"arenotmet,anormalorderlyshutdownshallbeinitiatedw>thinonehourandreactorcoolantpressureandtemp-eratureshallbereducedtolessthan110psigandsaturationtemperaturewithin24hours.c.SurveillancewithI~nocrableCoiigionvntWhenacomponentbecomesI>>operableitsredundantcomponentshallhudemonstratedtobeoperableiiuiedlatelyanddailythereafter.'12 ll BASESFOR3.1.8AND4.1.8HIGH'PRESSURECOOLANTIHJEL))OMaHighPressureCoolantInjectionSystem(KPCI)is.providedtoensureadequate'corecoolingintheunlikelyeventofntrolRodDrivepumpsandwhicharenotlargeenoughtoallo~'fastenoughdepressur)zatonxl)reactorcooan'nerea..e1tli"'kThHPCISystem.isrequired.forlinebreakswh')chexceedthecapab)lityoftheforcoresratobepyfeetive.eseogpressrtfhihurecoolantinjectionpumpsconsistsofacondensatepump,afeedwaterboosterpumpandamotorivenfeedwaterpump.Onesetofpumps)scapableofdel)ver.ing3,800gpmtothercreactorvesselatreactoressure.TheperformancecapabilityofHPCIaloneandinconjunctionwithothersystemstoprov)deadequatecoreso))ngforaspectrumof1)nebreaks)sdiscussed)ntheFifthSupplementoftheFSAR.tdeterm)ningtheoperabilityoftheHPCISystem,therequiredperformancecapab)l)tyofvariouscomponentsshallbe>ns)dered.~TheKPCISystemshallbecapableofmeetingitspumpheadversusflowcurve.gT.hemotordrivenfeeduaterpumpshallbecapableofautomaticinitiationuponreceiptofeitheranautomaticturbinetripsignalorreactorlow-water-levelsignal.e.'heCondenserhotwell~eve)shallnotbelessthan57)nches(75,000gallons).TheCondensatestoragetanksinventoryshallnotbelessthan105,000gallons.-Themotor-drivenfeedwaterpumpwillautomaticallytr)p)freactorh)ghwaterlevelissusta)nedfortensecondsandtheassociatedpumpdownstreamflowcontrolvalveandlowflowcontrolvalvearenotclosed.rr)ngreactorstart-up,operat)onandshutdown,thecondensateandfeedwaterboosterpumpsareinoperation.Ateactorpressuresupto450pslg,thesepumpsarecapableofsupply)ngtherequired3,800gpm.Above450ps)gavtor-driven-feedwaterpumpisnecessarytoprovidetherequiredflowrate.hbilitofthecondensate,feedwa-'boosterandmotordr)venfeedwaterpumpsw)1)bedemonstratedbytheirperationaspartofthefeedwatersupplyduringnormalstationoperation.Stand-bypumpsw)l1epecapayow)11belacedinservicetleastquarterlytosupp)yfeedwaterduringstationoperation.Anautomaticsysteminitiationtestwillbeerformedatleastonceperoperatingcycle.Th)sw)llinvolveautomaticstartingofthemotordr)venfeedwaterpumpsndflowtothereactorvessel.RevisedOctober1,198673 r

I.HIGH-PRESSURECOOLANTINJECTION1.0DesinSasesThehigh-pressurecoolantinjection(HPCI)systemisanoperatingmodeofthefeedwatersystemavailableintheeventofasmallreactorcoolantlinebreakwhichexceedsthecapabilityofthecontrolroddrivepumps(0.003ft2).HPCIalongwithoneemergencycoolingsystemhasthecapabilityofkeepingtheswollenreactorcoolantlevelabovethetopofactivefuelforsmallreactorcoolantboundarybreaksupto0.07ft2foratleast1000seconds.TheHPCIsystemwithoneofthetwoemergencycoolingsystemsandtwocorespraysystems,willprovidecorecoolingforthecompletespectrumofbreaksizesuptothemaximumdesignbasisrecirculationdischargelinebreak(5.446ft2).Itsprimarypurposeisto:a.provideadequatecoolingofthereactorcoreunderabnormalandaccidentconditions.b.removetheheatfromradioactivedecayandresidualheatfromthereactorcoreatsucharatethatfuelcladmeltingwouldbeprevented.c.provideforcontinuityofcorecoolingoverthecompleterangeofpostulated"breaksizesintheprimarysystemprocessbarrier.HPCIisnotanengineeredsafeguardssystemandisnotconsideredinanyLossofCoolantAccidentAnalyses.Itisdiscussedinthissectionbecauseofitscapabilitytoprovidemakeupwateratreactoroperatingpressure.2.0SstemDesinTheHPCIsystemutilizesthetwocondensatestoragetanks,themaincondenserhotwell,twocondensatepumps,condensatedemineralizers,twofeedwaterboosterpumps,feedwaterheaters,twomotor-drivenfeedwaterpumps,anintegratedcontrolsystemandallassociatedpipingandvalves.Thesystemiscapableofdelivering7600gpmintothereactorvesselatreactorpressurewhenusingtwotrainsoffeedwaterpumps.Thecondensateandfeedwaterboosterpumpsarecapableofsupplyingtherequired3,800gpmatapproximatelyreactorpressuresupto270psig.Above270psigamotor-drivenfeedwaterpumpisnecessarytoprovidetherequiredflowrate.

