ML24173A004: Difference between revisions

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{{#Wiki_filter:6/20/24, 4:17 PM blob:https://www.fdms.gov/885b93c0-71dc-41f4-af16-d0494215c1b1 SUNSI Review Complete Template=ADM-013 As of: 6/20/24, 4:16 PM E-RIDS=ADM-03 Received: June 14, 2024 ADD: Paul Laflamme, Brian PUBLIC SUBMISSIONBenney, Mary Neely Status: Pending_Post Comment (1) Tracking No. lxf-6n0e-vg8k Publication Date:4/17/2024Comments Due: June 17, 2024 Citation: 89 FR 27463 Submission Type: Web
{{#Wiki_filter:PUBLIC SUBMISSION As of: 6/20/24, 4:16 PM Received: June 14, 2024 Status: Pending_Post Tracking No. lxf-6n0e-vg8k Comments Due: June 17, 2024 Submission Type: Web Docket: NRC-2024-0037 Event Reporting Guidelines Comment On: NRC-2024-0037-0001 Draft NUREG: Event Report Guidelines Document: NRC-2024-0037-DRAFT-0002 Comment on FR Doc # 2024-08179 Submitter Information Email:atb@nei.org Organization:Nuclear Energy Institute General Comment See attached file(s)
Attachments 06-14-24_NRC Industry Comments on NUREG-1022 Rev 3 Supplement 2 6/20/24, 4:17 PM blob:https://www.fdms.gov/885b93c0-71dc-41f4-af16-d0494215c1b1 blob:https://www.fdms.gov/885b93c0-71dc-41f4-af16-d0494215c1b1 1/1 SUNSI Review Complete Template=ADM-013 E-RIDS=ADM-03 ADD: Paul Laflamme, Brian Benney, Mary Neely Comment (1)
Publication Date:4/17/2024 Citation: 89 FR 27463


Docket: NRC-2024-0037 Event Reporting Guidelines
Tony Brown Technical Advisor, Regulatory Affairs Phone: 202.739.8087 Email: mab@nei.org June 14, 2024 Office of Administration U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 ATTN: Program Management, Announcements and Editing Staff  
 
Comment On: NRC-2024-0037-0001 Draft NUREG: Event Report Guidelines
 
Document: NRC-2024-0037-DRAFT-0002 Comment on FR Doc # 2024-08179
 
Submitter Information
 
Email: atb@nei.org Organization: Nuclear Energy Institute
 
General Comment
 
See attached file(s)
 
Attachments
 
06-14-24_NRC Industry Comments on NUREG-1022 Rev 3 Supplement 2
 
blob:https://www.fdms.gov/885b93c0-71dc-41f4-af16-d0494215c1b1 1/1 Tony Brown Phone: 202.739. 80 87 Technical Advisor, Regulatory Email: mab@nei.org Affairs
 
J une 14, 2024
 
Office of Administration U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 - 0001 ATTN: Program Management, Announcements and Editing Staff


==Subject:==
==Subject:==
NEI Comments on Draft NUREG-1022, Revision 3, Supplement 2, Event Report Guidelines, Docket ID NRC-2024- 0037
NEI Comments on Draft NUREG-1022, Revision 3, Supplement 2, Event Report Guidelines, Docket ID NRC-2024-0037 Submitted via Regulations.gov Project Number: 689  
 
