05000298/FIN-2013004-01: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71111.04 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71111.04 | ||
| Inspector = C Henderson, D Allen, J Josey, J Laughlin, J O, | | Inspector = C Henderson, D Allen, J Josey, J Laughlin, J O'Donnell, L Ricketson, P Elkmann | ||
| CCA = H.8 | | CCA = H.8 | ||
| INPO aspect = WP.4 | | INPO aspect = WP.4 | ||
| description = The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, associated with the licensees failure to ensure the correct materials were installed in the control room emergency filtration system air operated valve HV-AO-272. Specifically, incompatible grease was introduced into the valve causing increased friction and degrading stroke times. The licensee entered this deficiency into their corrective action program for resolution as Condition Report CR-CNS-2013-04327. The failure to ensure the correct materials were installed in the control room emergency filtration system air operated valve HV-AO-272 was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency was more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. Specifically, the licensee introduced an incompatible grease into HV-AO-272 causing increased friction and degrading stroke times, thereby affecting the associated objective to ensure availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors evaluated the finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) For Findings At-Power, and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding: (1) was not a deficiency affecting the design and qualification of a mitigating structure, system, or component, and did not result in a loss of operability or functionality; (2) did not represent a loss of system and/or function; (3) did not represent an actual loss of function of at least a single train for longer than its technical specification allowed outage time, or two separate safety systems out-of-service for longer than their technical specification allowed outage time; and (4) did not represent an actual loss of function of one or more nontechnical specification trains of equipment designated as high safety-significance in accordance with the licensees maintenance rule program. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with work practices component because the licensee personnel failed to define and effectively communicate expectations regarding procedural compliance and to ensure that personnel followed procedures. | | description = The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, associated with the licensees failure to ensure the correct materials were installed in the control room emergency filtration system air operated valve HV-AO-272. Specifically, incompatible grease was introduced into the valve causing increased friction and degrading stroke times. The licensee entered this deficiency into their corrective action program for resolution as Condition Report CR-CNS-2013-04327. The failure to ensure the correct materials were installed in the control room emergency filtration system air operated valve HV-AO-272 was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency was more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. Specifically, the licensee introduced an incompatible grease into HV-AO-272 causing increased friction and degrading stroke times, thereby affecting the associated objective to ensure availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors evaluated the finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) For Findings At-Power, and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding: (1) was not a deficiency affecting the design and qualification of a mitigating structure, system, or component, and did not result in a loss of operability or functionality; (2) did not represent a loss of system and/or function; (3) did not represent an actual loss of function of at least a single train for longer than its technical specification allowed outage time, or two separate safety systems out-of-service for longer than their technical specification allowed outage time; and (4) did not represent an actual loss of function of one or more nontechnical specification trains of equipment designated as high safety-significance in accordance with the licensees maintenance rule program. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with work practices component because the licensee personnel failed to define and effectively communicate expectations regarding procedural compliance and to ensure that personnel followed procedures. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 00:20, 22 February 2018
| Site: | Cooper  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000298/2013004 Section 1R04 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2013 (2013Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.04 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Henderson D Allen J Josey J Laughlin J O'Donnell L Ricketson P Elkmann |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion III, Design Control Technical Specification |
| CCA | H.8, Procedure Adherence |
| INPO aspect | WP.4 |
| ' | |