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| | document type = CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS, INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE | | | document type = CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS, INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE |
| | page count = 450 | | | page count = 450 |
| | | project = TAC:M98964, TAC:M98965 |
| | | stage = Other |
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| =Text= | | =Text= |
| {{#Wiki_filter:. - _ - _ _ - - _ _ - _ _ - | | {{#Wiki_filter:}} |
| \% Duk3 Power Company.
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| av)k W g
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| " A Duke En,qy C,mpny EC07H 526 South Church Street
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| !!O. Box 1006 Charlotte, NC 28201 1006 M. S. Tuckman Executive Vice President (704)382-2200 OFFICE Nuclear Generation (704)382-4360 fax June 24, 1998 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission .
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| Washington, D. C. 20555 '
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| Attention: Document Control Desk
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| ==Subject:==
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| McGuire Nuclear Station Docket Numbers 50-369 and -370 Improved Technical Specifications, Supplement 5 TAC Nos. M98964 and M98965 By letters dated April 15, April 28, May 14, and May 22, 1998, the NRC transmitted requests for additional information (RAI) related to Sections 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.7, 3.8, 3.9 and 5.0 of the proposed Improved Technical Specifications (ITS) submitted by Duke Energy May 27, 1997.
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| By letter dated June 3, 1998, Duke Energy transmitted the responses to Sections 3.5, 3.9 and 5.0.
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| . Enclosures 1, 2, 3, and 4 of this letter provide responses to the RAIs on Sections 3.3, 3.4, 3.7 and 3.8. This provides the responses to the final installment of the RAIs.
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| Immediately following each staff comment (or group of comments) are changes to the ITS submittal necessary to resolve the staff's comment and supplement the initial ITS submittal. Changes are denoted by revision bars to facilitate staff review.
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| Attachment 3 of the initial ITS submittal identified existing license amendment requests incorporated in the ITS conversion. Since the original submittal, several additional license amendments have been propored and several amendments issued by the NRC as approved. Enclosure 5 includes an update to this list and a complication of ITS 1 pages which were affected by these individual license amendments.
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| s.
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| '. I I
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| 9806300354 980624 PDR ADOCK 05000369 p PDR ;
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| li N- _ __ _ ___- - _- _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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| a, ;
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| i i
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| U. S. Nuclear Regulat'ory Commission June 24, 1998 Page 2 Attachment 5 of.the initial ITS submittal identified changes to the current license which were beyond the scope of changes solely necessary to convert to the improved technical specification format. Upon discussion with the
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| 'NRC' staff and plant staff, additional items have been identified as beyond scope changes previously submitted as a
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| -part of the ITS conversion but not listed 'as beyond scope changes. Enclosure 6 provides this revised page.
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| The pages provided in Enclosures 1 through 6 in this response replace the corresponding pages in the May 27, 1997 submittal, Supplement 1 provided March 9, 1998, Supplement 2 provided March 20, 1998, Supplement 3 provided April 20, 1998i Supplement 4 provided June 3, 1998 and license amendment requests as shown on Attachment 3.
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| We are requesting a meeting with the NRC within two weeks to discuss this supplement to facilitate a draft SER by July 31, 1998.
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| In accordance with Duke administrative procedures and the Quality _ Assurance Program Topical Report, this response to the requests for additional information has been discussed with representatives of the McGuire Plant Operations Review Committee and the Nuclear Safety Review Board and determined to be.within the scope of the original review.
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| Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.91(b) (1) , a copy of this amendment has been provided to the appropriate State of North Carolina l
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| officials.
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| If any additional information is needed, please call Lee A.
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| ~Keller at 704-382-5826.
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| Very truly yours, X. 3. Gd M. S. Tuckman I Enclosures l
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| L
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| U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission June 24, 1998 Page 3 xc: w/ enclosures Mr. L. A. Reyes Administrator, Region II U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atlanta Federal Center -
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| 61 Forsyth St., SW, Suite 23T85 Atlanta, GA 30303 Mr. F. Rinaldi U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Washington, DC 20555 Mr. S. M. Shaeffer Senior Resident Inspector McGuire Nuclear Station Mr. Mel Frye Division of Radiation Protection 3825 Barrett Drive Raleigh, NC 27609-7221
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| U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission June 24, 1998 Page 4 M. S. Tuckman, being duly sworn, states that he is Executive Vice President of Duke Energy Corporation; that he is authorized on the part of said Company to sign and file with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission revisions to the Facility Operating Licenses of McGuire Nuclear Station; and that all the statements and matters set forth herein'are true and correct to the best of his knowledge.
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| f b. h ;= _-
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| M. S. Tuckman, Executive Vice President Supscribed and sworn to before me this 2MU' day of J4 , 1998 h .
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| Notary Public My Commission Expires:
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| JAW 2 2, Zool
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| e ITS SUPPLEMENT 5 MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION
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| i-ym---i 4
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| ENCLOSURE 1 RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION SECTION 3.3
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| l McGuirs & Cat:wb3 Imprcvid TS R5visw Ccmm5nta ITS 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation l
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| l l 3.3.1-01 CTS Table 3.3-1, Action 2.c l ITS LCO 3.3.1, Condition D, Required Action D.1.2 DOC L.1 l
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| CTS Table 3.3-1, Action 2.c specifies reduction of thermal power to less than or equal to 75%
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| within 4 hours. ITS LCO 3.3.1, Condition D, Required Action D.1.2 also specifies reduction of power to 75%, but the Completion Time is specified as 12 hours. DOC L.1 does not address this less restrictive change. Comment: Provido justification for ttfis less restrictive change.
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| DEC Response:
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| A new Less Restrictive DOC (L.24) has been written to justify the change in completion time.
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| l i
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| i L
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| l mc3_cr_.3.3.wpd 1 April 24,1998
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| 1 Sp$ 3.3. l l TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)
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| TABLE NOTATION ,
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| l
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| ( M dWith the Reactor Trip System breakers in the closed position, the Control Rod Drive System capable of rod withdrawal.
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| -t* Val ~ues lefrblank pendtngARC approval 4f three 1000 onehtioD (d) @Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Interlock) Setpoint. l (b)@elow the P-10 (Low Setpoint Power Range Neutron Flux Interlock) Setpoint. l t
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| oat. m m .\ r(R b 4r.y A.I g ACTION STATEMENTS ct. ,,g ... p,,.u s ACTION [ - ith~ numoer vruum cnanne L& one lesy than the MinimuffD f hann OPERAg renoir atr restore the inoperable channel I to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours. -
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| . cg,,%g , , , ,rg, ACTION I - 'Witu se er of OPE E channels less than the oJal )
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| Number Channels, S TUP and/or ER OPERATION ma proceed mrovi_ +ha fa11~4 ; ra="+8kae a satisfied: o V.I.1,b.ti,ED The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition thin 6 hours,
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| @\(The Minran= Chann#re omun e renutAmaat n et; w~ag A.4 m, R ceonermis channel may be bypassed for un to 4 hours) .
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| Ae.vi a for surveillance testingtiti otner enaneW6 0,G mM DeciTiesuon S r. A.y a3 \,,(a uv,.,4 ,JjwLA]Avms D al) stricted to less than or equal O,) .1 Either, THERMAL POWER is to 75% of RATED THERMAL POWERJana/tne Powey Range eut tg riux er detpoi is repdced to/less thin ne a a1 + 85%
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| of RA THFR ontare .wihin m nwesTfor, the QUADRANT $
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| 7 c.1.1 OWERTILTRATIOismonitoredatQeastonceper 2 hours l per ^narmem an$.2.4.2. o
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| @ V3 boM pek:Oal on, n w i,4J 4 k)t. l perfece.<J u % i Ory),1 D.3j E.2. be b M686'5 m b b*5 N P y tap mn% saph
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| %Qnn6:.susy r e
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| McGUlf.E - UNIT 1 3/4 3-6 Amendment No. 166 i
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| l pp 6 d 13 l
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| l
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| IABLE 3.3-1 (Continuod!
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| TABLE NOTATION l
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| @ Ghith the Reactor Trip System breakers in the closed position, the Control Rod Drive System capable of rod withdrawal.
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| h Q 2XAI M blank nena da'NRC approval A P diree loop (d) (B6elow the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Interlock) Setpoint.
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| (N @elow the P-10 (Low Setpoint Power Range Neutron Flux Interlock) Setpoint.
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| Oa. w l .
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| ! "'*'I i^'F'*
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| ACTION 1 -
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| ith th ACTION STATEMENTS '
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| l er of OPERABL annels one I g than the N M hanne PFRABLE reauir ntf. restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in HOT STAND 8Y within the next 6 hours.
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| [Ont ha ,..gg@
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| ACTION / - "With the n r of OPERABLE cha els one less than e Tota l Number of annels, STARTUP a /or POWER OPERATI may proceed l
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| Lprovided he following condi ons are satisfied:
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| ! D.l .I,0.2),E.I @
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| ! The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition' within 6 hours, l j @ 1e Minjaos cnannels OPERABLE requirement is_ met; how@
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| i A4 14N % iemoveram channel i M*"rp be bypassed for up to 4 hours)
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| D# n.4 for surveillance tes<:in er A- mas
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| * rd g c5,,eq fi,,,rion 4.3.lsdQa A4 ,4 crev p ,a o.l . z. O Either, THERNAL POWER restricted to less than or equal j to 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER /ana the PDrer Range Me Flux Tri etpoint is uced to les/than or ecual 8 af DA _ WEDMA{ BM :. T a marg e'700, the QUADRANT
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| [ D.2 2. POWER TILT RATIO is monitored at least once per 2' hours p
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| l pe r ka*M+faITiih 2.4.2. --
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| ' . . . . . . . . . . . _ . . ..p a . .....
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| ) oB j
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| - i
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| &%Gs
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| : 0. 3 , E . 2. & sa M806' 3 'a (* hou3 Al F/v ,*3p k ePTR h impan.
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| l l
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| l McGUIRE - UNIT 2 3/4 3-6 Amendment No. 148 Pay 6 op 23 f
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| L
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| Discussian of Changes Section 3.3 - Instrumentation i
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| TECHNICAL CHANGES - LESS RESTRICTIVE L.18-21 Not used.
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| l L.22 CTS Table 3.3-3 Actions 15 and 15b allow operation to proceed with one inoperabl.: channel (placed in trip) until the next performance of the COT. ITS 3.3.2 Conditions D, J and P contain a note which allows the cnannel to be placed in bypass for surveillance testing on other channels. Performance of surveillance on other channels cannot be completed because the inoperable channel is in trip and cannot be taken out of trip without the note. Most inoperabilities can be repaired prior to the performance of surveillance on other channels. However, should a repair be delayed, a surveillance on an inoperable channel would be missed and the operable channel would be declared inoperable forcing a unit shutdown. This change is consistent with NUREG-1431.
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| L.23 Not used.
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| L.24 The RTS CTS Action 2c on Table 3.3-1, applicable to an inoperable power range channel, requires power to be reduced to less than or equal to 75% within 4 hours or QPTR must be monitored using the movable incore detectors every 12 hours. This CTS Action was revised consistent with the corresponding STS Action. The l corresponding STS Action (0.1.2) provides consistency between the two options. The STS Actions require that either QPTR be verified or power be reduced to less than or equal to 75% within 12 hours.
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| The RTS safety function of the affected power range channel is satisfied by the Action requirement to place the channel in trip (CTS Action 2.a which has been retained as ITS Actions 0.1.1 or D.2.1). The proposed ITS Actions continue to ensure the reactor trip safety function of the channel is accomplished. In addition, the slow change in QPTR over time allows on occeptable level of safety to be maintained in the CTS and ITS by monitoring QPTR every 12 hours at a power level greater than 75%. Therefore, an acceptable level of safety is also provided by allowing a time of no more than 12 hours to reduce power to less than or equal to 75% as an alternative Action to monitoring QPTR every 12 hours.
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| Therefore, the increase in the time allowed to reduce power to less than or equal to 75% from 4 hours to 12 hours is acceptable.
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| L.25 CTS Action 15 for Catawba and 15a for McGuire allow operation to proceed with one inoperable channel (placed in trip) until the performance of the the next operational test. The CTS Action is McGuire Units 1 and 2 Page L - 6 Supplement 54 l
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| No Significant Hazards Consideration Section 3.3 - Instrumentation l l
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| ! LESS RESTRICTIVE CHANGE L.24 1
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| The Mcguire Nuclear Station is converting to the Improved Technical l Specifications (ITS) as outlined in NUREG-1431, " Standard Technical l Specifications, Westinghouse Plants." The proposed change involves \
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| making the current Technical Specifications (CTS) less restrictive.
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| Below is the description of this less restrictive change and the No '
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| Significant Hazards Consideration for conversion to NUREG-1431. 1
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| ', l The RTS CTS Action 2c on Table 3.3-1, applicable to an inoperable power "ange channel, requires power to be reduced to less than or equal to 75%
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| within 4 hours or QPTR must be monitored using the movable incore detectors every 12 hours. This CTS Action was revised consistent with the corresponding STS Action. The corresponding STS Action (0.1.2) provides consistency between the two options. The STS Actions require that either QPTR be verified or power be reduced to less than or equal to 75% within 12 hours. The RTS safety function of the offected power range channel is satisfied by the Action requirement to place the channel in trip (CTS Action 2.a which has been retained as ITS Actions D.1.1 or D.2.1). The proposed ITS Actions continue to ensure the reactor trip safety function of the channel is accomplished. In addition, the slow change in QPTR over time allows an acceptable level of safety to be maintained in the CTS and ITS by Ironitoring QPTR every 12 hours at a power level greater than 75%. Therefore, an acceptable level of safety is also provided by allowing a time of no more than 12 hours to reduce power to less than or equal to 75% as on alternative Action to ,
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| monitoring QPTR every 12 hours. Therefore, the increase in the time allowed to reduce power to less than or equal to 75% from 4 hours to 12 hours is acceptable.
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| In accordance with the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, the McGuire Nuclear Station has evaluated this proposed Technical Specifications change and determined it does not represent a significant hazards consideration. The following is provided in support of this conclusion.
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| : 1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequence of an accident previously evaluated?
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| The proposed change increases the completion time allowed to reduce power to less than or equal to 75% when one channel of j power range instrumentation is inoperable. This change will not offect the probability of an accident. The power range channels are not initiators of any analyzed events. The consequences of an accident are not affected by this change. The safety function of l
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| McGuire Units 1 and 2 Page 42 of 52 Supplement 55/20/97l
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| __,____a
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| N3 Significant Hazards Consideration Sectien 3.3 - Instrumentation the offected channel is satisfied when the instrument channel is placed in trip. The change will not alter assumptions relative to the mitigation of an accident or transient event. Therefore, this change will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequence of an accident previously evaluated.
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| 1
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| : 2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind 1 of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
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| This change will not physically alter the plant (no new or 1 different type of equipment will be installed). The changes in methods governing normal plant operation are consistent with current safety analysis assumptions. Therefore, the change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
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| : 3. Does this change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
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| The margin of safety is not offected by this change because the l requirements to place the affected instrument channel in trip ,
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| remain unchanged. The function of the power range instrument l channels is to actuate (trip) to mitigate design basis events. '
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| The proposed change does not alter the ability of the power range j instrumentation to respond to design basis events. The proposed change onty provides additional time to reduce power. The time allowed to reduce power is not an assumption of any safety 1 analysis. The applicable safety analysis assumptions will still be maintained, therefore, the change does not involve o 1 significant reduction in a margin of safety.
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| l McGuire Units 1 and 2 Page 43 of 52 Supplement 55/20/97l
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| McGuire & Catkwba Improved TS Review Comments 4
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| ITS 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation M a&+_
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| 3.3.1 02 ITS Table 3.3.1-1, Function 2.b CTS Table 4.31, Functional Unit 2, Low Setpoint DOC LA.3 JFD 5 ITS Table 3.3.1 1, Function 2. b requires SR 3.3.1.11 to be performed, which includes Note 2 that excludes detector voltage plateau verification prior to entry to Modes 1 or 2. CTS Table i 4.31, Functional Unit 2, Low Setpoint, specifies Channel Calibration, but does not include this exclusion, which was CTS Table Note (5). Comment: Revise the submittal to correct this discrepancy.
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| l DEC Response:
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| The requirement in CTS note 5 to obtain detector plateau curves need not be specified for every function that receives input from the NIS detectors. Once the plateau curves are obtained, they apply to all channels which rely on the NIS detectors and do not have to be reperformed for each NIS instrumentation bistable channel which is calibrated. The channel calibration for the power range low trip setpoint function can be performed independently of l the requirement to obtain detector plateau curves. The addition of this note is therefore administrative. An A DOC (A.69) is added to show this change.
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| l l
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| ! l l
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| l l l l
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| l
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| ! 1 1
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| 1 1
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| l mc3_cr_3.3.wpd 2 April 24,1998 l
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| l l
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| l
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| q ,3 ye 5f tuW S3.0 -
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| TABLE - (Continu$dl TABLE NOTATION
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| * - With e Reactor Trip Syst breakers closed and t Control Driv System capable of d withdrawal. j ff -
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| ow P-6 (Intermedia Range Neutron Flux In riock) Setpoint.
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| ### - Below P-10 (Low S point Power Range Neut n Flux Interlock)
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| Setnoint mw, mo Is.2 OA.l sa. 3 3.1
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| - gn 3.1.,.,1 p
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| - If not performed in previous 31 days. *4 )
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| i
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| , g ,y,t @ - Comparison of calorimetric to excore _ power indication GboveAst mATm urmIM.D. ] Adjust excore channes gains canninenFwitR)
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| AM P'' P*"g
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| / WeI calorimetric powr if absolute difference is greater than 2%. "k/
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| *" is so rJu f>cenon 4.0.4 apd not aoo icabWfor entry to r gd,3.5.13 h - Single point toeparison of incore to excore axial flux difference h ibove 1e ialw THERRAL POWF1h.IRecalibrate if the absolute di
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| * F erence is greater than or equal to 3%. ITFe pro ions of p.,ha- 4 ci ,
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| j u .se ation 4.orare not apoficable forAtry into E 2 or .
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| g gg - Neutron detectors may be excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION., $n
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| @ Detector plateau pdrves tham he ahtalJIId. evalua)d'd, and chred to f
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| .T manu6cturer_'s Mta. I For the Intermediate Range and Power R)nge Neu-
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| ,. o a 7 tron Flux channels the provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not _ _ j l en3s.t.H applicable for entrv into N00E 2 or 1.
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| SRT.3.l Q - Incore - Excore Calibration.labove % of RATED RMAL POWER.
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| vi s pecific4 tion 4.0.4 re not appli ble for entry int A/AgW r th E11'M
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| - Each train shall_ be tested at least every IAIII* r ays on a STAGGERED TEST e Tn ertrMe. 38 Al9 m
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| @ as; -/ DeleteiD j@ffe)96.CMb
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| -n,.3 3 g M A eechanem f
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| M Pater %
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| - diia'rIWi% surveillance an r-e- aVand F)shalT @ include verification that permissives P-6&and P-10 fare in their required _ gg,(g Mf3'[9 . state dor exi<tinppunt conditions bv onsemunn er ma n - m u_i m -- --
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| -- _f, quarte surveissance is inciuoc f i fvermceuon p1 Ene nigh F1 at Shutdown A Setpoint/f less t j (orequalto/ivetimesba ground.
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| 3)g.it - Setpoint verification is not required.
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| [M $A h t'l
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| } . l*1 McGUIRE - UNIT l 3/4 3-14 Amendment No. 166 9
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| p ,; l*/ al U
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| A ,17 N % M 3,3, l JABLE G (Continued)
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| TABLE NOTATION Wi the Reactor Trip System reakers closed and the ontro M ive System capable of ro withdrawal. l Below P-6 (Intermediate ange Neutron Flux Inte ock)Setpoint.
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| iff -
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| Below P-10 (Low Set int Power Range Neutron luxInterlock)
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| Setpoint.
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| 5 . ,a f h- If not performed in previous 3 ]8 g 3 3. l.2 @- Comparison of calorimetric to excore power indication dnave 15% 4/Al l dt1TED4HERMAI- ruwttr. / Adjust exCore Channel gains Consistent with b
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| * Oh4 /tJere s calorimetric power _if absolute differe'nce is greater than 2%.
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| * Q** / provisions SpeciIientinn (n_a are nM' annlicable/for entrF LM00E 2 o _lf ,
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| 4 R 3.3.l. 3 @- Sinole noint ca=amd=an af inenp to excore axial flux difference AM ove 15% of RATED THERMAL POWEno. IRicraibrate i f 1'n e an ninta -
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| A 7,$jz ference_ is greater than or equal InMgrovisions of pecif'-
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| catf ori 4.0.4 areAjot ADD 11cabVfor entryJftto MODE 2 o .
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| 08*f( 8
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| % SR 3.3 @- .
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| Neutron detectors may be excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION. se
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| @- tec nuf lateau curve,54 hall be obtaMed, evaluatedAnd of.46aredAq turer's dataEFor the Intermediate Hange ana Power Range Neu ;
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| i (Jm 2.. ron Flux channels the provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not -
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| % 54 3.3.i.e pplicable for entry into MODE 2 or 1-g33f,(,, @ - Incore - Excore Calibration, WDove ty4 oi MATED tRMAL POWER. e Stovisi Specifica#'on 4.0.4Ae not ano11 able for ent in g pE2 II awy -
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| Each train shall be tested at least every@ a s on-a STAGGERED TEST BASIS.
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| 7 ( se % rmed, e.<t
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| $i[!l$ g ur -
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| nemio .
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| e - r= W ,
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| .73 } ; ft h h f r i GuarMfl0 surveillance 4tLH00EM*i a* 2.<rRS shall GEtb include ~4
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| " 3' # verification that pe issives P-68and P-10/are in their required state for existin conditionsthv e servation_of M fe permis
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| * ufrterly survel ance shall nunrd ator windu CTude X ritica ~ n'ot the igh Flux at S down Alarm point of lep[than) r eg to five imes backgroun ,
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| sn$.f.rs lo - Setpoint verification is not required.
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| 1.3.r,et "
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| l McGUIRE - UNIT 2 3/4 3-14 Amendment No. 148 e, a e "
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| f l
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| Discussian of Changes Secticn 3.3 - Instrumentation ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES A.65 CTS Table 4.3-2 requires a TADOT on the manual initiation function for Containment Purge and Exhaust. ITS SR 3.3.6.4 'ndicates that ;
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| the verification of setpoint is not required for this l surveillance. The TAD 0T definition includes setpoint i verification, however, these are manual actuations with no associated setpoints. This change is administrative and consistent with NUREG-1431. 1 i
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| A.66 CTS Table 4.3-2 requires a TAD 0T on the manual initiation function for SI, Containment Spray, Phase A, Phase B, and Steam Line Isolation. ITS SR 3.3.2.7 indicates that the verification of I setpoint is not required for this surveillance. The TAD 0T definition includes setpoint verification, however, these are manual actuations with no associated setpoints. This change is administrative and consistent with NUREG-1431.
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| A.67 CTS Table 4.3-1 requires a TAD 0T on the manual initiation function for reactor trip, reactor trip bypass breakers, and SI input to reactor trip. ITS SR 3.3.1.14 indicates that the verification of setpoint is not required for this surveillance. The TAD 0T definition includes setpoint verification, however, these are manual actuations with no associated setpoints. This change is administrative and consistent with NUREG-1431.
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| A.68 Not used.
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| A.69 The portion of CTS Note 5 on Table 4.3-1 of the RTS Specification l regarding the exception to the provisions of Specification 4.0.4 for entry into Modes 1 or 2 for the detector p?ateau curve verification is retained in the ITS SR 3.3.1.11 as Note 2. This CTS note was applied to the power range neutron flux high trip function. The verification of plateau voltage curves is performed in lieu of a calibration of the neutron detectors and is only applicable to the neutron detectors. The note does not offect the channel calibration performed on the remaining portions of the power range instrumentation. The CTS and ITS both also contain notes which provide exceptions to the Channel Calibration for the l neutron detectors (note 1 in ITS SR 3.3.1.11 and note 4 in the CTS Table 4.3-1). Therefore, the plateau curve verification is independent of the calibrations required to be performed on the remaining portions of the power range channels. The placement of CTS note 5 in ITS SR 3.3.1.11 allows the note to address the power Page A - 15W Supplement 5+
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| l McGuire Unit 1 and 2
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| Discussien of Changes Secticn 3.3 - Instrumentation I
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| ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES I
| |
| range neutron flux high and low trip functions. As the neutron detectors are excluded from the colibrotinn of the power range 1 high and low trip functions (note 1 in ITS :R 3.3.1.11 and note 4 '
| |
| in the CTS Table 4.3-1), the addition of CTS note 5 to the power ;
| |
| j range neutron flux low trip function does not impact the channel l
| |
| calibration for that function. The channel calibration of the j power range neutron flux trip low function, continues'to be performed in the some manner as before. The Plateau curve ,
| |
| verification also continues to be performed as before, once every ;
| |
| 18 months which completes the required Channel Calibrations by including the common neutron detector such that the entire l instrument loop is checked (per the definition of Channel
| |
| [ Calibration) . As such, this change reorganizes the presentation
| |
| : l. of CTS note 5 but does not introduce any technical changes to the l CTS surveillance requirements. Therefore, this change is l considered administrative.
| |
| l A.70 Not used.
| |
| A.71 A new ITS Note that is included in SR 3.3.2.8 for McGuire and SR 3.3.2.9 for Catawba is added to the ESFAS Channel Calibration i surveillance requirement. This note requires that the channel calibration include verification of time constants. Time constants are specified in the ESFAS as part of the setpoint. In l CTS Table 3.3-4 the setpoints for McGuire Function 4.d and Catawba l Function 4.e contain time constants for which the ITS note is applicable. Therefore, the addition of this note is shown for 1 these functions. As the time constants are specified as part of the function setpoint and the fact that a channel colibratton must ,
| |
| verify each function's setpoint, the addition of the ITS note '
| |
| provides a clarification and does not introduce a technical change 1 in the calibration of any ESFAS function. Therefore, this change is considered administrative.
| |
| A.72 A new ITS Note has been added to the CTS requirement for ESFAS Response Time Testing. CTS 4.3.2.2 is modified by the addition of a Note that provides on exception for the performance of Response Time Testing of the Turbine Driven AFW pump consistent with the allowance specified in the corresponding ITS SRs. The note allows 24 hours after the SG pressure has reached on acceptable level for testing the turbine pump. The addition of this note is also consistent with an existing CTS allowance for testing the turbine-driven AFW pump contained in the Plant Systems Technical McGuire Unit I and 2 Page A - 16 9 Supplement 51l I
| |
| | |
| McGuire & Cat'awba improved TS Review Comments ITS 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation 3.3.1-03 CTS Table 3.3-1, Action Statement 3.b for Functional Unit 4, intermediate range, neutron flux ITS 3.3.1 Required Actions F.1 and F.2 DOC L.2 CTS Table 3.3-1, Action 3.b for Functional Unit 4, requires an inoperable channel to be restored prior to increasing power above 10%. Actions F.1 and F.2 for conr,esponding ITS 3.3.1 require power to be adjusted to either below P-6, the intermediate range neutron flux interlock, or above P-10, the power range neutron flux interlock, within 2 hours. DOC L.2 does not describe the proposed change's impact on safety and explain why the safety impact is acceptable.
| |
| Comment: Revise the submitta! (DOC L.2) to strengthen the justification for the proposed change.
| |
| DEC Response:
| |
| DOC L.2 is revised to provide additional justification for the proposed change.
| |
| l mc3_cr_3.3.wpd 3 April 24,1998 !
| |
| | |
| Discussion of Changes Section 3.3 - Instrumentation TECHNICAL CHANGES - LESS RESTRICTIVE 1
| |
| l The requirement to reduce the power range neutron flux high trip L.1 setpoints in CTS 3.3.1, Action 2c, is deleted. The loss of one power range neutron flux channel does not impact the reliability of the reactor trip system because the channel is required to be placed in trip. The ability to measure Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (QPTR), however, may be impacted. To address the impact on measuring QPTR, the QPTR surveillance prd, vide conditional notes that verify QPTR (ITS SR 3.2.4.1 and SR 3.2.4.2). Since the loss of one power range channel may only affect the ability to measure QPTR, there is no basis for reducing the pcwer range high flux trip setpoints and increasing the potential for an inadvertent reactor trip. The existing surveillance requirements in the QPTR TS provide adequate remedial measures (increased surveillance frequency and/or different method for monitoring QPTR) when an inoperable power range channel affects the input to QPTR. This change is consistent with NUREG-1431.
| |
| L.2 CTS 3.3.1, Action 3.b, for the Intermediate Range monitors between P-6 and P-10, requires an inoperable channel to be restored to OPERABLE status prior to increasing power above 10%. ITS 3.3.1, Action F, requires power to be adjusted to either below P-6 or above P-10 within 2 hours. The ITS Action ensures the plant is placed in a Condition where this RTS function is no longer required. Below P-6 the source range instrumentation provides the monitoring and protection functions to ensure safe operation of the plant. Above P-10 the Power range instrumentation provides the required RTS protection functions. Therefore, above P-10 and below P-6 the intermediate range monitors do not provide on RTS function that is relied on to mitigate a design bases accident.
| |
| This change is less restrictive since it allows power to be increased above the mode of applicability with the channel inoperable. This change is consistent with NUREG-1431.
| |
| L.3 CTS 3.3.1 action statement 3.a requires the Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Instrumentation (when below P-6) to be restored to OPERABLE status prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above P-6 with one channel inoperable. ITS 3.3.1 allows the same Action when two channels are inoperable. The CTS does not currently contain specific Actions when two channels are inoperable below P-6, therefore, LC0 3.0.3 would be entered. LC0 3.0.3 would require the plant to be in MODE 3 in 7 hours. An LC0 3.0.3 entry is overly restrictive. The ITS Action, to not allow power to be increased Page L - 1 Supplement 54 lMcGuireUnits1and2
| |
| | |
| Discussion of Changes Section 3.3 - Instrumentation TECHNICAL CHANGES - LESS RESTRICTIVE above P-6 until the intermediate range channels are restored to OPERABLE status, is appropriate since the intermediate range instrumentation are not credited in the Safety Analysis and the NIS Source Range monitors provide the protection and monitoring function below P-6. This change is consistent with NUREG-1431.
| |
| L.4 CTS 3.3.1 Action statement 9 provides requ'irements for the RTBs.
| |
| ITS 3.3.1, Action R, contains all Notes applicable to the RTBs from CTS Action statement 9 and CTS Action statement 12 and provides one hour to restore the RTBs to operable status. This one hour is in addition to the 6 hours currently allowed to be in MODE 3. The additional one hour to restore allows a reasonable time to correct minor problems or errors before being required to enter a shutdown action. This change is consistent with NUREG-1431.
| |
| L.5 The CTS 3.3.1 S/U (startup) frequencies for the Power Range !
| |
| Neutron Flux Low, Source Range Neutron Flux, and Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Channel Operational Test requirements are revised from 31 days prior to startup to 92 days prior to startup.
| |
| The normal test frequency for these channels is 92 days. Since the 92 day Frequency is adequate to verify operability of these channels when the unit is operating, it is also adequate to verify operability prior to startup. In addition, these surveillance (ITS SR 3.3.1.7 and SR 3.3.1.8) are further revised by Notes and conditional frequencies which allow the unit to shutdown and pass through their respective mode of applicability without stopping ;
| |
| the unit shutdown to perform these surveillance if entry into the i mode of applicability is temporary as the unit is moving towards l MODE 3 with the RTBs open. This change is acceptable due to the j fact that not performing these same surveillance would also l result in the unit being removed from the respective mode of !
| |
| applicability (shutdown). Therefore, if the unit is being !
| |
| shutdown and only passing through the modes of applicability for these surveillance, the performance of these surveillance is not ;
| |
| required unless the unit remains in the mode of Applicability for an extended period (as defined by the time limits in the Notes).
| |
| These changes are consistent with operating history and NUREG-1431.
| |
| I L.6 The requirement in CTS Tables 3.3-3, 3.3-4, and 4.3-2 for AFW Pump Manual Initiation Function has been deleted. The manual i McGuire Units 1 and 2 Page L - 2 Supplement 5+l l
| |
| | |
| Discussion of Changes Section 3.3 - Instrumentation TECHNICAL CHANGES - LESS RESTRICTIVE initiation of each individual pump is not a requirement of the safety analysis. Sufficient redundancy is provided by the number of pumps in the system and the number of instrument channels available for automatic actuation retained in ITS 3.3.2. This change is consistent with NUREG-1431.
| |
| l L.7 Not Used. ', !
| |
| L.8 The CTS 3.3.3.6 Action a Completion Time allows 7 days for a single inoperable channel of post accident monitoring (PAM) instrumentation for those instruments requiring two channels. ITS 3.3.3 allows 30 days for this condition. Increasing the I Completion Time to 30 days is acceptable based on operating j experience and the remaining OPERABLE channels. These channels l are passive and perform no actuation function. This change is '
| |
| l consistent with NUREG-1431.
| |
| L.9 CTS 3.3.3.6 Action a and CTS 3.6.4.1 Action a require a unit shutdown when one required channel is inoperable and the Actions cannot be completed. ITS 3.3.3 allows continued operation in this condition for functions with two required channels provided a special report is written to the NRC detailing planned corrective actions. This change also applies to the containment radiation ,
| |
| monitor function when the required channel is inoperable. This i l change is acceptable based on the remaining OPERABLE required l channel or, for the radiation monitor, this change is acceptable based on alternative methods of obtaining the required l information, such as taking samples. This change is consistent
| |
| ! with NUREG-1431. l l
| |
| )
| |
| ! L.10 The CTS 3.3.3.6 Action b Completion Time of 48 hours and CTS ,
| |
| l 3.7.4a Completion Time of 72 hours is extended to 7 days for all l channels, except hydrogen monitors. For hydrogen monitors, the completion time is extended from 48 hours to 72 hours. The extended completion time, retained in ITS 3.3.3, applies to single channel functions with the required channel inoperable and to two channel functions when both required channels of the applicable function are inoperable. Increasing the Completion Time for these instruments to 7 days (or 72 hours for the hydrogen monitors) %e e c;c in truments is acceptable because of the low probability of an event requiring PAM instrument operation and the availability of alternate means to obtain the required information. This Page L - 3 Supplement 54 lMcGuireUnits1and2
| |
| | |
| Discussion of Changes Section 3.3 - Instrumentation TECHNICAL CHANGES - LESS RESTRICTIVE change is consistent with NUREG-1431.
| |
| L.11 CTS 4.6.4.1 for the Hydrogen Monitors requires a channel check once per 12 hours, a monthly analog channel operational test, and a channel calibration 92 days on a staggered test basis. ITS 3.3.3 requires a channel check once per 31 days and a channel l calibration once per 92 days. Eliminatioit of the channel operational test is acceptable since the Hydrogen Monitors are passive devices; they do not initiate any automatic actuations and I are used only during post accident conditions in containment. The I channel operational test is designed to verify required alarm, j interlock, and trip functions. The extension of the channel check j frequency from 12 hours to 31 days is consistent with the ;
| |
| frequencies established for all other post accident monitoring instrumentation within the CTS. The elimination of the staggered )
| |
| testing is acceptable since the monitors do not perform a 1 mitigative function and this change avoids potential missed surveillance due to missing the staggered intervals. Test data for these monitors indicates that the 92 day interval is sufficient to ensure operability. The hydrogen monitors are only required for monitoring and are not immediately needed after an j event. This change is consistent with NUREG-1431.
| |
| l l
| |
| L.12 CTS 3.3.3.5 Action a requires the inoperable remote shutdown system instrument channels to be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. ITS 3.3.4 increases the Completion Time from 7 I days to 30 days. This change is reasonable based on operating experience and the low probability of an event occurring that would require the control room to be evacuated. This change is consistent with NUREG-1431.
| |
| L.13 CTS 3.3.3.5 Table 3.3-9 requires both auxiliary feedwater flow and i
| |
| steam generator level as separate indication of Decay Heat Removal l via the SGs. ITS 3.3.4 allows the use of either one or the other indicators rather than both. The purpose of these indications is to determine if decay heat removal is taking place via the SGs to ensure a safe shutdown. Therefore, adequate information to determine if decay heat removal is occurring via the SGs can be obtained by either of these indications. This change is consistent with NUREG-1431.
| |
| McGuire Units 1 and 2 Page L - 4 Supplement 54 l
| |
| | |
| No Significant Hazards Consideration Section 3.3 - Instrumentation LESS RESTRICTIVE CHANGE L.2 The McGuire Nuclear Station is converting to the Improved Technical Specifications (ITS) as outlined in NUREG-1431, " Standard Technical Specifications, Westinghouse Plants." The proposed change involves making the current Technical Specifications (CTS) less restrictive.
| |
| Below is the description of this less restrictive change and the No j Significant Hazards Consideration for conversion to NUREG-1431. 1 CTS 3.3.1, Action 3.b, for the Intermediate Range monitors between P-6 and P-10, requires an inoperable channel to be restored to OPERABLE status prior to increasing power above 10%. ITS 3.3.1, Action F, requires power to be adjusted to either below P-6 or above P-10 within 2 hours. The ITS Action ensures the plant is placed in a Condition where this RTS function is no longer required. Below P-6 the source range instrumentation provides the monitoring and protection functions to ensure safe operation of the plant. Above P-10 the Power range instrumentation provides the required RTS protection functions. Therefore, above P-10 and below P-6 the intermediate range monitors do not provide an RTS function that is relied on to mitigate a design bases accident.
| |
| This change is less restrictive since it allows power to be increased above the mode of applicability with the channel inoperable. This change is consistent with NUREG-1431.
| |
| In accordance with the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, the McGuire Nuclear Station has evaluated this proposed Technical Specifications change and determined it does not represent a significant hazards consideration. The following is provided in support of this conclusion.
| |
| : 1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability I or consequence of an accident previously evaluated?
| |
| The proposed change will allow power to be increased above 10%
| |
| with one inoperable Intermediate Range Monitor versus the current requirement that allows operation above 10% only if the channel is i restored to operable. The proposed change does not affect the probability of an accident. The Intermediate Range Neutron Monitoring Instrumentation are not assumed to be an initiator of any analyzed event. The consequences of an accident are not .
| |
| affected by this change. The consequences of applicable analyzed accidents are mitigated by the Power Range Neutron Monitoring channels which trip the reactor. The change will not alter assumptions relative to the mitigation of an accident or transient Page 7 of 49 Supplement 55/20/97
| |
| ~lMcGuireUnits1and2 l
| |
| l I
| |
| | |
| N3 Significant Hazards Consideration Secticn 3.3 - Instrumentation l
| |
| event. Therefore, the change will not involve a significant ;
| |
| increase in the probability or consequence of an accident previously evaluated.
| |
| : 2. Does the change create.the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
| |
| This change will not physically alter the plant (no new or
| |
| , different type of equipment will be installed). The changes in i methods governing normal plant operation are consistent with current safety analysis assumptions. The proposed change will j allow operation to proceed above 10% power with one inoperable I channel. At power levels above 10%, the function is no longer ;
| |
| required. Therefore, the change does not create the possibility j of a new or different kind of accident from any accident J previously evaluated.
| |
| i
| |
| : 3. Does this change involve a significant reduction in a margin of l l safety?
| |
| i i The proposed change will allow operation to proceed above 10%
| |
| ( power with one inoperable Intermediate Range Neutron Flux channel.
| |
| l At power levels above 10%, the function is no longer required.
| |
| l The margin of safety is not affected because the current technical specifications would allow indefinite operation with the channel inoperable below 10%. The safety analysis credits the Power Range Neutron Flux channels for tripping the reactor for applicable l analyzed accidents. The safety analysis assumptions will still be maintained, thus, no question of safety exists. Therefore, the l
| |
| change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
| |
| McGuire Units 1 and 2 Page 8 of 49 Supplement 55/20/97l l
| |
| .--_ ._______n
| |
| | |
| 1 McGuire & Catawba improved TS Review Comments ITS 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation l j
| |
| 3.3.1-05 STS Table 3.3.1-1, Function 5
| |
| [McGuire only) ITS Table 3.3.1-1, Function 5 CTS Table 4.3-1, Functional Unit 5 STS Table 3.3.1-1, Function 5, in the second line for Modes 3,4 and 5 applicability includes footnote (f),"With the RTBs open.........." This footnote has been adopted in ITS Table 3.3.1-1, Function 5, as footnote (e). Corresponding CTS Table 4.3-1, Functional Unit 5 does not include this provision. No justification for this change has been provided. this change is a more restrictive change because the CTS did not contain this exception. Comment: Revise the subrnittal to provide the appropriate justification for the proposed change.
| |
| DEC Response:
| |
| DEC disagrees. Footnote (e) is derived from CTS Table 3.3-1 requirements and is justified by ,
| |
| DOC A22. The format of CTS Table 4.3-1 does not provide the level of detail consistent with Table 3.3-1 such that these changes can be uniquely identified. Footnote (e) is implicitly derived from the fact that the startup modes in CTS Table 3.3-1 identify that the RTBs are closed by footnote * (ITS footnote a).
| |
| i i
| |
| l l
| |
| mc3_cr_3.3.wpd 5 April 24,1998 l
| |
| | |
| McGuire & Catawba Improved TS Review Comments ITS 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation 3.3.1-06 ITS SR 3.3.1.12 STS SR 3.3.1.12 JFD 7 ITS SR 3.3.1.12 has not adopted the Note contained in STS SR 3.3.1.12. JFD 7 states that surveillance requirements have been deleted as not applicable to this station, Comment: Provide specific technical justification why the Note in,STS SR 3.3.1.12 is not applicable to either McGuire or Catawba.
| |
| DEC Response:
| |
| The units do not have a RTD bypass manifold.
| |
| L l
| |
| l l
| |
| l l
| |
| mc3_cr_3.3.wpd 6 April 24,1998
| |
| | |
| 1 l
| |
| McGuiro & Cr.t wbs Imprsysd TS Rcvicw C mmtnta ITS 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation i
| |
| 3.3.1-09 STS Table 3.3.1-1, Function 18.b ITS Table 3.3.1-1, Function 16.b JFD 5 Surveillance requirements of the STS for Function 18.b, SR 3.3.1.11 and SR 3.3.1.13 have '
| |
| not been adopted in corresponding ITS 3.3.1, Function 16.b. JFD 5 explains that this change reflects current licensing basis / technical specification but offers no further technical explanation as to why this SR is not required. Comment: Explairf why no surveillance are required for this function.
| |
| DEC Response: i l
| |
| The P7 function is a logic only function which combines the output from the P10 and P13 interlocks. The subject STS surveillance are for channel calibration and channel operational test. These surveillance are performed for the P10 and P13 bistables which provide the input to P7. A channel calibration and channel operational test are not performed on a logic only function. As an alternative to the STS surveillance requirements for the P-7 Function, an Actuation Logic Test is included as the surveillance requirement for the P-7 interlock. The Actuation Logic Test is a plant specific method of verifying this interlock and is added to the ITS in lieu of a channel calibration and channel operational test to better fit the plant testing methods used for instrumentation. As the CTS does not specify testing for this Function, the addition of the Actuation Logic Test for the P-7 interlock is considered a more restrictive change (new DOC M.28).
| |
| mc3_cr_3.3.wpd s April 24,1998 i
| |
| f p
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 i Table 3.3.1-1 (page 3 of 7)
| |
| Reactor Trip System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNEL 5 CONDITIONS REQUIREMENT 5 VALUE SETPOINT
| |
| : 12. Underfrequency I IfI 1 per bus M SR 3.3.1.9 a 55.9 H2 a 56.4 H2 RCPs $R 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.16
| |
| : 13. SteamGenerator(SG) 1,2 4 per $G E SR 3.'3.1.1 a 15% a 16.7%
| |
| Water Level - Low SR 3.3.1.7 Low SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.16
| |
| : 14. Turbine Trip
| |
| : a. Low Fluid Oil Pressure I I9) 3 0 SR 3.3.1.10 a 42 psig a 45 psig i SR 3.3.1.15 !
| |
| : b. Turbine Stop l Valve Closure II9) 4 P SR 3.3.1.10 a 1% open a 1% open !
| |
| l j SR 3.3.1.15 l
| |
| : 15. Safety injection (51) 1,2 2 trains Q SR 3.3.1.14 NA NA l Input from Engineered SR 3.3.1.5 i
| |
| Safety Feature
| |
| ! Actuation System (E5FAS)
| |
| : 16. Reactor Trip System Interlocks i I a. Intermediate 2(d) 2 5 SR 3.3.1.11 a 6E 11 amp a IE-10 amp Range Neutron SR 3.3.1.13 Flux, P-6 , !
| |
| l b. Low Power 1 1 per T SR 3.3.1.5 NA NA Reactor Trips train Block, P-7
| |
| : c. Power Range 1 4 T 5R 3.3.1.11 s 49% RTP s 48% RTP Neutron Flux, SR 3.3.1.13 P-8
| |
| : d. Power Range 1,2 4 5 SR 3.3.1.11 a 9% RTP and a 10% RTP Neutron Flux, SR 3.3.1.13 s 11% RTP P-10 s 11%
| |
| : e. Turbine Impulse 1 2 T SR 3.3.1.12 turbine s 10%
| |
| Pressure P 13 SR 3.3.1.13 impulse turbine pressure impulse equivalent pressure equivalent (continued)
| |
| (d) Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlocks.
| |
| (f) Above the P 7 (Low Power Reactor Trips Block) interlock.
| |
| (g) Above the P.8 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlock.
| |
| 3.3-16 Supplement 5 l McGuire Unit 1 l
| |
| i 1
| |
| | |
| 3.3.1 l Table 3.3.1-1 (page 3 of 7)
| |
| ' Reactor Trip System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES l OR OTHER SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIZMENTS VALUE SETPOINT l
| |
| : 12. Unde rf requency I II) 1 per bus M SR 3.3.1.9 a 55.9 Hz a 56.4 H RCPs SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.16
| |
| : 13. Steam Generator (5G) 1,2 4 per SG E SR3.).1.1 a 15% a 16.7%
| |
| Water Level - Low SR 3.3.1.7 Low SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.16
| |
| : 14. Turbine Trip
| |
| : a. Low Fluid Oil P ressure I I9) 3 0 SR 3.3.1.10 a 42 psig a 45 psig SR 3.3.1.15
| |
| : b. Turbine Stop Valve Closure I I9) 4 P SR 3.3.1.10 a 1% open a 1% open SR 3.3.1.15
| |
| : 15. Safety injection l51) 1,2 2 trains Q SR 3.3.1.14 NA NA Input from Engineered SR 3.3.1.5 l Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS)
| |
| : 16. Reactor Irip System Interlocks
| |
| : a. Intermediate ZId) 2 5 SR 3.3.1.11 a 6E-11 amp a IE-10 amp Range Neutron SR 3.3.1.13 Flux, P-6 l b. Low Power 1 1 per T SR 3.3.1.5 NA NA Reactor Trips train Block, P-7
| |
| : c. Power Range 1 4 T $R 3.3.1.11 s 49% RTP s 48% RTP Neutron Flux, SR 3.3.1.13 P-8
| |
| : d. Power Range 1,2 4 5 SR 3.3.1.11 a 9% RTP and a 10% RTP Neutron Flux, SR 3.3.1.13 s 11% RTP P-10 s 11%
| |
| : e. Turbine Impulse 1 2 T SR 3.3.1.12 turbine s 10%
| |
| Pressure, P-13 SR 3.3.1.13 impulse turbine pressure impulse equivalent pressure equivalent (continued)
| |
| (d) Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlocks.
| |
| (f) Above the P-7 (Low Power Reactor Trips Block) interlock.
| |
| (g) Above the P-8 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlock.
| |
| 3.3-16 Supplement 5 l McGuire Unit 2
| |
| )
| |
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| CCe N R 3 J- N N N N s
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| N N N O -
| |
| h(l T - k C c A e e m o E v o l R
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| r r r e r u f e
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| ( L r
| |
| o s t n r
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| t s e t n e o o c e v u I g6 r e t a r l p n :- t:
| |
| -
| |
| * t c e R a n m aP u a a R V I e R e W e l t ,
| |
| N R - i p n s ex r O o o y t u e o - y t i S al g t s cs d S t iF n8 a ep np pi c p d a -
| |
| r gm em iu ee e i en RP T e au uu rl nr j r n o I n tP qP TF iu n T nr r ,
| |
| N U
| |
| e Gw o
| |
| l ot vn e
| |
| rt ew bs ro i
| |
| r et t u ex wu 4 L mL ra fn ra iL no ul Tc t y
| |
| t o ne IN ol PF P U A a - el el b e c N ew d o d o r f a O t o no no u . . a e . E I SL UC UC Ta b S R a b". R T I k.
| |
| C N U U f
| |
| '3 4
| |
| 5
| |
| 'S
| |
| : r. C G F J 1 1 J I y M 3
| |
| Q l
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| l 1 f 51 4
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| i 1
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| ~
| |
| }
| |
| | |
| Discussion cf Chang:s Section 3.3 - Instrumentation I TECHNICAL CHANGES - MORE RESTRICTIVE M.23 Not used.
| |
| M.24 CTS Tables 3.3-3, 3.3-4, and 4.3-2 Turbine Trio and Feedwater Isolation function have been revised to include an initiation signal from Tavg-Low coincident with Reactor Trip (P-4). This i signal relationship limits an excessive RCS cooldown following a reactor trip by terminating main feedwater flow to the steam generators. The inclusion of this initiation signal in ITS 3.3.2 is considered more restrictive and is consistent with the plant design and safety analysis.
| |
| M.25 Not used.
| |
| M.26 Not used.
| |
| M.27 Not used. l M.28 The CTS RTS Surveillance Table 4.3-1 is revised by the addition of a specific line item to address the P-7 Interlock Function. The new line item for the P-7 interlock includes an Actuation Logic Test (ITS SR 3.3.1.5) which must be performed for this function.
| |
| The addition of a specific surveillance requirement to verify the operation of the P-7 Interlock provides assurance this Function is l maintained operable. However, the addition of this requirement represents a new technical specification restriction on plant operations and is therefore considered a more restrictive change.
| |
| M.29 The CT: RTS Surveillance Table 4.3-1 is revised by the addition of an Actuation Logic Test surveillance for Function 16, "Sofety Injection input from ESFAS". The automatic SI input to the RTS is verified during the testing performed on the associated actuation logic. Actuation Logic Tests are performed Monthly on a Staggered Test Basis for each actuation train. The addition of this requirement for the SI input to the RTS Function represents a new surveillance requirement for the RTS and is therefore considered a more restrictive change. However, the addition of this new test requirement ensures the SI input to the RTS is properly addressed wit 6'n the ITS, which in turn, provides assurance that the
| |
| ; operability and availability of this Function continue to be i verified on a regular basis. In addition, the inclusion of the actuation logic test for this RTS Function is consistent with the McGuire Unit 1 and 2 Page M - 5 Supplement 54 l l
| |
| l
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1 1 (pese 3 of 6) teactor Trip system Instrumentation APPLICA4LE MDES OR OfbER
| |
| $PECIFIED REQUIAED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWA8LE filP FUNCil0N CONDifl0NS - CMANNELS COM0!TIONS REQUltEMENTS VAWi SETPo!NT Y
| |
| /U d Turbine Trip
| |
| : a. Lou fluid Oil Presswe 1 3 /0 st 3.3.1.10 54 3.3.1.15 ,
| |
| t psig e
| |
| psis i
| |
| : b. TurW ne Stop 1 4 P SR 3.3.1.10 t 1 1 open t t % ope volve Closure SR 3.3.1.15 l 7 X safety 1,2 2 trains o sa 3.3.1.14 hA NA g injection (l') e I t w from Engineered Safety Feature Actuatic" System (ESFAS) 5 3*3*16 N 38. Reector Trip Systen Interlocks
| |
| : a. Intermediate 23 2 3 SR 3.3.1.11 t 11 [ t 1E 10P O Range neutron $4 3.3.1.13 amp esp FLm , P-6
| |
| : b. Lou Power 1 1 per T 7sa 3.3 ti mA MA Reactor Trips train i st 3. 1.1 Stock, P-7
| |
| : c. Power sence 1 4 i st 3.3.1.11 s s 48 RTP heutron flux, sa 3.3.1.13 P-8
| |
| . Power Range boutron flux 1 4 .
| |
| _ ___. " -- M/ 5 (501%
| |
| $t 3./13 p.9 #- --
| |
| RTP f d / Power Range 1,2 4 heutron flux, 5 SR 3.3.1.11 St 3.3.1.13 2
| |
| tir end t)10bRTP
| |
| /
| |
| P 10 s E 4 Turbine lasulse Pressure, P-13 1 2 Y h sast ~s.J.1.
| |
| . I t
| |
| s turbine s k10 turbine g
| |
| sa 3.3.1.13 e ; = m < - ti -
| |
| g, g. .jp-tauonf. y .ontain -ty Aiise vaiue wn, on ,,4oint og g d,p ,,,. ,,,,, ,,,,,,,,,,, ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
| |
| 9 p om ao P < Power son.e .eutron ri > interioet. @ l 3.3 19 Rev 1. 04/07/95 >
| |
| w l l
| |
| l i
| |
| l i
| |
| ! 1 l
| |
| f
| |
| | |
| I l
| |
| McGuire & Catawba improved TS Review Comments ITS 3.3.1, Reacto Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation 3.3.1.11 CTS Table 4.3-1, Functional Unit 17 ,
| |
| [McGuire only] ITS Table 3.3.1-1, Function 16.b STS Table 3.3.1 1, Function 18.b DOC A.1 l
| |
| , . l l STS Table 3.3.1-1, Functional Unit 18.b provides requirements for the low power reactor trips j l block, P.7. These requirements have been adopted in corresponding ITS Table 3.3.1-1, l l Function 16.b. DOC A.1 does not explain why the proposed change is administrative and not l more restrictive. Comment: Provide the appropriate justification for this proposed change.
| |
| l DEC Response:
| |
| The requirements for this function are found in CTS Table 3.31, function 17.b and CTS Table l 2.2-1, function 17.b. No surveillance requirements are specified in CTS Table 4.3-1 and none
| |
| ! are proposed in ITS Table 3.3.1-1. CTS Table 4.3-1 identifies the addition of this function for 1 completeness, but does not add any surveillance requirements.
| |
| I i
| |
| l l
| |
| l t .
| |
| I 1
| |
| ; i l
| |
| r mc3_cr 3.3.wpd 10 April 24,1998 l _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _
| |
| | |
| McGuire & Catawba Improved TS Review Comments ITS 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation 3.3.1-12 CTS Table 4.31, Functional Unit 17.f (Catawba only)
| |
| CTS Table 4.3-1, Functional Unit 17.d (McGuire only)
| |
| STS Table 3.3.1-1, Function 18.e ITS Table 3.3.1-1, Function 16.f (Catawba only)
| |
| ITS Table 3.3.1-1, Function 16.e (McGuire only) i STS Table 3.3.1-1 Function 18.e has SR 3.3.1.10 as channel calibration surveillance requirement which includes a note that specifies the verification of* time constants. ITS Table 3.3.1-1 function 16.e/f surveillance requirements have been changed to SR 3.3.1.12 with no discussion of change. This revised SR does not include note as to the verification of time constants. Comment: Provide the appropriate justification for this proposed change.
| |
| DEC Response: l l
| |
| I The STS markup retains the CTS requirements. There are no time constants specified in the CTS, therefore, SR 3.3.12 is the appropriate channel calibration requirement. There are no differences in the STS surveillance other than the time constant note which is not applicable to this function. l l
| |
| I mc3_cr_3.3.wpd ll April 24,1998 i
| |
| w-_______-__-_________
| |
| | |
| McGuire & Catawba improved TS Review Comments ITS 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation l
| |
| 3.3.1-13 CTS Table 2.2-1, Note 2
| |
| [McGuire only) ITS Table 3.3.1-1, Note 2 l CTS Table 2.2-1, Note 2 specifies, "AT =As defined in Note 1." Note 1 states,"AT = Measured AT by Loop Narrow Range RTD." STS and ITS Table 3.3.1-1, Note 2 states, "AT is measured RCS AT , 'F." Comment: No justification has been provided for not retaining the words 'by Loop Narrow Range RTD'. Revise the submittal to provide the justification for the proposed
| |
| ; change.
| |
| l DEC Response:
| |
| The McGuire ITS is revised consistent with the CTS detail similar to Catawba' .
| |
| I 1
| |
| i mc3_cr_3.3.wpd 22 April 24,1998
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 I
| |
| Table 3.3.1-1 (page 5 of 7)
| |
| Reactor Trip System Instrumentation Note 1: Overtemoerature AT The Overtemperature AT Function Allowable Value shall not exceed the following Trip Setpoint by more than 4.4% of RTP. S l
| |
| I I '
| |
| AT
| |
| ,, 3, t,, 4 A To Ki - K, ( T - Ti /
| |
| l, t y (l t,,, +73 (P-P )- fg (A !)
| |
| 1 j.Where: AT is measured RCS AT t 'oop narrow range RTDs, F.
| |
| ATn is the indicated AT at RTP, *F.
| |
| s is the Laplace transform operator, sec-1 T,is the measured RCS average temperature, *F.
| |
| T is the nominal T,yg at RTP, s 585.1*F.
