Information Notice 1996-63, Potential Safety Issue Regarding the Shipment of Fissile Material: Difference between revisions

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| issue date = 12/06/1996
| issue date = 12/06/1996
| title = Potential Safety Issue Regarding the Shipment of Fissile Material
| title = Potential Safety Issue Regarding the Shipment of Fissile Material
| author name = Haughney C J
| author name = Haughney C
| author affiliation = NRC/NMSS/SFPO
| author affiliation = NRC/NMSS/SFPO
| addressee name =  
| addressee name =  
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| page count = 9
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{{#Wiki_filter:K) JIM MCKNIGHTUNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONOFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDSWASHINGTON, DC 20555December 5, 1996NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 96-63: POTENTIAL SAFETY ISSUE REGARDING THESHIPMENT OF FISSILE MATERIAL
{{#Wiki_filter:K) JIM MCKNIGHT
 
UNITED STATES
 
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
 
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS
 
WASHINGTON, DC 20555 December 5, 1996 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 96-63:                 POTENTIAL SAFETY ISSUE REGARDING THE
 
SHIPMENT OF FISSILE MATERIAL


==Addressees==
==Addressees==
All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensees authorized to possess special nuclearmaterial in unsealed quantities greater than a critical mass.
All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensees authorized to possess special nuclear
 
material in unsealed quantities greater than a critical mass.


==Purpose==
==Purpose==
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice to alertaddressees to an issue with potential safety significance regarding shipments using the fissilematerial exemption provisions and general licenses. It is expected that recipients will review thisinformation for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similarproblems. However, suggestions contained in this information notice are not NRC requirements;therefore, no specific action nor written response is required.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice to alert
 
addressees to an issue with potential safety significance regarding shipments using the fissile
 
material exemption provisions and general licenses. It is expected that recipients will review this
 
information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar
 
problems. However, suggestions contained in this information notice are not NRC requirements;
therefore, no specific action nor written response is required.


==Description of Circumstances==
==Description of Circumstances==
An NRC licensee recently informed NRC of a potential situation where one of the fissile materialexemptions in 10 CFR 71.53 would not have provided adequate criticality safety if large amountsof an exempt concentration of fissile material were to be transported in the presence of a specialmoderating material (i.e., beryllium). A recent contract was awarded to the licensee to processweapons-usable enriched uranium materials. The waste product, a uranium-beryllium filtercake,met the fissile exemption provisions in 10 CFR 71.53 and 49 CFR 173.453. The presence ofberyllium in significant quantities in NRC-regulated fissile exempt shipments is extraordinary, andwas not considered in the development of the fissile exemptions in the regulations. NRC hasreviewed and verified the licensee's calculations, and has concluded that the current regulationsneed to be revised to preclude criticality in fissile exempt shipments made under 10 CFR 71.53,and fissile shipments made underthe general licenses in 10 CFR 71.18 and 10 CFR 71.22. Thisinformation notice is being issued to provide additional, timely notice, to licensees, of thispotential safety issue, while the regulatory revisions are made.DiscussionThe licensee proposed to employ the provision in 10 CFR 71.53(d), or the parallel provision in theU.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations, 49 CFR 173.453(d).J//1961204021 on jl4PqtPDR ETE OO~tc 99 IN 96-63December 5, 1996 Section 71.53(d) exempts fissile material from the requirements in 10 CFR 71.55 and 71.59 (i.e.,the additional requirements placed on fissile packages and shipments to preclude criticality),provided the package does not contain more than 5 grams (0.18 ounces) of fissile material inany 10-liter (610-cubic-inch) volume. The fissile exemptions appearing in 10 CFR 71.53 areassumed to provide inherent criticality control for all practical cases in which fissile materialsexist at or below the applicable regulatory limits (i.e., independent calculations would generallynot be expected nor required). Consequently, the fissile exemptions generally do not place limitson the types of moderating or reflecting material present in fissile exempt packages, nor thenumber of fissile exempt packages that can be shipped in a single consignment, and do notrequire that a transport index (see 10 CFR 71.4) be assigned to packages for criticality control.Further, the fissile material exemptions and general license provisions allow any licensee tomake shipments without first seeking NRC approval.A fairly realistic computer model of the enriched uranium-beryllium oxide waste packages, asloaded for shipment into a sea-land container, and at 0.5 grams per liter, could not bedemonstrated to provide adequate nuclear criticality safety. Because the current regulationswould allow the possibility of criticality in fissile exempt shipments, and since there is noassurance that such shipments will not occur, NRC intends to revise 10 CFR Part 71 to addressexclusion of beryllium and other special moderating material (e.g., deuterium and graphite) in theshipment of fissile materials, and to limit the amount of fissile exempt material that can betransported in a single consignment.NRC has contacted the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the DOT on this issue. DOE is ashipper of fissile material, which could include the special moderating materials in question.NRC and DOT are coordinating the revisions to their respective regulations.NRC notes that very few licensees are involved in the shipment of fissile materials with beryllium,graphite, or deuterium. However, for those licensees that are involved in such shipments, it isimportant that programs be assessed to ensure that adequate criticality safety is provided wherefissile materials are transported with materials known or expected to have moderating propertiesgreater than water. As demonstrated by the licensee in this case, the existing fissile materialexemptions cannot be presumed, without independent analysis, to preclude nuclear criticality inall case I):K,)IN 96-63December 5, 1996 This information notice requires no specific action nor written response. If you have anyquestions about the information in this notice, please contact the individual listed below, or theappropriate NRC regional office.Charles J. Haighney, Actirt DireSpent Fuel Project OfficeOffice of Nuclear Material Safetyand SafeguardsTechnical contact:Earl P. Easton, NMSS(301) 415-8520e-mail: exe@nrc.gov
An NRC licensee recently informed NRC of a potential situation where one of the fissile material
 
exemptions in 10 CFR 71.53 would not have provided adequate criticality safety if large amounts
 
of an exempt concentration of fissile material were to be transported in the presence of a special
 
moderating material (i.e., beryllium). A recent contract was awarded to the licensee to process
 
weapons-usable enriched uranium materials. The waste product, a uranium-beryllium filtercake, met the fissile exemption provisions in 10 CFR 71.53 and 49 CFR 173.453. The presence of
 
beryllium in significant quantities in NRC-regulated fissile exempt shipments is extraordinary, and
 
was not considered in the development of the fissile exemptions in the regulations. NRC has
 
reviewed and verified the licensee's calculations, and has concluded that the current regulations
 
need to be revised to preclude criticality in fissile exempt shipments made under 10 CFR 71.53, and fissile shipments made underthe general licenses in 10 CFR 71.18 and 10 CFR 71.22. This
 
information notice is being issued to provide additional, timely notice, to licensees, of this
 
potential safety issue, while the regulatory revisions are made.
 
