ML23181A029
| ML23181A029 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nuclear Energy Institute |
| Issue date: | 06/29/2023 |
| From: | Mccullum R Nuclear Energy Institute |
| To: | Janice Nguyen Division of Fuel Management, Office of Administration |
| References | |
| DG-3057, NEI 22-02, Rev 2, NRC-2023-0107, 88FR36514 00002 | |
| Download: ML23181A029 (1) | |
Text
6/30/23, 7:19 AM blob:https://www.fdms.gov/32f49742-4019-48e2-82ed-f2209de21af2 SUNSI Review Complete Template=ADM-013 As of: 6/30/23, 7:12 AM E-RIDS=ADM-03 Received: June 29, 2023 PUBLIC SUBMISSION ADD: John -Chau Nguyen, Harriet Karagiannis, Bridget Status: Pending_Post Curran, Mary Neely Tracking No. ljh-iqrs-a7h1 Comment (2) Comments Due: July 05, 2023 Publication Date: 6/5/2023 Submission Type: Web Citation: 88 FR 36514 Docket: NRC-2023-0107 Draft Regulatory Guide: Weather-Related Administrative Controls at Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations Comment On: NRC-2023-0107-0001 Draft Regulatory Guide: Weather-Related Administrative Controls at Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations Document: NRC-2023-0107-DRAFT-0004 Comment on FR Doc # 2023-11895 Submitter Information Email: atb@nei.org Organization: Nuclear Energy Institute General Comment See attached file(s)
Attachments 06-29-23_NRC_Comments on DG3057 blob:https://www.fdms.gov/32f49742-4019-48e2-82ed-f2209de21af2 1/1
ROD MCCULLUM Sr. Director, Decommissioning and Used Fuel 1201 F Street, NW, Suite 1100 Washington, DC 20004 P: 202.739.8082 rxm@nei.org nei.org June 29, 2023 Mr. John-Chau Nguyen Division of Fuel Management Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001
Subject:
NEI Comments on Draft Regulatory Guide DG-3057 (Docket ID NRC-2023-0107)
Project Number: 689
Dear Mr. Nguyen:
On behalf of its members, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 1 is providing comments on Draft Regulatory DG-3057 and its endorsement of NEI 22-02, Revision 2, Guidelines for Weather-Related Administrative Controls for Short Duration Outdoor Dry Cask Storage Operations (ML22339A035). Issuance of the Regulatory Guide will further strengthen our shared understanding of how licensees can best use administrative controls as one method to demonstrate compliance with the requirements that structures, systems, and components (SSCs) important-to-safety (ITS) are designed to withstand the effects of severe weather without impairing their capability to perform their intended design functions during outdoor dry storage system (DSS) handling activities (ODHA).
Industrys DSS-ODHA activities have been the subject of considerable regulatory uncertainty over the last two years. Inspections during this period identified findings of non-compliance that differed from what industrys understanding of compliance has been since the time the DSSs were originally licensed. Recognizing this, on April 15, 2022, the NRC issued Enforcement Guidance Memorandum (EGM) 22-01, Enforcement Discretion for Noncompliance of Tornado Hazards Protection Requirements at Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations, (ML22087A496) to provide guidance to the NRC staff on exercising enforcement discretion while industry and NRC worked to address this uncertainty. The result of the ensuing dialogue was NEIs November 4, 2022, submittal of NEI 22-02, Revision 2.
1 The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) is responsible for establishing unified policy on behalf of its members relating to matters affecting the nuclear energy industry, including the regulatory aspects of generic operational and technical issues. NEIs members include entities licensed to operate commercial nuclear power plants in the United States, nuclear plant designers, major architect and engineering firms, fuel cycle facilities, nuclear materials licensees, and other organizations involved in the nuclear energy industry.
