ML20107M620

Proposed Tech Specs Deleting Table 3.8.1 Re Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Devices from Section 3/4.8.3.1

ML20107M620
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	11/07/1984
From:	TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:
Shared Package
ML20107M597	List: ML20107M596 ML20107M620
References
TVA-8ZN-TS-62, NUDOCS 8411140214
Download: ML20107M620 (9)

Text

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ENCLOSURE 1 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 TVA-SQN-TS-62 8411140214 841107 PDR ADOCK 05000327 P PDR

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3/4.8.3 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONOUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.8.3.1 All containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICA8ILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With one or more of the containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices inoperable:

a. Restore the protective device (s) to OPERABLE status or de-energize the circuit (s) by tripping the associated backup circuit breaker within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and verify the backup circuit breaker to be tripped at least once per 7 days thereafter; the provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable to overcurrent devices in circuits which have their backup circuit breakers tripped, or

b. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.8.3.1 All containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices shown in Table 3.8-1 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 18 months:

1. For at least one 6.9 kV reactor coolant pump circuit, such that all reactor coolant pump circuits are demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 72* months, by performance of:

(a) A CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the associated protective relays, Surveillance Instruction SNP SI-256 and (b) An integrated system functional test which includes simulated automatic actuation of the system and verifying that each relay and associated circuit breakers and control circuits function as designed using Surveillance Instruction SNP SI-257.

SEQUOYAH - U.9IT 1 3/4 8-15

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E!2CTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREM NTS (Continued)

(c) For each circuit bmaker found inoperable during these functional tests, an additional representative sample of at least 1 of the circuit bmakers of the inoperable type shall also be functionally tested until no more failures are found or all circuit breakers of that type have been functionally tested per Surveillance Instruetion SNP SI-257.

2. By selecting and functionally testing a repmsentative sample of at least 10% of each type of lower voltage circuit breakers. Circuit breakers selected for functional testing shall be selected on a rotating basis. The functional test, Surveillance Instruction SNP SI-258, shall consist of injecting a current input at the specified setpoint to each selected circuit bmaker and verifying that each circuit breaker functions as designal. Circuit breakers found inoperable during functional testing shall be restored to OPERABLE status prior to msuming operation. For each circuit breaker found inopemble during these functional tests, an additional representative sample of at least 10% of all the circuit breakers of the inoperable type shall also be functionally tested until no more failures are found or all circuit breakers of that type have been functionally tested.

3 By selecting and functionally testing a representative sample of each type of fuse on a rotating basis. Each mpresentative sample of fuses shall include at least 10% of all fuses of that type. The functional test, Surveillance Instruction SNP SI-270, shall consist of a non-destructive resistance measurement test which demonstrates that the fuse meets its manufacturer's design criteria. Fuses found inoperable during these functional tests shall be replaced with OPERABLE fuses prior to mausing operation. For each fuse found inoperable during these functional tests, an additional representative sample of at least 10% of all fuses of that type shall be functionally tested until no more failures are found or all fuses of that type have been functionally tested.e

b. At least once per 60 months by subjecting each circuit breaker to an inspection and pmventive maintenance in accordance with Surveillance Instruction SNP SI-266 in conjunction with its manufacturer's moommen-dations.

' Surveillance requimment 4.8.3.1.a.3 may be suspended until the completion of Cycle 2 provided that the following surveillance requirement is implemented:

A fuse inspection and maintenance program will be maintained to ensure that:

1. The proper size and type of fuse is installed,

2. The fuse shows no sign of deterioration, and

~3 The fuse connections are tight and clean.

SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 8-16

PAGES 3/It 8-17 THROUGH 3/11 8-33 FOR TABLE 3.8-1 ARE DELSTED

ELECTAICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3/4.8.3 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONOUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.8.3.1 All containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With one or more of the containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices inoperables.

a. Restore the protective device (s) to OPERABLE status or de-energize the circuit (s) by tripping the associated backup circuit breaker within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and verify the backup circuit breaker to be tripped at least once per 7 days thereafter; tb 4 ions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable to overcurrent

• circuits which have their backup circuit breakers tripped,

b. Be in at least HOT STAN08Y within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUT 00WN within the followinc 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.8.3.1 All containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices shown in Table 3.8-1 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 18 months:

1. For at least one 6.9 kV reactor coolant pump circuit, sucts that all reactor coolant pump circuits are demonstrated OPERA 8LE at least once per 72 months, by performance of:

(a) A CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the associated protective relays, Surveillance Instruction SNP SI-256 (b) An integrated system functional test which includes simulated automatic actuation of the system and verifying that each relay and associated circuit breakers and control circuits function as designed unloc e rveillance Instruction SI-257.

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SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 8-16

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS l

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

(c) For each circuit breaker fount inoperable during these functional i tests, an additional representative sample of at least 1 of the l circuit breakers of the inoperable type shall also be functionally '

tested until no more failures are found or all circuit breakers of that type h9ve been functionally tested per Surveillance l Instruction SNP SI-257.

2. By selecting and functionally testing a representative sample of at least 101 of each type of lower voltage otrouit breakers. Circuit breakers selected for functional testing shall be selected on a rotating basis. The functional test, Surveillance Instruction SNP SI-258, shall consist of injecting a current input at the specified setpoint to each selected circuit breaker and verifying that each circuit breaker functions as designed. Circuit breakers found inoperable during functior.nl testing shall be restored to OPERABLE I status prior to resuming operation. For each otrouit breaker found l inoperable during these functional tests, an additional representative sample of at least 101 of all the otrouit breakers of the inoperable type shall also be functionally tested until no more failures are found or all circuit breakers of that type have been functionally tested.

3. By selecting and functionally testing a representative sample of caoh type of fuse on a rotating basis. Each representative sample of fuses i shall include at least 101 of all fuses of that type. The functional l test, Surveillance Instruotton SNP SI-270, shall onnsist of a non-destructive resistance measuroment test which deme strates that the ruse meets its manufacturer's design criteria. Fuses found inoperable during these functional tests shall be replace! with OPERADLE fuses prior to resuming operation. For each fuse found inoperable during these functional tests, an additional representative sample of at least 10% of all fuses of that type shall be functionally tested until no more failures are found or all ruses of that type have been functionally tested.'

b. At least once per 60 months by subjecting each otroult breaker to an inspection and preventive maintenance in accordance with Surveillance Instruction SNP SI-266 in conjunction with its manufacturer's recommen-  !

da tions. i

' Surveillance requirement 4.8.3.1.a.3 may be suspendo1 until the completion of Cycle 2 provided that the following surveillance requirement is implemented t l

A ruse inspection and maintenance program will be maintainst to ensure that:

1. The proper size and type of ruse is installed, l

2. The ruse shows no sign of deterioration, and

3. The fuse connootions are tight and clean.

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SEQUOYAll - UNIT 2 3/4 8 17

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i PAGES 3/4 8-18 THROUGH 3/4 8-32 FOR TABLE 3 8-1 ARE DELETED i

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ENCLOSURE 2 JUSTIFICATION FOR PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TVA-SQN-TS-62 Description This proposed technical specification change deletes table 3.8-1, " Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protection Devices," from section 3/4.8.3.1.

Justification Presently a technical specification change is required to update this table before any related modifications are implemented. Deletion of this table will eliminate future technical specification d1anges of that nature and will allow more expeditious completion of required modifications. This table is already

, included in the applicable surveillance instructions (SI). Sequoyah's Workplan Control Form requires all affected procedures to be revised to document any modification. Therefore, the SI will provide valid and updated lists of the associated plant equipment. Also, any modifications related to the overcurrent devices will require an Unmviewed Safety Question Determination to ensure the integrity and safe operation of the plant. This change in the philosophy for technical specifications is similar to the change for-snubbers identified in Generic Letter 84-13.

Based on the attached significant hazards determination: (1) the proposed change does not constitute a significant hazards consideration as defined by 10 CFR 50.92; (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by the proposed change; and (3) this action will not result in a condition which significantly alters the impact of the ststion on the environment a9 described in the NRC Environmental Statement.

ATTACHMENT PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION TVA-SQN-TS-62

1. Is the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident previously evalaated in the safety analysis mport significantly increased? No, This technient specification diange is for documentation purposes and does not affect the plant configuration er surveillance testing mquirements.

' *herefore, the probability of any previously evaluated accident is not increased.

2. Is the possibility for an accident of a new or different type than evaluated previously in the safety analysis report created? No.

Since technical specification table 3.8-1 is included in the present SI, it is still readily available for reference or review. Deletion of the table from technical specifications will have no effect on the plant's design or operation. Therefore, the possibility of a new or different type accident is not created.

3. Is the margin of safety significantly reduced? No.

The associated plant systems will not be changed. Therefore, the design criteria is satisfied and the margin of safety is not reduced.

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