Discussion
 
The licensee proposed to employ the provision in 10 CFR 71.53(d), or the parallel provision in the
 
U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations, 49 CFR 173.453(d).
 
J//1
961204021              on                                                     jl4Pqt
 
PDR ETE OO~tc                                     99
 
IN 96-63 December 5, 1996 Section 71.53(d) exempts fissile material from the requirements in 10 CFR 71.55 and 71.59 (i.e.,
the additional requirements placed on fissile packages and shipments to preclude criticality),
provided the package does not contain more than 5 grams (0.18 ounces) of fissile material in
 
any 10-liter (610-cubic-inch) volume. The fissile exemptions appearing in 10 CFR 71.53 are
 
assumed to provide inherent criticality control for all practical cases in which fissile materials
 
exist at or below the applicable regulatory limits (i.e., independent calculations would generally
 
not be expected nor required). Consequently, the fissile exemptions generally do not place limits
 
on the types of moderating or reflecting material present in fissile exempt packages, nor the
 
number of fissile exempt packages that can be shipped in a single consignment, and do not
 
require that a transport index (see 10 CFR 71.4) be assigned to packages for criticality control.
 
Further, the fissile material exemptions and general license provisions allow any licensee to
 
make shipments without first seeking NRC approval.
 
A fairly realistic computer model of the enriched uranium-beryllium oxide waste packages, as
 
loaded for shipment into a sea-land container, and at 0.5 grams per liter, could not be
 
demonstrated to provide adequate nuclear criticality safety. Because the current regulations
 
would allow the possibility of criticality in fissile exempt shipments, and since there is no
 
assurance that such shipments will not occur, NRC intends to revise 10 CFR Part 71 to address
 
exclusion of beryllium and other special moderating material (e.g., deuterium and graphite) in the
 
shipment of fissile materials, and to limit the amount of fissile exempt material that can be
 
transported in a single consignment.
 
NRC has contacted the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the DOT on this issue. DOE is a
 
shipper of fissile material, which could include the special moderating materials in question.
 
NRC and DOT are coordinating the revisions to their respective regulations.
 
NRC notes that very few licensees are involved in the shipment of fissile materials with beryllium, graphite, or deuterium. However, for those licensees that are involved in such shipments, it is
 
important that programs be assessed to ensure that adequate criticality safety is provided where
 
fissile materials are transported with materials known or expected to have moderating properties
 
greater than water. As demonstrated by the licensee in this case, the existing fissile material
 
exemptions cannot be presumed, without independent analysis, to preclude nuclear criticality in
 
all cases.
 
I)                                   :K,)
                                                                              IN 96-63 December 5, 1996 This information notice requires no specific action nor written response. If you have any
 
questions about the information in this notice, please contact the individual listed below, or the
 
appropriate NRC regional office.
 
Charles J. Haighney, Actirt Dire
 
Spent Fuel Project Office
 
Office of Nuclear Material Safety
 
and Safeguards
 
Technical contact:     Earl P. Easton, NMSS
 
(301) 415-8520
                        e-mail: exe@nrc.gov
 
Attachments:
1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices
 
2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information Notices
 
o          k')~          Gu              A          7-
 
Attachment I
 
IN 96-63 December 5, 1996 Page 1 of I
 
LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
 
NMSS INFORMATION NOTICES
 
Info
 
rmation                                        Date of
 
Notice No.      Subject                      Issuance          Issued to
 
96-57      Incident-Reporting Require-        10/30/96          All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
 
ments Involving Intakes,                              Commission licensees
 
During a 24-Hour Period
 
that May Cause a Total
 
Effective Dose Equivalent
 
in Excess of 0.05 Sv (5 rem)
96-54      Vulnerability of Stainless          10117/96          All material licensees
 
Steel to Corrosion When
 
Sensitized
 
96-53      Retrofit to Amersham 660            10/15/96          All industrial radiography
 
Posilock Radiography                                  licensees
 
Camera to Correct Incon- sistency in 10 CFR Part 34 Compatibility
 
96-52      Cracked Insertion Rods              09/26/96          All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
 
on Troxler Model 3400                                Commission portable gauge
 
Series Portable Moisture                              licensees and vendors
 
Density Gauges
 
96-51      Residual Contamination              09/11/96          All material licensees
 
Remaining in Krypton-85 Handling System After
 
Venting
 
96-47      Recordkeeping, Decommis-            08/19196          All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
 
sioning Notifications for                            Commission licensees
 
Disposals of Radioactive
 
Waste by Land Burial
 
Authorized Under Former
 
10 CFR 20.304, 20.302, and Current 20.2002
 
v>
                                                                        Attachment 2 IN 96-63 December 5, 1996 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
 
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES
 
Information                                        Date of
 
Notice No.            Subject                      Issuance    Issued to
 
96-62          Potential Failure of the            11/20/96    All holders of OLs
 
Instantaneous Trip Function                      and CPs for nuclear
 
of General Electric RMS-9                        power plants
 
Programmers
 
96-61          Failure of a Main Steam Safety      11/20/96    All holders of OLs or
 
Valve to Reseat Caused by an                    CPs for nuclear power
 
Improperly Installed Release                    reactors
 
Nut
 
96-60          Potential Common-Mode Post-        11/14/96    All holders of OLs or
 
Accident Failure of Residual                    CPs for nuclear power
 
Heat Removal Heat Exchangers                    reactors
 
96-59          Potential Degradation of            10/30/96    All holders of OLs or
 
Post Loss-of-Coolant                            CPs for nuclear power
 
Recirculation Capability                        reactors
 
as a Result of Debris
 
96-58          RCP Seal Replacement with          10/30/96    All holders of OLs or
 
Pump on Backseat                                CPs for pressurized-water
 
reactors
 
96-57          Incident-Reporting Require-        10/29/96    All U.S. Nuclear
 
ments Involving Intakes,                        Regulatory Commission
 
During a 24-Hour Period                          licensees
 
That May Cause a Total
 
Effective Dose Equivalent
 
in Excess of 0.05 Sv
 
(5 rems)
OL = Operating License
 
CP = Construction Permit
 
IN 96-63 K>                                            v2    December 5, 1996 This information notice requires no specific action nor written response. If you have any
 
questions about the information in this notice, please contact the individual listed below, or the
 
appropriate NRC regional office.
 
ChaSes J.Haugfey
 
Charles J. Haughney, Acting Director
 
Spent Fuel Project Office
 
Office of Nuclear Material Safety
 
and Safeguards
 
Technical contact:      Earl P. Easton, NMSS
 
(301) 415-8520
                              e-mail: exeenrc.gov
 
Attachments:
      1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices
 
2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information Notices
 
96-63.IN                              *See Previous Concurrence.
 
OFC        SFPO*      Ic  SFPO*    l c    SFPO* I c      NRR/OECB*      I c    OGC*    lc    TEditor I
 
NAME      RLewis:LMG        EEaston        SShankman          AEChaffee          ENJenson          EKraus*
DATE        10/10/96        10/10/96        10/10/96            10/10/96            11/25/96        11/25/96 OFC    lIMOB      lI    SFP          t                I    l-            I                  I
 
NAME      KRamsey          CJH_ ney
 
DATE      1/27/96        W215196                                                  Ia;v4        i            _ _
                                                        N L S R
 
CO E & ENCLOSURE                              OC
 
C_  CO
 
C =COVER  E                        EE= COVER                                  N = NE) CQPT
 
IN 96-##
                                KJ                                          i2    October ##, 1996 present in fissile exempt packages, nor the number of fissile exempt packages that can be
 
shipped in a single consignment, and do not require that a transport index (see 10
      CFR 71.4) be assigned to packages for criticality control. Further, the fissile material
 
exemptions and general license provisions allow any licensee to make shipments without
 
first seeking NRC approval.
 
A fairly realistic computer model of the enriched uranium-beryllium oxide waste packages, as loaded for shipment into a sea-land container, and at 0.5 grams per liter, could not be
 
demonstrated to provide adequate nuclear criticality safety. Because the current
 
regulations would allow the possibility of criticality in fissile exempt shipments, and since
 
there is no assurance that such shipments will not occur, NRC intends to revise 10
      CFR Part 71 to address exclusion of beryllium and other special moderating material (e.g.,
      deuterium and graphite) in the shipment of fissile materials, and to limit the amount of
 
fissile exempt material that can be transported in a single consignment.
 
NRC has contacted the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the DOT on this issue. DOE
 
is a shipper of fissile material, which could include the special moderating materials in
 
question. NRC and DOT are coordinating the revisions to their respective regulations.
 
NRC notes that very few licensees are involved in the shipment of fissile materials-with
 
beryllium, graphite, or deuterium. However, for those licensees that are involved in such
 
shipments, it is important that programs be assessed to ensure that adequate criticality
 
safety is provided where fissile materials are transported with materials known or expected
 
to have moderating properties greater than water. As demonstrated by the licensee in this
 
case, the existing fissile material exemptions cannot be presumed, without independent
 
analysis, to preclude nuclear criticality in all cases.
 
This information notice requires no specific action nor written response. If you have any
 
questions about the information in this notice, please contact the individual listed below, or
 
the appropriate NRC regional office.
 
Charles J. Haughney, Acting Director
 
Spent Fuel Project Office
 
Office of Nuclear Material Safety
 
and Safeguards
 
Attachments:
        1.      List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices
 
2.      List of Recently Issued NRR Information Notices
 
Contact:        Earl P. Easton, NMSS
 
(301) 415-8520
                        e-mail: exe@nrc.gov
 
S:WPROJRXL1FIZ.IN                          See Previous Concurrence.
 
OFC        SFPON*      c    SFPO      l c  SFPO *    c  NRR/OECBh*    I c    OGCN    lc    TEditor I
 
NAME        RLewis:LMG        EEaston        SShankman        AEChaffee            ENJenson      EKraus *
DATE    I 10/10/96 I 10/10/96      I--
                                            I 10/10/96 I      10/10/96        1 11/25/96      1 11/25/96 OFC        IMOB      I      SFP                          I        l              _        lL,/
NAME      KRamseyeK CJHa_                            _      _
DATE      1I9 196        12- ?79            _6                                _,,___.    __  _ ________
    C - COVER                            E = COVER & LNULUbUKIt                N = Nu iurO
 
>-
        considerations and shipping experience indicate that the criticality of fissile exempt
 
packages is not an immediate threat to worker and public health and safety, the possibility
 
of criticality in fissile exempt shipments has prompted NRC to revise 10 CFR Part 71, to
 
address the possible inclusion of beryllium and other special moderating material (e.g.,
        deuterium and graphite) in the shipment of fissile materials, and to limit the amount of
 
fissile exempt material which can be transported in a single consignment.
 
NRC staff has also contacted the Department of Transportation (DOT) on this issue, as
 
DOT regulations contain a parallel provision to 10 CFR 71.53 (i.e., 49 CFR 173.453).
 
NRC and DOT are coordinating the revisions to their respective regulations.
 
In practice, operating and administrative limits and procedures should prevent the
 
collection of fissile materials in amounts or geometries which could achieve criticality as a
 
result of any single change in the conditions necessary for criticality safety. Nevertheless, NRC notes that until the expedited regulatory revisions are made, good practice would be
 
for licensees to exercise caution in deciding whether to ship: (1) fissile materials with
 
materials known or expected to have moderating properties greater than water; or (2)
        single consignments of fissile exempt packages in excess of 290 grams of uranium-235 or
 
180 grams of other fissile radionuclides. As demonstrated by the licensee in this case, the
 
existing fissile material exemptions cannot be presumed, without independent analysis, to
 
preclude nuclear criticality in all cases.
 
