05000458/FIN-2014002-03: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71152 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71152 | ||
| Inspector = R Kopriva, T Skaggs Ryan, A Barrett, D Allen, G Larkin, J O, | | Inspector = R Kopriva, T Skaggs Ryan, A Barrett, D Allen, G Larkin, J O'Donnell, L Ricketson | ||
| CCA = N/A for ROP | | CCA = N/A for ROP | ||
| INPO aspect = | | INPO aspect = | ||
| description = The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, involving the licensees failure to correctly translate the design basis for the diesel fuel oil transfer system into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. Specifically, the station confirmed through calculations that the emergency diesel generator fuel oil transfer system could not perform its seven day mission time to provide filtered fuel oil to emergency diesel generators at the Technical Specification maximum allowable value for fuel oil particulates, with the number of filters available on site. In response to this issue, the licensee verified that the diesel fuel oil particulate level had never approached the technical specification limit; therefore, operability of the emergency diesel generators was never challenged. This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report CR-RBS-2013-04780. The failure to translate into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions, the diesel fuel oil transfer system limitations to perform its seven day mission time associated with the number of filters available on site was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it was associated with Mitigating Events Cornerstone attribute of Design Control, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. In accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, dated June 19, 2012, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, the finding screened as having very low safety significance (Green) because it was not a design or qualification deficiency that represented a loss of operability or functionality; did not represent an actual loss of safety function of the system or train; did not result in the loss of one or more trains of non-technical specification equipment; and did not screen as potentially risk-significant due to seismic, flooding, or severe weather. The inspectors determined that this finding did not have a cross-cutting aspect because the most significant contributor did not reflect current licensee performance. | | description = The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, involving the licensees failure to correctly translate the design basis for the diesel fuel oil transfer system into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. Specifically, the station confirmed through calculations that the emergency diesel generator fuel oil transfer system could not perform its seven day mission time to provide filtered fuel oil to emergency diesel generators at the Technical Specification maximum allowable value for fuel oil particulates, with the number of filters available on site. In response to this issue, the licensee verified that the diesel fuel oil particulate level had never approached the technical specification limit; therefore, operability of the emergency diesel generators was never challenged. This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report CR-RBS-2013-04780. The failure to translate into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions, the diesel fuel oil transfer system limitations to perform its seven day mission time associated with the number of filters available on site was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it was associated with Mitigating Events Cornerstone attribute of Design Control, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. In accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, dated June 19, 2012, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, the finding screened as having very low safety significance (Green) because it was not a design or qualification deficiency that represented a loss of operability or functionality; did not represent an actual loss of safety function of the system or train; did not result in the loss of one or more trains of non-technical specification equipment; and did not screen as potentially risk-significant due to seismic, flooding, or severe weather. The inspectors determined that this finding did not have a cross-cutting aspect because the most significant contributor did not reflect current licensee performance. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 00:21, 22 February 2018
| Site: | River Bend  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000458/2014002 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2014 (2014Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | R Kopriva T Skaggs Ryan A Barrett D Allen G Larkin J O'Donnell L Ricketson |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion III, Design Control Technical Specification |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |