Information Notice 1996-63, Potential Safety Issue Regarding the Shipment of Fissile Material: Difference between revisions
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==Description of Circumstances== | ==Description of Circumstances== | ||
An NRC licensee recently informed NRC of a potential situation where one of the fissile materialexemptions in 10 CFR 71.53 would not have provided adequate criticality safety if large amountsof an exempt concentration of fissile material were to be transported in the presence of a specialmoderating material (i.e., beryllium). A recent contract was awarded to the licensee to processweapons-usable enriched uranium materials. The waste product, a uranium-beryllium filtercake,met the fissile exemption provisions in 10 CFR 71.53 and 49 CFR 173.453. The presence ofberyllium in significant quantities in NRC-regulated fissile exempt shipments is extraordinary, andwas not considered in the development of the fissile exemptions in the regulations. NRC hasreviewed and verified the licensee's calculations, and has concluded that the current regulationsneed to be revised to preclude criticality in fissile exempt shipments made under 10 CFR 71.53,and fissile shipments made underthe general licenses in 10 CFR 71.18 and 10 CFR 71.22. Thisinformation notice is being issued to provide additional, timely notice, to licensees, of thispotential safety issue, while the regulatory revisions are made.DiscussionThe licensee proposed to employ the provision in 10 CFR 71.53(d), or the parallel provision in theU.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations, 49 CFR 173.453(d).J//1961204021 on jl4PqtPDR ETE OO~tc 99 IN 96-63December 5, 1996 Section 71.53(d) exempts fissile material from the requirements in 10 CFR 71.55 and 71.59 (i.e.,the additional requirements placed on fissile packages and shipments to preclude criticality),provided the package does not contain more than 5 grams (0.18 ounces) of fissile material inany 10-liter (610-cubic-inch) volume. The fissile exemptions appearing in 10 CFR 71.53 areassumed to provide inherent criticality control for all practical cases in which fissile materialsexist at or below the applicable regulatory limits (i.e., independent calculations would generallynot be expected nor required). Consequently, the fissile exemptions generally do not place limitson the types of moderating or reflecting material present in fissile exempt packages, nor thenumber of fissile exempt packages that can be shipped in a single consignment, and do notrequire that a transport index (see 10 CFR 71.4) be assigned to packages for criticality control.Further, the fissile material exemptions and general license provisions allow any licensee tomake shipments without first seeking NRC approval.A fairly realistic computer model of the enriched uranium-beryllium oxide waste packages, asloaded for shipment into a sea-land container, and at 0.5 grams per liter, could not bedemonstrated to provide adequate nuclear criticality safety. Because the current regulationswould allow the possibility of criticality in fissile exempt shipments, and since there is noassurance that such shipments will not occur, NRC intends to revise 10 CFR Part 71 to addressexclusion of beryllium and other special moderating material (e.g., deuterium and graphite) in theshipment of fissile materials, and to limit the amount of fissile exempt material that can betransported in a single consignment.NRC has contacted the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the DOT on this issue. DOE is ashipper of fissile material, which could include the special moderating materials in question.NRC and DOT are coordinating the revisions to their respective regulations.NRC notes that very few licensees are involved in the shipment of fissile materials with beryllium,graphite, or deuterium. However, for those licensees that are involved in such shipments, it isimportant that programs be assessed to ensure that adequate criticality safety is provided wherefissile materials are transported with materials known or expected to have moderating propertiesgreater than water. As demonstrated by the licensee in this case, the existing fissile materialexemptions cannot be presumed, without independent analysis, to preclude nuclear criticality inall | An NRC licensee recently informed NRC of a potential situation where one of the fissile materialexemptions in 10 CFR 71.53 would not have provided adequate criticality safety if large amountsof an exempt concentration of fissile material were to be transported in the presence of a specialmoderating material (i.e., beryllium). A recent contract was awarded to the licensee to processweapons-usable enriched uranium materials. The waste product, a uranium-beryllium filtercake,met the fissile exemption provisions in 10 CFR 71.53 and 49 CFR 173.453. The presence ofberyllium in significant quantities in NRC-regulated fissile exempt shipments is extraordinary, andwas not considered in the development of the fissile exemptions in the regulations. NRC hasreviewed and verified the licensee's calculations, and has concluded that the current regulationsneed to be revised to preclude criticality in fissile exempt shipments made under 10 CFR 71.53,and fissile shipments made underthe general licenses in 10 CFR 71.18 and 10 CFR 71.22. Thisinformation notice is being issued to provide additional, timely notice, to licensees, of thispotential safety issue, while the regulatory revisions are made.DiscussionThe licensee proposed to employ the provision in 10 CFR 71.53(d), or the parallel provision in theU.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations, 49 CFR 173.453(d).J//1961204021 on jl4PqtPDR ETE OO~tc 99 IN 96-63December 5, 1996 Section 71.53(d) exempts fissile material from the requirements in 10 CFR 71.55 and 71.59 (i.e.,the additional requirements placed on fissile packages and shipments to preclude criticality),provided the package does not contain more than 5 grams (0.18 ounces) of fissile material inany 10-liter (610-cubic-inch) volume. The fissile exemptions appearing in 10 CFR 71.53 areassumed to provide inherent criticality control for all practical cases in which fissile materialsexist at or below the applicable regulatory limits (i.e., independent calculations would generallynot be expected nor required). Consequently, the fissile exemptions generally do not place limitson the types of moderating or reflecting material present in fissile exempt packages, nor thenumber of fissile exempt packages that can be shipped in a single consignment, and do notrequire that a transport index (see 10 CFR 71.4) be assigned to packages for criticality control.Further, the fissile material exemptions and general license provisions allow any licensee tomake shipments without first seeking NRC approval.A fairly realistic computer model of the enriched uranium-beryllium oxide waste packages, asloaded for shipment into a sea-land container, and at 0.5 grams per liter, could not bedemonstrated to provide adequate nuclear criticality safety. Because the current regulationswould allow the possibility of criticality in fissile exempt shipments, and since there is noassurance that such shipments will not occur, NRC intends to revise 10 CFR Part 71 to addressexclusion of beryllium and other special moderating material (e.g., deuterium and graphite) in theshipment of fissile materials, and to limit the amount of fissile exempt material that can betransported in a single consignment.NRC has contacted the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the DOT on this issue. DOE is ashipper of fissile material, which could include the special moderating materials in question.NRC and DOT are coordinating the revisions to their respective regulations.NRC notes that very few licensees are involved in the shipment of fissile materials with beryllium,graphite, or deuterium. However, for those licensees that are involved in such shipments, it isimportant that programs be assessed to ensure that adequate criticality safety is provided wherefissile materials are transported with materials known or expected to have moderating propertiesgreater than water. As demonstrated by the licensee in this case, the existing fissile materialexemptions cannot be presumed, without independent analysis, to preclude nuclear criticality inall cases. | ||
I):K,)IN 96-63December 5, 1996 This information notice requires no specific action nor written response. If you have anyquestions about the information in this notice, please contact the individual listed below, or theappropriate NRC regional office.Charles J. Haighney, Actirt DireSpent Fuel Project OfficeOffice of Nuclear Material Safetyand SafeguardsTechnical contact:Earl P. Easton, NMSS(301) 415-8520e-mail: exe@nrc.govAttachments:1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information Noticeso k')~ Gu A 7- Attachment IIN 96-63December 5, 1996Page 1 of ILIST OF RECENTLY ISSUEDNMSS INFORMATION NOTICESInformationNotice No.Date ofIssuanceSubjectIssued to96-5796-5496-53Incident-Reporting Require-ments Involving Intakes,During a 24-Hour Periodthat May Cause a TotalEffective Dose Equivalentin Excess of 0.05 Sv (5 rem)Vulnerability of StainlessSteel to Corrosion WhenSensitizedRetrofit to Amersham 660Posilock RadiographyCamera to Correct Incon-sistency in 10 CFR Part 34CompatibilityCracked Insertion Rodson Troxler Model 3400Series Portable MoistureDensity GaugesResidual ContaminationRemaining in Krypton-85Handling System AfterVentingRecordkeeping, Decommis-sioning Notifications forDisposals of RadioactiveWaste by Land BurialAuthorized Under Former10 CFR 20.304, 20.302,and Current 20.200210/30/9610117/9610/15/9609/26/9609/11/9608/19196All U.S. Nuclear RegulatoryCommission licenseesAll material licenseesAll industrial radiographylicenseesAll U.S. Nuclear RegulatoryCommission portable gaugelicensees and vendorsAll material licenseesAll U.S. Nuclear RegulatoryCommission licensees96-5296-5196-47 v>Attachment 2IN 96-63December 5, 1996 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUEDNRC INFORMATION NOTICESInformation Date ofNotice No. Subject Issuance Issued to96-6296-6196-6096-5996-58Potential Failure of theInstantaneous Trip Functionof General Electric RMS-9ProgrammersFailure of a Main Steam SafetyValve to Reseat Caused by anImproperly Installed ReleaseNutPotential Common-Mode Post-Accident Failure of ResidualHeat Removal Heat ExchangersPotential Degradation ofPost Loss-of-CoolantRecirculation Capabilityas a Result of DebrisRCP Seal Replacement withPump on BackseatIncident-Reporting Require-ments Involving Intakes,During a 24-Hour PeriodThat May Cause a TotalEffective Dose Equivalentin Excess of 0.05 Sv(5 rems)11/20/9611/20/9611/14/9610/30/9610/30/9610/29/96All holders of OLsand CPs for nuclearpower plantsAll holders of OLs orCPs for nuclear powerreactorsAll holders of OLs orCPs for nuclear powerreactorsAll holders of OLs orCPs for nuclear powerreactorsAll holders of OLs orCPs for pressurized-waterreactorsAll U.S. NuclearRegulatory Commissionlicensees96-57OL = Operating LicenseCP = Construction Permit | |||
1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information Noticeso k')~ Gu A 7- Attachment IIN 96-63December 5, 1996Page 1 of ILIST OF RECENTLY ISSUEDNMSS INFORMATION NOTICESInformationNotice No.Date ofIssuanceSubjectIssued to96-5796-5496-53Incident-Reporting Require-ments Involving Intakes,During a 24-Hour Periodthat May Cause a TotalEffective Dose Equivalentin Excess of 0.05 Sv (5 rem)Vulnerability of StainlessSteel to Corrosion WhenSensitizedRetrofit to Amersham 660Posilock RadiographyCamera to Correct Incon-sistency in 10 CFR Part 34CompatibilityCracked Insertion Rodson Troxler Model 3400Series Portable MoistureDensity GaugesResidual ContaminationRemaining in Krypton-85Handling System AfterVentingRecordkeeping, Decommis-sioning Notifications forDisposals of RadioactiveWaste by Land BurialAuthorized Under Former10 CFR 20.304, 20.302,and Current 20.200210/30/9610117/9610/15/9609/26/9609/11/9608/19196All U.S. Nuclear RegulatoryCommission licenseesAll material licenseesAll industrial radiographylicenseesAll U.S. Nuclear RegulatoryCommission portable gaugelicensees and vendorsAll material licenseesAll U.S. Nuclear RegulatoryCommission licensees96-5296-5196-47 v>Attachment 2IN 96-63December 5, 1996 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUEDNRC INFORMATION NOTICESInformation Date ofNotice No. Subject Issuance Issued to96-6296-6196-6096-5996-58Potential Failure of theInstantaneous Trip Functionof General Electric RMS-9ProgrammersFailure of a Main Steam SafetyValve to Reseat Caused by anImproperly Installed ReleaseNutPotential Common-Mode Post-Accident Failure of ResidualHeat Removal Heat ExchangersPotential Degradation ofPost Loss-of-CoolantRecirculation Capabilityas a Result of DebrisRCP Seal Replacement withPump on BackseatIncident-Reporting Require-ments Involving Intakes,During a 24-Hour PeriodThat May Cause a TotalEffective Dose Equivalentin Excess of 0.05 Sv(5 rems)11/20/9611/20/9611/14/9610/30/9610/30/9610/29/96All holders of OLsand CPs for nuclearpower plantsAll holders of OLs orCPs for nuclear powerreactorsAll holders of OLs orCPs for nuclear powerreactorsAll holders of OLs orCPs for nuclear powerreactorsAll holders of OLs orCPs for pressurized-waterreactorsAll U.S. NuclearRegulatory Commissionlicensees96-57OL = Operating LicenseCP = Construction Permit | |||
K>IN 96-63v2 December 5, 1996 This information notice requires no specific action nor written response. If you have anyquestions about the information in this notice, please contact the individual listed below, or theappropriate NRC regional office.ChaSes J. HaugfeyCharles J. Haughney, Acting DirectorSpent Fuel Project OfficeOffice of Nuclear Material Safetyand SafeguardsTechnical contact:Earl P. Easton, NMSS(301) 415-8520e-mail: exeenrc.govAttachments:1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information Notices96-63.IN*See Previous Concurrence.OFC SFPO* I c SFPO* l c SFPO* I c NRR/OECB* I c OGC* lc TEditor INAME RLewis:LMG EEaston SShankman AEChaffee ENJenson EKraus*DATE10/10/9610/10/9610/10/9610/10/9611/25/9611/25/96OFC lIMOB l I SFP t I I l- INAME KRamsey CJH_ neyDATE 1/27/96 W215196 Ia; v4 i _ _C_ CO E E CO E N L S R O CC =COVERE = COVER & ENCLOSUREN = NE) CQPT | |||
1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information Notices96-63.IN*See Previous Concurrence.OFC SFPO* I c SFPO* l c SFPO* I c NRR/OECB* I c OGC* lc TEditor INAME RLewis:LMG EEaston SShankman AEChaffee ENJenson EKraus*DATE10/10/9610/10/9610/10/9610/10/9611/25/9611/25/96OFC lIMOB l I SFP t I I l- INAME KRamsey CJH_ neyDATE 1/27/96 W215196 Ia; v4 i _ _C_ CO E E CO E N L S R O CC =COVERE = COVER & ENCLOSUREN = NE) CQPT | |||
IN 96-##KJ i2 October ##, 1996 present in fissile exempt packages, nor the number of fissile exempt packages that can beshipped in a single consignment, and do not require that a transport index (see 10CFR 71.4) be assigned to packages for criticality control. Further, the fissile materialexemptions and general license provisions allow any licensee to make shipments withoutfirst seeking NRC approval.A fairly realistic computer model of the enriched uranium-beryllium oxide waste packages,as loaded for shipment into a sea-land container, and at 0.5 grams per liter, could not bedemonstrated to provide adequate nuclear criticality safety. Because the currentregulations would allow the possibility of criticality in fissile exempt shipments, and sincethere is no assurance that such shipments will not occur, NRC intends to revise 10CFR Part 71 to address exclusion of beryllium and other special moderating material (e.g.,deuterium and graphite) in the shipment of fissile materials, and to limit the amount offissile exempt material that can be transported in a single consignment.NRC has contacted the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the DOT on this issue. DOEis a shipper of fissile material, which could include the special moderating materials inquestion. NRC and DOT are coordinating the revisions to their respective regulations.NRC notes that very few licensees are involved in the shipment of fissile materials-withberyllium, graphite, or deuterium. However, for those licensees that are involved in suchshipments, it is important that programs be assessed to ensure that adequate criticalitysafety is provided where fissile materials are transported with materials known or expectedto have moderating properties greater than water. As demonstrated by the licensee in thiscase, the existing fissile material exemptions cannot be presumed, without independentanalysis, to preclude nuclear criticality in all cases.This information notice requires no specific action nor written response. If you have anyquestions about the information in this notice, please contact the individual listed below, orthe appropriate NRC regional office.Charles J. Haughney, Acting DirectorSpent Fuel Project OfficeOffice of Nuclear Material Safetyand SafeguardsAttachments:1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information NoticesContact: Earl P. Easton, NMSS(301) 415-8520e-mail: exe@nrc.govS:WPROJRXL1FIZ.IN See Previous Concurrence.OFC SFPON* c SFPO l c SFPO | |||
1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information NoticesContact: Earl P. Easton, NMSS(301) 415-8520e-mail: exe@nrc.govS:WPROJRXL1FIZ.IN See Previous Concurrence.OFC SFPON* c SFPO l c SFPO | |||
* c NRR/OECBh* I c OGCN lc TEditor INAME RLewis:LMG EEaston SShankman AEChaffee ENJenson EKraus *DATE I 10/10/96 I 10/10/96 I 10/10/96 I 10/10/96 1 11/25/96 1 11/25/96I--OFC IMOB I SFP lL,/ I l _NAME KRamseyeK CJHa_ _ _DATE 1I9 196 12- ?79 _6 _,,___. __ _ ________C -COVERE = COVER & LNULUbUKItN = Nu iurO | * c NRR/OECBh* I c OGCN lc TEditor INAME RLewis:LMG EEaston SShankman AEChaffee ENJenson EKraus *DATE I 10/10/96 I 10/10/96 I 10/10/96 I 10/10/96 1 11/25/96 1 11/25/96I--OFC IMOB I SFP lL,/ I l _NAME KRamseyeK CJHa_ _ _DATE 1I9 196 12- ?79 _6 _,,___. __ _ ________C -COVERE = COVER & LNULUbUKItN = Nu iurO | ||
>-considerations and shipping experience indicate that the criticality of fissile exemptpackages is not an immediate threat to worker and public health and safety, the possibilityof criticality in fissile exempt shipments has prompted NRC to revise 10 CFR Part 71, toaddress the possible inclusion of beryllium and other special moderating material (e.g.,deuterium and graphite) in the shipment of fissile materials, and to limit the amount offissile exempt material which can be transported in a single consignment.NRC staff has also contacted the Department of Transportation (DOT) on this issue, asDOT regulations contain a parallel provision to 10 CFR 71.53 (i.e., 49 CFR 173.453).NRC and DOT are coordinating the revisions to their respective regulations.In practice, operating and administrative limits and procedures should prevent thecollection of fissile materials in amounts or geometries which could achieve criticality as aresult of any single change in the conditions necessary for criticality safety. Nevertheless,NRC notes that until the expedited regulatory revisions are made, good practice would befor licensees to exercise caution in deciding whether to ship: (1) fissile materials withmaterials known or expected to have moderating properties greater than water; or (2)single consignments of fissile exempt packages in excess of 290 grams of uranium-235 or180 grams of other fissile radionuclides. As demonstrated by the licensee in this case, theexisting fissile material exemptions cannot be presumed, without independent analysis, topreclude nuclear criticality in all cases.This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have anyquestions about the information in this notice, please contact the technical contact listedbelow, or the appropriate NRC Regional Office.William D. Travers, DirectorSpent Fuel Project OfficeOffice of Nuclear Material Safetyand | >-considerations and shipping experience indicate that the criticality of fissile exemptpackages is not an immediate threat to worker and public health and safety, the possibilityof criticality in fissile exempt shipments has prompted NRC to revise 10 CFR Part 71, toaddress the possible inclusion of beryllium and other special moderating material (e.g.,deuterium and graphite) in the shipment of fissile materials, and to limit the amount offissile exempt material which can be transported in a single consignment.NRC staff has also contacted the Department of Transportation (DOT) on this issue, asDOT regulations contain a parallel provision to 10 CFR 71.53 (i.e., 49 CFR 173.453).NRC and DOT are coordinating the revisions to their respective regulations.In practice, operating and administrative limits and procedures should prevent thecollection of fissile materials in amounts or geometries which could achieve criticality as aresult of any single change in the conditions necessary for criticality safety. Nevertheless,NRC notes that until the expedited regulatory revisions are made, good practice would befor licensees to exercise caution in deciding whether to ship: (1) fissile materials withmaterials known or expected to have moderating properties greater than water; or (2)single consignments of fissile exempt packages in excess of 290 grams of uranium-235 or180 grams of other fissile radionuclides. As demonstrated by the licensee in this case, theexisting fissile material exemptions cannot be presumed, without independent analysis, topreclude nuclear criticality in all cases.This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have anyquestions about the information in this notice, please contact the technical contact listedbelow, or the appropriate NRC Regional Office.William D. Travers, DirectorSpent Fuel Project OfficeOffice of Nuclear Material Safetyand SafeguardsAttachments:1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information NoticesContact: Earl P. Easton, NMSS(301) 415-8527S:IPROJIRXLFIZ.IN See Previous Concurrence.OFC lSFPO l -SFPO l f-0 e-O NRR/OECB l OGC l TEDITOR INAME RLeg -sAG EEas aman b affee WReamer EKrauslATVS I J.JIIAIg -I -&.10 & I 0 I la;: I a lIda I I , -I I /onLO#% IV. I(V U l TO'I 1J1_IU 1 v IU Iva % I I I Ef %IOFC DWM I IMOB l SFPO I SFPNAME RJohnson KRamsey CJHaughney WDTraversDATE I/ /96 / /96 / /96 I /96 lC = COVER E = COVER & ENCLOSURE N = NO COPY2 IN 96-##/ H October ##, 1996 shipped in a single consignment, and do not require that a transport index (see §71.4) beassigned to packages for criticality control. Further, the fissile material exemptions andgeneral license provisions allow any licensee to make shipments without first seeking NRCapproval.A fairly realistic computer model of the enriched uranium-beryllium oxide waste packages,as loaded for shipment into a sea-land container, and at 0.5 grams per liter, could not bedemonstrated to provide adequate nuclear criticality safety. Because the currentregulations would allow the possibility of criticality in fissile exempt shipments, and sincethere is no assurance that such shipments will not occur, NRC intends to revise10 CFR Part 71, to address exclusion of beryllium and other special moderating material(e.g., deuterium and graphite) in the shipment of fissile materials, and to limit the amountof fissile exempt material which can be transported in a single consignment.NRC staff has contacted the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the DOT on this issue.DOE is a shipper of fissile material, which could include the special moderating materials inquestion. NRC and DOT are coordinating the revisions to their respective regulations.NRC notes very few licensees are involved in the shipment of fissile materials withberyllium, graphite, or deuterium. However, for those licensees that are involved in suchshipments, it is important that programs be assessed to ensure that adequate criticalitysafety is provided where fissile materials are transported with materials known or expectedto have moderating properties greater than water. As demonstrated by the licensee in thiscase, the existing fissile material exemptions cannot be presumed, without independentanalysis, to preclude nuclear criticality in all cases.This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have anyquestions about the information in this notice, please contact the individual listed below, orthe appropriate NRC Regional Office.Charles J. Haughney, Acting DirectorSpent Fuel Project OfficeOffice of Nuclear Material Safetyand SafeguardsAttachments:1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information NoticesContact: Earl P. Easton, NMSS(301) 415-8520e-mail: exe@nrc.govS:IPROJIRXLIFIZ.IN *See Previous Concurrence. OPP3OFC SFPO* I c SFPO* lc SFPO* I c NRR/OECB* I c OG TE TOR INAME RLewis:LMG EEaston SShankman AEChaffee _____enson EKrausDATE I /196 / /96 1 1/96 I /196 1 196 I /196OFC DWM I IMOB l FlO I Sl FPO I jINAME RJohnson KRamsey CJHaughney WDTraversDATE I/ /96 I /96 1 /196 / /96 J .I.. ==_C = COVERE = COVER & ENCLOSUREN = NU COPlY | ||
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Revision as of 19:28, 6 April 2018
K) JIM MCKNIGHTUNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONOFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDSWASHINGTON, DC 20555December 5, 1996NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 96-63: POTENTIAL SAFETY ISSUE REGARDING THESHIPMENT OF FISSILE MATERIAL
Addressees
All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensees authorized to possess special nuclearmaterial in unsealed quantities greater than a critical mass.
Purpose
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice to alertaddressees to an issue with potential safety significance regarding shipments using the fissilematerial exemption provisions and general licenses. It is expected that recipients will review thisinformation for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similarproblems. However, suggestions contained in this information notice are not NRC requirements;therefore, no specific action nor written response is required.
