Information Notice 1996-71, Licensee Response to Indications of Tampering, Vandalism, or Malicious Mischief: Difference between revisions
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| issue date = 12/27/1996 | | issue date = 12/27/1996 | ||
| title = Licensee Response to Indications of Tampering, Vandalism, or Malicious Mischief | | title = Licensee Response to Indications of Tampering, Vandalism, or Malicious Mischief | ||
| author name = Martin | | author name = Martin T | ||
| author affiliation = NRC/NRR | | author affiliation = NRC/NRR | ||
| addressee name = | | addressee name = | ||
Line 14: | Line 14: | ||
| page count = 8 | | page count = 8 | ||
}} | }} | ||
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES | {{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES | ||
COMMISSION | NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION | ||
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION- | OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION- | ||
WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 December 27, 1996 NRC INFORMATION | WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 December 27, 1996 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 96-71: LICENSEE RESPONSE TO INDICATIONS OF | ||
TAMPERING, VANDALISM, OR MALICIOUS | |||
MISCHIEF | |||
==Addressees== | ==Addressees== | ||
All holders of operating | All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power reactors. | ||
licenses or construction | |||
permits for nuclear power reactors. | |||
==Purpose== | ==Purpose== | ||
This information | This information notice is being issued to alert licensees to the benefits of planning a | ||
notice is being issued to alert licensees | |||
to the benefits of planning a | |||
response to indications of tampering, vandalism, or malicious mischief. It is expected that | |||
recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate. However, suggestions contained in this information notice are not NRC | |||
requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required. | |||
==Description of Circumstances== | |||
Recent events at operating reactors indicate that some licensee personnel may not | |||
recognize the potential significance of early indications of potential tampering, vandalism, or malicious mischief. As a result, licensee response may be untimely and of limited scope | |||
and depth. Failure to promptly question, resolve the significance and implement an | |||
of | appropriate strategy to mitigate the consequence of a potential tampering, vandalism, or | ||
malicious mischief situation, could leave the plant in a vulnerable state for a significant | |||
period of time. Lack of detailed planning, procedures, and training frequently plays a role | |||
in the quality of response to these events. Brief accounts of two events illustrate the | |||
issue: | |||
===Improperly Positioned Valve at Beaver Valley=== | |||
During the conduct of a quarterly surveillance on Friday, July 14, 1995, to verify the | |||
position of certain safety-related locked valves; the licensee determined that the service | |||
water cross-connect valve at the discharge of the recirculation spray heat exchanger was | |||
in the incorrect position (shut in lieu of open), that the chain used to secure the valve in | |||
the proper position had been cut, and that the lock appeared to have been placed back on | |||
the chain in a manner that made it difficult to detect the condition. The licensee's staff | |||
the | initially assumed the valve had been inadvertently mispositioned during earlier operational | ||
evolutions, but subsequent interviews and analysis were unable to confirm this | |||
assumption. 2 I1 | |||
?Pfs ITE .1 0i-1tttt S%-071Z 9017-21 air | |||
_ - [,A_ ,a 0S | |||
===QAI 912flfA1=== | |||
-- v----60do 'I11 I | |||
41 -A,- | |||
T2D4t ICG | |||
IN 96-71 December 27, 1996 Licensee management first learned of the event on Tuesday, July 18, 1995. Consequ- ently, licensee management was not able to oversee the licensee evaluation of the event | |||
until considerable time had elapsed. The licensee's determination that potential tampering | |||
could not be ruled out | could not be ruled out was not made until six days after the incorrect valve position | ||
was identified. Thorough valve lineup checks and locked valve surveillances were not | |||
completed for both Beaver Valley units until after the plant staff made an emergency | |||
notification system (ENS) call on Thursday evening, July 20, 1995. The similarity of this | |||
event to an event in the early 1980s heightened the concern of both licensee and NRC | |||
personnel who knew of the previous events. | |||
Misadjusted Valves and Disabled Locks at St. Lucie | |||
In May 1996, St. Lucie personnel identified two pressure-relief valves which, when tested, were found to have pressure setpoints 55 percent and 9 percent above their design values. | |||
These valves also had broken wire seals. The root cause could not be determined. | |||
Although tampering could not be ruled out, it was concluded that the more likely cause for | |||
the misadjusted valves was poor maintenance. Licensee management decided to alert the | |||
Security force; however, site Security was not notified. The failure to follow through on | |||
alerting site Security precluded coordinated actions of Operations and Security staffs to | |||
enhance awareness to other possible tampering events. | |||
On July 26, 1996, St. Lucie staff identified nine padlocks and two door locks in vital areas | |||
that were intentionally damaged to inhibit opening the locks. These locks controlled | |||
of | personnel access to various pieces of plant equipment. The licensee did not identify | ||
keylock switches as needing to be checked; consequently, these switches were not | |||
the | checked until August 1996. Although the tampering of components within a vital area | ||
tampering, other than alerting Security, the | indicated the need to be alert to additional tampering, other than alerting Security, the | ||
measures to detect tampering. | licensee failed to consider additional measures to detect tampering. On August 14, 1996, St. Lucie staff identified three additional examples of tampering in vital areas that inhibited | ||
the opening of locks associated with safety-related equipment. | |||
with safety-related | |||
equipment. | |||
Discussion | Discussion | ||
The following | The following factors may have contributed to these events: | ||
(1) The licensees' contingency plans required by 10 CFR 73.55(h)(1) and the | |||
factors may have contributed | |||
to these events: (1) The licensees' | |||
contingency | |||
plans required by 10 CFR 73.55(h)(1) | |||
and the | |||
implementing procedures required by Appendix C to Part 73 did not adequately | |||
mischief. | address tampering, vandalism, and malicious mischief. Other licensee procedures | ||
touched some aspects of these situations; however, no plan or process was used to | |||
touched some aspects of these situations; | |||
however, no plan or process was used to | |||
malevolent | evaluate the potential malevolent event and determine its importance. Factors such | ||
as safety significance, overtness, intent, sophistication of method, and the history | |||
of similar incidents were not considered. Information Notice 83-27, "Operational | |||
Response to Events Concerning Deliberate Acts Directed Against Plant Equipment," | |||
described events in which licensees were not prepared to assess the situation and | |||
take necessary steps to ensure the operability of systems important to safety or | |||
make decisions concerning continued operation. The information notice indicated | |||
that guidelines or procedures prepared by the licensee outlining a process of | |||
i | |||
IN 96-71 December 27, 1996 following up on both deliberate and inadvertent acts with respect to plant operation | |||
should be available. | |||
(2) The licensees' actions were limited in scope and depth, at least initially, in pursuing | |||
events | the events. | ||
were not | (3) The licensees' Operations staff were not sensitive to abnormalities identified earlier | ||
and | and apparently assumed no malice. Since the Operations staff may be the first to | ||
encounter signs of tampering, vandalism, or malicious mischief during its tours and | |||
surveillance activities, sensitivity to precursors plays a key role in timely response to | |||
to | events of this nature. Therefore, licensees may wish to periodically refresh their | ||
Operations staff's sensitivity to and awareness of the evaluation process to ensure | |||
effective response to these acts. | |||
(4) The licensee's Security staff was not told about these problems until well into the | |||
sequence of events at St. Lucie. Security's ability to identify the perpetrators and | |||
institute other protective measures diminishes severely as time elapses. | |||
Events of this nature are required by Appendix G to Part 73 of 10 CFR to be reported to | |||
the NRC Operations Center within one hour of discovery. | |||
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any | |||
questions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts | |||
listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation project manager. | |||
Thomas T. Martin, Director | |||
Division of Reactor Program Management | |||
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation | ||
Technical contacts: Loren Bush, NRR | |||
(301) 415-2944 E-mail: llb(nrc.gov | |||
David Skeen, NRR | |||
(301) 415-1174 E-mail: dls@nrc.gov | |||
Attachment: | Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices | ||