VII-6laThefeedwatersystempumpshaverecirculationlineswithairoperatedflowcontrolvalvestopreventthepumpsfromoperatingagainstaclosedsystem.Intheeventoflossofairpressure,thesevalvesopenrecyclingpartoftheHPCIflowtothehotwell.HPCIflowwouldbereducedtoapproximately3,000gpmatareactorpressureof1,150psigand3,800gpmatareactorpressureof940psig.Rev.7Condensateinventoryismaintainedatanavailableminimumvolumeof180,000gallons.3.0DesinEvaluationDuringaloss-of-'coolantaccidentwithinthedrywell,highdrywellpressureduetoalinebreakwillcauseareactorscram.Thisautomaticscramwillcauseaturbinetripafte"afive-seconddelay.Inordertopreventcladdingtemperaturesfromexceedingtheirmaximumlimitfortheentirespectrumofbreaks,the3800gpm(fromonetrainofHPCI/feedwaterpumps).wouldhavetobeavailableimmediately.Feedwaterflowwouldbeavailableforconsiderabletimefromtheshaft-drivenfeedwaterpump.Theshaft-drivenfeedwaterpumpwouldcoastdownwhiletheelectricmotor-drivencondensatepumpsandfeedwaterboosterpumpswouldcontinuetooperate.Thecoastdowntimetoreach3,800gpmdeliverytothecoreisapproximately3.2minutes(FigureVII-17),sinceboththecondensateandfeedwaterboosterpumpswillcontinuetooperateonoff-sitepower.Theturbinetripwillsigna1themotor-drivenfeedwaterpumptostart.Thesignalwillbesimultaneouswiththestartoftheshaftpumpcoastdown.Themotor-drivenfeedwaterpumpwillbeuptospeedandcapableofsupplying3,800gpminabout:tenseconds.Asabackup,lowreactorwaterlevelwi11alsosignalthemotor-drivenpumptostart.TheinitiationsignaltransferscontrolfromthenormalfeedwatertotheHPCIinstrumentationandcontrollerwhichhasbeencontinuouslytrackingthenormalfeedwatercontrolsignal.Thustherewillbeacontinuoussupplyoffeedwatertothereactor.TheHPCIsingleelementcontrolsystemwillattempttomaintainreactorvesselwaterlevelat65inchesor72inches(dependinguponwhichpump,llor12respectively,isinservice)withamaximumfeedwaterflowlimitof3800gpm.Rev.7 r

VII-62Asustainedhighreactorwaterlevelreactorprotectionsystemsignalcoincidentwithanopenfeedwaterflowcontrolvalvewillselectivelytriptheassociatedfeedwaterpump.Theclutchoftheshaft-drivenpumpwillalsobedisengagedimmediatelyuponhighreactorwaterlevel.Shouldthereactorwaterlevelreachthelowlevelscramsetpointthemotordrivenpumpthattrippedonhighreactorwaterlevelwillrestart.Necessaryfeedwaterpumprecirculationisprovidedtoallowforcontinuedpumpoperationwiththeflowcontrolvalveclosed.Asfeedwaterispumpedoutofthecondenserhotwell,throughtheselectedequipmentofthecondensateandfeedwatersystemsandintothereactor,thecondenserhotwelllevelwillfall.Sincecondensedsteamfromtheturbinenolongerreplenishesthecondenserhotwell,condensatewillbetransferredfromthecondensatestoragetankstothehotwellformakeup.Thefeedwatersystempumpsoperateon4160v.Whentheplantisinoperation,thepowerissuppliedfromthemaingeneratorthroughthestationservicetransformerwhenthegeneratorison-lineandconnectedtothegrid.Whenthemaingeneratorisoff-line,thefeedwaterpumpsaresuppliedwithnormaloff-sitepowerfromthe115KVsystemthroughthereservetransformers.IfaHPCIinitiationsignalshouldoccur,allHPCI/feedwatersystempumpswouldstartimmediatelywithtwofeedwaterpumptrainsavailableforHPCIinjectionusingthesingleelementfeedwatercontrolsystemforreactorvessellevelcontrol.Ifamajorpowerdisturbanceweretooccurthatresultedinlossofthe115KVpowersupplytotheNineNilePoint115KVbus,powerwouldberestoredfromageneratorlocatedattheBennettsBridgeHydroStation.Thisgeneratorwouldhavethecapacityofsupplyingapproximately6,000KVAwhichissufficienttooperateonetrainofHPCI/feedwatersystempumps.IfHPCIinitiationweretooccur,thepreferredfeedwatertrainpumps(feedwaterpump12,feedwaterboosterpump13,condensatepump13)'wouldstart.Thenon-preferredtra'inpumpswouldbelockedoutonlossofoff-sitepowerandnotstartuntiltheoperatormanuallyresetthelockout.Ifapreferredtrainpumphadbeenlockedoutpriortothelossofoff-sitepower,itwouldremainlockedoutandthenon-preferredtrainbackuppumpwouldautomaticallystartonHPCIinitiation.Ifboththepreferredandbackuppumpsarerunning,thepreferredpumpwouldremaininserviceandthebackuppumpwilltrip.TheRev.7 0r VII-62auseofaBennettsBridgehydrogenerator,whilenotequivalenttoanon-siteemergencypowersource,providesahighlyreliablealternateoff-sitepowersupplyfortheHPCIfunctionofthefeedwatersystem.ev.74.0TestsandInsections"TestsandinspectionsofthevariouscomponentsaredescribedinSectionXI-SteamtoPowerConversion.

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