05000346/FIN-2010002-01: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71111.06 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71111.06 | ||
| Inspector = J Cassidy, D Melendez | | Inspector = J Cassidy, D Melendez-Colon, J Rutkowski, D Jones, A Wilson, T Go, J Cameron, P Voss | ||
| CCA = H.5 | | CCA = H.5 | ||
| INPO aspect = WP.1 | | INPO aspect = WP.1 | ||
| description = The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance for the licensees failure to maintain normally energized medium voltage cables BPGD302C, C1, D, and D1 in an environment consistent with the cable design. The cables, which are output cables for the station blackout diesel generator and were not designed for long-term water submergence, were in a manhole that was shown to be flooded regularly. Water submergence of energized medium voltage cables, not designed for water submergence, can accelerate deterioration of such cables and potentially affect the ability of the cables to withstand electrical transients. The licensees procedures and program for medium voltage cables did recognize the issue but did not identify the submergence issue with these cables. In response to the finding the licensee increased the frequency of monitoring for water in the manhole. No violation of NRC requirements was identified. The finding was determined to be more than minor because the finding was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the station blackout diesel generator was to provide electrical power to emergency core cooling systems (ECCSs) in the event of a loss of all alternating current power. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because it did not result in any inoperability of required equipment and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, work control component, because the licensee failed to appropriately plan work activities incorporating risk insights and job site conditions, including environmental conditions, which may impact plant system and components. Specifically, although the intent was to address water submergence of energized medium voltage risk-significant cables to reduce the risk of early cable failure, the licensee failed to identify and address site and component conditions that regularly submerged the energized 4160 volt cable associated with the electrical output of the station blackout diesel generator. (H.3(a)) | | description = The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance for the licensees failure to maintain normally energized medium voltage cables BPGD302C, C1, D, and D1 in an environment consistent with the cable design. The cables, which are output cables for the station blackout diesel generator and were not designed for long-term water submergence, were in a manhole that was shown to be flooded regularly. Water submergence of energized medium voltage cables, not designed for water submergence, can accelerate deterioration of such cables and potentially affect the ability of the cables to withstand electrical transients. The licensees procedures and program for medium voltage cables did recognize the issue but did not identify the submergence issue with these cables. In response to the finding the licensee increased the frequency of monitoring for water in the manhole. No violation of NRC requirements was identified. The finding was determined to be more than minor because the finding was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the station blackout diesel generator was to provide electrical power to emergency core cooling systems (ECCSs) in the event of a loss of all alternating current power. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because it did not result in any inoperability of required equipment and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, work control component, because the licensee failed to appropriately plan work activities incorporating risk insights and job site conditions, including environmental conditions, which may impact plant system and components. Specifically, although the intent was to address water submergence of energized medium voltage risk-significant cables to reduce the risk of early cable failure, the licensee failed to identify and address site and component conditions that regularly submerged the energized 4160 volt cable associated with the electrical output of the station blackout diesel generator. (H.3(a)) | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 19:39, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000346/2010002 Section 1R06 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2010 (2010Q1) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.06 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Cassidy D Melendez-Colon J Rutkowski D Jones A Wilson T Go J Cameron P Voss |
| CCA | H.5, Work Management |
| INPO aspect | WP.1 |
| ' | |