List of Recently Issued NRC Information | |||
AM -chrobL~A 4?f-r | |||
S | |||
W-Attachment | W- | ||
Attachment | |||
IN 96-71 December 27, 1996 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED | IN 96-71 December 27, 1996 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED | ||
NOTICES | NRC INFORMATION NOTICES | ||
Date of | Information Date of | ||
Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to | |||
96-70 Year 2000 Effect on Computer 12/24/96 All U.S. Nuclear | |||
System Software Regulatory Commission | |||
Commission | |||
licensees, certificate | licensees, certificate | ||
Line 458: | Line 235: | ||
holders, and registrants | holders, and registrants | ||
All holders of OLs | 96-69 Operator Actions Affecting 12/20/96 All holders of OLs | ||
Reactivity or CPs for nuclear | |||
power reactors | |||
96-68 Incorrect Effective Diaphragm 12/19/96 All holders of OLs | |||
Area Values in Vendor Manual or CPs for nuclear | |||
Result in Potential Failure power reactors | |||
of Pneumatic Diaphragm | |||
Actuators | |||
96-67 Vulnerability of Emergency 12/19/96 All holders of OLs | |||
Diesel Generators to Fuel or CPs for nuclear | |||
Oil/Lubricating Oil Incom- power reactors | |||
patibility | |||
96-66 Recent Misadministrations 12/13/96 All U.S. Nuclear | |||
Caused by Incorrect Cali- Regulatory Commission | |||
brations of Strontium-90 Medical Use Licensees | |||
Eye Applicators authorized to use | |||
strontium-90 (Sr-90) | |||
eye applicators | |||
96-65 Undetected Accumulation 12/11/96 All holders of OLs | |||
of Gas in Reactor Coolant or CPs for nuclear | |||
System and Inaccurate power reactors | |||
Reactor Water Level | |||
Indication During Shutdown | |||
OL = Operating License | |||
CP = Construction Permit | |||
IN 96-71 December 27, 1996 following up on both deliberate and inadvertent acts with respect to plant operation | |||
should be available. t | |||
(2) The licensees' actions were limited in scope and depth, at least initially, in pursuing | |||
the events. | |||
(3) The licensees' Operations staff were not sensitive to abnormalities identified earlier | |||
and apparently assumed no malice. Since the Operations staff may be the first to | |||
encounter signs of tampering, vandalism, or malicious mischief during its tours and | |||
surveillance activities, sensitivity to precursors plays a key role in timely response to | |||
events of this nature. Therefore, licensees may wish to periodically refresh their | |||
Operations staff's sensitivity to and awareness of the evaluation process to ensure | |||
effective response to these acts. | |||
(4) The licensee's Security staff was not told about these problems until well into the | |||
sequence of events at St. Lucie. Security's ability to identify the perpetrator(s) and | |||
institute other protective measures diminishes severely as time elapses. | |||
Events of this nature are required by Appendix G to Part 73 of 10 CFR to be reported to | |||
the NRC Operations Center within one hour of discovery. | |||
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any | |||
contacts | questions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts | ||
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation | listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation project manager. | ||
original signed by D.B. Matthews | |||
Thomas T. Martin, Director | |||
Division of Reactor Program Management | |||
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation | |||
Technical contacts: Loren Bush, NRR David Skeen, NRR | |||
(301) 415-2944 (301) 415-1174 E-mail: llb@nrc.gov E-mail: dls@nrc.gov | |||
Tech Editor has reviewed and concurred on 9/27/96 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices | |||
DOCUMENT NAME: 96-71.IN | |||
' | To receive a copy of this document. hIdlcate I the box: 'C' - Copy w/o | ||
'N' -No copy | attachmentlenclosure 'E' - Copy wfattachmentlenclosure 'N' - No copy | ||
I D/DRP I I | OFFICE TECH CONTS I C/PECB:DRPM I D/DRP I I | ||
* | NAME LBush* AChaffee* TMart | ||
DSkeen* L ' I | |||
DATE 10/31/96 11/01/96 12 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY | |||
acts with respect to plant operation | * IN 96- December , 1996 following up on both deliberate and inadvertent acts with respect to plant operation | ||
should be available. | |||
(2) The licensees' actions were limited in scope and depth, at least initially, in pursuing | |||
the events. | |||
identified | (3) The licensees' Operations staff were not sensitive to abnormalities identified earlier | ||
and apparently assumed no malice. Since the Operations staff may be the first to | |||
encounter signs of tampering, vandalism, or malicious mischief during its tours and | |||
surveillance activities, sensitivity to precursors plays a key role in timely response to | |||