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any
 
questions about the information in this notice, please contact the technical contact listed
 
below, or the appropriate NRC Regional Office.
 
William D. Travers, Director
 
Spent Fuel Project Office
 
Office of Nuclear Material Safety
 
and Safeguards
 
Attachments:
        1.      List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices
 
2.      List of Recently Issued NRR Information Notices
 
Contact:            Earl P. Easton, NMSS
 
(301) 415-8527 S:IPROJIRXLFIZ.IN                                  See Previous Concurrence.
 
OFC      lSFPO          l    -    SFPO l          f-0    e-O    NRR/OECB l          OGC l          TEDITOR I
 
NAME        RLeg  -sAG                EEas            aman          b      affee      WReamer          EKraus
 
lATVS
 
LO#% IV.
 
I  J.JIIAIgU
 
I(V
 
-    ITO'I- l  &.10
                                              &  I I 0 la;:      I
 
1J1_IUa 1lIdav    IIU I ,
                                                                                            Iva %
                                                                                                  -  II    I
 
I I/on
 
Ef %I
 
OFC        DWM        I          IMOB        l    SFPO        I        SFP
 
NAME        RJohnson              KRamsey          CJHaughney          WDTravers
 
DATE        I/ /96                    /  /96          / /96                I /96                                    l
 
C = COVER                                  E = COVER & ENCLOSURE                          N = NO COPY
 
2
 
IN 96-##
                                                                        /H        October ##, 1996 shipped in a single consignment, and do not require that a transport index (see §71.4) be
 
assigned to packages for criticality control. Further, the fissile material exemptions and
 
general license provisions allow any licensee to make shipments without first seeking NRC
 
approval.
 
A fairly realistic computer model of the enriched uranium-beryllium oxide waste packages, as loaded for shipment into a sea-land container, and at 0.5 grams per liter, could not be
 
demonstrated to provide adequate nuclear criticality safety. Because the current
 
regulations would allow the possibility of criticality in fissile exempt shipments, and since
 
there is no assurance that such shipments will not occur, NRC intends to revise
 
10 CFR Part 71, to address exclusion of beryllium and other special moderating material
 
(e.g., deuterium and graphite) in the shipment of fissile materials, and to limit the amount
 
of fissile exempt material which can be transported in a single consignment.
 
NRC staff has contacted the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the DOT on this issue.
 
DOE is a shipper of fissile material, which could include the special moderating materials in
 
question. NRC and DOT are coordinating the revisions to their respective regulations.
 
NRC notes very few licensees are involved in the shipment of fissile materials with
 
beryllium, graphite, or deuterium. However, for those licensees that are involved in such
 
shipments, it is important that programs be assessed to ensure that adequate criticality
 
safety is provided where fissile materials are transported with materials known or expected
 
to have moderating properties greater than water. As demonstrated by the licensee in this
 
case, the existing fissile material exemptions cannot be presumed, without independent
 
analysis, to preclude nuclear criticality in all cases.
 
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any
 
questions about the information in this notice, please contact the individual listed below, or
 
the appropriate NRC Regional Office.
 
Charles J. Haughney, Acting Director
 
Spent Fuel Project Office
 
Office of Nuclear Material Safety
 
and Safeguards
 
Attachments:
      1.      List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices
 
2.      List of Recently Issued NRR Information Notices
 
Contact:        Earl P. Easton, NMSS


===Attachments:===
(301) 415-8520
1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information Noticeso k')~ Gu A 7- Attachment IIN 96-63December 5, 1996Page 1 of ILIST OF RECENTLY ISSUEDNMSS INFORMATION NOTICESInformationNotice No.Date ofIssuanceSubjectIssued to96-5796-5496-53Incident-Reporting Require-ments Involving Intakes,During a 24-Hour Periodthat May Cause a TotalEffective Dose Equivalentin Excess of 0.05 Sv (5 rem)Vulnerability of StainlessSteel to Corrosion WhenSensitizedRetrofit to Amersham 660Posilock RadiographyCamera to Correct Incon-sistency in 10 CFR Part 34CompatibilityCracked Insertion Rodson Troxler Model 3400Series Portable MoistureDensity GaugesResidual ContaminationRemaining in Krypton-85Handling System AfterVentingRecordkeeping, Decommis-sioning Notifications forDisposals of RadioactiveWaste by Land BurialAuthorized Under Former10 CFR 20.304, 20.302,and Current 20.200210/30/9610117/9610/15/9609/26/9609/11/9608/19196All U.S. Nuclear RegulatoryCommission licenseesAll material licenseesAll industrial radiographylicenseesAll U.S. Nuclear RegulatoryCommission portable gaugelicensees and vendorsAll material licenseesAll U.S. Nuclear RegulatoryCommission licensees96-5296-5196-47 v>Attachment 2IN 96-63December 5, 1996 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUEDNRC INFORMATION NOTICESInformation Date ofNotice No. Subject Issuance Issued to96-6296-6196-6096-5996-58Potential Failure of theInstantaneous Trip Functionof General Electric RMS-9ProgrammersFailure of a Main Steam SafetyValve to Reseat Caused by anImproperly Installed ReleaseNutPotential Common-Mode Post-Accident Failure of ResidualHeat Removal Heat ExchangersPotential Degradation ofPost Loss-of-CoolantRecirculation Capabilityas a Result of DebrisRCP Seal Replacement withPump on BackseatIncident-Reporting Require-ments Involving Intakes,During a 24-Hour PeriodThat May Cause a TotalEffective Dose Equivalentin Excess of 0.05 Sv(5 rems)11/20/9611/20/9611/14/9610/30/9610/30/9610/29/96All holders of OLsand CPs for nuclearpower plantsAll holders of OLs orCPs for nuclear powerreactorsAll holders of OLs orCPs for nuclear powerreactorsAll holders of OLs orCPs for nuclear powerreactorsAll holders of OLs orCPs for pressurized-waterreactorsAll U.S. NuclearRegulatory Commissionlicensees96-57OL = Operating LicenseCP = Construction Permit K>IN 96-63v2 December 5, 1996 This information notice requires no specific action nor written response. If you have anyquestions about the information in this notice, please contact the individual listed below, or theappropriate NRC regional office.ChaSes J. HaugfeyCharles J. Haughney, Acting DirectorSpent Fuel Project OfficeOffice of Nuclear Material Safetyand SafeguardsTechnical contact:Earl P. Easton, NMSS(301) 415-8520e-mail: exeenrc.gov
                      e-mail: exe@nrc.gov