| |
| P,is the measured pressurizer pressure, psig P is the nominal RCS operating pressure, = 2235 psig K
| |
| i
| |
| = Overtemperature AT reactor trip setpoint, as presented in the COLR, K
| |
| 2
| |
| = Overtemperature AT reactor trip heatup setpoint penalty coefficient, as presented in the COLR, K
| |
| 3
| |
| = Overtemperature AT reactor trip depressurization setpoint penalty coefficient, as presented in the COLR, ri,T2 =
| |
| Time constants utilized in the lead-lag controller for AT, as presented in the COLR, r3
| |
| = Time constants utilized in the lag compensator for AT, as presented in the COLR,
| |
| =
| |
| r4, is Time constants utilized in the lead-lag controller for T,yg, as presented in the COLR,
| |
| =
| |
| t6 Time constants utilized in the measured T,yg lag compensator, as presented in the COLR, and, f(AI) i
| |
| = a function of the indicated difference between top and bottom detectors of the power-range nuclear ion chambers; with gains to be selected based on measured instrument response during plant startup tests such that:
| |
| (i) for qt - gb between the " positive" and " negative" f i (AI) breakpoints as presented in the COLR; fi (AI) = 0, where qt and qb are percent RATED THERMAL POWER in the top and bottom halves of the core respectively, and qt + qb is total THERMAL POWER in percent of RATED THERMAL POWER; (ii) for each percent imbalance that the magnitude of qt - gb (continued) l McGuire Unit 1 3.3-18 Supplement 5
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 (page 6 of 7)
| |
| Reactor Trip System Instrumentation is more negative than the f i(AI) " negative" breakpoint presented in the COLR, the AT Trip Setpoint shall be automatically reduced by the f t(AI) " negative" slope presented in the COLR; and (iii) for each percent imbalance that the magnitude of qt - gb
| |
| ; is more po'itive than the f (A'I) i " positive" breakpoint l presented .n the COLR, the AT Trip Setpoint shall be automatici.11y reduced by the tf (AI) " positive" slope presente.' in the COLR.
| |
| Note 2: Overoower AT The Overpower AT Function Allowable Value shall not exceed the following Trip Setpoint by more than 3.0$, of RTP.
| |
| 'I ''I o **~'5 1 s,s I - "5 I -# -#2 M 1 + x3s 1 + tes i s,s dere: AT is measured RCS AT by loop narrow range RIDS, *F. l ATn is the indicated AT at RTP, *F.
| |
| s is the Laplace transform operator, sec-1 T,is the measured RCS average temperature, *F.
| |
| T is the nominal T,yg at RTP, s 585.1*F.
| |
| K4 = Overpower AT reactor trip setpoint as presented in the COLR, K5 = 0.02/*F for increasing average temperature and 0 for decreasing average temperature, K6 =
| |
| Overpower AT reactor trip heatup setpoint penalty coe,fficient as presented in the COLR for T > T and K6 = 0 for T s T ,
| |
| t,i T2
| |
| = Time constants utilized in the lead-lag controller for AT, as presented in the COLR, t3
| |
| = Time constants utilized in the lag compensator for AT, as presented in the COLR, T6
| |
| =
| |
| Time constants utilized in the measured T,yg lag compensator, as presented in the COLR, ty =
| |
| Time constant utilized in the rate-lag controller for T,yo, as presented in the COLR, and
| |
| ~
| |
| f(AI) 2
| |
| = a function of the indicated difference between top and bottom detectors of the power-range nuclear ion chambers; with gains to be selected based on measured instrument response during plant startup tests such that:
| |
| (continued)
| |
| McGuire Unit 1 3.3-19 Supplement 5 l
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation l 3.3.1 Tab'le 3.3.1-1 (page 5 of 7) i Reactor Trip System Instrumentation l
| |
| Note 1: Overtemoerature AT The Overtemperature AT Function Allowable Value shall not exceed the following Trip i
| |
| Setpoint by more than 4.4% of RTP.
| |
| 'I ''T o u+ks) - T'+h(P-P )- f (A I)
| |
| I g ti is "1 - *2 (
| |
| l Where: AT is measured RCS AT by loop narrow range RTDs, 'F.
| |
| ATg is the indicated AT at RTP, 'F.
| |
| s is the Laplace transform operator, sec-l.
| |
| T 'F.
| |
| T,isisthethemeasured RCSataverage nominal T,yg RTP, s temperature, 585.1*F. ,
| |
| l P,is the measured pressurizer pressure, psig P is the nominal RCS operc ting pressure, = 2235 psig l Ki = Overtemperature AT reactor trip setpoint, as presented in the COLR, K2 = Overtemperature AT reactor trip heatup setpoint penalty coefficient, as presented in the COLR, K3 = Overtemperature AT reactor trip depressurization setpoint penalty coefficient, as presented in the COLR, t i ,T2 = Time constants utilized in the lead-lag controller for AT, as .
| |
| i presented in the COLR, I T3
| |
| = Time constants utilized in the lag compensator for AT, as presented in the COLR, T,4 is = Time constants utilized in the lead-lag controller for T,yg, as presented in the COLR, l' T6
| |
| = Time constants utilized in the measured T,yg lag compensator, as presented in the COLR, and, f(AI) t
| |
| = a function of the indicated difference between top and bottom l
| |
| detectors of the power-range nuclear ion chambers; with gains to be selected based on measured instrument response during plant startup tests such that:
| |
| (i) for gt - qb between the " positive" and " negative" fi (AI)
| |
| I breakpoints as presented in the COLR; fi (AI) = 0, where qt and qb are percent RATED THERMAL POWER in the top and l
| |
| bottom halves of the core respectively, and qt + qb is p
| |
| total TH O MAL POWER in percent of RATED THERMAL POWER; (ii) for each percent imbalance that the magnitude of qt - 4b (continued) l McGuire Unit 2 3.3-18 Supplement 5 i
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1
| |
| - Tabl'e 3.3.1-1 (page 6 of 7)
| |
| Reactor Trip System Instrumentation is more negative than the f i(AI) " negative" breakpoint presented in the COLR, the AT Trip Setpoint shall be automatically reduced by the f 3(AI) " negative" slope presented in the COLR; and (iii) for each percent imbalance that the magnitude of q - gb is more positive than the f i(AI) " positive" breakpoint presented in the COLR, the AT Trip Setpoint shall be automatically reduced by the ft (AI) " positive" slope presented in the COLR.
| |
| Note 2: Overoower AT {
| |
| The Overpower AT Function Allowable Value shall not exceed the following Trip Setpoint by more than 3.0% of RTP.
| |
| 4::::L1.i,,; m s-s:',;,:1.:,;'-s1 1. ,, - 1"w 1
| |
| Where: AT is measured RCS AT by loop narrow range RTDs, *F. l ATg is the indicated AT at RTP, "F.
| |
| s is the Laplace transform operator, sec-1 T,is the measured RCS average temperature, *F.
| |
| T is the nominal T,yg at RTP, s 585.1*F. i K4 = Overpower AT reactor trip setpoint as presented in the COLR, K5 = 0.02/*F for increasing average temperature and 0 for decreasing average temperature, K6 = Overpower AT reactor trip heatup setpoint penalty coe,,fficient as presented in the COLR for T > T and K6 = 0 for T s T ,
| |
| t,i t2 = Tiine constants utilized in the lead-lag controller for AT, as presented in the COLR, T3
| |
| = Time constants utilized in the lag compensator for AT, as presented in the COLR, t6
| |
| =
| |
| Time constants utilized in the measured T,yg lag compensator, as presented in the COLR, ty = Time constant utilized in the rate-lag controller for T,yg, as presented in the COLR, and f(AI) 2
| |
| = a function of the indicated difference between top and bottom detectors of the power-range nuclear ion chambers; with gains to l be selected based on measured instrument response during plant startup tests such that:
| |
| (continued)
| |
| McGuire Unit 2 3.3-19 Supplement 5 l l
| |
| l l
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 (page 7 of 8)
| |
| Reactor Trip System Instrumentation l
| |
| Note 1- Overtemperature AT The Overtemperature AT Function Allowable Value shall not exceed the following Trip Setpoint by more th
| |
| ! of Q (1+f a)i 1
| |
| ' 1 i
| |
| ~
| |
| (1
| |
| * f,s ) ,1 + f,s ,
| |
| ' b((1+v.s) 1*v,s) (1+r s) :P*D" Y U Where: AT is measured RCS A ATo is the indicated AT at RTP, 'F.
| |
| b J s is the Laplace transform operator, sec* .
| |
| T is the measured RCS average t rature. *F.
| |
| i T' is the nominal T, at RTP. s F. g S P is the measured pressurizer pressure. ~
| |
| P' is the nominal RCS operating pressure.psig/O 2235 ) [psig l l
| |
| K, s [1.09] K 2 [0.0138J/~r K3 = [0.0 671J/psig r, 2 [ 8 ) sec r2 s [ 3 ] sec r3 s[ 2 see r 2 [ 33 ) s r, s [ 4 ) sec r. s [ ] sec N50'T Os f,(AI) - 1. (35 + (q, - q.,)}
| |
| 03 of RTP when4[3-when - , sRTP
| |
| % - [35]%
| |
| < q -RTP q i
| |
| .05{(q, - q ) - 7} when q, q, > [7]% hTP , s [7]% RTP !
| |
| Where q, and q, are percen RTP in the upper and lowe halves of !
| |
| the core, respectively, d q, + q, is the total THE POWER in percent RTP.
| |
| I l
| |
| 3.3 21 Rev 1, 04/07/95 ; ' ' ' .
| |
| wa -
| |
| I i
| |
| | |
| RfS Instrumentation 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 (page 8 of 8)
| |
| Reactor Trip System Instrumentation Note 2- Overoower AT The Overpower AT Function Allowable Value shall not exceed the following Trip 1 Setpoint by more t @ of(R'grih
| |
| >> P::::l,,0. ;>>. -s,::. ,.:.. -s.
| |
| 1 , .:.. - >- - v>" _
| |
| . j Where: AT is measured RCS A NU AT, is the indicated AT at RTP. 'F. 1 s 1s the Laplace transform operator. sec' T is the measured RCS average t rature. *F.
| |
| T' is the nominal T, at RTP. s S gg @
| |
| 6s[1.09] K. [0.02]/*F for increasin Tm K. 2 [0.00128]/* when f r , 2 [8] sec [0]/*F for decreasing T [0]/*F whe T s T.T > T*
| |
| 2 s [3] !ac r, s [2] sec r s [2] sec r,2 [10] sec f (AI) - 0% TP for all AI.
| |
| @ (issGeiy 3.3 22 Rev 1. 04/07/95 9 ,
| |
| pecws
| |
| | |
| l I
| |
| McGuire & Catawba improved TS Review Comments ITS 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation 3.3.1-14 ITS Bases Background, Page B 3.3-3 STS Bases Background, Page B 3.3-3 The title of the second paragraph in the STS Bases Background is " Signal Process Control and Protection System" which has been changed to " Process Monitoring System"in the ITS. The paragraph that follows in the ITS describes process control equipment rather than process monitoring equipment. Comment: Revise the bases to correct thp discrepancy.
| |
| DEC Response:
| |
| The subject paragraph title was changed consistent with the terminology used by the plant staff.
| |
| Since the Bases is utilized by the plant staff, it is appropriate to utilize familiar terminology to avoid confusion.
| |
| l l
| |
| mc3_cr_3.3.wpd .13 April 24,1998
| |
| | |
| McGuire & Cat'awba improved TS Review Comments ITS 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation 3.3.1-15 Bases for ITS 3.3.1 Required Actions U.1, and U.2
| |
| [McGuire only] ITS 3.3.1 Conditions O and R The Bases marf.up for ITS 3.3.1 Required Actions U.1, and U.2 states ".......the reactor trip breaker is inoperable and Condition O is entered." Condition O does not apply to the reactor trip breakers; Condition R applies to the reactor trip breakers. Comment: Revise the Bases to refer to Condition R. ',
| |
| DEC Response:
| |
| This error was corrected in ITS Supplement 1 dated March 9,1998.
| |
| I mc3_cr_3.3.wpd 24 April 24,1998 l
| |
| | |
| McGuire & Catawba improved TS Review Comments ITS 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation 3.3.2-01 ITS SR 3.3.2.8 Note [McGuire]
| |
| ITS SR 3.3.2.9 Note (Catawba)
| |
| CTS Table 4.3-2, all Functional Units for which Channel Calibration is required l STS 1.1, Definition of Channel Calibration 1
| |
| The Note for ITS SR 3.3.2.8 states, "This surveillance shall include, verification that the time constants are adjusted to the prescribed values." This Note has not been included in the markup for CTS Table 4.3-2, for any of the Functional Units for which Channel Calibration is required, and has not been included in the definition of Channel Calibration. No justification has been provided for the addition of this note. Comment: Revise the submittal to correct the CTS markup and provide the appropriate justification.
| |
| DEC Response:
| |
| The applicable time constants are specified as part of the ESFAS Function Trip Setpoint and Allowable Value in the CTS (see Table 3.3-4 setpoints for McGuire Function 4.d and Catawba Function 4.e). The
| |
| * footnote in CTS Table 3.3-4 for Catawba Function 4.e clearly specifies that the time constant verification is part of the channel calibration. As the required time constants are specified in, and part of, the Trip setpoint and Allowable Value of the associated Function, the definition of Channel Calibration does in fact include verification of the specified time constants. An Administrative change (A.71) and associated markup are added to CTS Tables 4.3-I to more clearly identify this change for the Channel Calibration of the affected Functions in both plants, mc3_cr_3.3.wpd 15 June 12,1998
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| | |
| Discussion of Changes Section 3.3 - Instrumentation I ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES range neutron flux high and low trip functions. As the neutron detectors are excluded from the calibration of the power range high and low trip functions (note 1 in ITS SR 3.3.1.11 and note 4 in the CTS Table 4.3-1), the addition of CTS note 5 to the power range neutron flux low trip function does not impact the channel
| |
| : calibration for that functton. The channel calibration of the power range neutron flux trip low functioh continues to be I performed in the same manner as before. The Plateau curve verification also continues to be performed as before, once every 18 months which completes the required Channel Calibrations by l
| |
| including the common neutron detector such that the entire i instrument loop is checked (per the definition of Channel Calibration). As such, this change reorganizes the presentation of CTS note 5 but does not introduce any technical changes to the CTS surveillance requirements. Therefore, this change is considered administrative.
| |
| A.70 Not used.
| |
| A.71 A new ITS Note that is included in SR 3.3.2.8 for McGuire and SR 3.3.2.9 for Catawba is added to the ESFAS Channel Calibration >
| |
| surveillance requirement. This note requires that the channel calibration include verification of time constants. Time constants are specified in the ESFAS as part of the setpoint. In CTS Table 3.3-4 the setpoints for McGuire Function 4.d and Catawba Function 4.e contain time constants for which the ITS note is applicable. Therefore, the addition of this note is shown for these functions. As the time constants are specified as part of the functton setpoint and the fact that a channel colibrotion must verify each function's setpoint, the addition of the ITS note provides a clarification and does not introduce a technical change in the calibration of any ESFAS functlon. Therefore, this change is considered administrative.
| |
| A.72 A new ITS Note has been added to the CTS requirement for ESFAS Response Time Testing. CTS 4.3.2.2 is modified by the addition of a Note that provides an exception for the performance of Response
| |
| ? Time Testing of the Turbine Driven AFW pump consistent with the allowance specified in the corresponding ITS SRs. The note allows l 24 hours after the SG pressure has reached on acceptable level for ,
| |
| testing the turbine pump. The addition of this note is also consistent with an existing CTS allowance for testing the turbine-
| |
| ' driven AFW pump contained in the Plant Systems Technical McGuire Unit 1 and 2 Page A - 16W Supplement 51l 4
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| i
| |
| | |
| McGuire & Catawba improved TS Review Comments ITS 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation 3.3.2-02 ITS SR 3.3.2.9 Note (McGuire)
| |
| ITS SR 3.3.2.10 Note [ Catawba)
| |
| CTS 4.3.2.2 STS 1.1, Definition of ESFAS Response Time The Note for ITS SR 3.3.2.9 states,"Not required to be performed for the turbine driven AFW pump until 24 hours af ter SG pressure is 2900 psig." This Note hqs not been included in the markup for CTS 4.3.2.2 and has not been included in the definition of ESFAS Response Times.
| |
| No discussion has been provided for this proposed change. Comment: Revise the submittal to correct the CTS markup and provide the appropriate justification.
| |
| DEC Response: J I
| |
| The McGuire and Catawba CTS for the AFW System (Plant Systems Section) contain the 1 above allowance for testing the turbine-driven AFW pumps (see McGuire 4.7.1.2.b.2
| |
| * footnote and Catawba 4.7.1.2.1.b.2 ** footnote). As the ESFAS Response Time Testing may be performed in a series of overlapping tests, the actual pump start is performed consistent with ,
| |
| the CTS allowances provided in the applicable AFW pump surveillance requirements. The addition of the ITS Response Time Surveillance Note serves only as a clarification of the existing CTS requirements. An Administrative change (DOC A.72)is added to CTS surveillance 4.3.2.2 to more clearly identify and explain this change for both plants.
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| 1
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| )
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| 1 mc3_cr_3.3.wpd 16 June 12,1998 l
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| | |
| SfTa bl6 3.U .
| |
| INSVRUMENVATION
| |
| [ 38'D. 3. 2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION 1
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| (EIMUMGCONUJ4IONFORQPfRATIM M 33.1-9 lCo 3.3._2 The Engineered Safety Features ctuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation c., ot an@ ann -erwte shown in Tabl @ shall be OPERABl.
| |
| e poi th thffr Irif L J,.,.
| |
| Tabl(fs seyconsiszent witf the varues snownrin theMrin 3.3-bano wittjAE5 PONS int column of E/1MES as ,sfFown in Tale 3.3 5.
| |
| APPLICABILITY: CAs.4howff i Table h ACTION:
| |
| ). [ With an E AS Instrumentation enan i v. hdu conserva ve than the value show n the Allowable V ues ri setpointlessf column of hf**cB* F*^' /*a D [d Table .3-4, declare the channe inoperable and app ACTI requirement of Table 3 -3 until the channe is restored to the applicable I OPE BLE status with the Tri Setpoint adjusted nsistent with th Setpoint value.
| |
| AW ith =a = =s
| |
| 'a c t rudan ta t iiith channehr inoperable, take A.I r eu __ .. ~ ,m %,,, 0 @ the ACTION shown in Table .
| |
| A,g d .M. o <. 4- ''w es. 31.1.I N
| |
| A.1 U
| |
| [reqaml SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS A. met deC+ h
| |
| % tl.L1 1 ++ , 4.3.2.1 E ESFAS Inst ntation chann and interloc d the automati da,4 e J'l % actuatio ogic and rel s shall be de "pr k t^M trated OPERA by the perform ce of tthe ESF Instruments on Surveillanea (E.S 1 L O
| |
| * j. ve r, .m nuireewnte < ifierf in Table .3-2. #
| |
| e.A. 3.1.1.*l
| |
| @G snani ERED SAFET NYTURES RESPONSE TIME ni .acewa>,unctum
| |
| - Last snaii beJaa,rratea tenhDw thin diDlimit at least once per 18 mo[ nth Eac .
| |
| once per n.ivue et iusst on train such that oth trains are 6 teo at least %
| |
| months and one ch nel per functio such that all ch nels are AIf tested a least once per N mes 18 months w re N is the total number of ,
| |
| redund . t channels in a sp ific ESFAS fune on as shown in t Chan s" column of Table 'TotalNo.ofp 1
| |
| .3-3 7 b c.
| |
| erIF N.i re owed.Me perm W =srncaw e? i p,c4.g % nedekm Nr***'r f"#f'
| |
| * i uga. 24 A.urs 4.Nec & f ;
| |
| : t. $
| |
| ~
| |
| Nf* - ,
| |
| j
| |
| " A,72-i i
| |
| McGUIRE - UNIT 1 3/4 3-16 Amendment No. 166 i
| |
| AC
| |
| | |
| INSTRUMENTATION U1 34.3.2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMEN _
| |
| (1~1MIT14G CONDITIOVFOR OpERAKON7 1.co 3.3. . 3. z q l ann The Engineered Safety Features Actuatio)n System (ESFAS) Instrumen 1 O mb etpoig$_ana intariocw shown in Tabl shall be OPERABL
| |
| -\ M *^ s set. consisten vwitn the values snown in r ip detp eir ir able/3.3-%th RfEPONSE TIMESAs shown in T t column o 3- -
| |
| APPLICABILITY: Esdhown43 Tablec32RP.
| |
| I ACTION:
| |
| * # N *MC
| |
| .C. t,m e '
| |
| f 1 h an ESF h
| |
| Instrumentation ch nel or Interlock Trip conservati e than the value sho in the Allowable Valu tpoint5sD d all M <
| |
| column of Table 3. 4, declare the chann b Cd Ed6 ACTION quirement of Table inoperable and ap ly e applicable 3-3 until the channe i restored to
| |
| - OPERAB status with Setpoint adjusted cons stent with-th to etpoint value.,the Tr ACT''N A b ra n.0
| |
| 'g <@
| |
| ith anA$FAS Instrugefitatio3channelhrUnteflocB inoperable, take the ACTION shown in Table % 2 9, u en .e n.,a O3 -O SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS nore: ede h -
| |
| Tuk. aa.2-1
| |
| * M~~' *** f 4.3.2.1 Each FAS Instrumentation actuation 1 ic and relays '$ hall annel and interlock nd the automatic -
| |
| M f N ., "' the ESFA instrumentation Surve demonstrated OPERAB by the perfonnan of i ance Requirements s cified in Table 4. -2 !
| |
| GMM G EERED SR 33.2.9 gii.iMe demonstrated to b SAFETY EATURES RESPONSE TINE m eaon mi
| |
| 'na*
| |
| ithin @ limit at_1 east once per 18 months. fia'cT w once i. anperis3i months cauae as andseast one chaoneel rain such that per function sucboth rains that all are testea a least channels tested at east once per N t e redundary s 18 months where N s the total numbe of banners" channels column of in a spe.3-3.
| |
| Table ific ESFAS
| |
| , function shown in the "To No. of
| |
| ,N0.!$1 on e STAGGEREt> '
| |
| N.+ regus'ect r bbe perFord4 nstam Ng.to,Wne Artven AN PomPunMI I vt koon a.f9er 6Gpre. pure s r.j
| |
| _.q ,
| |
| A.7.t -
| |
| McGUI E - UNIT 2 3/4 3-16 Amendment No. 148 i
| |
| p9 I 4 24 f
| |
| | |
| Discussion of Changes Section 3.3 - Instrumentation ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES range neutron flux high and low trip functions. As the neutron detectors are excluded from the calibration of the power range high and low trip functions (note 1 in ITS SR 3.3.1.11 and note 4 in the CTS Table 4.3-1), the addition of CTS note 5 to the power range neutron flux low trip function does not impact the channel calibration for that function. The channel calibration of the power range neutron flux trip low functioh. continues to be performed in the same manner as before. The Plateau curve verification also continues to be performed as before, once every 18 months which completes the required Channel Calibrations by including the common neutron detector such that the entire instrument loop is checked (per the definition of Channel Calibration). As such, this change reorganizes the presentation of CTS note 5 but does not introduce any technical ch2nges to the CTS surveillance requirements. Therefore, this change is considered administrative.
| |
| A.70 Not used.
| |
| A.71 A new ITS Note that is included in SR 3.3.2.8 for McGuire and SR 3.3.2.9 for Catawba is added to the ESFAS Channel Calibration surveillance requirement. This note requires that the channel calibration include verification of time constants. Time constants are specified in the ESFAS as part of the setpoint. In CTS Table 3.3-4 the setpoints for McGuire Function 4.d and Catawba Function 4.e contain time constants for which the ITS note is applicable. Therefore, the addition of this note is shown for these functions. As the time constants are specified as part of the function setpoint and the fact that a channel calibration must verify each function's setpoint, the addition of the ITS note provides a clarification and does not introduce a technical change in the calibration of any ESFAS function. Therefore, this change is considered administrative.
| |
| A.72 A new ITS Note has been added to the CTS requirement for ESFAS Response Time Testing. CTS 4.3.2.2 is modified by the addition of a Note that provides on exception for the performance of Response Time Testing of the Turbine Driven AFW pump consistent with the allowance specified in the corresponding ITS SRs. The note allows 24 hours after the SG pressure has reached on acceptable level for testing the turbine pump. The addition of this note is also consistent with an existing CTS allowance for testing the turbine-driven AFW pump contained in the Plant Systems Technical McGuire Unit 1 and 2 Page A - 16W Supplement 54l
| |
| | |
| Discussion of Changes i Section 3.3 - Instrumentation i
| |
| ADMINIS1RATIVE CHANGES Specifications for the AFW system (see McGuire 4.7.1.2.b.2
| |
| * footnote and Catawba 4.7.1.2.1.b.2 ** footnote). As this allowance already exists in the CTS pump testing requirements, the addition l of the ITS Response Time Surveillance Note serves only as a 1 clarification of the existing CTS requirements. Therefore, this change is considered administrative.
| |
| s l A.73 The CTS Table 4.3-1 Note 9 is revised to more clearly identify the Nuclear Instrumentation channels associated with the P-6 and P-10 interlocks. The CTS Note requires the interlock status be verified when performing operational tests on the associated Instrumentation channels. The identification of the Intermediate Range Instrumentation in association with the P-6 interlock and the the Power Range Instrumentation in association with the P-10 interlock is consistent with the design of those interlocks. The clarification provided by the association of the correct Instrument channels with each interlock function does not introduce a technical change to the CTS. Therefore, this clarification is considered on administrative change.
| |
| I A.74 The McGuire specific Doghouse Water Level High-High Function has 3 channels of instrumentation per train per doghouse. Two-out-of- .
| |
| three channels in either of the two trains per doghouse can actuate the function for that doghouse. The CTS Action (#25) is based on the loss of one entire train (less than the minimum required number of channels operable or more than one channel inoperable). This McGuire specific Function differs from the standard instrument Function in that (6) total channels exist in two redundant trains for actuating the some doghouse function.
| |
| Therefore, the typical conversion to the ITS of the CTS Total number of channels with an Action for one channel inoperable does not apply. The CTS Action #25 is based on a loss of one train in a doghouse not one channel. This is reasonable considering that the redundant train is still available to perform the safety function.
| |
| Therefore, instead of the total number of channels being used in
| |
| [
| |
| the ITS " Required Channels" column, the CTS specified minimum number of channels per train is used in the ITS. The use of the CTS minimum number of channels required operable in the ITS along with the proposed ITS Action for "one required channel inoperable" accurately converts the CTS train based Action to the ITS format.
| |
| With two redundant trains, the Completion Time of 72 hours is appliccble to loss of one entire train or more than one of the three channels in a train must be inoperable. The proposed ITS Page A - 17W Supplement 51 lMcGuireUnit1and2 i
| |
| l
| |
| | |
| l I
| |
| McGuire & Cat'awba improved TS Review Comments ITS 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation j 1
| |
| 3.3.2-03 ITS 3.3.2, Notes for Required Actions D.1 and J.1
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| [McGuire only) STS 3.3.2, Notes for Required Actions D.1 and 1.1 DOC L.22 i JFD 14 l The Note for ITS Required Actions D.1 and J.1 omit the phrase "of other channels" from the corresponding Note in the STS which states,"... for surveillance testing of other channels."
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| DOC L.22 and JFD 14 indicate that the omitted STS phrase is ado'pted. Comment: Revise the ,
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| Note consistent with the STS. 1 DEC Response:
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| JFD 14 states that the Note is revised consistent with the approved allowance for testing the affected channels in bypass. The format of the ITS Notes for plants approved to test channels in bypass was previously approved by the NRC in the Vogtle and Watts Bar Plant ITS. Test in !
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| bypass, as described in the JFD, allows the required testing to be performed on the channel i which is bypassed as well as other channels. Where testing in bypass has not been approved, bypassing a channel only allows for the testing of other channels (the STS note is written for i this case where testing must be performed with the channel in trip). The STS Note restricts l
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| testing to "other channels" which may be placed in trip after an inoperable channel has been j bypassed. The revised Note more clearly reflects the allowance to perform testing on any !
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| channel (the bypassed channel cr other channels). JFD 14 describes the expanded test i I
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| options associated with " test in bypass" approval which may include the "other channels". The CTS markups associated with DOC L.22 on pages 3/4 3-24 and 25 accurately show the proposed Note used in ITS Required Actions D.1 and J.1. No additional changes or )
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| justifications are required.
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| )
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| i l
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| mc3_cr_3.3. doc 17 June 12,1998
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| (
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| McGuire & Cat'awba improved TS Review Comments i ITS 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation 3.3.2-04 ITS Table 3.3.21, Function 3.b.(3), Containment Pressure
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| [McGuire only) high-high JFD 5 CTS 4.3.2.2 The ITS does not adopt STS SR 3.3.2.10, to verify ESFAS Response Times are within limits.
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| JFD 5 bases this change on the current licensing basis / technical specifications. Neither CTS 4.3.2.2 or the markup of CTS 4.3.2.2 excludes containment pressure high high from verification of response time. Comment: Provide justification for not adopting STS SR 3.3.2.10.
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| DEC Response:
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| CTS Table 3.3-5, " Engineered Safety Features Response Times' documents the ESFAS.
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| channels for which response times are required and specifies the required time. CTS surveillance 4.3.2.2 must be used in conjunction with Table 3.3-5 to establish the current licensing basis and limits associated with response time testing ESFAS channels. The ESFAS Function in question 3.b.(3) (ITS number) is the Phase B Containment isolation on Containment Pressure high-high. Function 5.b on CTS Table 3.3-5 documents that no response time is ;
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| required for Phase B Containment isolation on Containment Pressure high-high. Therefore, j JFD 5 is accurate in stating that the deletion of STS surveillance 3.3.2.10 is based on the CTS requirements / licensing basis and no further justification or change is required.
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| l mc3_cr_3.3. doc fB June 12,1998 ;
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| i I I l l i _ 1
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| i McGuire & Catewba improved TS Review Comments ITS 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) instrumentation 3.3.2-05 ITS Table 3.3.21, Function 4.a, b, c, & d, Applicability, footnote (b)
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| STS Table 3.3.21, Function 4, a, b, c, & d, Applicability, footnote (b)
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| DOC A.29 CTS Table 3.3 3, Functional Unit 4.a, b, c, & d ITS Table 3.3.2-1, Note (b) provides an exception to the applicability of the requirements to Modes 2 and 3 when all MSIVs are closed and de-activated, consistent with STS DOC A.29 says this is consistent with CTS. However, the CTS did not originally contain this exception.
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| Comment: Revise the submittal to justify this less restrictive change.
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| DEC Response:
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| The CTS does contain this exception but in a different form. The plant Systems Section of the CTS contains the system level requirements for the MSIVs. As stated in DOC A.29, the CTS 3.7.1.4 Actions contain an explicit allowance for operation to continue in Modes 2 and 3 provided the inoperable MSIV is closed. The addition of the ITS Note providing a similar allowance to the applicability of the associated instrurt entation for the MSIVs is considered a clarification of the existing Plant System Action requirements for the MSIVs. If continued operation in Modes 2 and 3 is permitted when an incperable MSIV is closed, the supporting instrumentation which automatically closes the affected MSIV is also no longer required. This change makes the CTS requirements internally consistent between the system level and supporting instrumentation for the MSIVs. This type of clarification / consistency issue is i considered administrative. No further justification or change is required.
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| mc3_.cr_.3.3.wpd 19 June 12,1998
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| McGuire & Catawba improved TS Review Comments ITS 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation l
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| 3.3.2-06 ITS Table 3.3-3, Function 5 CTS Table 3.3-3, Functional Unit 5 STS Table 3.3.2-1, Function 5 DOC A.32 The Applicable Modes for ITS Table 3.3.2-1, Function 5 contains a footnote (e), that was not in the corresponding CTS Table 3.3-3, Functional Unit 5. This added footnote was adopted from STS Table 3.3.2-1, Functions 5. The footnote states, "Except when all MFIVs, MFRVs and associated bypass valves are closed and de-activated or isolated by a closed manual valve."
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| DOC A.32 provides an explanation about why this change is acceptable. DOC A.32 states,
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| " this change is administrative in nature ...." This change is a less restrictive change because the CTS did not contain this exception. Comment : Revise the submittal to provide the appropriate justification for the proposed change.
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| DEC Response:
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| The ESFAS Main Feedwater Isolation instrumentation provides an automatic close signal to the Main Feedwater system valves to isolate the feedwater system. The change addressed in DOC A.32, discussed above, provides a clarification which is consistent with the manner in which most isolation valves are treated in the CTS and ITS. That is, if the system can be adequately isolated (safety function of isolation valve performed), continued operation is permitted. Once the feedwater system is isolated, the ESFAS isolation instrumentation is no longer required.
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| This type of change is considered an administrative clarification of existing requirements consistent with the requirements for other isolation valves in the TS. No additional justification or change is required.
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| I mc3_cr_3.3.wpd 20 June 12,1998
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| 1 McGuire & Catawba improved TS Review Comments ITS 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation l
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| l 3.3.2-07 CTS Table 4.3-2, Functional Unit 5.b.
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| l
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| [McGuire only] ITS Table 3.3.2-1, Function 5.b The markup of CTS Table 4.3-2, Functional Unit 5.b specifies that SRs 3.3.2.2,3.3.2.4, and 3.3.2.6 be performed. These SRs are not included in corresponding ITS Table 3.3.2-1. Comment: Revise the submittal to correct the discrepancy DEC Response:.
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| The STS Markup of Table 3.3.2-1 for McGuire is revised to add the appropriate SRs and reference existing JFD 5. Note that the final typed copy of the McGuire ITS does include these SRs.
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| mc3_cr_.3.3.wpd 27 June 12,1998
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| ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 f ebte 3.3.21 (page 6 of 8)
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| Engineered safety feature Actuation system Instrumentation APPLICA8tf 8CDES Ca OTNit sPECIFIED RL JIRED SURVilLLANE ALLOWABLE filP FUNC180M CDMDiflCars DiANNCLs COhclil0NS REQJitDOTs VALUE !!TPo!N
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| : 5. Turt>ine Trip and feedseter Isotation *
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| : a. Automatic 1,2" ', 2 trairu SR 3.3.2.2 RA Actuation Logic st 3.3.2.4 and Actuation sa 3.3.2.6
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| "''"Y' g Q' gr (, P39
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| : b. so unter t=t -sie ese -
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| 1,2
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| ,3
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| [scIper h sa3.3.2.1 sa 3.3.2. ,
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| s s sg@x (P 54)
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| Q: sa 3.3.2 st 3.3.2. 73g 3,3,g,7, '
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| : c. safety Injection Refer to Fmetion 1 (safety injectien) for all Initiation **
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| feetions -d ree,ir ents.
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| 6 R 3.3.2.6>g
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| : 6. Ataillery feedseter
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| : a. Aucomotic 1,2,3 2 trains Actuntion Logic 32 3.3.2.2 mA mA e ard Ac sa 3.3.2.4 st 3.3.2.6 Ret (soli Prot ti i p.Aut-ti.
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| Actumtion tsg i,2,3 2 tr.i s sa 3.3.2. .4 and Actunt tet.y. tence .e Plant sFAs) b [. SCLevet LAnter 1,2,3 per p $3 3.3.2.1 y
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| -Lou Lou *g sG st 3.3.2.
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| st 3.3.2.
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| SR 3.3.2.
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| (conti E )
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| 03 6W 's notes uft specific.)diptesentatiac/mey contain enVAttewable wettrhw m t,"4 se,rhedotew used b( the miu '
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| at ,M s, associated bypass volve are closed ard activet or isetated by a aJff-fLT) s _
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| ~
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| f OcSL mst u -
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| W\-Whk i, 2 "I g (",, Y $ 9 'M' WOpfIS 3.3 37 Rev 1, 04/07/95 (4.C>v n s
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| McGuire & Cat'awba improved TS Review Comments !
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| ITS 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation l l
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| l l 3.3.2-09 CTS Table 3.3-3, Functional Unit 5.c
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| ! [McGuire only) ITS Table 3.3.2-1, Function 5.d i Bases discussion for Applicable Safety Analysis, LCO, and l ApplicWity, Function 5.d, STS Bases markup,
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| ! Insert page B 3.3-92 CTS Table 3.3-3 Functional Unit 5.c states that Doghouse Water I,evel-High initiates Feedwater
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| ; Isolation only. Corresponding ITS Table 3.3.2-1, Function 5.d states that Doghouse Water l Level- High initiates Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation. The Bases discussion for the Applicable Safety Analysis, LCO,' and Applicability for Function 5.d. states, "This signal only initiates a Feedwater Isolation." Comment: Revise the submittal to correct the discrepancy.
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| l j DEC Response: l The bases description of the Doghouse Level High-High Function is revised to more accurately describe this ESFAS Function. The bases has been revised to include the following description l of this actuation signal:
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| l "This signal initiates feedwater isolation for the specific doghouse .
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| where the High-High levelir detected and trips both main feedwater pumps thus causing a main turbine trip".
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| mc3_cr_3.3.wpd 23 June 12,1998 i
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| l
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| ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2
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| : BASES l
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| APPLICABLE b. Turbine Trio and Feedwater Isolation-Steam
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| : SAFETY ANALYSES, Generator Water Level-Hiah Hiah (P-14)
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| LCO, and APPLICABILITY This signal provides protection against excessive
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| : (continued) feedwater flow. The ESFAS SG water level L instruments provide input to the SG Water Level Control System. Therefore, the actuation logic must be able to withstand both an input-failure to the control system (which may then require the protection function actuation) and a single
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| . failure in the other channels providing the protection function actuation. Only three protection channels are necessary to satisfy the protective requirements. .The setpoints are based
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| - < on percent of narrow range instrument span.
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| : c. Turbine Trio and Feedwater Isolation-Safety Iniection Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation is also initiated by all Functions that initiate-SI. The Feedwater Isolation Function requirements for these Functions are the same as the requirements for their SI function. Therefore, the requirements are not repeated in Table 3.3.2-1.
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| Instead Function 1, SI, is referenced for all initiating functions and requirements.
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| : d. Turbine Trio and Feedwater Isolation -- RCS' T.,g Low Coincident with Reactor Trio (P-4)
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| This signal only initiates a Feedwater Isolation.- 1 The signal provides protection against excessive l cooldown, which could subsequently introduce a u positive reactivity excursion after a plant trip.
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| l There'are four channels of RCS'T ,, - Low (one per loop), with a two-out-of-four logic required coincident with a reactor trip signal (P-4) to initiate a feedwater isolation. The P-4 interlock is discussed in Function 8.a.
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| : e. Turbine Trio and Feedwater Isolation - Doohouse Water Level - Hiah Hiah l- -l This signal initiates a Feedwater Isolation. The signal terminates forward feedwater flow in (continued) l McGuire Unit 1 B 3.3-80 Supplement 5
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| ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES APPLICABLE e. Turbine Trio and Feedwater Isolation - Doahouse SAFETY ANALYSES, Water Level - Hiah Hiah (continued)
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| LCO, and APPLICABILITY the event of a postulated pipe break in the main feedwater piping in the doghouses to prevent flooding safety related equipment essential to the safe shutdown of the plant. The level instrumentation consists o'f six level switches (three per train) in each of the two reactor building doghouses. A high-high level detected by two-out-of-three switches in either train in the inboard or outboard doghouse will initiate a feeawater isolation. This signal initiates Feedwater Isolation for the specific doghouse where the High-High level is detected and trips both main feedwater pumps thus causing a main turbine trip.
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| Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation Functions must be l OPERABLE in MODES 1 and 2 except when all MFIVs, 1 MFCVs, and associated bypass valves are closed and l de-activated or isolated by a closed manual valve when the MFW System is in operation and the turbine generator may be in operation. In MODES 3, 4, 5, and 6, the MFW System and the turbine generator are not in service and this Function is not required to be OPERABLE.
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| : 6. Auxiliary Feedwater The AFW System is designed to provide a secondary side i heat sink for the reactor in the event that the MFW System is not available. The system has two motor !
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| driven pumps and a turbine driven pump, making it l available during normal and accident operation. The normal source of water for the AFW System is the condensate storage system (not safety related). A low suction pressure to the AFW pumps will automatically realign the pump suctions to the Nuclear Service Water System (NSWS)(safety related). The AFW System is aligned so that upon a pump start, flow is initiated to the respective SGs imediately.
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| (continued)
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| McGuire Unit 1 8 3.3-81 Supplement 5 l l
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| l
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| ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES APPLICABLE b. Turbine Trio and Feedwater Isolation-Steam SAFETY ANALYSES, Generator Water Level-Hiah Hiah (P-14)
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| LCO, and APPLICABILITY This signal provides protection against excessive (continued) feedwater flow. The ESFAS SG water level instruments provide input to the SG Water Level Control System. Therefore, the actuation logic must be able to withstand' Aoth an input failure to the control system (which may then require the protection function actuation) and a single failure in the other channels providing the protection function actuation. Only three protection channels are necessary to satisfy the protective requirements. The setpoints are based on percent of narrow range instrument span.
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| : c. Turbine Trio and Feedwater Isolation-Safety Iniection l
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| Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation is also initiated by all Functions that initiate SI. The Feedwater Isolation Function requirements for these Functions are the same as the requirements for their SI function. Therefore, the i requirements are not repeated in Table 3.3.2-1. !
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| Instead Function 1, SI, is referenced for all I initiating functions and requirements.
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| : d. Turbine Trio and Feedwater Isolation - RCS T.,g l low Coincident Wita_Rentor Trio (P-4) {
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| l l This signal only initiates a Feedwater Isolation.
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| The signal provides protection against excessive cooldown, which could subsequently introduce a positive reactivity excursion after a plant trip.
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| There are four channels of RCS T ., - Low (one per loop), with a two-out-of-four logic required coincident with a reactor trip signal (P-4) to initiate a feedwater isolation. The P-4 interlock is discussed in Function 8.a.
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| : e. Turbine Trio and Feedwater Isolation - Doahouse Water Level - Hiah Hiah l This signal initiates a Feedwater Isolation. The signal terminates forward feedwater flow in (continued) l McGuire Unit 2 B 3.3-80 Supplement 5
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| ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES APPLICABLE e. Turbine Trio and Feedwater Isolation - Doahouse SAFETY ANALYSES, Water level - Hiah Hiah (continued)
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| LCO, and APPLICABILITY the event of a postulated pipe break in the main feedwater piping in the doghouses to prevent flooding safety related equipment essential to the safe shutdown of the plant. The level instrumentation consists of six level switches (three per train) in each'of the two reactor building doghouses. A high high level detected by two-out-of-three switches in either train in the inboard or outboard doghouse will initiate a feedwater isolation. This signal initiates Feedwater Isolation for the specific doghouse where the High-High level is detected and trips both main feedwater pumps thus causing a main turbine trip.
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| Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation Functions must be OPERABLE in MODES 1 and 2 except when all MFIVs, MFCVs, and associated bypass valves are closed and de-activated or isolated by a closed manual valve when the MFW System is in operation and the turbine ,
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| generator may be in operation. In MODES 3, 4, 5, 1 and 6, the MFW System and the turbine generator are j not in service and this Function is not required to be .
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| OPERABLE.
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| : 6. Auxiliary Feedwater l
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| The AFW System is designed to provide a secondary side I heat sink for the reactor in the event that the MFW System is not available. The system has two motor driven pumps and a turbine driven pump, making it available during normal and accident operation. The normal source of water for the AFW System is the condensate storage system (not safety related). A low suction pressure to the AFW pumps will automatically realign the pump suctions to the Nuclear Service Water System (NSWS)(safety related). The AFW System is aligned so that upon a pump start, flow is initiated to the respective SGs imediately.
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| l (continued)
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| McGuire Unit 2 B 3.3-81 Supplement 5 l l
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| t
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| INSERT
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| : d. Turbine Trio and Feedwater Isolation - RCS T.,,. - Low coincident with Reactor Trio (P-4)
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| This signal only initiates a Feedwater Isolation. The signal provides protection against excessive cooldown, which could subsequently introduce a positive reactivity excursion after a plant trip. There are four channels of RCS T., - Low (one per loop), with a two-out-of-four logic required coinciden,t with a reactor trip signal (P-4) to initiate a feedwater isolation. The P-4 interlock is discussed in Function 8.a.
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| : e. Turbine Trio and Feedwater Isolation - Doohouse Water Level - Hiah Hiah l This signal ef4y initiates a Feedwater Isolation. The signal terminates l forward feedwater flow in the event of a postulated pipe break in the -
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| main feedwater piping in the doghouses to prevent flooding safety related equipment essential to the safe shutdown of the plant. The ,
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| -level instrumentation consists of six level switches (three per train) {
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| in each of the two reactor building doghouses. A high level detected by {
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| two-out-of-three switches in either train in the inboard or outboard l doghouse will initiate a feedwater isolation. This signal initiates )
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| Feedwater Isolation for the specific doghouse where the High-High level '
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| is detected and trips both main feedwater pumps thus causing a main turbine trip.
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| INSERT Page B 3.3-92 l.
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| McGuire L___________________ _ _
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| McGuire & Catawba improved TS Review Comments ITS 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation 3.3.2-10 Bases discussion of Applicable Safety Analyses, Function 6.b,
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| [McGuire only] Bases markup page B 3.3-94 Bases JFD 13 CTS Table 3.3-4, Functional Unit 7.c.
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| i The Bases discussion for ITS 3.3.2, Function 6.b [ steam generator water level] states, "The setpoints are based on percent of narrow range instrument span." Bases JFD 13 states that,
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| " Changes to the Bases have been made to incorporate detail which has been relocated from the CTS." CTS Table 3.3-4, Functional Unit 7.c, which specifies setpoints for the steam generator water level, does not specify narrow range. Comment: Revise iPs submittal to l provide the appropriate justification for the proposed difference.
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| DEC Response:
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| There is no difference to justify. CTS Table 3.3-4 specifies "% of span" for the setpoints associated with Functional Unit 7.c. Since Westinghouse designed plants only use the SG narrow range instrumentation for protection Functions, the corresponding bases was enhanced by the addition of the description " narrow range" for ITS Function 6.b discussed above. This is additional bases information which enhances the bases description of this Function and does not represent a change to the CTS. In addition, the phrase "% of span" is detail relocated to the ITS bases from the description of Functional Unit 7.c in CTS Table 3.3-4. Therefore, JFD 13 is also correct and accurate for this change. No additional justification is required.
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| I mc3_cr 3.3.wpd 24 June 12,1998 ]
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| 1
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| McGuire & Catawba improved TS Review Comments ITS 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation 3.3.2-11 CTS Table 3.3-3, Functional Units 7.f 1) and 2) )
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| [McGuire only] ITS Table 3.3.2-1, Functions 6.d. (1) and (2) !
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| l CTS Table 3.3-3, Functional Units 7.f.1) and 2) specify "4KV loss of voltage" and "4KV degraded voltage," respectively. ITS Table 3.3.2-1, Functions 6.d (1) and (2) omit specifying j "4KV". Comment: Revise the submittal to be consistent with the CTS. j 4
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| DEC Response:
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| In the process of converting to the ITS format and presentation, consistency with the STS was j maintained as closely as possible. The corresponding STS Functions to CTS Functional units 7.f.1 and 2 do not include a particular voltage labelin the Function title. Consistent with the STS, the Function setpoints (in volts) are clearly specified within the TS and the associated bases adequately describes the details of the functional requirements. As no technical change is intended or implied by conformance witil the STS nomenclature, this is an editorial matter.
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| In order to maintain consistency with the STS and to avoid unnecessary revisions, no changes are made to these functions.
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| I l l l
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| 1 mc3 cr_3.3.wpd 25 June 12,1998 l
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| I L______________ _ __ !
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| l l McGuire & Catawba improved TS Review Comments ITS 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) instrumentation l
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| 3.3.2-12 CTS Table 3.3-4, Functional Unit 7.f.1)
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| [McGuire only] ITS Table 3.3.2-1, Function 6. d. (1) l CTS Table 3.3-4, Functional Unit 7.f.1) does not specify any time de!ay for the Allowable
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| ! Value. Corresponding ITS Table 3.3.2-1, Function 6.d. (1), Allowable Value specifies a time delay of 8.5 +/- 0.5 sec. No DOC or JFD has been provided for the proposed change.
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| Comment: Revise the submittal to provide the justification for the proposed change. ,
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| l
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| ! DEC Response:
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| The markup of Functional Unit 7.f.1 on CTS Table 3.3-4 is revised to include the addition of the instrumentation time delay to the Allowable Value consistent with the corresponding ITS Function. Since the inherent instrument time delay affects both the Trip Setpoint and Allowable l Value, this revision does not introduce a technical change to the affected instrumentation or i intent of the CTS. The change to the CTS requirement improves clarity and consistency.
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| l Therefore, an "A" Doc is also added to explain this change.
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| 4 1
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| mc3_cr_3.3 v@d 26 June 12,1998
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| McGuire & Catawba improved TS Review Comments ITS 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation 3.3.2-13 CTS Table 3.3-4, Functional Unit 7.f 2)
| |
| [McGuire only] ITS Table 3.3.2-1, Function 6. d. (2)
| |
| CTS Table 3.3-4, Functional Unit 7.f. 2) does not specify any time delay for the Allowable Value. Corresponding ITS Table 3.3.2-1, Function 6.d. (2) specifies a time delay of 11 seconds for the Allowable Value with Si, and 600 seconds without Si time delays. No DOC has been provided for this proposed change. Comment: Revise the submit,tal to provide the justification for the proposed change.
| |
| DEC Response:
| |
| The markup of Functional Unit 7.f.2 on CTS Table 3.3-4 is revised to include the addition of the instrumentation time delay to the Allowable Value consistent with the corresponding ITS Function. Since the inherent instrument time delay affects both the Trip Setpoint and Allowable Value, this revision does not introduce a technical change to the affected instrumentation or intent of the CTS. The change to the CTS requirement improves clarity and consistency.
| |
| Therefore, an "A" Doc is also added to explain this change.
| |
| l l
| |
| l mc3_cr_3.3.wpd 27 June 12,1998 I
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| 1 McGuire & Catawba improved TS Review Comments ITS 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) instrumentation 3.3.2-14 STS 3.3.2, Required Actions J.1 and J.2
| |
| [McGuire only] ITS 3.3.2, Required Actions K.1 and K.2 CTS Table 3.3-3, Action 27 DOC M.14 STS 3.3.2, Required Actions J.1 and J.2 require Completion Times of 48 hours to restore channel to Operable status and 54 hours to be in Mode 3. ITS 3.3.2, Conditions K.1 and K.2 requires completion times of 1 and 7 hours in lieu of the 48 and 54' hours specified in the STS, Required Actions J.1 and J.2. CTS Tab;e 3.3-3, Action 27 is marked up consistent with the ITS. DOC M.14 states, "This change is consistent with NUREG-1431." The change is not consistent with NUREG-1431. Comment: A valid justification for the more restrictive change should be provided. Revise statement in DOC.
| |
| DEC Response:
| |
| DOC M.14 is only applicable to the addition of the Action "or be in Mode 3 in 7 hours" to CTS Action 27 (see CTS markup). Considering that CTS Action 27 allows one hour to place the affected channel in trip, the revision to CTS Action 27 (or be in Mode 3 in 7 hours) effectively provides 6 hours to be in Mode 3 (as time zero starts on Action Condition entry and one hour is allowed to place a channelin trip). The corresponding STS Actions Condition allows 48 hours to restore the affected channel or 54 hours to be in Mode 3. Considering that time zero starts upon Action Condition entry and 48 hours are allowed to restore the affected channel, the STS also effectively only allows 6 hours to be in Mode 3. Therefore, the existing DOC M.14 accurately describes the addmon of the Action "or be in Mode 3 in 7 hours" as consistent with the STS. No revision of the DOC is necessary.
| |
| I 1
| |
| I l
| |
| I mc3_cr_3.3.wpd 28 June 12,1998 l
| |
| | |
| McGuire & Catawba improved TS Review Comments Section 3.3, instrumentation (3.3.3 - 3.3.9)
| |
| I 3.3.3, PAM Instrumentation 3.3.3-01 Bases discussion for ITS LCO 3.3.3, page B 3.3-124 The third paragraph of the Bases discussion for STS LCO 3.3.3 states that unit specific TS ,
| |
| - should list all Type A and Category I variables identified by the unit specific Regulatory Guide analysis. Comment: Revise the submittal to provide a statement, at this point in the Bases, that Table 3.3.3-1 includes all the Type A and Category i variables for each plant. ;
| |
| - DEC Response:
| |
| 4- ,
| |
| The bases for the PAM LCO states in several places which variables the LCO includes. The fourth paragraph of ,the background section, first paragraph of the safety analyses section, last paragraph of safety analyses section, and the first paragraph of the LCO section all contain references to the requirements of the PAM LCO and identify what variables are included. The additional statement requested above does not add new information to the bases and is' redundant to the description of the LCO requirements contained in other sections of the bases.
| |
| ' As sufficient description of the LCO requirements exist, no additional statements are added to this bases.
| |
| l 1
| |
| mc3_cr_3.3.wpd 29 June 11,1998 1
| |
| l
| |
| [ _ . . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _
| |
| | |
| McGuire & Cat'awba improved TS Review Comments Section 3.3, instrumentation (3.3.3 - 3.3.9) 3.3.3-02 Bases discussion for ITS LCO 3.3.3, pages B 3.3-123 through B 3.3-133 in the Bases discussion of most PAM instruments the phrase, ... channels of ..... are required Operable...., is included. In some of the Bases discussions this phrase has not been include.
| |
| Some examples are in the Bases discussions of reactor vessel water level, auxiliary feedwater
| |
| . flow, and RCS subcooling margin monitor. Comment: Revise the Bases to state, for each instrument discussed, the number of channels required to be operable.
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| L DEC Response:
| |
| The bases inclusions discussed above are not part of the STS bases and have been added for -
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| additionalinformation. As the PAM LCO cl.early specifies the required number of channels for each variable (in Table 3.3.3-1), the additional bases information regarding the number of
| |
| , required channels for each variable is not necessary or required to understand the PAM Specification. As the information added to the bases is not essential to understanding the requirements of the LCO, and in fact redundant to the explicit LCO requirements, any omission of this information for a particular variable is purely an editorial concern and may be corrected at a later date. No further action need be taken at this time to revise the bases.
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| j j
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| L mc3_cr_3.3.wpd 30 June 11,1998 l
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| McGuire & Ca'tawba Improved TS Review Comments Section 3.3, Instrumentation (3.3.3 - 3.3.9) 3.3.3-04 (McGuire only) DOC L.10 CTS 3/4.3.3.6 Action b.1 ITS 3.3.3 Required Action F.1 The Completion Time for ITS 3.3.3 Required Action F.1 is 72 hours for restoring one hydrogen monitor channel to Operable status. Corresponding Action b.1 of CTS 3.3.3.6 specifies 48 hours. DOC L.10 does not address this change in Completion Time. Comment: Revise DOC L.10 to justify this relaxation.
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| DEC Response:
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| DOC L.10 is revised to more explicitly justify the change in Completion Time for restoring one hydrogen monitor to operable status, i
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| l l
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| t mc3_cr_3.3.wpd 32 June 11,1998
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| )
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| Discussicn of Changes Secticn 3.3 - Instrum:ntation TECHNICAL CHANGES - LESS RESTRICTIVE initiation of each individual pump is not a requirement of the !
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| safety analysis. Sufficient redundancy is provided by the number l of pumps in the system and the number of instrument channels i available for automatic actuation retained in ITS 3.3.2. This i change is consistent with NUREG-1431.
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| L.7 Not Used. 5 L.8 The CTS 3.3.3.6 Action a Completion Time allows 7 days for a single inoperable channel of post accident monitoring (PAM) instrumentation for those instruments requiring two channels. ITS 3.3.3 allows 30 days for this condition. Increasing the Completion Time to 30 days is acceptable based on operating experience and the remaining OPERABLE channels. These channels l are passive and perform no actuation function. This change is consistent with NUREG-1431.
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| L.9 CTS 3.3.3.6 Action a and CTS 3.6.4.1 Action a require a unit shutdown when one required channel is inoperable and the Actions cannot be completed. ITS 3.3.3 allows continued operation in this condition for functions with two required channels provided a special report is written to the NRC detailing planned corrective j actions. This change also applies to the containment radiation monitor function when the required channel is inoperable. This change is acceptable based on the remaining OPERABLE required channel or, for the radiation monitor, this change is acceptable j based on alternative methods of obtaining the required l information, such as taking samples. This change is consistent ,
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| with NUREG-1431. I L.10 The CTS 3.3.3.6 Action b Completion Time of 48 hours and CTS 3.7.4a Completion Time of 72 hours is extended to 7 days for all channels, except hydrogen monitors. For hydrogen monitors, the completion time is extended from 48 hours to 72 hours. The extended completion time, retained in ITS 3.3.3, applies to single channel functions with the required channel inoperable and to two channel functions when both required channels of the applicable function are inoperable. Increasing the Completion Time for these instruments to 7 days (or 72 hours for the hydrogen monitors) See I
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| these instr =cnts is acceptable because of the low probability of an event requiring PAM instrument operation and the availability of alternate means to obtain the required information. This lMcGuireUnits1and2 Page L - 3 Supplement 54
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| Discussian of Changes-Section 3.3 - Instrumentation TECHNICAL CHANGES - LESS RESTRICTIVE change is consistent with NUREG-1431.