events of this nature. Therefore, licensees may wish to periodically refresh their | |||
Operations staff's sensitivity to and awareness of the evaluation process to ensure | |||
effective response to these acts. | |||
(4) The licensee's Security staff was not told about these problems until well into the | |||
sequence of events at St. Lucie. Security's ability to identify the perpetrators and | |||
institute other protective measures diminishes severely as time elapses. | |||
Events of this nature are required by Appendix G to Part 73 of 10 CFR to be reported to | |||
the NRC Operations Center within one hour of discovery. | |||
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any | |||
of the | questions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts | ||
listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation project manager. | |||
Thomas T. Martin, Director | |||
Division of Reactor Program Management | |||
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation | ||
Technical contacts: Loren Bush, NRR David Skeen, NRR | |||
(301) 415-2944 (301) 415-1174 E-mail: llb@nrc.gov E-mail: dls@nrc.gov | |||
Tech Editor has reviewed and concurred on 9/27/96 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices | |||
DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DLS\96-XXX | |||
To receive a copy of this document. indicate In the box: 'C - Copy w/o | |||
attachment/enclosure WE- Copy wlettachmenlenClosure N - No copy | |||
OFFICE TECH CONTS C/PECB:DRPM l D/DRPJ- I | |||
NAME LBush* AChaffee* Toard n | |||
DSkeen1 A a e haW | |||
10/31/96 11/01/96 12/zo /96 DATE | |||
Al. -r. .. - . | |||
U11l.IWAL KLLUKU HUrY 4 AIn-nn/I | |||
t | |||
* IN 96-XX | * IN 96-XX | ||
Furthermore, the licensee contingency | November xx, 1996 available. Furthermore, the licensee contingency plans requiredby 10 CFR | ||
73.55(h)(1) and the implementing procedures required by Appendix C to Part 73 did | |||
not adequately address tampering, vandalism, and malicious mischief. | |||
(2) The licensee actions were limited in scope and depth, at least initially, in pursuing the | |||
events. | |||
(3) The Operations staff was not sensitive to abnormalities identified earlier and | |||
apparently assumed no malice. Since the Operations staff may be the first to | |||
encounter signs of tampering, vandalism, or malicious mischief during its tours and | |||
to | surveillance activities, sensitivity to precursors plays a key role in timely response to | ||
events of this nature. Therefore, licensees may wish to periodically refresh their | |||
Operations staffs sensitivity to and awareness of the evaluation process to ensure | |||
effective response to these acts. | |||
staff | (4) The licensee's Security staff was not told about these problems until well into the | ||
sequence of events. Security's ability to identify the perpetrator(s) and institute other | |||
protective measures diminishes severely as time elapses. | |||
Events of this nature are required by Appendix G to Part 73 of 10 CFR to be reported to the | |||
NRC Operations Center within one hour of discovery. | |||
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any | |||
questions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts | |||
listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager. | |||
Thomas T. Martin, Director | |||
Division of Reactor Program Management | |||
of | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation | ||
===Technical Contact:=== | |||
===Loren Bush, NRR=== | |||
(301) 415-2944 E-mail: llb@nrc.gov | |||
David Skeen, NRR | |||
(301) 415-1174 E-mail: dls@nrc.gov | |||
Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices | |||
DOCUMENT NAME: G:MDLS\IN96-XX.TPR | |||
To receive a copy of this document. hIdicate hI the box: 'C' - Copy w/o | |||
attachmenVenclosure 'E' - Copy wlattachmentlenclosure 'N' - No copy | |||
OFFICE PECB:DRPM IC PSGB:DRPM C/PSGB:DRPM C/PECB:DRPM , D/DRPM | |||
NAME DSkeenZot-C LBush* LCunninghamnM AChaffeeCifv-' TMartin | |||
DATE 10/3//96 10/xv/96 10/ /96 1l// /96 3y9 10/ /96 | |||
-i | |||
*-pervias OFFICIAL RECORD COPY 44I 1i | |||
K.IN 96-XX | |||
October xx, 1996 available. Furthermore, the licensee contingency plans requiredby 10 CFR | |||
73.55(h)(1) and the implementing procedures required by Appendix C to Part 73 did | |||
not adequately address tampering, vandalism, and malicious mischief. | |||
(2) The licensee actions were limited in scope and depth, at least initially, in pursuing the | |||
events. | |||
(3) The Operations staff was not sensitive to abnormalities identified earlier and | |||
apparently assumed no malice. Since the Operations staff may be the first to | |||
encounter signs of tampering, vandalism, or malicious mischief during its tours and | |||
surveillance activities, sensitivity to precursors plays a key role in timely response to | |||