===Attachments:===
S:IPROJIRXLIFIZ.IN                           *See Previous Concurrence.                   OPP3 OFC       SFPO*       Ic    SFPO*   lc  SFPO* I c       NRR/OECB*     I c   OG              TE TOR I
1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information Notices96-63.IN*See Previous Concurrence.OFC SFPO* I c SFPO* l c SFPO* I c NRR/OECB* I c OGC* lc TEditor INAME RLewis:LMG EEaston SShankman AEChaffee ENJenson EKraus*DATE10/10/9610/10/9610/10/9610/10/9611/25/9611/25/96OFC lIMOB l I SFP t I I l- INAME KRamsey CJH_ neyDATE 1/27/96 W215196 Ia; v4 i _ _C_ CO E E CO E N L S R O CC =COVERE = COVER & ENCLOSUREN = NE) CQPT IN 96-##KJ i2 October ##, 1996 present in fissile exempt packages, nor the number of fissile exempt packages that can beshipped in a single consignment, and do not require that a transport index (see 10CFR 71.4) be assigned to packages for criticality control. Further, the fissile materialexemptions and general license provisions allow any licensee to make shipments withoutfirst seeking NRC approval.A fairly realistic computer model of the enriched uranium-beryllium oxide waste packages,as loaded for shipment into a sea-land container, and at 0.5 grams per liter, could not bedemonstrated to provide adequate nuclear criticality safety. Because the currentregulations would allow the possibility of criticality in fissile exempt shipments, and sincethere is no assurance that such shipments will not occur, NRC intends to revise 10CFR Part 71 to address exclusion of beryllium and other special moderating material (e.g.,deuterium and graphite) in the shipment of fissile materials, and to limit the amount offissile exempt material that can be transported in a single consignment.NRC has contacted the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the DOT on this issue. DOEis a shipper of fissile material, which could include the special moderating materials inquestion. NRC and DOT are coordinating the revisions to their respective regulations.NRC notes that very few licensees are involved in the shipment of fissile materials-withberyllium, graphite, or deuterium. However, for those licensees that are involved in suchshipments, it is important that programs be assessed to ensure that adequate criticalitysafety is provided where fissile materials are transported with materials known or expectedto have moderating properties greater than water. As demonstrated by the licensee in thiscase, the existing fissile material exemptions cannot be presumed, without independentanalysis, to preclude nuclear criticality in all cases.This information notice requires no specific action nor written response. If you have anyquestions about the information in this notice, please contact the individual listed below, orthe appropriate NRC regional office.Charles J. Haughney, Acting DirectorSpent Fuel Project OfficeOffice of Nuclear Material Safetyand Safeguards


===Attachments:===
NAME    RLewis:LMG            EEaston  SShankman          AEChaffee        _____enson            EKraus
1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information NoticesContact: Earl P. Easton, NMSS(301) 415-8520e-mail: exe@nrc.govS:WPROJRXL1FIZ.IN See Previous Concurrence.OFC SFPON* c SFPO l c SFPO


* c NRR/OECBh* I c OGCN lc TEditor INAME RLewis:LMG EEaston SShankman AEChaffee ENJenson EKraus *DATE I 10/10/96 I 10/10/96 I 10/10/96 I 10/10/96 1 11/25/96 1 11/25/96I--OFC IMOB I SFP lL,/ I l _NAME KRamseyeK CJHa_ _ _DATE 1I9 196 12- ?79 _6 _,,___. __ _ ________C -COVERE = COVER & LNULUbUKItN = Nu iurO
DATE   I     /196                / /96     1  1/96             I/196        1     196          I   /196


>-considerations and shipping experience indicate that the criticality of fissile exemptpackages is not an immediate threat to worker and public health and safety, the possibilityof criticality in fissile exempt shipments has prompted NRC to revise 10 CFR Part 71, toaddress the possible inclusion of beryllium and other special moderating material (e.g.,deuterium and graphite) in the shipment of fissile materials, and to limit the amount offissile exempt material which can be transported in a single consignment.NRC staff has also contacted the Department of Transportation (DOT) on this issue, asDOT regulations contain a parallel provision to 10 CFR 71.53 (i.e., 49 CFR 173.453).NRC and DOT are coordinating the revisions to their respective regulations.In practice, operating and administrative limits and procedures should prevent thecollection of fissile materials in amounts or geometries which could achieve criticality as aresult of any single change in the conditions necessary for criticality safety. Nevertheless,NRC notes that until the expedited regulatory revisions are made, good practice would befor licensees to exercise caution in deciding whether to ship: (1) fissile materials withmaterials known or expected to have moderating properties greater than water; or (2)single consignments of fissile exempt packages in excess of 290 grams of uranium-235 or180 grams of other fissile radionuclides. As demonstrated by the licensee in this case, theexisting fissile material exemptions cannot be presumed, without independent analysis, topreclude nuclear criticality in all cases.This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have anyquestions about the information in this notice, please contact the technical contact listedbelow, or the appropriate NRC Regional Office.William D. Travers, DirectorSpent Fuel Project OfficeOffice of Nuclear Material Safetyand Safeguards
===OFC      DWM        I      IMOB      l        I===
                                              FlO        Sl      FPO        I                  jI


===Attachments:===
NAME    RJohnson           KRamsey         CJHaughney       WDTravers
1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information NoticesContact: Earl P. Easton, NMSS(301) 415-8527S:IPROJIRXLFIZ.IN See Previous Concurrence.OFC lSFPO l -SFPO l f-0 e-O NRR/OECB l OGC l TEDITOR INAME RLeg -sAG EEas aman b affee WReamer EKrauslATVS I J.JIIAIg -I -&.10 & I 0 I la;: I a lIda I I , -I I /onLO#% IV. I(V U l TO'I 1J1_IU 1 v IU Iva % I I I Ef %IOFC DWM I IMOB l SFPO I SFPNAME RJohnson KRamsey CJHaughney WDTraversDATE I/ /96 / /96 / /96 I /96 lC = COVER E = COVER & ENCLOSURE N = NO COPY2 IN 96-##/ H October ##, 1996 shipped in a single consignment, and do not require that a transport index (see §71.4) beassigned to packages for criticality control. Further, the fissile material exemptions andgeneral license provisions allow any licensee to make shipments without first seeking NRCapproval.A fairly realistic computer model of the enriched uranium-beryllium oxide waste packages,as loaded for shipment into a sea-land container, and at 0.5 grams per liter, could not bedemonstrated to provide adequate nuclear criticality safety. Because the currentregulations would allow the possibility of criticality in fissile exempt shipments, and sincethere is no assurance that such shipments will not occur, NRC intends to revise10 CFR Part 71, to address exclusion of beryllium and other special moderating material(e.g., deuterium and graphite) in the shipment of fissile materials, and to limit the amountof fissile exempt material which can be transported in a single consignment.NRC staff has contacted the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the DOT on this issue.DOE is a shipper of fissile material, which could include the special moderating materials inquestion. NRC and DOT are coordinating the revisions to their respective regulations.NRC notes very few licensees are involved in the shipment of fissile materials withberyllium, graphite, or deuterium. However, for those licensees that are involved in suchshipments, it is important that programs be assessed to ensure that adequate criticalitysafety is provided where fissile materials are transported with materials known or expectedto have moderating properties greater than water. As demonstrated by the licensee in thiscase, the existing fissile material exemptions cannot be presumed, without independentanalysis, to preclude nuclear criticality in all cases.This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have anyquestions about the information in this notice, please contact the individual listed below, orthe appropriate NRC Regional Office.Charles J. Haughney, Acting DirectorSpent Fuel Project OfficeOffice of Nuclear Material Safetyand Safeguards


===Attachments:===
DATE I/       /96             I /96       1   /196             / /96       J                 . I..       ==_
1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information NoticesContact: Earl P. Easton, NMSS(301) 415-8520e-mail: exe@nrc.govS:IPROJIRXLIFIZ.IN *See Previous Concurrence. OPP3OFC SFPO* I c SFPO* lc SFPO* I c NRR/OECB* I c OG TE TOR INAME RLewis:LMG EEaston SShankman AEChaffee _____enson EKrausDATE I /196 / /96 1 1/96 I /196 1 196 I /196OFC DWM I IMOB l FlO I Sl FPO I jINAME RJohnson KRamsey CJHaughney WDTraversDATE I/ /96 I /96 1 /196 / /96 J .I.. ==_C = COVERE = COVER & ENCLOSUREN = NU COPlY}}
    C = COVER                            E = COVER & ENCLOSURE                            N = NU COPlY}}


{{Information notice-Nav}}
{{Information notice-Nav}}

Latest revision as of 04:40, 24 November 2019

Potential Safety Issue Regarding the Shipment of Fissile Material
ML031050508
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant  Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 12/06/1996
From: Haughney C
NRC/NMSS/SFPO
To:
References
IN-96-063, NUDOCS 9612040215
Download: ML031050508 (9)


K) JIM MCKNIGHT

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS

WASHINGTON, DC 20555 December 5, 1996 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 96-63: POTENTIAL SAFETY ISSUE REGARDING THE

SHIPMENT OF FISSILE MATERIAL

Addressees

All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensees authorized to possess special nuclear

material in unsealed quantities greater than a critical mass.

Purpose

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice to alert

addressees to an issue with potential safety significance regarding shipments using the fissile

material exemption provisions and general licenses. It is expected that recipients will review this

information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar

problems. However, suggestions contained in this information notice are not NRC requirements;

therefore, no specific action nor written response is required.

Description of Circumstances

An NRC licensee recently informed NRC of a potential situation where one of the fissile material

exemptions in 10 CFR 71.53 would not have provided adequate criticality safety if large amounts

of an exempt concentration of fissile material were to be transported in the presence of a special

moderating material (i.e., beryllium). A recent contract was awarded to the licensee to process

weapons-usable enriched uranium materials. The waste product, a uranium-beryllium filtercake, met the fissile exemption provisions in 10 CFR 71.53 and 49 CFR 173.453. The presence of

beryllium in significant quantities in NRC-regulated fissile exempt shipments is extraordinary, and

was not considered in the development of the fissile exemptions in the regulations. NRC has

reviewed and verified the licensee's calculations, and has concluded that the current regulations

need to be revised to preclude criticality in fissile exempt shipments made under 10 CFR 71.53, and fissile shipments made underthe general licenses in 10 CFR 71.18 and 10 CFR 71.22. This

information notice is being issued to provide additional, timely notice, to licensees, of this

potential safety issue, while the regulatory revisions are made.

Discussion

The licensee proposed to employ the provision in 10 CFR 71.53(d), or the parallel provision in the

U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations, 49 CFR 173.453(d).

J//1

961204021 on jl4Pqt

PDR ETE OO~tc 99

IN 96-63 December 5, 1996 Section 71.53(d) exempts fissile material from the requirements in 10 CFR 71.55 and 71.59 (i.e.,

the additional requirements placed on fissile packages and shipments to preclude criticality),

provided the package does not contain more than 5 grams (0.18 ounces) of fissile material in

any 10-liter (610-cubic-inch) volume. The fissile exemptions appearing in 10 CFR 71.53 are

assumed to provide inherent criticality control for all practical cases in which fissile materials

exist at or below the applicable regulatory limits (i.e., independent calculations would generally

not be expected nor required). Consequently, the fissile exemptions generally do not place limits

on the types of moderating or reflecting material present in fissile exempt packages, nor the

number of fissile exempt packages that can be shipped in a single consignment, and do not

require that a transport index (see 10 CFR 71.4) be assigned to packages for criticality control.

Further, the fissile material exemptions and general license provisions allow any licensee to

make shipments without first seeking NRC approval.

A fairly realistic computer model of the enriched uranium-beryllium oxide waste packages, as

loaded for shipment into a sea-land container, and at 0.5 grams per liter, could not be

demonstrated to provide adequate nuclear criticality safety. Because the current regulations

would allow the possibility of criticality in fissile exempt shipments, and since there is no

assurance that such shipments will not occur, NRC intends to revise 10 CFR Part 71 to address

exclusion of beryllium and other special moderating material (e.g., deuterium and graphite) in the

shipment of fissile materials, and to limit the amount of fissile exempt material that can be

transported in a single consignment.

NRC has contacted the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the DOT on this issue. DOE is a

shipper of fissile material, which could include the special moderating materials in question.

NRC and DOT are coordinating the revisions to their respective regulations.

NRC notes that very few licensees are involved in the shipment of fissile materials with beryllium, graphite, or deuterium. However, for those licensees that are involved in such shipments, it is

important that programs be assessed to ensure that adequate criticality safety is provided where

fissile materials are transported with materials known or expected to have moderating properties

greater than water. As demonstrated by the licensee in this case, the existing fissile material

exemptions cannot be presumed, without independent analysis, to preclude nuclear criticality in

all cases.

I) :K,)

IN 96-63 December 5, 1996 This information notice requires no specific action nor written response. If you have any

questions about the information in this notice, please contact the individual listed below, or the

appropriate NRC regional office.

Charles J. Haighney, Actirt Dire

Spent Fuel Project Office

Office of Nuclear Material Safety

and Safeguards

Technical contact: Earl P. Easton, NMSS

(301) 415-8520

e-mail: exe@nrc.gov

Attachments:

1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices

2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information Notices

o k')~ Gu A 7-

Attachment I

IN 96-63 December 5, 1996 Page 1 of I

LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

NMSS INFORMATION NOTICES

Info

rmation Date of

Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to

96-57 Incident-Reporting Require- 10/30/96 All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

ments Involving Intakes, Commission licensees

During a 24-Hour Period

that May Cause a Total

Effective Dose Equivalent

in Excess of 0.05 Sv (5 rem)

96-54 Vulnerability of Stainless 10117/96 All material licensees

Steel to Corrosion When

Sensitized

96-53 Retrofit to Amersham 660 10/15/96 All industrial radiography

Posilock Radiography licensees

Camera to Correct Incon- sistency in 10 CFR Part 34 Compatibility

96-52 Cracked Insertion Rods 09/26/96 All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

on Troxler Model 3400 Commission portable gauge

Series Portable Moisture licensees and vendors

Density Gauges

96-51 Residual Contamination 09/11/96 All material licensees

Remaining in Krypton-85 Handling System After

Venting

96-47 Recordkeeping, Decommis- 08/19196 All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

sioning Notifications for Commission licensees

Disposals of Radioactive

Waste by Land Burial

Authorized Under Former

10 CFR 20.304, 20.302, and Current 20.2002

v>

Attachment 2 IN 96-63 December 5, 1996 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

NRC INFORMATION NOTICES

Information Date of

Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to

96-62 Potential Failure of the 11/20/96 All holders of OLs

Instantaneous Trip Function and CPs for nuclear

of General Electric RMS-9 power plants

Programmers

96-61 Failure of a Main Steam Safety 11/20/96 All holders of OLs or

Valve to Reseat Caused by an CPs for nuclear power

Improperly Installed Release reactors

Nut

96-60 Potential Common-Mode Post- 11/14/96 All holders of OLs or

Accident Failure of Residual CPs for nuclear power

Heat Removal Heat Exchangers reactors

96-59 Potential Degradation of 10/30/96 All holders of OLs or

Post Loss-of-Coolant CPs for nuclear power

Recirculation Capability reactors

as a Result of Debris

96-58 RCP Seal Replacement with 10/30/96 All holders of OLs or

Pump on Backseat CPs for pressurized-water

reactors

96-57 Incident-Reporting Require- 10/29/96 All U.S. Nuclear

ments Involving Intakes, Regulatory Commission

During a 24-Hour Period licensees

That May Cause a Total

Effective Dose Equivalent

in Excess of 0.05 Sv

(5 rems)

OL = Operating License

CP = Construction Permit

IN 96-63 K> v2 December 5, 1996 This information notice requires no specific action nor written response. If you have any

questions about the information in this notice, please contact the individual listed below, or the

appropriate NRC regional office.

ChaSes J.Haugfey

Charles J. Haughney, Acting Director

Spent Fuel Project Office

Office of Nuclear Material Safety

and Safeguards

Technical contact: Earl P. Easton, NMSS

(301) 415-8520

e-mail: exeenrc.gov

Attachments:

1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices

2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information Notices

96-63.IN *See Previous Concurrence.

OFC SFPO* Ic SFPO* l c SFPO* I c NRR/OECB* I c OGC* lc TEditor I

NAME RLewis:LMG EEaston SShankman AEChaffee ENJenson EKraus*

DATE 10/10/96 10/10/96 10/10/96 10/10/96 11/25/96 11/25/96 OFC lIMOB lI SFP t I l- I I

NAME KRamsey CJH_ ney

DATE 1/27/96 W215196 Ia;v4 i _ _

N L S R

CO E & ENCLOSURE OC

C_ CO

C =COVER E EE= COVER N = NE) CQPT

IN 96-##

KJ i2 October ##, 1996 present in fissile exempt packages, nor the number of fissile exempt packages that can be

shipped in a single consignment, and do not require that a transport index (see 10

CFR 71.4) be assigned to packages for criticality control. Further, the fissile material

exemptions and general license provisions allow any licensee to make shipments without

first seeking NRC approval.

A fairly realistic computer model of the enriched uranium-beryllium oxide waste packages, as loaded for shipment into a sea-land container, and at 0.5 grams per liter, could not be

demonstrated to provide adequate nuclear criticality safety. Because the current

regulations would allow the possibility of criticality in fissile exempt shipments, and since

there is no assurance that such shipments will not occur, NRC intends to revise 10

CFR Part 71 to address exclusion of beryllium and other special moderating material (e.g.,

deuterium and graphite) in the shipment of fissile materials, and to limit the amount of

fissile exempt material that can be transported in a single consignment.

NRC has contacted the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the DOT on this issue. DOE

is a shipper of fissile material, which could include the special moderating materials in

question. NRC and DOT are coordinating the revisions to their respective regulations.

NRC notes that very few licensees are involved in the shipment of fissile materials-with

beryllium, graphite, or deuterium. However, for those licensees that are involved in such

shipments, it is important that programs be assessed to ensure that adequate criticality

safety is provided where fissile materials are transported with materials known or expected

to have moderating properties greater than water. As demonstrated by the licensee in this

case, the existing fissile material exemptions cannot be presumed, without independent

analysis, to preclude nuclear criticality in all cases.

This information notice requires no specific action nor written response. If you have any

questions about the information in this notice, please contact the individual listed below, or

the appropriate NRC regional office.

Charles J. Haughney, Acting Director

Spent Fuel Project Office

Office of Nuclear Material Safety

and Safeguards

Attachments:

1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices

2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information Notices

Contact: Earl P. Easton, NMSS

(301) 415-8520

e-mail: exe@nrc.gov

S:WPROJRXL1FIZ.IN See Previous Concurrence.

OFC SFPON* c SFPO l c SFPO * c NRR/OECBh* I c OGCN lc TEditor I

NAME RLewis:LMG EEaston SShankman AEChaffee ENJenson EKraus *

DATE I 10/10/96 I 10/10/96 I--

I 10/10/96 I 10/10/96 1 11/25/96 1 11/25/96 OFC IMOB I SFP I l _ lL,/

NAME KRamseyeK CJHa_ _ _

DATE 1I9 196 12- ?79 _6 _,,___. __ _ ________

C - COVER E = COVER & LNULUbUKIt N = Nu iurO

>-

considerations and shipping experience indicate that the criticality of fissile exempt

packages is not an immediate threat to worker and public health and safety, the possibility

of criticality in fissile exempt shipments has prompted NRC to revise 10 CFR Part 71, to

address the possible inclusion of beryllium and other special moderating material (e.g.,

deuterium and graphite) in the shipment of fissile materials, and to limit the amount of

fissile exempt material which can be transported in a single consignment.

NRC staff has also contacted the Department of Transportation (DOT) on this issue, as

DOT regulations contain a parallel provision to 10 CFR 71.53 (i.e., 49 CFR 173.453).

NRC and DOT are coordinating the revisions to their respective regulations.

In practice, operating and administrative limits and procedures should prevent the

collection of fissile materials in amounts or geometries which could achieve criticality as a

result of any single change in the conditions necessary for criticality safety. Nevertheless, NRC notes that until the expedited regulatory revisions are made, good practice would be

for licensees to exercise caution in deciding whether to ship: (1) fissile materials with

materials known or expected to have moderating properties greater than water; or (2)

single consignments of fissile exempt packages in excess of 290 grams of uranium-235 or

180 grams of other fissile radionuclides. As demonstrated by the licensee in this case, the

existing fissile material exemptions cannot be presumed, without independent analysis, to

preclude nuclear criticality in all cases.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any

questions about the information in this notice, please contact the technical contact listed

below, or the appropriate NRC Regional Office.

William D. Travers, Director

Spent Fuel Project Office

Office of Nuclear Material Safety

and Safeguards

Attachments:

1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices

2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information Notices

Contact: Earl P. Easton, NMSS

(301) 415-8527 S:IPROJIRXLFIZ.IN See Previous Concurrence.

OFC lSFPO l - SFPO l f-0 e-O NRR/OECB l OGC l TEDITOR I

NAME RLeg -sAG EEas aman b affee WReamer EKraus

lATVS

LO#% IV.

I J.JIIAIgU

I(V

- ITO'I- l &.10

& I I 0 la;: I

1J1_IUa 1lIdav IIU I ,

Iva %

- II I

I I/on

Ef %I

OFC DWM I IMOB l SFPO I SFP

NAME RJohnson KRamsey CJHaughney WDTravers

DATE I/ /96 / /96 / /96 I /96 l

C = COVER E = COVER & ENCLOSURE N = NO COPY

2

IN 96-##

/H October ##, 1996 shipped in a single consignment, and do not require that a transport index (see §71.4) be

assigned to packages for criticality control. Further, the fissile material exemptions and

general license provisions allow any licensee to make shipments without first seeking NRC

approval.

A fairly realistic computer model of the enriched uranium-beryllium oxide waste packages, as loaded for shipment into a sea-land container, and at 0.5 grams per liter, could not be

demonstrated to provide adequate nuclear criticality safety. Because the current

regulations would allow the possibility of criticality in fissile exempt shipments, and since

there is no assurance that such shipments will not occur, NRC intends to revise

10 CFR Part 71, to address exclusion of beryllium and other special moderating material

(e.g., deuterium and graphite) in the shipment of fissile materials, and to limit the amount

of fissile exempt material which can be transported in a single consignment.

NRC staff has contacted the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the DOT on this issue.

DOE is a shipper of fissile material, which could include the special moderating materials in

question. NRC and DOT are coordinating the revisions to their respective regulations.

NRC notes very few licensees are involved in the shipment of fissile materials with

beryllium, graphite, or deuterium. However, for those licensees that are involved in such

shipments, it is important that programs be assessed to ensure that adequate criticality

safety is provided where fissile materials are transported with materials known or expected

to have moderating properties greater than water. As demonstrated by the licensee in this

case, the existing fissile material exemptions cannot be presumed, without independent

analysis, to preclude nuclear criticality in all cases.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any

questions about the information in this notice, please contact the individual listed below, or

the appropriate NRC Regional Office.

Charles J. Haughney, Acting Director

Spent Fuel Project Office

Office of Nuclear Material Safety

and Safeguards

Attachments:

1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices

2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information Notices

Contact: Earl P. Easton, NMSS

(301) 415-8520

e-mail: exe@nrc.gov

S:IPROJIRXLIFIZ.IN *See Previous Concurrence. OPP3 OFC SFPO* Ic SFPO* lc SFPO* I c NRR/OECB* I c OG TE TOR I

NAME RLewis:LMG EEaston SShankman AEChaffee _____enson EKraus

DATE I /196 / /96 1 1/96 I/196 1 196 I /196

OFC DWM I IMOB l I

FlO Sl FPO I jI

NAME RJohnson KRamsey CJHaughney WDTravers

DATE I/ /96 I /96 1 /196 / /96 J . I.. ==_

C = COVER E = COVER & ENCLOSURE N = NU COPlY