05000298/FIN-2013002-03
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Follow Operability Procedure |
| Description | The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, associated with the licensees failure to follow Station Procedure 0.5OPS, Operations Review of Condition Reports/Operability Determination, and properly document the basis for operability when a degraded or nonconforming condition was identified. Specifically, operators removed caution tags for the cross-connect valves of the diesel generator 1 air start receivers when the tags were required to support compensatory actions for a degraded condition. The licensee entered this deficiency into their corrective action program for resolution as Condition Report CR-CNS-2013-00386. The failure to properly assess and document the basis for operability when a degraded or nonconforming condition had been identified was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency was more than minor, and therefore, a finding, because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. Specifically, the licensees failure to properly document and assess the basis for operability resulted in a condition of unknown operability for a degraded nonconforming system, thereby affecting the associated objective to ensure availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors evaluated the finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding: (1) was not a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating structure, system, or component, and did not result in a loss of operability or functionality; (2) did not represent a loss of system and/or function; (3) did not represent an actual loss of function of at least a single train for longer than its technical specification allowed outage time, or two separate safety systems outof- service for longer than their technical specification allowed outage time; and (4) did not represent an actual loss of function of one or more nontechnical specification trains of equipment designated as high safety-significance in accordance with the licensees maintenance rule program. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the decision-making component because the licensee did not ensure that the proposed action was safe in order to proceed, rather than unsafe in order to disapprove the action. |
| Site: | Cooper  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000298/2013002 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2013 (2013Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Henderson C Hale J Josey J Laughlin D Proulx E Uribe J Gilliam |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V Technical Specification Technical Specification - Procedures |
| CCA | H.14, Conservative Bias |
| INPO aspect | DM.2 |
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Finding - Cooper - IR 05000298/2013002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Cooper) @ 2013Q1
Self-Identified List (Cooper)
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