events of this nature. Therefore, licensees may wish to periodically refresh their | |||
Operations staffs sensitivity to and awareness of the evaluation process to ensure | |||
effective response to these acts. | |||
(4) The licensee's Security staff was not told about these problems until well into the | |||
sequence of events. Security's ability to identify the perpetrator(s) and institute other | |||
protective measures diminishes severely as time elapses. | |||
Events of this nature are required by Appendix G to Part 73 of 10 CFR to be reported to the | |||
NRC Operations Center within one hour of discovery. | |||
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any | |||
questions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts | |||
listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager. | |||
Thomas T. Martin, Director | |||
Division of Reactor Program Management | |||
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation | |||
===Technical Contact:=== | |||
===Loren Bush, NRR=== | |||
(301) 415-2944 E-mail: llbenrc.gov | |||
David Skeen, NRR | |||
(301) 415-1174 E-mail: dIs@nrc.gov | |||
Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices | |||
DOCUMENT NAME: G:IDLSIN96-XX.TPR | |||
To receive a copy of this document,. Indicate i the box: 'C' - Copy w/o | |||
attachment/enclosure 'E' - Copy w/attachmenVenclosure 'N' - No copy | |||
OFFICE PECB:DRPM - I PSGB:DRPM C/PSWJ RM/ )C/PECB:DRPM I D/DRPM | |||
INAME | |||
DATE | |||
- | US-keen A50L- | ||
10/6/4/96 ILBush Xx:i' | |||
10t796 ILCurh&FaIIt V AChaffee | |||
10 9E | |||
910/ - /96 TMartin | |||
10/ /96 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY}} | |||
{{Information notice-Nav}} | {{Information notice-Nav}} |
Latest revision as of 04:41, 24 November 2019
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION-
WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 December 27, 1996 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 96-71: LICENSEE RESPONSE TO INDICATIONS OF
TAMPERING, VANDALISM, OR MALICIOUS
MISCHIEF
Addressees
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power reactors.
Purpose
This information notice is being issued to alert licensees to the benefits of planning a
response to indications of tampering, vandalism, or malicious mischief. It is expected that
recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate. However, suggestions contained in this information notice are not NRC
requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.
Description of Circumstances
Recent events at operating reactors indicate that some licensee personnel may not
recognize the potential significance of early indications of potential tampering, vandalism, or malicious mischief. As a result, licensee response may be untimely and of limited scope
and depth. Failure to promptly question, resolve the significance and implement an
appropriate strategy to mitigate the consequence of a potential tampering, vandalism, or
malicious mischief situation, could leave the plant in a vulnerable state for a significant
period of time. Lack of detailed planning, procedures, and training frequently plays a role
in the quality of response to these events. Brief accounts of two events illustrate the
issue:
Improperly Positioned Valve at Beaver Valley
During the conduct of a quarterly surveillance on Friday, July 14, 1995, to verify the
position of certain safety-related locked valves; the licensee determined that the service
water cross-connect valve at the discharge of the recirculation spray heat exchanger was
in the incorrect position (shut in lieu of open), that the chain used to secure the valve in
the proper position had been cut, and that the lock appeared to have been placed back on
the chain in a manner that made it difficult to detect the condition. The licensee's staff
initially assumed the valve had been inadvertently mispositioned during earlier operational
evolutions, but subsequent interviews and analysis were unable to confirm this
assumption. 2 I1
?Pfs ITE .1 0i-1tttt S%-071Z 9017-21 air
_ - [,A_ ,a 0S
QAI 912flfA1
-- v----60do 'I11 I
41 -A,-
T2D4t ICG
IN 96-71 December 27, 1996 Licensee management first learned of the event on Tuesday, July 18, 1995. Consequ- ently, licensee management was not able to oversee the licensee evaluation of the event
until considerable time had elapsed. The licensee's determination that potential tampering
could not be ruled out was not made until six days after the incorrect valve position
was identified. Thorough valve lineup checks and locked valve surveillances were not
completed for both Beaver Valley units until after the plant staff made an emergency
notification system (ENS) call on Thursday evening, July 20, 1995. The similarity of this
event to an event in the early 1980s heightened the concern of both licensee and NRC
personnel who knew of the previous events.