Mr. John-Chau Nguyen June 29, 2023 Page 2 In DG-3057, NRC has endorsed NEI 22-02, Revision 2 with certain clarifications and exceptions - several of which we agree with. NEI has attached detailed comments on these clarifications and exceptions to further strengthen alignment on a stable, predictable, and efficient regulatory framework to assure the safety of DSS ODHAs. However, there are two areas in which we disagree with what has been included in DG-3057.
- On Page 2 of the Regulatory Analysis, in the Second Paragraph under Alternative 1, NRC states that Many licensees are currently using administrative controls in contradiction to their design bases to meet regulatory requirements under the enforcement discretion provided by EGM 22-01. This is a broad generalization and should be removed. Industry believes it has consistently been in compliance with the requirements in its respective DSS FSARs and 10 CFR 72.212(b)(6). We believe that this disagreement stems from a lack of clarity regarding the use of administrative controls in accordance with the design bases. Incorporation of our attached comments will resolve this uncertainty.
- In a public meeting held on June 13, the NRC staff explained the interconnected nature of Clarifications #3, #4, and #5. We agree that these clarifications have a combined effect, and we are very concerned that this effect could undermine the regulatory certainty that the completed Regulatory Guide would otherwise provide. These three clarifications expand the scope of the guidance in a way that will introduce new uncertainties going forward and deviate from established licensing precedent. 2 The added language is both prescriptive (calling for licensees to perform substantial additional analyses of system performance during a wide range of weather events) and vague (using undefined terms like appropriate error margin). This expansion in scope goes beyond both what was intended when the DSSs were licensed and the focus on severe weather events (tornadoes, in particular) in related inspections that provided the impetus for this issue. Our detailed comments elaborate on this concern and recommend that these 3 clarifications be deleted.
We remain confident that DG-3057 can be finalized in a way that will restore regulatory stability and predictability to DSS ODHAs and improve efficiency. We look forward to finalization of RG 3.77 in the 4th quarter of 2023 so that the needed regulatory improvements, and any corresponding actions on the part of licensees, can be implemented prior to the expiration of EGM 22-01 in April 2024. Because a number of licensees plan loading campaigns in 2024 that could be affected by this guidance, NRC should consider allowing an implementation period for RG 3.77 and, if necessary, extending the date of EGM 22-01 until the end of that period.
We also request that NRC inspection procedures associated with RG 3.77 be updated and shared with the industry to enhance the licensees understanding of NRC expectations and to ensure regulatory compliance.
A more efficient regulatory framework is essential to the industry. The dialogue on this issue has been prolonged, diverting substantial NRC and industry resources away from more safety significant matters for the 2
Interim Storage Partners license SNM-2515, issued September 13, 2021; Holtec license SNM-2516, issued May 9, 2023, and Orano-TN EOS CoC Amendment 3, to become effective July 17, 2023.
Mr. John-Chau Nguyen June 29, 2023 Page 3 past two years. The lessons learned from this activity should be instructive as NRC works to modernize its regulatory framework.
Please contact me or Mark Richter of my staff (mar@nei.org) with any comments or questions on the content of this letter.
Sincerely, Rod McCullum Attachment c: Mr. John Lubinski, NRC/NMSS Ms. Shana Helton, NRC/NMSS/DFM Mr. Jake Zimmerman, NRC/NMSS/DFM
DG-3057 Weather-Related Administrative Controls at ISFSI Rev. 6.26.2023 Clarification/Exception NEI/Industry Comment Recommended Resolution Item 1 - Clarification: Industry has no comments on this clarification.
Item 2 - Exception: Lastly, the The guidance addresses all outdoor DCS activities. The state of Delete the sentence.
guidance only applies to a DSS the canister and cask at any time while outdoors is a site-when the DSSs confinement specific issue each licensee should consider in implementing boundary has been established as the guidance, including in rare short-duration situations where required by its licensing basis. the confinement boundary has not yet been established. Since there are situations in which the confinement boundary has not yet been established during which ODHAs must be protected by the use of administrative controls, this guidance should not be limited to apply only in cases where the confinement boundary is established.