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| l- L'.11 CTS 4'.6.4.1 for the Hydrogen Monitors requires a channel check once per 12 hours, a monthly analog channel operational test, and i a channel calibration 92 days on a staggered test basis. ITS L 3.3.3 requires.a channel check once per 31 days and a channel l calibration once per 92 days. Eliminationiof the channel L operational test is acceptable since the Hydrogen Monitors are
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| ! passive devices; they do not initiate any automatic actuations and j are used only during post accident conditions in containment. The channel operational test is designed to verify required alarm, interlock, ~and trip. functions. The extension of the channel check l frequency from 12 hours to 31 days is consistent with the-frequencies established for all other post accident monitoring instrumentation within the CTS. The' elimination of the staggered
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| , testing is acceptable since the monitors do not perform a L mitigative function and this change avoids potential mis' sed surveillance due to missing the staggered intervals. . Test data
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| -for these monitors-indicates that the 92 day interval is sufficient to ensure operability. The hydrogen monitors are only .
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| required for monitoring and are not immediately needed after an l event. This change is consistent with NUREG-1431.
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| l l y' L.12 CTS 3.3.3.5 Action a requires the inoperable remote shutdown
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| ; system: instrument-channels to~be restored to OPERABLE status l
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| fwithin 7 days. ITS 3.3.4 increases the Completion Time from 7 l days to 30 days. This change is reasonable based on operating l experience and the low prob 2bility of an event occurring that would require the control room to be evacuated. .This change is consistent with NUREG-1431.
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| l L.13 CTS 3.3.3.5 Table. 3.3-9 requires both auxiliary feedwater flow and steam generator level as separate indication of Decay Heat Removal via the SGs. ITS 3.3.4 allows the use of either one or the other indicators rather than both. The purpose of these indications is to determine if decay heat removal is taking place via the SGs to ensure a safe shutdown. Therefore, adequate information to determine if decay heat removal is occurring via the SGs m be obtained by either of these indications. This change is consistent with NUREG-1431. ,
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| McGuire Units 1 and 2 Page L - 4 Supplement 54 l l
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| No Significant Hazards Consideration Section 3.3 - Instrumentation LESS RESTRICTIVE CHANGE L.10 The McGuire Nuclear Station is converting to the Improved Technical Specifications (ITS) as outlined in NUREG-1431, " Standard Technical Specifications, Westinghouse Plants." The proposed change involves making the current Technical Specifications (CTS) less restrictive.
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| Below is the description of this less restrictive change and the No Significant Hazards Consideration for conversion to NUREG-1431.
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| The CTS 3.3.3.6 Action b Completion Time of 48 hours and CTS 3.7.4a Completion Time of 72 hours is extended to 7 days for all channels, except hydrogen monitors. For hydrogen monitors, the completion time is extended from 48 hours to 72 hours. The extended completion time, retained in ITS 3.3.3, applies to single channel functions with the required channel inoperable and to two channel functions when both required channels of the applicable function are inoperable. Increasing the Completion Time for these instruments to 7 days (or 72 hours for the hydrogen monitors) 4se the:c instruments is acceptable because of the low probability of an event requiring PAM instrument operation and the availability of alternate means to obtain the required information. This change is consistent with NUREG-1431.
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| In accordance with the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, the McGuire Nuclear Station has evaluated this proposed Technical Specifications change and determined it does not represent a significant hazards consideration. The following is provided in support of this conclusion.
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| : 1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequence of an accident previously evaluated?
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| The proposed change increases the Completion Time when the required channels of PAM Instrumentation are inoperable. This change will not affect the probability of an accident since the PAM instrumentation are not initiators of any analyzed event. The consequences of an accident are not affected by this change.
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| Post-accident indication of the required parameter (s) is available from alternate backup variables or sampling and a timely corrective action period is specified. The PAM instrumentation perform no mitigative functions. Therefore, this change will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequence of an accident previously evaluated.
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| lMcGuireUnits1and2 Page 23 of 49 Supplement 55/20/97 l
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| ND Significant Hazards Ccasideratien Stetion 3.3 - Instrumentation
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| : 2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
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| This change will not physically alter the plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed). The changes in methods governing normal plant operation are consistent with current safety analysis assumptions. Therefore, the change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. .
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| : 3. Does this change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
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| The proposed change increases the Completion Time when the required channels of PAM Instrumentation are inoperable. The margin of safety is not affected by this change because alternate variables for monitoring and sampling are available to provide the required post-accident indication and the PAM instrumentation provides no automatic actuation functions. The proposed change maintains the requirement for a timely corrective action. The safety analysis assumptions will still be maintained, therefore, the change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
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| l l
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| ]
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| l McGuire Units 1 and 2 Page 24 of 49 Supplement 55/20/07l
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| McGuire & Catawba improved TS Review Comments Section 3.3, instrumentation (3.3.3 - 3.3.9) 3.3.4, Remote Shutdown System 3.3.4-01 Bases JFD 3 Bases discussion for ITS LCO 3.3.4, page B 3.3-139 ;
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| {'
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| The Bases discussion for STS 3.3.4 states in part, The controls, instrumentation, and transfer switches are required for: Core reactivity control (initial arid long term);..... ,
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| I The Bases discussion for corresponding ITS 3.3.4 has not adopted the phrase, (initial and long term). Comment: Bases JFD 3 states that this is not applicable to this facility. Revise the submittal to explain why this is not applicable to this facility, or conform to the STS. j l
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| DEC Response: '
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| JFD 3 is correct as written for this item. The STS bases was written for the STS Table 3.3.4-1. l The corresponding DEC ITS Tables do not contain the same Core reactivity control (initial and long term) instrument and control Functions as the STS (i.e. no reactor trip capability (initial) and no source range monitoring function (long term)). The change to the bases discussed above is consistent with the DEC ITS Table 3.3.4-1 content regarding Core reactivity control.
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| As the ITS bases correctly reflects the content of the DEC ITS LCO no further bases change or justification is required.
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| 1 p
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| l l
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| l 1
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| mc3_cr_3.3.wpd 34 June 11,1998
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| McGuire & Catawba improved TS Review Comments Section 3.3, instrumentation (3.3.3 - 3.3.9) t 3.3.5, Loss of Power (LOP) Diesel Generator (Cd) Start Ins'rumentation 3.3.5-01 (McGuire Only) Bases JFD 4 Bases Backgrcund discussica for ITS 3.3.5, second [the deleted]
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| paragraph on page B 3.3 :44 The Bases discussion for STS 3.3.5 dr. scribes the time characteristics and the voltage set point for the degraded ve!!99e or loss of voPago and provides numerical values for these characteristics. The Bases discussion f.ir ITS 3.3.5 does not provide numerical values for the set points or the time delays that are mantioned. Comment: This is not a justifiable plant specific difference. Re' ise the submitt il to more closely conform to the STS, by providing the plant specific numerical values. 1 DEC Response: l The setpoints and time delays for the loss of voltage and degraded voltage functions are explicitly specified in the Chanrel Ca!!bration Surveillance Requirement for these Functions in the ITS 3.3.5 Specification. The specification of these values within the ITS 3.3.5 Specification is sufficient to ensure that they are maintained or the appropriate Action is taken. The repetition of this information in the be.ses does not add any additional assurance that the setpoints and time delays will be tr<aintailed within their specified values. Therefore, this bases information is not required and its Mtion or deletion is conside ed strictly editorial. No further justification or 3 revisions are requireri Ed this time i
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| 1 i
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| I l
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| l mc3_cr_.3.3.wpd 35 June 11,1998 ,
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| I 1
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| McGuire & Cat'awba improved TS Review Comments Section 3.3, instrumentation (3.3.3 - 3.3.9) 3.3.5-04 CTS Table 3.3-3 Action 15 (Catawba)
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| CTS Table 3.3-3 Action 15a (McGuire)
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| ITS 3.3.5 Condition A CTS Table 3.3-3 allows operation to continue with one inoperable channel placed in trip until f the next performance of a channel operational test. ITS 3.3.5 Condition A allows indefinite operation if the channelis placed in trip. Comment: ITS allows an, extended period of operation and is, therefore, less restrictive. Provide an L DOC to replace A 55. j DEC Response:
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| DOC A.55 is replaced with the more accurate L.25 DOC.
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| 1 I
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| l mc3_cr_3.3 wpd 36 June 11,1998 t - - - - - _ - __ -__-
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| TABLE NOTATION i Trip function may be blocked in this MODE below the P-11 (Pressurizer Pre m e Interlock) Setpoint.
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| H Trip function automatically blocked above P-11 and may be blocked below P-11 when Safuy Injection on low steam pressure is not blocked.
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| These values left blank pending NRC approval of three loop operation.
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| Note 1: Turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump will not start on a blackout nk, L \
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| Sec CT5 signal coincident with a safety injection signal.
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| In 3,4.1. ACTION STATEMENTS.
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| ACTION 14 With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance i testing per Specification 4.3.2.1, provided the other channel is OPERABLE.
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| f ACTION 15 With the number of OPERABLE channels one'less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed until performance of the next required OPERATIONAL TEST provided the inoperable channel is placed .
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| j in the tripped conditior withi:16 hours. j TION Gith numberpf OPERABLEK/ annels_ let,e than the lot #Numbe>ylPD k Ont *
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| * me Cha , 5ppration y progeo ugr11 perform 4 pet of thprnex M C A ht, M. KRATI TESTgrovide6ftne inoperable channel iT plac chace) e6 in the tripped condition witnin 6 hours. With more th w d ; a+T Qaorm o M.4 y channel inoperable,(enter Specification 3.8.1.1. yyggg *'
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| ACIJUN lbD witn Ene number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels. operation may proceed until performance of the next L.lb required OPERATIONAL TEST provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour.
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| Seeen ACTION 16 With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number
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| { of Channels, operation may proceed provided the inoperable channel is placed in the bypassed condition and the Minimum Channels DU/ OPERABLE requirement is set. One additional channel may be
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| /[ bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1.
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| ACTION 17 With le;s than the Ninimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, operation I 5** G may continue provided the containment purge supply and exhaust M *P 4 valves.are maintained closed.
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| J.T5 33.L k McGUIRE - UNIT 1 3/4 3-24 Amendment No. 166
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| IABLE 3.3-3 (Continued) l TABLE NOTATION Trip function may be blocked in this MODE below the P-11 (Pressurizer l Pressure Interlock) Setpoint.
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| 47 I
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| Trip function automatically blocked above P-11 and may be blocked below 1
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| P-11 when Safety Injection on low steam pressure is not blocked.
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| These values left blank pending NRC approval of three loop operation.
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| Note 1: Turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump will not start on a blackout
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| &c cts signal coincident with a safety injection signal.
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| MSN b ACTION STATEMENTS ',
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| IT5 M .2 ACTION 14 With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1, provided the other channel is OPERABLE.
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| ACTION 15 With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed until performance of the next required OPERATI0dAL TEST provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours.
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| M ACT! ith number nV0PFDASLE.che e1 5thantb(TotalNumbe/
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| M[.N Cha is operati y proceed u cerformande of the nexri' 7tequi PERATI TEST provi he inoperable channel is 4 [O[,y placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours. With more than cu E oc 8.c. one channel inoperable,'(enter Specification 3.8.1.1. jfes%t an 6.+ os c@
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| --~~-
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| .kopusb (4 cent SMs enIw CTION 15b With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the7 or Number of Channels, operation may proceed until performance of th us next required' OPERATIONAL TEST provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour.
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| ACTION 16 With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Si CTS Number of Channels, operation may proceed provided the inoperable
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| *\ 9 channel is placed in the bypassed condition and the Minimum G1 1 Channels OPERABLE requirement is met. One additional channel may 3 be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing per t Specification 4.3.2.1. -
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| /
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| Jee CG ACTION 17 With less than the Minimum Cr d els OPERABLE requirement, '
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| Autar 175 3,3.(,
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| & operation may continue provided the con.tainment purge supply and exhaust valves are maintained closed.
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| McGUIRE - UNIT 2 3/4 3-24 Amendment No. 148 .
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| 4 Seg 3 of 5~
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| l
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| _ - - - - - - - )
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| Discussion of Changes Section 3.3 - Instrumentation ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES A.53 A Note is added to the CTS 3.3.2 Actions that allows separate condition entry for each LOP DG Start Function. The Note, I
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| retained in ITS 3.3.5, provides explicit instructions for proper application of the actions for Technical Specification compliance.
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| In conjunction with ITS 1.3, " Completion Times," this Note I provides direction consistent with the intent of the existing l actions for the LOP Instrumentation. Thiichangeis i administrative and is consistent with NUREG-1431.
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| A.54 Not used.
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| A.55 Not used. CTS Table 3.3 3 M tien 15: 0110w: Operation to proceed with One incperab!c channel (placed in trip) until the next perfe=ance of the COT. ITS 3.3.5 allcw Operation to continue 4edefinitely if the channel is placed in trip. If the perfc =cnce of surveillance en Other channel; cannot be completed becau;c the inoperable channel is in trip, then the other channel .;culd be declared incperable in acccrdance ith SR 3.0.1 and a unit shutdown cc=cnced. Therefore, this limitation is unnecc : ry.
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| Tht: change i: administrative and is cen;istent ..ith NUREC 1031.
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| A.56 CTS 3.3.2, " Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation," contains the Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation Instrumentation. The ITS provides a separate specification (ITS 3.3.6, " Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation Instrumentation") for this function. This change is administrative and is consistent with NUREG-1431.
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| A.57 A Note is added to the CTS 3.3.2 Actions that allows separate condition entry for each Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation Instrumentation Function. This Note, retained in ITS 3.3.6, provides explicit instructions for proper application of the actions for Technical Specification compliance. In conjunction with ITS 1.3, " Completion Times," this Note provides direction consistent with the intent of the existing Actions for the ESFAS Instrumentation. This change is administrative and is consistent with NUREG-1431.
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| A.58-64 Not used.
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| McGuire Unit 1 and 2 Page A - 14 Supplement 54 l
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| Discussicn of Chang:s Secticn 3.3 - Instrumentation TECHNICAL CHANGES - LESS RESTRICTIVE ,
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| l L.18-21 Not used. I L.22 CTS Table 3.3-3 Actions 15 and 15b allow operation to proceed with one inoperable channel (placed in trip) until the next performance i of the COT. ITS 3.3.2 Conditions D, J and P contain a note which 1 allows the channel to be placed in bypass for surveillance testing onotherchannels.Performanceofsurveiliancesonotherchannels cannot be completed because the inoperable channel is in trip and j cannot be taken out of trip without the note. Most l inoperabilities can be repaired prior to the performance of surveillance on other channels. However, should a repair be delayed, a surveillance on an inoperable channel would be missed and the operable channel would be declared inoperable forcing a unit shutdown. This change is consistent with NVREG-1431.
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| L.23 Not used.
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| L.24 The RTS CTS Action 2c on Table 3.3-1, applicable to an inoperable i power range channel, requires power to be reduced to less than or equal to 75% within 4 hours or QPTR must be monitored using the movable incore detectors every 12 hours. This CTS Action was revised consistent with the corresponding STS Action. The corresponding STS Action (0.1.2) provides consistency between the two options. The STS Actions require that either QPTR be verified or power be reduced to less than or equal to 75% within 12 hours.
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| The RTS safety function of the affected power range channel is satisfied by the Action requirement to place the channel in trip (CTS Action 2.a which has been retained as ITS Actions D.1.1 or D.2.1). The proposed ITS Actions continue to ensure the reactor trip safety functton of the channel is accomplished. In addition, the slow change in QPTR over time allows an acceptable level of safety to be maintained in the CTS and ITS by monitoring QPTR every 12 hours at a power level greater than 75%. Therefore, an acceptable level of safety is also provided by allowing a time of no more than 12 hours to reduce power to less than or equal to 75% as on alternative Action to monitoring QPTR every 12 hours, Therefore, the increase in the time allowed to reduce power to less than or equal to 75% from 4 hours to 12 hours is acceptable.
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| L L.25 CTS Action 15 for Catawba and 15a for McGuire allow operation to proceed with one inoperable channel (placed in trip) until the performance of the the next operational test. The CTS Action is l
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| l McGuire Units 1 and 2 Page L - 6 Supplement 5+l l
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| I i
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| 1
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| Discussien of Changes Secticn 3.3 - Instrumentation TECHNICAL CHANGES - LESS RESTRICTIVE revised coasistent with the STS to allow operation to continue indefinitely once the channel is placed in trip. The trip logic associated with these channels provides an actuation when two out three channels on a bus are tripped. Therefore, the allowance to continue operation with one inoperable channel in trip is acceptable due to the fact that the channel in trip con be
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| : l. consideredtohaveaccomplisheditssafet),functionandthe l protection system for that bus is left in a conservative condition l (only one channel out of the remaining two must trip in order to l actuate the protection function). In addition, since two channels remain operable and only one is required to trip in order to l actuate the protection' function, the system is left in a condition where no single failure would prevent the actuation of the i protection function. As such the adoption of the STS Actions for these instrument channels continues to provide adequate assurance of safe plant operation.
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| L.26 Not used.
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| L.27 Not used.
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| L.28 CTS Action 26 for on inoperable channel of the Containment Pressure Control System on Table 3.3-3 is revised to simplify thd required action. The CTS Action requires that the inoperable channel be placed in the start permissive mode and that the Actions for the applicable supported systems be entered within one hour. This CTS Action is revised to address one or more inoperable channels and to simply declare the supported system inoperable immediately. The Containment Pressure Control System instrument channels provide both a start permissive and a terminate function for the Containment Spray, Containment Air Return and Hydrogen Skinuner Systems. The terminate function provides protection against inadvertent actuatton and the resulting negative pressure transient in the containment. If manually placed in one mode (as required by the CTS Actions) the other safety function provided by the channel becomes unavailable. The proposed ITS Action does not require that one of the safety functions provided by the instrument channels be disabled. In addition, the proposed ITS Action provides adequate assurance that operation with any number of inoperable Containment Pressure Control instrument channels is limited consistent with the Completion Times for the supported equipment. Therefore this change is acceptaDie and consistent with the ITS Actions for Catawba.
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| McGuire Units 1 and 2 Page L - 7 Supplement 51 l
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| Na Significant Hazards Consideration Secticn 3.3 - Instrumentation LESS RESTRICTIVE CHANGE L.25 The McGuire Nuclear Station is converting to the Improved Technical Specifications (ITS) as outlined in NUREG-1431, " Standard Technical Specifications, Westinghouse Plants." The proposed change involves making the current Technical Specifications (CTS) less restrictive. ,
| |
| Below is the description of this less restrictive change and the No l Significant Hazards Consideration for conversion to NUREG-1431. I CTS Action 15 for Catawba and 15a for McGuire allow operation to proceed with one inoperable channel (placed in trip) until the performance of the the next operational test. The CTS Action is revised consistent with the STS to allow operation to continue indefinitely once the j channel is placed in trip. The trip logic associated with these 1
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| channels provides on actuation when two out three channels on a bus are tripped. Therefore, the allowance to continue operation with one ,
| |
| inoperable channel in trip is acceptable due to the fact that the 1 channel in trip con be considered to have accomplished its safety function and the protection system for that bus is left in a conservative condtlion (only one channel out of the remaining two must trip in order to actuate the protection function). In addition, since '
| |
| two channels remain operable and only one is required to trip in order to actuate the protection function, the system is left in a condition where no single failure would prevent the actuation of the protection function. As such the adoption of the STS Actions for these instrument channels continues to provide adequate assurance of safe plant operation.
| |
| In accordance with the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, the McGuire Nuclear Station has evaluated this proposed Technical Specifications change and determined it does not represent a significant hazards consideration. The following is provided in support of this conclusion.
| |
| : 1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability l
| |
| or consequence of an accident previously evaluated?
| |
| t.
| |
| The proposed change increases the completion time allowed to continue to operate with one loss of power instrumentation channel inoperable. This change will not affect the probability of an accident. The Loss of Power ESFAS channels are not initiators of any analyzed events. The consequences of an accident are not offected by this change. The safety function of the affected channel is satisfied when the instrument channel is placed in trip. The change will not alter assumptions relative to the McGuire Units 1 and 2 Page 44 of 49 Supplement 55/20/97l
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| | |
| Section 3.3 - Instrumentation mitigation of an accident or transient event. Therefore, this change will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequence of an accident previously evaluated.
| |
| : 2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
| |
| This change will not physicolly alter the plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed). The changes in methods governing normal plant operation are consistent with current safety analysis assumptions. Therefore, the change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evolucted.
| |
| : 3. Does this change ir,volve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
| |
| The margin of safety is not affected by this change because the requirements to place the affected instrument channel in trip remain unchanged. The function of the Loss of Power ESFAS instrument channels is to actuate (trip) to mitigate design basis events. The proposed change does not alter the ability of the instrumentation to respond to design basis events. The applicable safety analysis assumptions will stilI be maintained, therefore, the change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
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| lMcGuireUnits1and2 Page 45 of 49 Supplement 55/20/97
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| i l
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| t McGuire & Catawba Improved TS Review Comments j SM! ion 3.3, instrumentation (3.3.3 - 3.3.9) 3.3.6, Containment Purge thf Exhaust isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6-01 Bases JFD 4 Bases Applicability discussion for ITS 3.3.6 Bases Applicability discussion states that during fuel handling operations within containment, the purge system must be exhausting through operable filters as mquired by LCO 3.9.3 (Catawba) or 3.9.4 (McGuire). . Comment: Provide documentation'that instrumentation for containment purge and exhaust isolation are not required to be operable while in Modes 5 and I 6 with fuel handling operations in progress. I DEC Response: I JFD 11 explains the deletion of "During Core Alterations and During movement of irradiated fuel
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| . in containment" from the Applicability of the Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation Instrumentation ITS Specification 3.3.6. The bases discussion in question above conforms with the change in the STS Applicability documented in JFD 11. JFD 11 states that the fuel handling accident analyses assume that the resulting release is through the containment purge filters and that no credit was taken for purge isolation. In addition, JFD 11 explains that ITS section 3.9 specifications require that any open purge penetration must exhaust through an operable and operating containment purge filtration system. These changes to the STS requirements are consistent with the current plant licensing basis as documented in the CTS. No additional documentation is required.
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| i i
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| mc3_cr._3.3.wpd 40 June 11,1998
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| McGuire & Catawba Improved TS Review Comments Section 3.3, instrumentation (3.3.3 - 3.3.9) 3.3.7, Control Room Area Ventilation System (CRAVS) Actuation System 3.3.7-01 (McGuire only) CTS ESFAS JFD 12 ITS 3.3.7 The staff recognizes that the CTS do not specify instrumentation requirements for the l ventilation systems. However, the staff has determined that these' systems meet the requirements for inclusion in the TS per 10 CFR 50.36. Comment: Provide justification as to why these systems do not meet these criteria.
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| DEC Response:
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| JFD 12 states that the proposed ITS 3.7 Plant Systems section contains sufficient requirements to ensure the operability of the CRAVS including requirements to ensure the system starts on a simulated or actual actuation signal. The only signal (SI) that automatically starts the CRAVS is therefore verified operable in the Plant Systems section of the technical specifications. The McGuire CRAVS does not automatically start on high radiation and manual initiation is not credited in the operation of this system for any design basis accidents. Therefore, a separate technical specification is unnecessary to address the CRAVS actuation instrumentation when the sole actuation signalis already adequately addressed in the Plant Systems section of the technical specifications. The proposed McGuire Plant System ITS requirements for the CRAVS
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| . are consistent with the applicable design basis accidents and with the current plant licensing basis as documented in the CTS. Therefore, the 10 CFR 50.36 criteria are satisfied for the l McGuire CRAVS. As this position is consistent with the current licensing basis, no additional !
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| justification or documentation is required.
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| )
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| 1 l
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| l l
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| I
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| ! mc3_cr_3.3.wpd 41 June 11.1998 I
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| i McGuira & CitIwba improvId TS Review Comments Section 3.3, instrumentation (3.3.3 - 3.3.9) 3.3.8 Auxiliary Building Filtered Ventilation Exhaust System (ABFVES) Actuation instrumentation 3.3.8-01 (McGuire only) CTS ESFAS JFD 12 ITS 3.3.8 E
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| The staff recognizes that the CTS do not specify instrumentation requirements for the ventilation systems. However, the staff has determined that these systems meet the
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| ( requirements for inclusion in the TS per 10 CFR 50.36. Comment: Provide justification as to why these systems do not meet these criteria.
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| DEC Response:
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| l JFD 12 states that the proposed ITS 3.7 Plant Systems section contains sufficient requirements to ensure the operability of the ABFVES including requirements to ensure the system starts on a simulated or actual actuah . signal. Because the proposed ITS requirements differ in format and presentation from the ST S does not mean the ITS is incomplete or that the 10 CFR 50.36 criteria is not met. The only credited signal (SI) that automatically starts and realigns the system is verified operable in the Plant Systems section of the technical specifications (ABFVES LCO).
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| The McGuire ABFVES automatic realignment on high radiation and manual initiation is not credited in the operation of this system for any design basis accidents. Therefore, a separate technical specification with surveillance and Actions for Functions that are not part of the safety function design is unnecessary to address the ABFVES actuation instrumentation. The sole credited actuation signal is already adequately addressed in the Plant Systems section of j
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| - the technical specifications as well as in the ESFAS Specification for Sl. The proposed McGuire !
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| Plant System ITS requirements for the ABFVES are consistent with the applicable design basis .
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| accidents and with the current plant licensing basis as documented in the CTS. Therefore, the 10 CFR 50.36 criteria are satisfied for the McGuire ABFVES. As this position is consistent with the current licensing basis and the 10 CFR 50.36 criteria, no additional justification or documentation is required.
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| mc3_cr_3.3.wpd 50- June 11,1998
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| McGuire & Catawba improved TS Rsv'3w Comments Section 3.3, Instrumentation (3.3.3 - 3.3.9) l l 3.3.9-08 (Catawba only) LA 24 ,
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| i Comment: DOC LA 24 has incomplete sentences at the bottom of page LA-6 and at the top i of page LA 7. In addition, a Relocated discussion of change is required for the proposed l removal of details in this DOC because they represent LCOs as instrument systems.
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| l DEC Response: ,
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| l 4
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| l The incomplete sentences in DOC LA 24 are revised to provide the missing information
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| (" exhaust of the fuel building air. Although these monitors perform"). In addition, the second part of the above comment is applicable to both Catawba and McGuire. DOC LA.24 for both Catawba and McGuire is revised to be a Relocated disscussion of change (R.4).
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| l l
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| l l
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| l l
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| l t
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| mc3_cr_.3.3.wpd 64 June 11,1998
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| Discussien of Changes Szcticn 3.3 - Instrumentation TECHNICAL CHANGES - REMOVAL OF DETAILS LA.21-23 Not used.
| |
| LA.24 Not used. T.um.~ = , m,.m . 4. m. ,.m...,,..,#.,.=.
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| I McGuire Unit 1 and 2 Page LA - 67 Supplement 55/20/97l )
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| 1 1
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| I
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| Discussicn of Changes Section 3.3 - Instrumentation TECHNICAL CHANGES - REMOVAL OF DETAILS T, L, m- r -... + m., ,,, n,m mm .
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| |
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| |
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| |
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| |
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| |
| + i LA.25 The specific requirement in CTS Table 3.3-3, Action 20 that details how to ensere (by observation of the permissive annunciator window), permissives are in their required state is moved to the Bases for ITS 3.3.2. Details of how to perform l required actions have been removed from the TS as a general philosophy of FUREG-1431. The Bases are controlled in accordance with ITS Section 5.0, Administrative Controls, and require a 10 ,
| |
| CFR 50.59 evaluatioa for changes. These controls ensure that any l changes to the Bases are evaluated. This change is consistent with NUREG-1431. l l
| |
| f McGuire Unit 1 and ? Page LA - 77 Supplements /20/97l
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| Discussion cf Changrs Sectien 3.3 - Instrumentation RELOCATION R.1 CTS 3.3.3.2, " Movable Incore Detectors," is relocated to the Selected Licensee Commitments (SLC) manual (Chapter 16 of the UFSAR. This Specification ensures the operability of movable incore detector instrumer.tation when required to monitor the flux distribution within the core. The detectors are used for periodic surveillance of the power distribution, and calibration of the excore detectors, but is not assumed in any DBA analysis and does not mitigate an accident. The loss of movable incore detectors was found to be a non-significant risk contributor to core damage frequency and offsite releases. This requirement is not necessary to ensure safe reactor operation as sumarized in WCAP-11618.
| |
| Therefore, this item is relocated out of Technical Specifications.
| |
| Any changes i.o the SLC manual requires a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation. ]
| |
| The 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation ensures that changes to this {
| |
| requirement are appropriately reviewed. This change is consistent l with NUREG-1431 and 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii). ]
| |
| R.2 Not used.
| |
| R.3 The CTS 3.3.3.9, " Explosive Gas Monitoring Instrumentation," is relocated to the SLC manual (Chapter 16 of the UFSAR). The explosive gas monitoring instrumentation is provided to ensure l that the concentration of potentially explosive gas mixtures l contained in the gaseous waste processing system is adequately monitored, which will help ensure that the concentration is maintained below the flammability limit. However, the system is I designed to contain detonations and will not affect the function of any safety related equipment. The concentration of oxygen in the gaseous waste processing system is not an initial assumption of any design basis accident or transient analysis. The loss of the explosive gas monitoring instrumentation was found to be a non-significant risk contributor to core damage frequency and offsite releases as summarized in WCAP-11618. Therefore, this item is relocated out of Technical Specifications. Any changes to the SLC manual requires a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation. This evaluation ensures that changes to this requirement are appropriately reviewed. This change is consistent with NUREG-1431 and 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).
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| l R.4 The requirements for radiation monitors in CTS 3.3.3.1 are relocated to the Selected Licensee Commitments Manual (Chapter 16 of the UFSAR). A specific discussion for each monitor follows:
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| lMcGuireUnit1and2 Page R - M Supplement 55/20/97 t
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| l
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| | |
| Discussisn of Changas Szction 3.3 - Instrumentation
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| 'RELOCA T10N I
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| The Containment Atmosphere - High Gaseous Radioactivity Monitor j (EMF-39) serves as both a containment effluent monitor and as an RCS leak detection monitor along with the particulate channel (EMF-38) . The requirements for RCS leakage detection monitoring are retained in ITS 3.4.15. The requirements for effluent monitoring, however, do not meet the selection criteria of 10 CFR !
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| 50.36 for retention within the Technical Specifications.
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| Therefore, the requirements associated with the containment ,
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| atmosphere gaseous detector channel for effluent monitoring are relocated from the Technical Specifications.
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| The Spent Fuel Pool Radioactivity Monitor (EMF-42) monitors rodtoactivity in the fuel butiding ventilation system and will automatically close the bypass path and initiote filtered exhaust of the fuel building air. Although these monitors perform an automatic actuation function, this function is a design feature of the system and is not credited in the license basis of the plant ,
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| for a fuel handling accident in the fuel building. The Technical l Specifications (ITS 3.7.12) require the fuel building ventilation system to be in continuous filtered operation during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within the fuel building so that on l automatic actuation is not necessary. The Technical l Specifications also require a suspension of fuei handling activities should the system become inoperable. Based on this, the Spent Fuel Pool Radioactivity Monitor does not provide on 1 actuation function to mitigate a fuel handling accident and is relocated from the Technical Specifications.
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| The Criticality Radiation Monitor (EMF-17 for Unit 1 and EMF-4 for l Unit 2) monitors radioactivity in the fuel storage pool area.
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| This monitor does not provide any mitigation of a design basis accident. The monitor does sound the containment evacuation alarm upon detection of high radiation. This monitor is provided as a criticality monitor and does not meet the criteria for inclusion within the Technical Specifications described in 10 CFR 50.36.
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| The Control Room Air Intake Gaseous Radiation Monitors (EMF-43A, 438) are provided to identify increasing levels of radioactivity l in the control room intakes. The control room area ventilation l system does not rely on these monitors to perform any actuation function to nitigate the effects of a DBA. These monitors do not meet the criteria in 10 CFR 50.36 for inclusion within the Technical Specifications.
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| ; McGuire Unit 1 and 2 Page R - 24 Supplement 55/20/07l l
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| L_________-__.-_.
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| | |
| ( Discussion of Changes-Sectitn 3.3 - Instrumentation l
| |
| ' . RELOCATION In view of the above discussion, these monitors are proposed for relocation out of Technical Specifications. Any changes to these requirements in the Selected Licensee Commitments Manual require a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation. The 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation ensures that changes to this requirement will not have any adverse impact on the safe operation of the plant. This change is consistent with the Application of Selection Criteria. ',
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| l l
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| l l
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| I McGuire Unit I and 2 Page R - 3+ Supplement 55/20/97l
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| | |
| C M 3 ,3,3, l 1 ENTATION 3/4.3.3 NONITORING IN UMENTATION RADIATION NONITORI OR PLANT OPERATIONS LINITING CONDI FOR OPERATION 3.3.3.1 he radiation monitoring instruments on channels for plant opera ons shown in Table 3.3-6 shall be OP BLE with their Alarm / Trip Set ints within the specified limits. ,
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| APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3 . -
| |
| /. e ACTION:
| |
| [
| |
| : a. With a radiation non oring channel Alarm / Trip Setpoint exceeding /
| |
| , I the value shown in able 3.3-6, adjust the Setpoint to within the' limit within 4 h rs or declare the channel inoperable, p'
| |
| : b. With one or e radiation monitoring channels inoperable, t/ke the action sh in Table 3.3-6. -
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| / l
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| : c. The pro sions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicabl . ,
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| i
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| \
| |
| SUR ILLANCE RE0UIREMENTS i
| |
| /4.3.3.1 Each radiation monitoring instrumentation hannel for plant operations shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the erfomance of the CHANNEL i
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| l CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and ANALOG CHANNEL 0 RATIONAL TEST operations for i the modes and at the frequencies shown in Tab 4.3-3. /
| |
| ) l l
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| 3/4.3.3 MONITORING INSTRUNENTATI JtADIATION MONITORING FOR PL ERATIONS LINITING CONDITION FOR TION 3.3.3.1 The rad tion monitoring instrumentation channels for plan operations sho I in Table 3.3-6 shall be OPERABLE with their Ala Setpoints wit n the specified limits. rip APPLICABI Y:, As shown in Table 3.3-6.
| |
| ACTI -
| |
| ~
| |
| : a. With a radiation monitoring channel Ala Trip Setpoint exceeding the value shown in Table 3.3-6, adjus he Setpoint to within the limit within 4 hours or declare the annel inoperable.
| |
| : b. With one or more radiation mont 1 action shown in Table 3.3-6. ring channels inoperable, take,the
| |
| : c. The provisions of Specif ation 3.C.3 are not applicable.
| |
| * '~ . _
| |
| SU'!VEILLANCE RE RENENTS 4.3.3.1 ach radiation monitoring instrumentation channel for lant opera ns shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performanc f the CHANNEL CHE , CHANNEL CALIBRATION and ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL ST operations for t modes and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-3.
| |
| 4 - . ... . . . . _
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| r McGUIRE - UNIT 2 3/4 3-42 Amendment No. 148 Ry I .F 4
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| _ eo l M - E v kM f rL iE F. y' ih hEs {h - ':-
| |
| e( t( M t e i
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| h n E ig to ci t(
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| n h .d
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| - ph eh 2 vn at t e sg Vg ( Ih t oi ia oc g n a i h tR ie ri mH lH c dt i H i i d
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| t -
| |
| Ay o-oy Hv f e aw oo ae A l a
| |
| _ RD y e r
| |
| _ t t Pt - e iL* mt u r nv i yL d( ee oi f i
| |
| _ ei l v t a t g ov mt ei i n Rn aa Ri h h nc t l o o lk t t F ai si ua l c i ia ao to ct a
| |
| ut oc ce iL oa ro WW ti ni ee t ti
| |
| _ nd ed i st rS nd R oa pa r ae aC
| |
| - O CR SR
| |
| _ T CR GD PR [o a R - -
| |
| I N
| |
| O . . . .
| |
| /
| |
| _ M 1 2 3 4 5
| |
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| |
| 4 b15 L T 4 t
| |
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| |
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| |
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| |
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| |
| ~a1
| |
| | |
| McGuire & Catawba improved TS Additional Changes Section 3.3, Instrumentation 3.3-04 ITS RTS Function 15 Safety injection input from ESFAS STS RTS Function 17 Safety injection input from ESFAS New DOC M.29 i
| |
| in order to ensure both the manual and automatic Si input from ESFAS to the RTS is addressed under the same RTS Function in the ITS, an Actuation Logic Test surveillance has l
| |
| been added to this RTS Function. The addition of this new surveillance in the ITS more 1 accurately describes the plant method for verifying the automatic Si input to the RTS. A new DOC (M.29) is added to discuss the resulting change to the CTS caused by the inclusion of this Monthly Surveillance Requirement. The existing 18 month TADOT surveillance for this Function is also retained as it best describes the plant method for testing the manual SI input to the RTS. The STS bases are enhanced to clarify that both the manual and automatic inputs are included in the requirements for this Function and that for Catawba and McGuire the statement regarding the "Si input is provided by relay" is not applicable. These changes make the STS more consistent with the corresponding Catawba and McGuire plant design and method of testing.
| |
| I I
| |
| I l
| |
| l 4
| |
| 1 l
| |
| ( mc3_cr_.3.3.wpd 6B June 11,1998 l.
| |
| i L__________________
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1
| |
| * Table 3.3.1-1 (page 3 of 7)
| |
| Reactor Trip System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT
| |
| : 12. Underfrequency I II) I per bus M SR 3.3.1.9 a 55.9 Hz a 56.4 Hz RCPs SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.16
| |
| : 13. SteamGenerator(SG) 1,2 4 per SG E SR 3.'3.1.1 a 15% a 16.7%
| |
| Water Level - Low SR 3.3.1.7 Low SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.16
| |
| : 14. Turbine Trip
| |
| : a. Low Fluid Oil Pressure 1(9). 3 0 SR 3.3.1.10 a 42 psig a 45 psig SR 3.3.1.15
| |
| : b. Turbine Stop Valve Closure II9) 4 P SR 3.3.1.10 a 1% open a 1% open SR 3.3.1.15
| |
| : 15. Safety injection (51) 1,2 2 trains Q SR 3.3.1.14 NA NA l Input from Engineered SR 3.3.1.5 Safety Feature Actuation System (E5FAS)
| |
| : 16. Reactor Trip System Interlocks
| |
| : a. Intermediate 2(d) 2 5 SR 3.3.1.11 a 6E-11 amp a 1E 10 amp Range Neutron SR 3.3.1.13 Flux, P-6
| |
| : b. Low Power 1 per T SR 3.3.1.5 NA NA l Reactor Trips 1
| |
| train Block, P-7
| |
| : c. Power Range 1 4 T SR 3.3.1.11 s 49% RTP s 48% RTP Neutron Flux, SR 3.3.1.13 P-8
| |
| : d. Power Range 1,2 4 5 SR 3.3.1.11 a 9% RTP and a 10% RTP Neutron Flux, SR 3.3.1.13 s 11% RTP P 10 s 11%
| |
| : e. Turbine Impulse 1 2 T SR 3.3.1.12 turbine s 10%
| |
| Pressure, P.13 SR 3.3.1.13 impulse turbine pressure impulse equivalent pressure equivalent (continued)
| |
| (d) Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Weutron Flux) interlocks.
| |
| (f) Above the P.7 (Low Power Reactor Trips Block) interlock.
| |
| (g) Above the P.8 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlock.
| |
| i 3.3-16 Supplement 5 i l McGuire Unit 1
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1
| |
| ' Table 3.3.1-1 (page 3 of 7)
| |
| Reactor Trip System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVE1LLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT
| |
| : 12. Underfrequency III) 1 per bus M SR 3.3.1.9 a 55.9 Hz a 56.4 Hz RCPs SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.16
| |
| : 13. SteamGenerator(SG) 1.2 4 per SG E SR 3.3.1.1 a 15% a 16.7%
| |
| Water Level - tow SR 3.3.1.7 Low SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.16
| |
| : 14. Turbine Trip
| |
| : a. Low Fluid Oil Pressure II9) 3 0 SR 3.3.1.10 2 42 psig a 45 psig SR 3.3.1.15
| |
| : b. Turbine Stop Valve Closure II9) 4 P SR 3.3.1.10 a 1% open a 1% open SR 3.3.1.15
| |
| : 15. Safety injection (51) 1.2 2 trains Q SR 3.3.1.14 NA NA l Input from Engineered SR 3.3.1.5 Safety Feature Actuation System (E5FAS)
| |
| : 16. Reactor Trip System Interlocks
| |
| : a. Intermediate 2(d) 2 5 SR 3.3.1.11 a 6E-11 amp a IE-10 amp Range Neutron SR 3.3.1.13 Flux P-6 l b. Low Power 1 1 per T SR 3.3.1.5 NA NA Reactor Trips train Block. P 7
| |
| : c. Power Range 1 4 i SR 3.3.1.11 s 49% RTP s 48% RTP Neutron Flux. SR 3.3.1.13 P-8
| |
| : d. Power Range 1.2 4 5 SR 3.3.1.11 a 9% RTP and a 10% RTP Neutron Flux. SR 3.3.1.13 s 11% RTP P-10 s 11%
| |
| : e. Turbine Impulse 1 2 T SR 3.3.1.12 turbine s 10%
| |
| Pressure. P-13 SR 3.3.1.13 impulse turbine pressure impulse equivalent pressure equivalent (continued)
| |
| (d) Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlocks.
| |
| (f) Above the P-7 (Low Power Reactor Trips Block) interlock.
| |
| (g) Above the P-8 (Power Range Neutron Flus) interlock.
| |
| l McGuire Unit 2 3.3-16 Supplement 5
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation i B 3.3.1 BASES APPLICABLE b. Turbine Trio-Turbine Stoo Valve Closure SAFETY ANALYSES, (continued)
| |
| LCO, and APPLICABILITY a load rejection, and the Turbine Trip-Stop Valve Closure trip Function does not need to be OPERABLE.
| |
| : 15. Safety In.iection Inout from Enoineered Safety Feature Actuation System The SI Input from ESFAS ensures that if a reactor trip has not already been generated by the RTS, the ESFAS automatic actuation logic will initiate a reactor trip upon any signal that initiates SI. This is a condition of acceptability for the LOCA. However, other transients and accidents take credit for varying levels of ESF performance and rely upon rod insertion, except for the most reactive rod that is assumed to be fully withdrawn, to ensure reactor shutdown.
| |
| Therefore, a reactor trip is initiated every time an SI signal is present.
| |
| Trip Setpoint and Allowable Values are not applicable to this Function. The SI Input is provided by a manual switch or by the automatic actuation logic.
| |
| Therefore, there is no measurement signal with which to associate an LSSS.
| |
| The LC0 requires two trains of SI Input from ESFAS to be OPERABLE in MODE 1 or 2.
| |
| ; A reactor trip is initiated every time an SI signal is present. Therefore, this trip Function must be OPERABLE in MODE 1 or 2, when the reactor is critical, and must be shut down in the event of an accident. In l MODE 3, 4, 5, or 6, the reactor is not critical, and
| |
| ! this trip Function does not need to be OPERABLE. l
| |
| : 16. Reactor Trio System Interlocks Reactor protection interlocks are provided to ensure 1 reactor trips are in the correct configuration for the i current unit status. They back up operator action 9 to i ensure protection system Functions are not bypassed during unit conditions under which the safety analysis ,
| |
| assumes the Functions are not bypassed. Therefore, i the interlock Functions do not need to be OPERABLE (continued)
| |
| I l McGuire Unit 1 B 3.3-26 Supplement 5 j l
| |
| 1 i
| |
| \ !
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES APPLICABLE b. Turbine Trio-Turbine Stoo Valve Closure SAFETY ANALYSES, (continued)
| |
| LCO, and APPLICABILITY a load rejection, and the Turbine Trip-Stop Valve Closure trip Function does not need to be l OPERABLE.
| |
| : 15. Safety In.iection Innut from Eneineered Safety Feature Actuation System The SI Input from ESFAS ensures that if a reactor trip has not already been generated by the RTS, the ESFAS automatic actuation logic will initiate a reactor trip upon any signal that initiates SI. This is a condition of acceptability for the LOCA. However, other transients and accidents take credit for varying levels of ESF performance and rely upon rod insertion, except for the most reactive rod that is assumed to be fully withdrawn, to ensure reactor shutdown.
| |
| Therefore, a reactor trip is initiated every time an SI signal is present.
| |
| Trip Setpoint and Allowable Values are not applicable to this Function. The SI Input is provided by a manual switch or by the automatic actuation logic.
| |
| Therefore, there is no measurement signal with which to associate an LSSS.
| |
| The LCO requires two trains of SI Input from ESFAS to be OPERABLE in MODE 1 or 2.
| |
| A reactor trip is initiated every time an SI signal is present. Therefore, this trip Function must be OPERABLE in MODE 1 or 2, when the reactor is critical, and must be shut down in the event of an accident. In MODE 3, 4, 5, or 6, the reactor is not critical, and this trip Function does not need to be OPERABLE.
| |
| : 16. Reactor Trio System Interlocki Reactor protection interlocks are provided to ensure reactor trips are in the correct configuration for the current unit status. They back up operator actions to ensure protection system Functions are not bypassed during unit conditions under which the safety analysis assumes the Functions are not bypassed. Therefore, the interlock Functions do not need to be OPERABLE (continued) l McGuire Unit 2 B 3.3-26 Supplement 5
| |
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| | |
| I Discussien of Changes Section 3.3 - Instrumentation j l
| |
| l TECHNICAL CHANGES - MORE RESTRICTIVE M.23 Not used.
| |
| M.24 CTS Tables 3.3-3, 3.3-4, and 4.3-2 Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation function have been revised to include an initiation signal from Tavg-Low coincident with Reactor Trip (P-4). This signal relationship limits an excessive RCS cooldown following a reactor trip by terminating main feedwater flow to the steam generators. The inclusion of this initiation signal in ITS 3.3.2 is considered more restrictive and is consistent with the plant design and safety analysis.
| |
| J I
| |
| M.25 Not used. 4 M.26 Not used.
| |
| lM.27 Not used. ,
| |
| I' M.28 The CTS RTS Surveillance Table 4.3-1 is revised by the addition of a specific line item to address the P-7 Interlock Function. The new line item for the P-7 interlock includes an Actuotton Logic Test (ITS SR 3.3.1.5) which must be performed for this Function.
| |
| The addition of a specific surveillance requirement to verify the j operation of the P-7 Interlock provides assurance this function is \
| |
| maintained operable. However, the addition of this requirement represents a new technical specification restriction on plant \
| |
| operations and is therefore considered a more restrictive change. l M.29 The CTS RTS Surveillance Table 4.3-1 is revised by the addition of an Actuation logic Test survetilance for Function 16, "Sofety injection input from ESFAS". The automatic SI input to the RTS is verified during the testing performed on the associated actuation logic. Actuation Logic Tests are performed Monthly on a Staggered
| |
| ^
| |
| Test Basis for each actuation train. The addition of this requirement for the SI input to the RTS Function represents a new surveillance requirement for the RTS and is therefore constaered a more restrictive change. However, the addition of this new test requirement ensures the SI input to the RTS is properly addressed l within the ITS, which in turn, provides assurance that the
| |
| : l. operability and availability of this Function continue to be i
| |
| verified on a regular basis. In addition, the inclusion of the actuation logic test for this RTS Function is consistent with the Page M - 55 Supplement 54 lMcGuireUnit1and2
| |
| | |
| Discussion ef Changes Section 3.3 - Instrumentation testing method used at Catawba and McGuire Plants to verify the operability of this Function.
| |
| I L ;
| |
| . \'
| |
| l.
| |
| 1 i
| |
| 4 i
| |
| l l
| |
| t: }
| |
| l l
| |
| McGuire Unit 1 and 2 Page M - 65 Supplement 51l
| |
| ._-.--a _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - -
| |
| | |
| RTS Instfunentation 3.3.1 4
| |
| Table 3.3.1 1. pose 5 of 8) teactor Trip System Iristruentetion APPLICA8LE MODES OR OTNER
| |
| $PECIFIED REQUltED $URVE!LLANCE ALLouABLE ft!P FUNCTION Coctil0NS thAmuCLs towottlous REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPolul
| |
| /N I Turbine Trip
| |
| : a. Lou Fluid O(L Pressure 1 3 /0 st 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.15 t
| |
| pseg e
| |
| psig
| |
| : b. Turbine stop 1 4 P st 3.3.1.10 t 1)Zopen t 1 open valve CLesurt st 3.3.1.15 J l 7 AT" safety 1,2 2 traire e SR 3.3.1.14 hA NA Injection ($1) i, Input from Engineered Safety feature Actuetten l,h System (ESFAS)
| |
| * N .M(. Reector 1 rip system Interlocks
| |
| : e. Intermediate 2I 2 3 St 3.3.1.11 4 11 [ t 1E10[
| |
| tange Neutron st 3.3.1.13 asp emp
| |
| : b. Lou Power 1 1 per T s
| |
| _- _a NA NA teactor Trips 'sa 3.3J. '.1 train I SR 3 7 1.13 Stock, P 7
| |
| : c. Power Range 1 4 T $2 3.3.1.11 s s 48 % RTP heutron ftun, SR 3.3.1.13
| |
| . Power Range seutron Flun
| |
| / 1 / 4 ~ "'''"
| |
| M / 3 [503%
| |
| / atr /
| |
| d / Power Range 1,2 4 5 SR 3.3.1.11 t Z t 10bRTP heutron flux, SR 3.3.1.13 RTP and l P 10 s C 4 Turbine impulse 1 2 T 3 tsa ). . I s s kl0 g Pressure, P-13 st 3.3.f.3aq turt>ine turbine SR 3.3.1.13 e ; =co . ,ti-,
| |
| gg .,
| |
| f t..
| |
| ent.tionA. .ont.in .ty .nse v.i ndir.
| |
| .,4.im .g g a., ou t ,e P.. ., _ ..t. t _ . .,_ ,,_ , ,nt.r _ .
| |
| 3 /) Atzrre the P (Power tanee neutron fium) interlock.
| |
| 1 i
| |
| j 3.3 19 Rev 1. 04/07/95 I
| |
| mc c
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES APPLICABE b. Turbine Trio-Turbine Stoo Valve Closure SAFETY ANALYSES. (continued)
| |
| LCO, and APPLICABILITY a load rejection, and the Turbine Trip-Stop Valve j Closure trip Function does not need to be OPERABLE.
| |
| Safety Iniection Input from Encineered Safety Feature-
| |
| @ T. Actuation System .
| |
| The SI Input from ESFAS ensures that if a reactc' trip l has not already been generated by the RTS. the ESFAS automatic actuation logic will initiate a reactor trip upon any signal that initiptes SI. This is a.'
| |
| condition of acceptability for the LOCA. ' However, other transients and accidents take credit for varying levels of ESF performance and rely upon rod insertion, except for the most reactive rod that is assuned to be fully withdrawn, to ensure reactor shutdown.
| |
| The SI infot t$
| |
| 1 Therefore, a reactor trip is initiated every time an CL, SI signal is present.
| |
| provideck gg mQ Trip Set)oint and Alltmrable Values 5re not a)olicable O Yto this unction. Uhe 51 In>ut is e un oea >y relay 2 or by the. Ado- Fin tne tsell Thereivre, uma r. u measur-n.
| |
| signal witn which to associate an LSSS.
| |
| Q gg'g The LCO r ires two trains of SI Input from ESFAS to be OPERAB in H0DE 1 or 2.
| |
| A reactor trip is initiated every time an SI signal is y l.
| |
| present. Therefore. this trip Function must be OPERABE in H0DE 1 or 2 when the reactor is critical, and must be shut down in the event of an accident. In H00E 3. 4. 5. or 6. the reactor is not critical, and this trip Function does not need to be OPERABE.
| |
| Reactor Trio System Interlocks h 18'.
| |
| Reactor protection interlocks are provided to ensure reactor trips are in the correct configuration for the current unit status. They back up operator actions to ensure protection system Functions are not bypassed during unit conditions under which the safety analysis assumes the Functions are not bypassed. Therefore, the interlock Functions do not need to be OPERABE (continued) I WOGdTS, R 3.3 29 Rev 1. 04/07/95 M cGud
| |
| | |
| McGuire & Catawba improved TS Additional Changes Section 3.3, Instrumentation 3.3-05 ITS RTS SR 3.3.1.8 Note CTS RTS Table 4.3-1 Note 9 DOC A.73 1
| |
| The ITS calibration surveillance requirement for the source, intermediate, and power range j instrumentation contains a note which requires that the P-6 and P-10 interlocks be verified to )
| |
| be in the required state for the existing plant conditions. In order to be more specific ,
| |
| regarding the interlock verification and to associate the interlock dith the correct '
| |
| instrumentation being calibrated, the ITS Note is revised. The appropriate instrumentation is l now identified with each interlock in the Note. For the P-6 interlock, the intermediate range l channels are specified and for the P-10 interlock the power range channels are identified.
| |
| l This is an editorial enhancement made solely to clarify the surveillance requirements and does l not introduce a technical change to the intent of the ITS.
| |
| l l
| |
| l l
| |
| I I
| |
| 1 i
| |
| I mc3_cr_3.3.wpd 69 June 11,1998
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation 3 . 3.1 -
| |
| -SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (c'ontinued)
| |
| SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.8 -------------------inTE--------------------
| |
| This Surveillance shall include verification that interlocks P-6 (for the Intermediate Range channels) and P-10 (for the Power Range channels) are in their
| |
| : i. required state for existing unit ',
| |
| conditions.
| |
| ------------------------------------------- -----NOTE-----
| |
| Only required Perform COT. when not l perforned within previous 92 days i
| |
| l Prior to L reactor startup 6.MQ Four hours after reducing i power below P-10 for power
| |
| ; and intermediate range l instrumentation AND Four hours after reducing power below P-6 for source ,
| |
| range ~
| |
| instrumentation ANQ Every 92 days l thereafter (continued)
| |
| McGuire Unit 1 3.3-11 Supplement 5 l l
| |
| | |
| )
| |
| RTS Instrumentation !
| |
| 3.3.1 !
| |
| I l
| |
| SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
| |
| SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY l 1
| |
| 4 SR 3.3.1.8 -------------------NOTE--------------------
| |
| This Surveillance shall include verification that interlocks P-6 (for the Intermediate' Range channels) and P-10 (for the Power Range channels) are in their required state for existing unit ',
| |
| conditions.- j
| |
| ________________.. ______________.--------- -----NOTE----- j' Only required Perform COT. when not performed within. previous 92 days Prior to reactor startup E
| |
| Four hours after reducing power below P-10 for power and intermediate range instrumentation M
| |
| Four hours after reducing power below P-6 i for source i range !
| |
| instrumentation l
| |
| l-
| |
| @ q Every 92 days thereafter I
| |
| l
| |
| , (continued)
| |
| McGuire Unit 2 3.3-11 Supplement 5 l
| |
| | |
| y ,p . SpuW nl - I TABLE - (Continued)
| |
| TABLE NOTATION
| |
| ! - With e Reactor Trip Syst ' breakers closed and t Control Driv System capable of d withdrawal. j H -
| |
| ow P-6 (Intermedia Range Neutron Flux In rlock) Setpoint.
| |
| Hi -
| |
| Below P-10 (Low S point Power Range Neut n Flux Interlock)
| |
| Setnoin+
| |
| m j m,e, w
| |
| - If not performed in previous 31 days.
| |
| u.uJ)
| |
| '5 l
| |
| sn.
| |
| e,R 3a.s
| |
| ).bi- .g W V'1 @ - Comparison of calorimetric to excore power indication QboveA5t i
| |
| MAhn uwDMAnura. JAdjust excore channel gains consinenrwith7 P^ t*
| |
| AM (
| |
| uct i calorimetric power if absolute difference is greater than 2%. *'t k /
| |
| " i s Specif>cau on 4.0.4 ape not applicablf for entry to
| |
| ( gd,3.3.g,3 @ - Single point comparison of incere to excore axial flux difference l , tbove in uiw THERMAL POWElb.IRecalibrate if the absolute dif.
| |
| *j,b4
| |
| ( p ference is greater than or. equal to 3%. _(tee proAions of Jpect
| |
| [
| |
| mw 2. tion 4.orAre not apoMcable forAtry into)lDOE 2 or v.
| |
| @ g,, - Neutron detectors may be excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 2 (Detect plateau pdryet tham ha nhtalJrfd evalugMd, f and conufared to '
| |
| @ t.A.1taan eturer's Mta. I For the Intermediate Range and Power R' nge a Neu- j
| |
| , .w 2 Ttion Flux channels the provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are'not _ _ j na.1.ts 88 applicable for entrv into MODE 2 or 1.
| |
| a l
| |
| SRD3hh J Incore - Excore Calibrationdabove vi s pecific4 tion 4.0.4
| |
| % of RATED RMAL POWER not appli ble for ent int j ,,
| |
| [n*gh -
| |
| Each train shall be tested at least every hays on a STAGGERED TEST I
| |
| l m t* ' BASIS.
| |
| f @e ,
| |
| ! @ as, v neletem g@(f,i 9e ne chuheh Interm=Lk g, f.e eoe. PerR4.ng c>ranete 3
| |
| (
| |
| OLuaFIFFTMsurveillance (trL nuuur n vand e shalT @ include I
| |
| *Y' ' g u.;a verification that permissives P-6&and P-10/are in their required _ gg'q tate for existinnip@Et conditionsJv onsemuon er rna n-nin ny
| |
| ,,q __
| |
| ~- guarter survei e iance s i inciuoc f fverincauon sne High F1 at Shutdown Al Setpoint/f less tha (or equal to ive times ba ground.
| |
| O [33).W5. le t JA
| |
| - Setpoint verification is not required.
| |
| } . le1 l
| |
| McGUIRE - UNIT l 3/4 3 14 Amendment No. 166 p ,;.14,f 2.3
| |
| | |
| TABLE G (Continued 1 TABLE NOTATION Wi the' Reactor Trip System reakers closed and the ontrol Rod ive System capable of ro withdrawal .
| |
| ff -
| |
| Below P-6 (Intermediate ange Neutron Flux Inte ock) Setpoint.
| |
| BelowP-10(LowSet int Power Range Neutron luxInterlock)
| |
| Setpoint.
| |
| .:f h- If not performed in previous 31 y ['
| |
| % M. l.2 @- Comparison of calorimetric to excore power indication shave 15%
| |
| dt1TEIMhtRNAL mu w. / Adjust exCore Channel gains Consistent wit /d Oh4 /Nere s calorimetric power _if absolute difference is creater than 2%.
| |
| * Y' fprovisionsA Specuica+ian r_o.a are nor annitcable/for entry LM00E 2 o f___1 f -
| |
| 4 M 3.3.l. 3 @- Sinale coint ea-ae-ican af inente to excore axial flux difference ove 15% of RATED THERMAL POWEllL IRecaijorate ii se ansa mta <
| |
| ference is areater than or eaual taj3L.fTheJ'rovision.s o ecif Mz .
| |
| (/aS catiori 4.0.4 aredot applicable'for entryJffto MODE 2 o .
| |
| f -
| |
| Neutron detectors may be excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
| |
| h-ua tector/ plateau curve 34 hall be obtaMed, evaluated And compared A i tJeg: z. N nufa(turer's dat4#For the Intermediate xange ana Power Range Neu%
| |
| ron Flux channels the provisions of. Specification 4.0.4 are not -
| |
| To g. 23.1.s fl applicable for entry into MODE 2 or 1. -
| |
| fg g (, @ - Incore - Excore Calibration, sDove /ps or NA EDTDf(RMAL POWER. he provist SpecificaM'on 4.0.4Ae not anolilable for ent in
| |
| (
| |
| MODE 2 IJ
| |
| .my -
| |
| Each train shall be tested at least every on.a STAGGERED TEST nei sasis-go,m araa .
| |
| h(s)e N$
| |
| neg C0 8"hg #
| |
| tT Guarw riv) survellianceGa unnrM.I a* ==(89 shall GU3n include
| |
| * #3 verification that pe issives P-68and P-10(are in their required state for existin conditions $iT3nservation ofAffe permis a
| |
| * I
| |
| --mmawrw A ) rterlysurvetWanceshalIJETudeX ertitca on of the igh Flux at Spdown Alaru Sttpoint of lef[tha'n) j re to five ses backgroung. ,
| |
| tJerr To sR 2.3.1.rs -
| |
| Setpoint, verification is not required. t A.Io R.t.3.r,et
| |
| ! McGUIRE - UNIT 2 3/4 3-14 Amendment No. 148
| |
| : j. .
| |
| k(
| |
| f
| |
| | |
| Discussion of Changes Section 3.3 - Instrumentation ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES Specifications for the AFW system (see McGuire .4.7.1.2.b.2
| |
| * footnote and Catawba 4.7.1.2.1.b.2 ** footnote). As this allowance already exists in the CTS pump testing requirements, the addition of the ITS Response Time Surveillance Note serves only as a clarification of the existing CTS requirements. Therefore, this change is considered administrative.
| |
| A.73 The CTS Table 4.3-1 Note 9 is revised to more clearly identify the-Nuclear Instrumentation channels associated with the P-6 and P-10 interlocks. The CTS Note requires the interlock status be verified when performing operational tests on the associated Instrumentation channels. The identification of the Intermediate '
| |
| l Range Instrumentation in association with the P-6 interlock and the the Power Range Instrumentation in association with the P-10 interlock is consistent with the design of those interlocks. The clarification provided by the association of the correct Instrument channels with each interlock function does not introduce a technical change to the CTS. Therefore, this clarification is considered on administrative change.
| |
| A.74 The McGuire specific Doghouse Water Level High-High Function has 3 channels of instrumentation per train per doghouse. Two-out-of-three channels in either of the two trains per doghouse can actuate the function for that doghouse. The CTS Action (#25) is based on the loss of one entire train (less than the minimum required number of channels operable or more than one channel inoperable). This McGuire specific Function differs from the standard instrument Function in that (6) total channels exist in two redundant trains for actuating the some doghouse function.
| |
| l Therefore, the typical conversion to the ITS of the CTS Total
| |
| ; number of channels with an Action for one channel inoperable does not apply. The CTS Action #25 is based on a loss of one train in o
| |
| ; - doghouse not one channel. This is reasonable considering that the redundant train is still avalIable to perform the safety function.
| |
| Therefore, instead of the total number of channels being used in the ITS " Required Channels" column, the CTS specified minimum number of channels per train is used in the ITS. The use of the CTS minimum number of channels required operable in the ITS along with the proposed ITS Action for "one required channel inoperable" l accurately converts the CTS train based Action to the ITS format.
| |
| With two redundant trains, the Completion Time of 72 hours is applicable to locs of one entire train or more than one of the three channels in a train must be inoperable. The proposed ITS Page A - 17 W Supplement 5+
| |
| lMcGuireUnit1and2 l
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation for fheIntermedM )
| |
| SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) "Ol" b
| |
| '0} J b/
| |
| SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY l SR 3.3.1.8 . --
| |
| - NOTE - - - - her the. Power % C This Surveillance shall include C, W 6)s l
| |
| verification that interlocks P 6 P 10 are in their required state for existing unit conditions.
| |
| Perform COT. ... -NOTE - -
| |
| Only required i when not l performed within previous s......
| |
| Prior to reactor startup M
| |
| Four hours after reducing power below P 10 for power and intermediate instrumentation M
| |
| Four hours after reducing power below P 6 for source range instrumentation E
| |
| Every 92 days i thereafter '
| |
| (continued) 3.3 12 Rev 1. 04/07/95 na l
| |
| l
| |
| | |
| McGuire & Ca'awba t improved TS Additional Changes Section 3.3, Instrumentation 3.3 08 (McGuire only) ITS 3.3.2 McGuire Specific Feedwater Isolation Function (5.e)
| |
| Doghouse Water Level High-High ITS 3.3.2 Condition L CTS 3.3.2 Function Sc CTS Action #25 New DOC A.74 The proposed ITS version of this McGuire specific Function is revised to more accurately convert it to the STS format. The CTS Action (#25) is based on the loss of one entire train (less than the minimum required number of channels operable or more than one channel inoperable). This McGuire specific Function differs from the standard instrument Function in that (6) total channels exist in two redundant trains for actuating the same doghouse function.
| |
| Therefore, the typical conversion to the ITS of the CTS Total number of channels with an Action for one channel inoperable does not apply. The CTS Action #25 is based on a loss of one train in a doghouse not one channel. This is reasonable considering that the redundant train is still available to perform the safety function. Therefore, instead of the total number of channels being used in the ITS " Required Channels" column, the CTS specified minimum number of channels per train is used in the ITS. The use of the CTS rninimum number of channels required operable in the ITS along with the proposed ITS Action for "one required channelinoperable" accurately converts the CTS train based Action to the ITS format.
| |
| mc3_cr_3.3.wpd 72 June 11,1998 t _ -__ ______________ - _
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 ACTIONS (continued)
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME J. One channel J.1 --------NOTE---------
| |
| inoperable. One channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing.
| |
| Place channel in 6 hours tri p.
| |
| M J.2 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours K. One Main Feedwater K.1 Place channel in 1 hours Pumps trip channel trip. ;
| |
| inoperable. !
| |
| E K.2 Be in MODE 3. 7 hours j
| |
| L. One required channel L.1 Restore the 72 hours l in one train of inoperable train to l
| |
| , Doghouse Water Level- OPERABLE status. i High High inoperable. l M
| |
| L.2 Perform continuous 73 hours monitoring of Doghouse water level.
| |
| M. Two trains of Doghouse M.1 Perform continuous I hour
| |
| , Water Level-High High monitoring of l inoperable. Doghouse water level.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| McGuire Unit 1 3.3-25 Supplement 5 l
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2 1 (page 3 of 6)
| |
| Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT
| |
| : 4. Steam Line Isolation
| |
| . (continued)
| |
| (2) Negative Rate - 3(b)(c) 3 per D SR 3 9.2.1 s 120(d) s 100(d) psi High steam SR 3.3.2.5 psi line SR 3.3.2.8 SR 3.3.2.9
| |
| : 5. Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation
| |
| : a. Automatic Actuation 1,2(') 2 trains 1 SR 3.3.2.2 NA NA Logic and Actuation SR 3.3.2.4 Relays SR 3.3.2.6
| |
| : b. $G Water Level -High 1,2'}
| |
| I 3 per $G J SR 3.3.2.1 s 85.\% s 83.9%
| |
| High (P-14) SR 3.3.2.2 SR 3.3.2.4 SR 3.3.2.5 SR 3.3.2.6 Sk 3.3.2.8 SR 3.3.2.9
| |
| : c. Safety Injection Refer to Function 1 (Safety injection) for all initiation functions and requirements. ,
| |
| I
| |
| : d. T.,,-Low 1,2')
| |
| I I per J SR 3.3.2.1 a 551*F a 553'F loop SR 3.3.2.5 SR 3.3.2.8 1
| |
| coincident with Refer to Function 8.a (Reactor Trip, P-4) for all Reactor Trip, P-4 initiation functions and requirements.
| |
| l e. Doghouse Water 1,2I ') '2 per L.M $R 3.3.2.1 13 inches 12 inches 1 Level-High High train per' SR 3.3.2.7 i Doghouse l
| |
| : 6. Auxiliary Feedwater
| |
| : 4. Automatic Actuation 1,2,3 2 trains H SR 3.3.2.2 NA NA )
| |
| Logic and Actuation SR 3.3.2.4 Relays SR 3.3.2.6 I
| |
| : b. SG Water Level -Low 1,2,3 4 per SG D SR 3.3.2.1 a 15% a 16.7% l Low SR 3.3.2.5 SR 3.3.2.8 ,
| |
| SR 3.3.2.9 i (continued)
| |
| (b) Except when all M51VS are closed and de-activated.
| |
| (c) Trip function automatically blocked above P-ll (Pressurtrer Pressure) interlock and may be blocked below P-11 when Safety injection Steam Line Pressure-Low is not blocked.
| |
| (d) Time constant utiltred in the rate / lag controller is a 50 seconds.
| |
| (e) Except when all MFlYs, MFCVs and associated bypass valves are closed and de-activated or isolated by a closed manual valve.
| |
| 3.3-32 Supplement 5 l McGuire Unit 1 l
| |
| l l
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 i
| |
| l ACTIONS -(continued)
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME J. One channel J.1 --------NOTE---------
| |
| inoperable. One channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing.
| |
| ________________g ___
| |
| Place channel in 6 hours trip.
| |
| M J.2 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours I
| |
| \
| |
| K. One Main Feedwater K.1 Place channel in 1 hours {
| |
| Pumps trip channel trip.
| |
| inoperatie.
| |
| K.2 Be in MODE 3. 7 hours L. One required channel L.1 Restora the 72 hours l l in one train of inoperable train to Doghouse Water Level- OPERABLE status.
| |
| High High inoperable.
| |
| M l L.2 Perform continuous 73 hours monitoring of Doghouse water level.
| |
| H. Two trains of Doghouse M.1 Perform continuous 1 hour Water Level-High High monitoring of inoperable. Doghouse water level.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| McGuire Unit 2 3.3-25 Supplement 5 l l
| |
| L
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation-3.3.2
| |
| .. Table 3.3.2-1 (page 3 of 6)
| |
| Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED REQUIRED $ SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT
| |
| : 4. Steam Line Isolation (continued)
| |
| (2) Negative Rate - 3(b)(c) 3 per D $R 3.9. 2.1 s 120(d) s 100(d) p3j High steam 5R 3.3.2.5 psi line SR 3.3.2.8 SR 3.3.2.9
| |
| : 5. Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation
| |
| : a. Automatic Actuation 1,2')
| |
| I 2 trains I SR 3.3.2.2 NA NA Logic and Actuation SR 3.3.2.4 Relays SR 3.3.2.6
| |
| : b. $G Water Level -High 1,2I ') 3 per $G J 5R 3.3.2.1 4 85.6% s 83.9%
| |
| High (P-14) $R 3.3.2.2 SR 3.3.2.4 SR 3.3.2.5 SR 3.3.2.6 SR 3.3.2.8 SR 3.3.2.9
| |
| : c. Safety Injection Refer to Function 1 (Safety Injection) for all initiation functions and j requirements.
| |
| d .' T., plow 1.2(') I per J SR 3.3.2.1 a $51'F a 553*F loop SR 3.3.2.5
| |
| $R 3.3.2.8 coincident with Refer to Function 8.a (Reactor Trip, P-4) for all ;
| |
| Reactor Trip, P-4 initiation functions and requirements.
| |
| l e. Doghouse We'er t 1,2 2 per 'L,M $R 3.3.2.1 13 inches 12 inches Level.High High train per SR 3.3.2.7 Doghouse
| |
| : 6. Auxiliary feedwater
| |
| : a. Automatic Actuation 1.2.3 2 trains H SR 3.3.2.2 NA NA Logic end Actuation SR 3.3.2.4
| |
| [
| |
| Relays SR 3.3.2.6
| |
| .- b. SG Water Level . Low 1,2,3 4 per SG D SR 3.3.2.1 a 15% a 16.7%
| |
| Low $R 3.3.2.5 SR 3.3.2.8 SR 3.3.2.9 (continued)
| |
| (b Except when all M51vs are closed and de-activated.
| |
| (c) ) Trip fuaction automatically blocked above P.11 (Pressurizer Pressure) interlock and may be blocked below P-Il when Safety Injection Steam Line Pressure-Low is not blocked.
| |
| d Time constant utilized in the rate / lag controller is a 50 seconds.
| |
| {e)) f acept when all K!Vs, MFCVs, and associated bypass valves are closed and de-activated or isolated by a closed manual valve.
| |
| l McGuire' Unit 2 3.3-32 Supplement 5 l
| |
| | |
| B 3.3.2 BASES FACTIONS- LJ )
| |
| '(continued)
| |
| . Condition L applies to the Doghouse Water Level - High High.
| |
| The failure of'one required channel in one train in either l ;
| |
| reactor _ building doghouse results in a loss of redundancy. l
| |
| .for the. function. . The function'can still . be initiated by l the remaining operable train. The ipoperable train is .
| |
| required to be restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours,-
| |
| or continuous visual monitoring of the doghouse water level ,
| |
| must be implemented in the following hour. l The allowed Completion Time is reasonable considering that the' redundant train remains OPERABLE to initiate the function if required.
| |
| M.1. M,2.1 and M.2.2 Condition M applies to the. Doghouse Water Level - High High. l The failure of two trains in either reactor building
| |
| . doghouse results in a' loss of the function. Continuous.
| |
| visual monitoring of the doghouse water level must be implemented.in the following hour.
| |
| The allowed Completion Time provides sufficient time for the ;
| |
| operating staff to establish the required monitoring.
| |
| j N.1 and N.2 Condition N applies to the Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Suction
| |
| -Transfer on Suction Pressure Low.
| |
| If one or more channels on a single AFW pum is inoperable, 48 hours is. allowed to restore the channel (p) sto OPERABLE status or to declare the associated AFW pump inoperable.
| |
| The failure of one or more channels on one pump disables the ability for the suction transfer on that pump.
| |
| The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, considering the remaining redundant pumps and transfer instrumentation.
| |
| 4 (continued)
| |
| .McGUire Unit 'l B 3.3-99 Supplement 5 l
| |
| | |
| ESFAS-Instrumentation' B 3.3.2 BASES-ACTIONS LJ Condition L applies to the Doghouse Water Level - High High.
| |
| The failure of one required channel in one train in either l reactor building doghouse results in a loss of redundancy for the function. The function can still be initiated by the remaining operable train. The required to be restored to OPERABLE status (noperable train is within 72 hours, or continuous visual monitoring of the doghouse water level must be implemented in the following hour.
| |
| The allowed Completion Time is reasonable considering that the redundant train remain: OPERABLE to initiate the function if required.
| |
| M.1. M.2.1 and M.2.2 Condition M applies to the Doghouse Water Level - High High.
| |
| The failure of two trains in either reactor building doghouse results in a loss of the function. Continuous visual monitoring of the doghouse water level must be implemented in the following hour.
| |
| The allowed Completion Time provides sufficient time for the operating staff to estab?ish the required monitoring.
| |
| N.1 and N.2 Condition N applies to the Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Suction Transfer on Suction Pressure Low.
| |
| If one' or more channels on a single AFW pump is inoperable, 48 hours is allowed to restore the channel (s) to OPERABLE status or to declare the associated AFW pump inoperable.
| |
| The failure of one or more channels on one pump disables the ability for the suction transfer on that pump.
| |
| The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, considering the remaining redundant pumps and transfer instrumentation.
| |
| L i
| |
| (continued) 1 McGuire Unit 2 B 3.3-99 Supplement 5 l I
| |
| l i
| |
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| |
| | |
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| l bd<d % 3.1. 2_,
| |
| TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued) /N hfjf)(,
| |
| g 7 CTIONSMEM inued) " ,
| |
| . [ ACTION @- RgA one uMdof doghouse water level instrumen ation ino etable(fiessEia m ee;-= reouireame r or crumneh g,g I
| |
| , restore the inoperable train to operable status'in 7Me, at ter n 4ours ws uvnne t rain wnpa-shiaJ or within one hour trains inoperable, monitor doghouse water level in the affect ed @w doghouse continuous 1y m nnrh terrns are reswen to weram
| |
| [ Qg - g [wmA bsesQ\ 5 43 1 ACTION @ - With Kay af da *iahV ChannelDinoperable, place the inoperable s ( A.\ chancel (s) in the start permissive mode within one hour and c.
| |
| the applicable artson- srn,-cr 6 Containment Spray Cr.3 A.b.z3 ,,
| |
| s
| |
| ~ Containment Air Return / Hydrogen Skismer c- t.s. Ms.5.6 -noy,3 ACTION - ith the er of Lt. c s one I than the 'ai numbe h'Qp %,.yA,. f Chapn'e STAR or PFRAT mav Drocee
| |
| : 9. y the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 1 rovided )?
| |
| *p y A ,.,.o e 3 m , w.. , $ @ -
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| Te us J bek,4 wMat Hsdacee4k. R hf Ac w m t cwhou r .:.L 3 ,e gy t mewair fut ~ n,,I w e.
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| e One ce rnore R.I bec.kre offec.M Immecliedeb I Con b nment oo bure contml 60pdpe,+
| |
| in rale,ect ,d3fe, 93ftedCheat.f(,$}
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| 4 moperdle.
| |
| I I
| |
| McGUIRE - UNIT 1 3/4 3-26 Amendment No. 166 04F " 2A L _____
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| )(
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| E L 4 h .h BS 2-AE 6 ,
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| | |
| TABLE 3.3-3 (continued) * * '
| |
| 1 g 3 ACTION STATEMENTS (Continued f* N08 _
| |
| ACT10Hh - 4d,E9 one Mws tion inoperablerfless than the minime*qousewaterlevelinstrumenta-[gh OA.Jc dLTnTefs operjartan restore the inoperable %e train to operable -
| |
| status in 72 hours. After 72 hours with one train inoperable, or within level inoneth hour @ trains inoperable, monitor doghouse water
| |
| " m.onre r e affected_
| |
| n --- omm doghouse continuously 6ntWboth train _F7rqp (fp ACTION S - idith F .
| |
| * o u.
| |
| dAs.wTPureGnh S D - - I ^
| |
| y
| |
| __ channels inoTErable, place the inoperable dW channel (s) in the start permissive mode within one hour and the applicable nuien sutrenti (Containment _ Spray __ .___
| |
| tainment Air Return / Hydrogen Skimmer CT 5(3 ti.56,GP ACTION @ - ith the er of OPERABLE,4hannels one essthanthegotal
| |
| "" " unber Channelt. STARTW mad /or30W OPFDAYTONg proceed
| |
| - U # *j _
| |
| the inoperable channe) is placed in the tripped condition Within I hour.Y te. f .f ' Ly n4
| |
| }u l. mod 6 3 s's ~1 hs.es.
| |
| 3 M ACTsoA N' " 'f
| |
| * a s ., n ur.,$**f s. y ade~t-O> w w .
| |
| \
| |
| g3 gre cJFecle"^ I'" '
| |
| Rc 0* "j{'5fb$
| |
| wpp ded- W h gg Q WOY s,a na opeu.Mt - ,
| |
| L. B McGUIRE - UNIT 2 3/4 3 26 hendment No. 148 I
| |
| i i
| |
| , pg 11 of MM l
| |
| f
| |
| | |
| Discussion of Changes Szction 3.3 - Instrumentation ADi41NISTRATIVE CHANGES Specifications for the AFW system (see McGuire 4.7.1.2.b.2
| |
| * footnote and Catawba 4.7.1.2.1.b.2 ** footnote). As this allowance already exists in the CTS pump testing requirements, the addition of the ITS Response Time Surveillance Note serves only as a l clartftcation of the existing CTS requirements. Therefore, this change is considered administrative. l A.73 The CTS Table 4.3-1 Note 9 is revised to more clearly identify the
| |
| , Nuclear Instrumentation channels associated with the P-6 and P-10 interlocks. The CTS Note requires the interlock status be verified when performing operational tests on the associated Instrumentation channels. The identification of the Intermediate Range Instrumentation in association with the P-6 interlock and the the Power Range Instrumentation in association with the P-10 interlock is consistent with the design of those interlocks. The clarification-provided by the association of the correct Instrument channels with each interlock function does not introduce a technical change to the CTS. Therefore, this clarification is considered an administrative change.
| |
| A.74 The McGuire specific Doghouse Water Level High-High Function has 3
| |
| ( channels of instrumentation per train per doghouse. Two-out-of-three channels in either of the two trains per doghouse can actuate the function for that doghouse. The CTS Action (#25) is based on the loss of one entire train (less than the minimum required number of channels operable or more than one channel inoperable). This McGuire specific Function differs from the standard instrument Function in that (6) total channels exist in two redundant trains for actuating the same doghouse function. .
| |
| , Therefore, the typical conversion to the ITS of the CTS Total l number of channels with an Action for one channel inoperable does \
| |
| ; not' apply. The CTS Action #25 is based on a loss of one train in a doghouse not onc channel. This is reasonable considering that the redundant train is still avallable to perform the safety function.
| |
| Therefore, instead of the total number of channels being used in the ITS " Required Channels" column, the CTS specified minimum l number of channels per train is used in the ITS. The use of the CTS minimum number of channels required operable in the ITS along with the proposed ITS Action for "one required channel inoperable" accurately converts the CTS train based Action to the ITS format.
| |
| With two redundant trains, the Completion Time of 72 hours is l opplicable to loss of one entire train or more than one of the l three channels in a train must be inoperable. The proposed ITS Page A - 17H Supplement 54 i
| |
| lMcGuireUnit1and2 l'
| |
| | |
| Discussien of Changes Section 3.3 - Instrumentation I
| |
| ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES Requir'e d Channels and Action Conditions preserve the CTS requirements in the IT,5 fo_rmat. Therefore, this change is considered administrative.
| |
| (
| |
| l t
| |
| l 4
| |
| McGuire Unit I and 2 Page A - 18 W Supplement 54l
| |
| | |
| . INSERT CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME L. % One required L.1 Restore the 72 hours l channels in one inoperable train to train of Doghouse OPERABLE status.,
| |
| Water Level-High .
| |
| * High inoperable. E L.2 Perform continuous 73 hours monitoring of Doghouse water level. j l
| |
| }
| |
| M. Two trains of M.1 Perform continuous 1 hour Doghouse Water monitoring of Level-High High Doghouse water level. l inoperable.
| |
| I l
| |
| l N. One or more N.1 Restore channel (s) to 48 hours l channels of OPERABLE status.
| |
| Auxiliary Feedwater Suction. E Pressure-Low for one auxiliary N.2 Declare associated 48 hours feedwater pump auxiliary feedwater !
| |
| inoperable. pump inoperable.
| |
| l
| |
| : 0. 0ne or more channels 0.1 Declare associated Imediately of Auxiliary Feedwater auxiliary feedwater Suction Pressure-Low pumps inoperable, for two or more auxiliary feedwater pumps inoperable.
| |
| INSERT Page 3.3-27 McGuire
| |
| | |
| INSERT APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOiAE E TRIP FbNCTION CON 0!TIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT
| |
| : d. T ,-Low 1,2 '} 1 per J SR 3.3.2.1 a 551*F a 553*F loop SR. 3.3.2.5 SR e3.3.2.8 coincident with Refer to Function 8.a (Reactor Trip. P-4) for all Reactor Trip P-4 initiation functions and requirements.
| |
| l e. Doghouse Water 1.25 ') 3 2 per L.M SR 3.3.2.1 13 inches 12 inches Level - High High train per SR 3.3.2.7 doghouse INSERT Page 3.3-37 McGuire l
| |
| | |
| Ld l
| |
| i Condition L applies to the Doghouse Water Level - High.
| |
| l The failure of t+#e one required channels in one train in either reactor building doghouse results in a loss of redundancy for the function. The function can still be initiated by the remaining operable train. The inoperable train is required to be restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours, or continuous visual monitoring of the doghouse water level must be implemented in the following hour. ,
| |
| The allowed Completion Time is reasonable considering that the redundant train remains OPERABLE to initiate the function if required.
| |
| M.1. M.2.1 and M.2.2 Condition M applies to the Doghouse Water Level - High.
| |
| The failure of two trains in either reactor building doghouse results in a loss of the function. Continuous visual monitoring of the doghouse water level must be implemented in the following hour.
| |
| The allowed Completien Time provides sufficient time for the operating staf f to establish the required monitoring.
| |
| N.1 and N.2 Condition N applies to the Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Suction Transfer on Suction Pressure Low.
| |
| If one or more channels on a single AFW pump is inoperable, 48 hours is allowed to restore the channel (s) to OPERABLE status or to declare the associated AFW pump inoperable. The failure of one or more channels on one pump disables the ability for the suction transfer on that pump.
| |
| The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, considering the remaining redundant pumps and transfer instrumentation.
| |
| Rd Condition 0 applies to the Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Suction Transfer on Suction Pressure Low.
| |
| If one or more channels on more than one AFW pumps are inoperable, the ability for the suction transfer b.7 3 been lost on multiple pumps. In this case, the associated AFW pumps must be declared inoperable ininediately.
| |
| INSERT Page B 3.3-112 McGuire Page2 of 2.
| |
| | |
| McGuire & Catawba Improved TS Additional Changes Section 3.3, instrumentation 3.3-9 Misc 3.3 Bases changes Enclosed are revisions to various bases pages to make plant specific changes, corrections, or i clarifications, or incorporate plant specific terminology or enhancements.
| |
| l l !
| |
| l \
| |
| l 4
| |
| i l
| |
| l l
| |
| l l
| |
| mc3_cr_3.3.wpd 73 June 11,1998
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation l B 3.3.1 '
| |
| 1 BASES APPLICABLE this case, the RTS will still provide protection, even with SAFETY ANALYSES, random failure of one of the other three protection LCO, and channels. Three operable instrumentation channels in a APPLICABILITY two-out-of-three configuration are generally required when (continued) there is no potential for control system and protection system interaction that could simultaneously create a need for RTS trip and disable one RTS channel. The two-out-of-three and two-out-of-four configurations allow l
| |
| one channel to be tripped during mai'ntenance or testing without causing a reactor trip. Specific exceptions to the
| |
| , above general philosophy exist and are discussed below.
| |
| Eg3ctor Trio System Functions The safety analyses and OPERABILITY requirements applicable to each RTS Function are discussed below:
| |
| : 1. Manual Reactor Trio The Manual Reactor Trip ensures that the control room operator can initiate a reactor trip at any time by using either of two reactor trip switches in the cor. trol room. A Manuil Reactor Trip accomplishes the same results as any r,ne of the automatic trip Functions. It may bE used by the reactor operator to shut down the reactor whenever any parameter is l
| |
| rapidly trending toward its Trip Setpoint.
| |
| The LC0 requires two Manual Reactor Trip channels to be OPERABLE. Each channel is controlled by a manual reactor trip switch. Each channel actuates one or more reactor trip breakers in both trains. Two independent channels are required to be OPERABLE so that no single random failure will disable the Manual Reactor Trip Function.
| |
| In MODE 1 or 2, manual initiation of a reactor trip must be OPERABLE. These are the MODES in which the shutdown rods and/or control rods are partially or
| |
| , fully withdrawn from the core. In MODE 3, 4, or 5, the manual initiation Function must also be OPERABLE if the shutdown rods or control rods are withdrawn or the Control Rod Drive (CRD) System is capable of withdrawing the shutdown rods or the control rods. In this condition, inadvertent control rod withdrawal is
| |
| [
| |
| (continued) l McGuire Unit 1 8 3.3-8 Supplement 5 I
| |
| L _ _ - _ _ - _ _ - - _ - - - - - - - - - - - _ - - - .
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation l B 3.3.1 {
| |
| l i
| |
| BASES
| |
| ! i l
| |
| APPLICABLE 18. Reactor Trio Breaker Undervoltaoe and Shunt Trio SAFETY ANALYSES, Mechanisms (continued)
| |
| LCO, and
| |
| ! APPLICABILITY OPERABLE for trip breakers that are open, racked out, incapable of supplying power to the CRD Syst<'n, or declared inoperable under Function 17 above.
| |
| OPERABILITY of both trip mechanisms on each breaker l ensures that no single trip meghanism failure will !
| |
| l prevent opening any breaker on a valid signal.
| |
| l These trip Functions must be OPERABLE in MODE 1 or 2 l when the reactor is critical. In fiODE 3, 4, or 5, I these RTS trip Functions must be OPERABLE when the
| |
| ! RTBs or associated bypass breakers are closed, and the CRD System is capable of rod withdrawal.
| |
| : 19. Automatic Trio Looic
| |
| ! The LC0 requirement for the RTBs (Functions 17 and 18) and Automatic Trip Logic (Function 19) ensures that means are provided to interrupt the power to allow the rods to fall into the reactor core. Each RTB is equipped with an undervoltage coil and a shunt trip coil to trip the breaker open when needed. Each train RTB has a bypass breaker to allow testing of the trip breaker while the unit is at power. The reactor trip.
| |
| signals generated by the RTS Automatic Trip Logic cause the RTBs and associated bypass breakers to open and shut down the reactor.
| |
| The LC0 requires two. trains of RTS Automatic Trip Logic to be OPERABLE. Having two OPERABLE channels ensures that random failure of a single logic channel
| |
| , will not prevent reactor trip.
| |
| These trip Functions must be OPERABLE in MODE 1 or 2 when the reactor is critical. In MODE 3, 4, or 5, these RTS trip Functions must be OPERABLE when the RTBs and associated bypass breakers are closed, and I the CRD System is capable of rod withdrawal.
| |
| l The RTS instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (Ref. 6).
| |
| (continued)
| |
| McGuire Unit 1 B 3.3-33 Supplement 5 l
| |
| | |
| +
| |
| RTS Instrumentation j
| |
| , B 3.3.1 ' i i
| |
| BASES I
| |
| SURVEILLANCE' SR 3.3.1.11 REQUIREMENTS-(continued). SR 3.3.1.11 is the' performance ~of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION, as described in SR 3.3.1.10, every 18 months. This SR is modified by two notes. Note 1 states that neutron detectors .
| |
| are' excluded from the CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The CHANNEL a CALIBRATION for the power range neutron detectors consists 'J of a normalization of the detectors
| |
| * based on a power 1 calorimetric and flux map performed 'above 15% RTP, The CHANNEL CALIBRATION for the source range and intermediate range neutron detectors consists of obtain.ing the high-voltage detector plateau and discriminator curves for source range, and the high ' voltage detector plateau for intermediate range,. evaluating those curves, and comparing the curves to the manufacturer's data. Note 2 states that this Surveillance is not required for the NIS power range detectors for entry into MODE 2 or_1,.and is not. required for the NIS intermediate range detectors for entry into MODE 2, because'the unit must be in at least MODE 2 to perform the test for the intermediate range detectors and MODE 1 for the power range detectors. The 18 month Frequency is based.on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the_ reactor at power. Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed on the 18 month Frequency.
| |
| '~
| |
| SR 3.3.1.12 SR 3.3.1.12 is the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION, as described in SR 3.3.1.10, every 18 months. Calibration of the AT channels is required at the beginning of each cycle upon completion of the precision heat balance. RCS loop AT- ,
| |
| values shall be determined by precision heat balance measurements at the beginning of each cycle.
| |
| The Frequency is justified by the assumption of an 18 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.
| |
| SR 3.3.1.13
| |
| : i. SR 3.3.1.13 -is .the performance of a COT of RTS interlocks every 18 months.
| |
| )
| |
| I (continued)
| |
| McGuire Unit 1 B 3.3-53 Supplement 5 l i
| |
| | |
| ! ESFAS Instrumentation j B 3.3.2 .
| |
| -BASES l
| |
| APPLICABLE 1. Safe +v In.iection (continued)
| |
| SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and .
| |
| Isolation of the control room to ensure APPLICABILITY habitability; i
| |
| Enabling ECCS suction from the refueling water
| |
| =
| |
| storage tank (RWST) switchover on low RWST level to ensure continued coolirig via use of the containment sump;
| |
| * Starting of annulus ventilation and auxiliary building filtered ventilation to limit offsite releases;
| |
| . Starting of diesel generators for loss of offsite power considerations; and
| |
| * Starting of component cooling water and nuclear service water systems for heat removal.
| |
| : a. Safety Iniection-Manual Initiation The LC0 requires one channel per train to be OPERABLE. The operator can initiate SI at any time by using either of two switches in the control room. This action will cause actuation of all components in the same manner as any of the automatic actuation signals.
| |
| The LC0 for the Manual Initiation Function ensures the proper amount of redundancy is maintained in the manual ESFAS actuation circuitry to ensure the operator has manual ESFAS initiation capability.
| |
| l Each train consists of one push button and the interconnecting wiring to the actuation logic l cabinet. This configuration does not allow testing at power.
| |
| (continued) l l
| |
| l McGuire Unit 1 B 3.3-64 Supplement 5 l
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES APPLICABLE 3. Containment Isolation SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and Containment Isolation provides isolation of the APPLICABILITY containment atmosphere, and all process systems that (continued) penetrate containment, from the environment. This Function is necessary to prevent or limit the release of radioactivity to the environment in the event of a large break LOCA. ;
| |
| There are two separate Containment Isolation. signals, Phase A and Phase B. Phase A isolation isolates all automatically isolable process lines, except component cooling water (CCW) and Nuclear Service Water System (NSWS) to RCP motor air coolers, at a relatively low containment pressure indicative of primary or secondary system leaks. For these types of. events, forced circulation cooling using the reactor coolant pumps (RCPs) and SGs is the preferred (but not required) method of decay heat removal. Since CCW and NSWS are required to support RCP operation,'not isolating CCW and NSWS on the low pressure Phase A signal enhances unit safety by allowing operators to j use forced RCS circulation to cool the unit.
| |
| Isolating CCW and NSWS on the low pressure signal may force the use of feed and bleed cooling, which could prove more difficult to control.
| |
| Phase A containment isolation is actuated automatically by SI, or manually via the actuation circuitry. All process lines penetrating containment, with the exception of CCW and NSWS are isolated. CCW is not isolated at this time to permit continued operation of the RCPs with cooling water flow to the thermal barrier heat exchangers and air or oil coolers. All process lines not equipped with remote operated isolation valves are manually closed, or j otherwise isolated, prior to reaching MODE 4.
| |
| Manual Phase A Containment Isolation is accomplished i by either of two switches in the control room. Either 1 switch actuates its associated train. l l
| |
| (continued) l l
| |
| McGuire Unit 1 B 3.3-71 Supplement 5 l l
| |
| i l.
| |
| | |
| LOP DG Start Instrumentation B 3.3.5 BASES 1
| |
| l ACTIONS In the event a channel's Trip Setpoint is found nonconservative with respect to the Allowable Value, or the i channel is found inoperable, then the function that channel l provides must be declared inoperable and the LC0 Condition l entered for the particular protection function affected. '
| |
| Because the required channels are specified on a per bus basis, the Condition may be entered peparately for each ius i as appropriate.
| |
| A Note has been added in the ACTIONS to clarify the l application of Completion Time rules. The Conditions of this Specification may be entered independently for each Function listed in the LCO. The Completion Time (s) of the inoperable channel (s) of a Function will be tracked separately for each Function starting from the time the Condition was entered for that Function.
| |
| i l
| |
| A.d Condition A applies to the LOP DG start Function with one loss of voltage or degraded voltage channel per bus inoperable.
| |
| If one channel is inoperable rRequired Action A.1 requires that channel to be placed in trip within 6 hours. With a channel in trip, the LOP DG start instrumentation channels are configured to provide a one-out-of-two logic to initiate a trip of the incoming offsite power.
| |
| l The specified Completion Time is reasonable considering the Function remains fully 0PERABLE on every bus and the low probability of an event occurring during these intervals.
| |
| fld Condition B applies when more than one loss of voltage or more than one degraded voltage channel on a single bus is inoperable.
| |
| Required Action B.1 requires restoring all but one channel to OPERABLE status. The 1 hour Completion Time should allow I
| |
| ample time to repair most failures and takes into account (continued) l McGuire Unit 1 B 3.3-132 Supplement 5 l
| |
| l
| |
| | |
| , Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation Instrumentation I B 3.3.6 i BASES LC0 The.LC0 requirements ensure that the instrumentation necessary to initiate Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation, listed in Table 3.3.6-1, is OPERABLE.
| |
| : 1. Manual Initiation I
| |
| The LC0 requires two channels OPERABLE. The operator {
| |
| caninitiateContainmentPurgeysolation'atanytime l by using either of two switches (manual Phase A i actuation or manual spray actuation) in the control room. Either switch actuates its associated train.
| |
| This action will cause actuation of all components in the same manner as any of the automatic actuation signals. !
| |
| The LC0 for Manual Initiation ensures the proper amount.of. redundancy is maintained in the manual actuation circuitry to ensure the operator has manual initiation capability. -
| |
| Each channel consists of one push button and the interconnecting wiring to the actuation logic cabinet.
| |
| : 2. Automatic Actuation Loaic and Actuation Relavs The LC0 requires two trains of Automatic Actuation 3 Logic and Actuation Relays OPERABLE to ensure that no l single random failure can prevent automatic actuation. )
| |
| Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays consist of the same features and operate in the same manner as described for ESFAS Function 1.b, SI, and ESFAS Function 3.a. Containment Phase A Isolation. The applicable MODES and specified conditions for the i , containment purge isolation portion of these' Functions are different and less restrictive than those for their Phase A isolation and SI roles. If one or more
| |
| ; of the SI or Phase A isolation Functions becomes L inoperable in such a manner that only the Containment i Purge Isolation Function is affected, the Conditions-applicable to their SI and Phase A isolation Functions need not be entered. The less restrictive Actions i specified for inoperabilicy of the Containment Purge Isolation Functions specify sufficient compensatory ,
| |
| measures for this case.
| |
| (continued) l McGuire Unit 1 B.3.3-136 Supplement 5
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES s
| |
| APPLICABLE this case, the RTS will still provide protection, even with SAFETY ANALYSES, random failure of one of the other three protection LCO, and channels. Three operable instrumentation channels in a APPLICABILITY two-out-of-three configuration are-generally required when (continued) there is no potential for control system and protection system interaction that could simultaneously create a need for RTS trip and disable one RTS channel. The two-out-of-three and two-out-of-four, configurations allow one channel to be tripped during maintenance or testing without causing a reactor trip. Specific exceptions to the above general philosophy exist and are discussed below.
| |
| Reactor Trio System Functions The safety analyses and OPERABILITY requirements applicable to each RTS Function are discussed below:
| |
| : 1. Manual Reactor Trio The Manual Reactor Trip ensures that the control room operator can initiate a reactor trip at any time by using either of two reactor trip switches.in the control room. A Manual Reactor Trip accomplishes the same results as any one of the automatic trip Functions. It may be used by the reactor operator to shut down the reactor whenever any parameter is rapidly trending toward its Trip Setpoint.
| |
| The LC0 requires two Manual Reactor Trip channels to l be OPERABLE. Each channel is controlled by a manual reactor trip switch. Each channel actuates one or more reactor trip breakers in both trains. Two independent channels are required to be OPERABLE so
| |
| < that no single random failure will disable the Manual Reactor Trip Function.
| |
| In MODE 1 or 2, manual initiation of a reactor trip must be OPERABLE. These are the MODES in which the shutdown rods and/or control rods are partially or L fully withdrawn from the core. In MODE 3, 4, or 5, the manual initiation Function must also be OPERABLE
| |
| ~
| |
| t L if the shutdown rods or control rods are withdrawn or l- the Control Rod Drive (CRD) System is capable of withdrawing the shutdown rods or the control rods. In l- this condition, inadvertent control rod withdrawal is (continued) l ' McGuire Unit 2 B 3.3-8 Supplement 5 l
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation
| |
| . B 3.3.1 B.ASES APPLICABLE 18. Reactor Trio Breaker Undervoltaae and Shunt Tric 1 SAFETY ANALYSES, Mechanisms (continued) l LCO, and APPLICABILITY OPERABLE for trip breakers that are open, racked out, incapable of supplying power to the CRD System, or declared inoperable under Function 17 above.
| |
| OPERABILITY of both trip mechanisms on each breaker ensures that no single trip me?hanism failure will prevent opening any breaker on a valid signal.
| |
| These trip Functions nxst be OPERABLE in MODE 1 or 2 when the reactor is critical. In MODE 3, 4, or 5, these RTS trip Functions must be OPERABLE when the RTBs or associated bypass breakers are closed, and the CRD System is capable of rod withdrawal.
| |
| i
| |
| : 19. Automatic Trio Loaic '
| |
| The LC0 requirement for the RTBs (Functions 17 and 18) and Automatic Trip Logic (Function 19) ensures that i means are provided to interrupt the power to allow the j rods to fall into the reactor core. Each RTB is ;
| |
| equipped with an undervoltage coil and a shunt trip .;
| |
| coil to trip the breaker open when needed. Each train RTB has a bypass breaker to allow testing of the trip {
| |
| breaker while the unit is at power. The reactor trip i signals generated by the RTS Automatic Trip Logic cause the RTBs and associated bypass breakers to open and shut down the reactor.
| |
| The LC0 requires two trains of RTS Automatic Trip Logic to be OPERABLE. Having two OPERABLE channels ensures that random failure of a single logic channel will not prevent reactor trip.
| |
| These trip Functions must be OPERABLE in MODE 1 or 2 when the reactor is critical. In MODE 3, 4, or 5, these RTS trip Functions must be OPERABLE when the RTBs and associated bypass breakers are closed, and the CRD System is capable of rod withdrawal.
| |
| The RTS instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR
| |
| ; 50.36 (Ref. 6).
| |
| l (continued)
| |
| McGuire Unit 2 8 3.3-33 Supplement 5 l
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES i
| |
| SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.11
| |
| ' REQUIREMENTS
| |
| -(continued) SR 3.3.1.11 is the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION, as described in SR 3.3.1.10, every 18 months. This SR is modified by two notes. Note 1 states that neutron detectors .]
| |
| are excluded from the CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION for the power range neutron detectors consists of a normalization.of the detectors' based on a power calorimetric and flux map performed hbove 15% RTP. The CHAhNEL CALIBRATION for the source range and intermediate range neutron detectors consists of' obtaining the high i voltage detector. plateau and discriminator curves for source 1 range, and the high voltage detector plateau for intermediate range, evaluating those curves, and comparing the curves to the manufacturer's data. Note.2 states that .
| |
| this. Surveillance is not required for the NIS power range I detectors for entry into MODE 2 or 1, and is not required for the NIS intermediate range detectors for entry-into i MODE 2, because the unit must be in at least MODE 2 to '
| |
| perfonn the test for the intermediate range detectors and MODE 1 for the power range detectors. The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveil. lance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed on the 18 month Frequency.
| |
| SR - 3. 3.1.12 SR 3.3.1.12-is the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION, as described in SR 3.3.1.10, every 18 months. Calibration'of the AT channels is required at the beginning of each cycle upon completion of the precision heat balance. RCS loop AT values shall be determined by precision heat balance measurements at the beginning of each cycle.
| |
| The Frequency is justified by the assumption of an 18 month 3 ' calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.
| |
| -SR 3.3.1.13 SR 3.3.1.13 is the performance of a COT of RTS interlocks every 18 months. l (continued)
| |
| McGuire Unit 2 B 3.3-53 Supplement 5 l l
| |
| l
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation
| |
| ; B 3.3.2 l
| |
| l BASES l
| |
| i APPLICABLE 1. Safety In.iection (continued)
| |
| ! SAFETY ANALYSES, l LCO,.and = Isolation of the control room to ensure APPLICABILITY habitability;
| |
| = Enabling ECCS suction from the refueling water storage tank (RWST) switchover on low RWST level to ensure continued cooling via use of the containment sump;
| |
| '
| |
| * Starting of annulus ventilation and auxiliary l -
| |
| building filtered ventilation to limit offsite releases;
| |
| * Starting of diesel generators for loss of offsite power considerations; and
| |
| . Starting of component cooling water and nuclear service water systems for heat removal.
| |
| : a. Safety In.iection-Manual Initiation c The LC0 requires one channel per train to be OPERABLE. The operator can initiate SI at any
| |
| , time by using either of two switches in the control room. This action will cause actuation of all components in the same manner as any of the automatic actuation signals.
| |
| The LC0 for the Manual Initiation Function i ensures the proper amount of redundancy is !
| |
| maintained in the manual ESFAS actuation circuitry to ensure the operator has manual ESFAS l initiation capability. l t
| |
| l- Each train consists of one push button and the ;
| |
| interconnecting wiring to the actuation logic
| |
| .l cabinet. This configuration does not allow .
| |
| testing at power. !
| |
| l J
| |
| (continued)
| |
| B 3.3-64 Supplement 5 l McGuire Unit 2
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES APPLICABLE 3. Containment Isolation SAFETY' ANALYSES, ELCO, and Containment Isolation provides isolation of the APPLICABILITY containment atmosphere, and all process systems that
| |
| -(continued) penetrate containment, from the environment. This Function is necessary to prevent or limit the release of radioactivity to the environment in the event of a large break LOCA. '
| |
| There are two separate Containment Isolation signals, Phase A and Phase B. Phase A isolation isolates all automatically isolable process lines, except component cooling water (CCW) and Nuclear Service Water System (NSWS) to RCP motor air coolers, at a relatively low containment pressure indicative of primary or secondary system leaks. For these types of events, forced circulation cooling using the reactor coolant-pumps (RCPs) and SGs is the preferred (but not required) method of decay heat removal. Since CCW and
| |
| :NSWS are required to support RCP operation, not I isolating CCW and NSWS on the low pressure Phase A signal enhances unit safety by allowing operators to use forced RCS circulation to cool the unit.
| |
| Isolating CCW and NSWS on the low pressure signal may force the use of feed and bleed cooling, which could prove more difficult to control.
| |
| Phase A containment isolation-is actuated 3 automatically by SI, or manually via the actuation i I
| |
| circuitry. L All process lines penetrating containment, with the exception of CCW and NSWS are isolated. CCW is not isolated at this time to permit continued operation of the RCPs with cooling water flow to the ,
| |
| thermal barrier heat exchangers and air or oil i coolers. All process lines not equipped with remote operated isolation valves are manually closed, or otherwise isolated, prior to reaching MODE 4.
| |
| Manual Phase A Containment Isolation is accomplished by either of two switches in the control room. Either switch actuates its associated train. l l
| |
| (continued)
| |
| McGuire Unit 2 B 3.3-71 Supplement 5 l
| |
| | |
| LOP DG Start Instrumentation B 3.3.5 BASES l l
| |
| ACTIONS In the event a channel's Trip Setpoint is found l nonconservative with respect to the Allowable Value, or the I channel is found inoperable, then the function that channel provides must be declared inoperable and the LC0 Condition entered for the particular protection function affected.
| |
| Because the required channels are specified on a per bus l basis, the Condition may be entered; separately for each bus i as appropriate.
| |
| J l
| |
| A Note has been added in the ACTIONS to clarify the application of Completion Time rules. The Conditions of this Specification may be entered independently for each Function listed in the LCO. The Completion Time (s) of the inoperable channel (s) of a Function will be tracked separately for each Function starting from the time the Condition was entered for that Function.
| |
| L.1 Condition A applies to the LOP DG start Function with one loss of voltage or degraded voltage channel per bus inoperable.
| |
| If one channel is inoperable, Required Action A.1 requires that channel to be placed in trip within 6 hours. With a channel in trip, the LOP DG start instrumentation channels are configured to provide a one-out-of-two logic to initiate a trip of the incoming offsite power.
| |
| l The specified Completion Time is reasonable considering the Function remains fully 0PERABLE on every bus and the low probability of an event occurring during these intervals.
| |
| )
| |
| IL1 Condition B applies when more than one loss of voltage or ;
| |
| more than one degraded voltage channel on a single bus is )
| |
| inoperable.
| |
| Required Action B.1 requires restoring all but one channel ,
| |
| to OPERABLE status. The 1 hour Ocmpletion Time should allow i ample time to repair most failures and takes into account (continued) l McGuire Unit 2 B 3.3-132 Supplement 5
| |
| | |
| Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation Instrumentation -
| |
| B 3.3.6 BASES LCO The LC0 requirements ensure that the instrumentation necessary to initiate Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation, listed in Table 3.3.6-1, is 0PERABLE.
| |
| : 1. Manual Initiation The LC0 requires two channels OPERABLE. The operator can initiate Containment Purge by using either of two switches;(manual Isolation at Aany time Phase actuation or manual spray actuation) in the control room. Either switch actuates its associated train.
| |
| This action will cause actuation of all components in the same manner as any of the automatic actuation signals.
| |
| .The LC0 for Manual Initiation ensures the proper amount of redundancy is maintained in the manual actuation circuitry to ensure the operator has manual initiation capability.
| |
| Each channel consists of one push button and the .
| |
| interconnecting wiring to the actuation logic cabinet.
| |
| : 2. Automatic Actuation looic and Actuation Relavs' The LCO requires two trains of Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays OPERABLE to ensure that no single random failure can prevent automatic actuation.
| |
| Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays consist i of the same features and operate in the same manner as i described for ESFAS Function 1.b. SI, and ESFAS Function 3.a. Containment Phase A Isolation. The applicable MODES and specified conditions for the containment purge isolation portion of these Functions are different and less restrictive than those for their Phase A isolation and SI roles. If one or more i of the SI or Phase A isolation Functions becomes inoperable-in such a manner that only the Containment L Purge Isolation Function is affected, the Conditions
| |
| , applicable to their SI and Phase A isolation Functions
| |
| ! need not be entered. The less restrictive Actions specified for_inoperability of the Containment Purge Isolation Functions specify sufficient compensatory measures for this case.
| |
| l' (continued) l McGuire Unit 2 B 3.3-136 Supplement 5
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 9
| |
| BASES APPLICABLE this case, the RTS will still provide protection, even with ;
| |
| SAFETY ANALYSES. random failure of one of the other three protection LCO, and channels. Three operable instrumentation channels in a APPLICABILITY two out of three configuration are generally required when (continued) there is no potential for control system and protection system interaction that could simultaneously create a need l for RTS trip and disable one RTS channel. The i
| |
| two out of three and two out of four configuration allow l
| |
| ) one channel to be tripped during maintenance or terting I without causing a reactor trip. Specific exception: to the !
| |
| l above general philosophy exist and are discussed belcw. ;
| |
| l l
| |
| Reactor Trio System Functions The safety analyses and OPERABILITY requirements applicable 1 to each RTS Function are discussed below:
| |
| i 1. Manual Reactor Trio The Manual Reactor Trip ensures that the control room operator can initiate a reactor trip at any time by using either of two reactor trip switches in the control room. A Manual Reactor Trip accomplishes the l
| |
| same results'as any one of the automatic trip Functions. It1@ used by the reactor operator to shut Q !
| |
| Z oown tne reactor whenever any parameter is rapidly l trending toward its Trip Setpoint.
| |
| The LCO requires two Manual Reactor Tri channels o be OPERABLE. Each channel is control b a 1
| |
| /
| |
| pOh6 00 7 reactor trip switch. Each channel -
| |
| - b actor trip breake in both trains. Jwo independent t 74g h '
| |
| Lgmj channels are require to be OPERABLE so that no single random failure will d sable the Manual Reactor Trip i Function.
| |
| In H00E 1 or 2. manual initiation of a reactor trip ;
| |
| i must be OPERABLE. These are the MODES in which the shutdown rods ard/or control rods are partially or fully withdrawn from the core. In H00E 3. 4. or 5.
| |
| the manual initiation Function must also be OPERABLE if the shutdown rods or control rods are withdrawn or the Control Rod Drive (CRD) System is capable of withdrawing the shutdown rods or the control rods. In this condition, inadvertent control rod withdrawal is (continued)
| |
| M B 3.3 8 Rev 1. 04/07/95 w c~-
| |
| | |
| l RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES D
| |
| W.
| |
| APPLICABLE Reactor Trio Breakers (continued)
| |
| SAFETY ANALYSES.
| |
| LCO. and These trip Functions must be OPERABLE in MODE 1 or 2 APPLICABILITY when the reactor is critical. In MODE 3. 4. or 5 these RTS trip Functions must be OPERABLE when the RTBs or associated bypass breakers are closed, and the CRD System is capable of rod withdrawal.
| |
| . Reactor Trio Breaker Undervoltaae and Shunt Trio Mechanisms .
| |
| The LCO requires both the Underveltage and Shunt Trip Mechanisms to be OPERABLE for each RTB that is in service. The trip mechanisms are not required to be OPERABLE for trip breakers that are open, racked out, incapable of supplying power to the RD System, or declared inoperable under Function above. n OPERABILITY of both trip mechanisms on eaker ensures that no single trip mechanism failure will prevent opening any breaker on a valid signal.
| |
| These trip Functions must be OPERABLE in MODE 1 or 2 ,
| |
| when the reactor is critical. In MODE 3. 4. or 5.
| |
| these RTS trip Functions must be OPERABLE.when the O~2 b, RTBs(RD the L System is capable of rod withdrawal.ERDassociated bypass breake I D M. Automatic Trio Loaic
| |
| . The LCO requirement for the RTBs (Functions and )
| |
| and Automatic Trip Logic (Function 2Q ensures that g means are provided to interrupt the power to allow the rods to fall into the reactor core. Each RTB is
| |
| /_ kequippedwithanundervoltagecoilandashunttrip coil to trio the breaker when needed. Eac h L(ifMh) I
| |
| = ha.s at. s ecu- ooec w o.o a nypass aker to allow testing of the tr'p DreaKer wnile the unit is at power. The reactor trip signals generated by the RTS Automatic Trip Logic cause the RTBs and associated bypass breakers to open and shut down the reactor.
| |
| The LCO requires two trains of RTS Au'atic Trip Logic to be OPERABLE. Having two OPERABLE channels ensures that random failure of a single logic channel will not prevent reactor trip.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| B 3.3 36 Rev 1. 04/07/95 au
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.9 (continued)
| |
| REQUIREMENTS The SR is modified by a Note that excludes verification of setpoints from the TADUT. Since this SR applies to RCP undervoltage and underfrequency relays, setpoint verification requires elaborate bench calibration and is
| |
| * accomplished during the CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
| |
| SR 3.3.1.lQ (
| |
| ACHANNELCALIBRATIONisperformedeveryh18[ months!or approximately at every refueling. CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a h
| |
| complete check of the instrument loop including the sensor.
| |
| The test verifies that the channel responds to a measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.
| |
| CHANEL CALIBRAT1uNS aust be nerformed consistent with the assumptions of the 6 nit.sfier#ib setpoint methodology.
| |
| @ piirerene tween the urrent as no values Ine ll previ est "as le values aus consiste with the drift lowance u in the set t methodo1 y.f -
| |
| The Frequency of 18 months is based on the assumption of an 18 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint methodology.
| |
| SR 3.3.1.10 is modified by a Note stating that this test shall include verification that the time constants are h4ffg g yL adjusted to the prescribed values where z.pplicable.[
| |
| CoMS 4 ore sLu SR 3.3.1.11 e T*ut 3.3.i-i . J SR 3.3.1.11 is the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION, as h describedinSR3.3.1.10.every,418Peonths. This SR is modified byfa now statino that' neutron detectors are 5 m, xcluded from the CHANEL CALIBRATION. The CHANNEL g g gu CALIBRATION for the power range neutron detectors, consists of a normalization of the detectors based on a power calorimetric and flux map oerformed above 15t RTP, The 7 CHANEL CALIBRATION for the source range and intermediate range neutron detectors consists of obtaining the[ detector j h3h voly (continued)
| |
| WO4dS B 3.3 55 Rev 1. 04/07/95 t% %E I
| |
| I 4
| |
| | |
| l RTS Instrtsmentation 4 8 3.3.1
| |
| [ '
| |
| BASES q hm b, fg,.ee4e,meAMt A % c. M NF s4 w h t SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.1 ntinued) 4.k REQUIREMENTS plateau discriminatorcurves/evaluatingthose rves, and comparing the curves to the manufacturer's data.
| |
| l 1
| |
| h M
| |
| : 7. SM
| |
| ""5 Surveillance is not required for the NIS power range detectors for entry into MODE 2 or 1. and is not required
| |
| ~
| |
| : for the NIS intermediate range detectors for entry into
| |
| * l MODE 2. because the unit must be in at least MODE 2 to l perform the test for the intermediate range detectors and m ,
| |
| 1 MODE 1 for the power range detectors. Thg187' month Q/ l l Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance !
| |
| ! under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance <
| |
| were perfonaed with the reactor at power. Operating !
| |
| experience has shown these components usually ss the Surveillance when performed on the 18 N th requency. @
| |
| l I
| |
| SR 3.3.1.12 i
| |
| , SR 3.3.1.12 is the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION, as I described in SR 3.3.1.10. everM8honthsdinis - is
| |
| [moG1TieQD note sta Lnat Tnl y est shall lude verific on of the resistance,4emperature tector (RTD ypass loop ow rate.
| |
| is test wi verify the r lag compens ion for flow from the to the RTDs.
| |
| The Frequency is justified by the assumption of an 18 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.
| |
| SR 3.3.1.13 SR 3.3.1.13 is the performance of a COT of RTS interlocks every 18)4sonths.
| |
| The Frequency is based on the known reliability of the a-interlocks and the multichanr.el redundancy available, and l 0 has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.
| |
| I' l (continued) l W(EHif5, B 3.3 57 .Rev 1. 04/07/95 l
| |
| M t.M
| |
| | |
| l ESFAS Instrtanentatisn B 3.3.2 BASES l
| |
| APPLICABLE 1. Safety In.iection (continued)
| |
| SAFETY ANALYSES.
| |
| LCO, and
| |
| * Enabling ECCS suction from the refuel water APPLICABILITY storage tank (RWST) switchover on low level to ensure continued cooling via RWST of the h containment sum g .
| |
| _ a. Safety Iniection-Manual Initiation
| |
| = U"N d 0"" * . The LCO res one channel operatorcan1$rtraintobe tiate SI at any i
| |
| vg,y,;. % hClbd A dvt" h. h) '
| |
| OPERABLE time by using either of two switches in the k hM.3 0g'9 vt has )- . control room. This action will cause actuation of all components in the same manner as any of
| |
| . p- ,( dfy\ yneM the automatic actuation signals.
| |
| O buof.o@.,k P*d" The LC0 for the Manual Initiation Function 4^O(whi-5,; ord ensures the proper amount of redundancy is maintained in the manual ESFAS actuation
| |
| ,e g ;j ,) o, p w .4 circuitry to ensure the operator has manual ESFAS ceg,;3 J r o d n A in m atjon capa Q
| |
| *^"'"**# * '
| |
| Each consisu or one push button and th h
| |
| { Me haf r* *']* inter ina wirinc to the actuat_ ion logic }e L cabinet. E ach ousn atton actuates both trainsJ This configuration does not allow testing at 1 power.
| |
| : b. Safety Iniection-Automatic Actuation Loaic and Actuation Relays This LCO requires two trains to be OPERABLE.
| |
| Actuation logic consists of all circuitry housed within the actuation subsystems, including the
| |
| . initiating relay contacts responsible for '
| |
| actuating the ESF equipment. * +
| |
| Manual and automatic initiation of SI must be OPERABLE in MODES 1. 2. and 3. In these MODES, there is sufficient energy in the primary and secondary systems to warrant automatic in_itiation of ESF Systems.JMa al Init Lion is fis tfeguirefin POCE 4 ven t automark (o 4ctuation is not eoui n@D M adequate time is available to manually actuate j required components in the event of a 08A. but ;
| |
| I l
| |
| (continued) l
| |
| % B 3.3 63 Rev 1. 04/07/95 j f% 6mrt- l l
| |
| t
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 j
| |
| l BASES APPLICABLE c. Containment Sorav-Containment Pressureh3blb)h -
| |
| SAFETY ANALYSES, (continued) } S LCO and APPLICABILITY sides to pressurize the containment and reach the ;
| |
| Containment Pressure-tilgn 3Afligh High)-4.
| |
| l setpoints. ,
| |
| : 3. Containment Isolation Containment Isolation provides isolation of the containment atmosphere, and all procest systems that penetrate containment, from the environment. This Function is necessary to prevent or limit the release of radioactivity to the envirornent in the event of a large brea' LOCA.
| |
| l There are two separate Containment Isolation signals.
| |
| Phase A and Phase B. Phase A isolation isolates all automatically isolable process lines, except component po M Mw S** cooling water (CCWK at a relatively low containment ,
| |
| vlab hslek( M pressure indicative of primary or secondary system 4o ItcP u,w o,,- leaks. For these types of events, forced circulation !
| |
| _ ce.len J cooling using the reactor; coolant pumps (RCPs) and SGs
| |
| . is the preferred (but not required) method of decay heat removal. Since CCWytprequirea to support ute - g g Mg l operation, not isolating CCW,on tne low pressure t t .
| |
| Phase A signal enhances unit sare1;y oy allowing operators to use forced RCS circulation to cool the unit. Isolating CCW force the use of feea(on unathe lowcooling, oleed pressure signal wnicn coulomay prove more difficult to control.
| |
| C I 4 O GiftUl.If81 Phase A centairetct/isclation butomatMilly byJSI. or manually viais &ctuated -.mD the&tomati kl' '
| |
| q -
| |
| actuatiorfQgilp All process lines penetrating containment, with the exception of CCW are isolated. J CCW is not isolated at this time to permit conunueo -
| |
| operation of the RCPs with cooling water flow to the tneraal barrier heat exchangers and air or oil coolers. All process lines ~' equipped with remote operated isolation valves are manually closed, or otherwise isolated, prior to reaching MODE 4.
| |
| Manual Phase A Containment Isolation is accomplished by either of two switches in the control room. Either I I
| |
| switch actuates d8E!(trains'. diote um minua)
| |
| (W anor1@
| |
| (continued)
| |
| W,5 B 3.3 79 Rev 1. 04/07/95 l A Gums
| |
| | |
| LOP DG Start Instrumentation B 3.3.5 BASES ACTIONS this Specification may be entered independently for each (continued) Function listed in the LCO. The Completion Time (s) of the inoperable channel (s) of a function will be tracked separately for each Function starting from the time the Condition was entered for that Function.
| |
| U Condition A applies to the LOP DG start Funct, ion with one I loss of voltage or degraded voltage channel per bus inoperable.
| |
| If one channel is inoperable. Required Action A.1 requires that channel to be placed in trip within 6 hours. With a channel in trip the LOP DG start instrumentation channels are configured ta provide a one out of logic to initiate a trip of the incoming offsite power. @
| |
| A Note is a to allow bypass' an inoperable cf 1 for ypassing the cha does not C9~
| |
| ~
| |
| This'all ance is made wher cause actuation and at least two othe channels are annit rinn that caramete . ~ ,
| |
| ~-"
| |
| p I Q The specified Completion Time 6ndTime allowed for bypassinal w ne cnannei arp reasonable considering the Function remains' i
| |
| / fully UPtHABil. on every bus and the low probability of an l event occurring during these intervals.
| |
| M Condition B applies when more than one loss of voltage or more than one degraded voltage channel on a single bus is inoperable.
| |
| Required Action B.1 requires restoring all but one channel to OPERABLE status. The 1 hour Completion Time should allow
| |
| .asf.a time to repair most failures. and takes into account the low probability of an event requiring an LOP start occurring during this interval.
| |
| l (continued) l B 3.3 147 Rev 1. 04/07/95 l
| |
| i L_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
| |
| | |
| Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6 BASES BACKGROUND (and the smuown euroe Mtem) These systems are described (continued) in the Bases for LCO 3.6.3, " Containment Isolation Valves."
| |
| APPLICABLE The safety analyses assume that the containment remains .
| |
| SAFETY ANALYSES intact with penetrations unnecessary for core cooling .
| |
| isolated early in the event, within approximately I 60 seconds. The isolation of the purge valves has not been analyzed mechanistically in the do e calculations,_alth<=h its rapid isolation is assumed. w m.a ^ -nt purge and 3 ust i ation radiati 1 tors act s backup to the signal to nsure closing the purge a exhaust valves.
| |
| They a also the primar means for a tically isolat ;
| |
| contai in the event of a fuel h ling _ accident du 'no J -
| |
| ~4 < shut .l Containment isolation in turn ensures meeting the containment leakage rate assumptions of the safety analyses.
| |
| (The A t W l,y and ensures that the calculated accidental offsite radiological doses are below 10 CFR 100 (Ref.1) limits, afp. g g
| |
| ' The containment purge and exhaust isolation instrumentation !
| |
| f '(O.N 'a h?"4 satisfies criterion 3 of tne eiida T.,
| |
| Pd' 5
| |
| * M M rdo nJ{ pt,p g po ,g ( p,[,Q -
| |
| L_** ' 'b i+5 - J-LCO The LC0 requirements ensure that the instrumentation ,
| |
| . necessary to initiate Containment Purge and Exhaust
| |
| . Isolation, listed in Table 3.3.61*. is OPERABLE.
| |
| : 1. Manual Initiation (Wud hud,eW\ e P f I
| |
| j The LCO requires two channels OPERABLE. The operator can initiate Containment Purae Isolation at any time py usmg either of two min 9the control room.
| |
| aing This action wiii QUAA.$PW \
| |
| Either switch actuatest cause actuation of alid ts in the same manner
| |
| [ g Dg*N) as any of the automatig actuation signals.
| |
| The LCO for Manual Initiation ensures the proper amount of redundancy is saintained in the manual gh . actuation circuitry to ensure the operator has manual 4.66604, initiation capabill:y.
| |
| Each channel consists of one push button and the
| |
| @ interconnecting wiring to the actuation logic cabinet.
| |
| I (continued)
| |
| Rev 1, 04/07/95
| |
| %S B 3.3 151 l
| |
| 1 l
| |
| l
| |
| | |
| McGuire & Cctawba improved TS Additionil Chrnges S'e ction 3.3, Instrumentation 3.3-10 ITS 3.3.3 Post Accident Monitoring Bases Core Exit Temperature (CET) variable STS Pages B.3.3131 and 132 The GTS bases discussion contains information regarding the CETc that is not applicable to l Catawba or McGuire. The STS bases discussion on pages B.3.3-131 and 132 contains specific requirements for the location of the CET pairs required to meet the LCO. This STS l information is not consistent with the description of this system in the Catawba and McGuire FSARs and can not be verified for Catawba and McGuire Plants. Therefore, it has been deleted from the proposed ITS.
| |
| i l
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| l l
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| r i
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| t l
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| l mc3_cr_3.3.wpd June 11,1998 74
| |
| | |
| PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3 BASES LC0 12. Steam Generator Water Level (Narrow Ranae)
| |
| (continued)
| |
| SG Water Level is provided to monitor operation of decay heat removal via the SGs. The Category I
| |
| ; indication of SG level is the narrow range level instrumentation.
| |
| SG Water Level (Narrow Range) is used to:
| |
| a identify the faulted SG following a tube rupture; a verify that the intact SGs are an adequate heat sink for the reactor; a determine the nature of the accident in progress (e.g., verify an SGTR); and a verify unit conditions for termination of SI during secondary unit HELBs outside containment.
| |
| Four channels per SG of narrow range water level are l
| |
| provided. Only two channels are required OPERABLE by the LCO.
| |
| 13, 14, 15, 16. Core Exit Temperature i
| |
| Core Exit Temperature is provided for verification and long term surveillance of core cooling.
| |
| Adequate core cooling is ensured with two valid Core l Exit Temperature channels per quadrant with two CETs
| |
| ! per required channel. Core inlet temperature data is used with core exit temperature to give radial distribution of coolant enthalpy rise across the core.
| |
| Core Exit Temperature is used to determine whether to
| |
| ( terminate SI, if still in progress, or to reinitiate i
| |
| (continued)
| |
| McGuire Unit 1 B 3.3-115 Supplement 5 l
| |
| | |
| PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3 B,ASES LC0 13, 14, 15, 16. Core Exit Temperature (continued)
| |
| SI if it has been stopped. Core Exit Temperature is also used for unit stabilization and cooldown control.
| |
| Two OPERABLE channels of Core Exit Temperature are required in each quadrant to provide indication of radial distribution of the coolant temperature rise across representative regions df the core. Two sets of two thermocouple (1 set from each redundant power train) ensure a single failure will not disable the ability to determine the radial temperature gradient.
| |
| : 17. Auxiliary Feedwater Flow AFW Flow is provided to monitor operation of decay heat removal via the SGs.
| |
| The AFW Flow to each SG is determined by flow indicators, pump operational status indicators, and NSWS and condensate supply valve indicators in the 4 control room. The AFW flow indicators are category 2, '
| |
| type 0 variables which are used to demonstrate the category 1 variable of AFW assured source. i AFW flow is used three ways:
| |
| l a to verify delivery of AFW flow to the SGs; (continued) l McGuire Unit 1 B 3.3-116 Supplement 5
| |
| | |
| I PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3 BASES 1
| |
| i LC0 12. Steam Generator Water level (Narrow Ranael !
| |
| (continued)
| |
| SG Water Level is provided to monitor operation of ;
| |
| l decay heat removal via the SGs. The Category I i indication of SG level is the narrow range level '
| |
| instrumentation.
| |
| SG Water Level (Narrow Range) is used to:
| |
| * identify the faulted SG following a tube rupture; e verify that the intact SGs are an adequate heat sink for the reactor; e determine the nature of the accident in progress (e.g., verify an SGTR); and
| |
| * verify unit conditions for termination of SI during secondary unit HELBs outside containment.
| |
| Four channels per SG of narrow range water level are provided. Only two channels are required OPERABLE by the LCO.
| |
| l l 13, 14, 15, 16. Core Exit Temperature Core Exit Temperature is provided for verification and long term surveillance of core cooling. l l
| |
| Adequate core cooling is ensured with two valid Core l Exit Temperature channels per quadrant with two CETs I per required channel. Core inlet temperature data is l used with core exit temperature to give radial j distribution of coolant enthalpy rise across the core, i I
| |
| Core Exit Temperature is used to determine whether to terminate SI, if still in progress, or to reinitiate a
| |
| I i
| |
| (continued) l McGuire Unit 2 B 3.3-115 Supplement 5 l ;
| |
| l i
| |
| | |
| PAM Instrumentation.
| |
| B 3.3.3 BASES,
| |
| ~LC0 13, 14, 15, 16. Core Exit Temperature (continued)
| |
| SI if it has been stopped. Core Exit Temperature is also used for unit stabilization and cooldown control.
| |
| Two OPERABLE channels of Core Exit Temperature are required in each quadrant to provide indication of radial distribution of the coolant temperature rise across representative regions of the core. Two sets of two thermocouple (1 set from each redundant power train) ensure a single failure will not disable the ability to determine the radial temperature gradient.
| |
| : 17. Auxiliary Feedwater Flow AFW Flow is provided to monitor operation of decay l heat removal via the SGs.
| |
| The AFW Flow to each SG is determined by flow indicators, pump operational status indicators, and-NSWS and condensate supply valve indicators in the control room. The AFW flow indicators are category 2, type D varf ables which are used to demonstrate the category 1 variable of AFW assured source.
| |
| I AFW flow is used three ways:
| |
| a to verify delivery of AFW flow to the SGs;
| |
| . 4 (continued) l l McGuire Unit 2 8 3.3.116 Supplement 5 l
| |
| E --
| |
| | |
| _ - _ - _ - _ - _ _ _ - _ = _ _ _ - _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ - . ._. _ _ _ _
| |
| PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3 BASES l LCO 14. Condensate orace Tank (CST) Level ontinued) annunc tor are considered the pri ry indication used by t operator. g DBAs that require AFW are he loss of electric .
| |
| power, steam line break (S , and small break LOCA.
| |
| l The CST is the initial rce of water for the AFW l System. However, as t CST is depleted, manual operator action is essary to replenish the or align suction to t AFW pumps from the hotwel l
| |
| ' (I) 25.@
| |
| Ri,Gl (9 d.18. Core Exit Temperature Core Exit Temperature is provided for verification and l long tern surveillance of core cooling.
| |
| avi svuius ivu was mace of the inimum msuvei or vaisu l core ex thermocouple (CET necessary for measuri core ling. The evaluat n determined the reduc compl nt of CETs necess y to detect initial cor r ery and trend the uing core heatup. The ev untions account for core nonuniformities.
| |
| luding incore effe s of the radial decay r distribution, excore ffects of ce densate ck in the hot. legs, and niform inlet taerwent s.
| |
| i l
| |
| Q- Based on these ev uations m oequate core cooITng 15 fCart/mkf kmp] ensureo with two valid Core Exit Temperature cha per quadrant. with two CETs ner reauired channei Qh gp ggg cyg
| |
| % E'tNM, N 4 NO co e t o 1
| |
| - 4
| |
| ." Temperature is used to determine whether to terminate l coolanbNi pj m , $1, if still in progress. or to reinitiat'e SI if it -
| |
| l m cross & core. j has been stopped. Core Exit Temperature is also used l for unit stabilization and cooldown control. ,
| |
| . l Two OPERABLE channels of Core Exit Temperature are reouired in each quadrant to provide indication of radial distribution of the coolant temperature rise M a s representative recions of the core rPowef 7 is ribution spr.etry was considered in determining i
| |
| the specific number and locations provided for diagnosis of local core problems. Therefore, two 3
| |
| Lrandomly selected thermocouple are not sufficient to3 (continued)
| |
| WO(M SI B 3.3 131 Rev 1, 04/07/95 twn.
| |
| l
| |
| | |
| PAM Insisrumentation B 3.3.3 BASES (T'h @ O @
| |
| LCO PJ. M, 17, 18. Core Exit Temperature (continued) p Y"etme the two thermocouple per channel requirement in any quadrant. The two therwocouples in each channel must meet the additional requirement that one is located near the center of the core and the other near J
| |
| the core perimeter, such that the pair of Core Exit Temperatures indicate the radial temperature gradient across their core quadrant. Unit specific evaluations ,
| |
| in response to Item II.F.2 of NUREG 0737 (Ref. 3) J snou40 naTe identified the thermoenunn nairinos thatf ;
| |
| tsatisfy these reauiremente IIwo sets of two les ure a single failure will not disable Thersocoup/
| |
| the abilit t tersi the__ radial temperature
| |
| . gradient. I p gp eg- t u -Enan)
| |
| : h. Auxiliary Feedwater Flow AFV Flow is provided to monitor operation of decay heat removal via the SGs.
| |
| Oy The AFW Flow to each SG is determinedprom a %
| |
| sirrerential essure measirrempnt calibrated for a )
| |
| 3 ange of 0 to 1200 gpm. edundant monitoring i T ciow <wA%}--:apabilit is provided by t 3 independent trains f p2h.p
| |
| . b'.1 ..d sbb$ *ws, inst tation for each . Each differential '
| |
| a.4c.44.k wepy l press e transmitter pro des an input to a trol ; i win ;.u.bn .'. ++ t. ,, room ndicator and the nit computer. Since he !
| |
| 1
| |
| '- ry indication us by the operator dur i coM r.m % Ard pr cident is the cont i room indicator, t PAM an
| |
| (
| |
| pg,,,4;,;,, w ,
| |
| D sweification deals s ifically with th portion _of )
| |
| g a m jtu4*pg g 2' 3.t_wJactrument hve.9o . ch .r -
| |
| , "] [ Y AFW flow is used three ways:
| |
| Lauond sneu.
| |
| * to verify delivery of AFW flow to the SGs:
| |
| * to determine whether to terminate 51 if still in progress, in conjunction with SG water level (narrow range): and a to regulate AFW flow so that the SG tubes remain i covered.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| WgMf5 B 3.3 132 Rev 1, 04/07/95 l
| |
| Mc6m'rt l
| |
| l I
| |
| | |
| McGuire & Citawba improv2d TS Addition:1 Changes Section 3.3, instrumentation 3.3-11 3.3.1 RTS Bases Manual Reactor Trip Function STS Page B 3.3-9 The STS Bases contains a discussion regarding Mode 6 which states "neither the shutdown l rods nor the control rods are permitted to be withdrawn". This statement is not true for Catawba and McGuire Plants. During latching and unlatching of rods in Mode 6, individual l
| |
| rods may actually be partially withdrawn. Also this statement ceJ!d be interpreted to prevent j the use of the RCCA change toolin the reactor building. Therefore, this statement has been deleted from the ITS.
| |
| l l
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| l l
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| l l
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| I-mc3_cr_3.3.wpd 75 June 11,1998 l
| |
| l'
| |
| | |
| .RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1
| |
| [ .
| |
| ; BASES l
| |
| L l l
| |
| [- ' APPLICABLE . .
| |
| '1. Manual Reactor Trio (continued)
| |
| . _ SAFETY ANALYSES, l LCO, and possible. In MODE 3, 4, or 5, manual initiation of a L APPLICABILITY- reactor trip does not have to be OFERABLE if the CRD l
| |
| System is not capable of withdrawing the shutdown rods or control rods. If the rods cannot be withdrawn from
| |
| < the core,.there is no need to be able to trip the reactor because all of the rods are inserted. In.
| |
| MODE 6, the CRDMs are disconnected from the control l rods and shutdown rods. Therefore, the manual initiation Function is not required.
| |
| : 2. . Power Ranae Neutron Flux
| |
| , The NIS power _ range detectors are located external to l the reactor vessel and measure neutrons leaking from the core. The NIS power range detectors provide input to the Rod Control System and the Steam Generator (SG)
| |
| , Water Level Control System. Therefore, the ' actuation l logic must be able to withstand an input failure to :
| |
| i.
| |
| the control system, which may then require the l protection function actuation, and a single failure in p the other channels providing the protection function actuation. Note that this Function also provides a .
| |
| L signal to prevent automatic.and manual rod withdrawal .
| |
| ! prior to initiating a reactor trip. Limiting further l rod withdrawal may terminate the transient and eliminate the need to trip the reactor.
| |
| ~
| |
| f.
| |
| a.- Power Ranae Neutron Flux-Hiah The Power Range Neutron Flux-High trip Function ensures that protection is provided, from all power levels, against a positive reactivity l
| |
| excursion leading to DNB during power operations.
| |
| L These can be caused by rod withdrawal or reductions ~in RCS temperature.
| |
| The LC0 requires all four of the Power Range ;
| |
| ll Neutron Flux-High channels to be OPERABLE.
| |
| L j i
| |
| In MODE 1 or 2, when a positive reactivity l
| |
| excursion could occur, the Power Range Neutron Flux-High trip must be OPERABLE. This Function l
| |
| L -1 (continued) 1 McGuire Unit 1 B 3.3-9 Supplement 5 l
| |
| | |
| 1 RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES APPLICABLE 1. Manual Reactor Trio (continued)
| |
| SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO,~and possible. In MODE 3, 4, or 5, manual initiation of a APPLICABILITY reactor trip does not have to be OPERABLE if the CRD System is not capable of withdrawing the shutdown rods or control rods. If the rods cannot be withdrawn from the core, there is no need to be able to trip the reactor because all of the rods are inserted. In MODE 6, the CRDMs are disconnec'ted from the control l rods and shutdown rods. Therefore, the manual initiation Function is not required.
| |
| : 2. Power Ranae Neutron Flux The NIS power range detectors are located external to the reactor vessel and measure neutrons leaking from the core. The NIS power range detectors provide input ,
| |
| to the Rod Control System and the Steam Generator (SG) I Water Level Control System. Therefore, the actuation logic must be able to withstand an input failure to the control system, which may then require the protection function actuation, and a single failure in the other channels providing the protection function actuation. Note that this Function also provides a signal to prevent automatic and manual rod withdrawal
| |
| ;- prior to initiating a reactor trip. Limiting further rod withdrawal may terminate the transient and eliminate the need to trip the reactor,
| |
| : a. Power Ranae Neutron Flux-Hiah The Power Range Neutron Flux-High trip Function ,
| |
| ensures that protection is provided, from all !
| |
| power levels, against a positive reactivity excursion leading to DNB during power operations.
| |
| These can be caused by rod withdrawal or reductions in RCS temperature.
| |
| I The LC0 requires all four of the Power Range Neutron Flux-High channels to be OPERABLE.
| |
| In MODE 1 or 2, when a positive reactivity I excursion could occur, the Power Range Neutron Flux-High trip must be OPERABLE. This Function (continued)
| |
| McGuire Unit 2 B 3.3-9 Supplement 5 l l
| |
| | |
| l RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES a APPLICABLE 1. Manual Reactor Trio (continued)
| |
| SAFETY ANALYSES.
| |
| LCO, and possible. In HDDE 3. 4. or 5. manual initiation of a APPLICABILITY reactor trip does not have to be OPERABLE if the CRD System is not capable of withdrawing the shutdown rods or control rods. If the rods cannot be withdrawn from ,
| |
| the core, there is no need to be able to trip the !
| |
| reactor beanse all of the rods are inserted. In N r i
| |
| Q DT)
| |
| MODE 6 A ither Ine snutoown roos nor the control rod 0 tare Dersitted to be withdrawrt arr rthe GPMs are ,
| |
| I U1sconnectea from the control rocs and shutdown rods.
| |
| Therefore, the manual initiation Function is not required.
| |
| : 2. Power Ranoe Neutron Flux The NIS power range detectors are located external to the reactor vessel and measure neutrons leaking from the core. The NIS power range detectors provide inpi't to the Red Control System and the Steam Generator (SG)
| |
| Water Level Control System. Therefore, the actuation logic must be able to withstand an input failure to the control system, which may then require the protection function actuation, and a single failure in the other channels providing the protection function actuation. Note that this function also provides a signal to prevent automatic and manual rod withdrawal r prior to initiating a reactor trip. Limiting further rod withdrawal may terminate the transient and .
| |
| eliminate the need to trip the reactor. -
| |
| . a. Power Ranae Neutron Flux-Hiah
| |
| . . 's .
| |
| The Power Range Neutron Flux-High trip Function ensures that protection is provided, from all power levels, against .a positive reactivity excursion leading to.DNB during power operations.
| |
| These can be caused by rod withdrawal or reductions in RCS temperature.
| |
| The LCO requires all four of the Power Range Neutron Flux-High c;.annels to be OPERABLE.
| |
| In H00E 1 or 2. when a positive reactivity excursion could occur, the Power Range Neutron Flux-High trip must be OFERABLE. This function (continued)
| |
| I B 3.3 9 Rev 1. 04/07/95 s
| |
| | |
| l McGuire & Catawba Improved TS Additional Changes Section 3.3, Instrumentation 3.3 12 Spelling Errors The attached pages contained minor spelling errors that have been corrected. These revised pages incorporate spelling corrections only; therefore, the footers retain their current submittal status.
| |
| l 1
| |
| 1
| |
| )
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| )
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| )
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| i i
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| l t
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| mc3_cr_3.3.wpd 76 June 11,1998 l r
| |
| | |
| , PAM Instrumentation 3.3c3 i
| |
| SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
| |
| -------------------------------------NOTE---------------------------_--_------ i SR 3.3.3.1 and SR 3.3.3.3 apply to each PAM instrumentation Function in ;
| |
| Table 3.3.3-1.
| |
| SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.3.1- ' Perform CHANNEL' CHECK for each require'd 31 days instrumentation channel that is normally energized.
| |
| l-SR 3.3.3.2 -------------------NOTE-------------_------
| |
| This'SR is only applicable to Hydrogen Monitors.
| |
| Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.- 92 days 1
| |
| SR 3.3.3.3 -------------------NOTE--------------------
| |
| Neutron detectors are excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
| |
| Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 18 month's t.
| |
| l- 1 l
| |
| I i
| |
| L l
| |
| McGuire Unit 1 3.3-38 5/20/97
| |
| | |
| Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation Instrumentation-3.3.6 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.6 Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation Instrumentation LC0 3.3.6 The Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.6-1 shall be OPERABLE.
| |
| l APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. (
| |
| ACTIONS 1
| |
| -------------------------------------NOTE-------------------------------------
| |
| Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more Functions A.1 Enter applicable Immediately with one or nore Conditions and manual or automatic Required Actions of ;
| |
| actuation trains LCO 3.6.3, )
| |
| inoperable. " Containment j Isolation Valves," )
| |
| for containment purge, and exhaust isolation valves made inoperable by isolation i instrumentation.
| |
| l l
| |
| l l
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| McGuire Unit 1 3.3-45 5/20/97
| |
| | |
| PAM Instrumentation 3.3.3
| |
| ' SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
| |
| -------------------------------------NOTE-------------------------------------
| |
| SR 3.3.3.1 and SR 3.3.3.3 apply to each PAM instrumentation Function in Table 3.3.3-1.
| |
| [ SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY l-I L -SR 3 . 3 . 3.1' Perform CHANNEL CHECK for each require'd 31 days l
| |
| instrumentation channel that is normally energized.
| |
| SR 3.3.3.2 -------------------NOTE--------------------
| |
| This SR is only applicable to Hydrogen Monitors.
| |
| Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 92 days- :
| |
| 1 i
| |
| SR_ 3.3.3.3 -------------------NOTE-------------------- l' Neutron detectors are excluded from CHANNEL
| |
| ' CALIBRATION.
| |
| ______......_______. _..______________...__ j Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 18 months R
| |
| l i L
| |
| McGuire Unit 2 3.3-38 5/20/97 e
| |
| | |
| Containment Purge and Exhaust. Isolation ' Instrumentation I
| |
| 3.3.6 33.3 INSTRUMENTATION y,
| |
| 3.3.6 Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation Instrumentation LC0 3.3.6 The Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation instrumentation
| |
| - for each Function in Table 3.3.6-1 shall be OPERABLE.
| |
| -APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3,-and 4. ',
| |
| JACTIONS
| |
| -------------------------------------NOTE-------------------------------------
| |
| Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more Functions A.1 Enter applicable Immediately !
| |
| with one or more Conditions and
| |
| ' manual or automatic Required Actions of l actuation trains LC0 3.6.3, l inoperable. " Containment-Isolation Valves,"
| |
| for containment purge and exhaust isolation valves made inoperable by isolation instrumentation, i
| |
| l l
| |
| [.
| |
| 'McGuire Unit 2 3.3-45 5/20/97 i
| |
| | |
| RTS. Instrumentation B 3.3.1-i .
| |
| BASE'S
| |
| - ACTIONS M.1 and M.2 (continued) _
| |
| Condition M applies to the following reactor trip Functions:
| |
| t
| |
| * Pressurizer Pressure-Low;
| |
| .l
| |
| * Pressurizer Water Level-High;
| |
| *. Reactor. Coolant Flow-Low-(Two . oops);
| |
| 1, -
| |
| * Undervoltage RCPs; and
| |
| *- .Underfrequency RCPs.
| |
| With one channel inoperable, the inoperable channel must be placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours. Placing the channel in the tripped condition results in a partial trip condition requiring only one ~ additional channel to initiate a reactor trip 'above the P-7 setpoint (and below the P setpoint for the Reactor Coolant Flow-Low (Two Loops)
| |
| Function).. These Functions do-not have to be OPERABLE below the P-7 setpoint.because, for the Pressurizer Water Level-High function, transients are slow enough for manual action;.
| |
| and for the other functions, power distributions that would cause a DNB concern at this low power ' level are unlikely.
| |
| The 6 hours allowed to place the channel in the tripped condition is justified in Reference 7. An additional 6 hours is allowed to reduce THERMAL POWER to below P-7 if'
| |
| .the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status or placed.in trip within-the specified Completion. Time.
| |
| Allowance of this time interval takes-into consideration the redundant capability provided by the remaining redundant OPERABLE channel, and the' low probability of occurrence of an event during this period that may require the protection afforded by the Functions associated with Condition M.
| |
| The Required Actions have been modified by a Note that L allows placing the inoperable channel in the bypassed condition for up to 4 hours while performing routine
| |
| ~
| |
| surveillance testing of the other channels. The note also
| |
| ! 4 allows an OPERABLE channel to be placed in bypass without entering the Required Actions for up to 4 hours for testing
| |
| .of the bypassed channel. However, only one channel may be-placed in bypass at any one time. The 4 hour time limit is justified in' Reference 7.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| McGuire Unit 1 B 3.3-42 5/20/97
| |
| | |
| ESF4S Instrumentation-
| |
| -B 3.3.2 BASES-APPLICABLE. a. Steam Line Isolation-Manual Initiation i SAFETY ANALYSES, (continued)
| |
| LCO, and APPLICABILITY .to be.0PERABLE. Individual valves may also be 4 closed using individual hand. switches in the .
| |
| control room. The-LC0 requires four individual channels to be OPERABLE.
| |
| : b. SteamLineIsolation-AutohticActuationLoaic and Actuation Relays Automatic actuation logic and actuation relays consist of the same features and operate in the same manner as described for ESFAS Function 1.b.
| |
| Manual and automatic initiation of steam line isolation must be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 when there is sufficient energy in the RCS and SGs to have an SLB or other accident. This could result in the release of significant quantities of energy'and cause a cooldown of the primary system. The Steam Line Isolation Function is required in. MODES 2 and 3 unless )
| |
| all MSIVs are closed and de-activated. In MODES 4, 5, and 6, there is insufficient energy in the RCS and SGs to experience an SLB or other accident releasing significant quantities of energy.
| |
| : c. Steam Line Isolation-Containment Pressure-Hiah hl.9h This Function actuates closure of the MSIVs in the event of a LOCA or an SLB inside containment to maintain"three unfaulted SGs as a heat sink for the reactor, and .to limit the mass and energy release to containment. The Containment Pressure
| |
| - High High function is described in ESFAS Function 2.C.
| |
| Containment Pressure-High High must be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3, when there is sufficient energy in the primary and secondary side to pressurize the containment following a pipe ;
| |
| (continued)
| |
| McGuire Unit 1 B 3.3-76 5/20/97
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation. ,
| |
| .B 3.3.2 BASES-APPLICABLE- 6. Auxiliary Feedwater (continued)
| |
| SAFETY. ANALYSES LCO, and' d. Auxiliarv Feedwater-Station Blackout APPLICABILITY l
| |
| A loss of power or degraded voltage to the service buses will be accompanied by a loss of reactor coolant pumping power and the subsequent
| |
| =need!for some method of dgcay heat removal. The-loss of power or degraded voltage is ' detected by a voltage drop on each essential' service bus.
| |
| Loss of power or degraded voltage to either
| |
| . essential service bus will start the turbine driven and motor driven AFW pumps to ensure that L at least one SG contains enough water to serve as the heat sink. for reactor decay heat and sensible .
| |
| : heat removal following the reactor trip. The turbine driven pump does not start on a loss of-power coincident with a SI signal.
| |
| Functions 6.a-through 6.d must be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 to ensure that the SGs. remain the heat sink for the reactor. These Functions do not have to be
| |
| ; OPERABLE-in MODES 5:and 6 because there is not enough
| |
| ! heat being generated in the reactor to require the SGs as"a heat sink. In MODE 4, AFW actuation does not need to be OPERABLE because either AFW or residual
| |
| ' heat removal (RHR) will already be in operation' to remove decay heat or sufficient time is available to manually place either system in operation.
| |
| : e. Auxiliary Feedwater-Trio of All Main Feedwater EMODI A Trip of all MFW pumps is an indication of a loss of MFW and the subsequent need for some method of decay heat and sensible heat removal to bring the reactor back to no load temperature and ;
| |
| pressure. Two contacts are provided in series (one from each MFW pump) in the starting circuit for each AFW pump. A trip of all MFW pumps closes both contacts and starts the motor driven ;
| |
| AFW pumps to ensure that at.least one SG is available.with water to act as the heat sink for the reactor. This function must be OPERABLE in MODES I and 2. This ensures that at least one SG
| |
| , is.provided with water to serve as the heat sink (continued)
| |
| McGuire Unit 1 B 3.3-83 Supplement 1 ]
| |
| | |
| B 3.3.1- l r
| |
| 1 ,
| |
| BASES.
| |
| ACTIONS M.1 and M.2 (continued).
| |
| Condition M applies to the following reactor trip Functions:
| |
| *- Pressurizer Pressure-Low;
| |
| * Pressurizer Water Level-High;
| |
| * Reactor Coolant Flow-Low (Two Loops);
| |
| a- Undervoltage RCPs;.and-
| |
| * Underfrequency'RCPs.
| |
| With one channel inoperable, the inoperable channel must be placed in .the tripped condition within 6 hours. Placing the channel in the tripped condition results in a partial trip condition requiring only one additional channel to initiate; a reactor-trip above the P-7 setpoint (and below the P-8.
| |
| setpoint for the Reactor Coolant Flow-Low (Two Loops)
| |
| . Function). .These Functions do not have to be OPERABLE below
| |
| -the P-7 setpoint because, for the Pressurizer Water Level-High function, transients are slow enough for manual action; and for the other functions, power distributions that would "
| |
| cause a DNB concern at this low power: level are unlikely.
| |
| L The 6 hours allowed to place the channel in the tripped condition is justified. in Reference 7. ' An additional 6 hours is allowed to reduce THERMAL- POWER to below P-7 if the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the specified Completion Time.
| |
| Allowance of this time interval takes into ' consideration the -
| |
| redundant capability provided by the remaining redundant OPERABLE channel, and the low probability of occurrence of an event during this period that may require the protection afforded by the Functions associated with Condition M.
| |
| .: ~
| |
| The Required Actions have been modified by'a Note that i
| |
| allows placing the inoperable channel in the bypassed L condition.for up to-4 hours while performing routine
| |
| : i. surveillance testing of the other channels. The note also allows an OPERABLE channel to be placed in bypass without entering the Required Actions for up to 4 hours for testing
| |
| .of the bypassed channel. -However, only one channel may be placed in bypass at any one time. The 4 hour time limit is justified in Reference 7.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| McGuire Unit 2 8 3.3-42 5/20/97 L ,
| |
| !L
| |
| | |
| .ESFAS Instrumentation-B 3.3.2
| |
| ' BASES APPLICABLE a. Steam Line-Isolation-Manual Initiation SAFETY ANALYSES, (continued)
| |
| LCO, and .
| |
| APPLICABILITY to be OPERABLE. Individual valves may also be closed using-individual hand switches in the control room. The LC0 requires four individual channels to be OPERABLE.
| |
| : b. Steam Line Isolation-Auto tic Actuation Looic and Actuation Relavs Automatic actuation logic and actuation relays
| |
| , consist of the same features and operate in the same manner as described for ESFAS Function 1.b.
| |
| Manual and automatic initiation of steam line isolation must:be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 when there is sufficient energy in the RCS and SGs to have l an SLB'or other accident. This could result in the release of significant quantities of energy and cause a cooldown of the primary system. The Steam Line Isolation Function is required in MODES 2 and 3 unless s
| |
| all MSIVs are closed and de-activated. In MODES 4, 5 and 6, there is insufficient energy in the RCS and SGs to experience an SLB or other accident releasing
| |
| .significant quantities of energy.
| |
| t
| |
| : c. Steam Line~ Isolation-Containment Pressure-Hiah ,
| |
| 111 211 This Function actuates closure of the MSIVs'in
| |
| ( the event of a LOCA or an SLB inside containment to maintain three unfaulted SGs as a heat sink -
| |
| for the reactor, and to limit the mass and energy release to containment. The Containment Pressure
| |
| - High High function is described in ESFAS Function 2.C.
| |
| L Containment Pressure-High High must be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3, when there is sufficient energy in the primary and secondary side to
| |
| : l. pressurize the containment following a pipe (continued)
| |
| McGuire Unit 2 B 3.3-76 5/20/97
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES APPLICABLE 6. Auxiliary Feedwater SAFETY ANALYSES, (continued)
| |
| LCO, and APPLICABILITY d. Auxiliary Feedwater-Station Blackout A loss of power or degraded voltage to the service buses will be accompanied by a loss of reactor coolant pumping po,wer and the subsequent need for some method of decay heat removal.. The loss of power or degraded voltage is detected by a voltage drop on each essential service bus.
| |
| Loss of power or degraded voltage to either essential service bus will start the turbine driven and motor driven AFW pumps to ensure that at least one SG contains enough water to serve as the heat sink for. reactor decay heat and sensible heat removal following the reactor trip. The turbine driven pump does not start on a loss of power coincident with a SI signal.
| |
| Functions 6.a through 6.d must be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 to ensure that the SGs remain the heat sink for the reactor. These Functions do not have to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6 because there is not enough heat being generated in the reactor to require .the SGs as a heat sink. In MODE 4, AFW actuation does not need to be OPERABLE because either AFW or residual heat removal (RHR) will already be in operation to remove decay heat or sufficient time is available to manually place either system in operation.
| |
| : e. Auxiliary Feedwater-Trio of All Main Feedwater Pumos A Trip of all MFW pumps is an indication of a loss of MFW and the subsequent need for some method of decay heat and sensible heat removal to bring the reactor back to no load temperature and 3' pressure. Two contacts are provided in series (one from each MFW pump) in the starting circuit for each AFW pump. A trip of all MFW pumps closes both contacts and starts the motor driven AFW pumps to ensure that at least one SG is available with water to act as the heat sink for
| |
| ' the reactor. This function must be OPERABLE in MODES 1 and 2. This ensures that at least one SG (continued)
| |
| McGuire Unit 2 B 3.3-83 Supplement 1 l l
| |
| \ _ .
| |
| I
| |
| | |
| McGuire & Catawba improved TS Additional Ch:nges .
| |
| y Section 3.3, Instrumentation 3.3-15 3.3.2 Containment Pressure Control System ESFAS Function 6 (CTS),9 (ITS)
| |
| CTS Action 26, ITS Condition R New DOC L.28
| |
| . (McGuire Only)
| |
| CTS Action 26 for an inoperable channel of the Containment Pressure Control System on Table 3.3-3 is revised to simplify the required action and to be cohsistent with the ITS Actions for Catawba. The McGuire CTS Action requires that the inoperable channel be placed in the.
| |
| start permissive mode and that the Actions for the applicable supported systems be entered within one hour. This CTS Action is revised to address one or more inoperable channels and I to simply declare the supported system inoperable immediately. The Containment Pressure
| |
| : j. Control System instrument channels provide both a start permissive and a terminate function
| |
| ~ for the Containment Spray, Containment Air Return, and Hydrogen Skimmer Systems. The l terminate function provides protection against inadvertent actuation and the resulting negative l
| |
| pressure transient in the containment. If manually placed in one mode (as required by the CTS Action) the other safety function provided by the channel becomes unavailable. The proposed ITS Action does not require that one of the safety functions provided by the !
| |
| . instrument channels be disabled, in addition, the proposed ITS Action provides adequate i i assurance that operation with any number of inoperable Containment Pressure Control instrument channels is limited consistent with the Completion Times for the supported l
| |
| l l
| |
| equipment. l l
| |
| l.,t.
| |
| J l
| |
| . )
| |
| I L
| |
| l L
| |
| i l
| |
| mc3_.cr 3.3.wpd 79 June 11,1998 i
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 i
| |
| ACTIONS (continued) l CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME j Q. One channel Q.1 Verify interlock is I hour inoperable. in required state for existing unit j condition.
| |
| I Q8 ',
| |
| Q.2.1 Be in MODE 3. 7 hours AHQ Q.2.2 Be in MODE 4. 13 hours R. One or more R.1 Declare affected Immediately Containment Pressure supported system Control System inoperable, channel (s) inoperable.
| |
| l l
| |
| l t
| |
| 1 i
| |
| 1 l
| |
| McGuire Unit 1 B 3.3-27 Supplement 5 l l
| |
| l i
| |
| l
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation- !
| |
| 3.3.2 I
| |
| ACTIONS (continued)
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME Q. One channel Q.1 Verify interlock is I hour inoperable. in required state for existing unit condition.
| |
| .QR ',
| |
| Q.2.1 Be in MODE 3. 7 hours AE Q.2.2 Be in MODE 4. 13 hours R. One or more R.1 Declare affected Immediately Containment Pressure supported system Control System inoperable.
| |
| channel (s) inoperable.
| |
| l l
| |
| l l
| |
| i McGuire Unit 2 3.3-27 Supplement 5 l
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 l
| |
| (
| |
| BASES ACTIONS 0.1. 0.2.1 and 0.2.2 (continued) 1
| |
| )
| |
| must be placed in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours and MODE 4 within the following 6 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experien'ce, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. 1' Placing the unit in MODE 4 removes All requirements for OPERABILITY of these interlocks.
| |
| B.d Condition R applies to the Containment Pressure Control {
| |
| System Start and Terminate Permissives. j With one or more channels inoperable, the affected I containment spray, containment air return fans, and hydrogen skimer fans must be declared inoperable immediately. The supported system LCOs provide the appropriate Required Actions and Completion Times for the equipment made inoperable by the inoperable channel. The imediate Completion Time is appropriate since the inoperable channel could prevent the supported equipment from starting when !
| |
| requi red. Additionally, protection from an inadvertent j actuation may not be provided if the terminate function is not OPERABLE.
| |
| SURVEILLANCE The SRs for each ESFAS Function are identified by the SRs REQUIREMENTS column of Table 3.3.2-1.
| |
| A Note has been added to the SR Table to clarify that Table 3.3.2-1 determines which SRs apply to which ESFAS Functions.
| |
| Note that each channel of process protection supplies both !
| |
| trains of the ESFAS. When testing channel I, train A and !
| |
| train B must be examined. Similarly, train A and train B j must be examined when testing channel II, channel III, and i channel IV (if applicable). The CHANNEL CALIBRATION and j COTS are performed in a manner that is consistent with the i assumptions used in analytically calculating the required channel accuracies.
| |
| (continued) j McGuire Unit 1 B 3.3-101 Supplement 5 l i
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES i
| |
| ACTIONS 0.1. 0.2.1 and 0.2.2 (continued) J 1
| |
| must be placed in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours and MODE 4 i within the following 6 hours. The allowed Completion Times j are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the a required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. i Placing the unit in MODE 4 removes 411 requirements for OPERABILITY of these interlocks.
| |
| fL.1 Condition R applies to the Containment Pressure Control '
| |
| System Start and Terminate Permissives.
| |
| With one or more channels inoperable, the affected-containment spray, containment air return fans, and hydrogen skimmer fans must be declared inoperable imediately. The supported system LCOs provide the appropriate Required ;
| |
| Actions and Completion Times for the equipment made l inoperable by the inoperable channel. The immediate Completion Time is appropriate since the inoperable channel could prevent the supported equipment from starting when requi red. Additionally, protection from an inadvertent actuation may not be provided if the terminate function is not OPERABLE.
| |
| 1 g SURVEILLANCE- The SRs for each ESFAS Function are identified by the SRs REQUIREMENTS column of Table 3.3.2-1.
| |
| A Note has been added to the SR Table to clarify that Table 3.3.2-1 determines which SRs apply to which ESFAS Functions.
| |
| Note that each channel of process protection supplies both trains of the ESFAS. When testing channel I, train A and train B must be examined. Similarly, train A and train B must be examined when testing channel II, channel III, and channel IV (if applicable). The CHANNEL CALIBRATION and COTS are performed in a manner that is consistent with the l assumptions used in analytically calculating the required channel accuracies.
| |
| I i
| |
| (continued)
| |
| McGuire Unit 2 B 3.3-101 Supplement 5 l l
| |
| | |
| Q N @I. $
| |
| E t 4 3
| |
| 2
| |
| * 3 E 2 2 3
| |
| .MO D
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| g u T .e .
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| U MLL UEB MNA 2 .hs mag c-
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| s u s U
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| R I NR t en r T NAE s i t S I HP /nt o N
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| I MCO 2ia D 8 8n .
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| M n E e .
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| /,
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| ) T .rg d S e
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| u Y
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| S ne pm Tw i
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| t n
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| m ot e
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| / e ns i u ao i
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| T A s t g t hq u O
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| A U HO / nH o te (
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| T T. 2i> 2D r C
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| 'm N A 2 ;y- ns u
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| E Fk a A, e g_h R
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| o ph. .
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| tc E r N
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| GI nn oo t
| |
| n o
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| Lt t N
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| E ii tt r C ba aa r e) e n uu o rt y r o tt t - eal u {
| |
| i cc a- t wn s t AA rl ado s A.
| |
| &l a
| |
| cd ee nvh We en e
| |
| r n p
| |
| o eeg P o J
| |
| in eF o ps t a GLi s{i y-r a
| |
| mcy mr- H u{t t n d MiI Tr et e
| |
| oia t gl uoe aeh et g t ai ol a h el gvo oes m
| |
| n e
| |
| + dT u- M.
| |
| 1 na ALR SWH DLI im E
| |
| N i w bd re ae tt ns b t t
| |
| O I
| |
| ue TF a b
| |
| 't CS oy A r, e. Ela e
| |
| e T
| |
| C N
| |
| s - I U . .
| |
| F 5 9/.
| |
| c g }
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| }(
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| c.
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| i i ,
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| L ON
| |
| =~
| |
| Ifl. li
| |
| | |
| k dudw 3. Q
| |
| , TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued) M/N fj/)g inued) A D k m3 CTION F M ENENTS 1 .w f7 s f'
| |
| [ ACTION @- Egn one sig!ug2MigGeCof doghouse water level instrumen ation ino )erable H Ie'ss Ela e tr:-= reouiream&F or e 4g I
| |
| G9, restore the inoperable train to operableinstatus'q 72 hours.
| |
| etter 724ours wirwn, train w y r=hia? or within one hour w trains inoperable, monitor doghouse water level in the affect @ed doghouse continuously Nnnen trms are reswea to;>peraoTy f
| |
| [ ACTION
| |
| - g A.mA bmS\ Sdr3
| |
| - With Kay nf * *iahl channelDinoperable, place the inoperable
| |
| .i A.1 channel (s) in the start permissive mode within one hour and
| |
| ^
| |
| the applicable rction =1 wiContainment Spray Cr.3a.8.a yontaineerit Air Return / Hydrogen Sk(seer c- I.3. Rti.5.6poy,y ACTION - ith the er of RABLt. cha s one 1 than the 'ai numb
| |
| $ %, gA,. f Cha START nd/or OPFRAT may procee revided p yp y the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped corjdition within 1 hi mooe 3 m r b..e h '
| |
| ACTIO*J M Tun drahs o( De h.c Waltr-NI Whb ^6ftM!t. M M avows m e.l. 3 C dojl.ascWa,hc lMl wille's I b e, L 4 h ' Ofit*. Ct' r00f S bc.krB A b botonmefd 60%Cdd 6 OfM hurt Conif0f inofemble , .
| |
| S9 3km cheado) anoperdle g1 -
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| , [, 2.
| |
| l McGUIRE - UNIT 1 3/4 3-26 Amendment No. 166 i
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| , TABLE 3.3-3 (C*ntinued) * '
| |
| 1 g g ACTION STATD1EN (Continue dM Nd8 ACTIONh tion -_ 44159 inoperableoneW4 /Dess than Mouse water level instrume the minie:eaquirw Og,g @nneN operaWen restore the inoperable train to operable status in 72 hours. After 72 hours with one train inoperable, or I within one hour trains inoperable. monitor doghouse wat t 1evel in_the affect _ doghouse continuously Et W bot l
| |
| " res e tn ,m-~ m ornm ra in. ;
| |
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| |
| ami Pwaa. Cnhl sh%. t ,
| |
| channel'(s)inthestartpermissivemodewithinonehourandchannels I ino the applicable icdon statratenf (Containment _ SprayCh ~~4 r?,@
| |
| tainment Air Returnfilydrogen Skimmer CT 5(3.6@n.pa.IE)
| |
| ACTION @ - ith the er of OPERAB annels on $s than th ta 6* * " Number Channels. STAR and ar_Pou GPFQATION proceed i
| |
| ! the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped ',
| |
| %e"'.t to.p '
| |
| condition within I hour.
| |
| g r* '+
| |
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| |
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| |
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| |
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| |
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| |
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| |
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| |
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| |
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| |
| .Syskm Cknne @ l 1noperdle .
| |
| McGUIRE - UNIT 2 3/4 3-26 Amendment No. 148
| |
| ( - ege it oC M24 j
| |
| | |
| Discussion of Changes l SIction 3.3 - Instrumentation TECHNICAL CHANGES - LESS RESTRICTIVE revised consistent with the STS to allow operation to continue indefinitely once the channel is placed in trip. The trip logic '
| |
| associated with these channels provides an actuation when two out
| |
| .three channels on a bus are tripped. Therefore, the allowance to continue operation with one inoperable channel in trip is acceptable due to the fact that the channel in trip con be considered to have accomplished its safety function and the protection system for that bus is left in a conservative condition (only one channel out of the remaining two must trip in order to actuate the protection function). In addition, since two channels remain operable and only one is required to trip in order to actuate the protection function, the system is left in a condition where no single failure would prevent the actuation of the protectton functlon. As such the adoptton of the STS Actions for 1.
| |
| these instrument channels continues to provide adequate assurance of safe plant operatlon.
| |
| L.26 Not used.
| |
| I L.27 Not used.
| |
| -L.28 CTS Action 26 for on inoperable channel of the Containment Pressure Control System on Table 3.3-3 is revised to simplify the required action. The CVS Action requires that the inoperable channel be placed in the start permissive mode and that the Actions for the applicable supported systems be entered within one hour. This CTS Action is revised to address one or more inoperable channels and to simply declare the supported system inoperable imediately. The Containment Pressure Cont'ol System instrument channels provide both a start permissive and a terminate function for the Containment Spray, Colitainment Air Return and Hydrogen Skimer Systems. The terminate function provides protection against inadvertent actuation and the resulting negative pressure =
| |
| transient in the containment. If manually placed in one mode (as required by the CTS Actions) the other safety function provided by the channel becomes unavailable. The proposed ITS Action does not require that one of the safety functions provided by the instrument channels be disabled. In addition, the proposed ITS Action provides adequate assurance that operation with any number of inoperable Containment Pressure Control instrument channels is limited consistent with the Completion Times for the supported equipment. Therefore this change is acceptable and consistent with the ITS Actions for Catawba.
| |
| McGuire Units 1 and 2 Page L - 77 Supplement 54l
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation i
| |
| 3.3.2 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME hK. (continued) .2.1 Be in H00E 3. hhours 13 2.2 BeinMODEI. Afleurs 4
| |
| Di.Onechannel .1 Verify interlock is I hour inoperable. in required state for existing unit l condition. i l
| |
| l
| |
| .2.1 Be in MODE 3. 7 hours E :
| |
| 2.2 Be in MODE 4. 13 hours l
| |
| 4 R. One. ca- R.t Plo u. c.Lo- > b w ,. h Pam cam %A p, .,,,s .
| |
| }
| |
| S a . .., w e .
| |
| ?
| |
| Ott IW & I hout" cel. ~< A s pr..p A;sRehm, o W l so-- - sp % ~r~h - )
| |
| i -
| |
| R. One oc m*'t R.) bedare oRedd Immed*4eQ7 C.nunme s,pport,g stem
| |
| & css"'gtj,gg s e.gnnehs> ono )c inYrasle, W0yr sT,5 3.3 28 Rev 1. 04/07/95 fu c. 6 met i
| |
| \
| |
| | |
| 1NSERT i
| |
| R.1 and R.?
| |
| Condition R cpplic; to the Containment Prc;;ure Control System Start and Terminat: Permi;;ivesy .
| |
| With One ch;nnel incperable, the channel must be rc;tered tc OPER? ALE :tatu cr placed in the start permissive ccadition within I hcur. If the action is i not completed, and the ;;;cciated containment : pray, egnreinment cir return j fans, and hydrogen skimmer; must be declared inoperabic. The 1 h0ur 1 Ocmpletion Time is rea:On;ble b;;cd en Operating experience. l I
| |
| 1 821 !
| |
| Condition R applies to the Containment Pressure Control System Start and di
| |
| ' Terminate Permissives.
| |
| .With one or more channels inoperable, the affected containment spray, i containment air return fans, and nydrogen skimmer fans must be declared
| |
| ' inoperable immediately. The supported system LCOs provide the appropriate- '
| |
| Required Actions and Completion Times for the equipment made inoperable by the inoperable channel. The immediate Completion Time is appropriate since the inoperable channel could prevent the supported equipment from starting when required. Additionally, protection from an inadvertent actuation may not be provided if the terminate function is not OPERABLE.
| |
| i INSERT Page B 3.3-114 McGuire
| |
| | |
| Na Significant Hazards C5nsideraticn Section 3.3 - Instrumentation LESS RESTRICTIVE CHANGE L.28 l I
| |
| The McGuire Nuclear Station is converting to the Improved Technical Specifications (ITS) as outlined in NUREG-1431, " Standard Technical Specifications, Westinghouse Plants." The proposed change involves making the current Technical Specifications (CTS) less restrictive.
| |
| Below is the description of this less restrictive change and the No Significant Hazards Consideration for conversion,to NUREG-1431.
| |
| CTS Action 26 for an inoperable channel of the Containment Pressure Control System on Table 3.3-3 is revised to simplify the required action. The CTS Action requires that the inoperable channel be placed in the start permissive mode and that the Actions for the applicable supported systems be entered within one hour. This CTS Action is revised to address one or more inoperable channels and to simply declare the supported system inoperable inanediately. The Containment Pressure Control System instrument channels provide both a start permissive and a i terminate function for the Containment Spray, Containment Air Return and Hydrogen Skinsner Systems. The terminate function provides protection against inadvertent actuation and the resulting negative pressure transient in the containment. If manually placed in one mode (as required by the CTS Actions) the other safety function provided by the channel becomes unavailable. The proposed ITS Action does not require that orm of the safety functions provided by the instrument channels be disabled. In addition, the proposed ITS Action provides adequate assurance that operation with any number of inoperable Containment Pressure Control instrument channels is limited consistent with the Completion Times for the supported equipment. Therefore this change is acceptable and consistent with the ITS Actions for Catawba.
| |
| In accordance with the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, the McGuire Nuclear Station has evaluated this proposed Technical Specifications 1 change and determined it does not represent a significant hazards 1 consideration. The following is provided in support of this conclusion.
| |
| : 1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequence of an accident previously evaluated?
| |
| The proposed change revises the Actions to allow one or more instrument channels to be inoperable and does not require the channel to be placed in the start permissive mode. This change will not affect the probability of an accident. The Containment Pressure Control instrumentation is not an initiator of any analyzed events. The consequences of an accident are not offected lMcGuireUnits1and2 Page 4746 of 5250 Supplement 55/20/97
| |
| | |
| L No Significant Hazards C:nsideratien Section 3.3 - Instrumentation l
| |
| by this change. The change continues to limit plant operation when the instrumentation is inoperable. The change wiil not alter assumptions relative to the mitigation of an accident or transient event. Therefore, this change will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequence of an accident previaus1y evaluated.
| |
| : 2. Does the change create the possibility of,o new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
| |
| This change will not physically alter the plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed). The changes in methods governing normal plant operation are consistent with :
| |
| current safety analysis assumptions. Therefore, the change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
| |
| : 3. Does this change involve a significant reduction in a margin of i safety?
| |
| The margin of safety is not affected by this change. The proposed change does not alter the ability of the instrumentation to respond to design basis events and continues to limit plant ;
| |
| operation when the instrumentation is not operable. The applicable l safety analysis assumptions are maintained in a similar manner as before, therefore, the change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
| |
| l i
| |
| McGuire Units 1 and 2 Page 4846 of 5250 Supplement 55/20/97l l
| |
| l
| |
| | |
| l l
| |
| f McGuire & Catawba improved TS Additional Changes I Section 3.3, instrumentation i
| |
| 3.3-16 CTS Table 3.3-10, Table 4.3-7, and Table 3.3-9 LA18,LA20 l I i l The CTS identifies certain equipment identifiers and panellocations for TS required equipment. The ITS relocated this information to plant procedures by DOC LA18 and LA20.
| |
| These DOCS are replaced by DOCS L29 and L30, respectively, tg justify the deletion of this procedural detail information.
| |
| 1 i
| |
| l mc3_cr_3.3.wpd 80 June 11,1998 l
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| Discussian cf Changes i Secticn 3.3 - Instrumentation I i
| |
| TECHNICAL CHANGES - LESS RESTRICTIVE L.29 CTS 3.3.3.6, Tables 3.3-10 and 4.3-7 for Accident Monitoring instrumentation, contains procedural detail information which describes the plant unique identifier for some functions. This level of detail is not necessary within the Technical Specification and is deleted. ITS 3.3.3 retains the requirement for the equipment to be operable, therefore, there is no reduction l in equipment requirements within the TS and no reduction in any l safety analysis assumptions. This change is consistent with NUREG-1431.
| |
| L.30 CTS 3.3.3.5 Table 3.3-9 lists the Readout location for remote shutdown instrumentation. The change moves this level of detail information to plant procedures. This type of information is not necessary in the Technical Specifications. ITS 3.3.4 retains the controls which require operability of remote shutdown systems,-
| |
| therefore, there is no reduction in equipment requirements within the TS and no reduction in any safety analysis assumptions. This '
| |
| change is consistent with NUREG-1431.
| |
| l l'
| |
| l l
| |
| McGuire Units 1 and 2 Page L - 87 Supplement 54l
| |
| | |
| Discussion of Changss 52ction 3.3 - Instrumentation
| |
| (
| |
| 1 TECHNICAL CHANGES - REMOVAL OF DETAILS LA.16 CTS Table 3.3-4 Turbine Trip and Eeedwater Isolation SG Level-High l High (P-14) descriptions that the trip setpoints and allowable values are "of narrow range instrument span," are being moved to j the Bases for ITS 3.3.2. This level of detail is not necessary
| |
| ! for the TS and is more appropriate to the Bases. Changes to the Bases are controlled by the Administrative Controls section, ITS 5.0, and require a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation,to change. This j evaluation ensures that changes to these requirements are ,
| |
| i appropriately reviewed. This change is consistent with NUREG- l 1431. i
| |
| ! LA.17 Not used.
| |
| ; LA.18 Not used.".'.c. '.',.'.#,
| |
| . . . '''-.,',.''^.-.."^>.'.,','..^.,^,_^#,."..'.
| |
| l ";nitcring Instrumentation, contain; info maticn .;hich describc the phnt unique identifier for some functions. This kvcl Of dctat', h nct n^ccccry ..ith',n the Tcchnk;', "p^cificati^n :nd i ,
| |
| l mcVed to th^ appropriate p' ant precedurcs. Th^ phnt procedure, l
| |
| ; cr centrelkd by administrative controh .;hich en;ure that l
| |
| change; to th :: requirement; are appropriately reviewed. This
| |
| ..u..,_..__
| |
| r 4. , .e-.4.,+.._.+.
| |
| . . 4. +. u. . .u.n
| |
| . n.e r. so
| |
| .- S. 4. .
| |
| I I
| |
| l LA.19 The specific information located in CTS SR 4.6.4.1 which requires j the Channel Calibration to be performed using a sample gas l containing hydrogen and the specific calibration points is moved l to the Bases. Changes to the Bases are controlled by the Administrative Controls, ITS Chapter 5.0, and require a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation to change. This evaluation ensures that changes to these requirements are appropriately reviewed. This change is consistent with NUREG-1431.
| |
| LA.20 Nof used.rT.e S .. .S, n S,.,1,4.,+.,.,
| |
| . . S. . .c, 6.. u. a. n, _.
| |
| T. .o k i. .. S . , n , A m , 4 1 m e ,. + 4. m ..m. #..m .
| |
| remetc :hutdcwn instrumentation. The change cyc thi kvel of detail infc =: tion to p hnt precedurcs. This type of information i is not neces;;ry in the Technic;' Specification . The
| |
| ! requirement; in ITS 3.3." provide sufficient contrch to en;urc l operability cf remetc chutdown system;. Change; te punt L procedure: are contrc1kd by ^, administrative Controh <;hich ensurc l that :ny chang ^: tc this infc= tion arc appropriat^1y review ^d.
| |
| I v, u, , , ., u.
| |
| ....r 4. ,. . -..,4,,+-.4
| |
| . _ .. m 4. +.. u. o, .n .n.. e. r.
| |
| , .. s a. S, ,
| |
| Page LA - 57 Supplement 55/20/97 lMcGuireUnit1and2
| |
| | |
| No Significant Hazards Consideration l Ssction 3.3 - Instrumentation I
| |
| i LESS RESTRICTIVE CHANGE L.29 l
| |
| The McGuire Nuclear Station is converting to the Improved Technical Specifications (ITS) as outlined in NUREG-1431, " Standard Technical Specifications, Westinghouse Plants." The proposed change involves making the current Technical Specifications (CTS) less restrictive.
| |
| Below is the description of this less restrictive change and the No ,
| |
| Significant Hazards Consideration for conversion to NUREG-1431.
| |
| a 4
| |
| CTS 3.3.3.6, Tables 3.3-10 and 4.3-7 for Accident Monitoring Instrumentation, contains procedural detail information which describes the plant untque identifier for some functtons. This level of detall is not necessary within the Technical Specification and is deleted. ITS 3.3.3 retains the requirement for the equipment to be operable, therefore, there is no reduction I l
| |
| in equipment requirements within the TS and no reduction in any Safety analysis assumptions. This change is consistent with NUREG-1431.
| |
| I In accordance with the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, the McGuire Nuclear Station has evaluated this proposed Technical Specifications ;
| |
| change and determined it does not represent a significant hazards consideration. The following is provided in support of this conclusion.
| |
| : 1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequence of an accident previously evaluated?
| |
| The proposed change removes specific equipment identifiers from the TS. This change will not offect the probability of an accident. The equipment identifiers are not on initiator of any analyzed events. The consequences of an accident are not affected by this change. The change continues to require the specific plant equipment to remain operable. Therefore, this change will not involve a significant increase in the probability or ;
| |
| consequence of an accident previously evaluated. l
| |
| : 2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
| |
| This change will not physically alter the plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed). The changes in methods governing normal plant operation are consistent with :
| |
| current safety analysis assumptions. Therefore, the change does I :
| |
| Page 499 of 569 Supplement 55/20/"7 lMcGuireUnits1and2
| |
| | |
| c_ _ -.
| |
| N3 Significant Hazards Ccnsideraticn Section 3.3 - Instrumentation l
| |
| l not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
| |
| : 3. Does this change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
| |
| The margin of safety is not offected by this change. The proposed change does not alter the ability of the i, instrumentation to respond to design basis events and continues to limit plant operation when the instrumentation is not operable. The applicable safety analysis assumptions are maintained in a similar manner as before, therefore, the change does not involve a i significant reduction in a margin of safety.
| |
| l l
| |
| i l
| |
| McGuire Units 1 and 2 Page 50 9 of 569 Supplement 55/20/''7l
| |
| | |
| Na Significant Hazards Consideration Secticn 3.3 - Instrumentation LESS RESTRICTIVE CHANGE L.30 1
| |
| The McGuire Nuclear Station is converting to the Improved Technical Specifications (ITS) as outlined in NUREG-1431, " Standard Technical Specifications, Westinghouse Plants." The proposed change involves making the current Technical Specifications (CTS) less restrictive.
| |
| l Below is the description of this less restrictive change and the No Significant Hazards Consideration for conversion to NUREG-1431.
| |
| CTS 3.3.3.5 Table 3.3-9 lists the, Readout Location for remote shutdown instrumentation. The change moves this level of detail information to plant procedures. This type of information is not necessary in the Technical Specifications. ITS 3.3.4 retains the
| |
| ; controls which require operability of remote shutdown systems,
| |
| ! therefore, there is no reduction in equipment requirements within
| |
| ? the TS and no reduction in any safety analysis assumptions. This change is consistent with NUREG-1431.
| |
| In accordance with the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, the McGuire
| |
| : Nuclear Station has evaluated this proposed Technical Specifications change and determined it does not represent a significant hazards consideration. The following is provided in support of this conclusion.
| |
| : 1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequence of an accident previously evaluated?
| |
| l The proposed change removes specific equipment locations from the This change will not affect the probability of an accident.
| |
| TS.
| |
| The equipment location description is not on initiator of any analyzed events. The consequences of an accident are not affected
| |
| [ by this change. The change continues to require the specific plant equipment to remain operable. Therefore, this change wtIl not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequence of an accident previously evaluated.
| |
| : 2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind l .of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
| |
| This change will not physically alter the plant (no new or j different type of equipment wtIl be installed). The changes in methods governing normal plant operation are consistent with current safety analysis assumptions. Therefore, the change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident ,
| |
| from any accident previously evaluated. l 1
| |
| lMcGuireUnits1and2 Page 51 H of 56 9 Sugglement5s/2c/97 I l
| |
| i
| |
| | |
| l Na Significant Hazards Consideration l SIcticn 3.3 - Instrumentation f
| |
| l
| |
| : 3. Does this change involve a significant reduction in a margin of l safety?
| |
| l l
| |
| The margin of safety is not affected by this change. The proposed l change does not alter the ability of the instrumentation to l respond to design basis events and continues to limit plant operation when the instrumentation is not operable. The applicable safety analysis assumptions are maintained in a similar manner as before, therefore, the change does not involve a ,
| |
| significant reduction in a margin of safety. l I
| |
| i i
| |
| , l
| |
| .1
| |
| )
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| I I
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| l McGuire Units 1 and 2 Page 5263 of 5663 Supplement 55/20/97l
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| i i ENCLOSURE 2 RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION SECTION 3.4 l
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| McGuire & Catawba impr:ved TS Rsv2w Commints !
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| ! ITS Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant Systems !
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| 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits 3.4.1-01 DOC A.7 CTS 4.2.5.3 JFD 6 STS SR 3.4.1.1 and associated Bases The requirement to conduct an 18 month surveillance to determine total RCS flow rate, CTS 4.2.5.3, has not been retained in the ITS 3.4.1 SRs. DOC A.7 states that this was a "left-over" requirement from a previously deleted requirement to perform a precision heat balance to determine RCS total flow. Justification is not clear why is this requirement should not be retained in the Technical Specifications. Comment: This is a change to both the CTS and STS, and is therefore beyond the scope of the STS Conversion effort; a technical review is f necessary. Provide sufficient justification for a review, or retain the SR. l l
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| DEC Response:
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| Amendments 128 to Facility Operating License NPF-35 and 122 to Facility Operating License NPF 52 dated February 17,1995 changed this surveillance requirement to eliminate the reference to " precision heat balance" when referring to the measurement of the total flow rate each 18 months.' The remaining surveillance required the Reactor Coolant System total flow rate to be determined by measurement at least once per 18 months. This " measurement" is
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| ; accomplished using the installed flow indicators. The total flow rate is " measured" and l
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| l' confirmed to be within the limits specified in Figure 3.4.1-1 every 12 hours in SR 3.4.1.3.
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| Since the measurement of the total flow rate every 18 months is performed the same way that the flow rate is determined for the 12 hour surveillance, the 18 month surveillance is redundant and is deemed unnecessary.
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| mc3_cr_3.4 1 June 8,1998
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| McGuire & Ct.tawba Impr:ved TS Rsv' w Comments l ITS Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant Systems t
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| l 3.4.1-02 Bases JFD 4 ITS Bases discussion of the Applicable Safety Analyses for ITS 3.4.1 The Bases discussion of the Applicable Safety Analyses for ITS 3.4.1 has not adopted the specific DNBR criterion from the Bases discussion for STS 3.4.1. The ITS Bases refers to the DNBR acceptance criteria, but provides no description of the criteria. Comment: This is not a justifiable plant specific difference Revise the Bases to describe the DNBR acceptance criteria.
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| DEC Response:
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| Specific DNBR criterion are not listed since the criteria are dependent on the DNB correlation used. DEC uses several DNB correlations in the performance of the safety analyses depending on the type of fuel and fuel vendor. Including all DNB correlation specific
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| . acceptance criteria would be quite length and also cumbersome and confusing. This information is not necessary for the operators or other users to understand the basis for the technical requirements nor how they are to be implemented. The discussion of DNBR and relevant acceptance criterion are contained in UFSAR Section 4.4.
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| 2 June 8,1998 l mc3_cr 3.4
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| McGuire & Cctawba improved TS Rsv'Iw Comments ITS Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant Systems 3.4.1-03 Bases JFD 4 Bases discussion of the Applicabie Safety Analyses for ITS 3.4.1 The Bases discussion of the Applicable Safety Analyses for STS 3.4.1 lists the types of transients analyzed in the safety analyses. This material has not been adopted in the ITS Bases for corresponding ITS 3.4.1. Comment: This is not a justifiable plant specific difference. Revise the Bases to provide the appropriate list of trahsients.
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| DEC Response:
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| The STS Bases discussion is incomplete. The changes to this discussion were made to include other acceptance criteria, not just DNBR, consistent with the licensing basis. All safety analysis transients initiated from within the parameter limits of this LCO will meet all of their respective acceptance criteria, including DNBR.
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| I mc3_cr_3.4 3 June 8,1998
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| McGuire & Catawba improved TS Rsview Ccmm:nts ITS Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant Systems 3.4.1-04 Bases JFD 3 (Catawba) JFD 4 (McGuire)
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| Bases for ITS LCO 3.4.1
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| - The discussion in the Bases for STS LCO 3.4.1 regarding feedwater venturi fouling detection and compensation has not been adopted. The submittal contains a justification for this omission that venturi fouling is not applicable without an explanation why. Comment: Revise the submittal to provide a specific justification or conform to the STS.
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| DEC Response:
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| The LCO bases were revised to be consistent with the licensing basis for determining RCS flow. Amendments 128 to Facility Operating License NPF-35 and 122 to Facility Operating License NPF-52 dated February 17,1995 and Amendments 153 to Facility Operating License NPF-9 and 135 to Facility Operating License NPF 17 dated January 12,1995 approved a change in the method for measuring RCS flow rate from the calorimetric heat balance method to a method based on a calibration of the RCS cold leg elbow differential pressure taps.
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| Measurement of the RCS flow rate using the calorimetric heat balance method relied heavily on the accurate determination of the secondary side feedwater flow rate by way of the feedwater venturis. Therefore, fouling detection and compensation of the venturis was important in the determination of the RCS flow rate. The elbow tap method of determining the RCS flow rate does not require the use of the feedwater venturis and does not require any current or future compensation for fouling of these venturis. The initial determination of the elbow tap coefficients was based on plant historical data including past calorimetric heat balances. This means there was a certain amount of feedwater fouling compensation which was accounted for in the determination of the RCS flow. However, current and future determinations of the RCS flow do not require any changes to the RCS flow rate uncertainty due to feedwater venturi fouling.
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| l mc3_cr_3.4 4 June 8,1998
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| McGuire & Catawba improved TS Review Comments ITS Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant Systems 3.4.2, RCS Minimum Temperature for Criticality 3.4.2-01 Bases for ITS SR 3.4.2.1 The Bases for STS SR 3.4.2.1 refers to TSTF 27 the markup. It appears to be an incorrect reference. TSTF-27 has not been adopted. Comment: Explain reference to TSTF-27. The wording preference change is otherwise acceptable.
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| * DEC Response:
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| The reference to TSTF-27 is deleted and replaced by the original STS wording. In order to clarify the aspect of alarm inoperability, ITS Bases SR 3.4.2.1 page B 3.4 9 has been changed to "... deviation alarm is alarming orinoperable..." with an added reference to JFD 2.
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| l mc3_cr_3.4 5 June 8,1998
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| RCS Minimum Temperature for Criticality -
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| B 3.4.2 BASES APPLICABILITY temperatures to fall below the temperature limit of this (continued) LCO.
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| ACTIONS L1 If the parameters that are outside the limit cannot be restored, the plant must be brought'to a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to MODE 2 with k,,, < 1.0 within 30 minutes.
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| Rapid reactor shutdown can be readily and practically achieved within a 30 minute period. The allowed time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 2 with k.,, < 1.0 in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
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| l SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.2.1 REQUIREMENTS i RCS loop average temperature is required to be verified at I or above 551*F every 30 minutes when T.,,-T,,, deviation alarm i not reset and any RCS loop T.,, < 561*F.
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| l The Note modifies the SR. When any RCS loop average l temperature is < 561'F and the T., -
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| T,,, deviation alarm is l alarming or inoperable RCS loop a,verage temperatures could l j fall below the LC0 requirement without additional warning. l The SR to verify RCS loop average temperatures every ;
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| 30 minutes is frequent enough to prevent the inadvertent violation of the LCO.
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| REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, Section 15.
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| : 2. 10 CFR 50.36, Technical Specifications, (c)(2)(ii).
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| McGuire Unit 1 B 3.4-9 Supplement 5 l
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| .,- RCS Minimum Temperature for Criticality -
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| B 3.402 BASES APPLICABILITY temperatures to fall below the temperature limit of this (continued) LCO. j ACTIONS . L.1 Iftheparametersthatareoutsidetpelimitcannotbe restored, the plant must be brought to'a MODE in which the.
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| LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to H00E 2 with k.,, < 1.0 within 30 minutes..
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| Rapid reactor shutdown can be.readily and practically achieved within a 30 minute period. The allowed time'is s.
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| reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 2 with k ,, < 1.0 in an-orderly manner and without challenging ,
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| plant systems. <
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| l l SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.2.1 -
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| l REQUIREMENTS RCS loop average temperature is required to be verified at or above 551*F every 30 minutes when T.,,-T,,, deviation alarm not reset and any RCS loop T.,, < 561*F.
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| The Note modifies the SR. When any RCS loop average l temperature is < 561*F and the T.,, T,,, deviation alarm is alarming or-inoperable, RCS loop average temperatures could :l .
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| fall below the LCO requirement without -additional warning. !
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| The SR to verify RCS loop average temperatures every 30 minutes is frequent enough to prevent the inadvertent violation of the LCO.
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| REFERENCES- 1. UFSAR, Section 15.
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| : 2. 10 CFR 50.36, Technical Specifications, (c)(2)(ii).
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| 1 McGuire Unit 2 B 3.4-9 Supplement 5 l
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| I RCS Hinimum Temperature for Critic:.lity B 3.4.2 l BASES APPLICABILITY temperatures to fall below the temperature limit of this (continued) LCO.
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| ACTIONS 6d If the parameters that are outside the limit cannot be :
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| @ restored, the plant must be brought to a H0DE in which the' LCO does not a ply. To achieve this status; the plant must l
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| be broucht to within 30 minutes. Rapid reactor
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| *H.kdC<g_U shutdown can be re ily and practically achieved within a Q0 minuto naana The allowed ti reasonable, based on operating experience, to reac in an orderly manner and without challenging plant s ,
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| i SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.2.1 REQUIREMENTS b RCS loop vera temperature is required to be verified at ,
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| or above F every 30 minutes whenpff T !
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| l (Goea to alarm not reset and any RCS Toop,,, deviatiog {
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| T., < F F. sc, pg U M l
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| -{The)fot(Dnodine sewann any RCS loop average ,
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| No & temperature is < MF they{T T deviatio I l t r dowrDalars isTa armt RCS looEaver,a,g,e tempera ures l J ; og u could fall below the LCO irement without additional 3 '' ve $anut r nt e re nn he 3
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| inadvertent violation o the LCO. pj .
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| REFERENCES H
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| : 1. h SAR. Section/ 15 @
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| 10CFR 5b.%,TulcAd SetdkiM[OltXII') @
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| l @r,4TS ,
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| B 3.4 8 Rev 1. 04/07/95 1/k AMt4L l
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| McGuire & Catawba improved TC Review Comments ITS Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant Systems 3.4.3, RCS Pressure / Temperature Limits 3.4.3 01 CTS 3.4.9.1 ITS LCO 3.4.3 l Bases Background discussion for ITS 3.4.3 CTS 3.4.9.1 specifically excludes the pressurizer from the heatup and cooldown rate limitations. This exception has not been retained in corresponding ITS LCO 3.4.3 in conformance with the STS. This information should be moved to the Bases Background. The proposed change has not been noted in the CTS markup and no justification has been provided. Comment: Revise the submittal to note the proposed change in the CTS markup and provide the appropriate justification.
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| DEC Response:
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| This information is already included in the STS Bases and corresponding ITS Bases Background and LCO sections. DOC LA14 has been added to the CTS markup to justify the movement of this detail to the Bases, mc3_cr_3.4 6 Jum 3,1998
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| beeDA M,*3
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| [ ~b.4 REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RC%)
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| p,5 RESSUREITEMPERATURELIMITS EEACimooter systDi
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| @s/ CIMITL W CONQJfl0N ESR OPE 94TIOT)
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| LC.o 1.9.~5 d Prb geyactor Coeiant s tem c e e-r oysssor temperature and M pressure shall be limited Qn.Jtecordanc} cfn,neit 4-rhei en-n an ricurc k a a-i anem.a- uduring heatup, cooldown, criticality, and i . service leak aiid hydrostatic testing (with: _ ;
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| : a. AHaximum heatup ra s as specifled in F,igure M M
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| : b. A Maximum cooldown rates as specified in Figure M* .N.3-T)h,
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| : c. A maximum temperature change of less than or e hour period during inservice hydrostatic % altesting to 10*F in any 1 h operations above the heatup and cooltown limit curves.
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| APPLICABILIH: At all ti s.
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| ' awe * 'f5 '" .I[lNSECT ACTION: mg m u ,, m ~ ._ _n ~ , m -q _ -.,.- @ , restore th amnearture amor nressure]
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| M to with'in the limit within 30 minutes;fperiopm an engineering evalAation t
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| ~;.s errects i tne t-or-v mit etndition on/the struc% ral int rit A- ecia;nMs f the R tor Cool Syste Jdeters: ne that the Reactor Coolant System -
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| A .t. remains acceptable 'for continued operationAor be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and reduce the RCS(Tdand1 pressure to less hanifUuw and) b l, 81 500 psig, respectively, within the rollowing 30 hours. 4 72houd I EILLANCE RE0VIREMENT b f Lca.t ews ra_h) tr .n eactor Coolant System temperature j di!I pressureAm na /rnove,@
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| 3 5.9 9 (ge.temw ,nea so bb within the limits at__least once per 30 minutes''Wuring system in N%
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| @ tup, coo facwn, and inservice leak and hydrostatic testing operations.
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| .a . m w vcases material irradiation surveillance spec ns shall removed an examined, to detemine chan . in material pro rties, as Og ( 4.4.9.1.
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| requ d by 10 CF 0, Appendix H. The results f these examinat' ns shall be tus to_ update cures 3.4-2 and 3.4-3. -
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| McGUIRE - UNIT 1 3/4 4 29 Amendment No. 166 l
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| 1 pcp I J 4
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| 'ip df-& s s.4.3 SA REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(Acs)
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| SA.s O/ ESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITS
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| #EACTOFt00LANT SifSTEN\ {
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| CINITINCutt)NDIT!ON FORAfPERAT!0tD 'I __
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| \ -
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| I . Ytc2 l -
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| Lea y,qJ (fGI"h she Ramew e9 ==9-+== FeMeh h niksuKrbcMemperature andh pressure shall he, limitedun accordanc3Eith tha'itait ure t snoie ner FioureD q se and 14-3during heatup.Jcooldown, criticality, and inservice leak and hydrostatic testing ith:
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| a.@ Maximum heatup rates as specified In Figu b.hximum cooldown rates as specified in.Figurehgg {
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| : c. A maximum temperature change of less than or e f
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| hour period during inservice 4Ydf5T G Yi1 altesting to 10*F in any 1 h operations !
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| above the heatup and cocidown limit curves.
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| l APPLICABILITY: At all times. h ,
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| Mi e a -
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| (jam &
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| gj Bith avat the aboutr i t-m onesedeM restore thel (tempecafure and/n ynrectorb to_within the limit within 30 minutest Be
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| _ an engt ing evaluatior to eterni e effects of f e out-of-lisi ondition on structural 4ntecri f the **+nr raalantAvstjen detemine that the naaetor Cochnt M ta= ~
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| g remains acceptable for continued operationfor be in at le'ast HOT SThMD8Y within the next 6 hours and reduce the RCS pressure to less thanczoox ano d.I, 61 500 psig, respectively, within the 30 hours.
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| l s.
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| $ SURVEILLANCE REQU1RENENT v +
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| &_ An% <JD Y
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| \cas.v. 4 ,J g ?,d- M Reactor Coolant System temperature 455'pressu shall be l
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| bg e== =ia=n enA*within the limits at least ance ner 30 minutes uring M htup, cooldown, and inservice . leak and huden<tatie tactina operation pe 7, 4.4.9.1.2 e reactor vessel materi irradiation survei ance specimens shall be r ved and examined, to temine changes in terial propertie , as
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| ** required 10 CFR 50, Appendix The results of the examinations s 1 be l used date Figures 3.4-2 an 3.4- &
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| RE - W IT 2 3/4 4-29 Amendment No. 148 hy ( o f 'l
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| Discussion of Changes SIction 3.4 - Reacter Coolant System TECHNICAL CHANGES - REMOVAL OF DETAIL intermediate range neutron flux channels. The design of the system described in the UFSAR and is controlled by plant design l documents which assure the continued function of the stated interlock. The UFSAR is reviewed and controlled in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59_which assures that no reduction in the level of safety afforded by the design will occur. This change is consistent with NUREC-1431.
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| LA.14 CTS 3.4.9.1 specifies the heatup and cocidown limitations for the reactor coolant system. The LCO statement indicates that this limit is not applicable to the pressurizer. Pressurizer heatup and cooldown limitations are contained in CTS 3.4.9.2. This clarification is not necessary for inclusion within the LCO and is relocated to the Bases for ITS 3.4.3. This change does not affect the requirements for RCS heatup and cooldown which are retained in LCO 3.4.3. Changes to the Bases are controlled in accordance with the administrative requirements in ITS Chapter 5. This change is consistent with NUREG-1431.
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| l McGuire Units 1 and 2 Page LA - 44 Supplement 55/20/97l
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| McGuire & Ca,tawba Improved TS Rsview Comments ITS Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant Systems 3.4.4, Reactor Coolant Loops Modes 1 and 2 ;
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| 3.4.4 01 Bases JFD 4 Bases discussion of the Applicable Safety Analyses for ITS 3.4.4 The Bases discussion of the Applicable Safety Analyses for STS 3.4.4 identifies the accident analyses that are important to RCP operation. This material basinot been adopted in the Bases for corresponding ITS 3.4.4 and no justification has been provided. Comment: Revise the Bases to provide the applicable accident analyses.
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| DEC Response:
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| The specific accident analyses given in the STS were replaced with the statement that the primary coolant flow rate is an important assumption in all accident analyses. Listing all of the )
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| current accident analyses in the bases discussion would be cumbersome and add little or no value to the discussion.
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| 1 mc3_cr_3.4 7 June 8,1998
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| McGuire & Catawba improved TS Review Comments ITS Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant Systems 3.4.5, RCS Loops - Mode 3 3.4.5-01 JFD 2 STS 3.4.5, Actions Condition C Bases for ITS LCO 3.4.5 Bases for ITS 3.4.5 Required Actions C.1 and C.2 Bases JFD 5 and JFD 7 ',
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| STS 3.4.5 Actions Condition C refers to "...and reactor trip breakers closed...". This has not been adopted in corresponding ITS 3.4.5 Actions Condition C and its associated Bases discussion. Comment: There is not an adequate justification for this difference. Revise the submittal to conform to the STS.
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| DEC Response:
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| The statement in STS condition C is not consistent with the actual LCO requirement which is that the requirements are based on the capability for rod withdrawal. The position of the I
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| reactor trip breakers is only one method for preventing rod withdrawal. Rod withdrawal may also be prevented by opening the control rod drive breakers or disconnect switches to rod lift coils. This condition is bracketed in the STS and changes may be permitted. Additionally,
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| 'this phrase was deleted in TSTF-87, R2, which has now been approved by NRC.
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| i 8 June 8,1998 mc3_cr_3.4
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| McGuire & Catawba improved TS Rav:sw Ctmments ITS Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant Systems 3.4.6, RCS Loops - Mode 4 3.4.6-01 JFD 8 ITS 3.4.6 Actions Conditions A, B, and C Editorial differences which describe possible combinations of loop inoperability have been )
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| proposed for STS 3.4.6 Actions Conditions A, B, and C in corresponding ITS 3.4.6. l Comment: These changes are not based on justifiable plant spebific differences. Revise the submittal to conform to the STS.
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| DEC Response:
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| As stated in JFD 8, the STS conditions do not address all of the possible combinations of not meeting the LCO, consistent with the CTS. The NRC has acknowledged this problem by the issuance of the HB Robinson ITS Amendment on a plant specific basis with changes similar to that proposed by DEC. The table below dernonstrates the problems with the STS.
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| Equipment Used Equipment Applicable STS Condition Applicable ITS to Meet LCO Discovered Condition Inoperable Two RCS loops one RCS loop A A One RCS loop one RCS loop Neither A nor B is B ,
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| and one RHR applicable because the i loop required RHR loop is not f inoperable.
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| One RCS loop one RHR loop A is not applicable because A and one RHR the required RCS loop is loop not inoperable. B is not applicable because two RCS loops are not
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| " required" operable.
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| Two RHR loops one RHR loop Neither A nor B is not B applicable because no RCS loops are " required" operable.
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| As shown, the STS does not maintain the plant specific licensing basis and requires revision i as proposed in the ITS conditions to maintain consistency with the CTS actions.
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| 9 June 8,1998 mc3_cr_3.4 l
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| [. _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ -
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| McGuire & Catawba improved TS Review Comments !
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| ITS Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant Systems l
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| )
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| . 3.4.7, RCS Loops - Mode 5, Loops Filled 1 3.4.7-01 Bases JFD 4 Catawba only Bases for ITS 3.4.7 Required Actions B.1 and B.2 The Bases for STS 3.4.7 Required Actions B.1 and B.'2 address the requirements associated with the Condition of required RHR loops inoperable or no RHR loop in operation. The Bases for ITS 3.4.7 Required Actions B.1 and B.2 contains an additional sentence which states that RCP seal injection flow is not considered an operation involving a reduction in boron concentration. JFD 4 is referenced but does not provide the justification for the proposed difference. Comment: JFD 4 does not explain why the proposed difference is acceptable.
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| Revise the submittal to provide the appropriate justification or conform to the STS.
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| DEC Response:
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| This is a clarifying statement requested by the plant staff. The charging pumps provide seal injection flow to the reactor coolant pump seals. The concern is that if a recent makeup to the volume control tank has been performed which had a boron concentration less than the RCS,
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| - then the charging pump flow to the RCS would have to be terminated since the charging pumps take suction from the volume control tank. The seal flow is very small, on the order of 1 10 gpm per seal, and would have no discernable affect on RCS boron concentration.
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| However, the plant staff was concerned that the action statement precluding operations j involving a reduction in boron concentration could be misinterpreted in this example to require l a termination of RCP seal flow. This would be an inappropriate and potentially unsafe action. j 1
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| i mc3_cr_3.4 10 June 8,1998 t _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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| 1 McGuire & Catawba improved TS Review Comments ITS Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant Systems j i
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| 3.4.8, RCS Loops - Mode 5, Loops Not Filled 3.4.8 Bases JFD 4 Catawba only Bases for ITS 3.4.8 Required Actions B.1 and B.2 The Bases for STS 3.4.8 Required Actions B.1 and B.2 address the requirements associated with the Condition of required RHR loops inoperabie or no RHR loop in operation. .The Bases for ITS 3.4.8 Required Actions B.1 and B.2 contains an additional sentence which states that RCP seal injection flow is not considered an operation involving a reduction in boron concentration. JFD 4 is ref erenced but does not provide the justification for the proposed difference. . Comment: JFD 4 does not explain why the proposed difference is acceptable.
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| Revise the submittal to provide the appropriate justification or conform to the STS. See ,
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| comment 3.4.7-01. 1 DEC Response:
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| This is a clarifying statement requested by the plant staff. The charging pumps provide seal injection flow to the reactor coolant pump seals. The concern is that if a recent makeup to the volume control tank has been performed which had a boron concentration less than the RCS, then the charging pump flow to the RCS would have to be terminated since the charging pumps take suction from the volume control tank.- The seal flow is very small, on the order of
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| ~ 10 gpm per seal, and would have no discernable affect on RCS boron concentration.
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| However, the plant staff was concerned that the action statement precluding operations involving a reduction in boron concentration could be misinterpreted in this example to require a termination of RCP seal flow. This would be an inappropriate and potentially unsafe action.
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| < -i l
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| mc3_cr_3.4 1J June 8,1998 L ___-___-____- _ _ _ - _ . _ .
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| McGuire & Ca.tawba improved TS Ravhw Ccmments ITS Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant Systems 3.4.9, Pressurizer -
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| 3.4.9-01 JFD 9 ITS LCO 3.4.9.b i
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| STS LCO 3.4.9.b requires that two groups of pressurizer heaters be capable of being powered from an emergency power supply. This requirement has not been adopted in corresponding ITS LCO 3.4.9.b. JFD 9 incorrectly states that the proposed diffe'rence is based on TSTF-94.
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| Comment: TSTF-94 R.3 has retained the requirement for emergency power. Revise the submittal to conform to the STS.
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| DEC Response:
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| In ITS Supplement 1, DEC added JFD 17 for McGuire to explain why this statement is not necessary and indicate that it is also not in the CTS. The design at McGuire is such that the heaters are powered from a 1E source, therefore, the subject statement is redundant and not necessary.
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| For Catawba, the ITS is revised to include this requirement. The Bases are revised, however, to indicate that this transfer is not a manual transfer. These are the changes required to the ITS as discussed in license amendment request for Catawba dated May 22,1998. New CTS markup pages are also provided consistent with this license amendment request.' Additionally, a typographical error in the typed Catawba ITS Bases LCO section. The STS markup shows the word "either" deleted, however, the typed ITS incorrectly included this word. This change has been corrected.
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| l L 1
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| ! j l'
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| mc3_ct3.4 12 June 8,1998
| |
| | |
| l McGuire & C::tawba improved TS Rsvhw Commants ]
| |
| ITS Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant Systems .
| |
| l 3.4.10, Pressurizer Safety Valves No comments on ITS requirements for pressurizer safety valves.
| |
| 3.4.11, Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs)
| |
| No comments on ITS PORV requirements. - 1 e 1 l
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| l l
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| l l
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| l l
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| 13 June 8,1998 mc3 cr_3.4
| |
| | |
| McGuire & Ca'fawba improved TS Review Comments ITS Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant Systems 3.4.12, Low Pressure Overpressure Protection (LTOP) Systems 3.4.12-01 JFD 3 McGuire ITS LCO 3.4.12
| |
| (& possibly Catawba) ITS 3.4.12 Required Action A.2.1 STS 3.4.12.a.2 requires two residual heat removal (RHR) suction, relief valves to be operable.
| |
| This requirement was not adopted in corresponding ITS LCO 3.4.12. JFD 3 states that this requirement is not applicable to the facility. JFD 3 does not explain why the requirement is not applicable. In fact, in McGuire ITS 3.4.12 Required Action A.2.1 specifies verifying that the RHR suction relief valve is operable. Comment: While LCO 3.4.12.a.2 and 3 are not in the CTS, including these alternative conditions may provide worthwhile flexibility. Evaluate LCO conditions a.2 and 3 for inclusion in TS 3.4.12. If included, conditions would necessitate including SRs 3.4.12.4 and 3.4.12.7.
| |
| DEC Response:
| |
| These were evaluated as part of the original ITS submittal and were determined not to be applicable for McGuire. The McGuire design only includes a common RHR relief valve. The RHR relief valve has a higher setpoint than the PORV low pressure setpoint for LTOP and using the RHR relief for LTOP requires limiting the RCS cooldown rate or minimum RCS j temperature. Thus, while the RHR relief valve will work for LTOP, additional controls beyond j that contained in the STS are necessary. DEC believes that the use of the RHR relief valve for LTOP mitigation is more appropriate as a compensatory measure, rather than an option at the LCO level. i l
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| The necessary analyses have not been completed at this time to support this change for Catawba. This change may be pursued after implementation of the ITS.
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| mc3_cr_3.4 14 June 8,1998
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| | |
| McGuire & Ca,tawba improved TS Rsview Comm2nts ITS Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant Systems 3.4.12 02 ITS 3.4.12 Required Actions A.4 and G.1 McGuire Only ITS 3.4.12 Required Action A.4 requires depressurizing the RCS and establishing an RCS vent of 2 4.5 square inches. ITS 3.4.12 Required Action G.1 requires depressurizing the RCS and establishing an RCS vent of 2 2.75 square inches in the event that the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A are not met. Comment: Revise the submittal to resolve this apparent discrepancy.
| |
| DEC Response:
| |
| The McGuire ITS submittalis revised to delete the reference to condition A within condition G for required action and completion times not met. Condition A already provides the appropriate optional actions, including depressurization. The Actions table for the typed ITS is also revised to correct a pagination error.
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| l mc3_c r._3.4 15 June 8,1998 l
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| i
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| | |
| l LTOP. System -
| |
| l 3.4.12 ACTIONS
| |
| ------------------------------------------NOTE--------------------------------
| |
| LC0 3.0.4 is not applicable.
| |
| i' CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME l A. Two centrifugal A.1 -- - - - - - - N OT E -- - - - - - -
| |
| - charging pumps capable Two centrifugal '
| |
| of injecting into the charging pumps may be RCS. capable of injecting l
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| into the RCS during E pump swap operation for s 15 minutes.
| |
| One centrifugal ---------------------
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| charging pump and one Initiate action to Immediately safety injection pump verify a maximum of capable of injecting one centrifugal l into the RCS. charging pump or one l safety: injection pump E- is capable of injecting into the Two safety injection RCS.
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| pumps capable of injecting into the M
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| .RCS.
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| !- A.2.1 Verify RHR suction Immediately relief valve is
| |
| ! OPERABLE and the suction isolation valves are open.
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| AE A.2.2.1 Verify RCS cold leg Imediately temperature > 167'F.
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| E A.2.2.2 Verify RCS cold leg Imediately temperature > 107'F anri cooldown rate
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| <20'F/hr.
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| M l
| |
| (continued)
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| McGuire Unit 1 3.4-31 Supplement 5 l 1
| |
| | |
| LTOP System 3.4.12 ACTIONS (continued) 1 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME 1
| |
| A. (continued) A.3 Verify two PORVs Immediately l secured open and associated block valves open and power removed. l E '.
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| A.4 Depressurize RCS and Imediately l
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| establish RCS vent of 2 4.5 square inches. l B. An accumulator not B.1 Isolate affected I hour i isolated when the accumulator. I accumulator pressure is greater than or equal to the maximum RCS pressure for existing cold leg temperature allowed in Specification 3.4.3.
| |
| C. Required Action and C.1 Increase RCS cold leg 12 hours associated Completion temperature to Time of Condition B > 300*F.
| |
| not met.
| |
| DE C.2 Depressurize affected 12 hours accumulator to less than the maximum RCS pressure for existing cold leg temperature allowed by Specification 3.4.3.
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| D. One PORV inoperable in D.1 Restore PORV to 7 days MODE 4. OPERABLE status.
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| (continued) l 3.4-32 Supplement 5 l McGuire Unit 1 1
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| | |
| LTOP System-3.4.12 i ACTIONS (continued)
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
| |
| ]
| |
| E. One PORV inoperable in E.1 Suspend all Imediately operations which MODE 5 or 6.
| |
| could lead to a water solid pressurizer.
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| AfiQ ,
| |
| E.2 Restore PORV to 24 hours OPERABLE status.
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| F. Required Action and F.1. Verify RCS cold leg I hour associated Completion temperature > 167'F.
| |
| Time of Condition E not met. AliQ F.2 Verify RHR suction 1 hour relief valve is OPERABLE and the suction isolation I valves are open.
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| G. Two PORVs inoperable. .G.1 Depressurize RCS and 8 hours establish RCS vent of M 2 2.75 square inches.
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| Required Action and.
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| associated Completion Time of Condition C, l D, E, or F not met.
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| E LTOP System inoperable for any reason other than Condition A, B, ,
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| C, D, E, or F.
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| McGuire Unit 1 3.4-33 Supplement 5 l
| |
| [ - - - - - - - - - - - - -
| |
| | |
| LTOP System 3.4.12
| |
| . ACTIONS
| |
| ------- ;---------------------------------NOTE--------------------------------
| |
| LCO 3.0.4 is-not applicable.
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| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A .= Two centrifugal A.1 --------NOTE--- '----
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| ^c hweing pumps capable Two centrifugal
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| * of injectir,9 into the charging' pumps may be RCS.- capable of injecting into the RCS during
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| '.E- pump swap operation for s 15 minutes.
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| One centrifugal ---------------------
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| charging pump and one Initiate action to . Imediately safety injection pump verify a maximum of capable of injecting one' centri fugal into~the RCS. charging pump or one safety. injection pump E is capable of injecting into'the
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| .Two safety injection RCS.
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| pumps capable of injecting into the E-RCS.
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| A.2.1 Verify RHR suction Immediately relief valve is OPERABLE and the
| |
| -suction isolation valves are open.
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| 8E A.2.2.1 Verify RCS cold leg' Immediately temperature > 167"F..
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| E A.2.2.2 Verify RCS cold leg Immediately-temperature > 107'F
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| , and cooldown rate
| |
| <20*F/hr.
| |
| E (continued)
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| [McGuire Unit 2 3.4-31 Supplement 5 l i
| |
| 1 i
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| i
| |
| _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __--_____-_ _ - -____ _ ___ - \
| |
| | |
| LTOP System 3.4.12 ACTIONS (continued)
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (continued) A.3 Verify two PORVs Imediately secured open and associated block valves open and power removed.
| |
| M ',
| |
| A.4 Depressurize RCS and Immediately establish RCS vent of 2 4.5 square inches.
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| B. An accumulator not B.1 Isolate affected I hour )
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| isolated when the accumulator.
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| accumulator pressure is greater than or equal to the maximum RCS pressure for existing cold leg temperature allowed in Specification 3.4.3. l I
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| i l
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| C. Required Action and C.1 Increase RCS cold leg 12 hours associated Completion temperature to i
| |
| Time of Condition B > 300'F. i l not met. l l M l C.2 Depressurize affected 12 hours accumulator to less than the maximum RCS ,
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| pressure for existing i cold leg temperature allowed by l Specification 3.4.3.
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| I D. One PORV inoperable in D.1 Restore PORV to 7 days MODE 4. OPERABLE status.
| |
| l (continued) 3.4-32 Supplement 5 l McGuire Unit 2
| |
| | |
| LTOP System 3.4.12 l
| |
| -ACTIONS -(continued) .l CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION . COMPLETION TIME E. One PORV inoperab1e' in E.1 Suspend all Immediately MODE 5 or.6. operations which could lead to a water solid pressurizer.-
| |
| M ',
| |
| E.2 Restore PORV to 24 hours OPERABLE status.
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| F. Required Action and F.1. Verify RCS cold leg I hour associated Completion. temperature > 167'F.
| |
| Time of Condition E not met. M. I F.2 Verify RHR suction 1 hour relief valve is OPERABLE and the suction isolation !
| |
| valves are open. 1 G.. Two PORVs . inoperable. G.1 Depressurize RCS and 8 hours-establish RCS vent of M 2 2.75 square inches.
| |
| Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition C, l D, E, or. F not met.
| |
| E LTOP System inoperable for any reason other
| |
| -than Condition A, B,
| |
| ~ C, D, E, or F.
| |
| McGuire Unit 2 3.4-33 Supplement 5 l
| |
| | |
| LTOP System-i-
| |
| B 3.4.12 '
| |
| ^
| |
| p BASES
| |
| :ACTIONSL F.1 and F.2 (continued).
| |
| L (continued) relief valve is 0PERABLE and the RHR suction isolation valves'open and the RCS temperature of the cold legs >
| |
| 167'F. The Completion Time of 1 hour reflects the importance of restoring the required. redundancy.at lower RCS temperatures.
| |
| L1 The RCS must be depressurized and a vent must be established within 8 hours when: ,
| |
| : a. Both required PORVs'are inoperable; or
| |
| . A Required Action and associated Completion Time of b.
| |
| Ll- Condition C, D, E, or F is not met; or-L c. The LTOP System is inoperable for any. reason other
| |
| .than Condition A, B, C, D, E, or F.
| |
| l The vent must be sized 2.2.75-square inches to ensure that the flow capacity is-greater than that required for the worst case mass input ~ transient reasonable during the applicable MODES. This action is needed to protect the RCPB
| |
| ! from a low temperature overpressure event and a possible
| |
| . brittle failure of the reactor vessel.
| |
| The Completion Time considers the time required to place the plant'in this Condition and the relatively low probability of an overpressure event .during this time. period due to increased operator awareness.of administrative control requirements.
| |
| g l- SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.12.1 and SR 3.4.12.2 REQUIREMENTS To minimize the potential for a low temperature overpressure L event by limiting the mass input capability, all but one L centrifugal charging pump or one safety injection pump are-verified. incapable of injecting into the RCS and the accumulator discharge isolation valves are verified closed
| |
| .l- and power removed.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| B 3.4-68 Supplement 5
| |
| _ l McGuire Unit 1 l
| |
| | |
| LTOP System B 3.4.12
| |
| . BASES ,
| |
| ACTIONS F.1 and F.2 (continued) l (continued) j relief valve is OPERABLE and the RHR suction isolation i valves open and the RCS temperature of the cold legs > I 167'F. The Completion Time of 1 hour reflects the
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| .importance of restoring the required redundancy at lower RCS temperatures. ,
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| L1 The RCS must be depressurized and a vent must be established within 8 hours when:
| |
| : a. Both required PORVs are inoperable; or
| |
| : b. A Required Action and associated Completion Time of l Condition C, D, E, or F is not met; or I
| |
| : c. The LTOP System is inoperable for any reason other than Condition A, B, C, D, E, or F.
| |
| The vent must be sized 2 2.75 square inches to ensure that the flow capacity is greater than that required for the worst case mass input transient reasonable during the ,
| |
| applicable MODES. This action'is needed to protect the RCPB from a low temperature overpressure event and a possible brittle failure of the reactor vessel. j The Completion Time considers the time required to place the ,
| |
| plant in this Condition and the relatively low probability of an overpressure event during this time period due to' >
| |
| increased operator awareness of administrative control requirements. ;
| |
| I SURVEILLANCE SF 3.4.12.1 and SR 3.4.12.2 4 REQUIREMENTS To minimize the potential for a low temperature overpressure event by limiting the mass input capability, all but one centrifugal charging pump or one safety injection pump are verified incapable of injecting into the RCS and the accumulator discharge isolation valves are verified closed I and power removed.
| |
| (continued) l McGuire Unit 2 B 3.4-68 Supplement 5 L _ __ _ _
| |
| | |
| REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM
| |
| . LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Conti uard ~
| |
| T uAce h ctcpr%L=he posua, u ynde ACTION: (continued) 4 Ub,h
| |
| '' *4 *
| |
| * l " A Mkh f-( 5 *f,uw<. AN Y N'* ,
| |
| i b @ With an accumulator within not isolated I hour. If required action is4not isolate the alfected accumulator met, either:
| |
| ggg j C."1
| |
| ~ @ Depressurize the accumulator to less than the maximum RCS pressure for the existing cold leg per Specification .
| |
| within 12 hours- -
| |
| s.v.s A.
| |
| C.I @
| |
| ~~ Increase RCS cold leg temperature'to greater than er epgal te h 300* F within 12 hours.
| |
| CASN @ With one PORY inoperable in MODE 4. restore the inoperable PORV to OPERABLE status within 7 days. If required action is not met, I co JA4 C7 depressurize the RCS and vent through at least a 2.75 square inch f vent within 8 hours.
| |
| g;,, y, p With one PORY inoperable in MODES 5 or 6, suspend all operations 1 which could lead to a water-solid pressurizer. Restore the l inoperable PORV to OPERABLE status within 24 hours. If required action is not met, either:
| |
| #g,% e g *4 ,.40 Ensure RCS temperature is greater than 167* F, and ND-3 is OPERABLE, and ND-1 and ND-2 are open within one hour.
| |
| ' 9E Q6 Depressurize the elCS and vent through at least a 2.75 square inch vent within 8 hours.
| |
| 4,6, c , D CM%6 @ M LTOP system inoperable for any reas9n o*,her than drfJ::tr- D',
| |
| g@ bove, depressurize the RCS and vent through at lleast a 75 h
| |
| squar vgwithin8 hours.
| |
| r f. Inti.ipventthateitherthe Mvs or the RCS ven are used to Two Pon.vs sitig i an RCS pressure tr sient, a Special k ort shall be d t to Specificati inopeni94 . pre i and submitted to he Commission purs l 6 .2 within 30 days. e report shall des be the circumstan l O itiating the transi t, the effect of th PORVs or vent on e QQ $3th,,, ) +,......,..a2n., rrective action nec carv to prevent re trence.
| |
| assikk Cm.ethe, ,
| |
| g 4 4 4 ',h'.,, (g/) The progions of SpecJ#ication] 3.0.4pnot applicable.
| |
| Q 0,c,..-F rioF met g, d51ED Q MD d ,
| |
| McGUIRE - UNIT 1 3/4 4-34 Amendment No. 166 l
| |
| : .; 3 a t 2
| |
| | |
| SpecMM $ 4.12, REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM l
| |
| ~ tIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued) w <r.c.e,-t m e prsu rs .c y< w ei ACTION: (continued) N e'M*1u8 b *' ^ ^ " -' c u r'.3 4 F
| |
| , 1; *.Q "LQ* "t"" so.4 :-
| |
| (er b , a @ With an accumulator not isolate % isolete the affected accumulator I g within 1 hour. If required action is not met, either: l C.1.
| |
| '"'""' h Depressurize the accumulator to less than the maximum pressure for the existing cold leg per Specification /
| |
| within 12 hours, g 0B C.! @ Increase RCS cold leg temperature to greater than(or eqpr to 300* F within 12 hours.
| |
| * C.4Mn _t1 @ With one PORY inoperable in MODE 4 restore the inoperable PORV to OPERABLE status within 7 days. If required action is not met, C.,661 G depressurize the RCS and vent through at least a 2.75 square inch vent within 8 hours.
| |
| 6,, u g @ With one PORY inoperable in MODES 5 or 6, suspend all operations which could lead to a water-solid pressurizer. Restore the inoperable PORY to OPERABLE status within 24 hours. If required c.,4tM E action is not met, either:
| |
| f.t W f.2. @ Ensure RCS temperature is greater than 167* F, and ND-3 is OPERABLE, and ND-1 and ND-2 are open within one hour.
| |
| ]
| |
| E G.i @ Depressurize the RCS and vent through at least a 2.75 square inch vent within 8 hours.
| |
| d ,c. c. c, A.I
| |
| (.. inn Cr @ M LTOP system inoperable for any reason other thano.. .r.. ca, itD(p. bo- depressurize the RCS and vent through at least a 2.75 square i ?n ithin 8 hours. e E. , < ) A. * -
| |
| f Gd' gU5 f. In t e ev rotnat either the P0 s or the RCS vent re used L is mitigate a RCS pressure transi nt, a Special Rep shall be I
| |
| '"Y' *
| |
| * ES prepared d submitted to the osmission pursua to. Specification M- ^-1 6.9.2 wi in 30 days. The r ort shall descri e the circumstance
| |
| ***^
| |
| "M * 'i"'[%k
| |
| +'*'
| |
| initia ng the transient, t effect of the RVs or vent on th trans ent. .and "y 'a-ent we action necess to prevent recu ence
| |
| [ ** f8 . @ The proviptins of Specifi.ention33.0.4 not applicable.
| |
| h .I'l McGUIRE - UNIT 2 3/4 4-34 Amendment No. 148 ,
| |
| l y 3 .f e 1
| |
| l l
| |
| L-_ __ _ _ . _ _
| |
| | |
| LTOP System 3.4.12 ,
| |
| l 1
| |
| ACTIONS (continued)
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME IN' M Two fe g r Depressurize RCS and i
| |
| ' G. 'G.1 8 hours j
| |
| - fETleVval establish RCS vent of 1 inoperable. 2: , square I
| |
| gg Required Action and
| |
| **
| |
| * 3,.15 h
| |
| associated Comple r j h *I
| |
| . ofD.,E.
| |
| c, Condition or.F 1
| |
| E LTOP System inoperable for any reason other h than C. D. Condition E. or F. A.f B. P
| |
| )
| |
| 1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS suRytlum.t g
| |
| SR 3.4.12.1 V fy a maximum of [one] 1 apable of injecting in I] pump is [
| |
| the RCS.
| |
| . /
| |
| G) QMn4sd _
| |
| SR3.4.12/ Verify a maxistui of one rging pumpyis 12 hours A capable of injecting into the RCS. l y-Qegne.seleyidy sW} @ ~
| |
| SR 3.4.12 Verify each acetanulator is isolated. 12 hours (continued)
| |
| . 3.4 30 Rev 1. 04/07/95 na<ue
| |
| | |
| LTOP System B 3.4.12 BASES ACTIONS D g d (continued)
| |
| The Completion lime considers the facts that only one of the
| |
| @m, Lee 11er,-valveT)is required to mitigate an overpressure g transtent and that the likelihood of an active failure of the remaining valve path during this time period is very -
| |
| low.
| |
| : h. E/.1 o A E..'1 g The consequences of operational events that will f _overpreJ)surize (Rer. 4 .
| |
| thewith Thus, RCS oneare of more the two severe 0ltC5 at lower Aliet valvtemoeratur _
| |
| =p-1 rable in M00E 5 or in MODE 6 witti the head on.phe }[og g uL'?
| |
| C letion Time to restore two valves to OPERABLE status is f gg9 ,
| |
| 24 rs. 94,.3,y p,.u,-
| |
| The Completion Time represents a reasonable time to 1N 5" l
| |
| investigate and repair several types of relief valve failures without exposur L '"M1 ** 1
| |
| @(.I*adI7 OPERABLE RC5 wTief veivbto a lengthy o protect against period with only one overpressure ents.
| |
| OS Gd.
| |
| The RCS aust be depressurized and a vent must be established within 8 hours when:
| |
| : a. Both required FCSfett6f IaivD are inoperable; or
| |
| : b. A Required Ac': ion and associated Completion Time of Conditiorf6/UK D. E, or F is not met: or
| |
| : c. The LTOP System is inoperable for any reason other thanConditionA./BJC.D.E.orF.
| |
| Theventmustbesizedh{ 7 square inches to ensure that On the flow capacity is grea,er n that required for the -
| |
| worst case mass input transient reasonable during the -
| |
| applicable MODES. This action is needed to protect the RCPB from a low temperature overpressure event and a possible brittle failure of the reactor vessel.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| ,)dDG'ST'S . B 3.4 68 Rev 1. 04/07/95 l
| |
| %.c M l
| |
| l j
| |
| 1 l
| |
| E __ __ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _
| |
| | |
| McGuire G: Cttawba improved TS Review Comments ITS Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant Systems 3.4.12-03 DOC L.26 McGuire Only ITS 3.4.12 Required Action A.4 4 CTS 3/4.4.9.3 Action I l
| |
| ITS 3.4.12 Required Action A.4 provides an option to depressurize the RCS and establish an RCS vent of 4.5 square inches in the event that two centrifugal charging pumps or two safety injection pumps or one centrifugal charging pump and one safetyinjection pump are capable of injecting into the RCS. This option is not provided in the corresponding CTS 3/4.4.9.3 Actions. DOC L.26 states that the proposed change is acceptable because the vent size was evaluated in the LTOP analysis and is approximated by two open PORVs. This issue has been identified in Attachment 5 of the submittal as being beyond the scope of conversion, and j requires additional staff review, Comment: Provide the LTOP analysis that determines that a 4.5 square inch RCS vent approximates the area of two open PORVs.
| |
| DEC Response:
| |
| The attached pages from internal calculation MCC-1223.03-00-0037 justifies this change.
| |
| i l
| |
| 1 mc3_,cr_3.4 16 June 8,1998
| |
| | |
| Staterr McQuke Nuideer Stanon. Unna 1 and 2 Attachment 5 Calcufetiort MCC-1223.03 CO 0037 Page 1 of 2 //
| |
| Subled: RC8 Vert Asee for TS 3.4.3.3 -+"
| |
| q 4:e4 i s... .e several reestor coolant system vent optione are included in the improwd Technical Speedications (rr$) section 3.4.12 for the Reactor Coolant System Low Temperature Overpressure Protocean (LTOP) System. The proposed specification contains a note in the LCO:
| |
| * NOTE: A PORV seeured in the open position may be used to meet tne RCS vont requirement prowded that Me assoolated tdeck valve is open and power la removed" and an acilon statemervt (condrton):
| |
| "A. Two contrWugal chstging pumps capetdo of injectirg into the RCS OR one contrfugal charging pump and one salsty iriection pump raph of insecting into the RC8 DR Two aefety injection pumps onpable at injectJng into the RCS" An acceptable Required Action le *A.4 Depressurize RC8 and estabash RCS vent of g 4.5 square inchee."
| |
| Usir g the PORV as a wnt poth is acoeptende since a single PORY has capecity, at the LTDP setpoint. which la greater tMn any single certrfrugal derging purnp or safety injectiort purnp.
| |
| The 4.5 sq inch RC8 vent for condlilen *A.4* ensures anal arvy comtWnetion of two centrifugal charging ansFor safety injechon purnpa will not cause the RCS to praecurtae to greater than the -
| |
| LTOP setpoint. TNe wil ensure that reestor vessel integrity is maintained during LTOP conditions.
| |
| The basis for the PORV vont and the 4.5 square inch vent are provided on page 2 of tNs attachmort The PORY capacity le shown to be 1081 at 385 pois inlet pressuto and greatly exceeds the cepeelty of any seggie CCP or Si pump. 4.5 sg hoh vent is showti to peswide e flowrote of 2016 gpm when the RCS pressure le 385 peig. The orifice 4h ion t uese a conserve $we value for gie ortflee flow 9x~"=w, assuming a smeu bore ratio and high reynolds uvinber and the 4.5 sq inch vent cepoofty geestly aseceeds the cepechy of any cernbtnetion of two
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| ) high head ECC8 pumps (and is approximately eqLael to the capacity of two PORVs).
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| Pump Pump Runout Plow Reference l CentrtfugalCharging Pumps (OCP) 560 ppm MCTC 1554WV.S00101 Safetyin)ecten Pump (SI) '
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| 675 ppm WCTC 1862WI.800101 l 075 gpm a 1081 gpm (PORv capeedy)
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| Condeborn Total plow Capacity l 2 CCP's 560 + 600 = 1120 gom
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| )
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| t 1 CCP and 1 SI 580 + trr5 = 1238 ppm !
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| 2 Srs 875 + 678 = 1350 som 1380 ppm a 2015 gpm (4.5 sq inch vent capacity)
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| Twetore. e PCRV secured in the open poeltton is acceptable fof an LTOP vent when no more than one CCP or $1 pump no capable of injecting into the MCS. A vent of 4.5 sq. Inches is l acceptable for LTOP when no more than two CCP's or SI pumps (arty combination) are capsDie of leiecting hoo the RCS.
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| t I
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| L _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ . . _ _ - -
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| _- . . -~,- _ _ vm m Mtr inket-ao-san 1 ,,,,,,,,,, ,, 2 fg, Rc5 vo~i Arc Le T> 4.41.1, W
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| et (s4'
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| /4A_ f v6v PORV Capacity inlet Dia 2.3 (3* XXS; Reference MCM 1205.09 0008)
| |
| Cy 55 (Reference CCl/ Curtin Starud lenor den Feb. 24,1994) e 385 paid (Reference TS 3.4.9.3)
| |
| Pressure 400 psia ',
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| Temperature 85 F Density 62.247 h /cu ft i
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| O = Ov eart (@
| |
| * 82.4 / p) = 1981 gpm (Reference Crane Tech. Paper 410, een 318)
| |
| Q (2 PORVs) = 2181 opm '
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| Orifice Capacity
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| {
| |
| Area l 4.5 'sq inches j 0.03125 se it C 0.6i (s limiting value for orifice bore and high ReynoldeReference number) j h 490.6 feet (quivalent to 386 paid at 100F) l q e Area v eqn(2 g h) = 4.491 cu lt/ sec; (Reference Crane Tech. Paper 410, eqn 3-21)
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| Q= 2015 ppm l
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| l
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| McGuire & Ce,tawba ImprovId TS Ravhw Ct:mments
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| - ITS Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant Systems i 3.4.13, RCS Operational Leakage No comments on ITS RCS operationalleakage requirements 1
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| l l
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| l' l I
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| i l I i
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| mc3_cr_3.4 17 June 8,1998 r
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| L_________________...__._____._______ __ . _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
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| McGuire & Catawba improved TS Review Comments ITS Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant Systems 3.4.14, RCS Pressure isolation "alve (PlV) Leakage .
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| 3.4.14 01 ITS SR 3.4.14.1 CTS 4.4.6.2.2 a CTS 4.4.6.2.2.a requires deraonstrating the RCS PlVs Operable at least once per 18 months.
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| The frequency for corresponding STS SR 3.4.14.1 h. "In accordatice with the Inservice Testing Program and te months" which has been adopted by ITS SR 3.4.14.1. Comment: The CTS markup does not show the proposed change and no justification has been provided. Revise the submittal to correct the CTS markup and provide the appropriate justification.
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| DEC Response:
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| - Compliance with the inservice testing program (10 CFR 50.55a) is requi^d by CTS 4.0.S, therefore, this change is administrative. DOC A44 has been added to justify this change.
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| I I
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| I l
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| mc3_cr_3.4 18 June 8,1998 l
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| | |
| Discussion of Changes Section 3.4 - Reactor Coolant System ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES A.42 CTS Table 4.4-4 requires the reactor coolant DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 51.0 pCi/gm be verified following power changes > 15% in 1 hour when in MODES 1, 2, and 3. ITS SR 3.4.16.2 requires this verification only when in MODE 1. This change is based on the _
| |
| intent of the surveillance to ensure iodine remains within limit during normal operation and following fast power level changes when fuel failure is more likely to occur.' Power level changes
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| >15% cannot occur in modes 2 and 3, therefore, this change is considered administrative. This change is consistent with NUREG-1431.
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| A.43 CTS 3.4.4 Actions e, f, and g take exception to declaring the PORVs inoperable due to inoperable block valve actions which require disabling the PORV. ITS 3.4.11 Actions B.1 and B.2 retains this exception for one block valve inoperable. This exception is not necessary for two or three block valves inoperable since the actions do not require disabling the PORV for these subsequent inoperabilities.
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| A.44 CTS 4.4.6.2.2.a requires demonstrating the RCS PIVs Operable at least once per 18 months. The frequency for corresponding ITS SR 3.4.14.1 is "In accordance with the Inservice Testing Program and 18 months." The reference to the inservice testing program in the ITS SR is administrative since CTS SR 4.0.5 also requires testing in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a, which specifies the inservice testing program requirements. This change is consistent with NUREG-1431.
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| McGuire Units 1 and 2 Page A - 10M Supplement 55/20/97l
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| | |
| McGuire & Catawba improved TS Rsview Ccmments ITS Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant Systems 3.4.14-02 Bases JFD 4 Bases Background discussion for ITS 3.4.14, STS Bases markup page B 3.4-70 Editorial differences with the Bases Background discussion for STS 3.4.14 have been proposed for the Bases for corresponding ITS 3.4.14. The last sentence of the second paragraph addresses identified leakage before operation and RCS operationalleakage. This material is applicable but has not been included in the ITS Bases. Comment: JFD 4 does not specifically address the proposed difference. Revise the submittal to provide the appropriate justification or conform to the STS. 1 DEC Response:
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| 1 The plant staff believes that the STS statements are non-conservative and are also I inconsistent with the way leakage is currently accounted fur at the station. Individual valve leakage is determined as required by SR 3.4.14.1 to be within limits during startup. The initial
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| ! PlV leakage is normally determined at lower RCS pressures and correction factors applied.
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| L During unit operation, the higher RCS pressure should actually result in smaller amounts of !
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| PlV leakage because the check valves would be seated due to increasing RCS pressure.
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| During unit operation, leakage through the RCS PlV penetrations is considered unidentified.
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| The actual RCS leakage during unit operation does not directly correlate to the individually measured PlV leakage, since two valves in series have to leak to create actual RCS leakage.
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| Total leakage is the sum of identified and unidentified leakage. Total leakage is determined by a water inventory balance. If this PlV leakage were treated as identified leakage, then the total leakage determined from a water inventory balance less this " identified leakage" could result in an unidentified leakage value that may actually be non-conservative.
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| Actual PlV leakage past any 2 valves in series during Unit operation is " unidentified" since it is not collected in a tank and measured during the RCS leakage surveillance, however the individually measured PlV leakages are not unidentified in that they do not need to meet the lower unidentified RCS leakage requirements (ie. Individual PlV allowable leakage rates are as discussed in the PlV spec, not "1 gpm unidentified").
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| I mc3_.cr 3.4 19 June 8,1998 l
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| McGuire & Cdawba improved TS Rsview Commsnts ITS Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant Systems 3.4.14 03 JFD 3 STS SR 3.4.14.3 STS SR 3.4.14.3 specifies a requirement for the RHR autoclosure interlock. This requirement has not been adopted in corresponding ITS 3.4.14. JFD 3 states that this requirement is not applicable to the facility. Comment: JFD 3 does not explain why.the requirement is not applicable. Revise the submittal to explain why the requirement is not applicable to the facility. ,
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| l DEC Response:
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| The autoclosure interlocks were removed by a prior license amendment (117/111 for Catawba and 112/94 for McGuire).
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| 1 l
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| 1 1
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| mc3_cr_3.4 20 June 8,1998
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| McGuire & Catawba imprr.ved TS Review Comments ITS Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant Systems 3.4.14 04 DOC L.12 CTS 3/4.4.6.2 Action c ITS 3.4.14 Required Action A.1 in the event that any RCS PlV leakage exceeds the limit, CTS 3/4.4.6.2 Action c requires isolating the high pressure portion of the affected system from the low pressure portion by use of at least two closed manual or deactivated automatic valves. Required Action A.1 for corresponding ITS 3.4.14 only requires the use of one valve. DOC L.12 provides the justification for the proposed change. Comment: DOC L.12 does not describe the proposed change's impact on safety and does not explain why the safety impact is acceptable. Revise the submittal to provide the appropriate justification for the proposed change.
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| DEC Response:
| |
| DOC L12 is revised to provide additional justification for this change.
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| mc3_c r._3.4 21 June 8,1998
| |
| | |
| l Discussion of Changes Sectien 3.4 - Reactor Coolant System l
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| TECHNICAL CHANGES - LESS RESTRICTIVE l L.11 The CTS SR 4.4.6.2.1 requirements to monitor the RCS LEAKAGE by use of the containment atmosphere radioactivity, sump level, and l reactor head flange leakoff system once per 12 hours, have been l
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| deleted. Channel checks of leak detection instrument channels are !
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| required once per 12 hours by CTS 4.4.6.1 and retained in ITS 3.4.15. Therefore, the parameters will continue to be monitored once per 12 hours. The requirement to moditor reactor head flange leakoff is deleted since leakage into this system is identified ;
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| leakage into the reactor coolant drain tank. The CTS 4.4.6.2.1 l requirement to perform a water inventory balance is retained as ITS 3.4.13.1 and is the definitive surveillance for establishing leakage within limits. This change is consistent with NUREG-1431.
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| L.12 CTS 3.4.6.2 actions for one or more flowpaths with leakage from one or more PIVs greater than the limit require isolation via two valves in 4 hours or a unit shutdown. ITS 3.4.14 permits isolation with one valve within the first 4 hours and to restore leakage within limits in 72 hours. The unit design does not support closure of a second valve without resulting in two ECCS trains becoming inoperable, therefore, the existing shutdown option is required. The ITS actions allow 72 hours to evaluate the condition and attempt to restore the leakage within limits and avoid an unnecessary plant transient. The proposed change cdditicnal time is acceptable on the basis that isolation by a single valve for no more that 72 hours provides on acceptable level of safety based on the low probability of the second isolatedion valve failing during the 72 hours.
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| L.13 CTS 3.4.6.2 requires the isolation of RCS PIV flowpaths with a closed manual or deactivated automatic valve. ITS 3.4.14 includes the provision for use of a check valve. This change permits more operational flexibility for the plant since many of the redundant PIVs are check valves. These valves are leak tested and provide assurance of RCS pressure boundary isolation. This change is consistent with NUREG-1431.
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| ; L.14 No explicit actions are provided in CTS 3.5.2 for an inoperable l RHR system interlock other than declaring the associated ECCS l subsystem inoperable. ITS 3.4.14 permits isolation of the RHR RCS I penetration and subsequent indefinite operation. The function of the interlock is to prevent the suction valves to the RCS froin opening when RCS pressure could overpressurize the RHR system.
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| McGuire Units 1 and 2 Page L - 4 Supplement 51 l l
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| l l
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| Discussicn of Changes l S:cticn 3.4 - Reactor Coolant System l l
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| TECHNICAL CHANGES - LESS RESTRICTIVE i
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| Therefore, a required action to lock the valves closed when the interlock is inoperable is consistent with the function of the interlock and fulfills the existing safety function. The valves can be manually unlocked during a shutdown when the RHR system is needed for cooldown. This change is consistent with NUREG-1431.
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| L.15 CTS SR 4.4.6.2.2.b requires RCS PIV testirig to be performed if the plant is in MODE 5 for more than 72 hours. ITS SR 3.4.14.1 requires testing if the unit is in MODE 5 for 7 days or more.
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| This is acceptable based on the fact that the amount of time in cold shutdown would not have an affect on the pressure retaining capability of the PIVs, however, the extended time will reduce the amount of leak testing that would be required as a result of an unplanned shutdown. This change is consistent with NUREG-1431.
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| L.16 The CTS 4.4.6.2.2.c requirement to perform PIV leakage testing prior to returning a valve to service following maintenance activities has been deleted. QA requirements and plant procedures already control retest requirements following maintenance activities on plant equipment. These controls are adequate to assure the level of safety provided by the existing specifications i is maintained and avoids a duplication of requirements within the '
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| TS. This change is consistent with NUREG-1431.
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| L.17 CTS 3.4.6.1 requires grab samples be obtained every 24 hours when the containment atmosphere gaseous radioactivity monitor is i inoperable and permits continaed operation in this condition for '
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| 30 days. ITS 3.4.15 allows a water inventory balance to be performed as an alternative to the current required action of obtaining and analyzing grab samples of containment atmosphere.
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| This is acceptable since both actions provide a mechanism to detect RCS leakage. The ITS actions also permit indefinite operation with the containment atmosphere gaseous radioactivity monitor inoperable provided these compensatory actions are performed. This change is acceptable since diverse indication of RCS leakage is maintained by the operable containment floor and equipment sump monitoring system and either the containment ventilation condensate drain tank (CVCDT) monitor or containment atmosphere particulate monitor. The actions limit operation to 30 days in this condition if both the containment atmosphere particulate radioactivity monitor and the CVCDT are inoperable or McGuire Units 1 and 2 Page L - 5 Supplement 54l l
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| | |
| No Significant Hazards Consideration Section 3.4 - Reactor Coolant System LESS RESTRICTIVE CHANGE L.12 The McGuire Nuclear Station is converting to the Improved Technical Specifications (ITS) as outlined in NUREG-1431, " Standard Technical Specifications, Westinghouse Plants." The proposed change involves making the current Technical Specifications (CTS) less restrictive. Below is the description of this less restrictive change and the No Significant Hazards s l Consideration for conversion to NUREG-1431.
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| CTS 3.4.6.2 actions for one or more flowpaths with leakage from one or more PIVs greater than the limit require isolation via two valves in 4 hours or a unit shutdown. ITS 3.4.14 permits isolation with one valve within the first 4 hours and to restore leakage within limits in 72 hours. The unit design does not support closure of a second valve without resulting in two ECCS trains becoming inoperable, therefore, the existing shutdown option is required. The ITS actions allow 72 hours to evaluate the condition and attempt to restore the leakage within limits and avoid an unnecessary plant transient. The proposed change additional time is acceptable on the basis that isolation by a single valve for no more that 72 hours provides an acceptable level of safety based on the low probability of the second isolationed valve failing during the 72 hours.
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| In accordance with the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, the McGuire Nuclear Station has evaluated this proposed Technical Specifications change and determined it does not represent a significant hazards consideration.
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| The following is provided in support of this conclusion.
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| : 1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequence of an accident previously evaluated?
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| The proposed change provides additional time to evaluate and restore an RCS PIV which exhibits excessive leakage after isolating the PIV with one valve. The additional time is based on the relatively low likelihood of another isolation valve failure within the additional time provided by the proposed Completion Time. The low likelihood of another valve failing assures that the change does not involve a significant increase in the probability of an accident previously evaluated. The change does not affect the consequence of an accident previously evaluated since one valve provides adequate isolation capability for the short period of time it alone provides isolation.
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| Only the period of time provided to close the second valve is changed.
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| McGuire Units 1 and 2 Page 26N of 5868 Supplement 54 l
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| l N2 Significant Hazards Consideration Secticn 3.4 - Riacter Coolant System i
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| l 2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
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| l The proposed change does not require the installation of any new or different kind of equipment. Nor does the change involve any significantly new or different MODE of operation of the plant.
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| Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new or l different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. J l 3. Does this change involve a significant reduction in a margin of l safety? ,
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| The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a l margin of safety since the inoperable RCS PIV is required to be i isolated by another valve which meets the same leakage limit requirements. The low likelihood of a second valve failure assures that no significant reduction in a margin of safety exists. ;
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| i l
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| l l l l
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| l i
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| McGuire Units 1 and 2 Page 2727 of 5658 Supplement 54 l l
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| l
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| ~
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| McGuire & Catawba improved TS Review Comments ITS Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant Systems 3.4.14-05 Bases JFD 4 STS 3.4.14 LCO Bases, page B 3.4-80 ITS 3.4.14 LCO Bases The STS Bases defines RCS PlV leakage as " identified leakage," while the ITS defines it as
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| " unidentified leakage." The unidentified leakage limit is 1 gpm. T,he identified leakage limit is 10 gpm. The PlV leakage limit is 5 gpm. It seems that if leakage is known to be PlV leakage it is identified, and since the PlV leakage limit does not exceed the identified leakage limit i while it does exceed the unidentified limit, that the ITS has incorrectly categorized PlV leakage. Comment: Justify the change in categorization of PlV leakage.
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| DEC Response:
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| See response to comment 3.4.14-02.
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| 4 I
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| I mc3_cr_3.4 22 June 8,1998 l
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| --____-___a
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| McGuire & Catawba improved TS Review Comments i ITS Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant Systems 3.4.15, RCS Leakage Detection System No comments on ITS requirements for the RCS leakage detection system 3.4.16, RCS Specific Activity No comments on ITS requirements on RCS specific activity. ',
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| 3.4.17, Reactor Coolant Loops Test Exceptions No comments on ITS reactor coolant loop test exceptions.
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| mc3_cr_3.4 23 June 8,1998
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| McGuire & Ca,tawba Improved TS Ravhw Comments ITS Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant Systems
| |
| ; 3.4, Additional Changes 3.4-01 STS 3.4.5 Action D STS SR 3.4.5.3 l ITS 3.4.5 Action D ITS SR 3.4.5.3
| |
| % l The STS requires two RCS loops to be operable in MODE 4 and' specifies one or both to also be in operation based on the ability for rod withdrawal. ITS 3.4.5 requires three RCS loops to be operable, consistent with the safety analysis. STS action D addresses the case where two RCS loops are inoperable. This station has 4 RCS loops, therefore, the appropriate ITS condition D is for three reauired RCS loops inoperable, consistent with the LCO statement.
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| STS SR 3.4.5.3 requries a verification of indicated power to the non-operating pump. ITS SR j 3.4.5.3 must also address the case where two RCS loops are not in operation, an allowed by the LCO statement. Therefore, the ITS SR 3.4.5.3 is revised to account for this case.
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| 1 i
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| mc3_cr_3.4 24 June 8,1998 I _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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| ! RCS Loops-MODE 3 3.4.5 i ACTIONS (continued) !
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| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME )
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| 1 C. One or two required C.1 Restore required RCS 1 hour !
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| RCS loop (s) not in loop (s) to operation, operation and Rod Control System capable E of rod withdrawal. 1 C.2 De-energize all - 1 hour !
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| control rod drivb !
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| mechanisms (CRDMs). l i
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| s l
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| D. Three required RCS D.1 De-energize all Immediately l l
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| loops inoperable. CRDMs.
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| M MD, No RCS loop in D.2 Suspend all Immediately i operation. operations involving !
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| a reduction of RCS boron concentration.
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| MQ D.3 Initiate action to Immediately I restore one RCS loop l to OPERABLE status i and operation.
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| l l
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| SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY j SR 3.4.5.1 Verify required RCS loops are in operation. 12 hours l l
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| (continued) l I
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| l McGuire Unit 1 3.4-13 Supplement 5 l '
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| L_-.----- - - - . _ _ _ _ _
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| RCS Loops -MODE 3 3.4.5' SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
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| SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.5.2 Verify steam generator secondary side water 12 hours levels are a 12% narrow range for required RCS loops.
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| SR 3.4.5.3 Verify correct breaker alignment and 7 days indicated power are available to the l required pumps that are not in operation.
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| l l
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| l l McGuire Unit 1 3.4-14 Supplement 5
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| | |
| RCS Loops-MODE 3 3.4.5 ACTIONS (continued)
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. One or two required C.1 Restore required RCS 1 hour RCS loop (s) not in loop (s) to operation, operation and Rod Control . System capable DR of rod withdrawal.
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| l C.2 De-energize all ' 1 hour control rod driva mechanisms (CRDMs).
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| D. Three required RCS D.1 De-energize all Innediately 'l loops inoperable. CRDMs.
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| ! l No RCS loop in D.2 Suspend all Innediately operation. operations involving i a reduction of RCS
| |
| : boron concentration.
| |
| M D.3 Initiate action to Immediately
| |
| ; restore one RCS loop to OPERABLE status and operation.
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| SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.5.1 Verify required RCS loops are in operation. 12 hours (continued) ,
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| 1 McGuire Unit 2 3.4-13 Supplement 5 l
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| | |
| RCS Loops-MODE 3 3.4.5 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (c'ontinued)
| |
| SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.5.2 Verify steam generator secondary side water 12 hours levels are a 12% narrow range for required RCS loops.
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| SR 3.4.5.3 Verify correct breaker alignment and 7 days indicated power are available to the l required pumps that are not i.1 operation.
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| l l
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| i l
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| l McGuire Unit 2 3.4-14 Supplement 5 u______ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _
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| RCS Loops-MODE 3 B 3.4.5 BASES l
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| ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued) .'
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| If one or two required RCS loop (s) are not in operation, and the Rod Control System is capable of rod withdrawal, the Required Action is either to restore the required RCS loop (s) to operation or to de-energize all CRDMs by opening the RTBs or de-energizing the motor generator (MG) sets.
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| When the Rod Control System is capab,le of rod withdrawal, it is postulated that a por.ar excursion could occur in the '
| |
| event of an inadvertent control rod withdrawal. This mandates having the heat transfer capacity of three RCS loops in operation. If only one or two loop (s) are in operation, the CRDMs must be deenergized. The Completion Times of 1 hour to restore the required RCS loop (s) to operation or de-energize all CRDMs is adequate to perform ,
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| these operations in an orderly manner without exposing the i unit to risk for an undue time period.
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| D.1. D.2. and 0.3 l If three required RCS loops are inoperable or no RCS loop is in operation, except as during conditions permitted by the Note in the LC0 section, all CRDMs must be de-energized by opening the RT8s or de-energizing the MG sets. All i operations involving a reduction of RCS boron concentration !
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| must be suspended, and action to restore one of the RCS l loops to OPERABLE status and operation must be initiated.
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| Boron dilution requires forced circulation for proper mixing, and opening the RTBs or de-energizing the MG sets removes the possibility of an inadvertent rod withdrawal.
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| < The intnediate Completion Time reflects the importance of maintaining operation for heat removal. The action to restore must be continued until one loop is restored to OPERABLE status and operation.
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| SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.5.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR requires verification every 12 hours that the required loops are in operation. Verification includes flow
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| < rate, temperature, and pump status monitoring, which help ensure that forced flow is providing heat removas. The Frequency of 12 hours is sufficient considering other (continued)
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| B 3.4-26 Supplement 5 l McGuire Unit 1
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| | |
| RCS Loops-MODE 3 B 3.4.5 BASES i
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| ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued)
| |
| If one or two required RCS loop (s) are not in operation, and the Rod Control System is capable of rod withdrawal, the Required Action is either to restore the required RCS loop (s) to operation or to de-energize all CRDMs by opening the RTBs or de-energizing the motor' generator (MG) sets. ,
| |
| When the Rod Control System is capab]e of. rod withdrawal, it j is postulated that a power excursion could occur in the event of an inadvertent ccatrol rod withdrawal. This mandates having the heat transfer capacity of three RCS loops in operation. If only one or two loop (s) are in ,
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| operation, the CRDMs must be deenergized. The Completion !
| |
| Times of 1 hour to restore the required RCS loop (s) to operation or de-energize all CRDMs is adequate to perform these operations in an orderly manner without exposing the unit to risk for an undue time period.
| |
| D.1. D.2. and D.3 l If three required RCS loops are inoperable or no RCS loop is in operation, except as during conditions permitted by the Note in the LC0 section, all CODMs must be de-energized by-opening the RTBs or de-er.ergizing the MG sets. All operations involving a reduction of RCS boron concentration must be suspended, and action to restore one of the RCS loops to OPERABLE status and operation must be initiated.
| |
| Boron dilution requires forced circidation for proper l mixing, and opening the RTBs or de-energizing the MG sets removes the possibility of an inadvertent rod withdrawal.
| |
| The immediate Completion Time reflects the importance of maintaining operation for heat removal. The action to restore must be continued until one loop is restored to OPERABLE status and operation.
| |
| SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.5.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR requires verification every 12 hours that the required loops are in operation. Verification includes flow rate, temperature, and pump status monitoring, which help ensure that forced flow is providing heat removal. The Frequency of 12 hours is sufficient considering other l
| |
| (continued) 1 i
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| I B 3.4-26 Supplement 5 l McGuire Unit 2 I - - _ - __-
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| RCS Loops-HODE 3 3.4.5 ACTIONS (continued) j CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
| |
| > - sn;% @ _
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| l h C. One, required RCS loom.
| |
| _not in operatio .
| |
| C.1 Restore required RCS 1 to operation.
| |
| 1 hour m or Tr u creake l 16/ lre clo tana Too wntrol E (4
| |
| _p System capable of rod y withdrawal. C.2 De energize all 1 hour i control rod drive a !
| |
| mechanisms (CRDHs).
| |
| 1 i
| |
| D. s D.1 De energi7e all Imediately I inoperable. CRDHs.
| |
| E E .
| |
| 1 No RCS loop in D.2 Suspend all Immediately l operation, operations involving ,
| |
| a reduction of RCS I boron concentration.
| |
| E D.3 Initiate action to Immediately restore one RCS loop i to OPERABLE status I and operation.
| |
| 1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l SURVtlLLANGL ggy j SR 3.4.5.1 Verify required RCS loops are in operation. 12 hours l l
| |
| l
| |
| ~
| |
| (continued) l W goa ,
| |
| 3.4 9 Rev 1. 04/07/95 weAu 1
| |
| l l
| |
| | |
| RCS Loops-H00E 3
| |
| ( -
| |
| 3.4.5 SURVEILLMCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) i SURVEILLMCE FREQUENCY l i
| |
| SR 3.4.5.2 Verify steam ' rator secondary side water 12 hours levelsareh( or required RCS loops.
| |
| arrow ro s e.)
| |
| : SR 3.4.5.3 Verify correct breaker alignment and 7* days l indicated power are available to the l
| |
| h required ha t in operation. l 1
| |
| l l
| |
| 1
| |
| % 3.4 10 Rev 1. 04/07/95 McGw
| |
| | |
| RCS Loops-MODE 3 B 3.4.5 BASES''
| |
| ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued) the Required Action is either to restore the required RCS
| |
| (~ 1 o operation or to de energize all CRDMs by opening the s_or de energizing the motor generator (MG) sets. When the a nsmreAn rnamosea ossition anmRod Control System 5 capab'e o" rod withdrawal. it is postulated that a power ,.
| |
| excursio:t could occur in the event of an inadvertent control N rod withdrawal This mandates having the heat transf r #.
| |
| capacity of GibRCS loops in r Ifonly oop O4"t r- or inoperation,thej5)must TheCompletionTim@es@) ort.)
| |
| a nour to restore the requi roopi'to ooeration r~
| |
| # " M "'p>
| |
| da energize all CRDMs is adequate to perfora these s operations in an orderly manner withotrt exposing the uni o
| |
| _ risk for an undue time period. _
| |
| D.1. D.2. and D.3 J (WN f oops are inoperable or no RCS loop is in C5 If oper ion, except as during conditions permitted by the Note in the LCO section, all CRDMs must be de energized by opening the RTBs or de energizing the MG sets. All operations involving a reduction of RCS boron concentration must be sus , and action to restore one of the RCS loops to OP LE status and operation must be initiated.
| |
| Boron dilution requires forced circulation for proper .;
| |
| mixing, and opening the RTBs or de energizing the MG sets removes the possibility of an inadvertent rod withdrawal.
| |
| The imediate Completion Time reflects the importance of maintaining operation for heat removal. The action to restore must De continued until one loop is restored to OPERABLE status and operation.
| |
| SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.5.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR requires verification every 12 hours that the required loops are in operation. Verification includes flow rate, temperature, and ptmp status monitoring, which help ensure that forced flow is providing heat removal. The Frequency of 12 hours is sufficient considering other indications and alarus available to t'. c,erator in the control room to monitor RCS loop performance.
| |
| l (continued)
| |
| M ,
| |
| B 3.4 25 Rev 1. 04/07/95
| |
| ~7h.t. W l
| |
| l i
| |
| | |
| McGuire & Catawba impr;ved TS Rzvhw Ccmments ITS Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant Systems 1 3.4, Additional Changes 3.4-02 STS Bases SR 3.4.8.2 ITS Bases SR 3.4.8.2 SR 3.4.8.2 requires verification of correct breaker alignment and indicated power are available to the required RHR pump not in operation. The Bases references additional pumps placed in operation. Catawba and McGuire only have two RHR pumps per' unit. The LCO already requires one pump to be in operation which leaves only one pump to be placed in operation.
| |
| Therefore, the Bases is revised to reflect this singular condition.
| |
| l
| |
| ! j l
| |
| I mc3_cr_3.4 25 June 8,1998
| |
| | |
| RCS Loops-M00t 5. Loops Not Filled B 3.4.8 l
| |
| i l
| |
| BASES ACTIONS B.1 and B.2 !
| |
| (continued)
| |
| If no required RHR loops are OPERABLE or in operation, ,
| |
| except during conditions permitted by Note 1, all operations i
| |
| ! involving a reduction of RCS boron concentration must be l suspended and action must be initiated immediately to l restore an RHR loop to OPERABLE status and operation. Boron .
| |
| dilution requires forced circulatiori for uniform dilution, I and the margin to criticality must not be reduced in this i
| |
| type of operation. The imediate Completion Time reflects the importance of maintaining operation for heat removal. 1 The action to restore must continue until one loop is restored to OPERABLE status and operation. ,
| |
| SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.8.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR requires verification every 12 hours that one loop is in operation. Verification includes flow rate, temperature, or pump status monitoring, which help ensure that forced flow is providing heat removal. The Frequency of 12 hours is sufficient considering other indications and i alarms available to the operator in the control room to
| |
| ; monitor RHR loop performance. l q
| |
| SR 3.4.8.2 Verification that the required number of pumps are OPERABLE l ensures that an additional pump can be placed in operation, if needed, to maintain decay heat removal and reactor coolant circulation. Verification is performed by verifying proper breaker alignment and power available to the required
| |
| : pumps. The Frequency of 7 days is considered reasonable in view of other administrative controls available and has been shown to be acceptable by operating experience, i
| |
| REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50.36. Technical Specifications, (c)(2)(ii).
| |
| B 3.4-40 Supplement 5 l McGuire Unit 1 l
| |
| | |
| RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops Not Filled B 3.4.8 BASES ACTIONS- B.1 and B.2 (continue 9 If no required RHR loops are OPERABLE or in operation, except during conditions permitted by Note 1, all operations involving a reduction of RCS boron concentration must be ,
| |
| suspended and action must be initiated innediately to l
| |
| , restore an RHR loop to OPERABLE status and operation. Boron dilution requires forced circulation,for uniform dilution, and the margin to criticality must not be reduced in this type of operation. The innediate Completion Time reflects the importance of maintaining operation for heat removal.
| |
| The action to restore must continue until one loop is restored to OPERABLE status and operation.
| |
| SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.8.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR requires verification every 12 hours that one loop is in operation. Verification includes flow rate, i
| |
| temperature, or pump status monitoring, which help ensure that forced flow is providing heat removal. The Frequency of 12 hours is sufficient considering other indications and i alarms available to the operator in the control room to '
| |
| monitor RHR loop performance, l
| |
| SR 3.4.8.2 i l
| |
| Verification that the required number of pumps are OPERABLE l l ensures that an additional pump can be placed in operation, l i
| |
| if needed, to maintain decay heat removal and reactor I coolant circulation. Verification is performed by verifying proper breaker alignment and power available to the required pumps. The Frequency of 7 days is considered reasonable in view of other administrative controls available and has been shown to be acceptable by operating experience.
| |
| REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50.36, Technical Specifications, '(c)(2)(ii).
| |
| l McGuire Unit 2 B 3.4-40 Supplement 5 1
| |
| I
| |
| | |
| RCS Loops-H00E 5. Loops Not Filled l B 3.4.8 BASES ACTIONS B.1 and B.2 (continued)
| |
| If no required RHR loops are OPERABLE or in operation, except during conditions permitted by Note 1. all operations involving a reduction of RCS boron concentration must be suspended and action must be initiated immediately to .
| |
| restore an RR loop to OPERABLE status and operation. Boron
| |
| . dilution requires forced circulation for unifons dilution, and the margin to criticality must not be neduced in this type of operation. The immediate Completion Time reflects the importance of maintaining operation for heat removal.
| |
| The action to restore must continue until one loop is restored to OPERABLE status and operation.
| |
| I SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.8.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR requires verification every 12 hours that one loop is in operation. Verification includes flow rate, temperature, or pump status monitoring which help ensure that forced flow is providing heat removal. The Frequency of 12 hours is sufficient considering other indications and alares available to the operator in the control room to monitor RHR loop performance.
| |
| 1 SR 3.4.8.2 Verification hat the required number of pumps are OPERABLE I i ensures that additional pungt can be placed in operation, i j 1 needed, to maintain decay hdat removal and reactor coolant circulation. Verification is performed by verifying proper breaker alignment and power available to the required pumps.
| |
| The Frequency of 7 days is considered reasonable in view of other administrative controls available and has been shown to be acceptable by operating experience.
| |
| REFERENCES @ l.106ft h%decl^d*I SP N kib ,(LXtXd), h l MS ,
| |
| B 3.4 39 Rev 1. 04/07/95 wacue i
| |
| L
| |
| | |
| McGuire & Catawba improved TS Review Comrnents l ITS Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant Systems 3.4, Additional Changes 3.4-03 STS Bases 3.4.11 Applicability ITS Bases 3.4.11 Applicability The last paragraph of the Applicability Section of the Pressurizer PORVs references the reduced PORV setpoint for LTOP in Modes 4,5, and 6. LTOP re,quirements which are addressed in LCO 3.4.12 for Mode 4 should indicate Mode 4 s; 300*F (for McGuire,285' F for Catawba). The Bases is revised accordingly.
| |
| mc3_cr_3.4 26 June 8,1998
| |
| | |
| Pressurizer PORVs B 3.4.11 BASES (continued)
| |
| APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the PORV and its block valve are required to be OPERABLE to limit the potential for a small break LOCA through the flow path. The most likely cause for a PORV small break LOCA is a result of a pressure increase transient that.causes the PORV to open. . Imbalances in the energy output of the core and heat removal by the secondary system can cause the RCS pressure to increase to the PORV opening setpoint. The most rapid increases will occur at the higher operating power and press,ure conditions of MODES 1 and 2.
| |
| Pressure increases are less prominent in MODE 3 because the core input energy is reduced, but the RCS pres L re is high.
| |
| Therefore, the LC0 is applicable in MODES 1, 2, and 3. The LC0 is not applicable in MODE 4 when both pressure and core energy are decreased and the pressure surges become much less significant. The PORV setpoint is reduced for LTOP in MODES 4 s 300*F, 5, and 6 with the reactor vessel head in l place. LC0 3.4.12 addresses the PORV requirements in these MODES.
| |
| ACTIONS Note 1 has been added to clarify that all pressurizer PORVs are treated as separate entities, each with separate Completion Times (i.e., the Completion Time is on a l component basis). The exception for LC0 3.0.4, Note 2, permits entry into MODES 1, 2, and 3 to perform cycling of the PORVs or block valves to verify their OPERABLE status.
| |
| Testing is not performed in lower MODES.
| |
| 8.d With the PORVs inoperable and capable of being manually cycled, either the PORVs must be restored or the flow path isolated within 1 hour. The block valves should be closed but power must be maintained to the associated block valves, since removal of power would render the block valve inoperable. Although a PORV may be designated inoperable, it may be able to be manually opened and closed, and therefore, able to perform its function. PORV inoperability may be due to seat leakage or other causes that do not l l
| |
| prevent manual use and do not create a possibility for a (continued)
| |
| McGuire Unit 1 B 3.4-53 Supplement 5 l l
| |
| L_ ____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . _ . _ _ _ _
| |
| | |
| Pressurizer PORVs B 3.4.11 BASES (continued)
| |
| APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the PORV and its block valve are required to be OPERABLE to limit the potential for a small break LOCA through the flow path. The most likely cause for a PORV small break LOCA is a result of a pressure increase transient that causes the PORV to open. Imbalances in the energy output of the core and heat removal by the secondary system can cause the RCS pressure to increase to the PORV opening setpoint. The most rapid increases will occur at the higher operating power and pressbre conditions of MODES 1 and 2.
| |
| Pressure increases are less prominent in MODE 3 because the core input energy is reduced, but the RCI pressure is high.
| |
| Therefore, the LC0 is applicable in MODES 1, 2, and 3. The LC0 is not applicable in MODE 4 when both pressure and core energy are decreased and the pressure surges become much less significant. The PORV setpoint is reduced for LTOP in MODES 4 s 300*F, 5, and 6 with the reactor vessel head in l place. LC0 3.4.12 addresses the PORV requirements in these MODES.
| |
| ACTIONS Note I has been added to clarify that all pressurizer PORVs are treated as separate entities, each with separate Completion Times (i.e., the Completion Time is on a component basis). The exception for LC0 3.0.4, Note 2, permits entry into MODES 1, 2, and 3 to perform cycling of the PORVs or block valves to verify their OPERABLE status.
| |
| Testing is not performed in lower MODES.
| |
| L.1 With the PORVs inoperable and capable of being manually cycled, either the PORVs must be restored or the flow path isolated within I hour. The block valves should be closed but power must be maintained to the associated block valves, since removal of power would render the block valve inoperable. Although a PORV may be designated inoperable, it may be able to be manually opened and closed, and therefore, able to perfonn its function. PORV inoperability may be due to seat leakage or other causes that do not l prevent manual use and N not create a possibility for a (continued) !
| |
| McGuire Unit 2 B 3.4-53 Supplement 5 l
| |
| )
| |
| i
| |
| | |
| Pressurizer PORVs B 3.4.11 BASES (continued)
| |
| APPLICABILITY In MODES 1. 2. and 3. the PORV and its block valve are required to be OPERABLE to limit the potential for a small break LOCA through the flow path. The most likely cause for a PORV small break LOCA is a result of a pressure increase transient that causes the PORV to open. Imbalances in the energy output of the core and heat removal by the secondary system can cause the RCS pres ure to increase to the PORV opening setpoint. -Tha most rapid increases will occur at i the higher operatino oower and a=""= maditi = M --
| |
| l MODES 1 and 2 I;lu!F PURys a also requir obeOPFJIAf.LE 1 n pou 1. 2.Axl 3 to inize challe stothef a // l ppdssurizer>(fety val f -
| |
| 1 i
| |
| Pressure increases are less prominent in MODE 3 because the core input energy is reduced but the RCS pressure is high.
| |
| Therefore, the LCO is applicable in MODES 1. 2. and 3. The LCO is not applicable in H00E 4 when both pressure and core energy are decreased and the pressure surges become much less s'anificant.
| |
| MODES 4 5. and 6 The PORV setpoint vessel is reduced for LTOP in [
| |
| f3008 with the reactor head in place.
| |
| LCO 3.4.12 addresses the PORY requirements in these MODES. I I
| |
| ACTIONS Note 1 has been added to clarify that all pressurizer PORVs are treated as separate entities, each with separate Completion Times (i.e.. the Completion Time is on a cv==Asent basis). The exception for LC0 3.0.4. Note 2 pennits entry into MODES 1. 2. and 3 to perform cycling of i the PORVs or block valves to verify their OPERABLE status.
| |
| Testing is not performed in lower MODES.
| |
| .A_J With the PORVs inoperable and capable of being manually i cycled either the PORVs must be restored or the flow path I isolated within 1 hour. The block valves should be closed but power must be maintained to the associated block valves.
| |
| .dnce removal of power would render the block valve inoperable. Although a PORY may be designated inoperable.
| |
| it may be able to be manually opened and closed, and therefore, able to perform its function. PORY inoperability may be due to seat l_eakagej msu, .enta6.un rg./
| |
| tayamnatic controu.rnuviems p otner causes 6na6 ao not ,
| |
| l prevent manual use ano ao not create a possibility for a ,
| |
| (continued) 1 I
| |
| MS . B 3.4 52 Rev 1. 04/07/95 !
| |
| N ,
| |
| i i
| |
| k I
| |
| | |
| McGuira & Catawba improvsd TS Review Comments ITS Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant Systems 3.4, Additional Changes 3.4-04 STS Bases 3.4.11 Applicable Safety Analysis, Applicability, Action A.1 ITS Bases 3.4.11 Applicable Safety Analysis, Applicability, Action A.1 Operatien of the RCS PORVs in Modes 1-4 is assumed to be manualin the cafety analysis.
| |
| No credit is taken for automatic actuation of the PORVs for accident mitigation in these modes. The Bases incorrectly implies that a failure of the automdtic operation of the PORVs results in PORV inoperability. This is inconsistent with the LCO and associated surveillance, and the safety analysis. The ITS Bases have been revised to correct this error.
| |
| \
| |
| mc3_cr._3.4 27 June 8,1998
| |
| \
| |
| | |
| 'l Pressurizer PORVs B 3.4.11 BASES BACKGROUND- the PORVs minimize challenges to the pressurizer safety (continued) valves and also may be used for low temperature overpressure protection (LTOP). See LC0 3.4.12 " Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) System."
| |
| APPLICABLE Plant operators employ the PORVs to depressurize the RCS in SAFETY ANALYSES response to certain plant transients' if normal pressurizer spray is not available. For the Steam Generator Tube
| |
| . Rupture (SGTR) event, the safety analysis assumes that manual operator actions are required to mitigate the event.
| |
| A loss:of offsite power is assumed to accompany the evert, and thus, normal pressurizer spray is unavailable to reduce l RCS pressure. The PORVs are assumed to be used for manual RCS depressurization, which is one of the steps performed to equalize the primary and secondary pressures in order to terminate the primary to secondary break flow and the i radioactive releases from the affected steam generator.
| |
| : l. The PORVs are assumed to operate in safety analyses for events that result in increasing RCS pressure for which departure from nucleate boiling _ ratio (DNBR) criteria are critical. By assuming PORV automatic actuation, the primary pressure remains below the high pressurizer pressure trip setpoint; thus, the DNBR calculation is more conservative.
| |
| Events that assume this condition include uncontrolled bank-withdrawal at power, uncontrolled bank withdrawal from subcritical, and single rod withdrawal at power (Ref. 2)'.
| |
| Pressurizer PORVs satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 j (Ref. 3). . )
| |
| t LC0 The LC0 requires the PORVs and their associated block valves to be OPERABLE for manual operation to mitigate the effects associated with an SGTR.
| |
| By maintaining two PORVs and their associated block valves i OPERABLE, the single failure criterion is satisfied. Three PORVs are required to be OPERABLE to meet RCS pressure L boundary requirements. The block valves are available to l- isolate the flow path through either a failed open PORV or a PORV with excessive leakage. Satisfying the LC0 helps minimize challenges to fission product barriers.
| |
| (continued) l McGuire Unit 1 B 3.4-52 Supplement 5 L.
| |
| | |
| Pressurizer PORVs.
| |
| B 3.4.11 -
| |
| BASES (continued)
| |
| APPLICABILITY- In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the PORY and its block valve are required to be OPERABLE =to limit the potential for a small break LOCA through the flow path. The most likely cause for a PORV.small break LOCA is a result of a pressure increase ,
| |
| transient that causes the PORV to open. Imbalances in the i energy output of the core and heat removal by the secondary i system can cause the RCS pressure to increase to the PORV opening setpoint. The most rapid increases will occur at the. higher operating power and press'ure conditions'of !
| |
| MODES 1 and 2.
| |
| Pressure increases are less prominent in MODE.3 because the core input energy is reduced, but the RCS pressure is high.. l Therefore, the LC0 is applicable in MODES 1, 2, and 3. The LC0 is not applicable in MODE 4 when both pressure and core-energy are decreased and the pressure surges become much less significant. The PORV setpoint is reduced for LTOP in MODES 4 s 300'F, 5, and 6 with the reactor vessel head in l place. LCO 3.4.12 addresses the PORV requirements in these MODES.
| |
| ACTIONS Note 1=has been added to clarify that all pressurizer PORVs are treated as separate entities, each with separate
| |
| . Completion Times (i.e., the Completion Time is on a component basis). The exception for LC0 ~3.0.4, Note 2, permits entry into MODES 1, 2, and 3 to perform cycling of
| |
| --the PORVs or block valves to verify their OPERABLE status.
| |
| Testing is not performed in lower MODES.
| |
| h.l With the PORVs inoperable and capable of being manually cycled,~ either the PORVs must be restored or the flow path isolated within 1 hour. The block valves should be closed but power must be maintained to the associated block valves, since removal of power would render the block valve l inoperable. Although a PORV may be designated inoperable, it may be able to be manually opened and closed, and therefore, able to perform its function. PORV inoperability may be due to seat leakage or other causes that do not l l prevent manual use and do not create a possibility for a
| |
| ! l j' l h
| |
| (continued) j McGuire Unit 1 B 3.4-53 Supplement 5 l
| |
| | |
| Pressurizer PORVs B 3.4.11 BASES ACTIONS A d (continued) small break LOCA. For these reasons, the block valve may be closed but the Action requires power be maintained to the valve. This Condition is only intended to permit operation of the plant for a limited period of time not to exceed the next refueling outage (MODE 6) so that maintenance can be performed on the PORVs to eliminate.the problem condition.
| |
| Normally, the PORVs should be available for automatic j mitigation of overpressure events and should be returned to OPERABLE status prior to entering startup (MODE 2).
| |
| Quick access to the PORV for pressure control can be made j when power remains on the closed block valve. The ,
| |
| Completion Time of 1 hour is based on plant operating experience that has shown that minor problems can be corrected or closure accomplished in this time period.
| |
| B.1. B.2. and B.3 l If one. or two PORVs are inoperable and not capable of being manually cycled, it must be either restored or isolated by closing the associated block valve and removing the power to the associated block valve. If one PORV is inoperable as a result of the Required Action C.2,. then Required Actions B.1 )
| |
| and B.2 are not applicable. The Completion Times of I hour are reasonable, based on challenges to the PORVs during this J time period, and provide the operator adequate time to correct the situation. If the inoperable valve cannot be restored to OPERABLE status, it must be isolated within the specified time. Because there is one PORV that remains ,
| |
| l OPERABLE, an additional 72 hours is provided to restore an i '
| |
| additional PORV to OPERABLE status when two PORVs are inoperable. If the PORV cannot be restored within this !
| |
| additional time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in {
| |
| which the LC0 does not apply, as required by Condition D. ]
| |
| With only one PORV inoperable, operation may continue ]
| |
| provided Required Actions B.1 and B.2 are met.
| |
| l C.1 and C.2 i
| |
| If one block valve is inoperable, then it is necessary to either restore the block talve to OPERABLE status within the (continued)
| |
| B 3.4-54 Supplement 5 l McGuire Unit 1 l
| |
| | |
| -Pressurizer PORVs l B 3.4.11 -l BASES ~-
| |
| SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.11,1 .
| |
| REQUIREMENTS- !
| |
| -(continued) The Surveillance demonstrates that the emergency nitrogen supply can be' provided and is performed-by transferring power from nornal air supply to emergency nitrogen supply and cycling the valves. The Frequency of-18 months is based on a' typical refueling cycle and industry accepted practice.
| |
| . REFERENCES 1. Regulatory Guide 1.32, February 1977.
| |
| l 2. UFSAR, Section 15.4.
| |
| : 3. 10 CFR 50.36. Technical Specifications, (c)(2)(ii).
| |
| I
| |
| : 4. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI. l
| |
| : 5. Resolution of Generic Issue 70, " Power-0perated Relief Valve and Block Valve Reliability," and Generic Issue 94, " Additional Low-Temperature Overpressure Protection for Light-Water Reactors," Pursuant to l
| |
| 10 CFR 50.54(f) (Generic Letter 90-06).
| |
| l l- :
| |
| l-p V
| |
| ] McGuire _ Unit 1 B 3.4-58 Supplement 5 L--._.___-_'__ ._
| |
| | |
| ' Pressurizer PORVs B 3.4.11 BASES I
| |
| BACKGROUND ~the PORVs minimize challenges to the pressurizer safety (continued) valves and also may be used for_ low temperature overpressure protection (LTOP). See'LC0 3.4.12 " Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) System."
| |
| APPLICABLE. Plant operators employ the PORVs to depressurize the RCS in SAFETY ANALYSES response to certain plant transients'if normal pressurizer spray is not available. For the Steam Generator Tube i Rupture (SGTR) event the safety analysis assumes that manual operator actions are required to mitigate the event.
| |
| A loss of offsite power. is assumed to accompany the event, and thus, normal pressurizer spray is unavailable to reduce
| |
| -l RCS pressure. The PORVs are assumed to be used for manual RCS depressurization, which.is one of the steps' performed to equalize the primary and secondary pressures in order to terminate the primary to secondary break flow and the radioactive. releases from the affected steam generator.
| |
| : l. The PORVs are assumed to operate in safety analyses for events that result in increasing RCS pressure for which departure from nucleate boiling ratio (DNBR) criteria are cri tical . By assuming PORV automatic actuation, the primary pressure remains below the high pressurizer pressure trip setpoint; thus, the DNBR calculation is'more conservative.'
| |
| Events that assume this condition include uncontrolled bank withdrawal at power . uncontrolled bank withdrawal from subcritical.: and single' rod withdrawal at power (Ref. 2).
| |
| Pressurize,* PORVs satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (Ref. 3).
| |
| >LCO The LC0 requires the PORVs and their associated block valves to be OPERABLE for manual operation to mitigate the effects associated with an SGTR.
| |
| By maintaining two PORVs and their associated block valves OPERABLE, the s' ingle failure criterion is satisfied. Three PORVs are required to be OPERABLE to meet RCS pressure E
| |
| boundary requirements. The block valves are available to isolate the flow path through either a failed open PORV or a l PORV with excessive leakage. Satisfying the LC0 helps- i minimize challenges to fission product barriers.
| |
| (continued) g lf McGuire Unit 2 B 3.4-52 Supplement 5 g
| |
| | |
| Pressurizer PORVs B 3.4.11 BASES (continued)
| |
| APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the PORV and its block valve are required to be OPERABLE to limit the potential for a small break LOCA through the flow path. The most likely cause for a PORV small break LOCA is a result of a pressure increase transient that causes the PORV to open. Imbalances in the energy output of the core and heat removal by the secondary system can cause the RCS pressure to increase to the PORV opening setpoint. The most rapid increases will occur at the higher operating power and pressbre conditions of MODES 1 and 2.
| |
| Pressure increases are less prominent in MODE 3 because the core input energy is reduced, but the RCS pressure is high.
| |
| Therefore, the LC0 is applicable in MODES 1, 2, and 3. The LCO is not applicable in MODE 4 when both pressure and core energy are decreased and the pressure surges become much less significant. The PORV setpoint is reduced for LTOP in MODES 4 s 300*F, 5, and 6 with the reactor vessel head in l place. LC0 3.4.12 addresses the PORV requirements in these MODES.
| |
| ACTIONS Note 1 has been added to clarify that all pressurizer PORVs are treated as separate entities, each with separate Completion Times (i.e., the Completion Time is on a component basis). The exception for LC0 3.0.4, Note 2, permits entry into MODES 1, 2, and 3 to perform cycling of the PORVs or block valves to verify their OPERABLE status.
| |
| Testing is not performed in lower MODES.
| |
| Ad With the PORVs inoperable and capable of being manually cycled, either the PORVs must be restored or the flow path isolated within 1 hour. The block valves should be closed but power must be maintained to the associated block valves, since removal of power would render the block valve inoperable. Although a PORV may be designated inoperable, it may be able to be manually opened and closed, and therefore, able to perform its function. PORV inoperability may be due to seat leakage or other causes that do not l prevent manual use and do not create a possibility for a (continued)
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| McGuire Unit 2 8 3.4-53 Supplement 5 l
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| | |
| Pressurizer PORVs B 3.4.11 BASES' 1
| |
| l ACTIONS Al (continued) ~ l small break LOCA. For these reasons, the block valve may be closed but the Action requires power be maintained to the valve. This Condition is only intended to permit operation of the plant for a limited period of time not to exceed the '
| |
| next refueling outage (MODE 6) so that maintenance can be performed on the PORVs to eliminate the problem' condition. 4 Normally, the PORVs should be available for automatic J mitigation of overpressure events and should be returned to '
| |
| OPERABLE status prior to entering startup (MODE 2).
| |
| -l Quick access to the PORV for pressure control can be made j when power remains on the closed block valve. The
| |
| - Completion Time of 1 hour is based on plant operating experience that has shown that minor problems can be .
| |
| corrected or closure accomplished in this time period. !
| |
| B.1. B.2. and B.3 l If one or two PORVs are inoperable and not capable of being manually cycled, it must be either restored or isolated by.
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| closing the associated block. valve and removing the power to I the associated block valve. If one PORV is inoperable as a- 1 result of the Required Action C.2, then Required Actions B.1 and B.2 are not applicable. The Completion Times of 1. hour are reasonable, based on challenges to the PORVs during this time period, and provide the operator adequate time to-correct the situation. If the inoperable valve cannot be restored to OPERABLE status, it must be isolated within the specified time. Because there is one PORV that remains OPERABLE, an additional 72 hours is provided to restore an
| |
| -additional PORV to OPERABLE status when two PORVs are inoperable. If.the PORV cannot be restored within this additional time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply, as required by Condition D.
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| ! With only one PORV inoperable, operation may continue provided Required Actions B.1 and B.2 are met.
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| V l C.1 ar.d C.2 If one block valve is inoperable, then it is necessary to either restore the block valve to OPERABLE status within the (continued) l ' McGuire Unit B 3.4-54 Supplement 5 i
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| | |
| Pressurizer PORVs B 3.4.11 BdSES SURVEILLANCE SR' 3.4.11.3 REQUIREMENTS ;
| |
| The Surveillance demonstrates that the emergency nitrogen (continued) supply can be provided and is performed by transferring power from normal air supply to emergency nitrogen supply and cycling the valves. The Frequency of 18 months is based on a typical refueling cycle and industry accepted practice.
| |
| REFERENCES 1. Regulatory Guide 1.32, February 1977.
| |
| l 2. UFSAR, Section 15.4.
| |
| : 3. 10 CFR 50.36, Technical Specifications, (c)(2)(ii).
| |
| : 4. A$ME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI.
| |
| : 5. Resolution of Generic Issue 70, " Power-0perated Relief Valve and Block Valve Reliability," and Generic Issue 94, " Additional Low-Temperature Overpressure Protection for Light-Water Reactors," Pursuant to I 10 CFR 50.54(f) (Generic Letter 90-06).
| |
| l B 3.4-58 Supplement 5 l McGuire' Unit 2 r
| |
| | |
| Justification for Deviaticns Secticn 3.4 - Reactor cod 1 ant System BASES j NOTE: The first five justifications for these changes from NUREG-1431 were generically used throughout the individual Bases section markups. Not all generic justifications are used in each section.
| |
| : 1. The brackets have been removed and the proper plant specific information or value has been provided.
| |
| : 2. Editorial change for clarity or for consistency with the Improved Technical Specifications (ITS) Writer's Guide. l
| |
| : 3. The requirement / statement has been deleted since it is not applicable i to this facility. The following requirements have been renumbered, )
| |
| where applicable, to reflect this deletion.
| |
| : 4. Changes have been made (additions, deletions, and/or changes to the NUREG) to reflect the facility specific nomenclature, number, f
| |
| reference, system description, or analysis description.
| |
| : 5. This change reflects changes made to the technical specifications.
| |
| : 6. Duke Power has not proposed to use a pressure and temperature limits report at tnis time. The proposed specifications retain the current '
| |
| pressure and temperature limits in a format consistent with NUREG-1431. ;
| |
| References to the PTLR and development methodology have been deleted as unnecessary. J l
| |
| : 7. The proposed change deletes unnecessary redundancy from the Bases of l the proposed specification. ,
| |
| l
| |
| : 8. The NUREG Bases for SR 3.4.1.1, 3.4.1.2, and 3.4.1.3 does not describe !
| |
| the purpose of the surveillance. Descriptions have been added to the l' proposed bases consistent with the function of the monitored parameters.
| |
| : 9. This change reflects a generic change to NUREG-1431 approved by the NRC as proposed in TSTF-137.
| |
| : 10. The two banks of pressurizer heaters used to comply with NUREG ;
| |
| specification 3.4.9 are permanently powered from the 1E power supply, i therefore, operability statements related to normal and emergency power are made consistent in the Bases. l McGuire Units 1 and 2 la Supplement 5l l
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| | |
| Justification for Deviations i S:ctien 3.4 - Reactcr Csolant System i
| |
| : 11. Operation of the RCS PORVs in Modes 1-4 is assuw.sd to be manual in the j
| |
| ; safety analysis. No credit is taken for automatic actuation of the l PORVs for accident mitigotion in these modes. The Bases incorrectly implies that a failure of the automatic operation of the PORVs results i
| |
| in PORV inoperability. This is inconsistent with the LCO and associated surveillance, and the safety analysis. The ITS Bases \
| |
| 3.4.11, Applicable Safety Analysis, Applicability, and Action A.] have been revised to correct this error. ',
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| i I
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| I
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| ! I 1
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| l
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| ! l l
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| l i
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| l l-l I.
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| McGuire Units 1 and 2 22 Supplement 5l m-___--_____
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| | |
| Pressurizer PORVs B 3.4.11 BASES BACKGROUND the PORVs minimize challenges to the pressurizer safety (continued) valves and also say be used for low temperature overpressure protection (LTOP). See LC0 3.4.12. " Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) System."
| |
| APPLICABLE Plant operators empi y the PORVs to depressurize the RCS in SAFETY ANALYSES response to certain lant transients if normal pressurizer spray is not availab e. For the Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) event, the safety analysis assines that manual operator actions are required to mitigate the event.
| |
| A loss of offsite power is assumed to accompany the event, and thus, normal pressurizer spray is unavailable to ce RCS pressure. The PORVs are asstmed to be used fo depressurization, which is one of the steps performed to CS M##W //
| |
| 4 equalize the p imary and secondary pressures in order to l terminate the primary to secondary break flow and the radioactive releases from the affected steam generator. ,
| |
| i The PORVs a(re mm530Medl'a*Mll>Yt) soie6y ena lyses for events that result in increasing RCS pressure for which departure from nucleate r T boili itio (DNBR) criteria are critical. By assuming M**b.u PORY Ia7 actuation, the primary pressure remains below the high pressurizer pressure trip setpoint: thus, the DNBR calculation is more conservative. Events that assume this concition include 6 mamie trip apnne soss sm-m 1reswateD(Ref. 2)f Pressurizer PORVs satisfy Criterion 3 offheJfRC Poficy) docpR@.% (RtI.3)
| |
| LCO The LCO requires the PORVs and their associated block valves to be OPERABLE for manual operation to mitigate the effects associated with an SGTR.
| |
| By maintaining two PORVs and their associated block valves OPERABLE, the single failure critt. ;on is satisfied.YThe yr artT <
| |
| block valves are available to isolate the flow path through- 9;,% W) w k )
| |
| either a failed open PORY or a PORV with excessive leakage. ogg g Satisfying the LCO helps minimize challenges to fission product barriers. !
| |
| Nt4 MSkiuw L,oe 50 M*M !
| |
| i i (continued) l wpm;fS , B 3.4 51 Rev 1, 04/07/95 l l '?Re Jewu-D fardon/r*//e/
| |
| necahrt/e/ braneiM/nnmo/
| |
| ynd singk re/mWrwen/s/pwer bow mb%e/dpet,$csY fnwt sder /
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| l i
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| i f
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| | |
| Pressurizer PORVs B 3.4.11 BASES (continued)
| |
| APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3. the PORV and its block valve are required to be OPERABLE to limit the potential for a small break LOCA through the flow path. The most likely cause for a PORV small break LOCA is a result of a pressure increase transient that causes the PORV to open. Imbalances in the energy output of the core and heat removal by the secondary system can cause the RCS presore to increase to the PORV opening setpoint. -The most rapid increases will occur at ,
| |
| the higher opera *a oower aM =""~ mMm= a -
| |
| MODES 1 and ? ry PUKVs a also requir o be OPEJABLE n pot.d 1, d 3 to inize challe stothef a //
| |
| ppdssurizer fety val -- ,
| |
| Pressure increases are less prominent in MODE 3 because the l core input energy is reduced, but the RCS pressure is high.
| |
| Therefore, the LCO is applicable in MODES 1, 2, and 3. The LCO is not applicable in MODE 4 when both pressure and core energy are decreased and the pressure surges become much
| |
| -D less r anificant.
| |
| MODES 4 5, and 6 with the reactor vessel head in place.The '
| |
| PORV setpo
| |
| [ 3$$ 7>) LCO 3.4.12 addresses the PORY requirements in these MODES. l ACTIONS Note 1 has been added to clarify that all pressurizer PORVs are treated as separate entities, each with separate Completion Times (i.e., the Completion Time is on a a=vorsit basis). The exception for LCO 3.0.4, Note 2, permits entry into MODES 1, 2, and 3 to perform cycling of the PORVs or block valves to verify their OPERABlf status.
| |
| Testing is not performed in lower MODES.
| |
| l u
| |
| With the PORVs inoperable and capable of being manually cycled, either the PORVs must be restored or the flow path isolated within 1 hour. The block valves should be closed but power must be maintained to the associated block valves, since removal of power would render the block valve inoperable. Although a PORY say be designated inoperable, it may be able to be manually opened and closed, and therefore, able to perform its function. PORY inoperability may be due to seat _leakagej in w oua6.vu rW./
| |
| facamauc controt,muoieuse otner coum 6nas ou not .
| |
| Trevent manual use ano ao not create a possibility for a L (continued)
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| M . B 3.4 52 Rev 1, 04/07/95 zwaaa l l
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| 1 I
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| i
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| Pressurinr PORVs i B 3.4.11 BASES i
| |
| ACTIONS AJ (continued) l small break LOCA. For these reasons, the block valve may be l closed but the Action requires power be maintained to the l valve. This Condition is only intended to permit operation of the plant for a limited period of time not to exceed the next refueling outage (HODE 6) so that maintenance can be
| |
| . performed on the PORVs to eliminate the problem condition.
| |
| : Normally, the PORVs should be available for automatic l l mitigation of overpressure events and should be returned to OPERABE status prior to entering startup (MODE 2).
| |
| Quick access to the PORY for pressure control can be made when power remains on the closed block valve. The Completion Time of 1 hour is based on plant operating experience that has shown that minor problems can be .N corrected or closure accomplished in this time period. / pone A 4 v /s N mopere6/e e 4 re,s u // o f wi e
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| )
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| B.1. B.2. and B.3 g g ,.
| |
| IfonedrtwofPOR inoperable a not capable of en R /rMAche l being manually cycled, i must be either restored or ay g.a gre isolated by closing the associated block valve and removing not AM// uke the power to the associated block valve.4The Completion Times of 1 hour are reasonable, based on challenges to the i PORVs during this time period. and provide the operator adequate time to correct the situation. If the inoperable l valve cannot be restored to OPERABE status, it must be isolated within the specified time. Because there is O
| |
| @ one PORV that remains OPERABE. an additional 72 hours S is provided to restore m e J-mMRY to OPERABE Mg4un tatag If the PORV cannot be restoreTwithin tiis W" ~gjQ l
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| l pggw g additional time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in 6
| |
| gnp yc which the LCO does not apply, as required by Condition {
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| C.1 anLG2 oN hR%*' '
| |
| If one block valve is inoperable, then it is necessary to - ?
| |
| either restore the block valve to OPERABE status within the l'tumd AM.
| |
| Completion Time of 1 hour or place the :ssociated PORV in E.1 w.0 83. 1
| |
| -danuar control The prime importance for the capability to on 4, j 08 ' Chied close the block valve is to isolate a :tttk open PORV.
| |
| pWh46 Therefore. if the block valve cannot be restored to OPERABE (continued)
| |
| ~
| |
| Wpr$75 . B 3.4 53 Rev 1. 04/07/95 l weAuu l
| |
| | |
| Pressurizer PORVs B 3.4.11 BASES SURVEILLMCE SR 3.4.11 (continued) I in REQUIREMENTS h4i The Surveillance demonstrates thattenergency S Pb I can be p Og k' provided and is performed by tr6nsferring power com normal i h* to eneroencWsuppigased of.118F oonths is on a typical refueling-dm.-Lappl cycle and-and cyclin L
| |
| irfdustry accepted practice. _
| |
| i REFERENCES 1. Regulatory Guide 1.32. February 1977.
| |
| : 2. M . Section 15 f J. ASME. Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. Section XI.
| |
| rw R W.b , Tc tbMtu \ S peClibb$^!> (Ch'2)(ii N EniLbb ./- 6%edt issue. 79 " fewt,-bptemkJ & led wivt c ) mas Wlw. get,Q;i, , %) c,oya ln#,
| |
| " A J f.4.1 Low tenetrabd- ee p asswt foMbb i
| |
| ,gt..Wol<rft(atbJ," fur >ucJ 49 lo cFit to N (M
| |
| ((3eneft (4Her (10 00. -
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| i i i
| |
| i B 3.4 57 Rev 1. 04/07/95 hM s
| |
| l f
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| w ___
| |
| | |
| McGuire & Cctawba improved TS Rsv'aw Commsnts ITS Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant Systems 3.4, Additional Changes 3.4-05 STS Bases 3.4.12 Applicable Safety Analysis, LCO, SR 3.4.12.1 and SR l' 3.4.12.2 The Bases for Applicable Safety Analysis and SR 3.4.12.1 and SR 3.4.12.2 are changed to indicate the accumulator discharge isolation valves are verified closed and " power removed" to align these descriptions more in line with STS Bases 3.5.1, " Accumulators".
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| j l
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| [
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| f l
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| [
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| mc3_cr_3.4 28 June 8,1998
| |
| | |
| LTOP System B 3.4.12 BASES APPLICABLE Etat Inout Tvoe Transients (continued) j SAFETY ANALYSES The isolated accumulators must have their discharge valves closed and power removed. l Fracture mechanics analyses established the temperature of LTOP Applicability at 300*F.
| |
| TheconsequencesofasmallbreakIbsofcoolantaccident (LOCA) in LTOP MODE 4 conform to 10 CFR 50.46 and 10 CFR 50, Appendix K (Refs. 5 and 6), requirements by having a maximum of one centrifugal charging pump OPERABLE and SI actuation enabled.
| |
| PORV Performance The fracture mechanics analyses show that the vessel is protected when the PORVs are set to open at or below the i specified limit. The setpoints are derived by analyses that )
| |
| model the performance of the LTOP System, assuming the l limiting LTOP transient of one centrifugal charging pump or one safety injection pump injecting into the RCS. These i analyses consider pressure overshoot and undershoot beyond !
| |
| the PORV opening and closing, resulting from signal I processing and. valve stroke times. The PORV setpoints at or. I below the derived limit ensures the Reference 1 P/T limits will be met.
| |
| The PORV setpoints will be updated when the revised P/T I limits conflict with the LTOP analysis limits. The P/T limits are periodically modified as the reactor vessel material toughness decreases due to neutron embrittlement l caused by neutron irradiation. Revised limits are
| |
| . determined using neutron fluence projections and the results of examinations of the reactor vessel material irradiation surveillance specimens. The Bases for LC0 3.4.3, "RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits," discuss these examinations.
| |
| The PORVs are considered active components. Thus, the failure of one PORV is assumed to represent the worst case, single active failure.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| McGuife Unit 1 B 3.4-63 Supplement 5 l
| |
| [ ._. -- - _-
| |
| | |
| B 3.4.12
| |
| -BASES
| |
| , APPLICABLE RCS Vent Performance l SAFETY. ANALYSES (continued) With the RCS depressurized, analyses show a vent size of 2.75 square inches is capable of mitigating the allowed LTOP overpressure transient. The capacity of a vent this size is. ,
| |
| greater than the flow of the limiting transient for the LTOP j configuration, one centrifugal charging pump or one safety )
| |
| ' injection pump OPERABLE, maintaining RCS pressure-less than the maximum pressure on the P/T limi*t curve. )
| |
| 1 The RCS vent size will be re-evaluated for compliance each !
| |
| time the P/T limit curves are revised based on the results I of the vessel material surveillance. l The RCS vent is passive and is not subject to active failure. '
| |
| i The LTOP System satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36 (Ref.7).
| |
| LC0 This LC0 ' requires that the LTOP . System is OPERABLE. The LTOP System is OPERABLE when the minimum coolant: input.and pressure relief capabilities are OPERABLE. Violation of this LCO could lead to the loss of low' temperature f
| |
| l overpressure mitigation and violation of the Reference 1 limits as 'a result of an operational transient.
| |
| To limit the coolant input capability, the LC0 permits a maximum of one centrifugal charging pump or one safety injection pump capable of injecting into the RCS and requires all accumulator discharge isolation valves ' closed and ininobilized when accumulator pressure is greater than or equal to the maximum RCS pressure for the existing RCS cold leg temperature allowed in LC0 3.4.3.
| |
| The elements of the LC0 that provide low temperature i overpressure mitigation through pressure relief are:
| |
| 4
| |
| : a. Two OPERABLE PORVs (NC-328 and NC-34A); or A PORV is OPERABLE for LTOP when its block valve is I open,. its lift setpoint is set to the specified limit l and testing proves its automatic ability to open at this setpoint, and motive power is available to the (continued) l B 3.4-64 Supplement 5 Il McGuire Unit 1
| |
| | |
| LTOP System.
| |
| B 3.4.12 BASES '
| |
| i
| |
| . ACTIONS F.1'and F.2 (continued)
| |
| (continued) relief. valve is OPERABLE and the RHR suction isolation valves open and the RCS temperature of the cold legs >
| |
| 167"F. The Completion Time of 1 hour reflects the importance of restoring the required redundancy at lower RCS temperatures.
| |
| Ed The RCS must be depressurized and a vent must be established within 8 hours when:
| |
| : a. Both required PORVs are inoperable; or :
| |
| l
| |
| : b. A Required Action and associated Completion Time of l Condition C, D, E, or F is not met; or I c.- The LTOP System is inoperable for any reason other ;
| |
| than Condition A, B, C, D, E, or F. '
| |
| l The vent must be sized 2 2.75 square inches to ensure that the flow capacity is greater than that required for the worst case mass input transient reasonable during the applicable MODES. This action is needed to protect the RCPB from a low temperature overpressure event and a possible brittle failure of th'e reactor vessel.
| |
| The Completion Time considers the time required to place the plant in this Condition and the relatively low probability of an overpressure event during this time period due to increased operator awareness of administrative control requirements.
| |
| SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.12.1 and SR 3.4.12.2 To minimize the potential for a low temperature overpressure event by limiting the c. ass input capability, all but one centrifugal charging pump or one safety injection pump are .
| |
| verified incapable of injecting into the RCS and the ,
| |
| accumulator discharge isolation valves are verified closed !
| |
| l and power removed.
| |
| l
| |
| , (continued) l McGuire Unit 1 B 3.4-68 Supplement 5
| |
| | |
| LTOP System B 3.4.12
| |
| : BASES-
| |
| ' APPLICABLE LHeat Inout Tvoe Transients (continued)
| |
| SAFETY ANALYSES The isolated accumulators must have their discharge valves closed and power removed. l-Fracture mechanics analyses established the temperature of' LTOP Applicability at 300'F.
| |
| The consequences'of a small break lots of coolant accident
| |
| -(LOCA) in LTOP MODE 4 conform to 10 CFR 50.46 and 10~CFR 50, Appendix K (Refs. 5 and 6), requirements by having a maximum-of one centrifugal charging pump OPERABLE and SI actuation enabled.
| |
| PORV Performance ihe fracture mechanics analyses show that the vessel is~
| |
| protected-when the PORVs are set to open at or below the specified limit. The setpoints-are derived by analyses that ;
| |
| model-the performance of the LTOP System, assuming the- 1 limiting LTOP transient of one centrifugal charging pump or-one safety injection pump injecting into the RCS. ? These analyses consider pressure overshoot and undershoot beyond
| |
| 'the PORV opening and closing, resulting from signal processing and' valve stroke times. . The PORV setpoints at or-below the derived limit ensures the Reference 1 P/T limits will be met.
| |
| The PORV setpoints will be updated when the revised P/T limits.-conflict with the LTOP analysis limits. The P/T limits are periodically modified as the reactor vessel I material toughness decreases due to neutron embrittlement I caused by neutron irradiation. Revised limits are determined using neutron fluence projections and the results of examinations of the reactor vessel material irradiation surveillance' specimens. The Bases for LC0 3.4.3,."RCS
| |
| :PressureandTemperature(P/T) Limits,"discussthese- l examinations. ,
| |
| The PORVs are considered active components. Thus, the
| |
| . failure of one PORV is assumed to represent the worst case, single active failure.
| |
| t-(continued)
| |
| McGuire Unit 2 B 3.4-63 Supplement 5 l L _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
| |
| | |
| LTOP System.
| |
| B 3.4.12
| |
| ' BASES APPLICABLE RCS Vent Performance SAFETY ANALYSES (continued) With the RCS dt pressurized, analyses show a vent size of 2.75 square inches is capable of mitigating the allowed LTOP overpressure transient. The capacity of a. vent this size is greater than the flow of the limiting transient for the LTOP configuration, one centrifugal charging pump or one safety injection pump OPERABLE, maintaining RCS pressure less than the maximum pressure on the P/T limit curve.
| |
| The RCS vent size will be re-evaluated for compliance each time the P/T limit curves are revised based on the results.
| |
| of the vessel material surveillance.
| |
| The RCS vent is passive and is not subject to active failure.
| |
| .The LTOP System satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36
| |
| -(Ref. 7).
| |
| LCO ..This LC0 requires that the LTOP System is OPERABLE. The LTOP System is OPERABLE when the minimum coolant input and pressure relief capabilities are OPERABLE. Violation of this LC0 could lead to the loss of low temperature i overpressure mitigation and violation of the Reference 1 '
| |
| limits as a result of an operational transient.
| |
| To limit.the coolant input capability, the LC0 permits a maximum of one centrifugal charging pump or one safety injection pump capable of injecting into the RCS and ~
| |
| requires all accumulator discharge isolation valves closed- 4 and innobilized when accumulator pressure is greater than or equal to the maximum RCS pressure for the existing RCS cold leg temperature allowed in LC0~3.4.3.
| |
| The elements of the LC0 that provide low temperature overpressure mitigation through pressure relief are:
| |
| : a. Two OPERABLE PORVs (NC-328 and NC-34A); or A PORV is OPERABLE for LTOP when its block valve is open, its lift setpoint is set to the specified limit l and testing proves its automatic ability to open at this setpoint, and motive power is available to the t-(continued) l McGuire Unit 2 B 3.4-64 Supplement 5
| |
| | |
| LTOP System.
| |
| B 3.4.12 BASES I l
| |
| ACTIONS F.1 and F.2 (continued)
| |
| (continued) relief valve is OPERABLE and the RHR suction isolation valves open and the RCS temperature of the cold legs >
| |
| 167'F. The Completion Time of I hour reflects the importance of restoring the required redundancy at lower RCS temperatures.
| |
| ful The RCS must be depressurized and a vent must be established within 8 hours when:
| |
| : a. Both required PORVs are inoperable, or i
| |
| : b. A Required Action and associated Completion Time of l Condition C, D, E, or F is not met; or
| |
| : c. The LTOP System is inoperable for any reason other than Condition A, B, C, D, E, or F.
| |
| The vent must be sized :t 2.75 square inches to ensure that the flow capacity is greater than that required for the worst case mass input transient reasonable during the applicable MODES. This action is needed to protect the RCPB from a low temperature overpressure event and a possible brittle failure of the reactor vessel.
| |
| The Completion Time considers the time required to place the plant in this Condition and the relatively low probability of an overpressure event during this time period due to increased operator awareness of administrative control requirements.
| |
| i SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.12.1 and SR 3.4.12.2 REQUIREMENTS l
| |
| To minimize the potential for a low temperature overpressure event by limiting the mass input capability, all but one centrifugal charging pump or one safety injection pump are verified incapable of injecting into the RCS and the accumulator discharge isolation valves are verified closed l and power removed.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| B 3.4-68 Supplement 5 l McGuire Unit 2
| |
| | |
| LTOP System B 3.4.12 BASES APPLICABLE Heat Inout Tyne Transients SAFETY ANALYSES-(continued) a. Inadvertent actuation of pressurizer heaters;
| |
| : b. Loss of RIR cooling; or
| |
| : c. Reactor coolant pump (RCP) startup with temperature asymmetry within the RCS or between the RCS and steam generators. ,
| |
| The following are required during the LTOP MODES to ensure that mass and heat input transients do not occur, which either of the LTOP overpressure protection means cannot handle:
| |
| a.
| |
| Rendering allofbut (oneVHPIl *n Mnd onedcharch -_ 4 g-pumpfylneapable injecdon;
| |
| @ Qorone.] p b. Deactivating the accumulator discharge isolation ty .., 4 pu,,p] vales in their closed positions; and j
| |
| : c. Disallowing sta f an RCP if secondary temperature l i
| |
| h is more than,f50 above primary temperature in any one loop. CCO 3.4.6. *RCS Loops-MODE 4." and L LCO 3.4.7. 'RCS Loops-HODE 5. Loops Filled,* provide ,
| |
| l .this protection.
| |
| The Reference 4 analyses demonstrate that either one@ J (P Morelipr v or the depressurized RCS and RCS vent can l mai in pressure b g [ ts when only one prIl muup) j IT oneM:hargint xmp Dre. ; prefactuated. Thus. tne 04 (cTJ,;t,,A' L u,. allows onlyto'e u rl So 6 oneycnerving cg,, 0%. .
| |
| " b by . i UMdUBLt curing ;ni Llu' ru.ur.a. 311ce neither one **
| |
| , WIM 414 nor the RCS vent can handle the pressure c P% e transient glib)from accumulator injectiorthwhen RCS j temperatures low. the LCO also requires"~the accumulators '
| |
| isolation when accumulator pressure '
| |
| is greater than or equal to the maximum RCS pressurg,,.or the existing RCS cold leg temperature allowed in t_he/MLco 5.4,1)
| |
| The h1ated accumulators must have their discharoe valves Q
| |
| _ l l nlmed ar ne - -.uppiy w wwi . ngMr InAnen 1 Cen i /I he a lyses s tne eii m av ato l
| |
| /aiscnoivc f. over a crower RC emperat range ([ 5]'F (and belon0 than t of the LC ([2751*F below) .
| |
| i.
| |
| "W #YdPe M l (continued) jgXP1ITS . B 3.4 62 Rev 1. 04/07/95 MM 1
| |
| l
| |
| | |
| LTOP System B 3.4.22
| |
| -BASES APPLICABLE RCS Vent Performance (continued)
| |
| SAFETY ANALY75 gSystem satisfies Criterion 2 of[theJRC D611c3 cocm 3uuA,9 @
| |
| LCO This LCO requires that the LTOP System is OPERABLE. The l LTOP System is OPERABLE when the minimum coolant input and pressure relief capabilities are OPERABLE. Violation of this LCO could lead to the loss of low temperature $
| |
| overpressure mitigation and violation of the Reference 1 limits as a result of an operatinn21 transient. --
| |
| ,[Pfem'hD wb ,%3 To limit the coolant input capability, t LCO GiGRhe " ' ~ ^ ^ ~
| |
| tranavt-f ntmo/ enth charging pump apable of rw .g Q Qr i injecting into the RCS andyall acetmulator discharoe geh g9 isolation valves closed and immobilize Joen accumulato
| |
| @ pressure is greater than or equal h to t@e maximum qQ RCS ;
| |
| pressu the existina RCS cold leg temperature allowed
| |
| @ in Lco =>N 75)
| |
| The elements of the LCO that provide low temperature overpressure mitigation through pressure relief are:
| |
| : a. 45 rsfief vaVes as fqHolw L1.
| |
| m OPERABLE g PORVs: or [(Nc-328.J N C-34 A)) @
| |
| A PORV is OPERABLE for LTOP when its block valve
| |
| -7 is open. its lift setpoint is set to thev11mit gd4j}
| |
| treouwod by tMe PTUD and testing proves its g
| |
| // ability to open at this setpoint, and motive power is available to the(@valveOand M - 1 control circuit $"
| |
| [2. Two RlR suction ief valves; or]
| |
| ~ ~
| |
| suction relief ve is OPERABLE for s aen its RHR suctio solation valve and i RHR suction valve are n, its setpoint is a or
| |
| / between [436.5) sig and [463.5) psig, testing has p van its ability to ope at this setpoint.
| |
| , _3 (continued) i M ,
| |
| B 3.4 65 Rev 1, 04/07/95
| |
| | |
| LTOP System B 3.4.12 BASES ACTIONS ftJ (continued)
| |
| The Completion Time considers the time required to place the plant in this Condition and the relatively low probability of an overpressure event during this time period due to increased operator awareness of akinistrative control -
| |
| requirements.
| |
| SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.12.lf' ISRA.4.12d1and SR 3.4.12.Y@
| |
| REQUEEMENTS To minimize the potential for a low temperature ove event by limitina the mass input __ capability, ma =d n sure 4 g i
| |
| 60neMflPIl V=n of verified incapable [4hd a maki==
| |
| injecting into thennone RCS andcharging the pump {rF " 5yd ,ml,3/
| |
| . "'O W"' t am-nlator discharge isolation valves are verified closed g l 'N Nee!C
| |
| ,.e s% w.% p p ,
| |
| The [HP;l s =u u E C/ charging puelI{s rendered I incapab~ e of injecting into the RCS through removing the t
| |
| p&inistrative a control.owerAnfrom the ptmps alternate byofracking method the breakers out under LTOP control may be employed using at least two independent means to prevent a pump start such that a single failure or single action will not result in an injection into RCS. This may be accomplished through_Jhe wn.ro teh beinD cpieceo in hwi w socKJ and east alvegnthe 4 discharge ricw patn uchug closed, w i
| |
| The Frequency of 12 ho9rs is sufficient, considering other indications and alarms available to the operator in the I control room, to verify the required status of the !
| |
| equipment.
| |
| ~ ~
| |
| SR 3.4.12 t
| |
| siacrreauvr suction relief valve shall be demonstrated l- OPERABLE by verifying IUR suction (valveonaAom sarctio@ ;
| |
| f isolation valves are open and by testing it in accordance - E !
| |
| 3-with the Inservice Testi;g Program. ERerpr to w 3 A nJD !
| |
| F (or snejam stgrion isot, anon verve surveillanel.lf This j l Survelliance is only required to be performed if the R}R 1
| |
| - suction relief valve is being used to meet his LCO. -
| |
| .p.,litqwtJ] l A Ma f j l l (continued) !
| |
| I
| |
| % , B 3.4 69 Rev 1. 04/07/95 l 7] k &
| |
| l \
| |
| l l
| |
| l l
| |
| | |
| McGuire & Catawba improv2d TS Rsvbw Commsnta ITS Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant Systems 3.4, Additional Changes 3.4-07 CTS 3.4.9.3 LA.10 The CTS specifies requirements which are adequately captured by regulation. The ITS relocated this information to plant procedures by DOC LA10. This DOC is replaced by DOC L27 to justify th; deletion of this redundant regulatory requirement.
| |
| I l
| |
| l l
| |
| 1 i
| |
| mc3_cr_3.4 30 June 8,1998
| |
| | |
| REACTOR CCOLANT SYSTEM
| |
| ~ LIMITING CONDITION' FOR OPERATION (Continuedi T wW h ctcpn%l=he m u ys, ke-ACTION: (continued) heNI?4 '"9 '''' " h<- N rm .h e.u p"ow<. A.N
| |
| )
| |
| cam ggg B @ With within 1 an hour. If accumulator required action is not enot met, isolate the aTTected either: % 1sok.Y._
| |
| accumulator C.'1
| |
| -' @ Depressurize the accumulator to less than the maximun RCS pressure for the existing cold leg per Specification .
| |
| l within 12 hours, 3.y ,3 A. l l
| |
| M C. @
| |
| -~~ Increase RCS cold leg temperature'to greater than Qr escal te h 300* F within 12 hours.
| |
| CASN @ With one PORY inoperable in MODE 4, restore the inoperable PORY to OPERABLE status within 7 days. If required action is not met, ca M4 G depressurize the RCS and vent through at least a 2.75 square inch !
| |
| vent within 8 hours. I l
| |
| g;,, q g With one PORY inoperable in MODES 5 or 6, suspend all operations which could lead to a water-solid pressurizer. Restore the inoperable PORY to OPERABLE status within 24 hours. If required g ,p action is not met, either: ,
| |
| s l ggg0 Ensure RCS temperature is greater than 167* F, and NO-3 is !
| |
| - OPERABLE, and ND-1 and NO-2 are open within one hour. I E
| |
| gC Depressurize the RCS and vent through at least a 2.75 square inch vent within 8 hours.
| |
| 48c0 Ca J.%6 @ N LTOP system inoperable for any reason other than g=S.'si, h dKiD bove, depressurize the RCS and vent through at least a 75_
| |
| squar vgwithin8 hours. ,
| |
| r . In the ent that either the RVs or the RCS ven are used to l TWO P0ft Vs sitig e an RCS pressure tr sient, a Special R ort shall he I l
| |
| d and submitted to he Comission purs t to Specificati mopu=94. pre g 6. 2 within 30 days. e report shall des be the circumstan
| |
| - itiating the transi t, the effect of th PORVs or vent on e Q J /k h.neh +emartea+, aad any rrective action necettarv to prevent recurrence.
| |
| assuki C* r% not applicable.
| |
| g 4 c 44, ,
| |
| : 67) The propifions of Spec)(ication] 3.0.4g&
| |
| & D,c,s.1' &
| |
| rio)- me.4 4, 3/4 4-34 Amendment No. 166 McGUIRE - UNIT 1 1
| |
| ' o
| |
| | |
| S pec M k b 5 4.81 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LINITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continuod)
| |
| M 4<. u w se s e psu.es .c 3e uer ACTION: (continued)
| |
| M,,,4 T %$p3, *~rmwes.o,g, yWb * <. --
| |
| e h (o4 % a @ With an ecc inulator not isolateu isollte the affected accumulator gg within I hear. If required action is not met, either:
| |
| (. 7. @
| |
| ~'""' Depressurize the accumulator to less than the maxi pressure for the existing cold leg per Specification /
| |
| within 12 hours, g.
| |
| M Col @ Incresse RCS cold leg temperature to g* eater than(or eqpr to 300* F within 12 hours. .
| |
| C.aAMa t) @ With one PORY inoperable in MODE 4, restore the inoperable PORV to OPERABLE status within 7 days. If required action is not met, C' g g depressurize the RCS and vent through at least a 2.75 square inch
| |
| . vent within 8 hours.
| |
| ( J,4 Q @ With one POR'l inoperable in M00ES 5 or 6, suspend all operations which could lead to a water-solid pressurizer. Restore the inoperable PORY to OPERABLE status within 24 hours. If required c,M1 action is not met, either:
| |
| f,1.,2 f.2. @ Ensure RCS temperature ~ is greater than 167' F, and ND-3 is OPERABLE, and HD-1 snd ND-2 are open within one hour.
| |
| E G. I _ @ Depressurize the RCS and vent through at least a 2.75 square inch vent within 8 hours.
| |
| d.e, c. o, . A.I LTOP system inoperable for any reason other thanu.. E. ca,
| |
| (.al4'n Cr @ @T@@.bove, depressurize the RCS and vent through at least a 2./5 square en ithin 8 hours.
| |
| 4
| |
| [ a.i In tne event nat either the P0 s or the RCS vent re used p
| |
| h** hD5 .
| |
| mitigate a RCS pressure transi nt, a Special Rep shall be
| |
| ""f' *' * .!L. prepared d submitted to the camission pursua to. Specification
| |
| %-"'8 ^^a aal 6.9.2 wi in 30 days. The r ort shall descri e the circumstance k * *, pl**I'# T *. initia ng the transient, t effect of the RVs or vent on th f ktransent.an#"y'a-ractweactionnecess to prevent recu ence
| |
| [ ***** ff- @ TheprovignsofSpeciftrition33.0.4 not applicable.
| |
| 8.r"1 l
| |
| l I
| |
| McGUIRE - UNIT 2 3/4 4-34 Amendment No. 148 ,
| |
| y 3 .< r
| |
| | |
| l Discussion of Changas Stetien 3.4 - Reacter Coslant System TECHNICAL CHANGES - LESS RESTRICTIVE L.26 CTS 3.4.9.3 permits two charging pumps or safety injection pumps capable of injecting into the RCS when two PORVs are secured open with block valves open and power removed. ITS 3.4.12 also permits this allowance when the RCS is depressurized and an RCS vent of greater than or equal to 4.5 square inches is established. This
| |
| !. .cha' 3e is acceptable because the vent size was evaluated in the LTOP analysis and is approximated by the twc open PORVs. This j change establishes an equivalent action to the existing requirements, however, the change is considered less restrictive since the CTS did not previously include this specific
| |
| ! alternative.
| |
| ; L.27 The requirement in CTS 3.4.9.3 action f to provide a special report when n PORV or RCS vent is used to mitigate an overpressure event has been deleted. This requirement is adequately captured by the reporting requirements in 10 CFR 50.73 and is implemented in plant procedures. Deletion of this level of duplicative detail and redundancy with regulation does not affect safety and is l consistent with NUREG-1431. The procedural controls are adequate l to assure the level of safety provided by the existing l
| |
| specifications wili be maintained.
| |
| l l
| |
| i McGuire Units 1 and 2 Pagr[L-88 Supplement 51l l
| |
| | |
| Discussien of Changes Ssetion 3.4 - Reactor Coolant Syster TECHNICAL CHANGES - REnVAL OF DETAIL 1
| |
| for inclusion in the TS. Changes to the Bases are controlled in accordance with the administrative requirements in ITS Chapter 5 and require a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation. This change is consistent with NUREG-1431.
| |
| LA.10 Not used.'nc w irement in CTS 3.1.0.3 cetion f to provide
| |
| :pecial report when the PORW cr RCS vent 1; c cd to mitigate en everprc::ure event !;; been deleted. Thi; require =cnt is adequately captured by the reporting require =cnt; i n 10 CFR 5943
| |
| :nd i; iT.plemented in phnt procedure:. Oc'etion Of thi; kvel Of duplic;tive detail is cen;i; tent with M'JREC 1431. The precedural I centrch are adequate to ;;;ure the level Of : fety provided by the existing specification; ill bc T.aintained.
| |
| LA.11 The list of RCS PIVs in CTS Table 3.4-1 has been relocated from the Technical Specifications to the UFSAR. This level of detail is not necessary for inclusion within the TS. The requirement to perform PIV testing is retained in ITS 3.4.14 and provides !
| |
| adequate controls for operability. Changes to the UFSAR are I reviewed and controlled in accordan:e with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59. These controls are adequate to assure the level of safety provided by the existing specifications will be t.a.ntained.
| |
| This change is consistent with NUREG-1431 LA.12 CTS Table 4.4-4 requirements associated with determining the gross specific activity of the reactor coolant include a number of l specific statements which describe details of the type of testing to be performed. These changes have been relocated to the Bases for ITS 3.4.16. Details of how surveillance tests are performed are more appropriate for the Bases and are not necessary for inclusion.in the TS. Changes to the Bases are controlled in accordance with the administrative requirements in ITS Chapter 5.
| |
| This change is consistent with NUREG-1431.
| |
| LA.13 The CTS 3.10.4.b requirement for the reactor trip setpoints on the intermediate and power range channels to be set less than or equal to 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER has been removed based on the system design which assures this function is as stated while below the P-7 interlock setpoint. ITS 3.3.1 provides the applicable LC0 and SR requirements regarding the setpoints and allowable values for the P-7 interlock and associated neutron flux - low and lMcGuireUnits1and2 Page LA - 34 Supplement 55/20/97
| |
| | |
| No Significant Hazards Consideration l Section 3.4 - Reactor C:31 ant System LESS RESTRICTIVE CHANGE L.27 The McGuire Nuclear Staticn is converting to the Improved Technical Specifications (ITS) as outIined in NUREG-1431, " Standard Technicol Specifications, Westinghouse Plants." The proposed change involves making the current Technical Specifications (CTS) less restrictive. Below is the description of this less restrictive change and the No Signifiant Hazards l Considerotton for conversion to NUREG-1431. l The requirement in CTS 3.4.9.3 action f to p vide a special report when a PORV or RCS vent is used to mitigate on overpressure event has been deleted. This requirement is adequately captured by the reporting requirements in 10 CFR 50.73 and is implemented in plant procedures. Deletion of this level of duplicative detail and redundancy with regulation does not affect safety and is consistent with NUREG-1431. The procedural controls are adequate to assure the l level of safety provided by the existing specifications will be 1 maintained.
| |
| l In accordance with the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, the McGuire l Nuclear Station has evaluated this proposed Technical Specifications change l and determined if does not represent a significant hazards consideration.
| |
| The following is provided in support of this conclusion.
| |
| : 1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or l consequence of an accident previously evaluated?
| |
| i The proposed changes delete requirements from Technical Specifications which are adequately addressed by the CFR. The location of regulatory controls is not an initiator of any analyzed event, therefore, the proposed change does not offect the probability of any analyzed accident. The CFR is directly implemented and enforceable. Therefore, the requirements associated with the CFR will continue to be met. The safety analysis assumptions associated t:lth analyzed events are not affected by the source location of regulatory requirements, therefore, the consequences of analyzed events are not changed.
| |
| l l McGuire Units 1 and 2 Page 55 % of 609 Supplement 51 L_ _ _ ____ _ _ _
| |
| | |
| No Significant Hazards Consideration Secticn 3.4 - Reactor Ccolant System
| |
| : 2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
| |
| The change will not physically alter the plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed). The changes in methods governing normal plant operation are consistent with current safety analysis assumptions. Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. )
| |
| : 3. Does this change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
| |
| The proposed changes delete requirements from Technical Specifications which are adequately addressed in the CFR. The changes do not reduce the margin of safety since the CFR is directly l implemented and enforceable and the location of regulatory j requirements has no impact on any safety analysis assumptions.
| |
| i l
| |
| l McGuire Units 1 and 2 Page 56% of 60% Supplement 5+ l
| |
| | |
| I l
| |
| l ENCLOSURE 3 i
| |
| l RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ,
| |
| )
| |
| SECTION 3.7 l
| |
| l :
| |
| 1 i
| |
| J l
| |
| l'
| |
| | |
| McGuira & Cctnwbs Impravad TS Rsvisw C:mm:nta ITS Secti2n 3.7, Pinnt Sy::tems 3.7.1, Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs) ,
| |
| 3.7.1-1 (McGuire only) DOC A.5 and M.2 CTS 3.7.1.1 Action a 4 ITS 3.7.1 Action B CTS 3.7.1.1 Action a requires the MSSVs to be restored to Operable status within 4 hours or the Power Range Neutron Flux Trip Setpoints reduced. If those actions are not completed, then the unit is placed in Mode 5 within 30 hours.
| |
| ITS 3.7.1 Action B only requires placing the unit in Mode 4 within 12 hours where the LCO is not applicable. Comment: The CTS requirement to place the Unit in Mode 5 is explicit. Revise the submittal to delete DOC A.5. Revise the l submittal to replace DOC M.2 with a less restrictive justification.
| |
| DEC Response:
| |
| DEC disagrees. DEC acknowledges that the actions are explicit, however, the l actions can not direct activities which are beyond the scope of the applicability of the LCO requirement. This LCO is only applicable in MODES 1,2, and 3.
| |
| Therefore, as stated in LCO 3.0.1, the compliance with the LCO is only required during the modes of applicability. In this in stance, as soon as the unit is in MODE 4, the LCO is no longer applicable and the actions would no longer be required to be met.
| |
| }
| |
| mc3_cr_3.7 ; May 18,1998
| |
| | |
| McGuira G2 Cettwba Impr vad TO Rsvisw Ccmmtnts ITS S3ctica 3.7, Pl nt Cystems
| |
| ! 3.7.1-2 (McGuire only) Bases JFD 3 i
| |
| Bases discussion of the Applicable Safety Analysis for ITS 3.7.1, STS Bases markup page B 3.7-1 The last sentence of the second paragraph has not been adopted. The STS text l states "This event also terminates normal feedwater flow to the steam generators". Comment: Bases JFD 3 does not explain this difference. Revise the submittal to provide a plant specific explanation or adopt the STS text.
| |
| DEC Response: 1 l
| |
| This deletion is also applicable to Catawba. This text is deleted from the final l typed ITS Bases for Catawba. but was inadvertently omitted from the STS j l markup. The STS Bases Markup for Catawba is revised to delete this text. A i
| |
| ! turbine trip does not directly cause a feedwater isolation as stated in the STS Bases, therefore, the statement is not applicable to the design at McGuire and Catawba. The feedwater isolation signals are identified in ITS 3.3.2.
| |
| l l
| |
| mc3_cr_3.7 2 May 18,1998
| |
| | |
| ITS Section 3.7, Plant Systems 3.7.1-3 (McGuire only) Bases JFD 4 Bases for ITS LCO 3.7.1, STS Bases markup page B 3.7-2 In the Bases LCO discussion, the third and fourth sentences of the first paragraph which explain that all five MSSVs are required Operable are not adopted. Comment: Bases JFD 4 does not explain this difference. Revise the submittal to provide a plant specific explanation or adopt the STS text.
| |
| DEC Response:
| |
| 1 i This comment is also applicable to Catawba. The ITS submittal is revised to adopt the STS text. ',
| |
| A formatting error has been corrected on ITS page B 3.7-2 for McGuire only. The last paragraph on this page should begin the Applicability section.
| |
| mc3_cr_3.7 3 May 18,1998
| |
| | |
| MSSVs B 3.7.1 BASES APPLICABLE or the Main Steam System. The reactor is tripped on high :
| |
| SAFETY ANALYSES pressurizer 3ressure in the peak primary pressure case. In l (continued) this case, tie pressurizer safety valves open, and RCS pressure remains below 110% of the design value. The MSSVs also open to limit the secondary steam pressure.
| |
| For the peak secondary pressure case, the reactor is tripped on overtemperature AT. Pressurizer, relief valves and MSSVs are activated and prevent overpressurization in the primary and secondary systems.
| |
| The MSSVs satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (Ref. 4).
| |
| t LC0 The accident analysis assumes five MSSVs per steam generator I to provide overpressure protection for design basis ;
| |
| transients occurring at 102% RTP. An MSSV will be considered ino)erable if it fails to open on demand. The LC0 requires tlat five MSSVs be OPERABLE in compliance with Reference 2, even though this is not a requirement of the DBA analysis. This is because operation with less than the full number of MSSVs requires limitations on allowable THERMAL POWER (to meet ASME Code requirements). These limitations are according to Table 3.7.1-1 in the accompanying LCO, and Required Action A.1 and A.2.
| |
| The OPERABILITY of the MSSVs is defined as the ability to i open within the setpoint tolerances, relieve steam geaarator overpressure, and reseat when pressure has been reduced.
| |
| The OPERABILITY of the MSSVs is determined by periodic surveillance testing in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. i The lift settings, according to Table 3.7.1-2 in the i accompanying LCO, correspond to ambient conditions of the ,
| |
| valve at nominal operatina temperature and pressure. i 1
| |
| This LC0 provides assurance that the MSSVs will perform j their designed safety functions to mitigate the consequences ;
| |
| of accidents that could result in a challenge to the RCPB. !
| |
| .I APPLICABILITY In MODE 1, the number of MSSVs per steam generator required to be OPERABLE must be according to Table 3.7.1-1 in the accompanying LCO. In MODES 2 and 3, only two MSSVs per steam generator are required to be OPERABLE.
| |
| i (continued) l McGuire Unit 1 B 3.7-2 Supplement 5 l
| |
| l
| |
| | |
| B 3.7.1 l l
| |
| BASES L
| |
| APPLICABILITY In MODES 4 and 5, there are no credible transients requiring l the MSSVs. The steam generators are not normally used for (continued) l heat removal in MODES 5 and 6, and thus cannot be l overpressurized; there is no requirement for the MSSVs to be OPERABLE in these MODES.
| |
| ACTIONS The ACTIONS table is modified by a Note indicating that separate Condition entry is allowed for each MSSV.
| |
| A.1 and A.2 l With one or more MSSVs inoperable, reduce power so that the available MSSV relieving capacity meets Reference 2 requirements for the applicable THERMAL POWER.
| |
| Operation with less than all five MSSVs OPERABLE for each steam generator is permissible, if THERMAL POWER is proportionally limited to the relief capacity of the remaining MSSVs. This is accomplished by restricting THERMAL POWER so that the energy transfer to the most limiting steam generator is not greater than the available relief capacity in that steam generator. For example, if one MSSV is inoperable in one steam generator, the relief capacity of that steam generator is reduced by approximately 20%. To offset this reduction in relief capacity, energy transfer to that steam generator must be similarly reduced.
| |
| This is accomplished by reducing THERMAL POWER by the necessary amount to conservatively limit the energy transfer to all steam generators, consistent with the relief capacity of the most limiting steam generator.
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| The maximum power level specified for the power range neutron flux high trip setpoint with inoperable MSSVs must ensure that power is limited to less than the heat removal capacity of the remaining 0PERABLE MSSVs. The reduced high flux trip setpoint also ensures that the reactor trip occurs early enough in the loss of load / turbine trip event to limit primary to secondary heat transfer and preclude overpressurization of the primary and secondary systems. To calculate this power level, the governing equation is the f relationship q = m Ah, where q is the heat input from the primary side, m is the steam flow rate and Ah is the heat of vaporization at the steam relief pressure (assuming no (continued)
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| McGuire Unit 1 B 3.7-3 3/30/98 l l
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| MSSVs B 3.7.1 l
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| BASES APPLICABLE or the Main Steam System. The reactor is tripped on high SAFETY ANALYSES pressurizer 3ressure in the peak primary pressure case. In (continued) this case, tie pressurizer safety valves open, and RCS pressure remains below 110% of the design value. The MSSVs also open to limit the secondary steam pressure.
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| For the peak secondary pressure case, the reactor is tripped on overtemperature AT. Pressurizer. relief valves and MSSVs are activated and prevent overpressurization in the primary and secondary systems.
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| The MSSVs satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (Ref. 4).
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| LC0 The accident analysis assumes five MSSVs per steam generator to provide overpressure protection for design basis transients occurring at 102% RTP. An MSSV will be considered ino)erable if it fails to open on demand. The LC0 requires t1at five MSSVs be OPERABLE in compliance with Reference 2, even though this is not a requirement of the DBA analysis. This is because operation with less than the ,
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| full number of MSSVs requires limitations on allowable j THERMAL POWER (to meet ASME Code requirements). These limitations are according to Table 3.7.1-1 in the accompanying LCO, and Required Action A.1 and A.2.
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| The OPERABILITY of the MSSVs is defined as the ability to open within the setpoint tolerances, relieve steam generator overpressure, and reseat when pressure has been reduced.
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| The OPERABILITY of the MSSVs is determined by periodic surveillance testing in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.
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| The lift settings, according to Table 3.7.1-2 in the accompanying LCO, corresoond to ambient conditions of the valve at nominal operating temperature and pressure.
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| This LC0 provides assurance that the MSSVs will perform i
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| their designed safety functions to mitigate the consequences of accidents that could r(sult in a challenge to the RCPB.
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| APPLICABILITY In MODE 1, the number of MSSVs per steam generator required to be OPERABLE must be according to Table 3.7.1-1 in the accompanying LCO. In MODES 2 and 3, only two MSSVs per steam generator are required to be OPERABLE.
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| (continued)
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| B 3.7-2 Supplement 5 l McGuire Unit 2
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| 1 MSSVs B 3.7.1 BASES l
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| l APPLICABILITY In MODES 4 and 5, there are no credible transients requiring l (continued) the MSSVs. The steam generators are not normally used for l heat removal in MODES 5 and 6, and thus cannot be overpressurized; there is no requirement for the MSSVs to be OPERABLE in these MODES.
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| ACTIONS The ACTIONS table is modified by a Note indicating that separate Condition entry is allowed for each MSSV.
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| A.1 and A.2 l With one or more MSSVs inoperable, reduce power so that the available MSSV relieving capacity meets Reference 2 requirements for the applicable THERMAL POWER.
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| Operation with less than all five MSSVs OPERABLE for each steam generator is permissible, if THERMAL POWER is proportionally limited to the relief capacity of the remaining MSSVs. This is accomplished by restricting THERMAL POWER so that the energy transfer to the most limiting steam generator is not greater than the available relief capacity in that steam generator. For example, if one MSSV is inoperable in one steam generator, the relief capacity of that steam generator is reduced by approximately 20%. To offset this reduction in relief capacity, energy transfer to that steam generator must be similarly reduced.
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| This is accomplished by reducing THERMAL POWER by the necessary amount to conservatively limit the energy transfer to all steam generators, consistent with the relief capacity of the most limiting steam generator.
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| The maximum power level specified for the power range neutron flux high trip setpoint with inoperable MSSVs must ensure that power is limited to less than the heat removal capacity of the remaining OPERABLE MSSVs. The reduced high flux trip setpoint also ensures that the reactor trip occurs early enough in the loss of load / turbine trip event to limit primary to secondary heat transfer and preclude ;
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| overpressurization of the primary and secondary systems. To calculate this power level, the governing equation is the relationship q = m Ah, where q is the heat input from the primary side, m is the steam flow rate and Ah is the heat of vaporization at the steam relief pressure (assuming no (continued) l McGuire Unit 2 8 3.7-3 3/30/98 l
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| MSSVs l B 3.7.1 . l
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| )
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| BASES APPLICABLE or the Main Steam System. Qf a sk1Teum reactwity feeoDacD SAFETY ANALYSES qs assumeU I)fhe reactor is tripped on high pressurizer -
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| (continued) pressurg. In this case, the pressurizer safety valves o e na MLd pressure remains below 110% of the design value. pen, MSSVs also open to limit the secondary steam pressure.' %%e l
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| Qt ma_naun reacuve reennact 1se s w The reactor'is teatet At f '*
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| sum}l l
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| tripped iling ra on overtemperature ncreases t AT. rture gnout]Thegtransient from neved
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| "; )
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| i roos be its initia lue__.fPressurizerreliefvalves ;
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| and MSSVs are activated and prevent overpressurization in j the primary and secondary systems. ')The MSSVs are used R .
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| 'tnave two tive ano one pa ve ra11ure modes. active
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| * failure s are spuri opening, and fail to reclose once .
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| The pas ve failure mode is lure to open a g t
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| nd._f l The MSSVs satisfy Criterion 3 of he alRC Po1Xf StatementJ. p toCFR.To.S4Uc4.uy'hu LCO The accident analysis requires four MSSVs per steam generator to provide overpressure protection for design basis transients occurring at 102% RTP. An MSSV will 5' considered inoperable if it fails to open on demand.
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| CU requires In Tive todVs De UPLMBLE in compli ewithf
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| ! eference 2. en though this is t a requi of the anal . This is becaus peration wit ess than the' ull r of MSSVs requi limitations allowable j PnWFR (to maat A_ C W reaui nts)f These
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| : l. limitations are according to Table 3.7.11 in the accompanying LCO and Required Action g 4 g o g The OPERABILI1Y of the MSSVs is defined as the ability to open within the setpoint tolerances, relieve steam generator i overpressure, and reseat when pressure has been reduced. .
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| r The OPERABILITY of the MSSVs is determined by periodic surveillance testing in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.
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| The lift settings, according to Table 3.7.12 in the accompanying LCO. correspond to ambient conditions of the valve at nominal operating temperature and pressure.
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| (continued)
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| P2&d%.
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| ,WOG-S e 0 3.7 2 Rev 1. 04/07/95
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| McGuira C: Cnttwb:Imprevzd TS Rtvisw Ccmmants I ITO S3ctlin 3.7 Plant Systems I l
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| 3.7.1-4 Bases JFD 4 l Bases for ITS 3.7.1 Required Action A.2, STS Markup page B 3.7-3 &
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| 4 The ITS Bases have added discussion for the new Required Action A.2. j i Comment: The Bases does not explain why the Completion Time for Required l i
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| Action A.2 is acceptable. Revise the Bases accordingly. {
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| DEC Response: ',
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| The ITS Bases are revised to provide justification for the proposed completion time consistent with similar actions in other LCOs in section 3.2. :
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| I d
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| f 1
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| 1 1
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| 4 l
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| l l
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| l mc3_cr_3.7 4 May 18,1998
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| MSSVs B 3.7.1 BASES ACTIONS L 1 and A.2 (continued) subcooled feedwater). The algorithm use is consistent with l the recommendations of the Westinghouse Nuclear Safety i Advisory Letter, NSAL-94-001, dated January 20, 1994 (Ref.7). Additionally, the calculated values are reduced by 9% to account for instrument and channel uncertainties. I The allowed Completion Time of 4 hou'rs provides an acceptable time to reach the required power level from full _.'
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| power operation without allowing the plant to remain in an unacceptable condition for an extended period of time and provides sufficient time to reduce the trip setpoints. The adjustment of the trip setpoints is a sensitive operation that may inadvertently trip the Reactor Protection System.
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| B.1 and B.2 If the MSSVs cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, or if one or more steam generators have less than two MSSVs OPERABLE, the unit must I be placed in a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. To l achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours, and in MODE 4 within 12 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.
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| SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.1.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies the OPERABILITY of the MSSVs by the verification of each MSSV lift setpoint in accordance with (continued) l McGuire Unit 1 8 3.7-4 Supplement 5 u-__--___--_---------
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| MSSVs B 3.7.1 BASES ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 (continued) subcooled feedwater). The algorithm use is consistent with the recommendations of the Westinghouse Nuclear Safety Advisory Letter, NSAL-94-001, dated January 20, 1994 (Ref. 7). Additionally, the calculated values are reduced by 9% to account for instrument and channel uncertainties.
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| The allowed Completion Time of 4 hours provides an acceptable time to reach the required power level from full power operation without allowing the plant to remain in an unacceptable condition for an extended period of time and provides sufficient time to reduce the trip setpoints. The adjustment of the trip setpoints is a sensitive operation that may inadvertently trip the Reactor Protection System.
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| B.1 and 8.2 If the MSSVs cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, or if one or more steam generators have less than two MSSVs OPERABLE, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To}}
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