Misadjusted Valves and Disabled Locks at St. Lucie
In May 1996, St. Lucie personnel identified two pressure-relief valves which, when tested, were found to have pressure setpoints 55 percent and 9 percent above their design values.
These valves also had broken wire seals. The root cause could not be determined.
Although tampering could not be ruled out, it was concluded that the more likely cause for
the misadjusted valves was poor maintenance. Licensee management decided to alert the
Security force; however, site Security was not notified. The failure to follow through on
alerting site Security precluded coordinated actions of Operations and Security staffs to
enhance awareness to other possible tampering events.
On July 26, 1996, St. Lucie staff identified nine padlocks and two door locks in vital areas
that were intentionally damaged to inhibit opening the locks. These locks controlled
personnel access to various pieces of plant equipment. The licensee did not identify
keylock switches as needing to be checked; consequently, these switches were not
checked until August 1996. Although the tampering of components within a vital area
indicated the need to be alert to additional tampering, other than alerting Security, the
licensee failed to consider additional measures to detect tampering. On August 14, 1996, St. Lucie staff identified three additional examples of tampering in vital areas that inhibited
the opening of locks associated with safety-related equipment.
Discussion
The following factors may have contributed to these events:
(1) The licensees' contingency plans required by 10 CFR 73.55(h)(1) and the
implementing procedures required by Appendix C to Part 73 did not adequately
address tampering, vandalism, and malicious mischief. Other licensee procedures
touched some aspects of these situations; however, no plan or process was used to
evaluate the potential malevolent event and determine its importance. Factors such
as safety significance, overtness, intent, sophistication of method, and the history
of similar incidents were not considered. Information Notice 83-27, "Operational
Response to Events Concerning Deliberate Acts Directed Against Plant Equipment,"
described events in which licensees were not prepared to assess the situation and
take necessary steps to ensure the operability of systems important to safety or
make decisions concerning continued operation. The information notice indicated
that guidelines or procedures prepared by the licensee outlining a process of
i
IN 96-71 December 27, 1996 following up on both deliberate and inadvertent acts with respect to plant operation
should be available.
(2) The licensees' actions were limited in scope and depth, at least initially, in pursuing
the events.
(3) The licensees' Operations staff were not sensitive to abnormalities identified earlier
and apparently assumed no malice. Since the Operations staff may be the first to
encounter signs of tampering, vandalism, or malicious mischief during its tours and
surveillance activities, sensitivity to precursors plays a key role in timely response to
events of this nature. Therefore, licensees may wish to periodically refresh their
Operations staff's sensitivity to and awareness of the evaluation process to ensure
effective response to these acts.
(4) The licensee's Security staff was not told about these problems until well into the
sequence of events at St. Lucie. Security's ability to identify the perpetrators and
institute other protective measures diminishes severely as time elapses.
Events of this nature are required by Appendix G to Part 73 of 10 CFR to be reported to
the NRC Operations Center within one hour of discovery.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any
questions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts
listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation project manager.
Thomas T. Martin, Director
Division of Reactor Program Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts: Loren Bush, NRR
(301) 415-2944 E-mail: llb(nrc.gov
(301) 415-1174 E-mail: dls@nrc.gov
Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
AM -chrobL~A 4?f-r
S
W-
Attachment
IN 96-71 December 27, 1996 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES
Information Date of
Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to
96-70 Year 2000 Effect on Computer 12/24/96 All U.S. Nuclear
System Software Regulatory Commission
licensees, certificate
holders, and registrants
96-69 Operator Actions Affecting 12/20/96 All holders of OLs
Reactivity or CPs for nuclear
power reactors
96-68 Incorrect Effective Diaphragm 12/19/96 All holders of OLs
Area Values in Vendor Manual or CPs for nuclear
Result in Potential Failure power reactors
of Pneumatic Diaphragm
Actuators
96-67 Vulnerability of Emergency 12/19/96 All holders of OLs
Diesel Generators to Fuel or CPs for nuclear
Oil/Lubricating Oil Incom- power reactors
patibility
96-66 Recent Misadministrations 12/13/96 All U.S. Nuclear
Caused by Incorrect Cali- Regulatory Commission
brations of Strontium-90 Medical Use Licensees
Eye Applicators authorized to use
eye applicators
96-65 Undetected Accumulation 12/11/96 All holders of OLs
of Gas in Reactor Coolant or CPs for nuclear
System and Inaccurate power reactors
Reactor Water Level
Indication During Shutdown
OL = Operating License
CP = Construction Permit
IN 96-71 December 27, 1996 following up on both deliberate and inadvertent acts with respect to plant operation
should be available. t
(2) The licensees' actions were limited in scope and depth, at least initially, in pursuing
the events.
(3) The licensees' Operations staff were not sensitive to abnormalities identified earlier
and apparently assumed no malice. Since the Operations staff may be the first to
encounter signs of tampering, vandalism, or malicious mischief during its tours and
surveillance activities, sensitivity to precursors plays a key role in timely response to
events of this nature. Therefore, licensees may wish to periodically refresh their
Operations staff's sensitivity to and awareness of the evaluation process to ensure
effective response to these acts.
(4) The licensee's Security staff was not told about these problems until well into the
sequence of events at St. Lucie. Security's ability to identify the perpetrator(s) and
institute other protective measures diminishes severely as time elapses.
Events of this nature are required by Appendix G to Part 73 of 10 CFR to be reported to
the NRC Operations Center within one hour of discovery.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any
questions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts
listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation project manager.
original signed by D.B. Matthews
Thomas T. Martin, Director
Division of Reactor Program Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts: Loren Bush, NRR David Skeen, NRR
(301) 415-2944 (301) 415-1174 E-mail: llb@nrc.gov E-mail: dls@nrc.gov
Tech Editor has reviewed and concurred on 9/27/96 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
DOCUMENT NAME: 96-71.IN
To receive a copy of this document. hIdlcate I the box: 'C' - Copy w/o
attachmentlenclosure 'E' - Copy wfattachmentlenclosure 'N' - No copy
OFFICE TECH CONTS I C/PECB:DRPM I D/DRP I I
NAME LBush* AChaffee* TMart
DSkeen* L ' I
DATE 10/31/96 11/01/96 12 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
- IN 96- December , 1996 following up on both deliberate and inadvertent acts with respect to plant operation
should be available.
(2) The licensees' actions were limited in scope and depth, at least initially, in pursuing
the events.
(3) The licensees' Operations staff were not sensitive to abnormalities identified earlier
and apparently assumed no malice. Since the Operations staff may be the first to
encounter signs of tampering, vandalism, or malicious mischief during its tours and
surveillance activities, sensitivity to precursors plays a key role in timely response to
events of this nature. Therefore, licensees may wish to periodically refresh their
Operations staff's sensitivity to and awareness of the evaluation process to ensure
effective response to these acts.
(4) The licensee's Security staff was not told about these problems until well into the
sequence of events at St. Lucie. Security's ability to identify the perpetrators and
institute other protective measures diminishes severely as time elapses.
Events of this nature are required by Appendix G to Part 73 of 10 CFR to be reported to
the NRC Operations Center within one hour of discovery.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any
questions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts
listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation project manager.
Thomas T. Martin, Director
Division of Reactor Program Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts: Loren Bush, NRR David Skeen, NRR
(301) 415-2944 (301) 415-1174 E-mail: llb@nrc.gov E-mail: dls@nrc.gov
Tech Editor has reviewed and concurred on 9/27/96 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DLS\96-XXX
To receive a copy of this document. indicate In the box: 'C - Copy w/o
attachment/enclosure WE- Copy wlettachmenlenClosure N - No copy
OFFICE TECH CONTS C/PECB:DRPM l D/DRPJ- I
NAME LBush* AChaffee* Toard n
DSkeen1 A a e haW
10/31/96 11/01/96 12/zo /96 DATE
Al. -r. .. - .