Description of Circumstances
An NRC licensee recently informed NRC of a potential situation where one of the fissile materialexemptions in 10 CFR 71.53 would not have provided adequate criticality safety if large amountsof an exempt concentration of fissile material were to be transported in the presence of a specialmoderating material (i.e., beryllium). A recent contract was awarded to the licensee to processweapons-usable enriched uranium materials. The waste product, a uranium-beryllium filtercake,met the fissile exemption provisions in 10 CFR 71.53 and 49 CFR 173.453. The presence ofberyllium in significant quantities in NRC-regulated fissile exempt shipments is extraordinary, andwas not considered in the development of the fissile exemptions in the regulations. NRC hasreviewed and verified the licensee's calculations, and has concluded that the current regulationsneed to be revised to preclude criticality in fissile exempt shipments made under 10 CFR 71.53,and fissile shipments made underthe general licenses in 10 CFR 71.18 and 10 CFR 71.22. Thisinformation notice is being issued to provide additional, timely notice, to licensees, of thispotential safety issue, while the regulatory revisions are made.DiscussionThe licensee proposed to employ the provision in 10 CFR 71.53(d), or the parallel provision in theU.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations, 49 CFR 173.453(d).J//1961204021 on jl4PqtPDR ETE OO~tc 99 IN 96-63December 5, 1996 Section 71.53(d) exempts fissile material from the requirements in 10 CFR 71.55 and 71.59 (i.e.,the additional requirements placed on fissile packages and shipments to preclude criticality),provided the package does not contain more than 5 grams (0.18 ounces) of fissile material inany 10-liter (610-cubic-inch) volume. The fissile exemptions appearing in 10 CFR 71.53 areassumed to provide inherent criticality control for all practical cases in which fissile materialsexist at or below the applicable regulatory limits (i.e., independent calculations would generallynot be expected nor required). Consequently, the fissile exemptions generally do not place limitson the types of moderating or reflecting material present in fissile exempt packages, nor thenumber of fissile exempt packages that can be shipped in a single consignment, and do notrequire that a transport index (see 10 CFR 71.4) be assigned to packages for criticality control.Further, the fissile material exemptions and general license provisions allow any licensee tomake shipments without first seeking NRC approval.A fairly realistic computer model of the enriched uranium-beryllium oxide waste packages, asloaded for shipment into a sea-land container, and at 0.5 grams per liter, could not bedemonstrated to provide adequate nuclear criticality safety. Because the current regulationswould allow the possibility of criticality in fissile exempt shipments, and since there is noassurance that such shipments will not occur, NRC intends to revise 10 CFR Part 71 to addressexclusion of beryllium and other special moderating material (e.g., deuterium and graphite) in theshipment of fissile materials, and to limit the amount of fissile exempt material that can betransported in a single consignment.NRC has contacted the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the DOT on this issue. DOE is ashipper of fissile material, which could include the special moderating materials in question.NRC and DOT are coordinating the revisions to their respective regulations.NRC notes that very few licensees are involved in the shipment of fissile materials with beryllium,graphite, or deuterium. However, for those licensees that are involved in such shipments, it isimportant that programs be assessed to ensure that adequate criticality safety is provided wherefissile materials are transported with materials known or expected to have moderating propertiesgreater than water. As demonstrated by the licensee in this case, the existing fissile materialexemptions cannot be presumed, without independent analysis, to preclude nuclear criticality inall cases.
I):K,)IN 96-63December 5, 1996 This information notice requires no specific action nor written response. If you have anyquestions about the information in this notice, please contact the individual listed below, or theappropriate NRC regional office.Charles J. Haighney, Actirt DireSpent Fuel Project OfficeOffice of Nuclear Material Safetyand SafeguardsTechnical contact:Earl P. Easton, NMSS(301) 415-8520e-mail: exe@nrc.govAttachments:1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information Noticeso k')~ Gu A 7- Attachment IIN 96-63December 5, 1996Page 1 of ILIST OF RECENTLY ISSUEDNMSS INFORMATION NOTICESInformationNotice No.Date ofIssuanceSubjectIssued to96-5796-5496-53Incident-Reporting Require-ments Involving Intakes,During a 24-Hour Periodthat May Cause a TotalEffective Dose Equivalentin Excess of 0.05 Sv (5 rem)Vulnerability of StainlessSteel to Corrosion WhenSensitizedRetrofit to Amersham 660Posilock RadiographyCamera to Correct Incon-sistency in 10 CFR Part 34CompatibilityCracked Insertion Rodson Troxler Model 3400Series Portable MoistureDensity GaugesResidual ContaminationRemaining