ML18153B150

Proposed Tech Specs Re Changes to TS Will Clarify SR for Reactor Protection & Engineered Safeguard Sys Instrumentation & Actuation Logic

ML18153B150
Person / Time
Site:	Surry
Issue date:	11/10/1994
From:	VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:
Shared Package
ML18153B149	List: ML18153B148 ML18153B150
References
NUDOCS 9411220194
Download: ML18153B150 (6)

Text

TABLE 4.1-1 (Continued)

""(1""(1...0 O.f:>

o .... MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR CHECK, CALIBRATIONS, AND TEST OF INSTRUMENT CHANNELS t-J J>t-J 00 0 .... Channel Description Check Calibrate Test Remarks n...a 7'

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10. Rod Position Bank Counters S(1,2) N.A. N.A. 1) Each six inches of rod motion 0-0 UJ.f:,, Q(3) when data logger is out of service 0 .... 2) With analog rod position 0 ....

""(10 .... 3) For the control banks, the bench-Ot,.JO

OOJ board indicators shall be checked 0 against the output of the bank overlap unit.

11. Steam Generator Level s R M

12. Charging Flow N.A. R N.A.

13. Residual Heat Removal Pump Flow N.A. R N.A.

14. Boric Acid Tank Level *D R N.A.

15. Recirculation Mode Transfer

a. Refueling Water Storage Tank Level-Low s R M

b. Automatic Actuation Logic and N.A. N.A. M Actuation Relays

16. Volume Control Tank Level N.A. R N.A.

17. Reactor Containment Pressure-CLS *D R M(1) 1) Isolation valve signal and spray signal

18. Boric Acid Control N.A. R N.A.

19. Item Deleted

-I V,

20. Accumulator Level and Pressure s R N.A.

.i:=,.

21. Containment Pressure-Vacuum s R N.A. I

"'-I Pump System

22. Steam Line Pressure s R M

TABLE 4.1-1 (Continued)

MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR CHECK, CAUBRATIONS, AND TEST OF INSTRUMENT CHANNELS Channel Description ~ Calibrate Tust Remarks

23. Turbine First Stage Pressure s R M

24. Emergency Plan Radiation Instr. *M R M

25. Environmental Radiation Monitors *M N.A. N.A. TLD Dosimeters

26. Logic Channel Testing N.A. N.A. M(1)(2) 1) Reactor protection, safety injection and the consequence limiting safeguards

27. Turbine Overspeed Protection Trip N.A. R R system logic channels are tested monthly Channel (Electrical) per this line item.

2) The master and slave relays are not included in the monthly logic channel test of the safety injection system.

28. Turbine Trip Setpoint verification is not applicable A. Stop valve closure N.A. N.A. p B. Low fluid oil pressure N.A. N.A. p

29. Seismic Instrumentation M R M

30. Reactor Trip Breaker N.A. N.A. M The test shall independently verify operability of the undervoltage and shunt trip attachments

31. Reactor Coolant Pressure (Low) N.A. R N.A.

-I V,

~

I 00

TABLE 4.1-1 (Continued)

MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR CHECK, CALIBRATIONS, AND TEST OF INSTRUMENT CHANNELS Channel Pescrjptjon .Qbe.ck canbrate ks1 Remarks

32. Auxiliary Feedwater

a. Steam Generator Water Level Low-Low s R M(1) 1) The auto start of the turbine driven pump is not included in the monthly test, but is tested within 30 days prior to each startup.

b. RCP Undervoltage s R N.A.(1) 1) The actuation logic and relays are tested within 30 days prior to each startup.

c. S.I. (All Safety Injection surveillance requirements)

d. Station Blackout N.A. R N.A.

e. Main Feedwater Pump Trip N.A. N.A. .R

33. Loss of Power

a. 4.16 KV Emergency Bus Under- N.A. R M voltage (Loss of Voltage)

b. 4.16 KV Emergency Bus Under- N.A. R M voltage (Degraded Voltage)

34. Deleted

35. Manual Reactor Trip N.A. N.A. R The test shall independently verify the operability of the undervoltage and shunt

-e trip attachments for the manual reactor trip function. The test shall also verify the operability of the bypass breaker trip circuit.

36. Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker N.A. N.A. M(1), 1) Remote manual undervoltage trip prior R(2) to placing breaker in service.

2) Automatic undervoltage trip. -I V,

37. Safety Injection Input to RPS N.A. N.A. R ..::.....

I

38. Reactor Coolant Pump Breaker N.A. N.A. R 00 Cl Position Trip

Attachment 3 Significant Hazards Consideration Determination Surry Power Station

e Significant Hazards Considerations

• A comprehensive review of the Technical Specifications surveillance program for Surry was performed to ensure that a test was being performed for each Technical Specifications surveillance line item in Table 4.1-1, "Minimum Frequencies for Check, Calibration and Test of Instrument Channels." The review included an evaluation of the technical adequacy of each test with respect to the Technical Specifications requirement. The review identified certain instrument and logic circuit tests for which the licensed plant design does not facilitate the complete testing of the circuit or actuation logic without using temporary modifications (e.g., temporary jumpers or lifting leads). Consistent with the approved licensing basis and industry testing standards, these instrument and logic circuits are tested to the extent practicable on a monthly basis and are fully tested on a refueling basis. To ensure the Technical Specifications accurately reflect the actual testing being performed and are consistent with the existing plant design and/or the original licensing basis, Virginia Electric and Power Company is proposing an administrative change to the Technical Specifications to identify the instrument channels and logic actuation circuits that cannot be fully tested in accordance with the definition of channel functional test.

Virginia Electric and Power Company has reviewed the proposed change against the criteria of 10 CFR 50.92 and has concluded that the change as proposed does not pose a significant hazards consideration. Specifically, the proposed change is considered to be administrative in nature in that it is a clarification to reconcile actual surveillance test practices and the licensing design basis with the surveillance test requirements.

Operation of Surry Power Station in accordance with the proposed Technical Specifications change will not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The proposed change to clarify the surveillance requirements for the Reactor Protection and Engineered Safeguards Systems instrumentation and actuation logic has no impact on the probability of an accident occurrence. The instrumentation and actuation logic will continue to be operated in the same manner. The actual test frequency is not changing. Rather, surveillance requirements are being clarified to represent the actual testing and the licensing and design bases. Testing of these instruments and actuation logic are presently design limited and would otherwise require using temporary modifications to complete the testing. Since the testing is not changing, the clarification of the Page 1 of 2

e actual testing does not contribute to the probability of any previously analyzed accident. The Reactor Protection and Engineered Safeguards Systems instrumentation and actuation logic will be operated in the same manner and the system operability requirements are not being altered. Therefore, the consequences of any design basis accident are not being increased by the proposed change to clarify the surveillance test requirements for the Reactor Protection and Engineered Safeguards System instrumentation and actuation logic.

2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

There are no plant modifications or changes in methods of plant operation introduced by this change in the clarification of the testing for the Reactor Protection and Engineered Safeguards Systems instrumentation and actuation logic. The plant is not being operated or tested in a different manner due to the proposed change. Therefore, no new accidents or accident precursors are generated by the proposed change to clarify the surveillance test requirements.

Clarifying the surveillance test requirements to represent the original licensing design basis and test conditions does not create the possibility of a new or different accident than previously analyzed.

3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Clarification of the testing for the Reactor Protection and Engineered Safeguards Systems instrumentation and actuation logic surveillance requirements does not affect the margin of safety in that the operability requirements for these safety systems remain unchanged. The existing testing is performed in accordance with plant design and licensing basis and provides adequate indication of the operability of the affected instrumentation or actuation logic. The Reactor Protection and Engineered Safeguards Systems instrumentation and actuation logic are fully tested on a refueling cycle basis which includes complete operation of each relay and end device. Therefore, the margin of safety is not altered by the proposed clarification of the testing for the Reactor Protection and Engineered Safeguards Systems instrumentation and actuation logic.

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