U11l.IWAL KLLUKU HUrY 4 AIn-nn/I
t
- IN 96-XX
November xx, 1996 available. Furthermore, the licensee contingency plans requiredby 10 CFR
73.55(h)(1) and the implementing procedures required by Appendix C to Part 73 did
not adequately address tampering, vandalism, and malicious mischief.
(2) The licensee actions were limited in scope and depth, at least initially, in pursuing the
events.
(3) The Operations staff was not sensitive to abnormalities identified earlier and
apparently assumed no malice. Since the Operations staff may be the first to
encounter signs of tampering, vandalism, or malicious mischief during its tours and
surveillance activities, sensitivity to precursors plays a key role in timely response to
events of this nature. Therefore, licensees may wish to periodically refresh their
Operations staffs sensitivity to and awareness of the evaluation process to ensure
effective response to these acts.
(4) The licensee's Security staff was not told about these problems until well into the
sequence of events. Security's ability to identify the perpetrator(s) and institute other
protective measures diminishes severely as time elapses.
Events of this nature are required by Appendix G to Part 73 of 10 CFR to be reported to the
NRC Operations Center within one hour of discovery.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any
questions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts
listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Thomas T. Martin, Director
Division of Reactor Program Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contact:
Loren Bush, NRR
(301) 415-2944 E-mail: llb@nrc.gov
(301) 415-1174 E-mail: dls@nrc.gov
Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
DOCUMENT NAME: G:MDLS\IN96-XX.TPR
To receive a copy of this document. hIdicate hI the box: 'C' - Copy w/o
attachmenVenclosure 'E' - Copy wlattachmentlenclosure 'N' - No copy
OFFICE PECB:DRPM IC PSGB:DRPM C/PSGB:DRPM C/PECB:DRPM , D/DRPM
NAME DSkeenZot-C LBush* LCunninghamnM AChaffeeCifv-' TMartin
DATE 10/3//96 10/xv/96 10/ /96 1l// /96 3y9 10/ /96
-i
- -pervias OFFICIAL RECORD COPY 44I 1i
K.IN 96-XX
October xx, 1996 available. Furthermore, the licensee contingency plans requiredby 10 CFR
73.55(h)(1) and the implementing procedures required by Appendix C to Part 73 did
not adequately address tampering, vandalism, and malicious mischief.
(2) The licensee actions were limited in scope and depth, at least initially, in pursuing the
events.
(3) The Operations staff was not sensitive to abnormalities identified earlier and
apparently assumed no malice. Since the Operations staff may be the first to
encounter signs of tampering, vandalism, or malicious mischief during its tours and
surveillance activities, sensitivity to precursors plays a key role in timely response to
events of this nature. Therefore, licensees may wish to periodically refresh their
Operations staffs sensitivity to and awareness of the evaluation process to ensure
effective response to these acts.
(4) The licensee's Security staff was not told about these problems until well into the
sequence of events. Security's ability to identify the perpetrator(s) and institute other
protective measures diminishes severely as time elapses.
Events of this nature are required by Appendix G to Part 73 of 10 CFR to be reported to the
NRC Operations Center within one hour of discovery.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any
questions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts
listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Thomas T. Martin, Director
Division of Reactor Program Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contact:
Loren Bush, NRR
(301) 415-2944 E-mail: llbenrc.gov
(301) 415-1174 E-mail: dIs@nrc.gov
Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
DOCUMENT NAME: G:IDLSIN96-XX.TPR
To receive a copy of this document,. Indicate i the box: 'C' - Copy w/o
attachment/enclosure 'E' - Copy w/attachmenVenclosure 'N' - No copy
OFFICE PECB:DRPM - I PSGB:DRPM C/PSWJ RM/ )C/PECB:DRPM I D/DRPM
INAME
DATE
US-keen A50L-
10/6/4/96 ILBush Xx:i'
10t796 ILCurh&FaIIt V AChaffee
10 9E
910/ - /96 TMartin
10/ /96 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY