ML18100B128: Difference between revisions

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10CFR50.59 EVALUATIONS e                          e DOCKET NO:  50-272 MONTH: - MAY 1994                            UNIT NAME:  SALEM 1 DATE:  JUNE 10, 1994 COMPLETED BY:  R. HELLER TELEPHONE:  (609)339-5162 The following items were evaluated in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Federal Regulations lOCFRS0.59. The Station Operations Review Committee has reviewed and concurs with these evaluations.
10CFR50.59 EVALUATIONS e                          e DOCKET NO:  50-272 MONTH: - MAY 1994                            UNIT NAME:  SALEM 1 DATE:  JUNE 10, 1994 COMPLETED BY:  R. HELLER TELEPHONE:  (609)339-5162 The following items were evaluated in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Federal Regulations 10CFRS0.59. The Station Operations Review Committee has reviewed and concurs with these evaluations.
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This has resulted in a change of the trip setpoint for the second level of undervoltage protection on the vital busses. This will increase the margin
This has resulted in a change of the trip setpoint for the second level of undervoltage protection on the vital busses. This will increase the margin


      .
.10CFR50. 59 EVALUATIONS e                        e DOCKET NO:  50-272 MONTH: - MAY 1994                            UNIT NAME:  SALEM 1 DATE:  JUNE 10, 1994 COMPLETED BY:  R. HELLER TELEPHONE:    (609)339-5162 (cont'd)
.10CFR50. 59 EVALUATIONS e                        e DOCKET NO:  50-272 MONTH: - MAY 1994                            UNIT NAME:  SALEM 1 DATE:  JUNE 10, 1994 COMPLETED BY:  R. HELLER TELEPHONE:    (609)339-5162 (cont'd)
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   .10CFR50. 59 EVALUATIONS MONTH: - MAY 1994 e
   .10CFR50. 59 EVALUATIONS MONTH: - MAY 1994 e
* DOCKET NO:
* DOCKET NO:
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14BSD and 13 & 14CSD. The implementation of this DCP will not involve changes of any kind to plant processes and it will not create the possibility
14BSD and 13 & 14CSD. The implementation of this DCP will not involve changes of any kind to plant processes and it will not create the possibility


      .
,10CFR50. 59 EVALUATIONS MONTH: - MAY 1994 e
,10CFR50. 59 EVALUATIONS MONTH: - MAY 1994 e
* DOCKET NO:
* DOCKET NO:
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COMPLETED BY:
COMPLETED BY:
50-272 SALEM 1 JUNE 10, 1994 R. HELLER TELEPHONE:  (609)339-5162 (cont'd)
50-272 SALEM 1 JUNE 10, 1994 R. HELLER TELEPHONE:  (609)339-5162 (cont'd)
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,10CFR50.
,10CFR50.
* 59 EVALUATIONS MONTH: - MAY 1994
* 59 EVALUATIONS MONTH: - MAY 1994 DOCKET NO:
                        *
* DOCKET NO:
UNIT NAME:
UNIT NAME:
DATE:
DATE:
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service water pumps as a result of abnormally low NPSH available. Isolation of CFCUs involves entry into an LCO and precludes the need to account for single active failures. For this proposal, the entry into an LCO is closely coupled with reactor shutdown and is much more limiting than the Technical Specification action time. This is a more conservative approach than the normal Technical Specification action time of seven days prior to reactor shutdown or restoration. In addition, the CFCUs have an additional redundancy provided by containment spray. Isolation of four CFCUs upon entering Mode 4 is in full compliance with the Technical Specifications as the CFCUs are not required to be operable for this mode.
service water pumps as a result of abnormally low NPSH available. Isolation of CFCUs involves entry into an LCO and precludes the need to account for single active failures. For this proposal, the entry into an LCO is closely coupled with reactor shutdown and is much more limiting than the Technical Specification action time. This is a more conservative approach than the normal Technical Specification action time of seven days prior to reactor shutdown or restoration. In addition, the CFCUs have an additional redundancy provided by containment spray. Isolation of four CFCUs upon entering Mode 4 is in full compliance with the Technical Specifications as the CFCUs are not required to be operable for this mode.
Therefore, this revision does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.  (SORC 94-043)
Therefore, this revision does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.  (SORC 94-043)
* PORV OR SAFETY VALVE CHALLENGES
 
* Salem Unit 1 In accordance with the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit 1 Technical Specifications Section 6.9.1.6, the following recent challenges to PORVs or Safety Valves are being reported:
PORV OR SAFETY VALVE CHALLENGES Salem Unit 1 In accordance with the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit 1 Technical Specifications Section 6.9.1.6, the following recent challenges to PORVs or Safety Valves are being reported:
* 05/27/94  On 05/27/94, while performing a ninety (90) second bump on No. 11 Reactor Coolant Pump, in accordance with procedure Sl.OP-SO.RCS-0001, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure increased to the Pressurizer Overpressure Protection System (POPS) Valve's setpoint two separate times. The actuations occurred approximately 30 seconds apart during the initial pump bump during the fill and vent sequence.
* 05/27/94  On 05/27/94, while performing a ninety (90) second bump on No. 11 Reactor Coolant Pump, in accordance with procedure Sl.OP-SO.RCS-0001, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure increased to the Pressurizer Overpressure Protection System (POPS) Valve's setpoint two separate times. The actuations occurred approximately 30 seconds apart during the initial pump bump during the fill and vent sequence.
The possibility of exceeding the POPS pressure setpoint of 375# was anticipated and a Balance of Plant (BOP) operator was stationed at the control console. Upon starting the RCP (pressure was at 325#) pressure increased. The BOP operator attempted to stop the pressure transient by adjusting the rates for letdown and charging.
The possibility of exceeding the POPS pressure setpoint of 375# was anticipated and a Balance of Plant (BOP) operator was stationed at the control console. Upon starting the RCP (pressure was at 325#) pressure increased. The BOP operator attempted to stop the pressure transient by adjusting the rates for letdown and charging.
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During testing of the individual rod position indication (!RPI) system, a step counter failed. The step counter was replaced and testing of the !RPI system was completed on June 1, 1994.
During testing of the individual rod position indication (!RPI) system, a step counter failed. The step counter was replaced and testing of the !RPI system was completed on June 1, 1994.


  ..
~REFUELING  INFORMATION MONTH: - MAY 1994 e
~REFUELING  INFORMATION MONTH: - MAY 1994 e
* DOCKET NO:
* DOCKET NO:

Latest revision as of 05:56, 3 February 2020

Monthly Operating Rept for May 1994 for Salem Generating Station Unit 1.W/940614 Ltr
ML18100B128
Person / Time
Site: Salem PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 05/31/1994
From: Hagan J, Morroni M
Public Service Enterprise Group
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NUDOCS 9406200045
Download: ML18100B128 (13)


Text

OPs~G*

Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station June 14, 1994 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

MONTHLY OPERATING REPORT SALEM NO. 1 DOCKET NO. 50-272 In compliance with Section 6.9.1.6, Reporting Requirements for the Salem Technical Specifications, the original copy of the monthly operating reports for the month of May 1994 are being sent to you.

Average Daily Unit Power Level Operating Data Report Unit Shutdowns and Power Reductions 10CFR50.59 Evaluations PORV or Safety Valve Challenges Operating Summary Refueling Information Sincerely yours, ager -

"""'"".............. tions RH:pc cc: Mr. Thomas T. Martin Regional Administrator USNRC Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19046 Enclosures 8-l-7.R4 The Energy People 9406200045 940531 95-2189 (10M) 12-89 PDR ADDCK 05000272 8- PDR

~ERAGE DAILY UNIT POWER LE.,

Docket No.: 50-272 Unit.Name: Salem #1 Date: 06/10/94 Completed by: Mike Morroni Telephone: 339-2122 Month May 1994 Day Average Daily Power Level Day Average Daily Power Level (MWe-NET) (MWe-NET) 1 0 17 0 2 0 18 0 3 0 19 0 4 0 20 0 5 0 21 0 6 0 22 0 7 0 23 0 8 0 24 0 9 0 25 0 10 0 26 0 11 0 27 0 12 0 28 0 13 0 29 0 14 0 30 0 15 0 31 0 16 0 P. 8.1-7 Rl

OPERATING DATA REPORT Docket No: 50-272 Date: 06/10/94 Completed by: Mike Morroni Telephone: 339-2122 Operating Status

1. Unit Name Salem No. 1 Notes
2. Reporting Period May 1994
3. Licensed Thermal Power (MWt) 3411
4. Nameplate Rating (Gross MWe) 1170
5. Design Electrical Rating (Net MWe) 1115
6. Maximum Dependable Capacity(Gross MWe) 1149
7. Maximum Dependable Capacity (Net MWe) 1106
8. If Changes Occur in Capacity Ratings (items 3 through 7) since Last Report, Give Reason~-=N"-'--=-A=-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
9. Power Level to Which Restricted, if any (Net MWe) N/A
10. Reasons for Restrictions, if any ~~~~---N~A~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

This Month Year to Date Cumulative

12. Hours in Report~ng Period 744 3623 148320
12. No. of Hrs. Rx. was Critical 0 1628.1 96760.l
13. Reactor Reserve Shutdown Hrs. 0 0 0
14. Hours Generator On-Line 0 1253.7 93141.5
15. Unit Reserve Shutdown Hours 0 0 0
16. Gross Thermal Energy Generated (MWH) 2376 4538904 295311218
17. Gross Elec. Energy Generated (MWH) 0 1167310 97703280
18. Net Elec. Energy Gen. (MWH) -16977 1061230 92998783
19. Unit Service Factor 0 34.6 62.8
20. Unit Availability Factor 0 34.6 62.8
21. Unit Capacity Factor (using MDC Net) 0 26.5 56.7
22. Unit Capacity Factor (using DER Net) 0 26.3 56.2
23. Unit Forced Outage Rate 100 55.8 21. 8
24. Shutdowns scheduled over next 6 months (type, date and duration of each)

None.

25. If shutdown at end of Report Period, Estimated Date of startup:

Unit was placed on line 06-04-94.

8-l-7.R2

UNIT SHUTDOWN AND POWER REDUCTIONS REPORT MONTH MAY 1994 DOCKET NO. :~5~0_-=27~2-----~

UNIT NAME: Salem #1 DATE: 06-10-94 COMPLETED BY: Mike Morroni TELEPHONE: 339-2122 METHOD OF.

SHUTTING LICENSE DURATION DOWN EVENT SYSTEM COMPONENT CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION 1 2 NO. DATE TYPE (HOURS) REASON REACTOR REPORT # CODE 4 CODE 5 TO PREVENT RECURRENCE 0583 5-1-94 F 528 A 4 ----------- HF PUMPXX INTAKE SYSTEM PROBLEMS 0850 5-23-94 F 216 B 4 ----------- cc VAL VEX MAIN SAFETY/RELIEF VALVE TEST 1 2 3 4 5 F: Forced Reason Method: Exhibit G - Instructions Exhibit - Same S: Scheduled A-Equipment Failure (explain) 1-Manual for Preparation of Data Source B-Maintenance or Test 2-Manual Scram Entry Sheets for Licensee C-Refueling 3-Automatic Scram Event Report CLER) File D-Requlatory Restriction 4-Continuation of CNUREG-0161)

E-Operator Training & License Examination Previous outage F-Administrative 5-Load Reduction G-Operational Error (Explain) 9-0ther H-Other (Explain)


~--------------~

10CFR50.59 EVALUATIONS e e DOCKET NO: 50-272 MONTH: - MAY 1994 UNIT NAME: SALEM 1 DATE: JUNE 10, 1994 COMPLETED BY: R. HELLER TELEPHONE: (609)339-5162 The following items were evaluated in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Federal Regulations 10CFRS0.59. The Station Operations Review Committee has reviewed and concurs with these evaluations.

ITEM

SUMMARY

A. Design Change Packages lEC-3325 Pkg 1 "MSlO Valve Control System Modification" - This Design Change Package {DCP) replaces/modifies the MSlO controllers to provide a "clamping {drain) circuit" internal to the following Westinghouse

{Hagan) Model No. 4111080-001 controllers for Main Steam Dump to Atmosphere values llMSlO, 12MS10, 13MS10 and 14MS10. This DCP decreases the controller gain, increases the reset value and decreases the recommended full power controller setpoint from 1035 psig to 1015 (+/-5) psig. The response of the present control system fails to ensure that the MSlO valves open prior to the opening of the Main Steam Safety Valves as a result of controller "windup". Addition of the drain circuit and adjustment of the controller gain and reset values will reduce the effects of controller "windup" and improve normal system pressure control as well as improve control system response under transient conditions. Further, addition of the drain circuit will restore the subject controllers to their original, as built configuration. The purpose of the decrease of the recommended full power controller setpoint is to provide a margin for MSlO operation below the lowest code safety valves actuation setpoint with consideration for setpoint error. The MSlO valves are not discussed in the Technical Specifications. Therefore, there is no reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. (SORC 94-038) lEE-0056 Pkg 1 "Power Operated Relief Valve Internal Change" -

This change replaces the internals {stem, cage and plug) of.the power operated relief valves {PORVs) lPRl and 1PR2 of the Salem Unit 1 pressurizer.

The internal parts of these PORVs were noted to have material degradation following the reactor trip on April 7, 1994, which was followed by multiple safety injection {SI) actuation

10CFR50.59 EVALUATIONS e e DOCKET NO: 50-272 MONTH: - MAY 1994 UNIT NAME: SALEM 1 DATE: JUNE 10, 1994 COMPLETED BY: R. HELLER TELEPHONE: (609)339-5162 (cont'd)

ITEM

SUMMARY

transients. When the valves were disassembled, both PORVs 1PR1 and 1PR2 were found to exhibit cracking on the pinning boss on the PORV plug, which contained the anti-rotational pin. PORV 1PR2 was found to have galling/wear at the stem and both valves exhibited galling/wear in the plug and cage area. This material degradation of the internal parts of these valves necessitated the replacement of these parts via this design change. In the new design of the valve internals, the boss has been eliminated and the stem is now pinned to the plug instead of the boss. The bases of the Technical Specifications state that the PORVs function to relieve pressure during all design transients up to an including the design step load increase with steam dump, and to minimize the undesirable opening of the pressurizer safety valves. The new valve internal components will not affect the capability of the PORVs to perform their intended safety functions during any design or licensing design basis events. The replacement of the valve internals will not reduce the margin of safety by ensuring reliable operation of the PORVs. The acceptance criteria for licensing basis accidents and transients will continue to be satisfied. There is no reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

(SORC 94-040) lSC-2269 Pkg 1 "Salem Electrical Upgrade Project" - This package separates the Unit 2 vital bus 4KV infeeds from Station Power Transformers 21 and 22 and ties them to the new offsite sources of power. The new offsite sources consist of four new station power transformers 3 & 4 (500/13KV) and 23 & 24 (13/4KV), two new 500KV circuit switchers 3T60 &

4T60, two new 13KV breakers A-B, D-E as well as associated relaying, controls, bus work and cabling. The modifications will improve the voltage profile on the vital and group busses.

This has resulted in a change of the trip setpoint for the second level of undervoltage protection on the vital busses. This will increase the margin

.10CFR50. 59 EVALUATIONS e e DOCKET NO: 50-272 MONTH: - MAY 1994 UNIT NAME: SALEM 1 DATE: JUNE 10, 1994 COMPLETED BY: R. HELLER TELEPHONE: (609)339-5162 (cont'd)

ITEM

SUMMARY

of safety between the setpoint value and the and the minimum allowable value and ensure safe operation of vital equipment. During cable installation some flood protection penetration seals on the east wall of the Auxiliary Building will be compromised. The installation group will monitor the weather through the National Weather Service and will take appropriate action to provide a temporary barrier if flooding conditions arise. There is no reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. (SORC 94-042) lEC-3316 Pkgs 1 & 2 "Throttling Service Water Flow To No. 11 and 12 CCHX" - These change packages throttle the No. 11 and 12 CCHX Service Water inlet isolation valves from the existing full open locked positions to partially open locked positions. These particular valve positions will be established in the field and dependent on the existing CCHX's flow resistances. These packages also address the throttling of Service Water inlet and outlet valves. The Component Cooling HX operating procedures will also be revised to update the CCHX design outlet temperatures from 95 degrees to 99 degrees F. Also, the compensatory actions imposed by Engineering Evaluation S-C-SW-MEE-0893, for SWS operation with river temperatures < 70 degrees F, will be removed from these procedures. The Westinghouse analysis demonstrates that the proposed throttling of valve 11SW21, and valve 11SW355, if required, will assure adequate service water flow rate delivery to the CCHX under postulated accident conditions. Calculation S-C-MDC-1317 shows that the proposed valve throttling during all modes of the plant operation will still ensure the original service water design flow rate of 10~000 gpm through the CCHX during all normal operating conditions. Thus the acceptance criteria for licensing basis accidents and transients will continue to be satisfied and the existing safety margins will not be affected.

(SORC ~4-043)

I I

.10CFR50. 59 EVALUATIONS MONTH: - MAY 1994 e

  • DOCKET NO:

UNIT NAME:

DATE:

COMPLETED BY:

50-272 SALEM 1 JUNE 10, 1994 R. HELLER TELEPHONE: (609)339-5162 (cont'd)

ITEM

SUMMARY

lEC-3330 Pkg 1 "Service Water Pump Upgrade, Nos. 13 and 14 Pump" lEC-3329 Pkg 1 - These DCPs involve the replacement of the existing Nos. 13 and 14 Service Water Pump with new pumps with slightly different designs. The 1SWE3 and 1SWE4 replacement Service Water Pumps will be compqtible with brackish river water, able to withstand the high silt flows, and designed for NPSHa at 76 feet river water level. The replacement pumps will be designed to operate in parallel with the existing pumps, and will use the existing motors and floor openings. The new pumps will be designed to operate over wider ranges of flows based on past plant operating experiences.

Minor modifications to the Service Water Intake Structures are required. These include the removal of the Seismic Restraints on Elevation 70 feet and the installation of vortex suppressors on Elevation 70 feet. The existing pump's line shaft bearing lubrication supply piping will be removed as the replacement pumps do not require line shaft bearing lubrication. Technical Specification 3/4.7.4 requires "At least two independent service water loops shall be OPERABLE". The replacement of the Layne Bowler Service Water Pumps with Johnston Pump Co. Service Water Pumps has no effect on this Technical Specification. In addition, IST procedure SP.OP-ST.SW-0002(Q) -

Inservice Testing - Service Water Pumps was reviewed. This procedure measures the Service Water Pump flow by discharge pressure. The acceptance criteria contained in these documents are not being changed. Hence, there is no reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

(SORC 94-044) lEC-3317 Pkg 1 "Relay Coordination for the 4160/480-240V Vital Transformers" - This DCP changes the overcurrent relay settings at the 4.16KV vital switchgear compartments 1A4D, 1B4D, 1C4D, 13 & 14ASD, 13 &

14BSD and 13 & 14CSD. The implementation of this DCP will not involve changes of any kind to plant processes and it will not create the possibility

,10CFR50. 59 EVALUATIONS MONTH: - MAY 1994 e

  • DOCKET NO:

UNIT NAME:

DATE:

COMPLETED BY:

50-272 SALEM 1 JUNE 10, 1994 R. HELLER TELEPHONE: (609)339-5162 (cont'd)

ITEM

SUMMARY

of an accident of a different type than previously evaluated in the SAR. This DCP will not increase the consequences of a malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the SAR.

The relay setting changes to the overcurrent relays of the 4.16KV vital bus incomer feeder and 4160/480-240 transformers will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

lEC-3308 Pkg 1 "Deletion of RMS 1R8, 1R14, 1R21, 1R22, 1R31B,C and 1R35" - This DCP will perform modifications to remove Channels 1R8, 1R14, 1R21, 1R22, 1R31B,C and 1R35 from the RMS. Detectors, check sources, electronics will be removed from the field, blank plates will be installed on local indicator units to serve as junction boxes, cables will be spared in place, conduits will be removed, monitors will be removed from the MCR equipment cabinets and meters on lRPl will be relabeled. There is no reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications, because the monitors being removed and RMS channel 1R31A are not listed, described or referenced in the Technical Specifications. Additionally, the RMS channels being removed by this DCP do not actuate any equipment which is included in the Technical Specifications. Therefore, the margin of safety for other systems is not impacted. (SORC 94-045)

B. Procedures and Revisions Sl.OP-AB.ZZ-OOOl(Q) "Severe Weather" - Rev. 3 - This procedure provides the direction necessary for plant operation during severe weather conditions. This discussion provides the reasoning behind the logic and flowpath of the procedure. It is not intended to provide additional direction to the procedure.

The actions taken by this proposal are intended to assure operability of the Service Water system during periods of abnormally low river levels.

The actions taken are specifically intended to reduce the probability of a malfunction of the

,10CFR50.

  • 59 EVALUATIONS MONTH: - MAY 1994 DOCKET NO:

UNIT NAME:

DATE:

50-272 SALEM 1 JUNE 10, 1994 COMPLETED BY: R. HELLER TELEPHONE: (609)339-5162 (cont'd)

ITEM

SUMMARY

service water pumps as a result of abnormally low NPSH available. Isolation of CFCUs involves entry into an LCO and precludes the need to account for single active failures. For this proposal, the entry into an LCO is closely coupled with reactor shutdown and is much more limiting than the Technical Specification action time. This is a more conservative approach than the normal Technical Specification action time of seven days prior to reactor shutdown or restoration. In addition, the CFCUs have an additional redundancy provided by containment spray. Isolation of four CFCUs upon entering Mode 4 is in full compliance with the Technical Specifications as the CFCUs are not required to be operable for this mode.

Therefore, this revision does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. (SORC 94-043)

PORV OR SAFETY VALVE CHALLENGES Salem Unit 1 In accordance with the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit 1 Technical Specifications Section 6.9.1.6, the following recent challenges to PORVs or Safety Valves are being reported:

  • 05/27/94 On 05/27/94, while performing a ninety (90) second bump on No. 11 Reactor Coolant Pump, in accordance with procedure Sl.OP-SO.RCS-0001, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure increased to the Pressurizer Overpressure Protection System (POPS) Valve's setpoint two separate times. The actuations occurred approximately 30 seconds apart during the initial pump bump during the fill and vent sequence.

The possibility of exceeding the POPS pressure setpoint of 375# was anticipated and a Balance of Plant (BOP) operator was stationed at the control console. Upon starting the RCP (pressure was at 325#) pressure increased. The BOP operator attempted to stop the pressure transient by adjusting the rates for letdown and charging.

However, lPRl lifted. Due to the pressure drop caused by the lifting of lPRl, the BOP operator cut back on letdown flow. This led to both lPRl and 1PR2 lifting briefly. The highest recorded pressure was 376.71#.

SALEM GENERATING STATION MONTHLY OPERATING

SUMMARY

- UNIT 1 MAY 1994 SALEM UNIT NO. 1 The Unit began the period shutdown while repairs and modifications following the April 7, 1994 reactor trip/safety injection continued.

The pressurizer safety valves were reinstalled on May 2, 1994 and the reactor coolant system (RCS) was filled and vented and a bubble was established in the pressurizer on May 3, 1994. Startup preparations were initiated on May 14, 1994 following NRC concurrence that corrective actions to the April 7, 1994 trip were completed satisfactorily. The Unit entered Mode 4 "HOT SHUTDOWN" on May 16, 1994. The Unit entered Mode 3 "HOT STANDBY" on May 19, 1994. Mode 3 testing was in progress when a pressurizer safety valve began to leak. Attempts to reseat the valve were unsuccessful. The Unit was cooled down to Mode 5 "COLD SHUTDOWN" on May 23, 1994, to repair the valve. The repairs were completed and the Unit entered Mode 4 "HOT SHUTDOWN" on May 28, 1994, and Mode 3 "HOT STANDBY" on May 29, 1994.

During testing of the individual rod position indication (!RPI) system, a step counter failed. The step counter was replaced and testing of the !RPI system was completed on June 1, 1994.

~REFUELING INFORMATION MONTH: - MAY 1994 e

  • DOCKET NO:

UNIT NAME:

DATE:

COMPLETED BY:

50-272 SALEM 1 JUNE 10, 1994 R. HELLER TELEPHONE: (609)339-5162 MONTH MAY 1994

1. Refueling information has* changed from last month:

YES NO X

2. Scheduled date for next refueling: MARCH 25. 1995
3. Scheduled date for restart following refueling: MAY 23, 1995
4. a) Will Technical Specification changes or other license amendments be required?:

YES NO NOT DETERMINED TO DATE ~=X~-

b) Has the reload fuel design been reviewed by the Station Operating Review Committee?:

YES NO X If no, when is it scheduled?: MARCH 1995

5. Scheduled date(s) for submitting proposed licensing action:

N/A

6. Important licensing considerations associated with refueling:
7. Number of Fuel Assemblies:
a. Incore 193
b. In Spent Fuel Storage 732
8. Present licensed spent fuel storage capacity: 1170 Future spent fuel storage capacity: 1170
9. Date of last refueling that can be discharged to the spent fuel pool assuming the present licensed capacity: September 2001 8-1-7.R4