Submitted via Regulations.gov
 
Project Number: 689


==Dear Program Management,==
==Dear Program Management,==
Accouncements and Editing Staff:
Accouncements and Editing Staff:
The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI)1, on behalf of its members, appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft NUREG-1022, Revision 3, Supplement 2, Event Report Guidelines (Docket ID NRC-2024-0037), which provides licensees updated guidance for evaluating and reporting degraded or unanalyzed conditions.
The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI)1, on behalf of its members, appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft NUREG-1022, Revision 3, Supplement 2, Event Report Guidelines (Docket ID NRC-2024-0037), which provides licensees updated guidance for evaluating and reporting degraded or unanalyzed conditions.
In general, NEI supports the staffs proposed changes to the guidance for reporting degraded or unanalyzed conditions that signficantly degrade plant safety. Defining discovery and including considerations for structures, systems, and components (SSCs) recategorized under 10 CFR 50.69 should result in fewer event report retractions and minimize the burden on licensees and NRC staff.
In general, NEI supports the staffs proposed changes to the guidance for reporting degraded or unanalyzed conditions that signficantly degrade plant safety. Defining discovery and including considerations for structures, systems, and components (SSCs) recategorized under 10 CFR 50.69 should result in fewer event report retractions and minimize the burden on licensees and NRC staff.
However, NEI recommends additional discussion on the use of risk insights for determining if a condition signficantly degrades plant safety. The discussion regarding Risk-Informed Safety Class (RISC)-3 and RISC-4 SSCs provides the licensee one method to use risk insights and probabilistic risk assessment 1 The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) is responsible for establishing unified policy on behalf of its members relating to matters affecting the nuclear energy industry, including the regulatory aspects of generic operational and technical issues. NEIs members include entities licensed to operate commercial nuclear power plants in the United States, nuclear plant designers, major architect and engineering firms, fuel cycle facilities, nuclear materials licensees, and other organizations involved in the nuclear energy industry.


However, NEI recommends additional discussion on the use of risk insights for determining if a condition signficantly degrades plant safety. The discussion regarding R isk-Informed Safety Class (RISC)-3 and RISC-4 SSCs provides the licensee one method to use risk insights and probabilistic risk assessment
Office of Administration June 14, 2024 Page 2 Nuclear Energy Institute (PRA) in evaluating applicable reporting requirements. However, this approach can only be used for licensees with an approved 50.69 program, and for SSCs that have been categorized under 50.69.
 
1 The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) is responsible for establishing unified policy on behalf of its members relating to matters affecting the nuclear energy industry, including the regulatory aspects of generic operational and technical issues. NEIs members include entities licensed to operate commercial nuclear power plants in the United States, nuclear plant designers, major architect and engineering firms, fuel cycle facilities, nuclear materials licensees, and other organizations involved in the nuclear en ergy industry.
Office of Administration Nuclear Energy Institute June 14, 2024 Page 2
 
(PRA) in evaluating applicable reporting requirements. However, this approach can only be used for licensees with an approved 50.69 program, and for SSCs that have been categorized under 50.69.
Licensees should also be given the option to use their PRA models to provide insight regarding whether or not a condition significantly degrades plant safety. NEI recommends including additional allowances for licensees to use existing risk insights to determine if a condition signficantly degrades plant safety.
Licensees should also be given the option to use their PRA models to provide insight regarding whether or not a condition significantly degrades plant safety. NEI recommends including additional allowances for licensees to use existing risk insights to determine if a condition signficantly degrades plant safety.
Additional NEI comments are in the attached table. NEI appreciates the NRCs effort in developing this draft guidance and considering these comments. We encourage timely issuance of the supplement.
Additional NEI comments are in the attached table. NEI appreciates the NRCs effort in developing this draft guidance and considering these comments. We encourage timely issuance of the supplement.
If you have questions concerning this letter, please contact me at mab@nei.org or 202.739.8087.
If you have questions concerning this letter, please contact me at mab@nei.org or 202.739.8087.
 
Respectfully, Tony Brown Technical Advisor, Regulatory Affairs  
Respectfully,
 
Tony Brown Technical Advisor, Regulatory Affairs


==Attachment:==
==Attachment:==
NEI Comment Table on Draft NUREG-1022, Revision 3, Supplement 2, Event Report Guidelines
NEI Comment Table on Draft NUREG-1022, Revision 3, Supplement 2, Event Report Guidelines c:
 
Michael King, NRC/NRR Lisa Regner, NRC/NRR/DRO/IOEB Paul LaFlamme, NRC/NRR/DRO/IOEB  
c: Michael King, NRC/ NRR Lisa Regner, NRC/NRR/DRO/IOEB Paul LaF lamme, NRC/NRR/DRO/IOEB Nuclear Energy Institute 1
 
NEI Comments on D raft NUREG-1022, Revision 3, Supplement 2, Event Report Guidelines


Affected Section Comment/Basis Recommendation
Nuclear Energy Institute 1
: 1. GENERAL Recommend additional discussion be Recommend including additional allowances for licensees to included on the use of risk insights for use existing risk insights to determine if a condition determining if a condition significantly sign ificantly degrades plant safety.
NEI Comments on Draft NUREG-1022, Revision 3, Supplement 2, Event Report Guidelines Affected Section Comment/Basis Recommendation
degrades plant safety. The discussion regarding Risk-Informed Safety Class (RISC)-3 and RISC-4 SSCs provides the licensee one method to use PRA and risk insights in evaluating applicable reporting requirements. However, this approach can only be used for licensees with an approved 50.69 program, and for SSCs that have been categorized under 50.69. Licensees should also be given the option to use their detailed PRA models to provide insight regarding whether or not a condition significantly degrades plant safety.
: 1. GENERAL Recommend additional discussion be included on the use of risk insights for determining if a condition significantly degrades plant safety. The discussion regarding Risk-Informed Safety Class (RISC)-3 and RISC-4 SSCs provides the licensee one method to use PRA and risk insights in evaluating applicable reporting requirements. However, this approach can only be used for licensees with an approved 50.69 program, and for SSCs that have been categorized under 50.69. Licensees should also be given the option to use their detailed PRA models to provide insight regarding whether or not a condition significantly degrades plant safety.
: 2. Section 2.1, Clarify that the moment of discovery occurs Proposed language:
Recommend including additional allowances for licensees to use existing risk insights to determine if a condition significantly degrades plant safety.
second bullet of when the evaluation is completed.
: 2. Section 2.1, second bullet of 2nd paragraph Clarify that the moment of discovery occurs when the evaluation is completed.
2nd paragraph
Proposed language:
* if the existence of a seriously degraded principal safety barrier or unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety cannot be readily determined when it occurs or when it is found to have occurred, and additional evaluation is needed, then the moment when the evaluation that supports the existence of such a condition is completed.
if the existence of a seriously degraded principal safety barrier or unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety cannot be readily determined when it occurs or when it is found to have occurred, and additional evaluation is needed, then the moment when the evaluation that supports the existence of such a condition is completed.  


Nuclear Energy Institute 2
Nuclear Energy Institute 2
Affected Section Comment/Basis Recommendation
Affected Section Comment/Basis Recommendation
: 3. Section 2.2.A, The paragraph is specifically associated Proposed language:
: 3. Section 2.2.A, last paragraph The paragraph is specifically associated with Example #3 and should be moved to the example to ensure consistent application.
last paragraph with Example #3 and should be moved to the example to ensure consistent 3. degradation of steam generator tubes that is deemed application. serious if the tubes fail to meet the performance criteria outlined in the plant-specific technical specifications (TS) for steam generator tube integrity. When one or more steam generator tubes meet the tube repair criteria and have not been plugged or repaired in accordance with the steam generator program, they are not considered to be severely degraded as long as structural integrity and the accident-induced leakage performance criteria in the plant -
Proposed language:
specific TSs are met.
: 3. degradation of steam generator tubes that is deemed serious if the tubes fail to meet the performance criteria outlined in the plant-specific technical specifications (TS) for steam generator tube integrity. When one or more steam generator tubes meet the tube repair criteria and have not been plugged or repaired in accordance with the steam generator program, they are not considered to be severely degraded as long as structural integrity and the accident-induced leakage performance criteria in the plant-specific TSs are met.
: 4. Section 2.2.B, Recommend clarifying that functionally Proposed language:
: 4. Section 2.2.B, Example #5 Recommend clarifying that functionally related components implies components from different systems. Also recommend replacing could with would to avoid any confusion or ambiguity when evaluating if a condition significantly degrades plant safety.
Example #5 related components implies components from different systems. Also recommend 5. Multiple functionally related safety -related components (i.e.
Proposed language:
replacing could with would to avoid any components in different systems) out of service that would confusion or ambiguity when evaluating if a prevent the fulfillment of a safety function.
: 5. Multiple functionally related safety-related components (i.e.
condition significantly degrades plant safety.
components in different systems) out of service that would prevent the fulfillment of a safety function.
: 5. Section 2.2.1, Recommend providing an example of a Proposed language:
: 5. Section 2.2.1, Example #4 Recommend providing an example of a condition that is normal and expected wear or degradation.
Example #4 condition that is normal and expected wear or degradation. (4) Additional Clarification for Events Not Required to Be Reported
Proposed language:
 
