05000458/FIN-2012010-07: Difference between revisions
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{{finding | {{finding | ||
| title = Loss | | title = Loss of Onsite Safety Review Committee Independence | ||
| docket = 05000458 | | docket = 05000458 | ||
| inspection report = IR 05000458/2012010 | | inspection report = IR 05000458/2012010 | ||
Latest revision as of 20:47, 20 February 2018
Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Loss of Onsite Safety Review Committee Independence |
| Description | The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, for several examples of failures to follow Procedure EN-OM-119, Onsite Safety Review Committee, Revision 8, which indicated that the onsite safety review committee failed to accomplish an independent review of station activities in accordance with the procedure. In response to this finding, the licensee developed a process to document the committee findings and reinforced roles and responsibilities for committee conduct, and committee members reviewed the implementing procedure. The licensee entered this finding into the corrective action program as Condition Report CR-RBS-2012- 03739. The multiple failures to follow the onsite safety review committee implementing procedure were performance deficiencies that were more-than-minor because failure to correct these performance deficiencies could compromise the nuclear safety oversight function of the committee, which could result in inappropriate decision-making on activities important to nuclear safety. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609 Appendix M, Significance Determination Process Using Qualitative Criteria, the finding was of very low safety significance because the performance deficiency did not result in any risk-significant issues. Because the most significant causal factor of the performance deficiency was the licensees failure to properly define, communicate and implement the roles for decision-making that affected nuclear safety, this finding has a human performance cross-cutting aspect associated with decision-making because the licensee failed to adequately communicate the authority and roles of the onsite safety review committee to the members. |
| Site: | River Bend  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000458/2012010 Section 4OA5 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2012 (2012Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Miscellaneous |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 93800 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Barrett B Tindell E Uribe B Hagar |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V |
| CCA | H.13, Consistent Process |
| INPO aspect | DM.1 |
| ' | |
Finding - River Bend - IR 05000458/2012010 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (River Bend) @ 2012Q3
Self-Identified List (River Bend)
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