in Krypton-85Handling System AfterVentingRecordkeeping, Decommis-sioning Notifications forDisposals of RadioactiveWaste by Land BurialAuthorized Under Former10 CFR 20.304, 20.302,and Current 20.200210/30/9610117/9610/15/9609/26/9609/11/9608/19196All U.S. Nuclear RegulatoryCommission licenseesAll material licenseesAll industrial radiographylicenseesAll U.S. Nuclear RegulatoryCommission portable gaugelicensees and vendorsAll material licenseesAll U.S. Nuclear RegulatoryCommission licensees96-5296-5196-47 v>Attachment 2IN 96-63December 5, 1996 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUEDNRC INFORMATION NOTICESInformation Date ofNotice No. Subject Issuance Issued to96-6296-6196-6096-5996-58Potential Failure of theInstantaneous Trip Functionof General Electric RMS-9ProgrammersFailure of a Main Steam SafetyValve to Reseat Caused by anImproperly Installed ReleaseNutPotential Common-Mode Post-Accident Failure of ResidualHeat Removal Heat ExchangersPotential Degradation ofPost Loss-of-CoolantRecirculation Capabilityas a Result of DebrisRCP Seal Replacement withPump on BackseatIncident-Reporting Require-ments Involving Intakes,During a 24-Hour PeriodThat May Cause a TotalEffective Dose Equivalentin Excess of 0.05 Sv(5 rems)11/20/9611/20/9611/14/9610/30/9610/30/9610/29/96All holders of OLsand CPs for nuclearpower plantsAll holders of OLs orCPs for nuclear powerreactorsAll holders of OLs orCPs for nuclear powerreactorsAll holders of OLs orCPs for nuclear powerreactorsAll holders of OLs orCPs for pressurized-waterreactorsAll U.S. NuclearRegulatory Commissionlicensees96-57OL = Operating LicenseCP = Construction Permit
K>IN 96-63v2 December 5, 1996 This information notice requires no specific action nor written response. If you have anyquestions about the information in this notice, please contact the individual listed below, or theappropriate NRC regional office.ChaSes J. HaugfeyCharles J. Haughney, Acting DirectorSpent Fuel Project OfficeOffice of Nuclear Material Safetyand SafeguardsTechnical contact:Earl P. Easton, NMSS(301) 415-8520e-mail: exeenrc.govAttachments:1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information Notices96-63.IN*See Previous Concurrence.OFC SFPO* I c SFPO* l c SFPO* I c NRR/OECB* I c OGC* lc TEditor INAME RLewis:LMG EEaston SShankman AEChaffee ENJenson EKraus*DATE10/10/9610/10/9610/10/9610/10/9611/25/9611/25/96OFC lIMOB l I SFP t I I l- INAME KRamsey CJH_ neyDATE 1/27/96 W215196 Ia; v4 i _ _C_ CO E E CO E N L S R O CC =COVERE = COVER & ENCLOSUREN = NE) CQPT
IN 96-##KJ i2 October ##, 1996 present in fissile exempt packages, nor the number of fissile exempt packages that can beshipped in a single consignment, and do not require that a transport index (see 10CFR 71.4) be assigned to packages for criticality control. Further, the fissile materialexemptions and general license provisions allow any licensee to make shipments withoutfirst seeking NRC approval.A fairly realistic computer model of the enriched uranium-beryllium oxide waste packages,as loaded for shipment into a sea-land container, and at 0.5 grams per liter, could not bedemonstrated to provide adequate nuclear criticality safety. Because the currentregulations would allow the possibility of criticality in fissile exempt shipments, and sincethere is no assurance that such shipments will not occur, NRC intends to revise 10CFR Part 71 to address exclusion of beryllium and other special moderating material (e.g.,deuterium and graphite) in the shipment of fissile materials, and to limit the amount offissile exempt material that can be transported in a single consignment.NRC has contacted the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the DOT on this issue. DOEis a shipper of fissile material, which could include the special moderating materials inquestion. NRC and DOT are coordinating the revisions to their respective regulations.NRC notes that very few licensees are involved in the shipment of fissile materials-withberyllium, graphite, or deuterium. However, for those licensees that are involved in suchshipments, it is important that programs be assessed to ensure that adequate criticalitysafety is provided where fissile materials are transported with materials known or expectedto have moderating properties greater than water. As demonstrated by the licensee in thiscase, the existing fissile material exemptions cannot be presumed, without independentanalysis, to preclude nuclear criticality in all cases.This information notice requires no specific action nor written response. If you have anyquestions about the information in this notice, please contact the individual listed below, orthe appropriate NRC regional office.Charles J. Haughney, Acting DirectorSpent Fuel Project OfficeOffice of Nuclear Material Safetyand SafeguardsAttachments:1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information NoticesContact: Earl P. Easton, NMSS(301) 415-8520e-mail: exe@nrc.govS:WPROJRXL1FIZ.IN See Previous Concurrence.OFC SFPON* c SFPO l c SFPO
- c NRR/OECBh* I c OGCN lc TEditor INAME RLewis:LMG EEaston SShankman AEChaffee ENJenson EKraus *DATE I 10/10/96 I 10/10/96 I 10/10/96 I 10/10/96 1 11/25/96 1 11/25/96I--OFC IMOB I SFP lL,/ I l _NAME KRamseyeK CJHa_ _ _DATE 1I9 196 12- ?79 _6 _,,___. __ _ ________C -COVERE = COVER & LNULUbUKItN = Nu iurO
>-considerations and shipping experience indicate that the criticality of fissile exemptpackages is not an immediate threat to worker and public health and safety, the possibilityof criticality in fissile exempt shipments has prompted NRC to revise 10 CFR Part 71, toaddress the possible inclusion of beryllium and other special moderating material (e.g.,deuterium and graphite) in the shipment of fissile materials, and to limit the amount offissile exempt material which can be transported in a single consignment.NRC staff has also contacted the Department of Transportation (DOT) on this issue, asDOT regulations contain a parallel provision to 10 CFR 71.53 (i.e., 49 CFR 173.453).NRC and DOT are coordinating the revisions to their respective regulations.In practice, operating and administrative limits and procedures should prevent thecollection of fissile materials in amounts or geometries which could achieve criticality as aresult of any single change in the conditions necessary for criticality safety. Nevertheless,NRC notes that until the expedited regulatory revisions are made, good practice would befor licensees to exercise caution in deciding whether to ship: (1) fissile materials withmaterials known or expected to have moderating properties greater than water; or (2)single consignments of fissile exempt packages in excess of 290 grams of uranium-235 or180 grams of other fissile radionuclides. As demonstrated by the licensee in this case, theexisting fissile material exemptions cannot be presumed, without independent analysis, topreclude nuclear criticality in all cases.This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have anyquestions about the information in this notice, please contact the technical contact listedbelow, or the appropriate NRC Regional Office.William D. Travers, DirectorSpent Fuel Project OfficeOffice of Nuclear Material Safetyand SafeguardsAttachments:1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information NoticesContact: Earl P. Easton, NMSS(301) 415-8527S:IPROJIRXLFIZ.IN See Previous Concurrence.OFC lSFPO l -SFPO l f-0 e-O NRR/OECB l OGC l TEDITOR INAME RLeg -sAG EEas aman b affee WReamer EKrauslATVS I J.JIIAIg -I -&.10 & I 0 I la;: I a lIda I I , -I I /onLO#% IV. I(V U l TO'I 1J1_IU 1 v IU Iva % I I I Ef %IOFC DWM I IMOB l SFPO I SFPNAME RJohnson KRamsey CJHaughney WDTraversDATE I/ /96 / /96 / /96 I /96 lC = COVER E = COVER & ENCLOSURE N = NO COPY2 IN 96-##/ H October ##, 1996 shipped in a single consignment, and do not require that a transport index (see §71.4) beassigned to packages for criticality control. Further, the fissile material exemptions andgeneral license provisions allow any licensee to make shipments without first seeking NRCapproval.A fairly realistic computer model of the enriched uranium-beryllium oxide waste packages,as loaded for shipment into a sea-land container, and at 0.5 grams per liter, could not bedemonstrated to provide adequate nuclear criticality safety. Because the currentregulations would allow the possibility of criticality in fissile exempt shipments, and sincethere is no assurance that such shipments will not occur, NRC intends to revise10 CFR Part 71, to address exclusion of beryllium and other special moderating material(e.g., deuterium and graphite) in the shipment of fissile materials, and to limit the amountof fissile exempt material which can be transported in a single consignment.NRC staff has contacted the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the DOT on this issue.DOE is a shipper of fissile material, which could include the special moderating materials inquestion. NRC and DOT are coordinating the revisions to their respective regulations.NRC notes very few licensees are involved in the shipment of fissile materials withberyllium, graphite, or deuterium. However, for those licensees that are involved in suchshipments, it is important that programs be assessed to ensure that adequate criticalitysafety is provided where fissile materials are transported with materials known or expectedto have moderating properties greater than water. As demonstrated by the licensee in thiscase, the existing fissile material exemptions cannot be presumed, without independentanalysis, to preclude nuclear criticality in all cases.This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have anyquestions about the information in this notice, please contact the individual listed below, orthe appropriate NRC Regional Office.Charles J. Haughney, Acting DirectorSpent Fuel Project OfficeOffice of Nuclear Material Safetyand SafeguardsAttachments:1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information NoticesContact: Earl P. Easton, NMSS(301) 415-8520e-mail: exe@nrc.govS:IPROJIRXLIFIZ.IN *See Previous Concurrence. OPP3OFC SFPO* I c SFPO* lc SFPO* I c NRR/OECB* I c OG TE TOR INAME RLewis:LMG EEaston SShankman AEChaffee _____enson EKrausDATE I /196 / /96 1 1/96 I /196 1 196 I /196OFC DWM I IMOB l FlO I Sl FPO I jINAME RJohnson KRamsey CJHaughney WDTraversDATE I/ /96 I /96 1 /196 / /96 J .I.. ==_C = COVERE = COVER & ENCLOSUREN = NU COPlY