(4) Additional Clarification for Events Not Required to Be Reported Licensees are not required to report an event pursuant to this criterion if the event results from a shared dependency among trains or channels that is a natural or expected consequence of the approved plant design, or normal and expected wear or degradation. For example, run to failure components would be considered normal and expected wear or degradation.}}
Licensees are not required to report an event pursuant to this criterion if the event results from a shared dependency among trains or channels that is a natural or expected consequence of the approved plant design, or normal and expected wear or degradation. For example, run to failure components would be considered normal and expected wear or degradation.}}

Latest revision as of 17:48, 24 November 2024

Comment (1) of Individual on Draft NUREG: Event Report Guidelines
ML24173A004
Person / Time
Site: Nuclear Energy Institute
Issue date: 06/14/2024
From:
Nuclear Energy Institute
To:
Office of Administration
References
NRC-2024-0037, 89FR27463 00001
Download: ML24173A004 (1)


Text

PUBLIC SUBMISSION As of: 6/20/24, 4:16 PM Received: June 14, 2024 Status: Pending_Post Tracking No. lxf-6n0e-vg8k Comments Due: June 17, 2024 Submission Type: Web Docket: NRC-2024-0037 Event Reporting Guidelines Comment On: NRC-2024-0037-0001 Draft NUREG: Event Report Guidelines Document: NRC-2024-0037-DRAFT-0002 Comment on FR Doc # 2024-08179 Submitter Information Email:atb@nei.org Organization:Nuclear Energy Institute General Comment See attached file(s)

Attachments 06-14-24_NRC Industry Comments on NUREG-1022 Rev 3 Supplement 2 6/20/24, 4:17 PM blob:https://www.fdms.gov/885b93c0-71dc-41f4-af16-d0494215c1b1 blob:https://www.fdms.gov/885b93c0-71dc-41f4-af16-d0494215c1b1 1/1 SUNSI Review Complete Template=ADM-013 E-RIDS=ADM-03 ADD: Paul Laflamme, Brian Benney, Mary Neely Comment (1)

Publication Date:4/17/2024 Citation: 89 FR 27463

Tony Brown Technical Advisor, Regulatory Affairs Phone: 202.739.8087 Email: mab@nei.org June 14, 2024 Office of Administration U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 ATTN: Program Management, Announcements and Editing Staff

Subject:

NEI Comments on Draft NUREG-1022, Revision 3, Supplement 2, Event Report Guidelines, Docket ID NRC-2024-0037 Submitted via Regulations.gov Project Number: 689

Dear Program Management,

Accouncements and Editing Staff:

The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI)1, on behalf of its members, appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft NUREG-1022, Revision 3, Supplement 2, Event Report Guidelines (Docket ID NRC-2024-0037), which provides licensees updated guidance for evaluating and reporting degraded or unanalyzed conditions.

In general, NEI supports the staffs proposed changes to the guidance for reporting degraded or unanalyzed conditions that signficantly degrade plant safety. Defining discovery and including considerations for structures, systems, and components (SSCs) recategorized under 10 CFR 50.69 should result in fewer event report retractions and minimize the burden on licensees and NRC staff.

However, NEI recommends additional discussion on the use of risk insights for determining if a condition signficantly degrades plant safety. The discussion regarding Risk-Informed Safety Class (RISC)-3 and RISC-4 SSCs provides the licensee one method to use risk insights and probabilistic risk assessment 1 The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) is responsible for establishing unified policy on behalf of its members relating to matters affecting the nuclear energy industry, including the regulatory aspects of generic operational and technical issues. NEIs members include entities licensed to operate commercial nuclear power plants in the United States, nuclear plant designers, major architect and engineering firms, fuel cycle facilities, nuclear materials licensees, and other organizations involved in the nuclear energy industry.

Office of Administration June 14, 2024 Page 2 Nuclear Energy Institute (PRA) in evaluating applicable reporting requirements. However, this approach can only be used for licensees with an approved 50.69 program, and for SSCs that have been categorized under 50.69.

Licensees should also be given the option to use their PRA models to provide insight regarding whether or not a condition significantly degrades plant safety. NEI recommends including additional allowances for licensees to use existing risk insights to determine if a condition signficantly degrades plant safety.

Additional NEI comments are in the attached table. NEI appreciates the NRCs effort in developing this draft guidance and considering these comments. We encourage timely issuance of the supplement.

If you have questions concerning this letter, please contact me at mab@nei.org or 202.739.8087.

Respectfully, Tony Brown Technical Advisor, Regulatory Affairs

Attachment:

NEI Comment Table on Draft NUREG-1022, Revision 3, Supplement 2, Event Report Guidelines c:

Michael King, NRC/NRR Lisa Regner, NRC/NRR/DRO/IOEB Paul LaFlamme, NRC/NRR/DRO/IOEB

Nuclear Energy Institute 1

NEI Comments on Draft NUREG-1022, Revision 3, Supplement 2, Event Report Guidelines Affected Section Comment/Basis Recommendation

1. GENERAL Recommend additional discussion be included on the use of risk insights for determining if a condition significantly degrades plant safety. The discussion regarding Risk-Informed Safety Class (RISC)-3 and RISC-4 SSCs provides the licensee one method to use PRA and risk insights in evaluating applicable reporting requirements. However, this approach can only be used for licensees with an approved 50.69 program, and for SSCs that have been categorized under 50.69. Licensees should also be given the option to use their detailed PRA models to provide insight regarding whether or not a condition significantly degrades plant safety.

Recommend including additional allowances for licensees to use existing risk insights to determine if a condition significantly degrades plant safety.

2. Section 2.1, second bullet of 2nd paragraph Clarify that the moment of discovery occurs when the evaluation is completed.

Proposed language:

if the existence of a seriously degraded principal safety barrier or unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety cannot be readily determined when it occurs or when it is found to have occurred, and additional evaluation is needed, then the moment when the evaluation that supports the existence of such a condition is completed.

Nuclear Energy Institute 2

Affected Section Comment/Basis Recommendation

3. Section 2.2.A, last paragraph The paragraph is specifically associated with Example #3 and should be moved to the example to ensure consistent application.

Proposed language:

3. degradation of steam generator tubes that is deemed serious if the tubes fail to meet the performance criteria outlined in the plant-specific technical specifications (TS) for steam generator tube integrity. When one or more steam generator tubes meet the tube repair criteria and have not been plugged or repaired in accordance with the steam generator program, they are not considered to be severely degraded as long as structural integrity and the accident-induced leakage performance criteria in the plant-specific TSs are met.
4. Section 2.2.B, Example #5 Recommend clarifying that functionally related components implies components from different systems. Also recommend replacing could with would to avoid any confusion or ambiguity when evaluating if a condition significantly degrades plant safety.

Proposed language:

5. Multiple functionally related safety-related components (i.e.

components in different systems) out of service that would prevent the fulfillment of a safety function.

5. Section 2.2.1, Example #4 Recommend providing an example of a condition that is normal and expected wear or degradation.

Proposed language:

(4) Additional Clarification for Events Not Required to Be Reported Licensees are not required to report an event pursuant to this criterion if the event results from a shared dependency among trains or channels that is a natural or expected consequence of the approved plant design, or normal and expected wear or degradation. For example, run to failure components would be considered normal and expected wear or degradation.