Item 3 - Clarification, Item 4 The combined effect of Clarifications 3, 4, and 5 is to greatly Delete Clarifications 3, 4, and 5. It
- Clarification, and Item 5 - expand the definition of safe condition and forecast to is important to maintain the Clarification: Industry concerns include a wide range of conditions that would exceed an SSCs definition of safe condition and regarding the regulatory design criteria. This significantly, in turn, expands the scope of forecast the same as proposed in uncertainty likely to be created by the guidance. the guidance to be consistent with the combined effect of these previously licensed definition of three clarifications the term 1. There is no safety This clarification has been written as an overly prescriptive task benefit to expanding the which will be difficult, if not impossible, to complete. It could definition.
cause licensees to chase information about things such as projected barometric pressures and monitoring weather below the threshold of severe weather. Additional monitoring of things below the threshold or below other bounding conditions 1
Interim Storage Partners license SNM-2515, issued September 13, 2021; Holtec license SNM-2516, issued May 9, 2023, and Orano-TN EOS CoC Amendment 3, to become effective July 17, 2023.
DG-3057 Weather-Related Administrative Controls at ISFSI Rev. 6.26.2023 Page 2 would be an unnecessary burden that would divert resources away from more safety significant tasks. This could then cause licensees to have to go beyond the NWS severe weather alert system as a resource.
This will subsequently trigger extensive design reviews based on this inevitably uncertain population of information. A significant level of effort will be required to conduct these reviews. Again, this will place an inordinate focus on items of little to no safety significance and further divert resources from more safety significant tasks.
Most significantly, these design reviews would be of little to no use towards meeting the intended purpose of this guidance.
This is because ensuring weather conditions and forecast would not exceed design criteria does not address the time when these cask systems would be in unanalyzed outdoor configurations, i.e., when the limiting criteria are unknown, for example, a storage cask being carried by a transporter (that may be NITS), or a storage cask without its lid. It is unclear how design criteria based on a prescribed configuration for a cask system can be extrapolated to an unanalyzed configuration to determine the triggers for weather conditions and outlooks.
The purpose of the guidance is to avoid operations during severe weather, not to confirm and re-evaluate every design basis parameter that could be affected by any kind of weather.
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DG-3057 Weather-Related Administrative Controls at ISFSI Rev. 6.26.2023 Page 3 The search to do this would inevitably become open-ended and, absent any limiting principle, the extent to which it will have been completed would be subject to differing interpretations between and amongst licensees and NRC inspectors. This will create substantial regulatory uncertainty going forward.
In accordance with 10 CFR 72.212(b)(6), licensees must comply with operating limits associated with normal and off-normal conditions established in the cask FSAR. It should be noted that NRC did not ask for the prescriptive design reviews called for in this clarification when staff approved the FSARs.
To essentially require them now in operationally focused guidance would constitute a backfit. Before issuing these clarifications, NRC must thoroughly weigh the potential resources required against the safety benefits that would be gained.
Item 5 - Clarification: In this It is not clear what is meant by an appropriate error margin Although we are recommending determination, forecast conditions in the context of the paragraph. that Clarification 5 be deleted, we should provide a conservative are making this comment to threshold, including an highlight the regulatory appropriate error margin, to uncertainty that would be ensure that SSCs ITS are not introduced by the open-ended subjected to any load expansion of the scope of this combinations beyond those guidance.
analyzed.
Item 5 - Clarification: From The terms qualitative or quantitative and quantitative and Although we are recommending in the load conditions, the qualitative qualitative are used interchangeably. This is confusing and the comment above that or quantitative criteria that Clarification 5 be deleted, we 3
DG-3057 Weather-Related Administrative Controls at ISFSI Rev. 6.26.2023 Page 4 define/outline a safe condition inconsistent with the regulatory and licensing precedent upon make this comment to emphasize and forecast should be which the definition of safe condition and forecast is based. the importance of maintaining the determined. These criteria will established licensing precedent.
form the acceptance criteria of the procedure establishing The term quantitative or administrative control.
qualitative acceptance criteria is based on 10 CFR 72.150. This And term has been used in the definition of safe condition and forecast that NRC approved in Based upon the licensees review Reference. To avoid any possible described above, the licensee misunderstanding, NRC should should determine quantitative and consistently use quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria qualitative acceptance criteria, to be consistent with the regulation.
The definition in NEI 22-02 is verbatim the same as the referenced precedents.
Item 6 - Clarification: The NRCs clarification to the statement adds and forecast, We suggest a simpler clarification Licensees should use the NWSs but it also deletes for the site and retains that can be that recognizes licensees may also hazardous weather outlook and justified as providing This is an important distinction industry use forecasts that are more forecast information unless needs. If a licensee sees a severe weather alert in the region, representative of local conditions another resource for the site is but it does not include the site, they need the flexibility to if such forecasts can be shown to available that provides equivalent make a site-appropriate decision to move forward. provide equivalent (or better) information in terms of timeliness weather information for the site and accuracy. than NWS.
In addition, the closest NWS station to an ISFSI site may not represent the weather at the site as accurately as other 4
DG-3057 Weather-Related Administrative Controls at ISFSI Rev. 6.26.2023 Page 5 sources. The NWS often provides a forecast based on data from the closest airport, which may not be near the site.
Item 7 - Clarification: The Industry believes that benchmarking or dry runs is too Add site operating experience to licensee should determine the restrictive. These activities are largely site-specific when plant benchmarking or dry runs.
expected duration of short- locations and facilities are layered on the generic operations duration outdoor activities by described in the DSS FSAR. The most accurate estimate of either benchmarking or dry runs. ODHA durations is site operating experience.
The ODHA duration should be periodically assessed based upon operating experience.
Item 8 - Exception: Licensees The premise of this exception is that malfunctions and severe Revise this exception as a should have procedures to ensure weather would occur at the same time. clarification to consider the DSS can be placed into an addressing malfunctions and analyzed condition in the event of unexpected delays in a more For the purposes of this guidance, malfunctions of handling a malfunction or delay generic way in which equipment equipment and other delays can be construed as off-normal malfunctions during ODHAs that events. Off-normal events occurring at the same time as leave the DSS in an unanalyzed design basis natural phenomena events would not be condition are entered into the considered in the design of systems or require analysis of the corrective action program so that condition as stated in NUREG-2215, Section 3.5.2.4, External the situation can be promptly Conditions as follows:
evaluated for safety significance with respect to contingency Off-normal conditions and events are presumed to occur in actions and/or returning the combination with normal conditions that are not mutually condition to an analyzed exclusive. Nonetheless, it is not required that the SAR analyze, condition.
or the system be designed for, the simultaneous occurrence of independent off-normal conditions or events, design-basis accidents, or design-basis natural phenomena.
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DG-3057 Weather-Related Administrative Controls at ISFSI Rev. 6.26.2023 Page 6 Conditions involving a latent equipment or instrument failure or malfunction (that is, one that occurs and remains undetected) should be presumed to exist concurrently with other off-normal or design-basis conditions and events. Typical latent malfunctions include a misreading instrument that is not detected as part of routine procedures, an undetected ventilation blockage, or undetected damage from an earlier design-basis event or condition if no provisions exist for detection, recovery, or remediation of such conditions.
As ODHAs are inherently performed while personnel are in attendance, any equipment malfunction would be immediately detected, and would not fall into the category of latent as described in NUREG-225, Section 3.5.2.4 above.
Because probability of the tornado event is small to begin with, postulating a concurrent equipment malfunction can be considered not credible. Requiring procedures to respond to a malfunction of equipment in the context of a concurrent tornado is unreasonable and could actually be detrimental to safety. Malfunctions are addressed in a controlled, deliberate, and timely manner commensurate with safety significance.
Layering weather-related time pressure atop the normal manner in which the corrective action program is implemented adds unnecessary pressure and increases the likelihood of errors.
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